




Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushan.

A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC

(ANCIENT, MEDIÆVAL AND
MODERN SCHOOLS.)

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न्यायशास्त्रस्य इतिहासः ।



महामहोपाध्याय-विद्याभूषण-शास्त्रसुधाकर-सिद्धान्तमहोदधि-
त्रिपिटकवागीश्वर --- एम,ए,— पि,एदच,डि,—
.एम,आर,ए,एस,— एफ,ए,एस्,वि,
इत्युपाधिधारिणा

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र आचार्य्येण सम्पादितः ।



कलिकाता विश्वविद्यालयद्वारा प्रकाशितः ।



कलिकाता राजधान्यां
व्याप्टिष्ट-मिशन-यन्त्रे मुद्रितः ।

शकाब्दा १८४२ ।

TO
THE HON'BLE SIR ASUTOSH MOOKHERJEE, Kt.,
C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., PH.D., F.R.A.S., F.R.S.E.,
*Sarasvatī, Śāstra-Vachaspathi, Sambuddhagama-Chakravartī, Offg. Chief
Justice, High Court of Judicature, Fort William, Calcutta,*
THE FOREMOST EDUCATIONIST OF HIS COUNTRY,
WHO HAS, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, SUCCESSFULLY
GUIDED THE POLICY OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN BENGAL,
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
AS A TOKEN OF PROFOUND ESTEEM
BY
HIS HUMBLE ADMIRER,
THE AUTHOR.

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।

आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शश्वदान्वीक्षिकीमता ॥

(KAUTILYA.)

“Ānvīkṣikī (Logic) has ever been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues.”

न्यायाम्बुधिर्दौघितिकारयुक्तिकल्लोलकोलाहलदुर्विगाहः ।

तस्यापि पातुं न पयः समर्थः किं नाम घौमत्यतिभाम्बुवाहः ॥

“Modern Logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of the commentators. Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk ? Why not ? Intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink its water pure and sweet.”

PREFACE

It pleased His Excellency the Earl of Ronaldshay, G.C.I.E., the Governor of Bengal, to utter these memorable words while presiding at the Convocation of the Calcutta University in the year 1918 :—“ That an Indian student should pass through a course of philosophy at an Indian University without ever hearing mention of, shall I say, Śāṅkara, the thinker who, perhaps, has carried idealism further than any other thinker of any other age or country, or of the subtleties of the Nyāya system which has been handed down through immemorial ages, and is to-day the pride and glory of the *toles* of Navadvīpa, does, indeed, appear to me to be a profound anomaly.”

Words like these coming from one who is himself a keen and ardent student of Indian Philosophy and a scrupulous and sympathetic ruler, came upon me, who have the good fortune to belong to Navadvīpa, “ with double sway ” and supplied the inspiration which sustained me in this my humble attempt to present a history of Indian Logic or Nyāya Darśana before the English-knowing public.

It was my revered preceptors Mahāmāhopadhyaya Mohesh Chandra Nyāyaratna, C.I.E., Principal, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and Mahāmāhopadhyaya Jadunath Sārvabhauma of Navadvīpa, who (the first by his lecture on *Bhāṣāparicheda* and *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, and the second by his lectures on *Kusumāñjalī* and *Ātma-tattva-viveka*) first awakened in me an interest in the study of Indian Logic. That was about the year 1892. Subsequently I read Modern Logic, viz. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* under Pandit Bāmācharan Nyāyāchārya and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Dīdhiti* under Pandit Jībanāth Mīśra, both of Benares College.

I searched out and studied most of the books and manuscripts on the subject of Hindu Logic to be found in the Sanskrit College Library and the Asiatic Society of Bengal and occasionally consulted works supplied by the Deccan College, Poona, and Benares Sanskrit College. I thus put myself in the way of acquiring some acquaintance with Indian Logic and from time to time published several books and articles on Nyāya.

With regard to Jaina Logic, I derived valuable help from my teacher, Śāstra-viśārada Jainācārya Vijayadharma Sūri, Pandit Indravijaya Upādhyāya and occasionally from Pandit Haragovind Seth Nyāyatīrtha. I gathered Jaina books from various Jaina Societies and Publishing Houses such as those at Benares,

Azimganj, Arrah, Bhavnagar, etc. I also used a large number of Jaina manuscripts, of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Deccan College, Poona, etc., besides those in the possession of the aforesaid Venerable Vijayadharma Sūri.

As regards Buddhistic Logic, I could not get much help from Pali sources, because neither in the Buddhistic Scriptures introduced into Ceylon in 254 B.C. by Mahendra, son of Aśoka, nor in the Buddhistic books recorded in writing in 88 B.C. by Vatta-gāmini, is there any trace of a systematic culture of Nyāya. Even during my visit to Ceylon in 1909 (Appendix K), I did not come across in that island any evidence of Nyāya-study. On this subject I have derived materials to some extent from Chinese, but mostly from Tibetan sources. Professor Kinura occasionally helped me in dealing with Chinese materials. Concerning the Tibetan sources almost all the materials were derived from *Bstan-hgyur* some volumes whereof were lent to me by the India office through the courtesy of Dr. F. W. Thomas. Through the kindness of Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, I was enabled to retain temporarily for my use some other volumes of *Bstan-hgyur* brought down from Gyantse during the Tibet Mission of 1904. To secure further materials bearing on the subject of Buddhistic Logic I visited Labrang and Pamyangchi monasteries in June 1907 and October 1908, respectively (Appendices I and J), and came across a world of facts for observation and comment. Since the opening of increased intercourse between India and Tibet consequent upon the Tashi Lama's visit to India in 1905 (of which an account is given in Appendix H), batches of Tibetan traders have been pouring into India and from them four copies of *Bstan-hgyur* have been obtained since 1911, of which one is with me, one in the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, one (a fragmentary copy) in the Sāhitya-Parishad Library, and one in the Calcutta University Library.

In regard to the chapters on modern Logic I occasionally consulted some scholars among whom Mahāmahopādhyāya Pramatha Nath Tarkabhūṣaṇa, Mahāmahopādhyāya Gurucharan Tarka-darśana-tirtha, Mahāmahopādhyāya Lakshman Śāstri, Mahāmahopādhyāya Vindhyeswari and Pandit Jāmini Nath Tarkavāgīśa may be gratefully mentioned.

My thanks are due to Hon'ble Mr. W. W. Hornell, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, who very kindly looked through the first batch of manuscripts and made many suggestions which have stood me in great stead in preparing the volume. I am also grateful to Rev. A. Johnstone, M.A., Principal, C.M.S. College, for having revised manuscripts as well as the proofs of the portion dealing with ancient Logic. Mr. F. J. Monahan, I.C.S., Commissioner, Presidency Division, looked through a few galleys and when

he left for England, the work of revision was very kindly undertaken by Dr. W. S. Urquhart, of the Scottish Churches College, to whom I offer my thanks. My special thanks are due to Dr. H. Stephen of the Calcutta University for the interest and thoroughness with which he examined all the proofs of the present volume.

The book however could not have seen the light nor assumed its present form were it not for help of various kinds received from that Macenas of letters—I mean the Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mukherji, Sarasvati, whose name is inseparably associated with every form of educational work in Bengal, who has spent the best years of his life in effecting various improvements in the status of the Calcutta University and who above anything else is the typical man of action—a great *Karmayogin*—unswerving in his aim and fixity of purpose, selfless in his devotion to work, pursuing it through life regardless of malediction or benediction, praise or blame.

CALCUTTA,
21st April, 1920.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

The late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣana had seen this book through up to p. 384. After his rather sudden death the work of seeing the remainder of the book through the press, was entirely left to me. I am, therefore, entirely responsible for any defects to be found in those pages. I have been helped, however, very materially by Dr. W. S. Urquhart and by Pandit Pasupati Nath Sāstri, M.A., to both of whom I have to express my thanks. The Index has been prepared by my old pupil Prof. Surendranath Bhaṭṭācārya, M.A., of the Behar National College and for the Tibetan Index I have to thank Mr. Johan Van Manen, Librarian, Imperial Library, Calcutta.

I am well aware of my unfitness to undertake such a task requiring years of patient study. But I was tempted to do so, among other reasons, on account of the feeling of esteem and regard which I always entertained for my late friend, and I look upon this slight service to his memory as going a little way towards repaying the many kindnesses he had always shown to me ever since I first knew him.

CALCUTTA,
December, 1920.

I. J. S. TARAPOREWALA.

INTRODUCTION.

My object in this volume is to write the history of what is called *Nyāya*, one of the six schools into which orthodox philosophy in India is divided. The word 'logic,' although it is in common parlance held synonymous with Indian *Nyāya*, is not exactly identical with it. Logic covers some of the subjects of *Nyāya* as well as *Vaiśeṣika* and is not co-extensive with either.

Indian Logic has been differently defined in different ages but the definition generally accepted is the science which ascertains valid knowledge either by means of the six senses or by means of the five members of the syllogism; in other words, perception and inference are the subject-matter of Logic.

In my anxiety to assign a proper place to Jaina and Buddhist Logic, which played no inconsiderable part in the development of the science of reasoning in India, I have made a departure from the time-honoured classification of Indian Logic into Ancient and Modern and have added an intermediate stage—thus dividing it into *three* periods. Ancient (650 B.C.—100 A.D.), Mediæval (up to 1200 A.D.) and Modern (from 900 A.D.). The standard texts for each of these periods were *Nyāya-Sūtra* by Akṣapāda, *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* by Dignāga and *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya respectively. The wide popularity of these works is evidenced by the large numbers of commentaries that have been written upon them, as mentioned below:—

THE ANCIENT SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

Text.

1. *Nyāya-sūtra* by Akṣapāda Gautama.

Commentaries.

2. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana.
3. *Nyāya-vārtika* by Udyotakara.
4. *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā* by Vācaspati Miśra.
5. *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā-parisuddhi* by Udayanācārya.
6. *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* by Vardhamāna.
7. *Nyāyālaṅkāra* by Śrīkaṇṭha.
8. *Nyāya-vṛtti* by Abhayatīlaka Upādhyāya.
9. *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra* by Vācaspati Miśra.
10. *Nyāya-rahasya* by Rāmabhadra.
11. *Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā* by Jayrāma.
12. *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti* by Viśvanātha Siddhāntapañcānana.
13. *Nyāya-saṃkṣepa* by Govinda Sannā.

THE MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

Text.

1. Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga.

Commentaries.

2. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti by Dignāga.
3. Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā by Dharmakīrti.
4. Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti by Dharmakīrti.
5. Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā by Devendrabodhi.
6. Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-ṭikā by Śākyabodhi.
7. Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti by Ravi Gupta.
8. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭikā (Viśālāmalavati-nāmā) by Jinendra-bodhi.
9. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra by Prajñākara Gupta.
10. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭikā by Jina.
11. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra by Yamāri.
12. Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭikā by Śaṅkarānanda.

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

Text.

1. Tattva-cintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa.

Commentaries.

2. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa by Vardhamana Upādhyāya.
3. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-āloka by Pakṣadhara Miśra.
4. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa by Rucidatta.
5. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha by Śaṅkara Miśra.
6. Anumāna-khaṇḍa-ṭikā by Vācaspati Miśra.
7. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa by Haridāsa Nyāyalāṅkāra.
8. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti by Raghunātha Sīromaṇi.
9. Maṇi-vyākhyā by Kaṇāda Tarkavāgiśa.
10. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-rahasya by Mathurānātha.
11. Tatva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti prasārinī by Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvaabhauma.
12. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra.
13. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgiśa.
14. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā by Harirāma Tarkavāgiśa.
15. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-gūḍhārtha-dīpikā by Raghudeva Nyāyā-laṅkāra.
16. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-vyākhyā by Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.

Sub-Commentaries.

17. Āloka-darpaṇa by Maheśa Thakkura.
18. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-āloka-parīśiṣṭa by Devanātha Thākura.
19. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-āloka-kaṇṭhakoddhāra by Mādhusūdana Thakkura.
20. Tattva-cintāmaṇi-āloka-rahasya by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa.

21. *Didhiti-rahasya* by Mathūranātha Tarkavāgiśa.
22. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī* by Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārva-
bhauma.
23. *Anumānāloka-prasāriṇī* on Pakṣadhara by Kṛṣṇadāsa.
24. *Sabdāloka-viveka* by Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgiśa.
25. *Didhiti-ṭikā* by Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma.
26. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā* by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra.
27. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-guḍhārtha-vidyotana* by Jayarāma
Nyāyapañcānana.
28. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā* by Bhavānanda Sid-
dhāntavāgiśa.
29. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-parīkṣā* by Rudra Nyāyavācaspati.
30. *Didhiti-ṭikā* by Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra.
31. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā* by Gadādhara.
32. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-ṭikā* by Rāmarudra Tarkavāgiśa.

Glosses.

33. *Tattva kālīsāṅkari-patrikā* by Kālīsāṅkara.
34. *Tattva-cāndri-patrikā* by Candra Nārāyaṇa.
35. *Tattva-raudri-patrikā* by Rudra Nārāyaṇa, etc.

Of all the nations of the world the Hindus and the Greeks appear to have developed systems of logic to a large extent independently of each other. Hindu Logic in its rudimentary stage can be traced as early as the 6th century before Christ. Greek Logic assumed a definite form in the fourth century B.C. though its germs can be traced a little earlier in the controversies of the Sophists and Socrates. But so far as the five-limbed syllogism of Hindu Logic is concerned the Hindu logician may have been indebted some way or other to the Greeks. While the syllogism was definitely formulated as a logical doctrine by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, *Prior Analytics* and *Posterior Analytics* in the 4th century B.C., the Hindu logician shows but a vague conception of it as late as the 1st century B.C. It is not inconceivable that the knowledge of Aristotle's logic found its way through Alexandria, Syria and other countries into Taxila (*vide* Appendix A). This is rightly corroborated by the Hindu tradition that Nārada who visited Alexandria (Śvetadvīpa) and became an expert in the handling of the five-limbed syllogism. So simple is syllogistic structure that it does not seem to require any theory of gradual development to explain its growth. And Aristotle might have conceived the idea of syllogistic form into which all reasoning could be put as a complete whole.

I am inclined, therefore, to think that the syllogism did not actually evolve in Indian Logic out of inference, and that the Hindu logician owed the idea of syllogism to the influence of Aristotle (*vide* Appendix B). To me it is one of the most important enquiries in the history of Indian Logic to ascertain at what stage the

doctrine of inference, which was an indigenous growth, was happily amalgamated with the borrowed art of syllogism into a common structure of logical thought. The Buddhist work *Kathāvatthu* furnishes several logical terms, e.g. *upanayana*, *nigamana*, etc., of syllogistic reasoning. But we find not a single instance where these terms have been methodically combined so as to form a syllogism proper. An attempt has been made to discuss the point at issue in the Appendix B. and I leave it to the reader to take my views for what they are worth.

Ancient logic was called *Ānvīkṣikī*, or the science of debate, but with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning it came to be called *Nyāya* from the 1st century A.D. The *Nyāya-Śāstra* in its earliest age flourished in Mithilā with Gotama but it attained its high development in Prabhāsa with Akṣapāda. The mediaeval logic from the 4th century A.D. was called *Pramāṇa Śāstra*, inasmuch as it dealt with *pramāṇa*, the means of valid knowledge, i.e. perception and inference. Ujjaini in Malwa and Valabhi in Gujarat were the scenes of activity of the Jaina logicians of the Śvetāmbara sect. The Digambaras flourished principally in Pāṭaliputra and Drāviḍa (including Karṇātā) about the 8th century A.D. Buddhist logicians flourished in universities such as Kāñcīpura, Nālanda (*vide* Appendix C), Odantapurī, Śrīdhānya-kāṭaka, Kāśmīra and Vikramaśilā (*vide* Appendix E). In Bengal Buddhist Logic attained its highest development during the reigns of the kings of the Pāl dynasty (*vide* Appendix D). Modern Logic commenced from the 10th century A.D. and was, in its first stage, called *Prakarana* or the Manual of Logic, but its real life began from the 13th century A.D., since when it has been called *Tarka-Śāstra* or the science of Dialectics. It flourished in the University of Mithilā (*vide* Appendix F) during 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, and afterwards that of Nadia (*vide* Appendix G) became its stronghold from the 16th century onwards.

CALCUTTA,
21st April, 1920.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSAN

FOREWORD.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushan came of a respectable Brahmana family of Faridpore. He was the third son of the well-known Pandit Pitambar Vidyāvāgīśa and was born on the 30th July, 1870, in the village of Khalkula in Faridpore. Satischandra was an infant four years old when he lost his father. The family was large and yet had no earning member ; and the eldest son Biswamber Jyotiṣārṇava who was then only sixteen maintained the family under circumstances of great difficulty.

Satischandra first went to the village school at the early age of five and rapidly made his mark amongst his fellow students. He stood first in the Minor Vernacular Examination from his Division and secured a scholarship which enabled him to proceed to Navadvip and take admission into the Hindu School. He passed the Entrance Examination of the Calcutta University in 1888, and obtained a scholarship which helped him to come to Calcutta and take his admission into the City College. In due course he passed the F.A. Examination and then migrated to the Krishnagar College. He took his B.A. degree with Honours in Sanskrit in 1892, and in the following year passed the M.A. Examination in Sanskrit from the Calcutta Sanskrit College. Meanwhile he had distinguished himself at the Sanskrit Examination held by the Vidagdha Jananī Sabhā of Navadvip and had obtained the title of *Vidyābhūṣaṇa*. It may be mentioned here that while still an undergraduate student in the City College he had married in 1889 the youngest daughter of Babu Gangadhar Acharyya, the first Principal of the Midnapore College.

In 1893, shortly after Satischandra had passed the M.A. Examination in Sanskrit, he settled at Krishnagar as Professor of Sanskrit in the local college. Here he had special opportunity to study Sanskrit Kāvya from Mahāmahopādhyāya Ajitnath Nyāyaratna and Sanskrit Nyāya from Mahāmahopādhyāya Jadunath Sārvabhauma, each the recognised authority on his special subject. Some years later his services were lent by the Government of Bengal to the Buddhist Text Society under whose auspices he edited a number of useful Pali Texts and published several original papers which attracted the attention of scholars in Europe and America. About this time he came into contact with Rai Saratchandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., the distinguished Tibetan Explorer at whose request his services were again lent by

the Government for three years to assist in the preparation of a Tibetan-English Dictionary. He was in Darjeeling for this purpose from 1897-1900 and utilised the opportunity to acquire a thorough mastery over the Tibetan language with the help of the celebrated Lama Funchhog Wangdan of Lhasa, then resident at Darjeeling. In December, 1900, Satischandra came to Calcutta as a Professor in the Sanskrit College. At about this period he acquired a thorough knowledge of Pali from Sramanas of Ceylon and Burma. In November, 1901, he appeared a second time at the M.A. Examination of the Calcutta University and chose Pali as his special subject. The University authorities were placed in a difficulty to find a suitable examiner. Ultimately Mr. C. H. Tawney and Prof. E. B. Cowell who had for many years been connected with the University arranged with Professor T. W. Rhys Davids to conduct the examination. Satischandra achieved high distinction and his attainments were specially praised by the distinguished examiner. In March, 1902, he was transferred to the Presidency College as Professor of Sanskrit. In December, 1905, the Tashi Lama came to India in order to visit the places sacred to Buddhists. Satischandra was deputed by the Government to accompany him, to act as Interpreter and to explain to him the histories and customs at the old Buddhist holy places. The Tashi Lama was highly pleased and presented Satischandra with a *Khatag* (silken upper garment) in token of high regard. On the 1st January, 1906, the Governor-General bestowed upon him the coveted title of Mahāmahopādhyāya. In 1907, on my nomination, Lord Minto, then Chancellor of the Calcutta University appointed him an Ordinary Fellow. At the same time he became a Fellow of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and Joint Philological Secretary. In 1908, the University conferred on him the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded him the Griffith Prize for original research. About this time the question of Principalship of the Sanskrit College had come under the consideration of the Government of Bengal and the suggestion had been put forward that a European scholar should be appointed. The Lieutenant-Governor felt doubtful as to the advisability of such a step and discussed the matter with me as Vice-Chancellor of the University. I expressed my emphatic disapproval of the course proposed and expressed the opinion that Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushan would be found admirably qualified for the Principalship if he were offered facilities for further training. This view prevailed and during 1909 and 1910 Satischandra was placed on deputation. In June 1909, he went to Ceylon and studied for six months with the venerable High Priest Sumangala, Principal of the Vidyodaya College at Colombo.

The first six months of the year 1910 he spent at Benares where, under the guidance of Dr. A. Venis, then Principal of the Queen's College, he studied under Subrahmanya Sastri, Bhagavatāchāryya, Sibakumar Sastri, Jibanath Jha and Bamacharan Nyāyāchāryya. After his return to Calcutta from Benares he studied for six months under the guidance of Dr. George Thibaut and acquired a good working knowledge of French and German. On the 1st December, 1910, he assumed charge of the Principalship of the Sanskrit College. In 1912 and 1916, he passed with great distinction the Preliminary and Final Examinations in Tibetan held by the Government, and carried off the sanctioned prizes on both occasions. He also acted as Lecturer on Pali and Tibetan in the University. His fame as a profound scholar of versatile attainments had rapidly spread and he was eagerly sought after in literary conferences. In 1913, he was the first President of the All India Digambar Jain Conference held at Benares. In 1914, he was President of the All India Svetambar Jain Conference held at Jodhpur and of the All India Sanskrit Conference held at Hardwar. In 1916, he was President of the Bengal Literary Conference held at Jessore, and of the District Literary Conference at Krishnagar. In 1919, he was a Vice-President of the First Oriental Conference held at Poona and President of the section on Pali and Buddhism. During all this period he worked strenuously as a scholar, and the value of his contributions to Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan studies cannot be easily appraised by a single individual. In the University itself he was a leading figure, and from 1912, acted as a Member of the Syndicate. His services were invaluable in reorganising Sanskrit studies of the indigenous type and his work as Secretary to the Sanskrit Board and the Sanskrit Association founded by the Government will be gratefully remembered by Pandits of the present generation all over this Presidency. There can be little doubt that he overworked himself, and in 1919 the first signs of failing health were indicated by a mild stroke of paralysis. Friends and well-wishers implored him to spare himself, but he was deaf to their entreaties, for as he used to say, it is better to die than to remain invalid. Two other mild attacks followed and the recovery was slow and gradual. At last on the 25th April, 1920, he passed away as the result of a sudden attack of apoplexy.

The publication of the present volume has a melancholy interest for me. In 1901 I had come across a monograph on "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan" by Sadajiro Sugiura who had offered it as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. The work seemed to me of fascinating interest as opening up a

new field of investigation full of untold possibilities. I suggested to Satischandra who at the time was engaged in the study of Tibetan that he should undertake to explore the materials available from Tibetan sources. The substance of his first researches in this direction was embodied in his thesis on "Mediaeval School of Indian Logic" which brought him the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and the Griffith Prize. He was however not content with this preliminary survey and continued steadily to collect fresh materials. The present volume was the result. At his request I read through more than half of the work before it was finally printed off and this made me realise the true value of what he had accomplished. Professor Taraporewala has with loving care seen through the press all that had not been printed when Satischandra passed away.

A list of his many and varied writings (complete as far as it has been possible to make it) has been compiled by several people and is herewith appended.

ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE.

A LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE MAHĀMAHŌ- PĀDHYĀYA DR. SATISCHANDRA VIDYABHUSHAN.¹

A. Works, original or edited.

1. Avadāna Kalpalatā: a Collection of Legendary Stories about the Bodhi-sattvas, by Kṣemendra, with its Tibetan version by Souton Lochava and Lakṣmīkara. Edited from a xylograph of Lhasa and Sanskrit MS. of Nepal by S. C. Das, H. M. Vidyabhushan and Mm. S. C. Vidyabhushan (Bib. Ind., Tib. Ser.—1888-1913).
2. Ātma-tattva-prakāś (A Bengali work on the Nyāya Philosophy)—1897.
3. Bhavabhūti and his Dramas (in Bengali)—1899.
4. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Facci. i-ii.—1900.
5. Kaccāyana's Pali Grammar (Edited in Devanāgarī characters and translated into English)—1901.
6. Tibetan Primer, I. by Lama Wangdan.—Transcribed into Roman Characters. Revised and translated by MM. S. C. Vidyabhushan—1902.
7. Tibetan Primer, II—1902.
8. Ratanautta (a Pali work).—Edited with an English translation—1902.
9. Notes on *Ratnāvalī*, with English and Bengali Translations—1903.
10. Buddha-dev (in Bengali)—1904.
11. Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-European Languages—1905.
12. Bauddha-stotra saṅgrahaḥ: a collection of Buddhist Hymns, Vol. I. (Bib. Ind., Tib. Ser.—1908).
13. Parīkṣāmukha-sūtram: a Digambara Jaina work on Logic (Nyāya) by Māṇikyā Nandi (Bib. Ind., Sans. Ser.—1909).
14. History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic—1909.
15. Amarakośa: a Metrical Dictionary of the Sanskrit Language with the Tibetan Version (Bib. Ind., Tib. Ser.—1911-12).
16. Amaratikā Kāmadhenuḥ (Bib. Ind., Tib. Ser.—1912).
17. Maitrī or Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, edited by E. B. Cowell. Second edition revised by Mm. S. C. Vidyabhushan (Bib. Ind., Sans. Ser. 1913-1919, *In progress.*)
18. The *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama, translated into English (Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. 8)—Allahabad, 1913.
19. Sāhitya-Pariṣat-Patrikā—Edited by Mm. S. C. Vidyabhushan from (1913-1916 ?)
20. Nyāyabindu: a Bilingual Index of Sanskrit and Tibetan words (Bib. Ind., Tib. Ser.—1917).
21. A Report on the Revival of Buddhism—1917.
22. A History of Indian Logic—1922.

B. Articles contributed to various English Journals.

(i) “The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.”

1. Mahāyāna and Hinayāna—1900.
2. Brahmanic References to the Buddhist Philosophy—1901.
3. Old Indian Alphabet—1904.
4. Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra—1905.
5. Uddyotakara—1914.
6. Influence of Aristotle on the Development of the Syllogism in Indian Logic—1918.

(ii) “The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.”

1. The Licchavi Race of Ancient India } (lxxi, 1.) Abstracts also printed in
2. Vṛātyā and Sāṅkara Theories of Caste } Proc. A.S.B., 1902.

¹ This list has been compiled from several sources and though extensive is by no means complete.

3. An Analysis of the *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*.
4. Anuruddha Thera—a learned Pālī author of Southern India in the 12th century A.D.
5. Diñnāga and his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*
6. Sarvajña-mitra : a Tāntrika Buddhist author of Kāśmīra in the 8th cent. A.D.
7. A Tibetan Almanac for 1906-07
8. The Gyantse Rock-Inscription of Chos-rgyal-quis-pa, a Ruler under Śābyapa Hierarch in the 14th cent. A.D.
9. Rōmaka, or the City of Rome, as mentioned in the Ancient Pālī and Sanskrit Works
10. *Hetu-cakra-hamaru*, or Diñnāga's Wheel of Reason, recovered from Labrang in Sikkim
11. Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet—
12. „ „ „ „ —2
13. „ „ „ „ —3
14. Nyāya-praveśa
15. Sāṅkhya Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas
16. Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography as preserved in Tibet
17. A Descriptive List of Works on the Mādhyamika Philosophy
18. Some rare Sanskrit works on Grammar, Lexicography and Prosody recovered from Tibet
19. Two Tibetan Charms obtained by Lt.-Col. Stuart H. Godfrey in Ladakh, one for chasing away Evil Spirits and the other for compelling Fortune
20. On the Date of a Copy of the *Svayambhū-purāṇa*. (N.S., v.)
21. Mahārāja Kanika Lekha
22. Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (about 1608-1688, A.D.) } (N.S., vi.)
23. The Localisation of certain Hymns of the *Rgveda*. (N.S., x.)
24. *So-sor tha-pa*, or a Code of Buddhist Monastic Laws (edited and translated. (N.S., xi.)
25. The *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, a most advanced Work on Hindu Logic (Summarised in English.) (N.S., xiv.)

(ii. a) “*Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.*”

1. The Śāraka Caste of India identified with the *Sérîké* of Central Asia (1903.)
2. The Buddhist doctrine of “Middler Path” (1904).
[See also items 1 and 2 under heading ii, above.]

(ii. b) “*Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.*”

1. On Certain Tibetan Scrolls and Images lately brought from Gyantse (i, 1.)
2. Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Vocabulary, being an edition of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, by Alexander Csoma de Körös. Edited by D. Ross and Mm. S. C. Vidyabhushan } (iv, 1-2.)
[in progress.]
3. Srid-pa-ho : a Tibetan-Chinese Tortoise Chart of Divination. (v, 1.)

(iii) “*The Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India.*”

1. Brahmanic References to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhist Philosophy. (iii, 2.)
2. The Mādhyamika School of Buddhist Philosophy, together with a Short Sketch of the leading Indian Schools of Philosophy. (iii, 3.)
3. A Brief Survey of the Hindu Philosophical Doctrines of Salvation
4. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—2
5. How Buddhism became extinct in India
6. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—3 (the Examination of the Sense-Organṣ)
7. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—4 (the Examination of the *Skandhas*, the five Aggregates of Being or Existence)

8. The Philosophy of *Prajñāpāramitā*; Absolute Knowledge. (iv, 3.)
9. The Philosopher Dinnāga, a Contemporary of the Poet Kālidāsa
10. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—5 (the Examination of the Elements) } (iv, 4.)
11. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—6
12. The Story of Haritika. (v, 1.)
13. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—7 (the Examination of the *Samis-kāras*, Origination, Continuance and Extinction) } (v, 3.)
14. History of the Mādhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna. (v, 4.)
15. The Story of Mahākāśyapa } (vi, 1.)
16. Nirvāṇa
17. The Influence of Buddhism on the Development of Nyāya Philosophy } (vi, 3.)
18. The Mādhyamika Aphorisms—8
19. The Buddhist Doctrine of the "Ego" or the "Soul"
20. Synopsis of the Duties of a Buddhist according to Bodhicaryavratā } (vi, 4.)
21. The examination of "Fire and Fuel"
22. *Pratītya-samutpada*, or the Buddhist Doctrine of Dependent Origination } (vii, 1.)
23. The Buddhist Version of the Nyāya Philosophy

(iv) "*The Journal of the Mahabodhi Society.*"

1. The Law of Karma } (1899).
2. Life of Dinnāga
3. Buddhist Convocations } (1901).
4. Buddhism in India
5. The History of Sāṃkhya Philosophy
6. Alexander Csoma de Kőrös
7. Ratanasutta
8. *Prajñāpāramitā* or Perfection of Wisdom
9. Conversion of the People of Laṅkā by Buddha
10. *Upasampada*, or Ordination ceremony of the Buddhist
11. Influence of Buddhism on the Development of the Hindu Nyāya Philosophy } (1902).
12. The Northern and Southern Schools of Buddhism
13. Nāgārjuna

(v) "*The Dawn.*"

1. History of the Grammatical Literature of India } (1901).
2. The Ancient History of Magadha
3. Dharmāranya, or Forest of Justice (1902).

(vi) "*The Bengalee.*"

1. The Influence of Bengali on the Nyāya Philosophy (1902).

(vii) "*The Indian Mirror.*"

1. An Apology for *Advaitavāda* or the Vedānta Philosophy I-III (1897).
2. History of the Pali Language (1900).
3. The University of Nālanda
4. The University of Taxila } (1901).
5. The Ancient City of Taxila
6. The Age of the Poet Māgha (1902).

(viii) "*The Open Court*" (America).

1. The Conversion of Rāvaṇa and of the People of Laṅkā by Buddha (1902).

C. Articles in Bengali contributed to Bengali Journals.¹(i) "*The Rishi.*"

1. Fruits of Karma, a Tibetan Story (1899).

(ii) "*The Panthā.*"

1. Jātaka Stories of the Pali Piṭakas (1901).

(iii) "*The Baṅgadarśan.*"

1. The Pali Source of Aesop's Fables (1902).
2. The Foundation of the Building for the Baṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad (1903).

(iv) "*The Kāyastha Samācār.*"

1. The Nyāya Philosophy of the Hindus (1902).

(v) "*The Bāṇi.*"

1. Romaka (1905).
2. Departure from Laṅkā (1910).

(vi) "*The Bhāratavarṣa.*"

1. Uddyotakara (1913).

(vii) "*The Janmabhūmi.*"

1. The Nyāya Doctrine of the Soul (1896).

(viii) "*The Kalpa.*"

1. The Theory of the Soul according to Western Philosophers (1896).

(ix) "*The Suhrīd.*"

1. The Study of Sanskrit in the University (1894).

(x) "*The Sāhitya Pariṣad Patrikā.*"

1. Bhavabhūti (1899).
2. Life of Lord Buddha (1900).
3. The Mahāparinirvāṇa of Lord Buddha (1901).
4. Kāyastha Chākādās, Taṅgadās and Bhuvanākar Śarma (1907).
5. Bauddha-nyāya (1915).

(xi) "*The Sāhitya.*"

1. A Buddhist Picture from Tibet
2. The Sixteen Mahāsthaviras of Tibet } (1905).
3. Vratya and Saṅkara Theories of Caste (1906).

(xii) "*The Sāhitya Samhita.*"

1. Anuruddhasthavira (1901).
2. Bauddha-darśana; a series of articles on the "Metaphysical Basket" of the Buddhist Scripture
3. Nyāya-darśan
4. Śaṅkhya-darśan
5. Pratītya-samutpada, or the Chain of Causes
6. Abhihammattha-saṅgaha

(1902).

¹ The titles have been translated into English.

(xiii) “*The Nanyabhārat.*”

1. The Existence, Immortality and Transmigration of the Soul } (1895).
2. The World, Pain and Emancipation }
3. The Hindu Theory of Rebirth (1896).
4. Panca-kandha (1897).
5. Notes on the Dhammapada (1899).
6. A brief History of the Pali Language (1900).
7. The *dharma-dīkṣā* of Rāvaṇa (1901).
8. History of Nyāya Philosophy } (1902).
9. Bauddha Dharma }

(xiv) “*The Bhārati.*”

1. Analysis of Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvrata (1899).
2. The Science of Language
3. The Bengali Alphabet
4. The Ancient History of Megadha
5. The Letter *kṣa*
6. The Relations of Grammar and Language
7. The Missionaries of Ancient India
8. Differences of Race and Differences of Language
9. Aṅguttara Nikāya
10. The Milk-drinking Swan of Sanskrit Poetry
11. How Buddhism became extinct in India
12. The Spirit of Self-help in Hindu Religion
13. Nicchivi Jāti
14. History of the Nyāya Philosophy
15. Bauddha-dharma
16. Prāti-mokṣa } (1903).
17. Ratnāvali }
18. The Grammar of Bengali } (1904).
19. Kumāra-jīva }
20. Amoghavajra } (1905).
21. Sarvajña-mitra }
22. Travels of the Tashī Lama in India (1906).
23. Travels in Sikkim 8
24. The University of Vikramaśīlā } (1908).
25. History of the Alphabet }
26. Buddha's Tooth in Ceylon (1910).
27. Natarāja Śiva in Ceylon (1911).

D. Presidential Addresses, etc.

1. The Birthplace of the great Poet Kālidasa and the place of his Death (Sāhitya Sammelan at Bhagalpur).
2. Nyāya-darśan.
3. Birthplace of Kālidasa (Sāhitya Sammelan at Calcutta)
4. Presidential Address (Sāhitya Sammelan at Jessore).
5. Presidential Address (Literary Section, Sāhitya Sammelan at Jessore.)

CONTENTS.

	Page
Portrait of the late MM. Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhusana .. Frontispiece	ix
Author's Preface	xiii
Introduction	xvii
Foreword by Sir Asutosh Mukerjee	xxi
A List of the writings of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan	xxi

PART I.

THE ANCIENT SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

ĀNVIKṢIKĪ—THE SCIENCE OF INQUIRY (650 B.C.—100 A.D.).

Chapter I.

The Growth of Ānvīkṣikī into an Art of Debate.

1. The Early Literature of India	1
2. Problems of the Vedas	2
3. Development of the conception of soul	2
4. <i>Ātmavidyā</i> , the Science of soul	4
5. <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> , which includes a Theory of Reasons	4
6. <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> bifurcates into Philosophy and Logic	5
7. <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> in its Philosophical Aspect called <i>Darśana</i>	6
8. Various names for <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> in its Logical Aspect	7

Chapter II.

The Teachers of Ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy and Logic).

9. Cārvāka, his Materialistic Doctrine	9
10. Kapila, his Doctrine of Matter and Soul	9
11. Dattātreyā, his Parable of a Tree	10
12. Punarvasu Ātreya, his Dissertation on the Senses	11
13. Sulabhā, a Lady Ascetic, her Canons of Speech	12
14. Aṣṭāvakra, a Violent Debater, how he Defeated a Sophist	13
15. Aṣṭāvakra Solves Puzzles	16
16. Medhātithi Gautama, the Founder of <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> par excellence	17

Chapter III.

The Doctrines of Ānvīkṣikī.

16. A Council of Debate (<i>Paṛiṣad</i>)	22
17. The Technical Terms used in the Council of Debate	23

	<i>Page</i>
18. <i>Tantra Yukti</i> , the Terms of Scientific Argument ..	24
19. Medhātithi Gautama's Doctrines as reproduced in the <i>Carakasamhitā</i>	25
i. <i>Kāryābhiniṣṛṭti</i> , the Aggregate of Resources for the Accomplishment of an Action	27
ii. <i>Parīksā</i> , the Standard of Examination	28
iii. <i>Sambhāṣā</i> or <i>vāda-vidhi</i> , the Method of Debate ..	28

Chapter IV.

Reception accorded to Ānvīkṣikī.

20. <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> condemned in certain circles	36
21. <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> held in high esteem in some quarters	37

SECTION II.

NYĀYĀ-SASTRA—THE SCIENCE OF TRUE REASONING.

Chapter I.

The Growth of Nyāyaśāstra.

22. Origin of the name <i>Nyāya</i>	40
23. The Antiquity of <i>Nyāyaśāstra</i>	41
24. The Early Teachers of <i>Nyāyaśāstra</i>	42
25. Nārada, an Expert in <i>Nyāyaśāstra</i>	43
26. <i>Nyāya-sūtra</i> , the first systematic work on <i>Nyāyaśāstra</i> ..	46
27. Aksapāda, the Author of the <i>Nyāya-sūtra</i>	47
28. Subjects of the <i>Nyāya-sūtra</i>	50
29. The Arrangement of Categories in the <i>Nyāya-sūtra</i> ..	52
30. The Process of Treatment of the Categories	53

Chapter II.

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra.

31. The Categories: their Enunciation	54
32. The Categories: their Definition	54
1. The means of Right knowledge (<i>pramāṇa</i>)	54
2. The Objects of Right knowledge (<i>prameya</i>)	56
3. Doubt (<i>saṁśaya</i>)	58
4. Purpose (<i>prayojana</i>)	59
5. Example (<i>dṛṣṭānta</i>)	59
6. Tenet (<i>siddhānta</i>)	59
7. Members of a Syllogism (<i>avayava</i>)	60
8. Confutation (<i>tarka</i>)	61
9. Ascertainment (<i>nirṇaya</i>)	62
10. Discussion (<i>vāda</i>)	63

	<i>Page</i>
11. Wrangling (<i>jalpa</i>)	63
12. Cavil (<i>vitandā</i>)	63
13. Fallacy (<i>hetvābhāsa</i>)	63
14. Quibble (<i>chala</i>)	65
15. Analogue (<i>jāti</i>)	65
16. A Point of Defeat (<i>nigrahasthāna</i>)	66
33. The Varieties of Analogue	67
1. Balancing the homogeneity	67
2. Balancing the heterogeneity	68
3. Balancing an excess	68
4. Balancing a deficit	69
5. Balancing the questionable	69
6. Balancing the unquestionable	70
7. Balancing the alternative	70
8. Balancing the question	71
9. Balancing the co-presence	71
10. Balancing the mutual absence	72
11. Balancing the infinite regression	73
12. Balancing the counter-example	73
13. Balancing the non-produced	74
14. Balancing the doubt	74
15. Balancing the point at issue or the controversial	75
16. Balancing the non-reason	75
17. Balancing the presumption	76
18. Balancing the non-difference	77
19. Balancing the demonstration	78
20. Balancing the perception	78
21. Balancing the non-perception	79
22. Balancing the non-eternal	79
23. Balancing the eternal	80
24. Balancing the effect	81
Application of the Analogues	81
Six-winged Disputation (<i>ṣaṭpakṣī kathā</i>)	82
34. Varieties of the points of the Defeat	84
1. Hurting the proposition	84
2. Shifting the proposition	85
3. Opposing the proposition	85
4. Renouncing the proposition	86
5. Shifting the reason	86
6. Shifting the topic	86
7. The meaningless	87
8. The unintelligible	87
9. The incoherent	87
10. The inopportune	87
11. Saying too little	88
12. Saying too much	88
13. Repetition	88
14. Silence	89

	<i>Page</i>
15. Ignorance	89
16. Non-ingenuity	89
17. Evasion	89
18. Admission of an opinion	89
19. Overlooking the censurable	89
20. Censuring the non-censurable	90
21. Deviating from a tenet	90
22. The fallacies of reason also furnish points of defeat or occasion for rebuke	90
35. Categories : their Examination (<i>parīkṣā</i>)	90
1. The Means of Right Knowledge (<i>pramāṇa</i>)	90
The means	90
Perception	92
Inference	93
Comparison	93
Verbal testimony	94
Other means	95
2. The objects of right knowledge (<i>prameya</i>)	97
The Soul	97
Body	99
Senses	99
Objects of sense	100
Intellect	101
Mind	101
Faults	101
Transmigration	101
Emancipation	102
3. Doubt (<i>saṁśaya</i>)	103
4. Discussion (<i>vāda</i>)	104
5. Wrangling and Cavil (<i>jalpa-vitandā</i>)	104
36. Topics Incidentally Examined	105
1. Parts and Whole (<i>avayava</i> and <i>avayavin</i>)	105
2. Atoms (<i>paramāṇu</i>)	105
3. The Three Times (<i>kāla</i>)	106
4. Words and their Meanings (<i>śabdārtha</i>)	106
5. The Veda	107
6. Sound (<i>śabda</i>)	109
7. Word (<i>pada</i>)	110
8. The eyes (<i>cakṣuh</i>)	111
9. Intellect (<i>buddhi</i>)	112
10. Memory (<i>smṛti</i>)	112
11. The fixed signification of numbers (<i>saṁkhyāikānta</i>)	114

Chapter III.

Commentaries on the Nyaya-sūtra.

36a. Nature of the Commentaries	115
37. Vātsyāyana, author of the <i>Nyāya-bhāṣya</i>	115

	<i>Page</i>
38. Vātsyāyana criticises Nāgārjuna	117
39. Vātsyāyana criticises other Doctrines of the Buddhists ..	120
40. Vātsyāyana's Explanation of certain Doctrines	121
41. Uddyotakara, Author of the <i>Nyāya-vārtika</i>	123
42. Uddyotakara's Controversy with the Buddhists	125
43. Uddyotakara criticises Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna ..	127
44. Uddyotakara criticises Dignāga	129
45. Uddyotakara's Explanation of Perception	130
46. Uddyotakara's Definition of Inference	130
47. Uddyotakara's Theory of Verbal Knowledge	131
48. Uddyotakara's Theory of Sufferings	132
49. Vācaspati Miśra, Author of the <i>Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā- tika</i>	133
50. Vācaspati opposes Dignāga	135
51. Vācaspati criticises Dharmakīrti	136
52. Vācaspati's Explanation of Determinate and Indeterminate Perceptions, <i>śavikalpaka</i> and <i>nirvikalpaka</i>	137
53. Vācaspati's Theory of Right Knowledge and Wrong Know- ledge (<i>pramā</i> and <i>apramā</i>)	138
53a. Vācaspati's Theory of Condition (<i>upādhi</i>)	140
53b. The Theory of Cause and Effect (<i>kārya-kāraṇa</i>)	140
53c. The Buddhist and Jaina Scriptures condemned	141
54. Udayanācārya, Author of <i>Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā- pariśuddhi</i>	141
55. Udayana combats the Buddhists	142
56. Udayana opposes Kalyāṇa Rākṣita and Dharmottara ..	143
57. Udayana's <i>Kuṣumāñjali</i>	143
58. Udayana's <i>Ātma-tattva-viveka</i>	145
59. Jayanta, Author of the <i>Nyāya-mañjarī</i>	146
60. Jayanta's Explanation of Verbal Knowledge	147
61. Jayanta criticises the Doctrines of Kalyāṇa Rākṣita and Dharmottara	149
62. Jayanta's Review of several other Buddhistic Doctrines ..	150
63. Śrīkaṇṭha	151
64. Abhayatilaka Upādhyāya	151
65. Other commentators on the <i>Nyāya-sūtra</i>	151

Chapter IV.

The Nyāya recognized as a Branch of Orthodox Learning. 152

66. A comparative Estimate of the <i>Ānvīkṣikī</i> and the <i>Nyāya</i>	152
67. The <i>Nyāya</i> included in <i>Śaddarśana</i>	152
68. The <i>Nyāya</i> supports the <i>Veda</i>	153
69. The <i>Nyāya</i> adapts itself to <i>Śaivism</i>	154
70. The Popularity of <i>Nyāya</i> established	155

PART II.
THE MEDIAEVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC
CALLED *Pramāṇasāstra*, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.
JAINA LOGIC.

Chapter I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the Jaina Canons.

	Page
1. The special Features of Mediaeval Logic. Formation of the Mediaeval school.	
2. Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism	158
3. The Jaina sects, Śvetāmbara and Digambara	159
4. Indrabhūti Gautama, a Disciple of Mahāvīra	159
5. The canonical Scriptures of the Jainas	160
6. Logical Subjects in the Canons	161

Chapter II.

Early Jaina Writers on Logic.

Bhadrabāhu the Senior	164
Bhadrabāhu the Junior	164
7. Bhadrabāhu's Syllogism	165
8. Bhadrabāhu's Explanation of <i>Syādvāda</i>	167
9. Umāsvāti	168
10. Umāsvāti's Doctrine of <i>Pramāṇa</i> (Right Knowledge)	169
11. Umāsvāti's Explanation of <i>Naya</i> (the Mood of Statements)	170

Chapter III.

Jaina Writers on Systematic Logic.

12. The written Records of the Jainas	172
13. Systematic Jaina Logic	172
14. Siddhasena Divākara <i>alias</i> Kṣapaṇaka	173
15. Siddhasena's <i>Nyāyāvatāra</i>	174
<i>Pramāṇa</i> , Right knowledge	174
<i>Naya</i> , the Method of Descriptions	181
16. Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāsramāṇa	181
17. Siddhasena Gaṇi	182
18. Samantabhadra	182
19. Samantabhadra's <i>Āptamīmāṃsā</i>	184
20. Akalaṅkadeva	185
21. Vidyānanda	186
22. Māṇikya Nandi	188
23. Māṇikya Nandi's <i>Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra</i>	188
Valid Knowledge, <i>pramāṇa</i>	189
Syllogism, <i>vyāpti</i>	189

	Page
Reason, <i>hetu</i>	190
Example, <i>dṛṣṭānta</i>	191
Inference, <i>anumāna</i>	192
Verbal Testimony, <i>āgama</i>	192
Scope of valid Knowledge, <i>viśaya</i>	192
Fallacy, <i>ābhāsa</i>	192
References to Philosophers	193
24. Prabhācandra	193
25. Rabhasānanda	194
26. Mallavādin	194
27. Amṛtacandra Sūri	195
28. Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka	195
29. Pradyumna Sūri	196
30. Abhayadeva Sūri	196
31. Laghusamantabhadra	197
32. Kalyāṇacandra	198
33. Anantavīrya	198
34. Deva Sūri	198
35. Deva Sūri's <i>Pramāna-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra</i>	200
Fallacies of Naya	203
The Soul, <i>ātmā</i>	204
The Method of Debate	204
36. Hemacandra Sūri	205
37. Candraprabha Sūri	206
38. Nemicaṇḍa Kavi	207
39. Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri, nicknamed Tiger-cub and Lion-cub	207
40. Haribhadra Sūri	208
41. Pārsvadeva Gaṇi	210
42. Śrīcandra	210
43. Devabhadra	211
44. Candrasena Sūri	211
45. Ratnaprabha Sūri	211
46. Tilakācārya	212
47. Mallisena Sūri	212
48. Rājaśekhara Sūri	213
49. Jñānacandra	213
50. Guṇaratna	214
51. Śrutasāgara Gaṇi	215
52. Dharma Bhūṣaṇa	215
52a. Vinayavijaya	516
53. Yaśovijaya Gaṇi	217
54. Yaśovijaya's Works	218

Chapter IV.

Continuity of Jaina Logic.

55. The conciliatory Character of Jaina Logic	221
56. Royal Patronage and Persecution	222

57.	Support of the Jaina Community	223
58.	Jaina Logic will not be extinct	224

SECTION II.

THE BUDDHIST LOGIC.

Chapter I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the old Buddhist Literature

59.	Buddha Gautama	225
60.	Origin of the Pāli Buddhist Literature	225
61.	Logical Topics in the Pāli Literature	227
62.	<i>Suttapitaka : Dīgha-nikāya : Brahmajāla Sutta</i>	227
63.	<i>Suttapitaka : Majjhimanikāya Anumāna Sutta</i>	229
64.	<i>Suttapitaka : Khuddaka Nikāya Udāna</i>	229
65.	<i>Vinaya-pitaka : Parivāra</i>	229
	Four kinds of Cases for Settlement (<i>adhikārā</i>)	229
	Seven Rules for the Settlement of Cases (<i>adhikāraṇa-samā-</i> <i>tha-dhamma</i>)	230
	A Complaint (<i>codanā</i>)	231
	A Complaint in Complainant and Respondent	231
	A Judicial Council of Monks (<i>saṅgha</i>)	231
	Members of a Council (<i>saṅgamāvācarabhikkhu</i>)	231
	The Judge or Umpire (<i>anuvijjaka</i>)	231
66.	<i>Vinaya-pitaka : patimokkha</i>	232
67.	<i>Abhidhamma-pitaka : kathāvatthuppakaraṇa</i>	234
68.	Methods of Disputation as illustrated in the <i>Kathāvatthu</i>	235
	A Case presented by a Dispute in a regular Form (<i>anuloma</i>)	235
	A Rejoinder by the Respondent (<i>patikamma</i>)	235
	The Rejoinder causing Entanglement or Defeat on the Dis-	
	putant (<i>niggaha</i>)	236
	Application of the Reasoning of the Disputant to his own	
	Case (<i>upanaya</i>)	236
	Conclusion (<i>niggamaṇa</i>)	237
	A Case presented through a simple Comparison (<i>suddhi-</i> <i>kasamsandana</i>)	237
	Definition of Terms (<i>lakkhanayatti kathā</i>)	238
	Clearing the Meaning of Terms (<i>vacanaśodhana</i>)	238
	A Case presented through an Analogy (<i>opamma saṃsandana</i>)	238
	A Case presented through the four-fold Method (<i>catūkka-</i> <i>nayasamsandana</i>)	239
	The Doctrine of Impermanence (<i>khanēka kathā</i>)	239
69.	Milinda-pañha <i>alias</i> the Bhikṣu-Sūtra	240
70.	Origin of the Mahāyāna	241
71.	Origin of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature	242
72.	Logic mentioned in the Sanskrit Literature	242
73.	The <i>Lalitavistara</i>	243
74.	The <i>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra</i>	243
75.	Eighteen Sects of the Buddhists	246
76.	Four Schools of Buddhist Philosophy	247

Chapter II.

Early Buddhist Writers on Logic.

	Page
77. Rise of Buddhist Logic	251
78. Ārya Nāgārjuna	251
79. Nāgārjuna's <i>Mādhyamika-kārikā</i>	253
80. Nāgārjuna's References to the Logical Doctrines of Aksapāda	255
81. Nāgārjuna's <i>Vigraha-vyāvartani-kārikā</i>	256
82. Nāgārjuna's <i>Pramāṇa-viśeṣa</i> or <i>Pramāṇa vidhvamsana</i> ..	257
83. <i>Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra</i>	259
84. Ārya Deva	261
85. Maitreya	262
86. Maitreya's <i>Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā</i>	262
87. Maitreya's Treatise on the Art of Debate	263
1. The Subject of Debate	263
2. The Place of Debate	263
3. The Means of Debate	264
4. The Qualifications of a Debater	264
5. Points of Defeat (<i>nigrahasthāna</i>)	264
6. Attending a Place of Debate	264
7. Confidence of a Debater	264
88. Ārya Asaṅga	265
89. Vasubandhu	266
90. Vasubandhu's <i>Tarka-śāstra</i>	267

Chapter III.

Systematic Buddhist Writers on Logic.

91. The Commencement of Mediaeval Logic	270
92. Ācārya Dignāga, the Father of Mediaeval Logic	270
93. Life of Dignāga	272
94. Dignāga's <i>Pramāṇa-samuccaya</i>	274
Chapter I—Perception	276
Chapter II—Inference for One's Self	280
Chapter III—Inference for the Sake of Others	282
Chapter IV—Reason and Example	286
Chapter V— <i>Apoha</i> , Negation of the Opposite	287
Chapter VI—Analogues or Far-fetched Analogy	288
95. Dignāga's <i>Nyāya-praveśa</i>	289
A Syllogism, <i>nyāyāvayava</i>	289
The Minor Term	290
The Middle Term and the Major Term	291
Fourteen Fallacies	293
The example	295
Perception and Inference	298
96. Dignāga's <i>Hetu-cakrahamaru</i>	299
97. <i>Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti</i>	299
98. <i>Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveśa</i>	300

	<i>Page</i>
99. <i>Ālambana-parīkṣā</i>	300
100. <i>Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti</i>	301
101. <i>Trikāla-parīkṣā</i>	301
102. Paramārtha	301
103. Śaṅkara Svāmin	302
104. Dharmapāla	302
105. Ācārya Śilabhadra	303
106. Ācārya Dharmakīrti	303
107. <i>Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā</i>	306
108. <i>Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti</i>	308
109. <i>Pramāṇa-viniścaya</i>	308
110. <i>Nyāya-bindu</i>	309
Perception	310
Inference for One's Self	310
Inference for the Sake of Others	312
Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga	315
111. <i>Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa</i>	318
112. <i>Tarka-nyāya</i> or <i>Vāda-nyāya</i>	318
113. <i>Santānāntara-siddhi</i>	319
114. <i>Sambandha-parīkṣā</i>	319
115. <i>Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti</i>	319
116. Devendrabodhi	319
117. Śākyabodhi	320
118. Vinita Deva	320
119. Ravi Gupta	322
120. Jinendrabodhi	323
121. Santa Raksita	323
122. Kamalasīla	327
123. Kalyaṇa Raksita	328
124. Dharmottarācārya	329
125. Muktakumbha	331
126. Arcata	331
127. Aśoka	332
128. Candragomin (Junior)	333
129. Prajñākara Gupta	336
130. Ācārya Jetāri	337
131. Jina	338
132. Ratna Kīrti	338
133. Ratna Vajra	339
134. Jina Mitra	340
135. Dānaśīla	340
136. Jñānaśrī Mitra	341
137. Jñānaśrī Bhadra	342
138. Ratnākara Śānti	342
139. Yamāri	343
140. Śaṅkarānanda	344
141. Subhākara Gupta	346
142. Mokṣakarā Gupta	346

Chapter IV.

The Decline of Buddhist Logic.

	<i>Page</i>
143. Contentious Spirit of Buddhist Logic	348
144. Loss of Royal Patronage	349
145. Advent of the Mahomedans	350
146. The Brāhmanic Preachers	351
147. Shelter in Foreign Countries	351
148. Extinction of the Buddhists and their Doctrines in India..	353

PART III.

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Prakarana—MANUAL OF LOGIC.

Chapter I.

The Nyāya-prakarana reduces its categories to one.

1. The Neo-Brāhmanic age	355
2. Composition of the <i>Prakarana</i> s, Manual of Logic	355
3. Four Classes of <i>Prakarana</i> s	356
4. <i>Nyāya-prakarana</i> developing the category of <i>pramāṇa</i>	357
5. Bhāsarvajña	357
6. Bhāsarvajña's <i>Nyāya-sāra</i>	358
<i>Nyāya-sāra</i> follows no particular Work	358
7. Contents of the <i>Nyāya-sāra</i>	359
Perception, <i>pratyakṣa</i>	359
Inference, <i>anumāna</i>	361
<i>Hetvābhāsa</i> , Fallacy of Reason	362
A. Unproved (<i>asiddha</i>)	362
B. The Contradictory (<i>viruddha</i>)	363
C. The Uncertain (<i>anaikāntika</i>)	365
D. Non-tried or Non-conclusive (<i>anadhyavasita</i> or <i>anupasaṁhārī</i>)	366
E. Mistimed or Incompatible Reason (<i>kālātyayopadiṣṭa</i> or <i>bādhita</i>)	367
F. Balancing the Controversy (<i>prakarana-sama</i>)	367
G. Non-erroneous Contradiction (<i>viruddhāvyabhicārī</i>)	368
Example, <i>udāharana</i>	368
Verbal Testimony, <i>āgama</i>	370
Emancipation, <i>mokṣa</i>	370
8. Commentaries on the <i>Nyāya-sāra</i>	371

Chapter II.

*Nyāya-prakarana*s embodying *Vaiśeṣika* categories.

9. The <i>Nyāya</i> incorporates the <i>Vaiśeṣika</i>	373
10. Varadarāja	373

	<i>Page</i>
11. <i>Tārkikarakṣā</i>	374
Valid knowledge, <i>pramāṇa</i>	375
Inference, <i>anumāna</i>	376
Syllogism, <i>avayana</i>	377
The Sign, <i>liṅga</i>	377
Debate, <i>kathā</i>	378
12. Commentaries on <i>Tārkikarakṣā</i>	380
13. Keśava Miśra	381
14. <i>Tarka-bhāṣā</i> , Technicality of Logic	381
Categories, <i>padārtha</i>	381
Instrument, <i>kaṇa</i>	382
Cause, <i>kāraṇa</i>	382
Perception, <i>pratyakṣa</i>	383
Inference, <i>anumāna</i>	383
Comparison, <i>upamāna</i>	384
Word, <i>śabda</i>	384
15. Commentaries on the <i>Tarka-bhāṣā</i>	384

Chapter III.

The Vaiśeṣika Prakaraṇa embodying the Nyāya category of Pramāṇa.

16. The Vaiśeṣika incorporates the Nyāya category	386
17. Vallabhācārya	386
18. <i>Nyāya-līlāvatī</i>	387
19. Commentaries on the <i>Nyāya-līlāvatī</i>	387
20. Annam Bhaṭṭa	388
21. <i>Tarkasaṃgraha</i>	388
22. Commentaries on <i>Tarkasaṃgraha</i>	390
23. Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana	392
24. <i>Bhāṣā-pariccheda</i>	392
25. <i>Tarkāmṛta</i>	393
26. Laugākṣi Bhāskara	395
27. <i>Tarka-kaumudī</i>	395

Chapter IV.

Works treating of certain topics of the Nyāya and certain topics of the Vaiśeṣika.

28. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika promiscuously amalgamated	396
29. Śaśadhara	396
30. <i>Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa</i>	396
31. Mādhavācārya	397
32. <i>Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha</i> , Akṣapāda Darśana	398
Inference as a Means of Right knowledge	398
The Inference as a Means of Right Knowledge cannot be denied	400

SECTION II.

Tarka-Śāstra—THE SCIENCE OF DIALECTICS.

Chapter II.

Formation of the Tarka-śāstra.

	<i>Page</i>
33. The Nyāya cannot be combined with Vaiśeṣika	402
34. Adoption of <i>Pramāṇa</i> alone	402
35. Adoption of the Vaiśeṣika Principles	402
36. Subtlety of Meanings aimed at	403
37. Fine Definition of Terms	403
38. The Use of Technical Terms	403

Chapter II.

Tattva-cintāmaṇi—the Earliest work on *Tarka-śāstra*.

39. Importance of <i>Tattva-cintāmaṇi</i>	405
40. Gaṅgeśa, the Author of the <i>Tattva-cintāmaṇi</i>	405
41. The Text of <i>Tattva-cintāmaṇi</i>	
Book I: Perception, <i>Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa</i>	407
Invocation of Blessings, <i>Maṅgala-vāda</i>	408
The Validity of Knowledge, <i>Prāmāṇya-vāda</i>	408
Invalid Knowledge, <i>Anyathā-khyāti</i>	409
Intercourse between Senses and their Objects— <i>Sannikarṣa</i>	
Ordinary Perception (<i>laukika pratyakṣa</i>)	411
Transcendent Perception (<i>alaukika pratyakṣa</i>)	412
Inference, <i>Samanāya-vāda</i>	414
The Invalidity of Non-perception. <i>Anupalabdhi</i> or <i>prāmā-</i> <i>nya vāda</i>	414
Non-existence (or Negation), <i>Abhāva-vāda</i>	415
Causes of Perception, <i>Pratyakṣa-kāraṇa-vāda</i>	416
The Atomic Nature of the Mind, <i>Manonutva-vāda</i>	417
The Doctrine of Self-consciousness, <i>Anūvyavasāya-vāda</i>	418
Immediate Perception, <i>Nirvikalpa-vāda</i>	418
Mediate Perception, <i>Savikalpa-vāda</i>	419
Book II. : Inference, <i>Anumāna-khaṇḍa</i>	419
The Determination of Inferential Knowledge— <i>Anumiti-nirū-</i> <i>pana</i>	419
Inference distinct from Perception	420
Five Provisional Definitions of Invariable Concomitance, <i>Vyāpti-pañcakam</i>	421
Definition of Invariable Concomitance given by “Lion” and “Tiger”, <i>Siṃha-vyāghroḥkta-vyāptilakṣaṇa</i>	423
Non-existence whose Counterpart is qualified by a Nature abiding in a different Locus, <i>Vyadhikarāṇa-dharmā-</i> <i>vacchinnābhāvaḥ</i>	423
Other objectionable Definitions of Invariable Concomitance, <i>Pūrvapakṣaḥ</i>	424

	Page
The conclusive Definition of Invariable Concomitance, <i>Siddhānta-lakṣaṇam</i>	424
Non-existence of the General Form, <i>Sāmānya bhāvāḥ</i> ..	425
Invariable Concomitance of Special Forms, <i>Viśeṣa-vyāpti</i> ..	426
The Means of apprehending Invariable Concomitance, <i>Vyāpti-grahopāyaḥ</i>	426
Conclusion as to the Means of apprehending Invariable Concomitance, <i>Vyāpti-grahopāya-siddhānta</i>	428
Reasoning (or Confutation), <i>Tarka</i>	429
Comprehensiveness of Invariable Concomitance, <i>Vyāpty-anugamaḥ</i>	429
Intercourse whose Character is General, <i>Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa</i> ..	429
Conclusion about the Intercourse whose Character is General, <i>Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-siddhāntaḥ</i>	430
The Conditional Middle Term, <i>Upādhi-vādaḥ</i>	431
The State of Being the Locus or Minor Term, <i>Pakṣatā</i> ..	432
Consideration or Knowledge of Premises, <i>Parāmarśaḥ</i> ..	433
An Exclusively Affirmative Inference, <i>Kevalānvayyanumānam</i>	434
An Exclusively Negative Inference, <i>Kevalavyatirekyanumānam</i>	434
An Affirmative—negative Inference	435
Presumption, <i>Ārthāpatti</i>	435
Inference for One's self, <i>Svārthānumāna</i>	435
Inference for the Sake of Others, <i>Parārthānumāna</i>	435
Syllogism, <i>Nyāyaḥ</i>	436
Parts of a Syllogism, <i>Avayavaḥ</i>	436
Fallacies, <i>Hetvābhāsaḥ</i>	438
Fallacies are serviceable as they point out Inefficiency ..	442
Inference of God, <i>Īśvarānumānam</i>	442
Book III : Comparison, <i>Upamāna-khaṇḍa</i>	443
Book IV : Verbal Testimony, <i>Śabda-khaṇḍa</i>	444
Definition of Verbal Testimony	444
Verbal Knowledge, <i>Śabda-bodhaḥ</i>	444
Speech as a Means of Valid-Knowledge	445
Expectancy, <i>Akāṅkṣā-vādaḥ</i>	447
Consistency, <i>Yogyatā</i>	447
Contiguity, <i>Āsattiḥ</i>	447
Intention, <i>Tātparayam</i>	448
The Non-eternity of Sound	448
Injunction, <i>Vidhi-vādaḥ</i>	448
Merit and Demerit, <i>Apūrva-vādaḥ</i>	449
Potentiality, <i>Śakti-vādaḥ</i>	449
Implication, <i>Lakṣaṇā</i>	451
Compound Words, <i>Samāsa-vādaḥ</i>	453
Verbal Suffixes, <i>Ākhyāta-vādaḥ</i>	453
The Roots, <i>Dhātu-vādaḥ</i>	453
Prefixes, <i>Upasarga-vādaḥ</i>	453
Validity of the Four Means of Knowledge	453

Chapter III.

Commentaries on the *Tattva-cīntāmaṇi*.

	Page
42. The Popularity of <i>Tattva-cīntāmaṇi</i>	454
43. The Mithilā School	454
44. Vardhamāna Upādhyāya	454
45. Pakṣadhara Miśra	455
46. Vāsudeva Miśra	456
47. Rucidatta Miśra	457
48. Bhagīratha or Megha Thakkura	457
49. Maheśa Thakura	457
50. Śankara Miśra	458
51. Vācaspati Miśra (the Younger or Junior)	459
52. Misaru Miśra	460
53. Durgādatta Miśra	460
54. Devanātha Thakkura	460
55. Madhusūdana Thakkura	461
56. The Nadia School	461
57. Vāsudeva Sāryabhauma	461
58. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	463
59. Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya	465
60. Jānakīnātha Śarma	466
61. Kaṇāda Tarkavāgiśa	466
62. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya Chakravarti	466
63. Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa	467
64. Kṛṣṇadāsa Srāvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya	468
65. Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgiśa	468
66. Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma	468
67. Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra	469
68. <i>Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā</i>	470
69. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati	476
70. Jayarāma Nyayapañcānana	477
71. Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma	478
72. Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgiśa	479
73. Harirāma Tarkavāgiśa	479
74. Viśvanātha Siddhāntapañcānana	479
75. Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgiśa	480
76. Govinda Nyāyavāgiśa	480
77. Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra	481
78. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācharya	481
79. Nṛsinha Pañcānana	482
80. Ramadeva Cirañjīva	483
81. Rāmarudra Tarkavāgiśa	483
82. Srikrṣṇa Nyāyālaṅkāra	483
83. Jayarāma Tarkālaṅkāra	483
84. Rudrarāma	484
85. "Buno" Rāmanātha	484
86. Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgiśa	484
87. Rājacūdāmaṇimakhin	485

	<i>Page</i>
88. Dharmarājādhvarin	485
89. Gopīnātha Mauni	485
90. Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Āde	486
91. Mahādeva Puntamkar	486
92. Raghunātha Śāstri (Parvata)	487

Chapter IV.

Present State of the Science of Dialectics.

93. Patronage of the Maharaja of Nadia	488
94. The Portuguese to be an Interest in Dialectics	488
95. British Government encourages Nyāya	490
96. Rise of Vernacular detrimental to Nyāya	492
97. The Universities on the Western Model	492

Appendices.

Appendix A. The University of Taxila	494
Appendix B. Influence of Aristotle on the Development of the Syllogism in Indian Logic	497
Appendix C. The University of Nālandā	514
Appendix D. A List of Kings of the Pāla Dynasty of Bengal and Behar	517
Appendix E. The Royal University of Vikramaśilā	519
Appendix F. University of Mithilā	521
Appendix G. The University of Nadia	523
Appendix H. The Tashi Lama's Visit to India	528
Appendix I. Reminiscences of a Visit to Labrang, Pami- yangchi and Padangi	530
Appendix J. Reminiscences of a Visit to Pamiyangchi	537
Appendix K. Journey to Ceylon	540

INDEXES.

Index of Subjects	542
Index of Books	579
Index of Authors	595
Index of Quotations	599
Index of Sanskrit Terms	611

Tibetan Indexes.

I. Logical Terms	634
II. Tibetan Quotations	638
III. Books	638
IV. Proper Names	644
V. Place Names	646
VI. Residuals	647
VII. Errata	647

A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC.

PART I.

THE ANCIENT SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Ānvikṣikī—the Science of Inquiry (650 B.C.—100 A.D.).

CHAPTER I.

The growth of Ānvikṣikī into an Art of Debate.

1. THE EARLY LITERATURE OF INDIA (CIRCA 1500 B.C.—600 B.C.).

The Brāhmaṇas maintain that their religion is eternal (*sanātana*). It is based on scriptures which are said also to be eternal but revealed in different cycles of time to seers or sages called *Rṣis*. These scriptures are called the Vedas which comprise the Saṁhitās (Hymns) and the Brāhmaṇas (Rituals, etc.).

The Vedas.

The Vedas are regarded even by modern scholars, who do not admit the perpetuity of their existence, to be the oldest records not only of India but of the whole Aryan world. The Saṁhitā of the R̥gveda which is the oldest part of the Veda is said by them to have come down to us from about 1500 B.C., while the Brāhmaṇas such as the Aitareya, Kauṣītakī, etc., are supposed to have belonged to a period between 900 B.C. and 600 B.C. The Āraṇyakas (Forest-treatises), which are theosophic in character, form the closing section of the Brāhmaṇas. The Upaniṣads which deal mainly with metaphysical questions are included in the Āraṇyakas and are as such older than 600 B.C.¹

¹ Compare Macdonell's "History of Sanskrit Literature," p. 47; and my "Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-European Languages."

2. PROBLEMS OF THE VEDAS (CIRCA 1500 B.C.—600 B.C.).

From the standpoint of subject-matter the Vedas (composed between 1500 B.C. and 600 B.C.) may be divided into three sections (kāṇḍas), viz. Prayer, Rituals and Knowledge. *upāsanā* (Prayer), *karma* (Rituals) and *jñāna* (Knowledge). Under *upāsanā* come the Saṁhitās which embody expressions of wonder and awe at the Powers of Nature such as Light, Darkness, Wind, Water, Rain, etc. The Brāhmaṇas which treat mainly of the sacrificial rites come under the head *karma*. The *jñāna-kāṇḍa* as represented by the Āraṇyakas is concerned mainly with the nature of soul and its destiny.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL (900 B.C.—600 B.C.).

As already suggested, the Brāhmaṇas hold that the doctrine of the soul and its destiny propounded in the Āraṇyakas (Upaniṣads) has existed in India from the beginning of time. Their view, which seeks to place the Brāhmaṇic religion on a firm basis unshaken by the influences of time, does not however find favour with modern scholars according to whom all human civilizations, including even the civilizations of the Indian people, grew up by a process of evolution. The conception of the soul and its destiny, like every thing else, has undergone stages of development in the course of ages. These stages may be clearly seen if we examine the doctrine of the soul as given in the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads.

Evolution in the Doctrine of Soul.

The Saṁhitās of the Ṛg-veda¹ and Atharva-veda² tell us that when a person dies his spirit (called *prāṇa*, breath, *asu*, breathing, or *manah*, intelligence, characterised as *aḥ bhāgo*, the unborn part), which leaves behind on earth all that is uncomfortable, is conveyed by the messenger of Yama (the Lord of Death) to the world of his forefathers where it obtains a delectable abode and enters upon a perfect life which will never cease.

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa³ and other later vedic works, which mention the soul as *ātman* lay much stress on its good work called *dharma* (righteous-
Soul in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.

¹ Ṛg-veda Saṁhitā ix. 113, 9, 11; x. 14, 8-10; x. 15, 14; and x. 16, 2, 5.

² Atharva veda saṁhitā xviii. 2, 27. Vide also Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Vol. V, pp. 300-335.

³ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa vi. 2, 2, 27; x. 6, 3, 1; xi. 7, 2, 23. Vide Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Vol. V, pp. 300-335.

ness) which is described as the strength of strengths (*kṣatrasya kṣatram*).¹ According to them all persons are after death reborn into another world where they enjoy pleasures or suffer pains according to their good or evil deeds.

The upaniṣads offer a subtle treatment of the soul distinguishing carefully between *jñāna* (knowledge) and *karma* (work). According to the Chāndogya² and the Brhadāraṇyaka³ a person who has acquired knowledge proceeds after death through the path of gods (*deva-yāna*) to the region of Brahma whence he does not return; while a person who has merely done useful work passing through the path of his forefathers (*pitṛ-yāna*) reaches the moon whence he, after the exhaustion of his merits, comes back to this world; and a person who has neither acquired knowledge nor has done any useful work traverses a third path—the path of transmigration (*saṁsāra*)—which leads him to continual births and deaths.

The third path is more fully expounded in the Kathopaniṣad⁴ which gives a clear exposition of the nature of the soul called *ātman*. The soul is described as being distinct from the body. It is not born, it does not die, it sprang from nothing and nothing sprang from it. It is eternal and everlasting and is not killed though the body is killed. The wise man who knows the soul as bodiless within the body, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, never grieves. The soul is comparable to a person who moves in a chariot, the body is the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, the mind the reins, the senses are the horses and the surrounding objects their spheres of operation. The soul is called the enjoyer when it is in union with the body, the mind and the senses. Fools run after outward pleasures and fall into the snare of death, but wise men cognizant of the imperishable nature of the soul never hanker after unstable things which give rise only to sufferings. As to the destiny of the soul after death, the Kathopaniṣad says that some souls enter the womb to have bodies as organic beings, while others go into inorganic matter according to their work and knowledge. Such transmigration continues until all desires that dwell in the heart cease. Then the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahman.

¹ तदेतत् सच्चिन्मयं ब्रह्म । तस्मात् सच्चिन्मयं परं नास्ति (Brhadāraṇyaka 10-14).

² Chāndogyopaniṣad 4-15, 5, 16; 5-10-3; 5-10-8.

³ Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 4-4-5; 6-2-15, and 16.

⁴ Kathopaniṣad 1-1-20; 1-2-18, 19; 1-2-22; 1-3-3, 4; 2-1-4; 2-5-6, 7; and 2-6-14, 15. Vide also Max Müller's translation of the Kathopaniṣad in the S.B.E. series.

1. *Ātmavidyā*—THE SCIENCE OF SOUL
(CIRCA 900 B.C.—600 B.C.).

The Upaniṣads (composed between 900 B.C. and 600 B.C.) which dealt with the soul and its destiny constituted a very important branch of study called *Ātma-vidyā*, the science of soul, *Adhyātma-vidyā*, the spiritual science, or *Brahma-vidyā*, the Divine Science, which is the foundation of all other sciences. In the previous paragraph there has been given some idea of the nature of the soul—a concrete substance—as it was understood in the ages of the Upaniṣads as well as in those of the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas. In the ages of the Upaniṣads there arose another idea—

an abstract conception—regarding the soul which developed *pari passu* with the first idea. Thus in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,¹ Brhadāranyakopaniṣad,² etc., we find that *ātma*, which referred not only to the human soul but to the soul of other objects as well, signified the essence of an object as distinguished from its outward form, and as such was often designated as *Brahman* the pervading essence, that is, the essence which permeated the object in all its forms and changes. This second idea of the soul, which gave birth to the Vedānta system of philosophy, began to exercise considerable influence on the first idea which was supported in other systems of philosophy, and a compromise between the two ideas was effected when the soul belonging to our practical condition (*vyāvahārika daśā*) was stated to be of the first description while the soul belonging to our transcendental condition (*pāramārthika daśā*) was stated to be of the second description.

5. *Ānvikṣikī*—WHICH INCLUDES A THEORY OF REASONS
(CIRCA 650 B.C.—100 B.C.).

Ātma-vidyā was at a later stage called *Ānvikṣikī*, the science of inquiry. Manu³ uses *Ānvikṣikī* as an equivalent for *ātma-*

¹ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10-3-1 (Weber's edition).

² Brhadāranyakopaniṣad (3rd chapter, 7th Brāhmaṇa), Muṇḍakopaniṣad, i. 1, 1, Bhagavadgītā 10-32.

³

चैवितुभ्यस्तथीं विद्याद्

दण्ढनीतिश्च शास्त्रतौम् ।

आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्यां

वार्त्तारम्भांश्च लोकतः ॥ (Manu Samhitā 7—43).

Kāmandaka too in his Nītisāra writes :—

आन्वीक्षिक्यात्मविज्ञानं धर्माधर्मौ चयौचितौ ।

अर्थानर्थौ च वार्त्तायां दण्ढनीतौ नयानर्थौ ॥

vidyā, and his followers, the Mānavas,¹ describe it—evidently considering it synonymous with the Upaniṣad—as a branch of the Vedas. Ānvikṣikī while comprising the entire function of Ātma-vidyā was in fact different from it, and consequently from the Upaniṣad too. Kauṭilya² (about 327 B.C.) recognized Ānvikṣikī as a distinct branch of study over and above the three, viz. *Trayi*

The distinction between Ānvikṣikī and Ātma-vidyā. (the Vedas), *Vārītā* (Commerce) and *Danḍa-nīti* (Polity) enumerated in the school of

Manu. The distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *Ānvikṣikī* lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions. Ānvikṣikī dealt in fact with two subjects, viz. *ātmā*, soul, and *hetu*, theory of reasons. Vātsyāyana³ observes that Ānvikṣikī without the theory of reasons would have like the Upaniṣad been a mere *ātma-vidyā* or *adhyātma-vidyā*. It is the theory of reasons which distinguished it from the same. The Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, in so far as they treated of reasons affirming or denying the existence of soul, were included by Kauṭilya in the Ānvikṣikī.⁴ The formation of Ānvikṣikī must have commenced in the period of the Upaniṣad in which some of its technical terms were forestalled, but it did not take any definite shapes until about 650 B.C. when it was recognized as a distinct branch of learning.

6. ĀNVIKṢIKI BIFURCATES INTO PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC (ABOUT 650 B.C.).

Ānvikṣikī, as previously pointed out, treated of two subjects, viz. the soul and the theory of reasons. In

The theory of soul and that of reasoning.

so far as it was mainly concerned with the soul, Ānvikṣikī was developed into Philosophy called *Darśana*⁵; and in so far as it dealt largely with the

¹ त्रयीवार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति मानवाः । त्रयीविद्येष्टो ह्यान्विकीति ।

(Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1—2, p. 6, Sham Śāstri's edition).

² ह्यान्विकी त्रयीवार्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति विद्याः ।

(Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1—2, p. 6).

³ इमास्तु चतस्रो विद्याः प्रथक् प्रख्यानाः प्राणभूतामनुग्रहाय उपदिश्यन्ते यासां चतुर्थीयम् ह्यान्विकी न्यायविद्या । तस्याः प्रथक् प्रख्यानाः संशयादयः पदार्थाः । तेषां प्रथमवचनमन्तरेण अध्यात्मविद्यामात्रमिदं स्यात् यथोपनिषदः (Nyāyabhāṣya, 1—1-1).

⁴ सांख्ययोगोलोकायतं चेत्स्यान्विकी (Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya, 1—2, p. 6).

⁵ In Sanskrit दर्शन, in Pāli दस्सन, in Prākṛta दंसण, and in Tibetan ལྟོམ་ ।

theory of reasons it was developed into Logic called pre-eminently *the Ānvikṣikī* or *Ānvikṣikī par excellence*. This bifurcation of Ānvikṣikī into Philosophy and Logic commenced with the very formation of the science but specially about 550 B.C. when Medhātithi Gautama expounded the logical side of the Ānvikṣikī. The Ānvikṣikī continued however for many centuries to be used in the *general sense* of a science which embraced both the subjects of Philosophy and Logic.

7. ĀNVIKṢIKĪ IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT CALLED *Darśana*.

As already observed, Ānvikṣikī treating of the soul was called *Darśana* (philosophy). "Darśana" literally signifies *seeing*: it is in fact the science which enables us to see our soul. The Brhadāranyakopaniṣad¹ says that "the soul is verily to be seen," and the Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā² declares that "the highest virtue consists in seeing the soul through meditation." In the Muṇḍakopaniṣad³ we find that "when the soul is *seen*, the knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are dispelled and all act-forces are exhausted." It was about the first century B.C. that the Ānvikṣikī dealing with the soul was replaced by the word "Darśana." The Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata which were incorporated in Ānvikṣikī were designated as Darśana or branches of philosophy. The word Darśana in this special sense occurs in the Mahābhārata,⁴ Bhāgavata Purāṇa,⁵ Nyāya-bhāṣya,⁶ Vedānta-bhāṣya,⁷ etc.

¹ आत्मा वारे द्रष्टव्यः (Brhadāranyakopaniṣad, ii, 4-5).

² अथन्तु परमो धर्मो यद् योगेनात्मदर्शनम् (Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā, book i, verse 8).

³ भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः विद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः

जीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥ (Muṇḍakopaniṣad, ii, 2-8).

⁴ तुल्यं शौचं तपोयज्ञं दया भूतेषु चानघ ।

व्रतानां धारणं तुल्यं दर्शनं न समं तयोः ॥ (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 110-45).

⁵ स्तूयमानो जनैर्गभिः मायया नामरूपया ।

विमोहितात्मभिर्नाना दर्शनैर्न च दृश्यते ॥ (Bhāgavatapurāṇa, 8-14-10).

⁶ यत् पुष्पधर्मो ज्ञानम् अन्तःकरणस्य इच्छा द्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखानि धर्मा इति कस्यचिद् दर्शनं तत् प्रतिषिध्यते । (Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3-2-35).

⁷ Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on the Vedānta sūtra 2-2-1.

8. VARIOUS NAMES FOR ĀNVIKṢIKĪ IN ITS LOGICAL ASPECT
(FROM 650 B.C. ONWARDS).

As already observed, Ānvikṣikī dealing with the theory of reasons was developed into Logic designated specially as *the Ānvikṣikī*—or *Ānvikṣikī par excellence*. We find the term Ānvikṣikī¹ used in this *special sense* of Logic in the Manusamhitā,² Gautama-dharma-sūtra,³ Rāmāyaṇa,⁴ Mahābhārata,⁵ etc. In about 327 B.C. Kauṭilya⁶ characterised the Ānvikṣikī (evidently Logic) as a highly useful science which furnished people with reasons for the estimation of their strength and weakness, kept their intellect unperturbed in prosperity and adversity, and infused into their intelligence, speech and action, subtlety and power.

The Ānvikṣikī, in virtue of the theory of reasons predominating it, was called *Hetu-śāstra* or *Hetu-vidyā*,⁷ the science of reasoning, as is evident from the Manusamhitā,⁸ Mahābhārata,⁹ etc.

It was also called *Tarka-vidyā*,¹⁰ the art of debate, or *Vāda-vidyā*, the art of discussion, inasmuch as it dealt with rules for carrying on disputations in learned assemblies called *pariṣad*.

¹ The *Ānvikṣikī* is called in Tibetan རྩོམ་པ་ *rtsod-pa*. (Vide the Amarakoṣa, Svargavarga, verse 155, edited in Sanskrit with Tibetan version by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

² Manusamhitā 7-43.

³ Gautama-dharma-sūtra, adhyāya 11.

⁴ Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, sarga 100, verse 36.

⁵ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya, 180, verse 47.

⁶ धर्माधर्मा चय्याम् । चर्यानिर्णयौ वार्तायाम् । नयानयो दण्डनीत्याम् । बलावले चैतासां हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाणो लोकस्यापकरोति, यस्यनेभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति, प्रज्ञावाक्त्रिया वैशारद्यं च करोति—

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्माणाम् ।

आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शशदान्वीक्षकौ मता ॥

(Artha śāstra of Kauṭilya, p. 1-2, 7).

⁷ The Hetu-śāstra or Hetu-vidyā is called in Tibetan གཏན་རྩིས་རྒྱུ་ལྟ་བུ་ *Gtan-tshigg-rig-pa* (vide the Mahāvvyutpatti, part I, p. 20, edited in Sanskrit, Tibetan and English by Dr. E. D. Ross and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta. Also *Bstan-hgyur*, *mdo*, Go, folios 223-377).

⁸ Manusamhitā, 2-11.

⁹ Mahābhārata, ādiparva, adhyāya 1, verse 67. Śāntiparva, adhyāya 210, verse 22; Aśvamedhaparva, adhyāya 85, verse 27. Cf. J.R.A.S. 1891-92, pp. 1-39, and 412.

¹⁰ *Tarka-vidyā* is called in Tibetan རྩོམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་ *Rtog-ge-rig* (vide Amarakoṣa, Svargavarga, verse 155, Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition).

Tarka-vidyā or Vāda-vidyā is referred to in the Manusamhitā,¹ Mahābhārata,² Skandapurāṇa,³ Gautama-dharma-sūtra,⁴ Rāmāyāṇa,⁵ Yājñavalkya samhitā,⁶ etc. The Nyāya-sāstra. Ānvikṣikī was, as we shall see later, also called *Nyāya-sāstra*,⁷ the science of true reasoning.

¹ Manusamhitā, 6-50; 8-269, 12-106, 111.

² Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 180, verse 47, and adhyāya 246, verse 18.

³ Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17.

⁴ Gautama-dharma-sūtra, adhyāya 11.

⁵ Rāmāyaṇa 1-13-23, 7-53-15.

⁶ Yājñavalkya-samhitā, 3-292; etc.

⁷ The *Nyāya* is called in Tibetan རྟོག་པ་ Rig-pa (*vide* the Mahāvvyutpatti, part II, p. 133, edited in Sanskrit-Tibetan-English by Dr. E. D. Ross and Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta; also—Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Go, folios 223-377).

CHAPTER II.

The Teachers of Ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy and Logic).

9. CĀRVĀKA—HIS MATERIALISTIC DOCTRINE (CIRCA 650 B.C.).

The Vedic literature¹ refers to a class of men who did not believe in gods, and would not perform sacrifices. They were subsequently designated as the followers of Cārvāka, a pupil of Brhaspati. Cārvāka was perhaps not the name of any particular individual but represented the atheistic doctrine of olden times. In the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad² (before 600 B.C.) there is a reference to such doctrine according to which our soul (consciousness) is produced through the combination of four elements, viz. earth, water, fire and air, just as an intoxicating power is generated by the comixture of rice, molasses, etc.

The dissolution into those elements is our death, after which our consciousness disappears. In the Rāmāyaṇa³ the same doctrine is elucidated by Jāvēla when he says that our parents are our progenitors, that there is no future life and that we should not believe in anything which cannot be proved through perception. This doctrine, which is referred to also in the Caraka-saṁhitā,⁴ etc., and which attracted a very large number of adherents, is widely known as *Lokāyata* or that which prevails in the world.⁵

10. KAPILA—HIS DOCTRINE OF MATTER AND SOUL (ABOUT 650-575 B.C.).

The earliest orthodox writer on Ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy) as mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara⁶ Upaniṣad was Kapila who is tradition-

¹ Vide R̥gveda, 10-38-3; 8-70-7; 8-71-8, etc.

² अरेयमात्मा जनकरोवाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव
एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः ससुत्याय तान्येव अनुविनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति ।
(Brhadāraṇyaka, 4-5-13).

³ स नास्ति परमित्येतत् कुब बुद्धिं मद्भामते ।
प्रत्यक्षं यत् तदातिष्ठ परोक्षं दृष्टतः कुब ॥
(Rāmāyana, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, sarga 108, verse 17).

⁴ Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, chap. XI.

⁵ For a history of the Lokāyata compare Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids' Introduction to the Kūṭadanta Sutta in "Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. II."

⁶ अविं प्रकृतं कपिलं यत्तमये ।
ज्ञानैर्विभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ॥ (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, 5-2).

ally known to have been born at Puṣkara near Ajmere, but who according to the Padmapurāṇa dwelt in Indraprastha (Delhi). The doctrine propounded by him was orally transmitted to form at later times a system of philosophy called the *Sāṃkhya*. Kapila imparted his doctrine to Āsuri¹ who taught it to Pañcaśikha. The

The *Sāṃkhya* doctrine of soul, *puruṣa*. fact that Āsuri is mentioned in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa² as a teacher warrants us to suppose that he lived before 600 B.C. which is the latest date of composition of the Brāhmaṇas. Kapila as the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu preceded Dattātreyā. Seeing that Kapila preceded Buddha (circa 570–490 B.C.) we shall not be far wrong if we place the former at an age from 650 B.C. to 570 B.C. As the original work of Kapila has not come down to us we can say nothing about his doctrine beyond the fact that he treated of the soul under the name of *Puruṣa* and the primordial matter under the name of *Prakṛti*, both of which were, according to him, eternal.³ The soul, which experiences pleasure and pain owing to its connection with matter, attains release when it realizes itself to be totally unconnected with the same.

11. DATTĀTREYA—HIS PARABLE OF A TREE (ABOUT 650 B.C.).

A sage named Dattātreyā,⁴ who as the sixth incarnation of Viṣṇu was junior to Kapila, is stated in the Bhāgavata purāṇa to have taught Ānvikṣikī to Alarka, Prahlāda and others. The proper name of the sage was Datta while his family name was Ātreya. He lived on the Girnar hills in Kathiawar where a temple associated with his name still exists. It appears from the Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa⁵ that the Ānvikṣikī-vidyā expounded by him consisted of

¹ *Sāṃkhya kārikā*, verse 70.

² Macdonell's *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 215.

³ अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लदण्डां
वह्नीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजं ह्येकीं जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्यनां भुङ्क्तभोगानजोऽन्यः ॥ (Śvetāśvatara, 4–5).

⁴ षष्ठमक्षरपत्यत्वं दत्तः प्राप्नोऽनन्तयया ।
आन्वोच्चिकोऽसलर्काय प्रज्ञादादिभ्य जच्चिवान् ॥
(Bhāgavata purāṇa, 1–3–12).

⁵ शृणु तात यथा योगो दत्तात्रेयेण धीमता ।
असलर्काय पुरा प्रोक्तः सम्यक् शृष्टेन विस्तृतात् ॥
(Mārkaṇḍeya purāṇa, 16–12).

A sage named Ātreya is mentioned in the Kauśika sūtra of the Atharva-veda. Vide Weber's *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 153.

a mere disquisition on soul in accordance with the *yoga* philosophy.

The yoga doctrine of soul. He preached the doctrines of transmigration and emancipation under the parable of a tree. To identify a gross object with "I" or to look upon it as "mine" is, according to him, the germ of selfishness which grows up into a large tree bearing the fruits of pleasure and pain. He in whom the tree of selfishness has not grown is freed from all bondage for ever. Things when looked upon in their true nature do not cause affliction but they become sources of great woes when we consider them as our own.

From this summary we may conclude that Dattātreya expounded the philosophical side of Ānvikṣikī and not its logical aspect.

12. PUNARVASU ĀTREYA: HIS DISSERTATION ON THE SENSES (CIRCA 550 B.C.).

In the Caraka-saṁhitā, the original author of which was Punarvasu Ātreya,¹ there is a dissertation on the senses (*indriya*)² which seems to belong to the Ānvikṣikī system. The Caraka-saṁhitā, originally called the Āyurveda, is said to have been delivered by a sage named Punarvasu better known as Ātreya who resided at the side of the Himālayas. The sage was perhaps the same Ātreya³ who is mentioned in the Tibetan books as a Professor of medicine under whom Jīvaka the physician of Buddha studied for several years at Taxila about 550 B.C. Ātreya was a countryman of Pāṇini as both of them flourished in the Punjab—one at Taxila (Takṣaśilā) and the other at Śālātura. Like the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, Ātreya's Āyurveda⁴ was divided into eight books called "sthānas" or "places." The rule which Pāṇini lays down as to the use of the word Punarvasu in the singular number shows that Ātreya whose proper name was Punarvasu was a Vedic sage.

It is not known whether the Caraka-saṁhitā, as it exists at present, contains any genuine teachings of Ātreya, but the most elementary doctrines of each book of the saṁhitā are by common consent ascribed to him. The eighth chapter of sūtra-sthāna

¹ Ātreya is called in Tibetan རྒྱུན་ལེན་ཀྱི་བུ་ Rgyun-léng-kyi-bu (*vide* Mahāvvyutpatti, p. 22, Bibliotheca Indica).

² अर्थानि इन्द्रिय, प्रक्रमणीयमध्यायं व्याख्यास्याम इति च साह भगवान् आनेयः ।

(Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, adhyāya 8).

³ Bkaḥ-hgyur, Dulva III. *Vide* Rockhill's Life of Buddha, p. 64. Cf. Pali Mahāvagga, Khandhakas I, VIII in which there occurs the name Aṭṭhaka.

⁴ अर्न्दास पुनर्वसोरकवचनम् (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 1-2-61).

of the work contains a dissertation on the senses a summary of which is given below:—

There are five organs of sense, viz. the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. The five elements of which these are made are fire, ether, earth, water and air. The five objects of sense are colour, sound, smell, taste and touch. The five kinds of sensuous knowledge are the visual, the auditory, the olfactory, the gustatory and the tactual. The mind, which is different from these senses, is one and as such cannot attend to them simultaneously. Hence we cannot perceive more than one thing at a time.

Dissertations on the senses, like the one given above, contributed not a little to the development of the doctrine of soul which formed a part of the Ānvikṣikī.

13. SULABHĀ—A LADY ASCETIC: HER CANONS OF SPEECH (ABOUT 550-500 B.C.).

In the Mahābhārata¹ there is mention of an old female ascetic named Sulabhā who delivered a discourse on what constituted the merits and defects of speech as belonging to the province of Ānvikṣikī. Sulabhā, who was in all probability a fictitious person, represents the philosophical culture of the 6th century B.C. It is related that once she transforming herself by occult processes into a lady of blooming youth came to the court of Janaka the pious king of Mithilā, whose fame as a philosopher was established far and wide. After the rites of hospitality had been duly observed she was led to the royal presence. Janaka was not a little surprised to hear that her sole object in coming to his court was to ascertain, from a personal interview with him, wherein lay the secret of final release of the soul. Janaka pointed out the impudence of such a wish entertained by a lady whose ambition must be something gross and material, and who must have come to his court as a spy. He concluded by asking in a taunting tone what business a lady could have had with the doctrine of *Release*, seeing that her strength lay solely in her radiant youth and beauty. Though rebuked in such unpleasant, improper and ill-applied terms, Sulabhā was not in the least annoyed but maintained a tranquil and dignified attitude. In the course of her reply to the king she made the following observations, on the canons of a sound speech:—

A speech properly so called should be subtle, discriminative and orderly. It should lead to a decision and indicate a purpose.

¹ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 320, verses 78-94.

A good speech is (1) fraught with sense, (2) unequivocal, (3) fair, (4) not pleonastic, (5) smooth, (6) determinative, (7) not bombastic, (8) agreeable, (9) truthful, (10) not harmful, (11) refined, (12) not too laconic, (13) not abstruse, (14) not unsystematic, (15) not far-fetched, (16) not superfluous, (17) not inopportune, and (18) not devoid of an object.

A speech, if it is to be freed from the faults of judgment, should not be prompted by lust, wrath, fear, greediness, abjectness, crookedness, shamefulness, tenderness or conceit.

A speech is said to be lucid if there is agreement between it on one hand and the speaker and hearer on the other. A speech which, though clear to the speaker himself, is uttered without any regard for the hearer, produces no impression in the latter. That speech again, which does not convey the meaning of the speaker himself but is uttered solely out of regard for the hearer, is disingenuous and faulty. He alone is a speaker who employs words which, while expressing his own meaning, are also understood by his hearer.

14. AṢṬĀVAKRA—A VIOLENT DEBATER: HOW HE DEFEATED A SOPHIST (ABOUT 550-500 B.C.).

In the Mahābhārata¹ the sage Aṣṭāvakra ("crooked in eight parts"), who represents the culture of the 6th century B.C., is stated to have been a great logician. He was the son of Kahoḍa who was a disciple and son-in-law of Uddālaka, father of Śvetaketu. With the object of defeating a famous sophist named Vandin, otherwise known as the son of Suta or Varuṇa, Aṣṭāvakra while a mere boy came to attend a sacrificial ceremony at the palace of king Janaka in Mithilā. Being prevented at the gate Aṣṭāvakra addressed the king and said: "A road while there is no Brāhmaṇa on it belongs to the blind, the deaf, women, carriers of burden and the king respectively, but when a Brāhmaṇa is there it belongs to him alone." Hearing these words the king gave him permission to enter. The warder in offering an apology said, that Aṣṭāvakra was stopped because he was still a lad, and under orders of Vandin lads were not permitted to enter the sacrificial ground. Aṣṭāvakra said: "If

Aṣṭāvakra's debate with Vandin. this be the condition O warder, that the door is opened only to the old, I have a right to enter, I am old: I have observed sacred vows and am in possession of energy proceeding from the Vedic lore. A person is not old because his head is gray but the gods

¹ Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, Chaps. 132-134.

regard him as old who, though young in years, is possessed of knowledge." "Who is Vandin? Where is he now? Tell him to come here so that I may destroy him even as the sun destroys the stars."

Vandin was summoned to be present in the assembly of debate on the sacrificial ground. While he arrived there Aṣṭāvakra threatened him and exclaimed: "Do thou answer my questions and I shall answer thine!"

- (1) Aṣṭāvakra asks: What things are signified by one?

Vandin replies: There is only one *fire* that blazes forth in various shapes, there is only one *sun* that illumines the whole world, there is only one lord of the gods named *Indra*, and the lord of the deceased forefathers is also one, named *Yama*.

- (2) Vandin asks: What things are signified by two?

Aṣṭāvakra replies: There are two friends named *Indra* and *Agni* who move together, the two celestial sages are *Nārada* and *Parvata*, twins are the *Āsvīnīkumāras*, two is the number of *wheels* of a car, and the *wife* and *husband* are likewise two that live together.

- (3) Aṣṭāvakra asks: What things are signified by three?

Vandin replies: There are three classes of *beings* born in consequence of their acts, three are the *Vedas* which perform the Vājapeya sacrifice, at three times the *adhvaryu* priests commence sacrificial rites, three is the number of the *world*, and three also are the *divine lights*.

- (4) Vandin asks: What things are signified by four?

Aṣṭāvakra replies: Four are the *stages* of a Brāhmaṇa's life, sacrifices are performed by four *orders*, there are four *cardinal points* as well as *colours*, and four is the number of the *legs* of a cow.

- (5) Aṣṭāvakra asks: What things are signified by five?

Vandin replies: There are five *fires*, the metre *pañkti* possesses five feet, the *sacrifices* are five and there are five *senses*, the *locks* of celestial nymphs are five, and five are the *rivers* of the Punjab.

- (6) Vandin asks: What things are signified by six?

Aṣṭāvakra replies: Six *cows* are paid as a gratuity on the occasion of establishing the sacred fire, the *seasons* are six, six are the *senses*, six stars constitute the constellation *kṛttikā*, and six is the number of the *sādyaska* sacrifices.

- (7) Aṣṭāvakra asks: What things are signified by seven?

Vandin replies: Seven is the number of *domesticated animals*, the *wild animals* are likewise seven, seven metres are used in completing a *sacrifice*, the *sages* are seven in number,

seven forms of paying *homage* are extant in the world, and seven are the strings of a *lute*.

(8) Vandin asks : What things are signified by eight ?

Aṣṭāvakra replies : Eight are the *hemp-threads* which carry a hundred weights, eight is the number of legs of the *stag* that preys upon a lion, eight *Vasu*-gods are among the celestials, and eight are the *angles of a stake* in a sacrificial rite.

(9) Aṣṭāvakra asks : What things are signified by nine ?

Vandin replies : Nine is the number of *mantras* used in kindling fire for the manes, nine are the appointed functions in the process of *creation*, nine letters compose a foot of the metre *vṛhatī*, and nine is ever the number of *figures* in calculation.

(10) Vandin asks : What things are signified by ten ?

Aṣṭāvakra replies : Ten is the number of *cardinal points*, ten times hundred make up a *thousand*, ten is the number of *months* during which women bear, and ten are the *teachers* of true knowledge.

(11) Aṣṭāvakra asks : What things are signified by eleven ?

Vandin replies : Eleven are the *modifications of senses*, the number of *yūpas* (stakes) is eleven, eleven are the *changes of the natural state*, and there are eleven *Rudras* among the gods in heaven.

(12) Vandin asks : What things are signified by twelve ?

Aṣṭāvakra replies : Twelve months complete a *year*, a foot of the metre *jagatī* consists of twelve letters, there are twelve *minor sacrifices* and twelve is the number of the *Adityas*.

(13) Aṣṭāvakra asks : What things are signified by thirteen ?

Vandin replies : The *thirteenth lunar day* is considered most auspicious, and thirteen *islands* exist on earth.

Having proceeded so far, Vandin stopped.

Aṣṭāvakra completed the reply thus :

Thirteen sacrifices are presided over by *Keśi*, and thirteen letters compose the *aticchandās* metre.

Seeing Aṣṭāvakra speaking and Vandin silent, the assembly

Shouts of victory for
Aṣṭāvakra.

broke into a loud uproar indicative of victory for one and defeat for the other. The

Brāhmaṇas present there being pleased approached Aṣṭāvakra to pay him their homage. Aṣṭāvakra said : "This Vandin defeating the Brāhmaṇas in controversy used to cast them into water. Let him to-day meet with the same fate : seize him and drown him into water." Janaka remaining speechless, Aṣṭāvakra reproached him thus : "O King, has flattery robbed thee of thy sense so that pierced by my words, as elephants by the

hooks, thou heedest them not!" Janaka replied: "Your words are excellent and superhuman. As you have defeated Vandin in debate, I place him at your disposal."¹

15. AṢṬĀVAKRA SOLVES PUZZLES.

At Mithilā King Janaka to test the ingenuity of Aṣṭāvakra² once made a statement as follows:—

"He alone is a learned man who knows the thing which is possessed of 360 spokes (i.e. days), 12 parts (i.e. months) of 30 subdivisions (days) each, and 24 joints (i.e. new moons and full moons)."

Aṣṭāvakra who fully understood the significance of the statement replied as follows:—

"May that ever-moving wheel (i.e. the sun) that has 24 joints (i.e. new moons and full moons), six naves (i.e. seasons), 12 peripheries (i.e. the signs of the zodiac or months) and 360 spokes (i.e. degrees or days) protect thee."

Janaka asked: "Who amongst the gods beget those two which go together like two mares yoked to a car and swoop like hawks?"

Aṣṭāvakra said: "May God, O King, forbend the presence of these two (i.e. thunder and lightning) in thy house, yea even in the house of thy enemies. He (i.e. the cloud), whose charioteer is the wind, begets them."

Thereupon the king said: "What is it that does not close its eyes even while sleeping; what is it that does not move even when born; what is it that has no heart. and what does increase even in its own speed?"

Aṣṭāvakra said: "It is a fish that does not close its eye-lids while sleeping; it is an egg that does not move when produced; it is a stone that has no heart; and it is a river that increases in its own speed."

¹ The dialogue, which shows besides their ready wit, an acquaintance of the debaters with all branches of learning known at their time, is neither "enigmatical" nor "puerile," when we consider that in olden times the names of things stood for numbers, nay constituted the dictionary of numbers called *Aṅkābhidhāna*. It bears to a certain extent an analogy to the novice's questions (*Kumāra pañha*) which appear from the Pāli canonical works to have been a necessary part of the training of a young Buddhist monk.

The doctrine involved in the dialogue was criticised by Akṣapāda in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (4-1-41) under the title of *Samkhyaikānta-vāda*, the doctrine of the fixity of things signified by numbers.

The dialogue is quite simple and natural, and I do not find in it an exposition of the doctrine of unity of the Supreme Being as supposed by Nilakantha, a commentator on the *Mahābhārata*, who lived at Kūrpara to the west of the Godāvarī in *Mahārāṣṭra* in the 16th century A.D.

² *Mahābhārata*, *Vanaparva*, chaps, 132-134.

The king amazed at Aṣṭāvakra's ingenuity remained silent for a while, and then applauded him thus: "O possessor of divine energy thou art no human being."

16. MEDHĀTITHI GAUTAMA—THE FOUNDER OF ĀNVIKṢIKI
par excellence
(CIRCA 550 B.C.).

While the teachers mentioned before dealt with some particular topics of Ānvīkṣikī, the credit of founding the Ānvīkṣikī in its special sense of a science is to be attributed to a sage named Gotama or Gautama. In the Padmapurāṇa,¹ Skandapurāṇa,² Gandharva tantra,³ Kusumāñjali, Naiṣadha carita,⁴ Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti, etc., Gotama or Gautama is mentioned as the founder of the science of Ānvīkṣikī (Logio) or Anvikṣikī *par excellence*. The people of Mithilā, too, ascribe the foundation of the science of Ānvīkṣikī or Logio to Gotama or Gautama. The birth-place of and point out, as the place of his birth, a village named Gautama-sthāna⁵ where a fair is held every year on the 9th day of the lunar month of Caitra (March-April). It is situated on the outskirts of Mithilā at a distance of 28 miles north-east of modern Darbhanga. There is a mud-hill of considerable height (supposed to be the hermitage of Gautama) at the base of which lies the celebrated Gautama-kunḍa ("Gautama's well"), the water whereof is like milk to the taste and feeds a perennial rivulet called on this account "Kṣīrodadhi" or "Khiroī" signifying literally the sea of milk.

Gautama lived with his wife Ahalyā who, for her flirtation with Indra, was, according to the Rāmāyaṇa,⁶ cursed by her

1 कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं मद्दत् ।
गोतमेन तथा न्यायं सांख्यं तु कपिलेन वै ।
(Padmapurāṇa, Uttarakhaṇḍa, chap. 263).

2 गोतमः स्त्रेन तर्केण खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि ।
(Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, chap. xvii).

3 गोतमप्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरताः सर्व एव हि ।
शास्त्रार्थी योनिमापन्नाः सन्दिग्धाः सर्व कर्मसु ॥
(Gandharva tantra quoted in Prāṇatoṣiṇī tantra).

4 मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रसूचे मद्दामुनिः ।
गोतमं तमवेतैव यथा विन्य तथैव सः ॥
(Naiṣadha carita, canto xvii).

5 The author of this book visited Gautama-sthāna in October 1913.

6 मिथिलीपवने तत्र आश्रमं दृश्य राघवः ।
पुराणं निर्जनं रम्यं पप्रच्छ मुनिपुङ्गवम् ॥ १ ॥

husband and transformed into a stone. She remained in this stony state for some time until she was emancipated by Rāma-candra. Then she regained her human form and was admitted into heaven.

Ahalyā in her accursed state is at present represented by a slab of stone, which lies between a pair of trees in a village called Ahalyā-sthāna (Ahiria) two miles to the east of Gautama-sthāna already mentioned. In the vicinity of this slab there is a temple which commemorates the emancipation of Ahalyā by Rāma-candra.

The Mahābhārata¹ which gives a different version of the story mentions a son of Ahalyā named Cirakārīn who is said to have been ordered by his father to kill Ahalyā, but who, being of a reflective turn of mind, refrained from carrying out the order. Gautama, in consideration of the natural weakness of her sex, pardoned his wife and dwelt from that time forward in his hermitage without ever separating himself from her.

In the Pratimā-nāṭaka² the poet Bhāsa, who is believed to have flourished during the Kuśāna period,³ speaks of a sage named Medhātithi as the founder of the Nyāya-śāstra, a later appellation for the Ānvikṣikī. In the Mahābhārata,⁴ we find that Medhātithi and Gautama were the names of the same person, one being his proper name and the other his family name. Therefore the full name of the founder of Ānvikṣikī was Medhātithi Gautama.

इदमात्रमसंकाशं किंन्विद सुनिवर्जितम् ।

अतुमिच्छामि भगवन् कस्यायमुर्ध्वं आश्रमः ॥ १२ ॥

गौतमस्य नरयेष्ठ पूर्वमासौ नृदात्मनः ।

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशः सुरैरपि सुपूजितः ॥ १३ ॥

स चान्न तप आतिष्ठददृष्ट्यासहितः पुराः ।

वर्षं पूमान्यनेकानि राजपुत्र महायशः ॥ १४ ॥

(Rāmāyaṇa, Ādikāṇḍa, sarga 48).

¹ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 272-9; and Aśvamedhaparva, 56-26.

² भोः काश्यपगोत्रोऽस्मि । साङ्गोपाङ्गं वेदमधीये, मानवीयं धर्मशास्त्रं, माहेश्वरं योगशास्त्रं बार्हस्पत्यम् अथैशास्त्रं, मेधातिथेर्न्यायशास्त्रं, प्राचेतसं श्राद्धकल्पं च ।

(Bhāsa's Pratimā-nāṭaka, Act V, p. 79, M.M. Gaṇapati Śāstri's edition).

³ Vide A. M. Meerwarth's "The dramas of Bhāsa: a literary study" in J.A.S.B., 1917.

मेधातिथिर्महाप्राज्ञो गौतमस्तपसि स्थितः ।

विदुष्य तेन कालेन पत्न्याः संस्थावतिक्रमम् ॥

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 265-45, Bāṅgavāsi edition).

Medhātithi Gautama seems to have belonged to the family and school of Naciketas Gautama¹ and to have sprung, like Buddha Gautama, from the Āṅgīrasa² tribe. His remote ancestor was perhaps the sage Nodhā Gotama descended from that Gotama who is described in the R̥gveda,³ and the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa⁴ of the White Yajurveda as having settled in a place the description of which tallies with that of Gautama-sthāna in Mithilā. The descendants of Gotama⁵ were called Gotamāsah, Gotama or Gautama.⁶

1 शान्तसङ्कल्पसुमना यथास्याद्वीतमन्युर्गौतमो माभिच्छ्रियो ।
 लप्सुदृष्टं माभिवदेत् प्रतीत एतत् त्रयाणां प्रथमं वरं दृष्टे ॥
 यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।
 एवं सुने विज्जनत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥
 हन्त त इदं प्रवक्ष्यामि गुह्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ।
 यथा च मरणं प्राप्य आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥

(Kāthopaniṣad, 1-1-10 ; 2-4-15 ; and 2-5-6).

² In the Pāli Mahāvagga Āṅgīrasa (in Pāli Āṅgīrasa) occurs as a name of Buddha Gautama who evidently belonged to the Āṅgīrasa tribe:—

Āṅgīrasassa kāye anekavaṇṇā acciyo honti—

(Mahāvagga, pathamaṃ pāṭihāriyaṃ, I. 15.7, p. 25, Dr. Oldenberg's edition).
 Āṅgīraso Sakyamuni sabbabhūtānukampako.

(Parivāra III. 5, edited by Dr. H. Oldenberg).

In the Mahābhārata and Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa, Gautama (husband of Ahalyā) and his son Cīrakārin are described as having belonged to the Āṅgīrasa tribe:—

अचापुदाहरन्तोमामितिहासं पुरातनम्
 चिरकारिस्तु यत्पूर्वं दत्तमाङ्गिरसे कुले ॥
 चिरकारौ महाप्राज्ञौ गौतमस्याभवत् सुतः ।
 चिरेण सर्वकार्याणि विमृश्यान् प्रपद्यते ॥

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, chap. 265, verses 2-4 ; Calcutta, Baṅgavāsi edition).

वने लङ्गिरसः श्रेष्ठो गौतमो नाम योमवित् ।
 तस्माद् भविष्यते पुण्यं गौतमं नाम तदनम् ॥

(Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa, anuṣaṅgapāda, chapter 23).

³ R̥gveda-saṃhitā, maṇḍala 1, sūkta 81, verse 3 ; sūkta 61, verses 14-16 ; sūkta 62, verse 6 ; sūkta 62, verse 13 ; sūkta 64, verse 1 ; sūkta 77, verse 5 ; sūkta 85, verse 11.

⁴ Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajurveda, kāṇḍa 1, adhyāya 4, Mādhyandiniya recension. Vide also my article on "The Localization of certain hymns of the R̥gveda" in J.A.S.B., February 1914.

5 अङ्गवच्छिरः कृत्यवशिष्ट गौतमेभ्यश्च । ९९९ ॥

(Kātantra, Catuṣṭaya kārakaprakaraṇa).

⁶ The story of Gautama as related above seems to be historical in so far as his family and native-place are concerned, but the legend of Ahalyā associated with the story is untrustworthy.

We thus find that Medhātithi, Gotama, Gautama and Medhātithi Gautama were the names for one and the same person, who founded the Ānvikṣikī *par excellence*. His work on Ānvikṣikī has not come down to us in its original form. We do not therefore know whether he treated of the soul and reasoning together in one volume, or dealt with them separately. His theory of reasoning has reached us in a crude form through the Caraka-saṁhita, and in a developed form through the Nyāya-sūtra, while we may gather some idea of his theory of soul through the same sources as well as through the Mahābhārata and the Pali Brahmajāla-sutta.

Bhāsa¹ speaks of Medhātithi's "Nyāya-śāstra". The term *Nyāya* was prevalent in the day of Bhāsa, and by "Nyāya śāstra" he really meant its prototype the Ānvikṣikī. In the Śānti-parva of the Mahābhārata,² there is mention of a Medhātithi who, along with certain other sages, revealed to the world the Upaniṣad-doctrine of emancipation. This Medhātithi seems to have been the same as our Medhātithi Gautama.

Medhātithi Gautama is more often called simply Gautama. As previously noticed, Gautama was the name under which the founder of Ānvikṣikī was best known in the Padmapurāṇa, Matsya-purāṇa, etc., and his art of debate is still designated as *Gautamī*

Vidyā (Gotamide science). The fame of Gautama as a great master of the art of debate seems to have spread as far as Persia. In one of the yashts³ of the Khorda Avesta edited⁴ during the reigns of the Sasanian Kings Ardashīr (A.D. 211-241) and Shapūr I (A.D. 242-272), we read⁵ "how the Fravashis cause

¹ Bhāsa's Pratimā-nāṭaka, Act V, p. 79, M.M. Gaṇapati Śāstri's edition.

² चतुर्थोपनिषदो धर्मः साधारणः स्मृतः ।
वानप्रस्थाद् गृहस्थाच्च ततोऽन्यः संप्रवर्तते ॥
अस्मिन्नेव युगे तात विप्रः सर्वार्थदर्शिभिः ।
मेधातिथिर्बुधः । ... एनं धर्मं कृतवन्तः ॥

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Mokṣadharmā, adhyāya 243, verses 14-17).

³ Vide the 13th yasht, para. 16.

⁴ According to Arda-viraf-nāma, the Avesta written on cow-hides with golden ink, and given to the Persians by Zaratusht (Zoroaster), existed in its original form for 300 years until it was burnt by Iskander Rumi (Alexander the Great) who destroyed Persepolis about 325 B.C. The fragments that survived were put together by Zoroastrian priests under the name of Avesta, which was edited and proclaimed canonical during the reigns of Ardashīr and Shapūr of the Sasanian dynasty. It is suggested that it was in the Sasanian period that Indian traditions entered the scripture of the Persians. Cf. Dr. K. Geldner's "Persia" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

⁵ Vide the 13th yasht, para. 16; and Early Religious Poetry of Persia, by J. H. Moulton, p. 141.

a man to be born who is a master in assemblies and skilled in sacred lore, so that he *comes away from debate* a victor over *Gaotema*.¹”

In the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*² of the Pāli Sutta-piṭaka we meet with ten orders of non-Buddhist recluses of which “*Gotamakā*”³ was one. This order Medhātithi Gautama’s age. referred most probably to the followers of Gotama or Gautama the founder of *Ānvīkṣikī*. The *Brahmajāla-sutta*⁴ describes a sage designated as *takki* (argumentationist) and *vīmaṃsi* (casuist) who maintained that certain things were eternal and other things were non-eternal. If this sage was identical with the leader of the *Gotamakā* sect or the founder of the *Ānvīkṣikī*, it will be difficult to resist the conclusion that he was a senior contemporary of Buddha Śākyamuni. We may therefore fix the date of Medhātithi Gautama at about 550 B.C.

¹ “*Gaotema*,” who is identified by Dr. Haug and J. H. Moulton, with the Buddha Gautama, is more probably the same as Medhātithi Gautama, the well-known founder of the art of debate and a descendant of Nodhā Gautama. “*Yō Nāidyāonhō Gaotēmahe paro-yāo parstōitavāiti*. (Yasht 13, para. 16).

² *Āṅguttaranikāya*, part III, chap. 65, pp 276–77, edited by Dr. Morris, Pāli Text Society.

³ Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids in his *Introduction to the Kassapa-siha-nāda sutta* in the *Dialogues of Buddha*, pp. 220–21, observes: “the only alternative is that some *Brāhmaṇa*, belonging to the *Gotama-gotta*, is here referred to as having had a community of *Bhikṣus* named after him.”

⁴ The *Brahmajāla sutta* 1–32 included in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, p. 29, edited by Dr. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London.

CHAPTER III.

The Doctrines of Ānvikṣikī.

16. A COUNCIL OF DEBATE (*Parīṣad*) (CIRCA 900-500 B.C.).

The theory of reasons (*hetu*), which formed an important subject of Ānvikṣikī, grew out of debates in councils of learned men. In the Chāndogya¹ and Brhadāranyaka² upaniṣads there are references to councils for the discussion of metaphysical subjects, e.g. the nature of the soul and the Supreme Being. The Praśnopaniṣad³ reports the proceedings of a council, in which Sukeśā Bhāradvāja, Saivya Satyakāma, Sauryāyaṇī Gārgya, Kauśalya Āśvalāyana, Bhārgava Vaidarbhi and Kabandhī Kātyāyana approach the sage Pippalāda and ask him a series of questions such as "how has this world been produced," "how is it sustained" and "how does the life-breath come into our body." Such a council was called *samsad*, *samiti*, *sabhā*, *parīṣad* or *parṣad*.

A Council of learned men.

In the socio religious institutes of Manu,⁴ Parāśara,⁵ Yājñavalkya⁶ and others, we find that the council consisted generally of

four, ten or twenty-one Brāhmaṇs, who were learned in the Vedic and secular literatures and could give decisions in matters on which

1 श्वेतकेतुर्ह्यङ्गिरसः पाञ्चालानां समितिमेवाय
(Chāndogyaupaniṣad, 5-3-1).

2 श्वेतकेतुर्ह्यङ्गिरसः पाञ्चालानां परिषदनामज्जाम
(Brhadāranyaka, 6-2-1).

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, pp. 128-132.

3 Praśnopaniṣad, Praśna 1-6.

4 चैविद्यो हेतुकस्तर्को नैषत्तो धर्मपाठकः ।
त्रयश्चाश्रमिणः पूर्वैः परिषत् स्याद्दशावरा ॥
(Manu-saṁhitā, 12-110, 111).

5 अनाहिताग्रयो येऽन्ये वेदवेदाङ्गपारगाः ।
पञ्च त्रयो वा धर्मज्ञाः परिषत् सा प्रकौर्त्तिता ॥
(Parāśara-saṁhitā, 8-19).

6 चत्वारो वेदधर्मज्ञाः पर्वत् चैविद्यमेव वा ।
सा ब्रूते यं स धर्मः स्यादेको वाध्यात्मवित्तमः ॥
(Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā, 1-9).

people might ask their advice. The debates or dialogues, such as those described in the *Praśnopaniṣad*, the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, were in all probability the precursors of the theory of reasons (*hetu-vāda*) treated in the *Ānvīkṣikī*. The words, which had to be used in special senses to carry on debates in the councils, constituted the technical terms of the *Ānvīkṣikī*.

17. THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE COUNCILS OF
DEBATE
(900-500 B.C.).

Some of the technical terms used in the councils of debate had grown up along with the Upaniṣads. Some of the terms used in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. For instance in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*¹ we meet with four terms, viz. (1) *Smṛti* (scripture), (2) *pratyakṣa* (perception), (3) *aitihya* (tradition), and (4) *anumāna* (inference). These terms recur in the *Rāmāyaṇa*² with a little alteration as (1) *aitihya* (tradition), (2) *anumāna* (inference), and (3) *śāstra*, scripture. Three of these terms, are used in the *Manu-saṁhitā*,³ as (1) *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śāstra*.

Similarly in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, *Kāthopaniṣad*, etc., there occur such terms as *tarka*⁴ (reasoning), *vāda*⁵ (debate), *yukti*⁶ (continuous argument), *jalpa*⁷ (wrangling), *vitandā*⁸ (cavil), *chala*⁹ (quibble), *nirṇaya*¹⁰ (ascertainment), *prayojana*¹¹ (purpose), *pramāṇa*¹² (proof), *prameya*¹³ (the object of knowledge), etc.

1 स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यम् । अनुमानश्चतुष्टयम् । एतैरादित्यमष्टयम् । सर्वैरेव विधास्यते ॥
(*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, 1-2).

2 ऐतिह्यमनुमानश्च प्रत्यक्षमपि चागमम् ।
यो हि सम्यक् परोक्षेन कुतस्तेषामवुद्धिता ॥ (*Rāmāyaṇa*, 5-87-23).

3 प्रत्यक्षानुमानश्च शास्त्रश्च विविधागमम् ।
अयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमनोयता ॥ (*Manu-saṁhitā*, 12-105).

⁴ *Tarka* occurs in *Kāthopaniṣad*, 2-9; *Manu-saṁhitā*, 12-106; *Mahābhārata*, 2-453; and *Bhāgavata purāṇa*, 8-21-2.

⁵ *Vāda* occurs in *Manu-saṁhitā*, 6-50; *Rāmāyaṇa*, 1-13-23 and 7-53-15; and *Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā*, 3-292.

⁶ *Yukti* occurs in *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, 6-23; *Rāmāyaṇa*, 2-1-13; *Bhāgavata purāṇa*, 3-31-15; and *Kāmandakiya-nīṭisāra*, 1-49.

⁷ *Jalpa* occurs in *Mahābhārata*, 13-4322.

⁸ *Vitandā* occurs in *Mahābhārata*, 2-1310 and 7-3022; and *Pāṇini*, 4-4-102.

⁹ *Chala* occurs in *Manu-saṁhitā*, 8-49; and *Rāmāyaṇa*, 4-57-10.

¹⁰ *Nirṇaya* occurs in *Mahābhārata*, 13-7533, 7535.

¹¹ *Prayojana* in *Manu-saṁhitā*, 7-100; *Mahābhārata*, 1-5805; and *Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā*, 3-133.

¹² *Pramāṇa* occurs in *Manu-saṁhitā*, 2-13; *Rāmāyaṇa*, 2-37-21; and *Mahābhārata*, 13-5572; *Kautilya* 3-1.

¹³ *Prameya* occurs in *Rāmāyaṇa*, 1-52-13; *Mahābhārata*, 1-157 and 8-1449.

18. *Tantra-yukti*—THE TERMS OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT
(QUOTED BY KAUṢĪLYA ABOUT 327 B.C.).

In the last chapter of the Artha-śāstra (a work on polity), Kauṣilya gives a list of thirty-two technical terms called *Tantra-yukti* or "the forms of scientific argument" (*dvātriṃśadākārā-stantrayuktayaḥ*). This list appears also in the Caraka-saṃhitā¹ and the Suśruta-saṃhitā,² two authoritative works on medicine. It was evidently prepared neither by Kauṣilya nor by the authors of the two saṃhitās, but by a person or persons who wanted to establish debates on a scientific basis.

The terms included in the list are found to have been employed more widely in works on Nyāya Philosophy than in those on Polity or Medicine. Definitions of some of those terms have been actually quoted by Vātsyāyana³ and other commentators on the Nyāya-sūtra. The *Tantra-yukti* which literally signifies "scientific argument" was compiled possibly in the 6th century B.C. to systematize debates in *Parīśads* or learned councils. In the Suśruta-saṃhitā⁴ it is distinctly stated that by means of *Tantra-yukti*

¹ Vide Caraka saṃhitā, Siddhisthāna, chapter XII. The *Tantra-yukti* along with other matters was added to the Caraka-saṃhitā by the redactor Drdhabala of Pañcanada (the Punjab). In the Caraka-saṃhitā the *Tantra-yukti* consists of 34 technical terms as enumerated in the following verses:—

चतुर्विंशद् विचित्राभिर्भूषितं तन्त्रयुक्तिभिः ।
तत्राधिकरणं योगो हेत्वर्थोऽर्थः पदस्य च ॥
प्रदेशोद्देशनिर्देश वाक्यशेषाः प्रयोजनम् ।
उपदेशान्तिदेशाश्चार्थापत्तिविनिर्णयाः ॥
प्रसङ्गकान्तानेकान्तः सापवर्गो विपर्ययः ।
पूर्वपक्षविधानानुमतयाख्यानसंशयाः ।
अतौतानादितापेक्षा स्वमञ्जा ह्यसमुचयाः ।
निर्देशनं निर्वचनं सन्निधोगो विकल्पनम् ॥
प्रत्युच्चारणयोद्धारः सम्प्रसक्तन्त्रयुक्तयः ।
तन्त्रे व्याससमासाभ्यां भवन्त्येतानि कृत्वशः ॥

² Vide Suśruta-saṃhitā, Uttaratanttra, chapter LXV. The Uttara-tantra is said to have been added to the Suśruta-saṃhitā by the redactor Nāgārjuna. The *Tantra-yukti* as embodied in the Suśruta-saṃhitā consists of 32 technical terms:—

द्वाविंशद् युक्तयो ह्येतास्तन्त्रसारगवेषणे ।
मया सम्यगवेनिहिताः शब्दन्यायाद्यैः संयुताः ॥
परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति हि तन्त्रयुक्तिः

(Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, 1-1-4).

³ असङ्गादिप्रयुक्तानां वाक्यानां प्रतिषेधनम् ।
सवाक्यं सिद्धिरपि च क्रियते तन्त्रयुक्तिः ॥

(Suśruta-saṃhitā, Uttaratanttra, chapter LXV).

a debater can establish his own points and set aside those of his opponents who indulge in unfairness. In the department of Hetu-śāstra (Logic) there is indeed no work older than the Tantra-yukti which is a little manual on the systematization of arguments or debates.

The technical terms constituting the Tantra-yukti are the following :—

(1) *Adhikaraṇa* (a subject), (2) *vidhāna* (arrangement), (3) *yoga* (union of words), (4) *padārtha* (category), (5) *hetvārtha* (implication), (6) *uddēśa* (enunciation), (7) *nirdeśa* (declaration), (8) *upadeśa* (instruction), (9) *apadeśa* (specification), (10) *atideśa* (extended application), (11) *pradeśa* (determination from a statement to be made), (12) *upamāna* (analogy), (13) *arthāpatti* (presumption), (14) *saṁśaya* (doubt), (15) *prasaṅga* (a connected argument), (16) *viparyaya* (reversion), (17) *vākya-śeṣa* (context), (18) *anumata* (assent), (19)

The thirty-two terms of Tantra-yukti. *vyākhyāna* (description), (20) *nirvacana* (etymological explanation), (21) *nidarśana* (example), (22) *apavarga* (exception), (23)

sva-saṁjñā (a special term), (24) *pūrva-pakṣa* (question), (25) *uttara-pakṣa* (reply), (26) *ekānta* (certain), (27) *anāgatāvekṣaṇa* (anticipation), (28) *atīkrāntāvekṣaṇa* (retrospection), (29) *niyoga* (injunction), (30) *vikalpa* (alternative), (31) *samuccaya* (aggregation), and (32) *ūhya* (ellipsis).

In the Caraka-saṁhitā the Tantra-yukti, which consists of thirty-four terms, includes the following :—

(1) *Prayojana* (purpose), (2) *nirṇaya* (ascertainment), (3) *anekānta* (uncertain), (4) *pratyuccāra* (repetition), (5) *uddhāra* (citation), and (6) *saṁbhava* (probability).

The list of Kautilya differs from that of the Caraka-saṁhitā.

19. MEDHĀTITHI GAUTAMA'S DOCTRINES AS REPRODUCED IN THE CARAKA-SAMHITĀ (ABOUT 78 A.D.).

The Caraka-saṁhitā¹ gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ānvikṣikī possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. Caraka is a general name for the ancient śākhās (branches) of the Yajurveda as well as for the teacher of those śākhās. The word "Carakāḥ" signifies, according to Pāṇini,² the persons who study the Veda (i.e.

¹ As Ātreya communicated his Āyurveda-saṁhitā at first to Agniveśa, the Caraka-saṁhitā is also called the Agniveśa-tantra. Agniveśa is called in Tibetan མེ་བཤིན་མཉུག Me-bshin-hjug (vide Mahāvīyutpatti, part I, p. 23, Bibliotheca Indica series).

² कठचरकाङ्ग (Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-3-107).

Max Müller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, pp. 225, 350, 364, 369.

the śākhās of the Yajurveda) enounced by the teacher Caraka. Some say that the exact meaning of "Caraka," as applied to the Caraka-saṁhitā, is unknown. The expression "Caraka-saṁhitā" may, according to them, mean the Āyurveda-saṁhitā of the school of Carakāh or the Āyurveda-saṁhitā as redacted by a member of the Caraka¹ sect or by a physician named Caraka. According to the Nyāya-mañjarī² Caraka was a physician, and the Chinese Tripitaka³ describes him as a physician at the court of Kaniṣka, the Kuśāna king of Gāndhāra. Punarvasu Ātreya (about 550 B.C.) was the original author of the Caraka-saṁhitā called Āyurveda-saṁhitā, and the physician Caraka was perhaps the redactor of the Saṁhitā at the beginning of the Christian era.⁴

The doctrines of Ānvikṣikī did not evidently constitute a part of the original Āyurveda of Punarvasu Ātreya. These doctrines seem to have been incorporated into the Caraka-saṁhitā by the redactor Caraka in whose time they were widely known and studied. The doctrines (with the exception of those relating to *Kāryābhini-vṛtti*) seem to have been the productions of Medātithi Gautama who flourished in the 6th century B.C. Medātithi Gautama's doctrines were embodied in the Caraka-saṁhitā⁵ of Caraka as well as in the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda. But while Caraka accepted them in their crude forms, Akṣapāda pruned them thoroughly before they were assimilated in the Nyāya-sūtra.

The doctrines as we find them in the Caraka-saṁhitā are treated under three heads, viz. :—

- (1) *Kāryābhini-vṛtti*, the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action.
- (2) *Parīkṣā*, the standard of examination, and
- (3) *Sambhāṣā-vidhi*, or *vāda-vidhi*, the method of debate.

¹ For an account of the wandering sect named Caraka see the Aṅguttara nikāya, part iii, p. 276; Ratnolkā dhāraṇī; Mahāvastu iii, 412, 7-10, etc. quoted by Prof. Rhys Davids in his "Indian sects or schools in the time of the Buddha," in the J.R.A.S. for 1898. See also Prof. C. Bendall's observations in the J.R.A.S. for 1901.

²

अथोच्यते अनादिरेवैषा चिकित्सकस्मृतिः व्याकरणादिस्मृतिवत् ।

संक्षेपविसृज्य विवक्ष्यैव चरकादयः कर्तारः न तु ते सर्वेदर्शिनः ॥

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chapter IV, p. 249, edited by Gaṅgādhara Śāstri, Vizianagram Sanskrit series).

³ Jolly, *Medicin* (Bühler's Grundriss, iii, 10), p. 11.

In the Journal Asiatique (1896), T. VIII, pp. 447-451, Mr. Sylvain Levi maintains on the authority of Chinese books that Caraka the author of the Caraka-saṁhitā lived in the court of Kaniṣka. The date of Kaniṣka has not yet been finally fixed, but I provisionally take it to be 78 A.D. *Vide* my "History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic," pp. 62-63. Kaniṣka's capital was at Puṣpapura (Peshwar) in Gāndhāra, but he held his Buddhist convocation at Jālandhara.

⁴ Professor L. Sualī fixes the date of Caraka at about 100 A.D. (Filosofia Indiana, p. 28).

⁵ Caraka-saṁhitā, Vimāna-sthāna, adhyāya 8.

As regards *Kāryābhiniṣṭṭi*, it does not appear to have been a part of the *Ānvīkṣikī* of Medhātithi Gautama. Perhaps it was a part of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in an early stage. *Parīkṣā* is redundant as the four terms coming under this head, viz. : *āptopadeśa*,

Which of the doctrines of the Caraka-saṁhitā emanated from Medhātithi Gautama ? *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *yukti* reappear with a little modification in the names of *śabda*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *aupamya* under the sub-head *vādamārga* of *sambhāṣā-vidhi*. It

is uncertain as to whether the first four or the last four were included in the *Ānvīkṣikī* of Medhātithi Gautama. *Sambhāṣā-vidhi* or *vāda-vidhi* was undoubtedly the principal topic of *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā*. Some of the terms coming under the sub-head *vāda-mārga* did not however form a part of the original *sambhāṣā vidhi*. For instance the terms *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* were borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy in its first stage and incorporated into the *vāda-mārga* by Caraka himself. There are other terms such as *pratiññā*, *sthāpanā*, *pratiṣṭhāpanā*, *hetu*, *upanaya*, *nigamana*, *uttara*, *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta* which in their technical senses were perhaps unknown to Medhātithi Gautama and were introduced into the *vāda-mārga* by Caraka while he compiled and redacted the *Āyurveda-saṁhitā* in the first century A.D.

The terms coming under the three heads are explained in the Caraka-saṁhitā as follows :—

- I. *Kāryābhiniṣṭṭi*—the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action.

A person who is determined to accomplish an action successfully should examine the following resources :—

- (1) *Kāraṇa* or *hetu*—the actor or agent who accomplishes an action.
- (2) *Karṇa*—the instrument which co-operates with the actor to accomplish the action.
- (3) *Kārya-yoni*—the material cause which while undergoing modification is developed into the action.
- (4) *Kārya*—the action for the accomplishment of which the actor moves.
- (5) *Kārya-phala*—the effect for the attainment of which the action is undertaken.
- (6) *Anubandha*—the adjunct, that is, that pleasurable or painful condition which resulting from the action attaches unavoidably to the actor.
- (7) *Deśa*—the place of the action.
- (8) *Kāla*—the time of the action.
- (9) *Pravṛtti*—the activity or exertion put forth for achieving the action.
- (10) *Upāya*—a favourable circumstance or that condition of the actor, instrument and the material cause in which they can well render facilities and aids to the action being accomplished.

II. Parīkṣā—THE STANDARD OF EXAMINATION.

Things, existent or non-existent, are tested by four standards, viz. (1) *āptopadeśa*, reliable assertion (2) *pratyakṣa*, perception, (3) *anumāna*, inference, and (4) *yukti*, continuous reasoning. These are collectively called *parīkṣā*¹ (examination), *hetu*² (reason), or *pramāṇa*³ (means of valid knowledge).

Reliable assertion is the assertion of a person who is trustworthy, noble, wise and freed from evil propensities, whose perception runs unimpeded, and the truth of whose words is never called in question.

Perception is the knowledge which is produced through a union of the soul with the mind, senses and their objects.

Inference is preceded by perception and refers to three times, e.g. a fire is inferred from smoke, fruits are inferred from a seed, etc.

Continuous reasoning refers to the knowledge which beholds conditions resulting from the co-operation of many causes and abiding in three times. For instance, one's birth in the womb is due to a combination of the soul and the five primal essences of earth, water, fire, air and space; the soul alone is related to the next life; acts result from the union of an agent and certain means; acts that are done bear fruits, acts not done bear no fruits; there can be no sprout where there is no seed; good or bad fruits correspond to the good or bad acts that produce them; and one kind of seed cannot produce another kind of fruit.

III. Sambhāṣā OR vāda-vidhi⁴—THE METHOD OF DEBATE.

Utility of Debate (sambhāṣā-prasaṁsā).

If a person carries on debate with another person both being versed in the same science, it increases their knowledge and happiness. Besides, it produces dexterity, bestows eloquence and brightens reputation. If there was any misapprehension in a subject

¹ Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, 11th adhyāya :—

द्विविधमेव खलु सर्वं सचासच । तस्य चतुर्विधा परीक्षा । अप्तोपदेशः प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं युक्तिश्चेति ।

² Caraka-saṁhitā, Vimāna-sthāna, adhyāya 8 :—

हेतुर्नामोपलब्धिकारणं तत् प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमैतिह्यमोपम्यम् । हेतुभिर्द्युपलभ्यते तत् तज्जम् ।

³ Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, 11th adhyāya :—

एवं प्रमाणैः चतुर्भिर्दृष्टैः पुनर्नवे धर्मद्वारैश्चवधीयते ।

⁴ Caraka-saṁhitā, Vimāna-sthāna, adhyāya 8.

already studied it removes that misapprehension, and if there was no misapprehension in the subject it produces zeal for its further study. It also makes debaters familiar with certain matters which were unknown to them. Moreover some precious mystic doctrines, which a preceptor imparted to his favourite pupil, come out in essence from the pupil who, owing to a temporary excitement and ambition for victory, is impelled to expound them in the course of the debate. Hence wise men applaud debate with fellow scholars.

Two kinds of Debate (dvividhā sambhāṣā).

A debate with a fellow-scholar may be carried on either
 A congenial debate. (1) peacefully (*sandhāya*) or (2) in a spirit of opposition (*virhaya*). The first is called a congenial debate (*anuloma sambhāṣā*), and the second a hostile debate (*virhaya sambhāṣā*). The congenial debate takes place when the respondent (or opponent) is possessed of erudition, wisdom, eloquence and readiness of reply, is not wrathful or malicious, is well versed in the art of persuasion, and is patient and sweet-speeched. In debating with such a person one should speak confidently, interrogate confidently and give answer in confidence. One should not be alarmed at suffering defeat from him nor should one rejoice in inflicting defeat on him. It is improper to show obstinacy towards him, or to introduce before him matters which are irrelevant. While using persuasion with gentleness, one should keep in view the subject of debate. This kind of debate is called a peaceful or congenial debate.

Before entering upon a hostile debate with a person one should
 A hostile debate. examine one's strength through a casual conversation with him and observation in any other way of his merits. Such an examination should settle the opportuneness or otherwise of entering upon the debate. The merits considered as good are erudition, wisdom, memory, ingenuity and eloquence. The demerits considered as bad are irritability, shallowness, shyness and inattentiveness.

Three classes of respondents (trividhaḥ paraḥ).

In consideration of the merits and demerits mentioned above the respondent (or opponent) may be of three kinds, viz. superior, inferior, and equal

A Council of Debate (pariṣad).

The assembly (*pariṣad*) in which a debate is to take place may be of two kinds, viz. (1) learned, i.e. an assembly of wise men, and (2) ignorant, i.e. an assembly of fools. Each of these may be subdivided as (a) friendly, (b) indifferent or impartial, and (c) hostile or committed to one side.

The Expedients of Debate (vāḍopāya).

It is not advisable to enter upon debate in a hostile assembly, no matter whether the assembly is learned or ignorant. In an ignorant assembly, friendly or indifferent, one may enter upon debate with a person who is of blazing fame, but who neither possesses erudition, wisdom and eloquence, nor is held in esteem by respectable people. In debating with such an opponent one may employ crooked and long-strung word-bolts. Now assuming a delightful countenance and now indulging in ridicule one should engage the assembly in such a way that the opponent does not find an opportunity of speaking. If the opponent utters an unusual word he should be immediately told that such a word is never used or that his original proposition has fallen to the ground. In the case of his attempting to offer challenge he should be stopped with the observation: "Go and study for a full year, sitting at the feet of your preceptor: this much that you have done to-day is enough." If in the meantime the shout of "vanquished, vanquished" has even once been uttered, no further debate need be held with the opponent.

Some say that this procedure may be adopted in debate even with a superior opponent, but experts do not approve of its adoption when the opponent happens to be an old man.

In a friendly assembly one may enter upon debate with an opponent who is inferior or equal. In an indifferent (or impartial) assembly consisting of members that are endued with attentiveness, erudition, wisdom, memory and eloquence, one should speak with great care marking the merits and demerits of one's opponent. If the opponent appears to be superior, one should, without expressing one's inferiority, never engage in debate with him. If on the other hand the opponent happens to be inferior, one should at once defeat him. An opponent, who is weak in the scriptures, should be defeated through citations of long passages from them. An opponent devoid of erudition should be defeated through the employment of unusual words and phrases. An opponent whose memory is not sharp should be defeated with crooked and long-strung word-bolts. An opponent devoid of ingenuity should be defeated through the use of same words bearing different meanings and different words bearing the same meaning. An opponent, who is devoid of eloquence, should be defeated through the jeering imitations of his half-uttered speeches. An opponent whose knowledge is shallow should be defeated by being put to shame on that account. An opponent of irritable temper

should be defeated by being thrown into a state of nervous exhaustion.' An opponent who is timid should be defeated through the excitement of his fear. An opponent who is inattentive should be defeated by being put under the restraint of a certain rule. Even in a hostile debate one should speak with propriety, an absence of which may provoke the opponent to say or do any thing.

Influencing the assembly one should cause it to name that as the subject of debate with which one is perfectly familiar and which presents an insurmountable difficulty to one's opponent. How to influence a Council. When the assembly meets, one should observe silence after saying to one's opponent: "it is not now permissible for us to make any suggestions. Here is the assembly which will fix the subject and limits of debate, agreeably to its wishes and sense of propriety."¹

The Limits of Debate (vāda-maryādā).

The limits of debate consist of such directions, as: "This should be said, this should not be said, if this occurs defeat follows, etc."²

The Course of Debate (vāda-mārga).

The following are the categories³ which should be studied for a thorough knowledge of the course of debate:—

- (1) *Debate (vāda)*—a discourse between two parties agreeably to the scriptures and in a spirit of opposition on a subject such as "whether there is rebirth, or there is no rebirth." It is of two kinds, viz. (1) wrangling (*jalpa*) which is a debate for the purpose of defence or attack, and (2) cavil (*vitandā*) which is a perverse debate for the purpose of a mere attack.
- (2) *Substance (dravya)*—that in which actions and qualities inhere and which can constitute a material cause, e.g. ether, air, fire, water, earth, soul, mind, and space.
- (3) *Quality (guṇa)*—that which inheres in a substance and is inactive, e.g. colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, heavy and

¹ This trick, the knowledge of which is useful in guarding oneself against a cunning debater, should never be adopted in a fair debate.—S. C. Vidyabhusana.

² Udayanācārya (10th century A.D.) following the old laws of debate observes that an objection may be removed by debate, but on no account should it proceed beyond the limit of practical absurdity.

आवातावधिराशङ्का तर्कःशङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ (Kusumāñjali, 3-7).

³ The explanation of *substance*, *quality*, *action*, *generality*, *particularity* and *inherence* is given in the Caraka-saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, adhyāya 1; and the explanation of the remaining terms in the Vimāna-sthāna, adhyāya 8. The terms (2-7) were evidently taken from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and not from Ānvikṣikī of Medhātithi Gautama.

light, cold and hot, intelligence, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, dissimilarity, contrariety, union, separation, number, measure, etc.

- (4) *Action (karma)*—that which is the cause of both union and separation, which inheres in a substance and represents the function which is to be performed, and which is not dependent on any other action.
- (5) *Generality (sāmānya)*—that which produces unity.
- (6) *Particularity (viśeṣa)*—that which produces diversity.
- (7) *Inherence (samavāya)*—a permanent relation between a substance and its qualities or actions in virtue of which they cannot exist separately.
- (8) *Proposition (pratijñā)*—the statement of what is to be established, e.g. the soul is eternal.
- (9) *Demonstration (sthāpanā)*—the establishment of a proposition through the process of a reason, example, application and conclusion, e.g.
 - (i) The soul is eternal (*a proposition*).
 - (ii) Because it is a non-product (*reason*).
 - (iii) Just as ether which being a non-product is eternal (*example*).
 - (iv) The soul similar to ether is a non-product (*application*).
 - (v) Therefore the soul is eternal (*conclusion*).
- (10) *Counter-demonstration (pratishthāpanā)*—the establishment of the counter-proposition, e.g.
 - (i) The soul is non-eternal (*a proposition*).
 - (ii) Because it is cognized by the senses (*reason*).
 - (iii) Just as a pot which being cognized by the senses is non-eternal (*example*).
 - (iv) The soul similar to a pot is cognized by the senses (*application*).
 - (v) Therefore the soul is non-eternal (*conclusion*).
- (11) *Reason (hetu)*¹—the source of knowledge such as perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), scripture (*aitihya*), and comparison (*aupamya*).
- (12) *Application (upanaya)*—as shown above.
- (13) *Conclusion (nigamana)*—as shown above.
- (14) *Rejoinder (uttara)*—the proposition in a counter-demonstration.
- (15) *Example (dṛṣṭānta)*—the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion, and which describes the subject, e.g. hot as “fire,” stable as “earth,” etc., or just as the “sun” is an illuminator so is the text of the Sāṃkhya.

¹ The word reason (*hetu*), which in the old Brāhmanic and Jaina works signified a source of knowledge, is not exactly identical with the reason (*hetu*) which constitutes the second member of a syllogism or demonstration. It seems that the doctrine of syllogism or demonstration was introduced into Hindu Logic at a comparatively late time, and the word *hetu* used in connection with this doctrine was allowed for some time to retain its old signification.

- (16) *Tenet or conclusion (siddhānta)*—a truth which is established on examination by experts and on proof by reasons. It is of four kinds, viz. a truth accepted by all the schools, that accepted by a particular school, that accepted hypothetically, and that accepted by implication.
- (17) *Word (śabda)*—a combination of letters. It is of four kinds, viz. that which refers to a matter which is seen, that which refers to a matter which is not seen, that which corresponds to what is real, and that which does not correspond to what is real.
- (18) *Perception (pratyakṣa)*—that knowledge which a person acquires by himself through his mind conjoined with the five senses. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and the like are objects of the mind, while sound, etc., are objects of the five senses.
- (19) *Inference (anumāna)*—a reasoning based on the knowledge of connected facts, e.g. fire is inferred from the power of digestion.
- (20) *Comparison (aupamya)*—the knowledge of a thing acquired through its similarity to another thing.
- (21) *Tradition (aitihya)*—consisting of reliable assertions, e.g. the Veda, etc.
- (22) *Doubt (saṁśaya)*—uncertainty, e.g. is there, or is there not, untimely death?
- (23) *Purpose (prayojana)*—that for the accomplishment of which actions are undertaken, e.g. I shall live carefully “to avoid untimely death.”
- (24) *Uncertain (savyābhicāra)*—going astray, e.g. this medicine may be or may not be suited to this disease.
- (25) *Inquiry (jijñāsā)*—examination.
- (26) *Ascertainment (vyavasāya)*—determination, e.g. that disease is due to the disturbance of wind in the stomach, and this is its medicine.
- (27) *Presumption (artha-prāpti)*—the knowledge of a thing implied by the declaration of another thing, e.g. when it is said that a person should not eat during the day, it is implied that he should eat during the night.
- (28) *The originating cause (sambhava)*—that from which something springs out, e.g. the six ingredients (*dhātus*), constitute the originating cause of the foetus in the womb.
- (29) *Censurable (anuyojya)*—a speech which is fraught with fault, e.g. a person makes a general statement while a particular one is required: instead of saying ‘this disease is curable by medicine,’ one should say ‘this disease is curable by an emetic medicine or a purgative medicine.’
- (30) *Non-censurable (ananuyojya)*—the reverse of the censurable.
- (31) *Interrogation (anuyoga)*—an inquiry about a subject made by a person who studies it, e.g. when a person asserts that the soul is eternal, his fellow-scholar inquires “what is the reason?” This inquiry is an interrogation.
- (32) *Re-interrogation (pratyanuyoga)*—an inquiry about another inquiry, e.g. when one says that the soul is eternal because

it is non-produced, the re-interrogation will be "why it is non-produced?"

- (33) *Defect of speech (vākya-doṣa)*—consisting of inadequacy, redundancy, meaninglessness, incoherence, contradiction, etc.
- (a) "Inadequacy" or saying too little which occurs when there is an omission of the reason, example, application or conclusion.
 - (b) "Redundancy" or saying too much which consists of (i) "irrelevancy," e.g. a person talks of the polity of Vṛhaspati or Śukra while the subject of discourse is medicine, or (ii) "repetition," e.g. when a person repeats a word or its meaning several times, as *bhaiṣajya*, *sādhana*, *auśadha*, etc., all of which signify medicine.
 - (c) "Meaninglessness"—consisting of a mere grouping of letters without any sense, e.g. k, kh, g, gh, ṇ, etc.
 - (d) "Incoherence"—a combination of words which do not convey a connected meaning, e.g. whey, wheel, race, thunder, morning, etc.
 - (e) "Contradiction"—consisting of opposition to the example, tenet or occasion, e.g. on the occasion of sacrifices, animals should be offered up. Any thing uttered inconsistently with the occasion is contradiction.
- (34) *Excellence of speech (vākya-prasāṁsā)*—when a speech is freed from inadequacy, etc., is fraught with well-expressive words and is otherwise uncensurable, it is applauded as excellent, perfect or meritorious.
- (35) *Quibble (chala)*—a speech consisting of mere words fraught with cunning, plausibility and diversion of sense. It is of two kinds, viz. (1) 'quibble in respect of a word,' e.g. a person uses the word 'navatantra' to signify a man who has studied nine scriptures, though he really intends to signify a man who has studied his scripture recently, or (2) 'quibble in respect of a generality,' e.g. the medicine which cures phthisis should also cure bronchitis, as both come under the genus 'disease.'
- (36) *Non-reason or fallacy (ahetu)*—which is of three kinds, viz. :
- (a) "Begging the question" ("prakarāṇa-sama") occurring when that which is to be proved is taken as the reason, e.g. the soul is eternal because it is distinct from the body: the body is non-eternal, and the soul being heterogeneous from the body must be eternal.
 - (b) "Assumption based on doubt" ("saṁśaya-sama") occurring when that which is a cause of doubt is regarded as dispelling the doubt, e.g. it is doubtful whether a person who has studied a portion of the science of medicine is a physician; this person has studied a portion of the science of medicine: hence he is a physician. This is another form of "begging the question."
 - (c) "Balancing the subject" ("varṇya-sama") occurring where the example is not different from the subject

in respect of their questionable character. e.g. the intellect is non-eternal, because it is intangible, as a sound. Here the eternality of the intellect is as questionable as that of the sound.

- (37) *Mistimed (atīta-kāla)*—a fallacy which arises when that which should be stated first is stated afterwards.
- (38) *Attribution of censure (upālabha)*—imputation of defect to the reason adduced.
- (39) *Avoidance of defect (parihāra)* which occurs when the defect is corrected or amended, e.g. when the soul resides in the body, the signs of life are noticeable; but when the soul leaves the body those signs are no longer noticed: hence the soul is distinct from the body.
- (40) *Abandonment of a proposition (pratijñā-hāni)*—which occurs when a disputant, being attacked, abandons the proposition first advanced by him, e.g.
 A person advances first a proposition, viz.
 the soul is eternal;
 and being attacked by an opponent, he abandons it saying,
 the soul is not eternal.
- (41) *Admission (abhyanujñā)*—the acceptance by a person of what is attributed to him by his opponent, whether agreeable or disagreeable, e.g.
 A disputant says: "you are a thief."
 His opponent replies: "you too are a thief."
 The reply of the opponent is an admission.
- (42) *Shifting the reason (hetvantara)*—which occurs when one instead of advancing the proper reason adduces a different one.
- (43) *Shifting the topic (arthāntara)*, e.g. A person cites the symptoms of gonorrhoea while he was to have cited those of fever.
- (44) *A point of defeat or an occasion for rebuke (nigrahasthāna)*—which occurs when a disputant suffers defeat at the hands of his opponent. It consists in the disputant misapprehending, or being unable to apprehend, something repeated thrice in an assembly the members whereof have apprehended it. It may also occur when one censures that which is not censurable or abstains from censuring that which is censurable.

CHAPTER IV.

Reception accorded to Ānvikṣikī.

(FROM 650 B.C. ONWARDS).

20. ĀNVIKṢIKI CONDEMNED IN CERTAIN CIRCLES.

Ānvikṣikī known as *Hetu-sāstra* or *Tarka-vidyā*, the general principles of which might be applied to test the validity or otherwise of the injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras, was not received with favour by a certain section of the Brāhmaṇas, who could never think of calling in question the authority of those injunctions and prohibitions. We are therefore not surprised to find Manu¹ enjoining excommunication upon those members of the twice-born castes who disregarded the Vedas and Dharma-sūtras relying upon the support of *Hetu-sāstra* or Logic. Similarly Vālmiki² in his Rāmāyaṇa discredits those persons of perverse intellect who indulge in the frivolities of *Ānvikṣikī*, the science of Logic, regardless of the works on Sacred Law (Dharma-sāstra) which they should follow as their guide. Vyāsa³ in the Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, relates the dole-

- 1 योऽवमन्येत ते सूत्रे हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः ।
स साधुभिर्वैद्विष्कार्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥
(Manu-saṁhitā, adhyāya 2, verse 11).
- 2 धर्मशालेषु सुखेषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्बौद्धिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ॥ 36-39 ॥
(Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyā kāṇḍa, sarga 100).
- 3 अहमासं पण्डितको हेतुको वेदनिन्दकः ।
आन्वौत्तिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थकाम् ॥ 47 ॥
हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत् ।
आक्रोष्टा चाभिवक्ता च ब्रह्मवाक्यं च दिजान् ॥ 48 ॥
नास्तिकः सर्वशङ्की च सूर्यः पण्डितमानिकः ।
तस्येयं फलनिर्दत्तिः शृगालत्वं सम द्विज ॥ 49 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 180).

In the Gandharva tantra we find :—

गीतम प्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरताः सर्व एव हि ।
शास्त्रार्थं योनिमापन्नाः सन्दिग्धाः सर्वकर्मासु ॥

(Quoted in Prāṇatoṣiṇī tantra).

ful story of a repentant Brāhmaṇa who, addicted to *Tarka-vidyā* (Logic), carried on debates divorced from all faith in the Vedas and was on that account turned into a jackal in his next birth as a penalty. In another passage of the Śāntiparva, Vyāsa¹ warns the followers of the Vedānta philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a *Tārkika* or Logician. Vyāsa² does not care even to review *Hetu-sāstra* in the Brahma-sūtra seeing that it has not been recognized by any worthy sage. Stories of infliction of penalties on those given to the study of *Tarka-vidyā* are related in the Skandapurāṇa³ and other works; and in the Naiṣadhacarita⁴ we find Kali satirising the founder of *Ānvikṣikī* as "Go-tama" the most bovine among sages.

21. ĀNVIKṢIKI HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM IN SOME QUARTERS.

On the other hand *Ānvikṣikī*, while it attached due weight to the authority of the Vedas, was held in very high esteem. There were also people who could appreciate the value of reasoning for ascertaining truths. Thus the Gautama-dharma-sūtra⁵ prescribes a course of training in *Ānvikṣikī* (Logic) for the king, and acknowledges the utility of *Tarka* (reasoning) in the administra-

1 स्नातकानामिदं शास्त्रं वाच्यं पुत्रानुशासनम् ।

* * * * *

न तर्कशास्त्रदग्धाय तथैव पिशुनाय च ॥ 18 ॥

(Mahābhārata Śāntiparva, adhyāya 246).

2 अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ 17 ॥ (Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2).

3 गोतमः स्नेन तर्कणं खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि ।

शत्रोऽथ मुनिभिस्तत्र शार्गालीं योनिमुच्छति ।

पुनश्चानुगृहीतोऽसौ श्रुतिसिद्धान्ततर्कतः ।

सर्व्वं लोकोपकाराय तव शास्त्रं भविष्यति ॥

(Skandapurāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17).

मुक्तये यः शिखात्वाय शास्त्रमुचे महासुनिः ।

गोतमं समवेतैव यथा वितुथ तथैव सः ॥ 75 ॥

(Naiṣadhacarita, canto xvii).

5 राजा सर्व्वस्त्रेष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जः साधुकारी स्यात् साधुवादो, यय्याम् आम्बीक्षिक्वाद्या-
भिविनोतः ।.....न्यायाधिगमे तर्कभ्युपायः । तेनाभ्युद्य यथास्थानं गमयेत् । विप्रतिपत्तौ
चैविसृष्टदेभ्यः प्रत्यवहृत्य निष्ठां गमयेत् ॥

(Gautama dharma-sūtra, adhyāya 11).

tion of justice, though in the case of conclusions proving incompatible, the ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas. *Manu*¹ admits that *dharma* or duty should be ascertained by logical reasoning (*tarka*), but the reasoning should not, according to him, be opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends *Ānvikṣikī* (Logic) as a necessary study for a king² and a *Tarkī*³ (logician) as an indispensable member of a legal assembly. *Kauṭilya*⁴ in his *Arthaśāstra* characterises *Ānvikṣikī* (Logic) as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the permanent shelter of all virtues.

*Yājñavalkya*⁵ counts *Nyāya* or Logic among the fourteen principal sciences while *Vyāsa*⁶ admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upaniṣads with the help of *Ānvikṣikī* or Logic. In the *Padmapurāṇa*⁷ *Nyāya* (Logic) is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning promulgated by God Viṣṇu, while in the *Matsyapurāṇa*,⁸ *Nyāya-vidyā* (the science of Logic) together

- 1 शार्धं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।
यत्कर्तव्यमनुसन्वते स धर्म वेद नेतरः ॥

(*Manu-saṁhitā*, adhyāya 12, verse 106).

- 2 त्रैविद्योऽप्यज्ञेयं विद्याद् दण्डनीतिश्च शास्त्रतौम् ।
आन्वौक्तिकौश्चाहविद्यां वार्त्तारम्भाश्च लोकतः ॥

(*Manu-saṁhitā*, adhyāya 7, verse 43).

- 3 त्रैविद्यो त्रैतुकस्तर्को नैवक्तो धर्मपाठकः ।
यस्याश्रमिणः पूर्वो परिषत् स्याद् दशवरा ॥

(*Manu-saṁhitā*, adhyāya 12, verse 111).

- 4 प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शस्त्रदान्वत्तिकौमता ॥

(*Artha-śāstra* of *Kauṭilya*, chap. II).

- 5 पुराणन्यायमीमांसा धर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

(*Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā*, adhyāya 1, verse 3).

- 6 तच्चोपनिषदं तात परिशेषं तु पार्थिव ।
मथनानि मनसा तात दृष्ट्वा चान्वौक्तिकीं पराम् ॥

(*Mahābhārata* quoted by *Viśvanātha* in his *Nyāya-vṛtti*, 1-1-1).

- 7 अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् पुराणन्यायविस्तरान् ।
मीमांसां धर्मशास्त्रञ्च परिगुह्याथ साम्प्रतम् ॥
मत्स्वरूपेण च पुनः कल्पादावुदकाकारे ।

(*Padmapurāṇa*, vide *Muir's Sanskrit texts*, Vol. III, p. 27).

- 8 अनन्तरञ्च वज्रेशो वेदास्तस्य विनिश्चिताः ।

मीमांसा न्यायविद्या च प्रमाणादकसंयुता ॥ (*Matsyapurāṇa*, 3-2).

with the Vedas is said to have emanated from the mouth of Brahma himself. In fact so widespread was the study of *Nyāya* that the Mahābhārata is full of references to that science. In the Ādiparvā¹ of the Mahābhārata, the *Nyāya* (Logic) is mentioned along with the Veda and Cikitsā (the science of medicine), and the hermitage of Kāśyapa² is described as being filled with sages who were versed in the *Nyāya-tattva* (categories of Logic), and who knew the true meaning of a demonstration, objection and conclusion. The Śāntiparvā³ refers to numerous tenets of *Nyāya* supported by reasoning and scripture, while in the Āśvamedhaparvā⁴ we find that the sacrificial ground of Yudhiṣṭhira was crowded by logicians (*Hetu-vādin*) who employed arguments and counter-arguments to vanquish one another. Similar other instances of the popularity of *Nyāya* (Logic) may be cited from the Mahābhārata and other works which were composed in their present forms about the beginning of the Christian era.

It seems that the unfavourable criticism to which Ānviṣīki (the science of Logic) had long been exposed, terminated practically in the first century A.D. when, under the name of *Nyāya-śāstra*, it accepted the authority of the Vedas and propounded the doctrine of syllogistic reasoning the validity of which was never challenged.

- 1 न्यायमिच्छा चिकित्सा च दानं पाशुपतं तथा ।
हेतुनैव सम जन्म दिव्यमानुष संज्ञितम् ॥ 67 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 1).
- 2 न्याय तत्त्वात्मविज्ञानसम्यग्नेवेदपारगैः ॥ 42 ॥
स्थापनाक्षेपसिद्धास्त परमार्थज्ञतां गतैः । 44 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 70).
- 3 न्यायतन्त्रोष्णनेकानि तैस्त्रैस्तानि वादिभिः ।
हेलागमसमाचारैर्यदुक्तं तदुपास्यताम् ॥ 22 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 21).
- 4 तस्मिन् यज्ञे प्रवृत्ते तु वाग्मिनो हेतुवादिनः ।
हेतुवादान् बहूनाक्तः परस्पर-जिगीषवः ॥ 27 ॥
(Mahābhārata, Āśvamedhaparva, adhyāya 85).

SECTION II.

Nyāya-śāstra—the Science of True Reasoning.

(CIRCA 1 A.D.—1200 A.D.)

CHAPTER I.

The Growth of Nyāya-śāstra.

22. ORIGIN OF THE NAME NYĀYA.

It has been previously observed that *Nyāya*¹ was one of the various names by which the *Ānvīkṣikī* was designated in its logical aspect. With the introduction of this word, the ancient school of Indian Logic entered upon the second stage of its development. In the first stage Logic was generally designated as *Ānvīkṣikī*, *Hetu-sāstra* or *Tarka-vidyā*, but in the second stage it was, as we find in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, widely known as *Nyāya-śāstra*.

The *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā* designated as *Nyāya-śāstra*.

The word *nyāya* popularly signifies 'right' or 'justice.' The *Nyāya-śāstra* is therefore the science of right judgment or true reasoning. The Chinese *Can-li*² and the Tibetan *Rigs-bstan-bcos*,³ as equivalents of the Sanskrit *Nyāya-śāstra*, express exactly the same meaning.

The popular meaning of *Nyāya*.

Technically the word *nyāya* signifies a syllogism (or a speech of five parts), and the *Ānvīkṣikī* was called *Nyāya-śāstra*, when *nyāya* constituted its special topic. That the word *nyāya* actually signified a syllogism is evident from an observation quoted by Vātsyāyana⁴ that "*nyāya* functions neither with regard to things

The technical meaning of *Nyāya*.

¹ Vātsyāyana observes:—

येयमावौचित्यी प्रमाणादि पदार्थैर्विभज्यमाना..... (*Nyāya bhāṣya*, 1-1-1),

² Yuan Chwang (Hwen-thsang) translates *Nyāya* (*Can-li*) by true reason (or reasoning)—*vide* Professor H. Ui's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 84.

³ The *Nyāya-śāstra* is called in Tibetan རིགས་པའི་བཟན་བཅོས་ *Rigs-paḥi-bstan-bcos*, the science of right judgment—*vide* Mahāvvyutpatti, part ii, p. 133, edited by Dr. E. D. Ross and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series, Calcutta.

⁴ तत्र नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तते किमर्हि संशयितेऽर्थे

(*Nyāyabhāṣya* 1-1-1; also Dr. Gaṅgā Nath Jhā's Translation of the *Nyāya-sūtra* in the *Indian Thought*, vol. IV, p. 174).

unknown nor with regard to things that are definitely known, but it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful." Vātsyāyana defines,¹ no doubt, *nyāya* as an examination of objects by evidences, but he takes evidences to signify a syllogism which consists of a 'proposition' based on verbal testimony, a 'reason' based on inference, an 'example' based on perception, an 'application' based on comparison, and a 'conclusion' based on all the previous four. Viśvanātha² explains *nyāya-svarūpa* as the essential form of a syllogism which consists of its five parts, and Mādhavācārya³ understands by the term *nyāya* an inference for the sake of others in which a syllogism is specially employed. In view of this technical meaning we may interpret *Nyāya-śāstra* as the science of syllogism or the science of inference for the sake of others, that is, the science of demonstration.

23. THE ANTIQUITY OF NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA (FROM CIRCA 1 A.D.).

The term "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic does not appear to have been used in literature before the first century A.D. Pāṇini⁴ (about 350 B.C.) did not know the word "Nyāya" in the sense of Logic, and even Patañjali⁵ (about 150 B.C.) does not seem to have been conversant with the word, which does not occur in his *Bhāṣya* on *ukthādi-gaṇa*. It does not find place, in this sense,⁶ in the *Artha-*

1 प्रमाणैरर्थं परीक्षणं न्यायः (Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-1).

2 Vide Viśvanātha's Nyāya sūtra-vṛtti, 1-1-25, 1-1-31, 1-1-38 and 1-1-40 in which *nyāya-svarūpa*, *nyāya-pūrvāṅga*, *nyāyottarāṅga* and *nyāyāśraya* are defined. The five parts of *nyāya* (syllogism) will be explained later.

3 Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, under the head Akṣapāda-darśana, p. 114, Calcutta edition.

4 Goldstucker in his Panini, p. 157, says that both Kātyāyana and Patañjali knew the Nyāya-sūtra. There is however no proof for the statement.

There is no doubt that Pāṇini derives the word *nyāya* (evidently in the sense of justice) from the root *nī* in his Aṣṭādhyāyī, 3-1-122 as follows :—अध्यायन्यायोच्चावसंचारायः His Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-2-60 ऋतुकथादि सूत्रान्तात् ढक् does not, however, presuppose *nyāya* in the sense of "Logic."

5 Patañjali did not use the word *naiyāyika* (logician) as *nyāya* was not included in the *ukthādigana* in his *Bhāṣya*. The *Gaṇapāṭha*, which includes it, is a later work. For *nyāya* vide Aṣṭādhyāyī, 4-4-92.

6 *Nyāya* signifies just or justice, equitable or equity :

शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्यते धर्मन्यायेन केनचित् ।

न्यायस्तत्र प्रमाणं स्यात् तत्र पाठो हि नश्यति ॥

(Artha śāstra, adhikaraṇa 3, chap. 1, p. 150).

śāstra¹ of Kauṭilya (about 327 B.C.). The term "Nyāya," which previously signified "right," "method," "analogy" or "maxim," is used in the sense of Logic for the first time in the Mahābhārata,² Viṣṇu purāṇa,³ Matsya purāṇa,⁴ Padma purāṇa,⁵ Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā,⁶ etc., in passages which are presumed to have been written after the beginning of the Christian era.

The Nyāya-śāstra was not so called before the subject of "Nyāya" (syllogism) was introduced into it. As the Caraka-saṁhitā,⁷ so far as we know, contains for the first time an exposition of the doctrine of syllogism under the name of *sthāpanā* (demonstration), it is presumed that the word *Nyāya* as an equivalent for Logic came into use about the composition of that Saṁhitā, that is, about the opening of the Christian era. The word became very popular about the second century A.D. when the Nyāya-sūtra was composed. Vātsyāyana (about 400 A.D.) uses the expression "*parama-nyāya*"⁸ for the conclusion (*nigamana*) which combines in itself all the five parts of a syllogism. Dignāga (about 500 A.D.) explicitly mentions the five parts or members of a syllogism as *Nyāyāvayava*.⁹

24. THE EARLY TEACHERS OF NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA (ABOUT 100 A.D.).

Nothing is definitely known about the early teachers of Nyāya-śāstra. In the Ādiparva of the Mahābhārata¹⁰ we find that the hermitage of Kāśyapa was filled with sages who knew the true

1

संघमुल्लस्य संघेषु न्यायवृत्तिर्हितः प्रियः ।
दासो युक्तजनस्तिष्ठेत् सर्वचित्तानुवर्तकः ॥

(Artha-śāstra of Kauṭilya, adhikaraṇa 11, adhyāya 1, p. 379, Sham Śāstri's edition).

² Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 1, verse 67; adhyāya 70, verses 42-44 and Śāntiparva, adhyāya 210, verse 22.

³ Viṣṇu purāṇa, third part. adhyāya 6.

⁴ Matsya purāṇa, 3-2.

⁵ Padma purāṇa, Uttarakhanda, chap. 263.

⁶ Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā, 1-3, etc.

⁷ Caraka-saṁhitā, Vimāna-sthāna, adhyāya 8.

⁸ सर्वेषामेकार्थसमवाये सामर्थ्यप्रदर्शनं निगमनमिति सोऽयं परमो न्यायः ।

(Nyāya bhāṣya, 1-1-1).

⁹ Nyāyāvayava called in Tibetan 'rigs-paḥi-yan-lag' occurs in the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap. VI, as follows :—རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ལ་མོགས་པ་ནིན།

(Tshad-ma-kun-las-btuṣ-pa, chap. vi. Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce).

10

न्यायतत्त्वात्मविज्ञानसम्यग्निर्बेदपारगैः । ॥ 42 ॥
नानावाक्यसमाचार समवाय विशारदैः ।

meanings of demonstration, refutation and conclusion. As *sthāpanā*, *ākṣepa* and *siddhānta*, which are the Sanskrit equivalents for demonstration, refutation and conclusion, are the technical terms of Nyāya-śāstra as used in the Caraka-saṁhitā, it may be reasonably inferred that the sages who dealt with them in the hermitage of Kāśyapa were the early exponents of that śāstra. Kāśyapa¹ lived on the river Mālīnī in the district of Saharanpur midway between Delhi and Hardwar.

25. NĀRADA—AN EXPERT IN NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA
(ABOUT 100 A.D.).

In the Sabhāparva of the Mahābhārata we find that a sage named Nārada² was an expert in Nyāya-śāstra.³ He was skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality, conjunction and co-existence (inherence), genus and species, etc., capable of deciding questions through evidences (*pramāṇa*), and clever in ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a speech of five parts (*pañcāvayava-vākya*). The “speech of five parts” refers undoubtedly to a syllogism of five members, and it is interesting to note that Nārada,

Nārada's skill in syllogistic reasoning.

विशेषकार्यविदुभिश्च मोक्षधर्मपरायणैः ॥ 43 ॥

स्थापनाच्चेपसिद्धान्त परमार्थज्ञतां गतैः ।

शब्दच्छन्दोनिर्दिष्टज्ञैः कालज्ञानविशारदैः ॥ 44 ॥

द्रव्यकर्मगुणज्ञैश्च कार्यकारणवेदिभिः ।

(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, adhyāya 70).

1

मालिनीमभितो राजन् नदीं पुण्यां सुखोदकाम् ॥ २१ ॥

तस्यास्त्रीरे भगवतः काश्यपस्य सहात्मनः ।

आश्रमप्रवरं रम्यं सदर्पिगणसेवितम् ॥ २७ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Ādiparva, chap. 70).

² Nārada is called in Tibetan མེས་གླིང་གྱི་བུ་ Mi-sgyin-gyi-bu (*vide* Mahāvvyut-patti, part I, p. 23, edited by Dr. E. D. Ross and Dr. Satis Chanda Vidyabhusana. in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

3

वेदोपनिषदां वेत्ता ऋषिः स्मरगणार्चितः ।

इतिहासपुराणज्ञः पुराकल्पविशेषवित् ॥ 2 ॥

न्यायविद्वन्तत्त्वज्ञः षडङ्गविदनुत्तमः ।

ऐक्यसंयोग नानात्व समवायविशारदः ॥ 3 ॥

वक्ता प्रगल्भी मेधावी स्मृतिमान्नयवित् कविः ।

परापरविभागज्ञः प्रमाणकृतनिश्चयः ॥ 4 ॥

पञ्चावयवयुक्तस्य वाक्यस्य गुणदोषवित् ।

उत्तरोत्तरवक्ता च वदतोऽपि बृहस्पतेः ।

धर्मार्यकाममोक्षेषु यथावत् कृतनिश्चयः ॥

(Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 5).

who, as we shall presently see, travelled in Śvetadvīpa (perhaps Alexandria), was one of the earliest experts in judging the merit and demerit of such a speech.

This Nārada represents the philosophical culture of the 1st century A.D. No work on Nyāya-śāstra written by him has come down to us. But Jayanta¹ in the Nyāya-mañjarī quotes a verse attributed to him which gives an exposition of a logical “point of defeat” (*nigraha-sthāna*) technically known as “the abandonment of a proposition (*pratiññā-hāni*).

The personality of Nārada is shrouded in mystery. He² is represented in the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas to have been himself very quarrelsome and clever in exciting quarrels among other people. Cursed by Brahmā he wandered over earth without staying at any fixed habitation. He was of an imposing figure with flowing braids of hair and a long grey beard—wearing a mendicant’s garment, holding in one hand a staff of gold and in the other a beggar’s bowl together with a lute of tortoise shell, and chanting always the name of Hari the Lord. He carried messages of gods to men and *vice versa*. Once he left heaven for a pleasant ramble on earth and repaired to the court of Sṛñjaya who ordered his daughter Sukumārī of unrivalled beauty to attend upon him. Nārada fell in love with her, and they were married; but owing to a curse he looked like a monkey to his bride. He however worked off the curse by severe austerities, and Sukumārī could with difficulty be reconciled to him when he appeared, on the removal of the curse, in his resplendent beauty. Nārada studied music for two years under two wives of Kṛṣṇa, Jāmbavatī and Satyabhāmā, but had to prolong his studies for another two years under the third wife of Kṛṣṇa named Rukminī to attain mastery over the notes of the musical scale.

He visited Śvetadvīpa³ supposed to be identical with the

1 यदाह नारदः—

सारस्तु व्यवहाराणां प्रतिज्ञा समुदाहृता ।

तद्वानौ हीयते वादी तरं सामुत्तरो भवेत् ॥

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. XII., p. 640, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

² For legends about Nārada consult the Mahābhārata, Bhāgavata purāṇa, Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa, Viṣṇu purāṇa, Varāha purāṇa, Bhaviṣya purāṇa, Adbhuta Rāmāyaṇa, etc.

तस्माज्जोकेषु ते बृह न भवेद् अमृतः पदम् । (Viṣṇu purāṇa, 1-15, tīkā).

³ क्षीरोदधेर्योत्तरतो हि द्वीपः । श्वेतः स नाम्ना प्रथितो विशालः ।

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 335-8).

Śvetadvīpa may also be identified with Syria. Cf. “Comparative studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity,” by Dr. B. N. Seal, Calcutta.

country of which the capital was Alexandria where he became the guest of a merchant in a town called Dvaidal-nāyaka, and where he saw Viṣṇu (God) worshipped with fervour by devotees who attained their suitable end through His grace.

In the Varāha purāṇa ¹ Nārada is stated to have in a previous birth been a Brāhmaṇa, Sārasvata by name, in the city of Avantī, who offered oblations of water to his dead ancestors in the lake of Puṣkara at Ajmere.

There is extant a work on Smṛti ² dated about the 4th century A.D., which is said to have been written by the sage Nārada. Other works such as the Nārada-pañca-rātra are also attributed to him.

The fiction about Nārada seems to have originated from one Nārada whose existence is unquestioned. The real Nārada. This real Nārada is mentioned in the Sarvānukramikā of Kātyāyana as a descendant of Kaṇva ³ and a seer of certain mantras of the Ṛgveda. It appears from the Chāndogyopaniṣad ⁴ that he was versed in many sciences including *vāko-vākya* ⁵ (perhaps Logic). He was either the founder of a distinguished line, the succeeding members of which took up his renowned name, or the founder of a school of thought, the various followers of which were known to the world after him.

Our Nārada, an expert in Nyāya-śāstra, was a descendant or follower of the real Nārada or was an altogether fictitious person requisitioned by the compilers of the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas who fathered upon him the sayings and doings of different ages and countries to make them authoritative.

¹ Varāha purāṇa, adhyāya 2, verses 63-83, and adhyāya 3, verses 3-7, in the Bibliotheca Indica series).

² The Nārada-smṛti seems to have been composed about the fourth century A.D. as it frequently mentions *dīnāra* (the Roman coin denarius) which was imported into India about the time of the Roman emperors. Compare तद्द्विदशद्वयवर्णस्तु दीनाराख्यः स एव च ॥

(Nārada-smṛti parīṣiṣṭa 60, edited by Dr. J. Jolly, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

³ Vide also Dr. J. Jolly's Introduction to the Nārada-smṛti (Minor Law books), in the S.B.E. series, p. xviii.

Nārada-smṛti, the real author of which is unknown, represents the theories of Smṛti and Nyāya of the early centuries of Christ.

⁴ Sāyana's commentary on the Ṛgveda, 8-3-13 and 9-104-6. Kaṇva was an ancestor of Kāśyapa already mentioned.

⁵ Chāndogyopaniṣad, prapāthaka 7, khaṇḍa 1, verse 2, and "The Upanishads" translated by F. Max Müller, S.B.E. series, p. 110.

⁶ *Vāko-vākya* may signify grammar, rhetoric or debate. Śaṅkara interprets it as Logic.

26. NYĀYA-SŪTRA—THE FIRST SYSTEMATIC WORK ON NYĀYA-ŚĀSTRA.

The first regular work on the Nyāya-śāstra is the Nyāya-sūtra or “aphorisms on true reasoning.” It is divided into five books, each containing two chapters called *āhnikas* (diurnal portions). Perhaps the Nyāya-sūtra, as it exists at present, is not entirely the work of one person, but has been enlarged by interpolations from time to time. It contains references to the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Buddhist systems of philosophy. There are in it passages which were quoted almost *verbatim* from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,¹ Mādhyamika-sūtra,² and other Buddhist works which were composed about the third or fourth century A.D. It seems that these passages were interpolated by Vātsyāyana who is said to have written the first commentary called *Bhāṣya* on the Nyāya sūtra about 400 A.D. The Nyāya-sūtra contains in itself the principles both of Logic and Philosophy.

¹ बुद्ध्या विवेचनानु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-2-26).

“There is no essence in things inasmuch as they are discerned by our intellect.”

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते । (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. II, x).

“We cannot ascertain the essence of things which are discerned by our intellect.”

स्फटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद् अन्तहीनामहेतुः (Nyāya-sūtra, 3-2-11).

“Even in the case of a crystal there is no cause for the production of one after another, because all individuals are momentary.”

अनुत्पत्तिञ्च धर्माणां क्षणिकार्थं वदाम्यहम् ॥ (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. VI).

“By saying that a thing is momentary, I mean that it is not produced.”

² न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् (Nyāya sūtra, 4-1-39).

“Things cannot be self-existent owing to their inter-relations.”

नहि स्वभावो भावानां प्रत्ययादिषु विद्यते (Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. I).

“There is no self-existence of things owing to their mutual relationship.”

न सन नासन् न सदसदसत् सतो वैधर्मात् (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-48).

“A thing is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, owing to the mutual incongruity of existence and non-existence.”

न सन नासन् न सदसन धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा (Mādhyamika sūtra, chap. VII).

“There cannot be production of a thing which is existent, non-existent or both.”

मायामन्वर्धनगरं मृगहृण्णिकावद् वा (Nyāya-sūtra, 4-2-32).

“The concept of things is like a trick of jugglery, the city of the celestial quire or a mirage.”

27. AKṢAPĀDA—THE AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA
(ABOUT 150 A.D.).

In the early commentaries on the Nyāya-sūtra the author of the Sūtra is distinctly named as Akṣapāda.¹ Vātsyāyana² in the Nyāya-bhāṣya (about 400 A.D.) says that the Nyāya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Akṣapāda the foremost of the eloquent; while Uddyotakara³ in his Nyāya-vārtika (about 600 A.D.) affirms that it was Akṣapāda the most excellent of sages that spoke out the Nyāya-śāstra in a systematic way. In the Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-ṭikā⁴ (81 A.D.) and the Nyāya-mañjarī,⁵ Akṣapāda is stated to have been the promul-

Akṣapāda credited as the author of the Nyāya-sūtra.

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानम् तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम् ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. VII).

“The origination, continuance and cessation of a thing are said to be like a trick of jugglery, a dream or the city of the celestial quire.”

वर्त्तमानाभावः पततः पतित-पतितश्च कालोपपत्तेः (Nyāya-sūtra, 2-1-39).

“The present time is non-existent because the falling down of an object relates to the time during which the object fell down and to the time during which it will fall down.”

गतं न गम्यते तावत् अगतं नैव गम्यते ।

गतागतं विनिर्मुक्तं गम्यमानं न गम्यते ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chap. II).

“We are not passing a path which has already been passed, nor are we passing that which is yet to be passed; the existence of a path, which has neither been passed nor is yet to be passed, is beyond comprehension.”

¹ Akṣapāda is called in Tibetan རྒྱལ་མིག་ཅན་ Rkañ-mig-can, “with eyes on his feet.” (Vide Mahā-vyutpatti, part I, p. 22, edited in Sanskrit-Tibetan-English by Dr. Sir E. D. Ross and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.)

2

योऽक्षपादस्तु न्यायः प्रत्यभादृतां वरम् ।

तस्य वात्स्यायन इदं भाष्यजातमवर्त्तयत् ॥

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, colophon, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

3

यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां श्लाघ्यं शस्त्रं जगतो जगाद ।

कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिं हेतोः करिष्यते तच्च मया निबन्धः ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, opening lines).

4

अथ भगवता अक्षपादेन निःश्रेयसहेतो श्लाघ्ये प्रणीते...

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, opening lines).

5

अक्षपादप्रणीतो हि विततो न्यायपादपः ।

सान्द्रादन्तरसंख्यन्तफलसन्दर्भनिर्भरः ॥

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. I).

gator of the Nyāya-śāstra, while Mādhavācārya in his Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha (about 1350 A.D.) designates the Nyāya philosophy as *Akṣapāda-darśana*, the philosophy of Akṣapāda.

But in the Padma purāṇa,¹ Skanda purāṇa,² etc., the Nyāya-śāstra is stated to have been expounded by Gotama or Gautama. Viśvanātha³ in his Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti calls the Nyāya-sūtra as Gotama-sūtra, that is, the sūtra of Gotama. Now the question arises as to who. Gotama or Akṣapāda, was the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra. Anantayaśvan⁴ in his commentary on the Piṭṛmedha-sūtra supposes on grounds best known to himself that Gautama (Gotama) and Akṣapāda were the same person.

The Nyāya-koṣa⁵ mentions two legends to account for the name Akṣapāda as applied, according to it, to Gautama. It is said that Gautama was so deeply absorbed in philosophical contemplation that one day during his walks he fell unwittingly into a well, out of which he was rescued with great difficulty. God therefore mercifully provided him with a second pair of eyes in his feet, to protect the sage from further mishaps. This is a ridiculous story manufactured merely to explain the word “Akṣapāda” “as composed of, “Akṣa” (eye) and “Pāda” (feet).

Another legend which represents Vyāsa, a disciple of Gautama, lying prostrate before his master until the latter condescended to look upon him, not with his natural eyes, but with a new pair of eyes in his feet, may be dismissed with scant ceremony as the invention of a later generation of logicians, anxious to humiliate Vyāsa for the vilification of the Nyāya system in the Mahābhārata and Vedānta-sūtra.

¹ Padma purāṇa, Uttarakhanda, chap. 263, where the following verse occurs:—

कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं मद्यत् ।

गोतमेन तथा न्यायं सांख्यं तु कपिलेन वै ॥

² गोतमः स्नेन तर्केन खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि ।

(Skanda purāṇa, Kālikā khanda, chap. XVII).

³ एषा सुनिवर गोतम छत्रवृत्तिः श्रीविश्वनाथ कृतिना सुगमाख्यवर्णा ।

श्रीकृष्णचन्द्र चरणाम्बुज चक्षुरीक श्री मच्छिरोमणिवचः प्रचक्षरकारि ॥

(Nyā-sūtra-vṛtti, concluding verse).

⁴ To the Gṛhya-sūtras of the Sāma-veda probably belong also Gautama's Piṭṛmedha-sūtra (cf. Burnell, p. 57: the commentator Anantayaśvan identifies the author with Akṣapāda, the author of the Nyāya-sūtra), and Gautama-dharma-sūtra.—Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 85.

⁵ Nyāya-koṣa (2nd edition, by M.M. Bhīmācārya Jhālākīkara, Bombay).

In fact Gotama or Gautama, the founder of Ānvīkṣikī, was quite different from Akṣapāda. While one lived in Mithilā, the other flourished at Prabhāsa in Kathiawar. The Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa¹ describes Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda as the sons of a Brāhmaṇa named Soma-śarmā who was Śiva incarnate, and well known for his practice of austerities at the shrine of Prabhāsa² during the time of Jātūkarnya Vyāsa.

It is by no means easy to determine who was the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra. Gautama and Akṣapāda seem both to have contributed to the production of the work. The Nyāya-sūtra treats mainly of five subjects, viz. (1) *pramāṇa*, the means of right knowledge, (2) *prameya*, the object of right knowledge, (3) *vāda*, a debate or discussion, (4) *avayava*, the members of a syllogism, and (5) *anyamataparīkṣā*, an examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines. The second and the third subjects, and possibly also the first subject in its crude form, ample references to which are met with in the old Brāhmaṇic, Buddhistic, and Jaina books, were in all probability first handled by Gautama whose *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā* was constituted by them. The

1

सप्तविंशतिमे प्राप्ते परिवर्त्ते क्रमागते ।
जातुकण्यो यदा व्यासो भविष्यति तपोधनः ॥
तदाहं संभविष्यामि सोमशर्मा द्विजोत्तमः ।
प्रभासतीर्थमासाद्य योगात्मा लोकविश्रुतः ॥
तत्रापि मम ते पुत्रा भविष्यन्ति तपोधनाः ।
अक्षपादः कणादश्च उलूकी वत्स एव च ॥

(Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa published under the name of Vāyu purāṇa by A.S.B., adhyāya 23).

² Prabhāsa washed on its western side by the river Sarasvatī, and reputed as the residence of Kṛṣṇa, is mentioned in the Śrīmad Bhāgavata thus:—

न वस्तुयमिहास्माभिर्जिजीविषुरार्यकाः ।
प्रभासं सुमहत्पुण्यं यास्यामोऽदौव साचिरम् ॥

(Bhāgavata, Skandha II, adhyāya 6).

स्त्रियो बालाश्च वृद्धाश्च शंखोद्धारं व्रजन्ति तः ।
वयं प्रभासं यास्यामो यत्र प्रत्यक् सरस्वती ॥

(Bhāgavata, Skandha II, adhyāya 30).

Prabhāsa was situated beyond the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar, where we come across all the edicts of Aśoka as well as an inscription of Rudradāman supposed to be the first inscription in Sanskrit about 150 A.D. which mentions Candra Gupta and Aśoka by names. There are also some inscriptions in Gupta characters, and there is no doubt that Prabhāsa situated on the Sarasvatī acquired celebrity in very old times.

Cf. Archaeological Survey of Western India, Vol. II, p. 128.

Poet Bhavabhūti of Viḍarbha introduces himself as the son of Jātūkarnī (*vide* Uttararāma-carita).

fourth and fifth subjects, and possibly also the first subject in its systematic form, were introduced by Akṣapāda into the *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā* which in its final form was styled the Nyāya-sūtra. Akṣapāda was therefore the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra which derived a considerable part of its materials from the *Ānvīkṣikī-vidyā* of Gautama. Just as Caraka was the redactor of the Agniveśa-tantra or the Āyurveda of Ātreya, Akṣapāda was the redactor of the *Ānvīkṣikī* of Gautama. Hence Nyāya is called *Gautamī-vidyā* as well as *Akṣapāda-darśana*.

We know nothing of Jātūkarṇya Vyāsa except that the name Jātūkarṇya widely prevailed in Vidarbha (Berar), and that the word Vyāsa usually signified a compiler. It seems that after king Kaniṣka had held the fourth Buddhist Council at Jālandhara in the first century A.D. to collect the teachings of Buddha, the Brāhmaṇic sages too in the following centuries met together in groups to compile the Purāṇas and other śāstras. Jātūkarṇya was probably one of the compilers at Vidarbha, and Akṣapāda, the compiler of the Nyāya-sūtra, was one of his contemporaries.

The Nyāya-sūtra, which was criticised by Nāgārjuna, referred perhaps to the Caraka-saṃhitā under the name of Āyurveda.¹ Akṣapāda seems therefore to have flourished before Nāgārjuna (circa 250–320 A.D.) who employs many logical terms presumably from the Nyāya-sūtra, and after Caraka whose Saṃhitā compiled about 78 A.D. embodies logical doctrines of a cruder form than those of the Nyāya-sūtra. The date of Akṣapāda² may therefore be approximately fixed at about 150 A.D.

28. SUBJECTS OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The principal subjects treated in the Nyāya-sūtra may be grouped under the following heads:—

- (1) *Pramāṇa*—the means of knowledge, which comprises *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), and *śabda* (verbal testimony). Of these, *śabda* (verbal testimony) as defined in the Nyāya-sūtra combines in itself the

¹ मन्त्रायुर्वेद प्रामाण्यवच्च तद्व्याख्यानात्प्रामाण्यात् ।

(Nyāya-sūtra, 2-1-69, p. 42, Sacred Books of the Hindus series, Allahabad).

² The Japanese scholar Professor H. Ui observes:—The date of Nyāya sūtra seems to be between Nāgārjuna (the second-third century) and Vasubandhu (the fourth century). (The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 16).

The Italian scholar Professor L. Sualì places the date between 300 A.D. and 350 A.D. (Filosofia Indiana, p. 14).

Dr. H. Jacobi places the date between 200 A.D. and 450 A.D. on the ground that the Nāya-sūtra attacks Śūnyavāda, but does not allude to Vijñāna-vāda.

(Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. xxxi, 1911, p. 29).

meanings of *āptopadeśa* (reliable assertion), *śabda* (word), and *aitihya* (tradition), as explained in the Caraka-saṁhitā. *Upamāna* or *upamāna* (comparison) included in the Tantra-yukti and mentioned in the Jaina works is accepted here as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The term “*pramāṇa*” in the sense given here was not widely used even in the days of Caraka (about 78 A.D.) inasmuch as he employed three terms, viz. *parīkṣā*, *hetu*, and *pramāṇa*, to signify the means of knowledge.

- (2) *Prameya*—the object of knowledge, which comprises the soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and release. It corresponds to *Ātmavāda* of the *Ānvikṣikī*. Though the word “*prameya*” in the sense of an object of knowledge occurs in the Caraka-saṁhitā, it does not there refer specially to the twelve objects enumerated in the Nyāya-sūtra. The word, as already shown, is mentioned in the sense of an object of knowledge, also in the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, and Manu-saṁhitā.
- (3) *Vāda*—a discussion. In the Caraka-saṁhitā *vāda* as a substitute for *kathā* (discourse) includes *jalpa* (wrangling) and *vitandā* (cavil). The categories of the Nyāya-sūtra beginning with *saṁśaya* (doubt) are subsidiaries to *vāda* in the carrying on of which they are to be employed. The subject of *vāda* as treated in the Nyāya-sūtra represents the *sambhāṣā-vidhi* (the method of debate) as explained in the Caraka-saṁhitā. *Jāti* (analogue), *hetvābhāsa* (fallacy) and *nigrahasthāna* (the point of defeat) are included in the subject of *vāda*. “*Jāti*” is the same as “*uttara*” (rejoinder) and “*hetvābhāsa*” (fallacy) is the same as “*ahetu*” (non-reason) mentioned in the Caraka-saṁhitā. The grounds covered by the two sets of terms are however not exactly identical. The term “*jāti*” in the sense of “analogue” or “futile rejoinder” does not occur in any work anterior to the Nyāya-sūtra, but when it was introduced it incorporated in it “*ahetu*” as explained in the Caraka-saṁhitā. The term “*nigraha*” in the sense of “defeat” was extensively used in the Pāli literature, and “*nigraha-sthāna*” (the point of defeat or occasion for rebuke) was a technical term in the Caraka-saṁhitā. The doctrine of “*nigraha-sthāna*” attained a high development in the Nyāya-sūtra.
- (4) *Avayava*—consists of five parts or members of a syllogism. It covers the same ground as *sthāpanā* (demonstration) explained in the Caraka-saṁhitā. Some of the five parts seem to have been known by name to the old Brāhmanic writers as well as to the authors of the Jaina sthānāṅga sūtra and Pāli Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, but not in their technical senses nor as members of a syllogism. We do not find the five parts combined together in the form of a syllogism before the composition of the Nyāya-sūtra and the Caraka-saṁhitā.
- (5) *Anyamata-parīkṣā*—the examination of the doctrines of other

systems of philosophy. There is in the Nyāya-sūtra an examination of various philosophical doctrines, e.g. in Book III, chap. II there is a criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of intellect (*buddhi*) and the Saugata doctrine of momentariness (*kṣanika-vāda*); in Book IV, chap. I there is a review of the (Buddhist) doctrine of voidness (*Śūnyatā*) and the Vedānta doctrine of the transformation of Brahma (*Brahma-pari-ṇāma-vāda*), etc.

29. THE ARRANGEMENT OF CATEGORIES IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The Nyāya-sūtra treats of sixteen categories which comprise all the topics of *vāda-mūrga* (the course of debate) as enumerated in the Caraka-saṃhitā. While there is apparently no order among the topics of the Caraka-saṃhitā, there exists evidently a regular arrangement among the categories of the Nyāya-sūtra. The categories are, according to the commentaries¹ on the Nyāya-sūtra, supposed to represent stages in the course of a debate between a disputant and his respondent. The first of the categories is (1) *pramāṇa*, which signifies the means of knowledge, and the second is (2) *prameya*, which refers to the objects of knowledge. These two categories, which constitute the basis of a debate, supply the thesis or case which a disputant is to prove. The third category, (3) *saṃśaya* (doubt), having roused a conflicting judgment about the case, the disputant in pursuance of his (4) *prayojana* (purpose) cites a parallel case called (5) *dṛṣṭānta* (a familiar instance) which is not open to such a doubt. The case is then shown to rest on (6) *siddhāntas* (tenets) which are accepted by both the parties. That the case is valid is further shown by an analysis of it into five parts called (7) *avayava* (members). Having carried on (8) *tarka* (confutation) against all contrary suppositions the disputant affirms his case with (9) *nirṇaya* (certainty). If his respondent, not being satisfied with this process of demonstration, advances an antithesis, he will have to enter upon (10) *vāda* (discussion) which will necessarily assume the form of (11) *jalpa* (a wrangling) and (12) *vitandā* (a cavil). Failing to establish his antithesis, he will employ (13) *hetvābhāsa* (fallacious reasons), (14) *chala* (quibbles), and (15) *jāti* (analogues), the exposure of which will bring about his (16) *nigrahasthāna* (defeat).

¹ Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya and Viśva-nātha in his Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti, while explaining the sixteen categories, justify the gradual order of their succession. Dr. Ballantyne in his translation of the Nyāya-sūtra, and Dr. Robert Adamson in his "History of Logic" (pp. 165-166), point out that the categories represent stages in dialectic or in the process of clearing up knowledge by discussion.

30. THE PROCESS OF TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES.

As pointed out by Vātsyāyana,¹ the Nyāya-sūtra treats of its categories through the processes of enunciation (*uddesā*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and examination (*parīkṣā*). *Enunciation* is the mere mention of the categories by name; *definition* consists in setting forth that character of a category which differentiates it from other categories; and *examination* is the settlement, by reasoning, of the question whether the definition of a certain category is really applicable to it. Book I of the Nyāya-sūtra deals with the enunciation and definition of the sixteen categories, while the remaining four books are concerned with a critical examination of the categories.

¹ Vātsyāyana observes :—

त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः । उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति ।

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-2).

CHAPTER II.

Contents of the Nyāya-sūtra.¹

31. THE CATEGORIES : THEIR ENUNCIATION.

As the Nyāya-sūtra is the foremost work on Nyāya-śāstra, a full summary of its doctrines is given here. Akṣapāda says that supreme felicity, *summum bonum* (*nirṣreyasa*), is attained by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories treated in his Nyāya-sūtra. The categories² are enumerated as follows:—

(1) The means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (2) the object of right knowledge (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*saṁśaya*), (4) purpose (*prayojana*), (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) tenet (*siddhānta*), (7) members (*avayava*), (8) confutation (*tarka*), (9) ascertainment (*nirṇaya*), (10) discussion (*vāda*), (11) wrangling (*jālpa*), (12) cavil (*vitandā*), (13) fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), (14) quibble (*chala*), (15) analogue (*jāti*), and (16) the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

32. THE CATEGORIES : THEIR DEFINITION.

Definitions of the sixteen categories are given below:—

(1) The Means of Right Knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*), are the means of right knowledge.

¹ Vide "The Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama" translated by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the "Sacred Books of the Hindus" series, Allahabad; also Dr. Ballantyne's translation of the Nyāya-sūtras, first four books, Benares.

² In Tibetan the sixteen categories, *ṣoḍaśa padārthāḥ* (ཚེག་གི་རྣམ་པ་རྒྱུ་ལ་ tshig-gi-don heu-drug), are designated respectively as follows:—

(1) ཚད་མ་ tshad-ma (source of right cognition), (2) གཤམ་བྱ་ gshal-bya (object of right cognition), (3) ཇེ་ཚམ་ the-tshom (doubt), (4) དགོས་པ་ dgoḡ-pa (motive), (5) དཔེ་ dpe (example), (6) མ་ཤས་ cha-śas (member of a syllogism), (7) བྱུང་པའི་མཐའ་ grub-pahi-mthah (established tenet), (8) རྟོག་གེ་ rtog-ge (corroborating a proposition by showing that its denial is impossible, *reductio ad absurdum*), (9) གཏན་ལ་དབང་པ་ gtan-la-gwab-pa (demonstration or ascertainment), (10) རྟོག་པ་ rtsod-pa (discussion), (11) བརྟེན་པ་ brjod-pa (wrangling), (12) སྤྱོད་པ་ལྟར་སྤྱོད་པ་ sun-hbyin-du-rgol-wa (cavil or reducing a proposition *ad absurdum* without caring to establish one's own view), (13) རྟོག་པ་རྟོག་པ་ rgyu-ltar-gnañ-wa (fallacious middle term), (14) ཚེག་རྣམ་ tshig-dor (quibble), (15) ལྟམ་ཚད་ ltag-choḍ (evasive answer), and (16) ཆད་པའི་གནས་ chad-pahi-gnas (a reason why one may be declared unfit to continue the controversy).—Vide Mahāvīyutpatti, part II, p. 133, Bibliotheca Indica series; also Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Go, folios 233-377.

Perception¹ is the knowledge which arises from the intercourse of a sense with its object, being determinate, unnameable, and non-erratic.

Sense—includes the mind. The knowledge of the soul, pleasure, pain, etc., is produced by their intercourse with the mind which, according to the Bhāṣya 1-1-4 of Vātsyāyana, is a sense-organ.

Determinate—this epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate (doubtful) knowledge; as for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust. His knowledge, which is of a doubtful character, is not perception.

Unnameable—signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears. It arises in fact without the aid of language.

Some say that there is no perception entirely free from verbal representation. All things have names: there is nothing devoid of a name. Whenever a thing is perceived it is perceived as bearing a name. The thing being inseparably connected with its name, the perception of the thing involves that of the name also. Hence there is no perception which is not invariably accompanied by a name.

Akṣapāda does not accept the above view on the ground, as explained in the Bhāṣya 1-1-4 of Vātsyāyana, that we can perceive a thing although we may not know its name, and when we know the name we perceive the thing as entirely distinct from it. Thus our perception of a thing is totally independent of its name. It is, however, admitted that the name is useful in communicating our perception to our fellow-men. They cannot comprehend our perception unless we give a name to it. It is therefore concluded that the name of a thing is not necessarily present and operative at the time when the thing is perceived.

Non-erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat (vapour) quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

[The Sanskrit Sūtra defining perception may also be translated as follows:—

Perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is non-erratic, being either indeterminate (“nirvikalpaka” as “this is something”) or determinate (“savikalpaka” as “this is a Brāhmaṇa”)].

¹ In Tibetan the definition is stated as follows:—

དབང་པོ་དང་རྟོག་འཕྲད་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཞེས་པ་མངོན་སུམ་གཏན་དུ་མེད་པ་འབྲུག་པ་མེད་པ་རྟོག་པའི་བདག་ཅིན་ Dwañ-po-dañ-don-hphrad-pa-las-byuñ-wahi-śes-pa-mñon-sum-gtan-du-med-pa-hphrul-pa-med-pa-rtog-pahi-bdag-nid. It has been translated by Alexander Csoma de Koros as follows: Perception is cognition [which is] produced through contact between an organ of sense and its object, [which is] not contained in the word, not discrepant from its object, and the essence of which is certainty. Mahāvvyutpatti, part II, p. 134, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta; also Bstan-hgyur Mdo, Go, folios 233-377.

Inference is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, viz. 'â priori,' 'â posteriori,' and 'commonly seen.'

Â priori (*pūrvavat*) is the knowledge of effect derived from the perception of its cause, e.g. one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.

Â posteriori (*śeṣavat*) is the knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effect, e.g. one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain.

'Commonly seen' (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*) is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen or seen together, e.g. seeing a beast possessing horns, one infers that it possesses also a tail, or one infers the presence of water from the presence of cranes.

[Vātsyāyana, the first commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, takes the last to be "not commonly seen" (*sāmānyato h̥dr̥ṣṭa*), which he interprets as the knowledge of a thing which is not commonly seen, e.g. observing affection, aversion and other qualities one infers that there is a substance called soul].

Comparison is the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.

A man hearing from a forester that a *bos gavaeus* is like a cow resorts to a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he heard he institutes a comparison, by which he arrives at the conviction that the animal which he sees is *bos gavaeus*. This is knowledge derived through comparison.

Word or verbal testimony is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.

'A reliable person' is one (*a ṛṣi, ārya or mleccha*) who as an expert in a certain matter is willing to communicate his experiences of it. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the assertion of the old man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge called *word* or verbal testimony.

Word is of two kinds, viz (1) that which refers to matter which is seen, e.g. a physician's assertion that physical strength is gained by taking butter; and (2) that which refers to matter which is not seen, e.g. a religious teacher's assertion that one conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices.

Rumour (*aitihya*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*), and non-existence (*abhāva*), are not separate means of right knowledge as they are included in the four stated above.

(2) The Objects of Right Knowledge (*prameya*).

The soul (*ātmā*), body (*śarīra*), senses (*indriya*), objects of sense (*artha*), intellect (*buddhi*), mind (*manah*), activity (*pravṛtti*),

fault (*doṣa*), transmigration (*pretyabhāva*), fruit (*phala*), pain (*duḥkha*), and emancipation (*apavarga*), are the (principal) objects of right knowledge.

Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are the marks of the soul.

These are the qualities of the substance called soul.

Desire is a sign which proves the existence of "soul." A soul, having experienced pleasure in a certain thing, *desires* again to acquire it through recognition of the same. Aversion is another sign, inasmuch as the soul feels aversion against a thing from which it suffered pain. Similarly volition, etc., are also signs of the soul. The existence of soul is thus, according to the Nyāya-bhāṣya and Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-10, proved on the basis of recognition involved in our desire, aversion, etc. The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to time connected with a body suitable to its desert (merit and demerit). The connection of the soul with a body is its birth, while their mutual separation is its death. Transmigration, which consists in a series of births and deaths, is the source of all our sufferings. When our desert is completely exhausted, our soul, freed from transmigration, attains emancipation or release (*mokṣa*).

The body is the site of gestures, senses and sentiments.

Body is the site of *gestures* inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of *senses* for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. *Sentiments* which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them.

The nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses, which are produced from elements.

Earth, water, light, air, and ether—these are the elements. The *nose* is of the same nature as earth, the *tongue* as water, the *eye* as light, the *skin* as air, and *ear* as ether.

Smell (odour), taste (savour), colour, touch and sound which are qualities of the earth, etc., are objects of the senses.

Smell which is the prominent quality of earth is the object of the nose, *taste* the prominent quality of water is the object of the tongue, *colour* the prominent quality of light is the object of the eye, *touch* the prominent quality of air is the object of the skin, and *sound* the quality of ether is the object of the ear.

Intellect is the same as apprehension or knowledge.

The mark of the mind is that there do not arise in the soul more acts of knowledge than one at a time.

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it requires also a conjunction of the mind. Now, the mind,

which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-organ at a time, hence there cannot occur more acts of perception than one at a time.

Activity is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action.

There are three kinds of action, *viz. bodily, vocal, and mental*, each of which may be subdivided as good or bad.

Bodily actions which are *bad* are:—(1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery.

Bodily actions which are *good* are:—(1) giving, (2) protecting, (3) and serving.

Vocal actions which are *bad* are:—(1) telling a lie, (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering, and (4) indulging in frivolous talk.

Vocal actions which are *good* are:—speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books.

Mental actions which are *bad* are:—(1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) scepticism.

Mental actions which are *good* are:—(1) compassion, (2) generosity, and (3) devotion.

Faults are those which cause activity.

They are affection (attachment), aversion, and stupidity.

Transmigration means rebirths.

As already explained, it is a series of births and deaths. *Birth* is the connection of a soul with a body which includes the sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments. *Death* is the soul's separation from them.

Fruit is the thing produced by activity and faults.

It is the enjoyment of *pleasure* or suffering of *pain*. All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable and pain which is fit only to be avoided.

Pain is that which causes uneasiness.

It is affliction which every one desires to avoid. The Sanskrit Sūtra defining "pain" may also be translated as follows: *Pain* is the mark of hindrance to the soul.

Emancipation or release is the absolute deliverance from pain.

A soul, which is no longer subject to transmigration, is freed from all pains. Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body and taking another, is the cause of its experiencing pleasure and pain. The soul attains emancipation as soon as there is an end of the body, and consequently of pleasure and pain.

(3) Doubt (*samśaya*).

Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties

common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.

- (1) *Recognition of common properties*—e.g. seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both.
- (2) *Recognition of properties not common*—e.g. hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal, nor in atoms which are eternal.
- (3) *Conflicting testimony*—e.g. merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not.
- (4) *Irregularity of perception*—e.g. we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in a mirage where it really does not exist.
A question arises, whether water is perceived only when it actually exists or even when it does not exist.
- (5) *Irregularity of non-perception*—e.g. we neither perceive water in the radish where it really exists, nor on dry land where it does not exist.
A question arises, whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist.

(4) Purpose (*prayojana*).

Purpose is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act.

It refers to the thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid. A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food.

(5) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

An example is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.

With regard to the general proposition "wherever there is smoke there is fire," the example is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator.

(6) Tenet (*siddhānta*).

A tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.

The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between 'a dogma of all the schools' (*sarva-tantra*), 'a dogma peculiar to some school' (*prati-tantra*), 'a hypothetical dogma' (*adhikaraṇa*), and 'an implied dogma' (*abhyupagama*).

A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.

The existence of five elements or five objects of sense is a tenet which is accepted by all the schools.

A *dogma peculiar to some school* is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools.

“A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing”—this is a peculiar dogma of the Sāṃkhyas.

A *hypothetical dogma* is a tenet which if accepted leads to the acceptance of another tenet.

“There is a soul apart from the senses, because it can recognize one and the same object by seeing and touching.” If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following:—(1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them, etc.

An *implied dogma* is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it, e.g. the discussion whether sound is eternal or non-eternal presupposes that it is a substance.

(7) Members of a Syllogism (*avayava*).

The members (of a syllogism) are signalled by a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), an explanatory example (*udāharaṇa*), an application of the example (*upanaya*), and a statement of the conclusion (*nigamana*).

A *proposition* is the statement of what is to be proved, e.g.
the hill is fiery.

A *reason* is the means for proving what is to be proved through the homogeneous or heterogeneous (affirmative or negative) character of the example, e.g.

because it (the hill) is smoky.

Here “smoke” is the reason.

A *homogeneous (or affirmative) example* is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be proved, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given, e.g.

whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen.

Here “kitchen” is a familiar instance which possesses fire, and implies that fire invariably goes with smoke, which is the reason given.

N.B.—An *affirmative example* may, according to the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-36, be defined as a familiar instance, which being similar to the minor term (subject) possesses the property of that term as copresent with the reason.

A *heterogeneous* (or *negative*) *example* is a familiar instance which is devoid of the property to be proved, and which implies that the absence of this property is incompatible with the reason given, e.g.

whatever is not fiery is not smoky, as a lake.

Here the lake is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of fire, and implies that absence of fieriness is incompatible with the smoke, which is the reason.

Application is the winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be proved as being so or not so.

Application is of two kinds : (1) *affirmative*, and (2) *negative*. The affirmative application, which is expressed by the word "so," occurs when the example is of an affirmative character. The negative application, which is expressed by the phrase "not so," occurs when the example is of a negative character.

Affirmative application—"So" is this hill (smoky).

Negative application—This hill is "not so" (not smoky).

Conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition after the reason has been mentioned.

It is the confirmation of the proposition after the reason and the example have been mentioned

Conclusion—Therefore the hill is fiery.

The five members may be fully set forth as follows:—

- (i) *Proposition*—This hill is fiery.
- (ii) *Reason*—Because it is smoky.
- (iii) *Example*—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen (*homogeneous* or *affirmative*).
- (iv) *Application*—"So" is this hill (smoky)—(*affirmative*).
- (v) *Conclusion*—Therefore this hill is fiery.

(8) Confutation (*tarka*).

Confutation,¹ which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters.

Is the soul eternal or non-eternal? Here the real character of the soul, viz. whether it is eternal or non-eternal, is not known. In ascertaining the character we reason as follows: If the soul were non-eternal it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its own actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final emancipation. But such a conclusion is absurd: such possibilities are known to belong to the soul: therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal.

¹ *Tarka* may be rendered also as 'argumentation,' 'reasoning,' 'hypothetical reasoning,' 'reductio ad absurdum,' etc.

(9) Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*).

Ascertainment is the determination of a question through the removal of doubt, by hearing two opposite sides.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements advanced to him are supported by one of two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate one of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called ascertainment. Ascertainment is not, however, in all cases preceded by doubt, for instance, in the case of perception things are ascertained directly. So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scriptures. But in the case of investigation (inference), doubt must precede ascertainment.

(10) Discussion (*vāda*).

Discussion is the adoption, by two parties, of two opposite theses which are each analysed in the form of five members, and are supported or condemned by any of the means of right knowledge, and by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets.

A *dialogue*, disputation or controversy (*kathā*) is the adoption of a side or thesis by a disputant, and its opposite one by his opponent. It is of three kinds, viz. *discussion* (*vāda*) which aims at ascertaining the truth, *wrangling* (*jalpa*) which aims at gaining victory, and *cavil* (*vitandā*) which aims at finding mere faults. A *discutient* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth.

An instance of discussion is given below :—

Discutient—There is soul.

Opponent—There is no soul.

Discutient—Soul is existent (proposition).

Because it is an abode of consciousness (reason).

Whatever is not existent is not an abode of consciousness, as a hare's horn (negative example).

Soul is not so, that is, soul is an abode of consciousness (negative application).

Therefore soul is existent (conclusion).

Opponent—Soul is non-existent (proposition).

Because it is not perceptible by any of our senses (reason).

Whatever is not perceptible by any of our senses is non-existent, as a hare's horn (positive example).

Soul is so (is not perceptible any of our senses) (positive application).

Therefore soul is non-existent (conclusion).

Discutient—The scripture which is a means of right knowledge declares the existence of soul.

Opponent—The scripture (of certain sects) denies the existence of soul.

Discutient—If there were no soul, it would not be possible to apprehend one and the same object through sight and touch.

Opponent—If there were soul, there would be no change of cognitions.

Discutient—The doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various tenets which we hold, viz. that there are eternal things, that everybody enjoys pleasure or suffers pain according to his own actions, etc. Therefore there is soul.

(11) Wrangling (*jalpa*).

Wrangling, which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid by quibbles, analogues, and other processes which deserve rebuke.

A *wrangler* is one who, engaged in a disputation, aims only at victory, being indifferent whether the arguments which he employs, support his own contention or that of his opponent, provided that he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has taken an active part in the disputation.

(12) Cavil (*vitandā*).

Cavil is a kind of wrangling which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side.

A *caviller* does not endeavour to establish any thing, but confines himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.

(13) Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*).

Fallacies of reason are the erratic (*savyābhicāra*), the contradictory (*viruddha*), the controversial (*prakaraṇa-sama*), the counter-questioned (*sādhya-sama*), and the mistimed (*kālātīta*).

The *erratic* is the reason which leads to more conclusions than one.

An instance of the *erratic* reason is given below :—

Proposition—Sound is eternal.

Erratic reason—Because it is intangible.

Example—Whatever is intangible is eternal as atoms.

Application—So is sound (intangible).

Conclusion—Therefore sound is eternal.

Again :

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal.

Erratic reason—Because it is intangible.

Example—Whatever is intangible is non-eternal, as cognition.

Application—So is sound (intangible).

Conclusion—Therefore sound is non-eternal.

Here from the reason (intangible) there have been drawn two opposite conclusions, viz. that sound is eternal, and that sound is non-eternal. The reason (or middle term) is erratic when it is not pervaded

by the major term, that is, when there is no connection between the major term and middle term, as pervader and pervaded. 'Intangible' is pervaded neither by 'eternal' nor by 'non-eternal.'

The *Contradictory* is the reason which opposes what is to be established.

Proposition—A pot is produced.

Contradictory reason—Because it is eternal.

Here the reason is contradictory because that which is eternal is never produced.

The *controversial* or *balancing the point at issue* is a reason which is adduced to arrive at a definite conclusion while it is really one which can give rise to mere suspense as to the point.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal.

Reason—Because it is not possessed of the attribute of eternality.

The reason that "sound is not possessed of the attribute of eternality" does not throw any new light, but keeps the parties in suspense as before.

The *counter-questioned* or *balancing the question* is a reason which not being different from what is to be proved stands in need of proof for itself.

Proposition—Shadow is a substance.

Reason—Because it possesses motion.

That which possesses quality and motion is a substance. To say that shadow possesses motion is the same as to say that it is a substance. Hence the reason stands as much in need of proof as the proposition itself. This is a counter-questioned reason or a reason which balances the question.

The *mistimed* is the reason which is adduced when the time is past in which it might hold good.

Proposition—Sound is durable.

Mistimed reason—Because it is manifested by union, as a colour.

The colour of a jar is manifested when the jar comes into union with a lamp, but the colour existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceased. Similarly, the sound of a drum is manifested when the drum comes into union with a rod, and the sound must, after the analogy of the colour, be presumed to have existed before the union took place, and to continue to exist after the union has ceased. Hence sound is durable. The reason adduced here is *mistimed*, because the manifestation of sound does not take place at the time when the drum comes into union with the rod, but it takes place at a subsequent moment when the union has ceased. In the case of colour, however, the manifestation takes place just at the time when the jar comes into union with the lamp. As the time of their manifestation is different, the analogy between colour and sound is not complete, therefore, the reason is mistimed.

[Some interpret the aphorism as follows: The *mistimed* is a reason which is adduced in a wrong order among the five members, for instance, if the reason is stated before the proposition. But this interpretation, according to Vātsyāyana, is wrong

for a word bears its legitimate connection with another word (in a Sanskrit sentence) even if they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their sense. Moreover the placing of members in a wrong order is noticed in the Nyāya-sūtra as a *nigraha-sthāna* called *aprāpta-kāla* (inopportune)].

(14) Quibble (*chala*).

Quibble is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.

It is of three kinds, viz. quibble in respect of a term (*vāk-chala*), quibble in respect of a genus (*sāmānya-chala*), and quibble in respect of a metaphor (*upacāra-chala*).

Quibble in respect of a term consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by the speaker who happened to use it ambiguously.

A speaker says : "this boy is *nava-kambala* (possessed of a new blanket).

A quibbler replies : "this boy is not certainly *nava-kambala* (possessed of nine blankets) for he has only one blanket.

Here the word *nava*, which is ambiguous, was used by the speaker in the sense of "new," but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in the sense of "nine."

Quibble in respect of a genus consists in asserting the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is very wide.

A speaker says : "this Brāhmaṇa is possessed of learning and conduct."

An objector replies : "it is impossible, for how can this person be inferred to be possessed of learning and conduct from his being merely a Brāhmaṇa ? There are little boys who are Brāhmaṇas, yet not possessed of learning and conduct."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that possession of learning and conduct was not meant to be an attribute of the whole class of Brāhmaṇas, but it was ascribed to "this" particular Brāhmaṇa who lived long enough in the world to render it possible for him to pursue studies and acquire good morals.

Quibble in respect of a metaphor consists in denying the proper meaning of a word, by taking it literally while it was used metaphorically, and *viceversa*.

A speaker says : "the scaffolds cry out."

An objector replies : "it is impossible for scaffolds to cry out, for they are inanimate objects."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word "scaffolds" was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds.

(15) Analogue (*jāti*).

Analogue, also called an analogous rejoinder or far-fetched analogy, consists in offering opposition founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.

A disputant says : " the soul is inactive because it is all-pervading as ether."

His opponent replies : " if the soul is inactive because it bears similarity to ether as being all-pervading, why is it not active because it bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union " ?

The reason of the opponent is futile, because it bears only a far-fetched analogy to that of the disputant.¹

or again :

Disputant—Sound is non-eternal, because, unlike ether, it is a product.

Opponent—If sound is non-eternal because, as a product, it is dissimilar to ether; why is it not eternal because, as an object of auditory perception, it is dissimilar to a pot ?

The reason employed by the opponent is futile because the analogy which it bears to that of the disputant is far-fetched.²

(16) A Point of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

A point of defeat, also called a clincher, an occasion for rebuke or a place of humiliation, arises when one misunderstands or does not understand at all.

If a person begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter ignorance, or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing that he understands well, it is of no avail to employ counter-arguments. He is quite unfit to be argued with, and there is nothing left for his opponent, but to turn him out or quit his company, rebuking him as a block-head or a knave.

An instance of the point of defeat :—

Whatever is not quality is substance ;
because there is nothing except colour, etc. (quality).

A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool, for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his proposition (which admits both quality and substance).

Another instance :

Disputant—Fire is not hot.

Opponent—But the evidence of touch disproves such a statement.

¹ The opposition is futile, because it overlooks the universal connection between the middle term and the major term which is existent in the arguments of the disputant, but wanting in the arguments of the opponent. Whatever is all-pervading is inactive, but whatever is a seat of union is not necessarily active.

² The opposition is futile because it overlooks the disconnection between the middle term and the absence of the major term. There is an utter disconnection between " a product " and " not-non-eternal," but there is no such disconnection between " an object of auditory perception " and " not eternal."

Disputant, in order to gain the confidence of the assembled people, says—"O learned audience, listen, I do not say that fire is not hot," etc.

It is only meet that the opponent should quit the company of a man who argues in this way.

33. THE VARIETIES OF ANALOGUE.

The analogues are as follows: (1) Balancing the homogeneity (*sūdharmya-sama*), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (*vaidharmya-sama*), (3) balancing an excess (*utkarṣa-sama*), (4) balancing a deficit (*apakarṣa-sama*), (5) balancing the questionable (*varṇya-sama*), (6) balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇya-sama*), (7) balancing the alternative (*vikalpa-sama*), (8) balancing the question (*sādhya-sama*), (9) balancing the co-presence (*prāpti-sama*), (10) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāpti-sama*), (11) balancing the infinite regression (*prasaṅga-sama*), (12) balancing the counter-example (*pratidrṣṭānta-sama*), (13) balancing the non-produced (*anutpatti-sama*), (14) balancing the doubt (*saṁśaya-sama*), (15) balancing the point at issue (*prakaraṇa-sama*), (16) balancing the non-reason (*ahetu-sama*), (17) balancing the presumption (*arthāpatti-sama*), (18) balancing the non-difference (*aviśeṣa-sama*), (19) balancing the demonstration (*upapatti-sama*), (20) balancing the perception (*upalabdhi-sama*), (21) balancing the non-perception (*anupalabdhi-sama*), (22) balancing the non-eternal (*anitya-sama*), (23) balancing the eternal (*nitya-sama*) and (24) balancing the effect (*kārya-sama*).

(1) **Balancing the homogeneity.**—If, against an argument based on a homogeneous example, one offers an opposition merely based on the same kind of example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the homogeneity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether.

The argument, viz. sound is non-eternal, is based on the homogeneity of sound with the non-eternal pot, on the ground of both being products. The opposition, viz. sound is eternal, is said to be based on the homogeneity of sound with the eternal sky, on the alleged ground of both being incorporeal. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is

called "balancing the homogeneity," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides only in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.¹

(2) **Balancing the heterogeneity.**—If against an argument based on a heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based merely on the same kind of example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the heterogeneity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
whatever is eternal is not a product, as the ether.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

The argument, viz. sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the eternal ether. The opposition, viz. sound is eternal, is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the heterogeneity," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides merely in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them.²

(3) **Balancing an excess.**—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example, one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing an excess."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is non-eternal (and must be corporeal),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal).

¹ The opposition is futile because it is based on a mere homogeneous example. In the argument—"sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot"—the homogeneous example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal, but in the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal like the sky" the homogeneous example "sky" does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternality, because there are things, such as intelligence or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

² In the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot," the heterogeneous example "pot" does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality, because there are things, such as intelligence or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal. Hence the opposition is futile.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it must also be corporeal like it: if it is not corporeal, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing an excess," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

It is based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters. Thus the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality, is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product) because there are things, such as intelligence or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal.

(4) **Balancing a deficit.**—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example, one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing a deficit."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition :—

Sound is non-eternal (and cannot be audible),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal and not audible).

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it cannot be audible, for a pot is not audible; and if sound is still held to be audible, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing a deficit," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of a certain character wanting in the example (and supposed consequently to be wanting also in the subject).

The equality alleged to exist between "sound" and "pot" is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product).

(5) **Balancing the questionable.**—If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of an example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the questionable."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the questionable,” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example. It puts an end to all kinds of inference by ignoring the difference between the subject and the example altogether.

(6) **Balancing the unquestionable.**—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called “balancing the unquestionable.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that, if the non-eternality of a pot is to be unquestionable, why is not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot and sound are both products? This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the unquestionable,” which aims at showing the equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the example as well as of the subject.

It ignores totally the difference between the subject and the example, and thus puts an end to all kinds of inference.

(7) **Balancing the alternative.**—If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called “balancing the alternative.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal and formless,
because it is a product,
- like a pot (which is non-eternal and has forms).

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound are both products, yet one has form and the other is formless: why on the same principle is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal? This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative," which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and the example.

It introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (*viz.* being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason (*viz.* being a product).

(8) **Balancing the question.**—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the example requires proof as much as the subject does, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the question."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that, the pot and sound being both products, one requires proof for its non-eternality as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot, and the pot is to be proved non-eternal by the example of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject), resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternality or noneternality of sound. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the question," which attempts to bring an argument to a standstill by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

It is based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as the subject. The example does not in fact stand in need of proof as to its characters, a "pot" being known to all as a product and non-eternal. Hence the opposition is futile.

(9) **Balancing the co-presence.**—If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition, futile as it is, will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke,
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason, and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or is absent from that site. If the smoke is present with fire at the same site, there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is, in his opinion, as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence," which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that a potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his reach, it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site. "Balancing the co-presence," which attaches an undue importance to the proximity of sites, is therefore a totally futile opposition.

(10) *Balancing the mutual absence.*—If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition, futile as it is, will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the mutual absence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke,
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The opponent asks: "Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?" "Such a supposition is indeed absurd." The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the mutual absence" which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

Seeing that an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance, it is affirmed that a thing is accomplished sometimes by

the cause being absent from its site. "Balancing the mutual absence," which attaches too much importance to remoteness of sites, is therefore a totally futile opposition.

(11) *Balancing the infinite regression.*—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the infinite regression."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal.
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is itself to be established by further reasons. This gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition "sound is non-eternal" not less than the proposition "sound is eternal." This sort of opposition is called "balancing the infinite regression," which aims at stopping an argument by introducing an infinite regression which is said to beset the example.

Now, an example is a thing the characters of which are well known to an ordinary man as well as to an expert. It does not require a series of reasons to reveal its character.

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

(12) *Balancing the counter-example.*—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the existence of a mere counter example, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the counter-example."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,
Reason—because it is a product,
Example—like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Proposition—Sound is eternal,
Example—like the ether.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, why it should not be held to be eternal by the example of the ether? If the example of the ether is set aside, let the example of the pot too be set aside. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the counter-example," which aims at setting aside an argument by the introduction of a mere counter-example.

A mere counter-example without a reason attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. We can rely on an example attended

by reason, but not on a counter-example unattended by reason. Hence the opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example is to be rejected as futile.

(13) **Balancing the non-produced.**—If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called “balancing the non-produced.”

A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is a non-effect-of-effort,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, viz. being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, viz. sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being eternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort. This sort of opposition is called “balancing the non-produced,” which pretends to show an equality of the arguments of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

It is futile because the subject can become such only when it is produced, and that there is, then, no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition, viz. “sound (while non-produced) is eternal, because it is not then an effect of effort,” carries no weight with it, since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound, while it is produced, is certainly an effect of effort, and as such is non-eternal.

(14) **Balancing the doubt.**—If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal, consequent on the example and its general notion being equally objects of perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called “balancing the doubt.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is non-eternal (or eternal),
because it is an object of perception,
like a pot (or potness).

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as potness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but the pot being non-eternal and potness (the general notion of all pots) being eternal, there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the doubt," which aims at discarding an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

It is futile because sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with potness, but it must be pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. Though on the score of homogeneity we may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, we can, however, on the score of heterogeneity pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with, as well as heterogeneity from, other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

(15) *Balancing the point at issue, or the controversial.*—It is an opposition which is supposed to be conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is audible,
like soundness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, viz. sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, viz. audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), serves only to give rise to suspense for the removal of which it was employed. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the point at issue" which hurts an argument by giving rise to suspense which was to be removed.

It is futile and cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a point which happens to support one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

(16) *Balancing the non-reason.*—It is an opposition which is supposed to be based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here "being a product" is the reason for "being non-eternal," which is the predicate.

- (a) The reason does not precede the predicate, because the former is called a reason only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be called such before the establishment of the predicate.
- (b) The reason does not succeed the predicate because a reason would be useless if the predicate could be established without it.
- (c) The reason and the predicate cannot exist simultaneously, for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow. A reason which is dependent on the predicate cannot establish the latter. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-reason," which aims at setting aside an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

There is in fact no impossibility for the reason to operate. The knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which is to be established, take place from reason, which must precede that which is to be known and established. If the reason is held to be impossible, why then is not the opposition itself, which depends on reason, held to be so? In the event of the opposition being impossible, the original argument will hold good.

(17) *Balancing the presumption.*—If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the presumption."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is presumed to be eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal on account of its homogeneity with non-eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being incorporeal). This sort of opposition is called "balancing the presumption," which aims at stopping an argument by setting presumption as a balance against it.

The opposition is futile because if things unsaid could come by presumption, there would arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unexpected conclusion.

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether.

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion :—

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

This would hurt the opposition itself. In fact the presumption as adduced by the opponent is erratic. If one says that "sound is non-eternal because of its homogeneity with non-eternal things," the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things," and *vice versa*. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable.

(18) **Balancing the non-difference.**—If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property inasmuch as they are all existent: this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus : If the pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality in consequence of their both being products, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property, inasmuch as all of them are existent. Therefore, there being no difference between the eternal and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference," which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

It is futile because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example, happens in certain instances to abide in the reason, while in other instances, it does not abide in the same.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product, are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different in consequence of their being existent, we should like to

know in what respect they are non-different. If they are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality, then the argument would stand thus :—

All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent,
like (?).

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is nothing left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing, while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for the want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternality abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent things. Hence all things are not mutually non-different, and the opposition called "balancing the non-difference" is unreasonable.

(19) **Balancing the demonstration.**—If an opposition is offered by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration."

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sound as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternality of sound as follows :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the ether.

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound, while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead-lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration."

It is futile because there is an admission of the first demonstration. The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound. If to avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he now denies the reason which supports non-eternality, we would ask why does he not deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called "balancing the demonstration" is not well founded.

(20) **Balancing the perception.**—If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even

without the intervention of the reason, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the perception."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is a product, for we *perceive* that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the perception," which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up an act of perception as a balance against it.

The opposition is futile, because the character of the subject can be ascertained by other means as well. The argument, viz. "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot," implies that sound is proved to be non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception, etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

(21) **Balancing the non-perception.**—If against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the non-perception."

If the non-perception of a thing proves its non-existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in the opinion of the opponent, prove the existence of the thing. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-perception," which aims at counteracting an argument by setting up non-perception as a balance against it.

The opposition of this kind is not valid because non-perception is merely the negation of perception. Perception refers to that which is existent, while non-perception to that which is non-existent. The non-perception of non-perception which signifies a mere negation of non-perception cannot be interpreted as referring to an existent thing. Hence opposition called "balancing the non-perception" is not well founded.

There is, moreover, an internal perception of the existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds of knowledge. There are internal perceptions of such forms as "I am sure," "I am not sure," "I have doubt," "I have no doubt," etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence thereof. Hence the non-perception itself is perceptible, and as there is no non-perception of non-perception, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" falls to the ground.

(22) **Balancing the non-eternal.**—If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argu-

ment by attributing non-eternality to all things, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the non-eternality."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus: If sound is non-eternal on account of its being homogeneous with a pot which is non-eternal, it will follow as a consequence that all things are non-eternal because they are in some one or other respect homogeneous with the pot—a consequence which will render all inferences impossible for want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-eternal" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

It is futile because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity. We cannot ascertain the character of a thing from its mere homogeneity with another thing: in doing so we must consider the logical connection between the reason and the predicate. Sound, for instance, is non-eternal not merely because it is homogeneous with a non-eternal pot but because there is a connection between "being a product" and "being non-eternal." Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homogeneous with a non-eternal pot in one or another respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal ether in one or another respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore not founded on a sound basis.

(23) **Balancing the eternal.**—If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non-eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non-eternal, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the eternal."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

You say that sound is non-eternal. Does this non-eternality exist in sound always or only sometimes? If the non-eternality exists *always*, the sound must also be always existent, or in other words, sound is eternal. If the non-eternality exists only *sometimes*, then too the sound must in the absence of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the eternal," which pretends to counteract an argument by setting up eternality as a balance against it.

The opposition is baseless because the thing opposed is always non-eternal on account of the eternality of the non-eternal. By speaking

of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be *always* non-eternal, and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other: by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition.

(24) **Balancing the effect.**—If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition, futile as it is, will be called "balancing the effect."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The effect of effort is found to be of two kinds, viz. (1) the production of something which was previously non-existent, e.g. a pot, and (2) the revelation of something already existent, e.g. water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind? If sound is an effect of the first kind it will be non-eternal, but if it is of the second kind it will be eternal. Owing to this diversity of the effects of effort, it is not possible to conclude that sound is non-eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the effect."

It is futile because in the case of sound effort does not give rise to the second kind of effect. We cannot say that sound is revealed by our effort because we are unable to prove that it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but produced.

If an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect," why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special ground to suppose that the "effect" in the argument signified "a thing produced and not revealed," so also there is no special ground to suppose that the word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect" is self-destructive.

Application of the Analogues.

In showing the futility of analogues we may test them in the light of the following principles:—

(i) If a special meaning is to be attached to a word in the opposition, the *same meaning* will have to be attached to the word in the original argument, e.g. the word "effect" should be used in one and the same sense by a disputant and his opponent.

(ii) Defect attaches to the *opposition of the opposition* just as it attaches to the opposition itself.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

[Here “effect” signifies “a thing produced”].

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

[Here “effect” signifies “a thing revealed”].

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason “effect” is erratic (which may mean “a thing produced”). The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason “effect” is erratic (which may mean “a thing revealed”). So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

(iii) If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called “*admission of an opinion*” (*matānujñā*).

A certain person lays down a proposition which is opposed by a certain other person. The first person, viz. the disputant, charges the opposition made by the second person, viz. the opponent, with a defect, e.g. that the reason is erratic. The opponent instead of rescuing his opposition from the defect with which it has been charged by the disputant, goes on charging the disputant’s opposition of the opposition with the same defect. The counter-charge which the opponent brings in this way is interpreted by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant’s reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called “admission of an opinion.”

(iv) “Admission of an opinion” also occurs when the disputant, instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the *same defect* belongs to his opponent’s side as well.

By overlooking the four principles stated here a person may entangle himself in a six-winged disputation.

Six-winged Disputation (*ṣaṭpaksī kathā*).

The first wing. A certain disputant, to prove the non-eternality of sound, says :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

[The disputant evidently took the word “effect” in the sense of “a thing produced,” but he did not make his meaning clear].

The second wing. An opponent, seeing that the word “effect” is ambiguous, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

Here the opponent evidently took the word "effect" in the sense of "a thing revealed."

The third wing. The disputant, seeing that the reason "effect" is erratic, charges the opposition with a defect thus:—

Sound is *not* eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

He means that sound cannot be inferred to be eternal from its being an effect, because "effect," which is the reason here, admits of two different meanings, viz (1) a thing [that did not previously exist but is now] produced, and (2) a thing [that already existed and is now] revealed. The reason being erratic the conclusion is uncertain.

The opponent finding that the reason "effect," which is erratic, proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus:—

Sound is also *not* non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

He alleges that the defect (viz. the erraticity of the reason) with which his opposition (viz. sound is eternal) is charged, also attaches to the opposition of the opposition made by the disputant (viz. sound is *not* eternal, that is, is non-eternal).

The fifth wing. The disputant finding that the counter-charge brought against him amounts to his opponent's admission of self-defect says:—

The opponent by saying that "sound is also not non-eternal" has (by the force of the word "also") admitted that it is also not eternal. In other words the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant's opinion.

The opponent finding that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument from the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's admission of the charge says:—

The sixth wing. The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has (by the force of the word "also") admitted that it is also not non-eternal. In other words, if the counter-charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. The sixth wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of "admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential.

The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant or the opponent had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special meaning, viz. "a thing produced" or "a thing revealed," or if they had agreed that the word "effect" being ambiguous no conclusion could be drawn. Instead of stopping at the proper limit they have obstinately carried on their disputation which is found after all to be totally futile.¹

34. VARIETIES OF THE POINTS OF DEFEAT.

The points of defeat, also called clinchers, occasions for rebuke or places of humiliation, are the following :—

(1) Hurting the proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*), (2) shifting the proposition (*pratijñāntara*), (3) opposing the proposition (*pratijñā-virodha*), (4) renouncing the proposition (*pratijñā-sannyāsa*), (5) shifting the reason (*hetvantara*), (6) shifting the topic (*arthāntara*), (7) the meaningless (*nirarthaka*), (8) the unintelligible (*aviññātārtha*), (9) the incoherent (*apārthaka*), (10) the inopportune (*apṛāpta-kāla*), (11) saying too little (*nyūna*), (12) saying too much (*adhika*), (13) repetition (*punarukta*), (14) silence (*ananubhāsaṇa*), (15) ignorance (*ajñāna*), (16) non-ingenuity (*apratibhā*), (17) evasion (*vikṣepa*), (18) admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*), (19) overlooking the censurable (*pāryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa*), (20) censuring the non-censurable (*niranuyojoyānuyoga*), (21) deviating from a tenet (*apasiddhānta*), and (22) the semblance of a reason (*hetvābhāsa*).

"A point of defeat," which is the same as "a clincher," "an occasion for rebuke," "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace," arises generally from a misemployment of the proposition or any other part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is a discutiut, wrangler or caviller.

(1) Hurting the proposition occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter-example.

A disputant argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal as a pot,
sound is so (cognisable by sense),
therefore sound is non-eternal.

¹ Vide Nyāya-sūtra, 5-1-43.

Jayanta observes :—

षट्पञ्चासुभयोरसिद्धिः ।

वाच्यसुत्तरमतो निरवद्यं जातिवादिनमपि प्रति तज्ज्ञैः ।

कथञ्चोत्तरगिरा न तु कार्यं पक्षषट्कं परिकल्पनगोष्ठौ ।

(Nyāya-mañjarī, chap. 12, p. 637, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

An opponent counter-argues thus :—

A genus (e.g. potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense, is found to be eternal: why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by sense be eternal?

The disputant being thus opposed says :—

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal as a pot,
sound is cognisable by sense,
therefore sound is eternal.

By thus admitting in his example (the pot) the character (the eternality) of a counter-example (the genus or type), that is, by admitting that a pot is eternal, he hurts his own proposition (viz. sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

(2) **Shifting the proposition** arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it, by importing a new character to his example and counter-example.

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense,
like a genus (or type).

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and the other is not so: hence the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all-pervasive.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition. The proposition originally laid down was :—

Sound is non-eternal.

The proposition now defended is :—

Sound is non-all-pervasive.

A person who shifts his proposition in this way is to be rebuked inasmuch as he does not rely upon his original reason and example.

(3) **Opposing the proposition** occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.

Substance is distinct from quality,
because it is perceived to be non-distinct from colour, etc.

In this argument it is to be observed that if substance is distinct from quality, it must also be distinct from colour, etc., which constitute the quality. The reason, viz. substance is non-distinct from colour, etc., is opposed to the proposition, viz. substance is distinct from quality. A person who thus employs a reason, which opposes his proposition, is to be rebuked as a fool.

(4) Renouncing the proposition.—If one disclaims a proposition when it is opposed, it will be called “renouncing the proposition.”

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus: Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal.

The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims his proposition thus :—

Who says that sound is non-eternal ?

This sort of denial of one's own proposition is called “renouncing the proposition ” which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

(5) Shifting the reason occurs when the reason of a general character being opposed, one attaches a special character to it.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person says that sound cannot be proved to be non-eternal through the mere reason of its being cognisable by sense, just as a genus (or type) such as potness (or pot-type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal

The first person defends himself by saying that the reason, viz. being cognisable by sense, is to be understood as signifying that which comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisable by sense. Sound comes under the genus (or type) “soundness” and is at the same time cognisable by sense; but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pot-type does not come under another genus or type such as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type though it is cognisable by sense. Such a defence, which consists in shifting one's reason, rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

(6) Shifting the topic is an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is eternal (proposition),
because it is intangible (reason).

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence of any other resource, to defend his position as follows :—

Hetu which is the Sanskrit equivalent for “reason” is a word derived from the root “hi” with the suffix “tu.” A word, as a part of a speech, may be a noun, a verb, or an indeclinable. A noun is

defined as, etc., etc. The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

(7) The meaningless is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters in a series.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is eternal,
because k, c, t, t and p are j, v, g, d and d,
like jh, bh, gh, dh and dh.

As the letters k, c, t, etc., convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

(8) The unintelligible is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double *entendre* or words not in ordinary use or words very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "the unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

(9) The incoherent is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defences argues as follows:—

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consists of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent," which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke.

(10) The inopportune is an argument, the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire (proposition),
whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
because it has smoke (reason),
the hill has fire (conclusion),
the hill has smoke (application).

This sort of argument is called "the inopportune," which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke. Since the meaning of an argument is affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who overlooks the order cannot establish his conclusion and is therefore rebuked.

(11) **Saying too little.**—If an argument lacks even one of its parts, it is called “saying too little.”

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts :—

- (1) The hill has fire (proposition).
- (2) Because it has smoke (reason).
- (3) All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example).
- (4) The hill has smoke (application).
- (5) Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

As all the five parts or members are essential, a person who omits even one of them should be scolded as “saying too little.”

(12) **Saying too much** is an argument which consists of more than one reason or example.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows :—

- The hill has fire (proposition).
- Because it has smoke (reason).
- And because it has light (reason).
- Like a kitchen (example).
- And like a furnace (example).

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person, who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage), employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as “saying too much.”

(13) **Repetition** is an argument in which (except in the case of re-inculcation) the word or the meaning is said over again.

Repetition of the word—Sound is non-eternal,
Sound is non-eternal.

Repetition of the meaning—Sound is non-eternal, echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent, etc.

There is a difference between “repetition” and “re-inculcation” inasmuch as the latter serves some useful purpose

In re-inculcation a special meaning is deduced from the word re-inculcated, e.g.

- The hill has fire (proposition).
- Because it has smoke (reason).
- All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example).
- The hill has smoke (application).
- Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

In this argument the “conclusion” is a re-inculcation of the “proposition” serving a special purpose (viz. in showing the fifth member of the syllogism).

Repetition consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption, e.g.

“A thing which is not non-eternal does not possess the character of a product”—this is a mere repetition of the following:—

“A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal.”

(14) **Silence** is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent who takes up such an attitude is to be rebuked.

(15) **Ignorance** is the non-understanding of a proposition.

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the knowledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand. He is to be rebuked for his ignorance.

(16) **Non-ingenuity** consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity.

(17) **Evasion** arises if one stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend another business.

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion.

(18) **The admission of an opinion** consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists on one's own side

A certain person addressing another person says: “You are a thief.”

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of the “admission of an opinion” which brings disgrace on the person who makes it.

(19) **Overlooking the censurable** consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his shortcoming, it is the duty of the audience

to pass a vote of censure on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the censurable."

(20) Censuring the non-censurable consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.

A person brings discredit on himself if he rebukes a person who does not deserve rebuke.

(21) Deviating from a tenet. — A person who after accepting a tenet departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."

A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sāṃkhya philosophy which lays down that (1) what is existent never becomes non-existent, and (2) what is non-existent never comes into existence, etc. A certain other person opposes him by saying that all human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time, and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and non-existence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.

(22) The fallacies of reason also furnish points of defeat or occasions for rebuke.

Fallacies are mere semblances of reason. A person who employs them in a disputation certainly deserves rebuke.

There are infinite points of defeat or occasions for rebuke, of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.

35. CATEGORIES: THEIR EXAMINATION (*parīkṣā*).

A critical examination should be made of each case where there is room for doubt. In case of well-known facts admitted by all, examination is unnecessary. A critical examination of some of the categories is given below:—

(1) The Means of Right Knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The means.

Some¹ say that perception and other so-called *means of right knowledge* are invalid as they are impossible at all the three times. Perception is impossible at the present, past and future times inasmuch as it can neither be prior to, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense. If perception occurred anteriorly it could not have arisen from the contact

¹ The sūtras from 2-1-8 to 2-1-19 of the Nyāya-sūtra contain a critical examination of *pramāṇa* (the means of right knowledge).

of a sense with its object. With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour preceded perception or the perception preceded colour. If one says that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, one must give up one's definition of perception, viz. that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object. If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly, it cannot be maintained that objects of sense are established by perception. Colour, for instance, is an object which is said to be established by visual perception. But this conclusion will have to be abandoned if perception is supposed to occur posteriorly to the object. If perception were simultaneous with its object, there would not be any order of succession in our cognitions as there is no such order in their corresponding objects. Various objects of sense can exist at one time, e.g. colour and smell exist in a flower at the same time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object, we must admit that the colour and the smell can be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell. This is absurd because two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place at the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. Perception and other so-called means of right knowledge are therefore not only invalid but also impossible. Moreover, if an object of knowledge is to be established by a means of knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of knowledge. Just as a balance is an instrument when it weighs a thing, but is an object when it is itself weighed in another balance, so a means of knowledge is an instrument when it establishes an object, but is an object when it is itself to be established. Finally if a means of knowledge does not require another means of knowledge for its establishment, let an object of knowledge be also established without any means of knowledge.

In reply it is stated that if perception and other means of right knowledge are impossible, then the denial of them is also impossible, for owing to absence of the matter to be denied the denial itself will be inoperative. If there is no means of knowledge to establish any thing, how is the denial itself to be established? If on the other hand the denial is held to be based on a certain means of knowledge, we are thereby to acknowledge the validity of that means. When we deny a thing on the ground of its not being perceived, we acknowledge by implication that perception is a means of right knowledge. Similarly inference, etc., are also means of knowledge. There is no fixed rule that the means of knowledge should precede the objects of knowledge or should succeed them or be simultaneous with them. They resemble sometimes a drum which precedes its sound, sometimes an illumination which succeeds the sun, and another time a smoke which is synchronous with the fire. The means of knowledge are self-established like the illumination of a lamp. Just as a lamp illumines itself and other objects, so the means of knowledge establish themselves and the objects of knowledge. Though a lamp which illumines

Validity of the means
of right knowledge estab-
lished.

other objects is itself illumined by our eye, we cannot deny a general notion of illuminator as distinguished from that of the objects illuminated. Similarly we must admit a general notion of the means of knowledge as distinguished from that of the objects of knowledge. The means of knowledge are therefore neither invalid nor impossible.

Perception.

Some say that the definition of perception as given before is defective, as it does not notice the conjunction of soul with mind and of mind with sense, which are also causes of perception. From the contact of a sense with its object no knowledge arises unless, it is said, there is also conjunction of soul with mind. A sense coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul only if the sense is conjoined with the mind. Hence the conjunction of soul with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception. Moreover the contact of a sense with its object is sometimes not found to be the cause of perception, e.g. a person listening to a song does not see colour though it comes in contact with his eye.

In reply it is stated that if the conjunction of soul with mind is to be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception, then direction ("dik"), space ("deśa"), time ("kāla") and ether ("ākāśa") should also be enumerated among the causes of perception. But such an enumeration is held on all hands to be undesirable. The soul, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition of perception inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the soul. Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies the soul which is its abode. Consequently in speaking of knowledge the soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production of perception. The mind too has not been omitted from our definition inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simultaneity of acts of knowledge. Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential character of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place at a time. This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic substance, which is conjoined with the sense, when knowledge is produced. Hence in speaking of knowledge we have by implication mentioned the mind as a condition of perception. The contact of a sense with its object is mentioned as the special cause of perception. There are many kinds of knowledge, such as perception, recollection, etc. Conjunction of soul with mind is a cause which operates in the production of all kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with its object is the cause which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception, but also other kinds of knowledge. By saying that perception is knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, we have distinguished five special kinds of knowledge, viz. (1) the visual perception also called eye-knowledge or colour-knowledge, (2) the

auditory perception also called ear-knowledge or sound-knowledge, (3) the olfactory perception also called nose-knowledge or smell-knowledge, (4) the gustatory perception also called tongue-knowledge or taste-knowledge, and (5) the tactual perception also called skin-knowledge or touch-knowledge. It is admitted that a person while listening to a song may not see colour though the latter comes in contact with his eye. Yet the instance does not prove that the contact of a sense with its object, is not the cause of perception, for it is to be understood that his intent listening prevents him from seeing the colour. In other words, the auditory perception supersedes the visual perception, because the song is more attractive than the colour.

Perception, some say, is inference because it apprehends a thing by grasping only a part of the same. We are said

Is Perception a mere inference? to perceive a tree while we really perceive only a part of it. This knowledge of the tree, as a whole, derived from the knowledge of a part of it, is said to be a mere inference.

In reply it is stated that perception is not inference for even the objectors admit that at least a part of the tree is actually perceived. Hence perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied, on the contrary it is accepted as different from inference.

Inference

Inference, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it errs in certain cases. For instance, if we see a river

Is inference a means of right knowledge? swollen we infer that there has been rain, if we see ants carrying off their eggs, we infer that there will be rain, and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These inferences are said to be not necessarily correct, for a river may be swollen because of its being embanked, the ants may carry off their eggs because their nests have been damaged, and the supposed screaming of a peacock may be nothing but the voice of a man.

Inference, we reply, is really a means of right knowledge, as the errors alleged to be involved in it may be explained away. The swelling of a river caused by rain is different from that which results from the embankment of a part of it; the former is attended by a great rapidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of fruits, leaves, wood, etc. The manner in which ants carry off their eggs just before rain is quite different from the manner in which they do so when their nests are damaged. The ants run away quickly in a steady line when rain is imminent, but fear makes them fly in disorder when their nests are damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural. If in such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process.

Comparison.

Comparison, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as the knowledge of a thing cannot be established

Is comparison a means of right knowledge? through its similarity to another thing, no matter whether the similarity is complete, con-

siderable or partial. On the ground of complete similarity we never say "a cow is like a cow"; on the ground of considerable similarity we do not say "a buffalo is like a cow"; and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say "a mustard seed is like Mount Meru." Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no precise standard.

This objection does not, we maintain, carry any weight, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree. The similarity in a high degree exists between such well-known objects as a cow and a *bos gavaeus*, etc.

Some hold that comparison is not a separate means of knowledge, for when one notices the likeness of a cow in a strange animal, one really performs an act of perception. In reply it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how otherwise does the name *bos gavaeus* convey the general notion of the animal called *bos gavaeus*? That the name *bos gavaeus* signifies one and all members of the *bos gavaeus* class is not a result of perception, but the consequence of a distinct knowledge called comparison.

Comparison, some say, is not different from inference, for both seek to establish the unperceived by means of the perceived. We recognize a *bos gavaeus* at first sight through its special similarity to a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object is said to be nothing but inference.

In reply we maintain that it is not in a *bos gavaeus* unperceived that we find the real matter of comparison. The matter of comparison is similarity, e.g. between a cow and a *bos gavaeus*. The *bos gavaeus* in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a *bos gavaeus* we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge of a perceived thing through its similarity to another thing also perceived. This characteristic distinguishes it from inference which furnishes us with knowledge of an unperceived thing through that of a thing perceived. Comparison is not identical with inference because the former is established through the compendious expression "so." "As is a cow, so is a *bos gavaeus*—": this is an instance of comparison. This use of 'so' makes it clear that comparison is a distinct means of right knowledge.

Verbal testimony.

Verbal testimony, some say, is inference because the object indicated by it is not perceived but inferred. Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperceived object through that of an object which is perceived. Verbal testimony too enables us to acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object through that of a word which is perceived (heard). In inference as well as in verbal testimony we pass to an unperceived object through an object which is perceived. Just as in inference there is a certain connection

between a sign (e.g. smoke), and the thing signified by it (e.g. fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it. Verbal testimony does not therefore differ from inference.

In reply we say that there is a great difference between inference and verbal testimony. The knowledge gained by verbal testimony is correct, not simply because it comes through the medium of words, but because it comes through words spoken by a reliable person. There are, it is said, paradise, nymphs, *uttarakurus*, seven islands, ocean, human settlements, etc. We accept them as realities not simply because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign in the other. In the case of verbal testimony the special point is to decide whether the sign (word) comes from a reliable person. Moreover the connection between a word and the object signified by it is conventional and not a natural one. We acknowledge that a word indicates a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the word "cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity. In the case of inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g. smoke), and the thing signified (e.g. fire), is natural and necessary. The connection involved in inference is not, therefore, of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony. In the case of verbal testimony there is no perception of the connection. The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception. For instance, the inference that "the hill is fiery because it is smoky" is based on a certain connection between smoke and fire, which is actually perceived in a kitchen or elsewhere. The connection between a word and the object signified by it, which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. The word *uttarakuru*, for instance, signifies the country of that name, but the connection between the word and the country is not perceived, as the latter lies beyond our observation. Hence verbal testimony is not inference.

Are there any other means of right knowledge ?	Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four because there are such other means of right knowledge as <i>rumour</i> ("aitihya"), <i>presumption</i> ("arthāpatti"), probability ("sambhava") and <i>non-existence</i> ("abhāva").
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In reply we say that the means of right knowledge are really four, inasmuch as *rumour* is included in verbal testimony, and *presumption*, *probability* and *non-existence* are included in inference.

Other means.

Rumour is an assertion which has come from one to another without any indication of the source from which it first originated, e.g. on this tree there live goblins.

It is not a separate means of knowledge, but partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony and is a special kind of it.

Presumption is the deduction of one thing from the declaration of another thing, e.g. from the declaration

Presumption. that 'unless there is cloud there is no rain,'

we deduce that 'if there is rain there must have been cloud.'

Some say that presumption is not valid as it leads to uncertainty. "If there is no cloud there will be no rain"—from this we are said to presume that if there is a cloud there will be rain. But it often happens that a cloud is not followed by rain. So presumption does, according to the objectors, lead to uncertainty. In reply we say, that if there is uncertainty it is due to the objectors supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so. "If there is no cloud there will be no rain." From this we are entitled to presume that if there is rain there must have been cloud. But if one pretends to presume that "if there is a cloud there will be rain," one's so-called presumption will be an invalid one.

Presumption is thus found to be the knowledge of a thing derived through the consideration of it from the opposite standpoint. It does not differ from inference since both pass from a perceived thing to an unperceived one through a certain connection.

Probability consists in cognising the existence of a thing from that of another thing in which it is included, e.g.

Probability. knowledge of the measure of an *ādhaka* from

that of a *drona* of which it is a fourth part.

Probability is inference because it is the cognizance of a part from that of a whole with which it is inseparably connected.

Of two opposite things, the *non-existence* of one establishes the

Non-existence or nega- existence of the other, e.g. the non-existence of
tion. rain indicates the existence of an obstruction¹
of the cloud which was to have brought it down.

Some say that non-existence is not a means of right knowledge, as there is no object which is known by it. Though a mark may distinguish the object which is marked, the non-existence (absence) of the mark cannot, it is said, distinguish the object which is not marked. A blue pot is distinguished by the blueness which is its mark. But how can we distinguish an unmarked object by the non-existence (absence) of the mark which it does not possess?

In reply we say that non-existence serves to mark out an object unmarked by the mark which characterises other objects. Suppose a person wants to bring a pot which is not blue. The absence of blueness is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular pot he wants to bring, and to exclude the other pots which are blue. Thus an object may be known through the non-existence (absence) of its mark. If you say that the non-existence (absence) of a mark is impossible where there was no mark at all, it is, we reply, not so, because the non-existence (absence) is possible in reference to a mark elsewhere. We can, says an objector, talk of a mark being non-existent (absent) if it was previously existent (present). A pot is said to be not blue only in reference to its having been blue previously. In reply

¹ When there is an obstruction of cloud by wind, drops of water cannot fall in spite of their weight.

we say that it is not so. "Not blue" is no doubt possible only in reference to "blue," but that blueness may exist elsewhere. For instance, we can talk of this pot being not blue in contrast to that pot which is blue. Moreover, we perceive non-existence as a mark antecedent to the production of a thing. When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the halves (parts) which are destined to compose it.

Non-existence or negation is not however a separate means of knowledge. It is included in inference. It infers one thing from the absence of another thing through the mutual connection of the two things, as follows: If a particular thing existed, it would have been seen; it is not seen: therefore it does not exist.

In the Nyāya-sūtra, 2-2-12, non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) is divided into two kinds¹ viz. (1) *prāgabhāva*, prior non-existence, that is, the non-existence of a thing before it is brought into existence, and (2) *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, posterior non-existence or destruction, that is, the disappearance of a thing after it has come into existence.

(2) The Objects of Right Knowledge (*prameya*).

The Soul.

A sense is not *soul* because we can apprehend an object through both sight and touch. "Previously I saw the jar and now I touch it": such recognition will be impossible if "I" is not different from the eye which cannot touch and from the skin which cannot see. In other words, the "I" or soul is distinct from the senses.

Some say that the soul is not different from the senses, as there is a fixed relation between a sense and its object. Colour, for instance, is an exclusive object of the eye, sound of the ear, smell of the nose, and so on. It is the eye that apprehends colour, and there is no necessity for assuming a soul distinct from the eye for the purpose of explaining the apprehension of colour. In reply we say that the soul is certainly distinct from the senses. There is, no doubt, a fixed relation between a sense and its object, and in virtue of such relation the sense cannot apprehend more than one object; but the "I" can apprehend many objects, that is, the "I" can see colour, hear sound, and so on. Hence the "I" or soul, which confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension, is different from the senses each of which can apprehend only one object.

¹ In the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, 2-2-9, negation (*abhāva*) is divided into (1) negation of identity (*tādātmyābhāva*), and (2) negation of correlation (*saṃsargābhāva*); and the latter is subdivided into (a) prior negation (*prāgabhāva*), (b) posterior negation (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), and (c) absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*).

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-1, existence and non-existence are both spoken of as things, and in the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-1, the non-existence of a thing is said to be perceived by the same means as the existence of it, e.g. the non-existence of colour is perceived by the eye.

If the body were soul there should be release from sins as soon as the body was destroyed. But in reality a person is not freed from sins although his body is destroyed, inasmuch as the sins pursue him in his subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul.

Some say that the soul is not different from the mind inasmuch as the arguments which are adduced to establish the soul are applicable to the mind as well. I can see an object by my eye and touch it by my skin. The agent which sees the object and touches it, is, no doubt, different from both the eye and the skin. Let however the agent, says an objector, be identified with the mind. Since an agent requires an instrument to accomplish a thing, it is, we reply, a mere verbal trick to apply the name "mind" to that which is really the "soul." To explain the acts of seeing, touching, etc., you admit an agent distinct from the senses which are called its instruments. The sense or instrument by which the act of thinking is performed is called the "mind." The agent sees by the eye, hears by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, touches by the skin and thinks by the "mind." Hence we must admit the agent (soul) over and above the instrument (mind). If you call the agent "mind," you will have to invent another name to designate the instrument. This verbal trick will not, after all, affect our position. Moreover, the mind cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature. An atomic agent cannot perform such diverse acts as seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc.

Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it does not, in some cases, continue quite as long as the body does. Knowledge belongs neither to a sense nor to its object because it continues even on their destruction. If knowledge had been a quality of the sense, it could not continue after the sense had been destroyed. But knowledge in the form of memory is found actually to abide even after the sense has perished. Hence the sense is not the abode of knowledge. Similarly knowledge does not abide in an object of sense, and does not belong to the mind.

As two or more things cannot be known (perceived) simultaneously, it is to be concluded that the mind, which is an instrument of our knowledge, is an atom in dimension. If we supposed this mind to be the abode of knowledge we could not call it an instrument in the acquisition of the same, and knowledge as a quality of an atom would in that case be imperceptible. Knowledge must therefore be admitted, by the principle of exclusion, to be a quality of the soul. The soul is all-pervading, but it cannot perceive many things simultaneously, on account of the absence of contact of the mind with many sense-organs at a time. Though many objects can come in proximity with their corresponding senses simultaneously, the mind, which is an atom, can come in conjunction with only one sense at a time. Hence two or more things are not perceived simultaneously although the soul which perceives them is all-pervading.

The soul is immortal inasmuch as we find in a child joy, fear and grief which arise from the memory of things previously experienced. A new-born child manifests marks of joy, fear and grief. This is inexplicable unless we suppose that the child perceiving certain things in this life remembers the corresponding things of its past life. The things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in past life continue to do so in this life. The memory of the past proves the pre-existence of the soul. Moreover, if we do not admit our soul to be eternal, we shall be confronted by many absurdities such as "loss of merited action" (*kṛta-hāni*), and "gain of unmerited action" (*akṛtābhyāgama*). A man who has committed a certain sin may not suffer its consequences in this life, and unless there is a soul continuing to his next life he will not suffer them at all. This is a "loss of merited action." Again, we often find a man suffering the consequences of action which he never did in this life. This would be a "gain of unmerited action," unless we believe that his soul did the action in his previous life.

Body.

Our body is earthy because it possesses the special qualities of earth. In other worlds there are beings whose bodies are watery, fiery, airy or ethereal. Though our body is composed of all the five elements we call it earthy owing to the preponderance of earth in it.

The senses are material substances inasmuch as they invariably receive obstruction. Nothing can offer obstruction to a non-material all-pervading substance. The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc., and are therefore material substances.

Senses.

Some¹ say that the senses are not many as all of them are dependent on touch (skin). The eye, ear, nose and tongue are said to be mere modifications of touch (skin) which pervades them, that is, there is only one sense, viz. touch (skin), all others being merely its forms.

It is, we reply, not so because the objects of other senses are not perceived by touch (skin). If there had been only one sense, viz. touch (skin), then it could have seen colour, heard sound, and so on. But a blind man possessing the sense of touch cannot see colour. Hence it is concluded that senses are many. Moreover, had there been only one sense, viz. touch, it would have in conjunction with the mind produced the functions of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc., simultaneously. But we cannot perform different functions at once. This proves that the senses are many. The mind, which is an atomic substance, being unable to come in contact with many senses at a time cannot produce many functions simultaneously. Further, touch can perceive only those

¹ Compare—All the senses are only modifications of touch.—Democritus.

objects which are near (contiguous), but it cannot perceive objects which are far off. We can, however, perceive colour and sound from a great distance. This is certainly not the function of touch, but of some other sense which can reach distant objects.

In fact, the senses are five. There are five objects, viz. colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour), and touch which are cognised respectively by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. There are therefore five senses corresponding to the five objects. The senses must be admitted to be five also on the following grounds:—(a) The characters of knowledge—there are five senses corresponding to the five characters of knowledge, viz. visual, auditory, olfactory gustatory and tactual. (b) The sites—the senses are five on account of the various sites they occupy. The visual sense rests on the eye-ball, the auditory sense on the ear-hole, the olfactory sense on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body. (c) The processes—there are five senses involving five different processes, e.g. the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching it through the (ocular) ray, while the tactual sense apprehends an object which is in association with the body, and so on. (d) The forms—the senses are of different forms, e.g. the eye partakes of the nature of a blue ball, and the ear is not different from ether, etc. (e) The materials—the senses are made up of different materials: the eye is fiery, the ear is ethereal, the nose is earthy, the tongue is watery, and the skin (touch) is airy.

Objects of Sense.

The earth possesses four qualities, viz. odour (smell), savour (taste), colour, and tangibility. In water there are three

The objects of sense: their distribution. qualities, viz. savour, colour, and tangibility. Colour and tangibility are known to be the qualities of fire while tangibility and sound belong respectively to air and ether. Some say that the earth does not possess four qualities, but possesses only one quality, viz. odour (smell), which is apprehended by the nose; that water does not possess three qualities but only one quality, viz. savour (taste), which is apprehended by the tongue; and that the other elements too do, each of them, possess only one quality. In reply, we say, that the earth really possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one. Had the earth possessed only odour (smell) and the water only savour (taste), then it would have been impossible for us to see the earthy and watery things. We are competent to see only those things which possess colour, and if the earth and water had not possessed colour, how could we have seen them? Since we can see the earthy and the watery, it follows that they possess colour. If you say that the earth and water are visible, because they are mixed with the fiery things which possess colour, why then the air and ether too are not visible? There is no rule that it is only the earth and water that can be mixed with fiery things, but that the air and ether cannot be so mixed. Proceeding in this way we find that the earth, etc., do not each possess only one quality.

Intellect.

Some maintain that the intellect is permanent, because it possesses the capacity of recognizing objects. A thing which was known before is known again now—this sort of knowledge is called recognition. Intellect (*buddhi*) is not permanent. It is possible only if the intellect which knew an object in the past continues also at the present, that is, if the intellect is persistent or permanent. Recognition would have been impossible if the intellect had been transitory. Hence the intellect which recognizes objects is said to be permanent. In reply we say that the intellect does not recognize objects, but it is the soul that does so. Knowledge cannot be attributed to an unconscious instrument, the intellect, but it must be admitted to be a quality of a conscious agent, the soul. Hence the intellect is not permanent.

Mind.

The mind being one, there are no simultaneous cognitions. If there had been more minds than one, they could have come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could have been produced simultaneously. As many cognitions are never produced at once, the mind must be admitted to be one. The mind is one.

If the mind had been possessed of magnitude, it could have come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could have taken place simultaneously. Since this has been found to be impossible, the mind is an atom. The mind is an atom.

Faults.

The faults are divided into three groups, viz. affection, aversion, and stupidity. Affection includes lust, avarice, and stupidity. The faults: their sub-division. avidity and covetousness. Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessness. Of the three, stupidity is the worst because it is only a stupid person who may be influenced by affection and aversion.

Transmigration.

Transmigration belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series of births and deaths implied by transmigration, is possible only if the soul is eternal. If the soul were destructible, it would be victim to two unexpected chances, viz. destruction of actions done by it (*kṛta-hāni*), and suffering from actions not done by it (*akṛtābhyāgama*). Transmigration belonging to the soul.

Seeing that man does not often reap fruits proportionate to his acts, some maintain that the acts are entirely subservient to God (*Isvara*)¹ who alone can provide them with fruits. This view is opposed. God is the giver of fruits.

¹ It may be noted that in the Nyāya-sūtra there is only a casual mention of God.

by others who say that if God were the only source of fruits, man could attain them even without any acts. Reconciling the two views we conclude that man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts do not produce any fruits by themselves: they become fruitful only through the grace of God.

The fruit is not produced immediately, because it is capable of being enjoyed after a lapse of time. The fruit, Time of production of the fruits. e.g. of maintaining the sacred fire, is the attainment of heaven, which is not possible until the time of death when the soul departs from our body. Just as a tree, whose roots are now nourished with water, will produce fruits in future, so the sacred fire which is maintained now will enable the maintainer to attain heaven after death.

Birth is nothing but pain, because it consists of our connection with the body, the senses and the intellect, which Birth is pain. bring us various distresses. The body is the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruments by which pain is experienced, and the intellect is the agent which produces in us the feeling of pain. Our birth—as connected with the body, the senses and the intellect—is necessarily a source of pain. We do not altogether deny pleasure which often arises amidst pains. Some persons, thinking that pleasure is the *summum bonum*, are addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth, infirmity, disease, death, connection with the undesirable, separation from the desirable, etc. It is therefore clear that one who pursues pleasure, does in reality pursue pain, or in other words, pleasure is a synonym for pain.

Emancipation.

Some say that there is no opportunity for us to attain emancipation because of the continual pressure of our Attainment of emancipation. debts,¹ troubles and activities. As soon as we are born we incur, according to them, three debts which we must go on clearing off until the time of our decay and death; and troubles are our constant companions while activities pursue us throughout our life. There is then no opportunity for us to attain emancipation. In reply we say that there is no lack of opportunity for our emancipation, because the sacrifices to be performed for clearing off our debts may be trusted to our soul. A person, while old, should refrain from all searches after sons, wealth and retinue. He should retire from the world when he has trusted to his soul the sacrifices which he used to perform to clear off his debts. By so doing he will imagine that his soul is the sacrificial fire in which his physical actions are offered as oblations. Freed from all debts, he will live on alms and find an ample opportunity for effecting his own emancipation. As there is no distress in a person who enjoys a sound

¹ The three debts are: (1) Debt to sages (*ṛṣi-ṛṇa*)—which can be cleared off only by undergoing a course of student life. (2) Debt to gods (*deva-ṛṇa*)—from which we can be freed only by performing sacrifices. (3) Debt to our progenitors (*pitṛ-ṛṇa*)—which cannot be cleared off except by begetting children.

sleep, so there is no pressure of troubles and activities in one who has attained emancipation. Emancipation is the condition of supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement. A person, by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, viz. affection, aversion and stupidity, disappear. He is then no longer subject to any activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is the way in which his emancipation is effected and supreme felicity secured.

(3) Doubt (*samśaya*).

1. Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately. It is said that doubt about an object is never produced, if *both* the common and uncommon properties of the object are recognized. For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post. We at once decide that it is a man, for though tallness is a property possessed in common by man and post, locomotion is a property which distinguishes a man from a post. Likewise doubt about an object is said never to be produced if *only* the common or the uncommon properties are recognized. For instance, if we see a tall object in the twilight we have no reason to doubt whether it is a man or a post. Tallness is certainly a property possessed in common by man and post, but the tallness of a man is not identical with that of a post: it merely resembles it. Now the knowledge of similarity between the tallness of a man and that of a post presupposes a knowledge of the man and the post, of which the two kinds of tallness are attributes. If there is already a knowledge of the man and the post, there cannot be any doubt about them, for knowledge is the vanquisher of doubt.

2. It is further said that doubt cannot arise either from conflicting testimonies or from the irregularity of perception and non-perception. In the case of conflicting testimonies there is, according to them, a strong conviction on each side. Suppose a disputant says: there is soul. His opponent replies: there is no soul. The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary there is conviction, in the minds of both.

3. Doubt, they say, does not arise from the irregularity of perception and non-perception, because in the irregularity itself there is regularity. An irregularity may be designated as such with reference to something else, but with reference to itself it is a settled fact. If the irregularity is settled in itself, it is regular and cannot cause doubt. On the other hand, if the irregularity is not settled in itself, it is devoid of its own character and cannot cause doubt.

4. Likewise there is, they say, the chance of an endless doubt owing to the continuity of its cause. Recognition of properties common to many objects is, for instance, a cause of doubt. The common properties continue to exist and hence there will, they say, be no cessation of doubt.

1. In reply we say that doubt does arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties jointly. Doubt is not impossible. The recognition of properties common to many objects is certainly a cause of doubt, if there is no reference to the precise characters of the objects. There is indeed a common (non-distinctive) knowledge about a man and a post suggested by the tall object, but there is no precise (distinctive) knowledge about them. Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of the precise character which distinguishes a man from a post) being absent, doubt must arise. Similar arguments will apply to doubt arising from the recognition of uncommon properties alone. 2. In the case of conflicting testimonies there is certainly a ground for doubt. When a disputant and his opponent make conflicting statements, one is led to believe that both statements are worth consideration, but is unable to penetrate into the precise characters of the statements. Hence though the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting statements. 3. It has been said that doubt cannot arise from the irregularity of perception and non-perception as the irregularity is settled in itself. This objection is untenable, as the irregularity cannot be concealed by mere verbal tricks. The irregularity though settled in itself does not lose its irregular character until the objects to which it is related are removed. 4. It has been urged that there is the possibility of an endless doubt inasmuch as its cause is continuous. In reply we say that though materials of doubt, such as common properties, etc., continue to exist, we do not always recognize them. Unless there is recognition of the common properties, etc., there cannot be doubt.

(4) Discussion (*vāda*).

One should hold discussions with unenvious¹ persons, such as disciples, preceptors, fellow-students and seekers of the *summum bonum*. In case of a necessity for the search of truth, discussion may be held even without an opposing side. A person desirous of knowledge may submit his views for examination by simply expressing his curiosity for truth without an attempt to establish the views.

(5) Wrangling and Cavil (*jalpa-vitaṇḍā*).

Wranglings and cavils may be employed to keep up our zeal for truth, just as fences of thorny boughs are used to safeguard the growth of seeds. Certain Use of wrangling and cavil. talkative people propound philosophies which are mutually opposed, while others violate all sense of rectitude out of a bias for their own side. Seeing that these people have not attained true knowledge, and are not freed from faults, we may, in our disputation against them, employ wranglings and cavils which do not in themselves produce any profit or deserve any encomium.

¹ The epithet "unenvious" excludes those who do not seek truth but desire victory.

36. TOPICS INCIDENTALLY EXAMINED.

(1) Parts and Whole (*avayava* and *avayavin*).

Some say that *parts* alone are realities and that there is no *whole* behind them. A tree, for instance, is yellow in some parts and green in other parts. If the tree were one whole, then the contradictory qualities of yellowness and greenness could not have belonged to it simultaneously. Hence the parts alone must, according to them, be regarded as real.

In reply Akṣapāda says that nothing would be perceptible if the *whole* were denied. Suppose that the parts alone are real. Then since a part is not of a fixed dimension, it may itself be divided into parts, these latter again into further parts and so on, until we reach the atoms which are the ultimate parts. Now the atoms which possess no bulk are not perceptible. Consequently the thing which is said to consist merely of parts is also not perceptible. We must therefore admit a whole beyond its parts. Moreover, if there were no whole, we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say 'one jar,' 'one man,' etc. This use of 'one' would vanish if there were no whole. If any one were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance, but an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible, but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be perceptible, and these atoms being called 'one jar,' the use of 'one' will not vanish. The analogy, we reply, does not hold good because the soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas the atoms do not possess bulk and are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to conclude that because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms too are perceptible in the mass; to avoid this conclusion we must admit the existence of a whole beyond the parts.

(2) Atoms (*paramāṇu*).

In the Nyāya-sūtra 4-2-16, it is stated that there can never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation of things. Even at the dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), things will continue to exist in the form of atoms. An atom is that which is not divisible into parts: it is a whole without parts. The view that an atom cannot be devoid of parts because it is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*) in its inner and outer sides, is not tenable because the terms "innerside" and "outerside" are not applicable to an eternal atom which is altogether different from an ordinary thing a constituent of which encloses, or is enclosed by, another constituent of it. It is no doubt admitted that the ether is all-pervading, but it neither obstructs anything nor is repelled by anything, so that the question of inner side or outer side does not arise at all. Those who argue that an atom must possess parts because it can come in conjunction with another atom only in some of its parts, should bear in mind that their argument gives rise to

a *regressus ad infinitum* which is not proper. If an atom is held to be divisible into parts, those parts again must be supposed to be divisible into further parts. This would lead to the fallacy of an infinite regression which should be avoided. A thing although repeatedly divided and subdivided does not lose itself. There remains a particle called *atom* which does not perish even at the dissolution of the world.

[According to commentators two atoms make a *dvyanuka* (dyad or binary compound) and three *dvyanukas* make a *tryasarenu* (triad or a tertiary compound). All things which we perceive are composed of *tryasarenius*.]

(3) The Three Times (*kāla*).

There is, some¹ say, no *present* time, because when a thing falls we can know only the time through which it has fallen, and the time through which it will fall. Some deny the present time. When a fruit, for instance, falls from a tree we recognize only the past time taken up by the fruit in traversing a certain distance, and the future time which will be taken up by the fruit in traversing the remaining distance. There is no intervening distance which the fruit can traverse at the so-called present time. Hence they say there is no present time.

In reply we say that there is the present time, as the past and future times are related to it. The past is that which precedes the present, and the future is that which succeeds it. Hence if there is no present time, there cannot be any past or future time. If the past is defined as that which is not the future and the future is defined as that which is not the past, the definition would involve a fallacy of mutual dependency. Hence we must admit the present time to which the past and future are related.

The present time is indicated by the very existence of things. If the present time is denied, there cannot be any perception which can arise only in connection with a thing which is present in time; and in the absence of perception all kinds of knowledge would be impossible. Hence the present time is established by the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*. The present time is indicated by what continues, the past by what has been finished, and the future by what has not yet begun.

(4) Words and their Meanings (*śabdārtha*).

Some say that there is a fixed connection between words and their meanings. A particular word bears a particular meaning, e.g. the word 'cow' denotes the animal of that name, but it does not denote a horse, a jar or any other thing. Is the connection between a word and its meaning natural? There is therefore a fixed connection between a word and its meaning.

¹ The sūtras from 2-1-39 to 2-1-43 which contain a critical examination of the present time (*vartamāna*) seem to have been interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra by Vātsyāyana inasmuch as the objections raised therein emanated most probably from Nāgārjuna (*q.v.*).

In reply we say that it is through convention that the meaning of a word is understood. The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection is fixed by man and is not inseparable. Moreover there is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning. The *ṛsis*, *āryas* and *mlecchas* use the same word in different senses, e.g. the word "yava" is used by the *āryas* to denote a long-awned grain, but by the *mlecchas* to denote a panic-seed. So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform.

(5) The Veda.¹

Some say that the Veda is unreliable, as it involves the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. For instance, the Veda affirms that a son is produced when a sacrifice for the sake of a son (*putreṣṭi*) is performed. It often happens that a son is not produced though the sacrifice has been performed. Besides, there are many contradictory injunctions in the Veda, e.g. it declares "let the oblation be offered after sun-rise," "let the oblation be offered before sun-rise," etc., and at the same time "the oblation offered after sun-rise, is eaten up by the brown dog," "the oblation offered before sun-rise, is eaten up by the motley-coloured dog," etc. There is also tautology such as "let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice," etc.

In reply we say that the so-called untruth in the Veda comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice. Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect in the operator (officiating priest) consists in his not being a learned man, and the defect in the materials consists in the fuel being wet, butter being not fresh, remuneration to the officiating priest being small, etc. A son is sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice, if these defects are avoided. There is therefore no untruth in the Veda. Neither is there any contradiction. Let a person offer the oblation before sun-rise or after sun-rise, if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times. Two alternative courses being open to him, he can perform the sacrifice before sun-rise or after sun-rise according to his agreement or desire. The deprecatory texts, that the oblations are eaten up by dogs, indicate that the time agreed upon should not be altered. The Veda cannot be charged with the fault of contradiction if it enjoins such alternative courses. There may be re-inculcation in the Veda, but there is no tautology in it. Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the Veda. If there is any repetition there, it is either for completing a certain number of syllables, or for explaining a matter briefly expressed, etc. "Let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice"—such instances embody a useful repetition.

¹ It is interesting to note how the Nyāya-śāstra defends the Veda from the attacks made against it perhaps by the followers of Ānvīkṣikī.

The two main divisions of the Veda are : (1) hymn (*samhitā*), and (2) ritual (*Brāhmaṇa*). The ritual portion admits of three sub-divisions, viz. the injunctive (*vidhi*), descriptive (*arthavāda*), and re-inculcative (*anuvāda*).

The principle of classification of the Vedic speech.

An injunction (*vidhi*), which may be either mandatory or permissive, is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of action [as the means of attaining good], e.g. "let him, who desires paradise, perform the fire-sacrifice." This is a mandatory injunction.

Description (*arthavāda*) is of four kinds, viz. valedictory, deprecatory, illustrative, and narrative. The valedictory (*stuti*) is a speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action, by extolling its consequences, e.g. "By the Sarvajit sacrifice gods conquered all; there is nothing so efficacious as the Sarvajit sacrifice, it enables us to obtain everything and to vanquish every one, etc." Here there is no direct command on us, but the Sarvajit sacrifice is extolled in such a way that we are persuaded to perform it. The deprecatory (*nindā*) is a speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action, by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting it, e.g. "one who performs any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyotiṣṭoma falls into a pit and decays there." Here one is persuaded to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice the neglect of which brings about evil consequences. The illustrative (*parakṛti*) is the mentioning of a course of action, the obstruction of which by some particular person led to bad consequences, e.g. on presenting oblation one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter afterwards, but alas! the Caraka priests first took the sprinkled butter which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc. Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Caraka priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the course. The narrative (*purāṇkalpa*) is the mentioning of some thing as commendable on account of its antiquity, e.g. "By this the Brāhmaṇas recited the Sāma hymn, etc."

Re-inculcation (*anuvāda*) is the repetition of that which has been enjoined by an injunction. Re-inculcation may consist of the repetition of an injunction or the repetition of that which has been enjoined. The first is called verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation. "Non-eternal, not eternal" this is a verbal repetition. "Non-eternal, possessing the character of extinction"—this is an objective repetition.

The Vedas are reliable like the spells or mantras and the medical science, because of the reliability of their authors. Spells counteract poison, etc., and the medical science prescribes correct remedies. The authority which belongs to them is derived from their authors, the sages, who were reliable persons. The sages themselves were reliable because (1) they had an intuitive perception of truths, (2) they had great kindness for living beings, and (3) they had the desire of communicating their knowledge of the truths. The authors (lit. the seers and speakers) of the Vedas were also the authors of the spells and

the medical science. Hence like the spells and medical science the Vedas must be accepted as authoritative.

(6) Sound (*śabda*).

There are conflicting opinions about the nature of sound. Some say that sound is a quality of ether and that it is all-pervading, eternal and capable of being manifested. Others say that sound like smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in which it abides, and is capable of being manifested. Sound is said by others to be a quality of ether and to be subject to production and destruction like knowledge. Others again say that sound arises from the concussion of elements, requires no abode, and is subject to production and destruction.

Sound, according to the Nyāya-sūtra 2-1-14, is non-eternal because (1) it has a beginning, i.e. arises from the concussion of two hard substances, e.g. an axe and a tree, etc.; (2) is cognised by one of our senses (the ear); and (3) is spoken of as possessing the properties of an artificial object, e.g. is described as grave, acute, etc.

Some say that the so-called beginning of a sound is merely a manifestation of it, that is, sound does not really begin, but is merely manifested by the concussion of two hard substances. In reply it is said that the concussion does not manifest but produce sound. You cannot suppose the concussion to be the manifestor and sound the manifested, unless you can prove that the concussion and sound are simultaneous. But the proof is impossible as a sound is heard at a great distance, even after the concussion of the substances has ceased. So sound is not manifested by the concussion. It is however legitimate to suppose that sound is produced by the concussion, and that one sound produces another sound, and so on until the last sound is heard at a great distance.

Some say that it is not true that whatever has a beginning is non-eternal. Look! the non-existence (destruction) of a jar, which began when the jar was broken, is eternal (indestructible). In reply it is said that, that which is really eternal belongs to three times. But the non-existence (destruction) of a jar does not belong to three times as it was impossible before the jar was broken. Hence the non-existence (destruction) of a jar, which has a beginning, is not really eternal.

Whatever is cognised by our senses is non-eternal: this is also said to be an unsound argument. When, for instance, we perceive a jar, we perceive also its genus (i.e. jar-ness) which is eternal. In reply we say that not all things cognised by our senses are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a certain genus.¹ A jar, for instance, is non-eternal because we perceive it as

¹ The aphorism (Nyāya-sūtra 2-1-17) may also be interpreted as follows:—Sound is non-eternal because it is inferred to advance in a series.—We do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal: our intention is to say that

belonging to the genus jar-ness. But jar-ness which is cognised by our sense is not non-eternal, because it does not belong to a further genus named jar-ness-ness. Similarly sound is non-eternal, because it is cognised by our sense as belonging to the genus called sound-ness.

It is said that the attribution of the properties of an artificial object to sound does not make it non-eternal. Artificial properties attributed to sound. It is often alleged that we attribute to eternal things the properties of an artificial object, e.g. we speak of the extension of ether as we speak of the extension of a blanket. In reply we say that when we speak of the extension of ether, we really mean that the extension belongs to an artificial thing which has for its substratum the ether. Hence we do not in reality attribute to eternal things the properties of artificial objects. Sound is in fact non-eternal, because neither do we perceive it before utterance, nor do we notice any veil which covers it. If sound were eternal it would be perceived before utterance. You cannot say that sound really existed before utterance, but was covered by some veil, for we do not notice any such veil.

Some say that sound should be regarded as eternal because there is traditionary teaching. A teacher delivers, in the form of a lecture, certain sounds which are found to be repeated by his pupil after a long interval. This repetition, according to them, would be impossible if the sounds were perishable. In reply it is pointed out that the sounds, which have not been audible after their delivery by the teacher, are reproduced or imitated by his pupil. On the ground of the inaudibility, reproducibility and imitability, the sounds must be pronounced to be non-eternal.

Sound has not for its substratum any of the tangible substances, viz. earth, water, fire, and air. Its substratum is ether which pervades all space. Hence sound is produced even in a vacuum which is devoid of smell, taste, colour, and touch—the qualities of tangible substances. The reason why the sound produced in a vacuum does not reach our ears, is that there is no air to carry it. The fact of having an intangible substance for its substratum, is no bar to the sound being non-eternal. Sound, though its substratum is the intangible ether, is produced by the contact of two hard substances. One sound produces another sound, and so on until the last sound ceases owing to some obstacle. Sound is therefore non-eternal.

(7) Word (*pada*).

The letters ended with an affix¹ form a word (*pada*) which is of two kinds, viz. a noun, and a verb. In assimilating an affix the letters may be transformed. The transformation takes place by substitution

things cognised by our sense as advancing in a series are non-eternal. Sound is cognised in that manner (i.e. sound advances like a wave), and hence sound is non-eternal.

¹ The indeclinables (*avyaya*) which drop their affixes are also words (Pāṇini 2-4-82).

(*ādeśa*), and not by modification (*vikāra*), e.g. in *bho + ti* (*bhū + ti = bhavati*), *o* vacates a place which is occupied by its substitute *av*.

What does a word signify? A word presents to us an *individual*, a *form* and a *genus* (type). The word 'cow' reminds us of an individual (a four-footed animal), its form (limbs) and its genus or type (cowhood or cow-type). Now, it is asked what is the real signification of a word—an individual, a form or a genus (type)? Some say that the word denotes an individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can make any statement, e.g. "that cow is going"—here "that" can be used only in reference to an individual cow. Others say that the word denotes form by which an entity is recognised, e.g. we use such expressions as 'this is a cow,' and 'this is a horse,' only with reference to the forms of the cow and the horse. Others hold that the word must denote genus (type), for if we did not take genus into consideration the word cow might denote any individual of any kind.

In reply we say that the word signifies all the three, though prominence is given to one of them. For the purpose of distinction the individual is prominent. In order to convey a general notion, pre-eminence is given to the genus (type). In practical concerns much importance is attached to the form. As a fact the word ordinarily presents to us the form, denotes the individual, and connotes the genus (type).

An *individual* (*vyakti*) is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities. An individual

Individual. is any substance which is cognised by the senses as a limited abode of colour, taste, smell, touch, weight, solidity, tremulousness, velocity or elasticity.

The *form* (*ākṛti*) is that which is called the token of the genus. The genus, cowhood for instance, is recognized by a certain collocation of the dewlap which is a form. We cannot recognize the genus of a formless substance.

A *genus* or type (*jāti*) is that whose nature is to produce the same conception. Cowhood is a genus (or type) which underlies all cows. Seeing a cow somewhere we acquire a general notion of cows (i.e. derive knowledge of cowhood). This general notion enables us on all subsequent occasions to recognize individual cows.

(8) The eyes (*cakṣuḥ*).

Some say that the eyes are not two: the conceit of duality arises from the single organ of vision being divided by the bone of the nose. In reply we say that the eyes are really two, because the destruction of one does not cause the destruction of the other.

The eye is said by some to be a material substance inasmuch as its function is limited by its contact. A thing is seen when it has contact with the eye, but it is not seen when the eye is not connected.

Is the eye a material substance? In other words, the eye, like any other material substance, exercises its

function only in virtue of its contact with things. Others say that if the eye had been a material substance, it could have apprehended only those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is contended that the eye is a non-material substance.

In reply we say that though the eye does not coincide with things which are greater or smaller in bulk, yet the rays issuing from the eye reach the things to their entire extent. Hence in spite of the eye being a material substance, there is no impossibility for it to apprehend the great and the small

(9) Intellect (*buddhi*).

Some philosophers¹ [the sāmkhya] maintain that the intellect is permanent as it is capable of recognizing objects. A thing which was known before, is known now as the identical thing. This sort of identifying knowledge is called recognition, which is possible only if the intellect which existed in the past continues also at the present time, that is, if the intellect is permanent. Knowledge which is a function of the intellect is not different from the latter.

Akṣapāda opposes them by saying that the intellect, which is an unconscious instrument, cannot recognize objects, recognition being really a function of a conscious agent, the soul. If knowledge were not different from the permanent intellect, then various sorts of knowledge could have as permanent entities existed simultaneously, and there would have been no cessation of knowledge or recognition. Finding the absurdity of such contingencies, we cannot admit the intellect to be a permanent entity and knowledge a function of it.

(10) Memory (*smṛti*).²

Memory (*smṛti*) belongs to the soul which possesses knowledge of the past, present and future. Memory is awakened by such causes as attention, context, exercise, signs, marks, likeness, possession, relation of protector and

¹ Vide Nyāya-sūtra, 3-2-1.

² Compare—The king said: 'In how many ways, Nāgasena, does memory spring up?'

³ In sixteen ways, O king. That is to say; by personal experience, as when the Venerable Ānanda, or the devoted woman Khajjuttarā, or any others who had that power, called to mind their previous births—or by outward aid as when others continue to remind one who is by nature forgetful—or by the impression made by the greatness of some occasion, as kings remember their coronation day, or as we remember the day of our conversion—by the impression made by joy, as when one remembers that which gave him pleasure—or by the impression made by sorrow, as when one remembers that which pained him—or from similarity of appearance, as on seeing one like them we call to mind the mother or father or sister or brother, or on seeing a camel or an ox or an ass we call to mind others like them—or by difference of appearance as when we remember that such and such a colour, sound, smell, taste or touch belong to such and such a thing—or by the knowledge of speech, as when one who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others and then himself remembers—or by a sign, as when we recognize a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign—or from effort to recollect, as when one by nature

protégé, immediate subsequence, separation, similar employment, opposition, excess, receipt, intervention, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, entreaty, action, affection, and merit and demerit.

Attention—enables us to fix our mind on an object by restraining it from wandering away to any other object.

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof (*pramāṇa*), that which is to be proved (*prameya*), etc.

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression.

Sign—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate), (3) correlated, or (4) opposite, e.g. smoke is a sign of fire with which it is connected; a horn is a sign of a cow from which it is inseparable; an arm is a sign of a leg with which it is correlated; and the non-existent is a sign of the existent by the relation of opposition.

Mark—a mark on the body of a horse awakens the memory of the stable in which it was kept.

Likeness—as the image of Devadatta drawn on a board reminds us of the real person.

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and *vice versa*.

Protector and Protégé—such as a king and his attendants.

Immediate subsequence—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar.

Separation—as of husband and wife.

Similar employment—as of a fellow-disciple.

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon.

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded.

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom some thing has been or will be received.

Intervention—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

Pleasure and pain—reminding us of that which caused them.

Desire and aversion—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

Fear—reminding us of that which caused it, e.g. death.

Entreaty—reminding us of that which was wanted or prayed for.

forgetful is made to recollect by being urged again and again: "try and think of it"—or by calculation, as when one knows by the training he has received in writing, that such and such a letter ought to follow after such and such a one—or by arithmetic, as when accountants do set sums by their knowledge of figures—or by learning by heart, as the repeaters of the scriptures by their skill in learning by heart recollect so much—or by meditation, as when a Bhikkhu calls to mind his temporal states in days gone by—by reference to a book, as when kings calling to mind a previous regulation, say: "Bring the book here," and remind themselves out of that—or by a pledge, as when, at the sight of goods deposited, a man recollects (the circumstances under which they were pledged)—or by association, as when one remembers a thing because one has seen it, or a sound because one has heard it, or an odour because one has smelt it, or a touch because one has felt it, or a concept because one has perceived it."

'Very good, Nāgasena!'

(The questions of King Milinda—Book III, chapter 7, pp. 122–123, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, S.B.E. Series).

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer.

Affection—as recollecting a son or wife.

Merit and demerit—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life.

(11) The fixed signification of numbers ¹ (*samkhyaikānta*).

Some say that there is only *one* thing, viz. Brahma. Others say that things are *two*, viz. the eternal and non-eternal. Some find the things to be *three*, viz. the knower, the knowable and knowledge; while others treat of *four* things, viz. the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way philosophers indulge themselves in a *fixed number* of things. Aksapāda opposes them by saying that the fixity of number cannot be established. In establishing the fixed number, there must be a reason. Now is the reason included in the number or excluded from it, or identical with it? If the reason is included in the number, it is as unfixed as the number itself. If the reason is excluded from the number, the fixity of number must be abandoned. If the number and the reason are identical, there will remain no means to establish the fixity of number.

¹ This doctrine, which occurs in the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-41, throws some light on the dialogue between Aṣṭāvakra and Vandin related in the Mahābhārata, Vana-parva, chaps. 132-134 (*vide ante*). It bears an analogy to the novice's question (Kumāra-pañha) which runs as follows :—

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. एकं नाम किं ?
What is one ? | 1. सख्ये सत्ता आहारङ्कितिका ।
Food is a thing on which all animals
subsist. |
| 2. द्वे नाम किं ?
What are two ? | 2. नामश्च रूपश्च ।
Name and form. |
| 3. त्रीणि नाम किं ?
What are three ? | 3. तिस्सो वेदना ।
Three kinds of feeling. |
| 4. चत्तारि नाम किं ?
What are four ? | 4. चत्तारि अरियसच्चानि ।
The four noble truths. |
| 5. पञ्च नाम किं ?
What are five ? | 5. पञ्चुपादानक्खम्भा ।
The five constituent aggregates, etc.,
etc. |

(Khuddakapāṭha of the Pāli sutta Piṭaka).

CHAPTER III.

Commentaries on the Nyāya-sūtra.

36a. NATURE OF THE COMMENTARIES.

In the previous chapter there has been given a summary of Nyāya-sūtra, the fundamental work on Nyāya Philosophy of the second century A.D. The Nyāya-sūtra was not followed, for several hundred years, by any other original treatises on Nyāya from the pen of the Brāhmanic writers. But these writers brought out numerous commentaries which served not only to elucidate and develop the Nyāya-sūtra, but to review critically, in the light of the sūtra, the various theories of contemporaneous philosophies. The commentaries are therefore store-houses of valuable information on Philosophy and Logic. It is not possible to give here a complete analysis of the commentaries, but a passing reference to some of their leading topics will be made in the following pages.

37. VĀTSYĀYANA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-BHĀṢYA (ABOUT 400 A.D.).

The earliest commentary extant on the Nyāya-sūtra is the Nyāya-bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana¹ or Pakṣila Svāmī.² In it there are references to previous logicians designated as *eke* (some), *kecit* (certain), or *anye* (others), who were perhaps authors of commentaries³ which have not come down to us. The Nyāya-bhāṣya

¹ The name Vātsyāyana occurs in the colophon of Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika thus :—

यद्वचपादप्रतिमो भार्य वात्स्यायनो जगौ ।

अकारि महत्तल्लस्य भारद्वाजेन वार्तिकम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, Book V, Chap. II, last line).

² Vācaspati Miśra mentions the name Pakṣila Svāmī thus :—

अथ भगवता अक्षपादेन, निःश्रेयसहेतो शास्त्रे प्रणीते व्युत्पादिते च भगवता पक्षिल
स्वामिना किमपरमवशिष्यते यदर्थं वार्त्तिकारस्य इति

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā, opening lines).

³ Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-2-9, criticises, in connection with his definition of *kālātīta*, the opinion of a previous commentator by saying—

अवयव विपर्ययस वचनं न सूत्रार्थः ।

was separated from the Nyāya-sūtra by at least two centuries, as we find in it explanations of certain terms which became almost unintelligible at the time.¹

Vātsyāyana must have flourished before Dignāga (q.v.), as the latter criticises him in connection with his explanation of the mind (*manas*) as a sense-organ,² and possibly also before Vasubandhu whose theory of syllogism, so antagonistic to that of Akṣapāda, has not been controverted, nay even referred to, by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya.

The Nyāya-sūtra, as already observed, contains certain aphorisms which refer to the doctrines expounded in such well-known Buddhist works as the Mādhyamika-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, etc. Vātsyāyana followed Nāgārjuna and the Laṅkāvatāra. These aphorisms do not constitute an essential part of the Nyāya-sūtra, and were evidently interpolated into it before or during the time of Vātsyāyana³ who wrote *Bhāṣya*, commentary, on it. Vātsyāyana must therefore have flourished after the composition of the Buddhist works, the doctrines of which were interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra.

Hence the earliest limit of his age is A.D. 300, when the Mādhyamika-sūtra and Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra are supposed to have been composed. As Age of Vātsyāyana. Dignāga lived about 500 A.D. and Vasubandhu about 480 A.D., Vātsyāyana who preceded them could not have lived after the latter date. Taking the mean between the earliest and the latest dates we may approximately fix the date of Vātsyāyana⁴ at about 400 A.D.

Vātsyāyana, in extolling the *Nyāya-sāstra* (called the *Ān-vīkṣiki*), quotes a verse from the *Artha-sāstra*⁵ of Kauṭilya (about

¹ Dr. H. Jacobi observes:—When commenting on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-5, Vātsyāyana gives two different explanations of the terms *pūrvavat*, *śesavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, the names of the three subdivisions of inference, showing thereby that the meaning of these important terms had become doubtful at his time. (The dates of the philosophical sūtras, p. 6, Journal of the American Oriental Society for 1911).

² Vide Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-4; and *Prāmāṇya-samuccaya*, chapter I.

³ Dr. Hermann Jacobi observes:—The text of the sūtras as we have them is at best that which the oldest scholiast chose to comment upon, and it cannot be safely traced further back—J.A.O.S., for 1911, the dates of philosophical sūtras, pp. 2-3.

⁴ Vide my “Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāya-bhāṣya” in the Indian Antiquary for April 1915.

327 B.C.), and in giving an example of "the incoherent" (*apār-thaka*) extracts a sentence from the *Mahābhāṣya*¹ of Patañjali (150 B.C.).

Vātsyāyana, also designated as Drāmila² (same as Drāviḍa), was in all probability a native of Drāviḍa (the Deccan), of which the capital was Kāñcīpura, modern Conjeeveram. The title "Svāmin"³ appended to "Pakṣila" in the name "Pakṣila Svāmin" also points to the same country as his birthplace. We may add that Kāñcī was a famous centre not only of Brāhmanic learning, but also of Buddhistic culture, and it was here that Dignāga (500 A.D.) and Dharmapāla (600 A.D.) and other Buddhist logicians lived and flourished. It may be of some interest to note that Vātsyāyana⁴ makes a reference to the boiling of rice which is a staple food of the people of Drāviḍa. This Vātsyāyana who lived about 400 A.D., when Candragupta II, called Vikramāditya, was king of Magadha, should not be confounded with the sage or sages of that name, who compiled the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Kāmasūtra*.

38. VĀTSYĀYANA CRITICISES NĀGĀRJUNA.

The sūtras 4-1-39 and 4-1-40 which seem to have been, as previously observed, interpolated into the *Nyāya-sūtra*⁵ deal with the Buddhist doctrine of inter-relation (*apekṣā* or *pratyaya*) evidently taken from the *Mādhyamika-sūtra*⁶ (Chapters I and XV) of Nāgārjuna who flourished about

1

दशदाडिमानि षड्रूपाः

कुण्डमज्जानिनं पल्लपिण्डः ।

(*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 5-1-10, and *Mahābhāṣya*, 1-1-3).

² Jaina Hemacandra supposes Drāmila to be another name for Vātsyāyana :—

वात्सायनो मङ्गनागः कौटिल्यश्चकामजो

द्रामिलः पञ्चलस्त्वामी विष्णुगुप्तोऽङ्गुलश्च सः ॥

(*Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*).

Vātsyāyana would not have been called Drāmila, had he been a native of Vatsa, the capital of which was Kauśāmbī near Allahabad.

³ Svāmin is a common surname in Madras. In Pāli books, however, we read of a sage named Vacchagotta or Vātsyāyana living in Ayodhyā.

⁴ *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2-1-40, edited by Jaya Narayan Tarkapañcānana, *Bibliotheca Indica* series.

⁵ The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama, translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B.H. Series, Allahabad.

6

रूपादिष्वतिरेकेण यथा कुम्भी न विद्यते ।

वाक्वादिष्वतिरेकेण तथा रूपं न विद्यते ॥

(*Mādhyamika-sūtra*, Chapter I, verse 3, p. 19, B.T.S. edition, Calcutta).

250-300 A.D. In the Bhāṣya on the sūtras, Vātsyāyana summarises the doctrine as follows:—

Some say that things are not self-existent as they exist merely in relation to one another. A thing is called short only in relation to another thing which is long, and *vice versa*. The long and short are inter-related, but not self-existent.

In the same Bhāṣya Vātsyāyana controverts the doctrine on the ground that it is self-destructive. If the long and short are not self-existent, it will be impossible to establish a relation between them, and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of inter-relation will fall to the ground.

The sūtras 4-2-31, 4-2-32 and 4-2-33, of the Nyāya-sūtra,¹

The Mādhyamika doctrine of *śūnyatā*, voidness, criticised.

seem also to have been interpolations. In the Bhāṣya on those sūtras, Vātsyāyana criticises the doctrine, evidently taken from the Mādhyamika-sūtra,² according to which

our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the celestial choirs or as a mirage.³

न सद्भावः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्यय हेतुभिः ।

स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथम् ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, Chap. XV, p. 93, B.T.S. edition, Calcutta).

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ।

(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-39).

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम्

(Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-40, S.B.H. series, Allahabad).

सद्भवविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ 4-2-31

मायागन्धर्वनगरं नगदृष्टिक्वावद्वा ॥ 4-2-32

(Nyāya-sūtra translated into English by Satis Chanda Vidyabhusana, S.B.H. Series, Allahabad).

2

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम् ॥

(Mādhyamika-sūtra, chapter VII).

यथैव गन्धर्वपुरं मरीचिका यथैव मायासुपिनं यथैव ।

स्वभावशून्या तु निमित्तभावना तथोपमानं जानत सर्वधर्मान् ॥

(Quoted in the Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 57, B.T. Society's edition, Calcutta).

³ As explained in the Buddhist works (such as the Mādhyamika-sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Dvyaṛdha-śatikā, etc.). The doctrine of inter-relation *pratyaya* or *apekṣā*) leads to that of voidness (*śūnyatā*). Compare—

यः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्षते ।.....

यच्च स्वभावेनानुत्पादो भावानां सा शून्यता ।

यः प्रत्ययैर्जायति सद्भावातो

न तस्य उत्पादः स्वभावतोऽस्ति ।

Nāgārjuna in his Upāyakaūśalya-sūtra, chapter I, says that a thesis can be established through a reason and an example (*udāharana*), which may be either affirmative or negative. A syllogism, according to him, consists of three members and not of five, the last two members, viz. application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) being superfluous and not better than "analogous rejoinders" (*jātyuttara*).

Vātsyāyana¹ in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-39, answers these objections as follows:—

The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) are essential parts of a syllogism inasmuch as they serve on the strength of the general principle involved in the example, to confirm the reason and reassert decisively the proposition which, when first advanced, was of a doubtful character. After an invariable relation

यः प्रत्ययाधीनः स शून्य उक्तो

यः शून्यतां जानाति सोऽप्रसक्तः ॥ इति ॥

तथाचार्यलङ्कावतारे — स्वभावानुपपत्तिं सन्धाय मद्भामते सर्वधर्माः शून्या इति मया दर्शिता इति ॥ द्वार्जुनशक्तिकायां शून्याः सर्वधर्माः निःस्वभावयोगेन । इति ॥

(Mādhyamika vṛtti, Chap. XXIV, pp. 184-185, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition).

एवं शून्यमुपादानमुपादाता च सर्वशः ।

प्रज्ञयते च शून्येन कथं शून्यस्तथागतः ॥

(Mādhyamika vṛtti, Chap. XXII, p. 160, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition).

The doctrine of voidness (*śūnya-vāda*) flourished between 200 A.D. and 500 A.D. Compare Dr. L. Sual's *Filosofia Indiana*, p. 8.

¹ Vātsyāyana observes:—

‘उपनयनश्चाङ्गरेण साध्येऽनुपसंहृतः साधको धर्मो नाथे साधयेत् । निगमनाभावे वानभि-
व्यक्तसम्बन्धानां प्रतिज्ञादौनामेकार्थेन प्रवर्त्तनं तथेति प्रतिपादनं करोति । ... न चेत्स्यां हेतु-
दाहरणपरिशुद्धौ सत्यां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पात् जातिनिग्रहस्थानवङ्गत्वं
प्रक्रमते, अव्यवस्थाय खलु साध्यसाधनभावम् उदाहरणे जातिवादी प्रत्यवतिष्ठते व्यवस्थिते तु
खलु धर्मयोः साध्यसाधनभावे दृष्टान्तस्थो गृह्यमाणे साधनभूतस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वेनोपमानं न
साधर्म्यमात्रस्य न वैधर्म्यमात्रस्य वेति

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-39, pp. 34-35, published under the name of Nyāya-darśana, Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

Uddyotakara too in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-39, cites the opinion of a certain sage who held that the application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) were not separate members of a syllogism, as they served no purpose different from that of the reason and the proposition:—

उपनयनिगमने नावयवाङ्गरे चर्याविशेषात् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-39, p. 140, edited by M.M. Vindhyaśvari Prasāda, in the Bibliotheca Indica series).

The sage referred to was very probably Nāgārjuna. It is however to be noted that neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara mentions Nāgārjuna by name.

between the reason (middle term) and the predicate (major term) has been proved in the example, there is no occasion for an opponent to say that the application (*upanaya*) is a mere analogous rejoinder, because it is based not on a mere similarity or dissimilarity indicated by its particle "so" or "not so," but on the general principle established by the example.

39. VĀTSYĀYANA CRITICISES OTHER DOCTRINES OF THE BUDDHISTS.

Vijñāna-vāda—idealism.

The sūtras 4-2-26 and 4-2-27, which seem to have been interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra,¹ deal with the Buddhist doctrine of the reality of knowledge (*vijñāna*) alone, evidently taken from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra,² chapters II and X. In the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26, Vātsyāyana³ summarises the Buddhist doctrine as follows:—

Some say that things do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just as a web does not possess a reality indepen-

¹ Vātsyāyana seems here to have referred to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

बुद्धा विवेचनात् भवानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिसत्त्वपकर्षणे पटसङ्गावानुपलब्धिवत् तदनुपलब्धम् ॥

Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26, translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B.H. Series, Allahabad).

²

बुद्धा विविचयानानां स्वभावा नावधार्यते ।

यस्माद् अनभिलाष्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः ॥

(Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. II, p. 50, and chapter XI, p. 115, of the Asiatic Society of Bengal).

སྒྲོ་ཡིས་རྒྱུ་པར་གཞིགས་ན་ཡང་།

གང་ཕྱིར་རང་བཞིན་མི་རིག་སྟེ།

རེ་ཕྱིར་རེ་དག་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད།

ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་བརྟན། ॥

(Bkaḥ-gyur, Mdo, ca, folio 150, also 253).

³ The Nyāya-sūtras, 4-2-26 and 4-2-27, may be interpreted in such a way that they refer to the Mādhyamika philosophy rather than to the Yogācāra. In fact Dr. H. Jacobi J.A.O.S. for 1911, p. 29, maintains that the Yogācāra or *Vijñāna-vāda* did not commence until the 5th century A.D. when Asaṅga lived. But we should not forget that Maitreyanātha was a great expounder of *Vijñāna vāda* about 400 A.D., and that there is an exposition of it in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra about 300 A.D. I therefore conclude that though Akṣapāda (150 A.D.) was not conversant with the Yogācāra or *Vijñāna-vāda*, Vātsyāyana (about 400 A.D.) knew the doctrine and criticised it in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-2-26, 4-2-27 and 3-2-11. Dr. Sher-batski on the authority of Vācaspati and Vātsyāyana observes that the Nyāya-sūtra, 4-2-26, is directed against the school of the *Vijñāna-vādins* (J.A.O.S. for 1911, p. 5).

dent of its threads. Hence it is our thoughts alone, they say, that are real, the external things are all unreal.

Vātsyāyana controverts this Buddhist doctrine by saying that it is self-destructive, because if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be unreal and on the other hand if things are unreal they are incapable of being separated from our thoughts. The holder of the doctrine commits, according to Vātsyāyana, a contradiction by saying that things are unreal, and at the same time by going on to separate them from our thoughts.

Kṣaṇika-vāda—the Theory of Impermanence.

The sūtra 3-2-11, which refers to the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatra*) as explained in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, etc., was evidently interpolated by Vātsyāyana into the Nyāya-sūtra.¹ In his *Bhāṣya*—commentary—on the sūtra, Vātsyāyana cites the opinion of *kṣaṇik-vādins* according to whom all entities are momentary, as they exist for a moment only. We feel the momentariness of entities on seeing their growth and decay which imply production and destruction.

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 3-2-12, 3-2-13, controverts the doctrine of momentariness by saying that there is no absolute certainty for an entity to be replaced by another entity after the lapse of a moment, and that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation.²

40. VĀTSYĀYANA'S EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN DOCTRINES.

A Syllogism of Ten Members.

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-32, alludes to certain logicians according to whom a syllogism consisted of ten members as follows:—

1. Proposition (*pratijñā*).—This hill is fiery.
- Five ordinary members 2. Reason (*hetu*).—Because it is smoky.
3. Example (*udāharana*).—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen.

¹ स्फुटिकेऽपि अपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद् यत्क्षीनामहेतुः । 3-2-11.

नियमहेतुभावाद् यथादर्शनमभ्यनुज्ञा । 3-2-12.

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः । 3-2-13.

(Nyāya-sūtra, pp. 86-87, edited and translated by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, S.B.H. Series, Allahabad).

² Vide the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, chap. VI, called Kṣaṇika-parivarta, p. 99, Bengal Asiatic Society's MSS.

Cf. All is in a state of flux—Heraclitus.

4. Application (*upanaya*).—So is this hill (smoky).
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*).—Therefore this hill is fiery.
1. (a) Inquiry as to the proposition (*jijñāsā*).—Is this hill fiery
Five additional members. in all its parts, or in a particular
part?
2. (a) Questioning the reason (*saṁśaya*).—That which you call
smoke may be nothing but vapour.
3. (a) Capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion
(*śakya-prāpti*).—Is it true that smoke is always a con-
comitant of fire? In a kitchen there are of course both
smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron ball there is no
smoke.
4. (a) Purpose for drawing the conclusion (*prayojana*).—Pur-
pose consists in the determination of the true conditions
of the hill, in order to ascertain whether it is such that
one can approach it, or such that one should avoid it,
or such that one should maintain an attitude of in-
difference towards it.
5. (a) Dispelling all questions (*saṁśaya-vyudāsa*).—It is beyond
all questions that the hill is smoky, and that smoke is
an invariable concomitant of fire.

The five additional members serve no doubt to make our cognition clear, but they do not *prove* any thing. Hence they cannot, according to Vātsyāyana, be regarded as essential members or parts of a syllogism.¹

God—Īśvara.

Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-sūtra, 4-1-16, casually mentions Īśvara (God) whose nature is described by Vātsyāyana in the Nyāya-bhāṣya 4-1-21, as follows :—

God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is rich with merit, knowledge and concentration. He possesses eight supernatural powers which are the consequences of his merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to his will, produces merit in each person, and sets the earth and other elements in motion. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate the existence of Him who transcends the evidences of perception, inference and scripture?

Emancipation—mokṣa.

In the Nyāya bhāṣya, 1-1-22, there is mention of certain philosophers who maintained that in emancipation there was manifesta-

¹ Here Vātsyāyana refers perhaps to the Jaina syllogism of ten members as illustrated in the Daśavaikālika-niryukti of Bhadrabāhu who, I suppose, was a contemporary of Chandra Gupta II, called Vikramāditya, about 375 A.D. The Jain logician, Anantavīrya, in his commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra, verse 13, says that the best form of syllogism consists of ten parts, the mediocre of five parts and the worst of two parts only.

tion of eternal pleasure of the soul. They based their view on the ground that human activity being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure, it was natural that the end of such activity was the enjoyment of eternal pleasure. They also relied on the scripture-texts (*upanishads*) which, according to them, declared that absolute pleasure belonged to the soul that attained emancipation.

Vātsyāyana in the Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-22, opposed the above-mentioned philosophers by saying that emancipation or release (*mokṣa*), which was a condition of immortality freed from fear and change, was attended with a total cessation of pain, but there was no cause for production in the emancipated soul of any pleasure which was eternal. He further said that human activity was directed towards the removal of pain and not to the attainment of pleasure, which was invariably mixed up with pain and which could merely bring about bondage of an intricate form. As regards the scripture-texts, these, according to Vātsyāyana, spoke, no doubt, of the essence of soul as being pleasure, but pleasure signified nothing but perfect freedom from pain. Hence emancipation or release was not, according to him, eternal pleasure, but an absolute deliverance from pain.

41. UDDYOTAKARA, AUTHOR OF THE Nyāya-vārtikā
(ABOUT 635 A.D.).

Uddyotakara was the author of a sub-commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called the Nyāya-vārtikā.¹

The latest date assigned to Uddyotakara.

The Vāsavadattā,² an immortal work of the poet Subandhu, mentions Uddyotakara as a rescuer of the Nyāya, while the Vāsavadattā itself is mentioned in the Harṣacarita³ by Bāṇa as a classical work which humbled the pride of all previous poets. The Harṣacarita⁴ describes Bāṇa as a poet who lived at the court of King Śrī Harṣa or Harṣavardhana, and the manner in which the poet introduces himself into the work leaves no room for doubt that he was very young while his patron the king was mature in age and

1 यदक्षपादप्रतिनी भाष्यं वात्स्यायनो जगौ ।

चकारि महत्तमस्य भारद्वाजेन वार्तिकम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtikā, closing lines).

2 न्यायस्थितिनिबोधोत्तकरस्वरूपां बौद्धसंगतिमिवालङ्कार भूषिताम्...वासवदत्तां ददृश

(Vāsavadattā, p. 235, Hall's edition).

3 कवीनामगलद् दर्पो नूनं वासवदत्तया ।

शक्तेव पाण्डुपुत्राणां मया कर्णमोचरम् ॥

(Harṣa-carita, ucchvāsa I).

4 (Harṣa-carita, ucchvāsa II, p. 58. Īśvara candra Vidyāsāgara's edition).

experience. King Harṣa reigned in Thāneśvara during the whole of the period (A.D. 629–644) that the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-thsang travelled through India. This leads us to conclude that Bāṇa flourished about A.D. 635, which is the latest date that can be assigned to Uddyotakara.

In the Nyāya-vārtika Uddyotakara mentions a Buddhist treatise on Logic called the Vādavidhi¹ which seems to be only another name for the Vādanyāya by Dharmakīrti. On the other hand Dharmakīrti in his Nyāya-bindu² mentions a śāstra which evidently refers to the Nyāya-vārtika, and a śāstra-kāra who seems to be the same as Uddyotakara. Hence we conclude that Dharmakīrti³ and Uddyotakara were contemporaries who flourished about A.D. 635.

The name Bhāradvāja,⁴ as applied to Uddyotakara, is derived from the family to which he belonged, while he is called Pāsupatācārya⁵ on account of his having been a preceptor of the Pāsupata Śaiva sect.

Nothing is definitely known as to the place where Uddyotakara was born. The only place mentioned by him is Śrughna⁶ which is situated on the Western Jumna canal, 40 miles north of Thāneśvara.⁷ It seems to me that Uddyotakara, while writing

¹ यदपि वादविधौ साध्याभिधानं प्रतिज्ञेति प्रतिज्ञालक्षणसुक्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1–33, pp. 121, A.S.B.).

དམ་བཅས་པ་ཡང་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་བཞུགས་པའི་ཁྱིམ་རོ།

(Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti in *Bstan-hgyur*, *Ḥdo*, Ce, fol. 399).

It is reported that Vasubandhu too wrote a treatise called Vādavidhi, which is no longer extant.

² स्वयमिति वादिना यस्तदा साधनमाह । एतेन यद्यपि कचिच्छास्त्रे स्थितसाधनमाह । तच्छास्त्रकारेण तस्मिन् धर्मिणि...

(Nyāya-bindu, chap. III, pp. 110–11, Peterson's edition).

³ For the date of Dharmakīrti see my "Uddyotakara, a contemporary of Dharmakīrti" in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, for July 1914.

^{4, 5} इति श्री परमर्षिभारद्वाजपाश्र्पताचार्य श्रीमदुद्योतकरकृतो न्यायवार्तिके पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ।
(Nyāya-vārtika, colophon).

⁶ एष पन्थाः झुङ्गं गच्छति

(Nyāya-vārtika 1–33, p. 113, M.M. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin's edition).

⁷ It was very probably this route by which Hiuen-thsang reached Śrughna on April 1, A.D. 635. (*Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records*, pp. 186–90) Cunningham observes: "The importance of the position [of Śrughna] is shown by the fact that

the Nyāya-vārtika, resided at Thāneśvara which was connected with Śrughna by a high road. It is not unlikely that he received some time in his career patronage at the court of Thāneśvara.

42. UDDYOTAKARA'S CONTROVERSY WITH THE BUDDHISTS.

The main object which prompted Uddyotakara to write his sub-commentary was to oppose Dignāga, Nāgārjuna, and other Buddhist logicians that preceded him. This is evident from the opening lines of the Nyāya-vārtika in which he says: "Akṣa-pāda the foremost of sages propounded a śāstra (body of doctrines) for the peace of the world; and I shall write an expository treatise on it to remove the veil of error cast by quibblers."¹

Dignāga is throughout designated as *Bhadanta*² (a venerable Buddhist monk) whose definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) is criticised in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4), and whose denial of the evidences of comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) is reviewed in the same work (1-1-6, 7).

Do Buddhists deny the Soul?

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 3-1-1,³ Uddyotakara points out a certain inconsistency among the doctrines maintained by Bhadanta. Uddyotakara observes: "If you (Buddhists) say that

The Buddhistic denial of the soul criticised.

it stands on the high road leading from the Gangetic Doab, *via* Mirat, Saharanpur, and Ambala, to the Upper Panjab and commands the passage of the Jumna. By this route Mahmud of Ghazni returned from his expedition to Kanoj, by this route Timur returned from his plundering campaign at Haridwar, and by this route Baber advanced to the conquest of Delhi."

(Ancient Geography of India, p. 347).

1

यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां
शमाय शस्त्रं जगतो जगद् ।
कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः
कश्चित्ते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika, opening lines).

² अक्षो प्रमाणाभिज्ञता भदन्तस्य गवा गवयसारूप्य प्रतिपत्तेस्तु संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धं प्रतिपद्यते इति सूचार्थः

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-6, p. 61, A.S.B.).

³ न चात्मानमनभ्युपगच्छता तथागत दर्शनम् अर्थवत्तायां व्यवस्थापयितुं शक्यम्, न चेदं वचनं नास्ति सर्वाभिसमयस्तुत्रेभिधानात् । तस्माद्वास्ति आत्मेति ब्रुवाणः सिद्धान्तं बाधत इति ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 3-1-1, pp. 341-42).

there is no soul, you make an assertion contrary to your own doctrine. Your doctrine is that "I" is identical neither with *rūpa* (form) nor with *vedanā* (feeling), *saṃjñā* (sensation) *saṃskāra* (impression) and *viññāna* (knowledge). Your scripture declares: 'O monk, I am not *rūpa* nor am I *vedanā*; I am not *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* is not myself; and neither am I *viññāna*.' The "I" which is not identical with the five *skandhas* (aggregates of being) is in fact the soul. One who does not admit the soul can make no sense out of the philosophy of Tathāgata. The text quoted above about the existence of the soul cannot be denied) as it actually occurs in the Sarvābhisamaya-sūtra. It is therefore clear that if Bhāṇḍarī says, 'there is no *ātman*,' he hurts his own system."

"A further text speaking of the soul is as follows:—'I shall teach you, O Bhikṣus, the burden and the burden-bearer: the five *skandhas* are the burden, and the *pudgala* is the burden-bearer.' He who says, 'there is no *ātman*,' is a heretic."²

1 तथा भारं वो भिक्खवो देसिस्सामि भारहारं च भारः पञ्चस्कन्धा भारहारश्च पुद्गल इति ।
यच्चात्मा नास्तीति च मिथ्यादृष्टिको भवतीति सूचम् ;

भारं वो भिक्खवे देसिस्सामि। भारहारं च। कतमो भिक्खवे भारो। पञ्चपादानकखन्धा
तिस्र वचनीयम्। कतमो च भिक्खवे भारहारो। पुग्गलो तिस्र वचनीयं।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 3-1-1, p. 342, quoted from Saṃyutta nikāya part III, chap. III, p. 25, Pali Text Society's edition).

² The following correspondence, on the Buddhistic denial of the soul, quoted from the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland for 1901, pp. 307-308, and p. 573, will be read with interest:—

"*Buddhist sūtras quoted by Brāhmana authors.*

Dear Mr. Rhys Davids,—Several months ago I invited my friend Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, the joint editor of the Buddhist Text Society's Journal—whose essays are eulogised in the last Bulletin of M. Barth [of Paris]—to collect the numerous references to Buddhist sayings or tenets, scattered in the treatises of Uddyotakara, Udayana, Vācaspati Miśra, etc. I heard from the Pandita that, just at the same time, he had been urged by yourself to devote himself to that work. A few weeks ago, he sent me copious materials: their publication will, no doubt, prove itself a contribution of some importance to our knowledge of the great schools of the Mahāyāna Philosophy, and of the polemical relations between these schools and the orthodox adherents of the Darśanas.

We shall first publish, in the *Muséon*, our observations and references to the Bauddha chapter of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, without any claim to philological or historical accuracy and exhaustion of the subject—of course! We intend to show only the practicability and usefulness of such inquiries, if trained scholars would but care for it. Nevertheless, two discoveries of Professor S. C. Vidyabhusana deserve actual notice in a more *conspicuous* journal.

The first is the following:—The Śālistamba-sūtra quoted by Candrakīrti in chap. xxvi of the Madhyamakavṛtti, by Śāntideva in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, also by Prajñākaramati in the Bodhicaryāvatāraṭīkā as giving a complete *exposé* of the Pratītya-samutpāda, is quoted (without any mention of its name) with remark-

43. UDDYOTAKARA CRITICISES VASUBANDHU AND NĀGĀRJUNA.

In his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-37, Uddyotakara refers to a Buddhist philosopher (identified with Vasubandhu, who remarked that the three parts of a syllogism as defined by Akṣapāda were not so ingenious as they

The Buddhist theory of example, *dṛṣṭānta*, criticised.

able fidelity by the celebrated author of the Bhāmatī, *ad* Brahma-sūtra ii, 2, 19. Fragments of the same sūtra are to be found in the Sarvadarśana.

The second also is curious :—The sūtra of “the burden and the burden-bearer.” as well known from the Abhidharmakośa, the Bodhicaryāvatārikā, and the Tibetan authorities, was one of the most decisive authorities referred to by the “Pudgalavādins.” This very sūtra is cited by Uddyotakara against its Buddhist opponents :—“therefore, if [a Buddhist] says, ‘[there] is no *ātman*,’ he hurts [his own] system. It has been said : ‘I shall teach you, Bhikṣus, the burden and the burden-bearer : the five *skandhas* are the burden, and the *pudgala* is the burden-bearer.’ ‘Who says [there] is no *ātman* is heretic.’ Such is the sūtra.”

Are these last words authentic ?... This seems very hard ; but you know, dear Mr. Rhys Davids, that I cannot help thinking that the *pudgalavāda* is more in harmony with the *duḥkha satya* and the law of *karman* than the *nairātmyavāda*, etc....

GHEENT,

January 7, 1901.

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

THE SŪTRA OF THE BURDEN-BEARER.

WURZBURG,

April 22, 1901.

Dear Professor Rhys Davids,—It will probably not have escaped your notice that the “sūtra of the Burden and the Burden-bearer,” which Professor de la Vallée Poussin, in his letter in your last issue (p. 308), refers to as quoted by the Pudgalavādins as an authority on their side, is actually to be found in our Pāli Piṭaka, at vol. iii, p. 25, of the Saṃyutta Nikāya.

The manner in which this ancient sutta was appealed to by the opponents of the Bauddhas as being against the Bauddhas’ doctrine of the *non-ātman* is very instructive.

Far from being entitled, on the ground of this sutta, to consider the *pudgalavāda* as a genuine portion of the ancient doctrine, it is just the other way. For we have in it a proof that *puggala* in the sense of a soul (*attā*) was unknown to the author of the sutta. He uses the word quite clearly as referring simply to the five *skandhas*, and indeed states so in so many words. To him *bhāra* and *hāra*, Burden and Bearer, form one inseparable unity, and the laying down of the Burden, that is of the *skandhas*, is synonymous and simultaneous with the laying down of the Bearer (*Bhāranikkhepana* = *hāranikkhepana*).

Uddyotakara, in his use of the sutta, is guilty of what we call, in logic, a *sub reptio*.

Yours sincerely,

E. HARDY.

[From the point of view of absolute truth the soul is unreal, but from the empirical standpoint it is real. The illusory relation between the fivefold aggregate and the soul as a burden and its bearer will continue until their absorption into Śūnyatā or nirvāṇa.]

appeared.¹ Vācaspati Miśra in his Vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā² on the Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-37, quotes the same remark which he explains by saying that “here Subandhu [evidently the same as Vasubandhu] observes that the three parts of a syllogism beginning with ‘proposition’ as defined by Akṣapāda are badly confounded.” Uddyotakara does not examine the remark, but satirically says that the person from whom it emanated was a mighty logician!!! In this connection there is however an examination of the definition, given by a Buddhist logician, of an example (*drṣṭānta*)³ in which, according to him, the reason (middle term) and the predicate (major term) co-abide, e.g. in a syllogism, viz. sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot—the non-eternality and producibility co-abide in a pot. Uddyotakara asks: how can a Buddhist, a holder of the doctrine of momentariness, maintain that non-eternality (which refers to posterior non-existence) and producibility (which refers to prior non-existence) co-exist in a pot (which possesses a mere momentary existence)?

On similar grounds Uddyotakara attacks the Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna⁴, who in his *Pramāṇa-viheṭṭana* or *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana* (q.v.) defines an example as the place in which is decisively shown the relation between the reason (middle term) and its invariable companion the predicate (major term). It is impossible for a Buddhist to show the correlation of the reason (e.g. the fact that it is a product) and the predicate (e.g. non-eternality), since the two cannot, according to him, co-exist.

तदेतस्मिन्प्रवयवत्रये एवं लक्षणोपपादिते तेषां त्रयो दुर्विभावा इति । अनेन वाक्येन महानैयायिकत्वमात्मनः स्थापितं भवति ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-37, p. 139, Bibliotheca Indica series).

² अत्र सुवन्धना प्रतिज्ञादयस्त्रयोऽवयवा दुर्विहिता अक्षपादलक्षणनेत्युक्तं तद्दृश्यति ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, 1-1-37, p. 203, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

³ तथा सिद्धी दृष्टान्त इत्यन्ये ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-37, p. 139, Bibliotheca Indica series).

⁴ In the *Pramāṇa-vihetana (vidhvāṃsana)*, an example (*dṛṣṭānta*, in Tibetan : dpe) is defined by Nāgārjuna thus:—

དཔེ་ཆེས་པ་ནི་གཏན་མོགས་ཀྱི་ལྷོགས་ཁྲུམ་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པའི་གཞིར་འདོད་ལ།

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 417).

Uddyotakara opposes the above definition as follows :—

एतेन तयोः सम्बन्धि निदर्शनं दृष्टान्त इति प्रत्युक्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-37, pp. 139-140, edited by M. M. Vindhyeśvarī Prasād in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

44. UDDYOTAKARA CRITICISES DIGNĀGA.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika¹ mentions a Buddhist logician Bhadanta (same as Dignāga)² who defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a knowledge which is free from reflection (*kalpanā*),³ that is, which is not connected with a name or genus. Perception is in fact a pure sense-knowledge which is not expressed by a name or specified by a genus, which is specific in itself and cognised by itself.

This definition of perception is declared by Uddyotakara to be absurd. If a certain knowledge were not expressible by a name, how could it be called perception? The word perception would be meaningless if the knowledge corresponding to it were not capable of being expressed by a name. In the same way if perception referred to a specific individual (*svarūpa*) and not to a genus, it could not, according to Uddyotakara, be grasped in our mind and expressed to our fellowmen, since our cognition of an object invariably assumes a generic form.

¹ अपरे तु मन्यन्ते प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोदमिति । अथ केयं कल्पना नाम जातियोजनेति । यत् किल न नामाभिधीयते न च जात्यादिभिर्व्यपदिश्यते विषयस्वरूपानुविधायि परिच्छेदक-मात्मसंबोधं तत् प्रत्यक्षमिति ।..... अथास्य वाक्यस्य कोऽर्थो यदि प्रत्यक्षं व्याघातः कथं प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोदमिति चानेन वाक्येनाभिधीयते न चाभिधेयमिति कोऽन्यो भदन्तादन्तुमर्हति ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-4, pp. 44-45, Bibliotheca Indica series).

² Vācaspati Miśra in his gloss on the above observes:—

संप्रति दिग्भागस्य लक्षणं सुपन्यस्यति अपरे इति

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā, 1-1-4, p. 102, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

³ Vācaspati and Jayanta observe that *kalpanā*, reflection, is the connection of an object with its adjuncts enumerated below:—

- (1) Name (*nāma*), e.g. dittha, etc.
- (2) Genus (*jāti*), e.g. cow, etc.
- (3) Quality (*guṇa*), e.g. dark, etc.
- (4) Action (*kriyā*), e.g. walking, etc.
- (5) An adventitious entity (*dravya*), e.g. a load (on the back), etc.

A knowledge unconnected with any of these adjuncts is perception. For instance, our perception of an individual cow consists of a specific knowledge into which the name, genus, etc., of the individual cow do not enter.

Cf. पञ्च चैताः कल्पना भवन्ति जातिकल्पना गुणकल्पना क्रियाकल्पना नामकल्पना द्रव्यकल्पना चेति ।

(Jayanta's Nyāya-mañjarī, chapter II, p. 93, edited by Gaṅgādhara Sastri, Vizianagaram, Sanskrit series; compare also Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā, 1-1-4, p. 102, edited by Gaṅgādhara Sāstri, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

The word *kalpanā* seems to have been used in a different sense by Dignāga (q.v.). The idea of genus (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), and name (*nāma*) was derived from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali.

45. UDDYOTAKARA'S EXPLANATION OF PERCEPTION.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*), as defined by Akṣapāda, is knowledge which is produced by the intercourse of a sense with its object.

The *intercourse* (*sannikarṣa*), which is of six kinds, is explained in the Nyāya-vārtika (1-1-4) of Uddyotakara as follows:—

- (1) Conjunction (*saṃyoga*)—e.g. a jar is perceived through its conjunction with our eye.
- (2) Conjoined-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the colour of a jar there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which colour inheres.
- (3) Conjoined-inherent inherence (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*)—e.g. in perceiving the generic nature of the colour (colourness) there is conjunction of our eye with the jar in which inheres colour wherein again colourness is inherent.
- (4) Inherence (*samavāya*)—e.g. we perceive sound which inheres in our ear-cavity.
- (5) Inherent-inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*)—e.g. we perceive soundness (the generic nature of sound) which inheres in sound which in its turn is inherent in our ear-cavity.
- (6) Qualification or particularity (*viśeṣanā*)—e.g. we perceive the non-existence of a thing through the particularisation of the spot which the thing could occupy on earth.

46. UDDYOTAKARA'S DEFINITION OF INFERENCE.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, defines inference¹ (*anumāna*) as that knowledge which is preceded by perception of the reason (middle term) and remembrance of its invariable concomitance with the predicate (major term). For an instance, I perceive that this hill has smoke which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this hill has fire. The form of inference is as follows:—

- (1) Whatever is smoky is fiery.
- (2) This hill is smoky.
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery.

Inference is divided by Uddyotakara as (1) exclusively—affirmative (*anvayī*), (2) exclusively—negative (*vyatirekī*), and (3) affirmative-negative (*anvaya-vyatirekī*). Exclusively—affirmative is the inference in which the middle term abides in the major term as well as in things homogeneous with it, there being nothing which is heterogeneous from the major term, e.g. this is nameable, because it is

¹ कृत्यनुमद्वैतो लिङ्गपरामर्शानुमानम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-5, p. 47, M.M. Vindheśvarī Prasada's edition).

Inference is *liṅga-parāmarśa* (a syllogism from sign) as aided by remembrance.

knowable. Exclusively—negative is the inference in which the middle term abides in the minor term alone, there being nothing else in which that term is known to be present, e.g. the earth is different from other elements, because it possesses smell. Affirmative—negative is the inference in which the middle term, while abiding in things homogeneous with the major term, does not abide in any thing heterogeneous from the same, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is cognised by our senses.

47. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE.

The signification of letters.

If a word is a mere combination of letters, how do we cognise a thing on hearing the word?

Uddyotakara in his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sūtra, 2-2-55, says

How does a word signify a thing?

The Nyāya theory of Uddyotakara.

we become cognisant of a thing on hearing the last letter of its corresponding word as aided by the recollection of the preceding letters, i.e. when we hear the last letter, there

is a collective recollection of all the previous letters. For instance, the word "cow" cannot present to us any thing until we have heard its last letter, viz. *w*, as aided by our recollection of the preceding letters, viz. *c* and *o*. The letters *c*, *o* and *w* by a conventional association produce in us the cognition of the thing called cow. This is the way in which things are signified by letters or rather words composed of letters, in accordance with the Nyāya philosophy followed by Uddyotakara.

Sphoṭa-vāda—the doctrine of phonetic explosion.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-55, alludes, however,

A rival theory.
Sphoṭa the outburst of a conglomerate sound.

to certain sages who held that things could not be signified by letters. These sages, as pointed out by Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-ṭikā, 2-2-55, were sup-

porters of *sphoṭa-vāda*, the theory of phonetic explosion. According to them, a thing is not signified by letters—no matter whether the letters are taken in their separate or collective form. No single letter of a word can produce cognition of a thing corresponding to the word. Neither *c* nor *o* nor *w* as separated from one another can produce in us the cognition of a thing called cow. The letters in their collective form too cannot produce the cognition, because each letter, as soon as it is pronounced, perishes and does not continue long to form a whole word. *C*, *o* and *w* not being able to exist simultaneously cannot produce the cognition of a cow.

We cannot also, they say, derive the cognition of a thing from a word on hearing its last letter as aided by the recollection of the preceding letters, because the recollection of letters can bring about only the *letters*, but not the *things* corresponding to them. Yet nobody can deny that on hearing the word "cow" we become cognisant of the thing called "cow." Hence there must be something over and above the letters which produces the cognition of the thing. This something is a conglomerate sound which bursts out after each letter has been uttered. It is distinct from the letters but revealed by them. This outburst of a conglomerate sound, that is, of a word as a whole, is called *sphoṭa*, which literally signifies an explosion of sounds. When we utter the first letter of a word there is revelation of the *sphoṭa*, which becomes more and more explicit along with the utterance of the following letters, until at last we become cognisant of the thing signified by the word.

Apoha—negation of the opposite.

In the Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-65, Uddyotakara mentions the
 Does a word denote
apoha, exclusion?
 Buddhists who hold that what forms the
 denotation of a word is really *apoha*,¹ ex-
 clusion of the opposites. A word bears, ac-
 cording to them, a denotation of exclusion; that is, it denotes ex-
 clusion of what is denoted by other words. Thus the denotation
 of a cow is the exclusion of the denotation of a non-cow, that is, a
 cow is that which is not a non-cow. This theory is controverted
 by Uddyotakara on the ground (1) that we cannot conceive of a
 negative denotation, that is, the denotation of exclusion, unless we
 have previously conceived of a denotation of a positive character,
 e.g. a man can form no idea of a non-cow until he has formed the
 idea of a cow from which the former idea is to be excluded, and
 if he has already conceived of the denotation of a cow, there is no
 necessity for a further denotation of exclusion; (2) though in
 the case of two opposite (contradictory) words the denotation of
 one word may exclude that of the other, the exclusion will not be
 possible in the case of such a word as "all" which has nothing to
 exclude.

48. UDDYOTAKARA'S THEORY OF SUFFERINGS.

Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-1, says that pain or
 Channels of sufferings. suffering (*duḥkha*) is of twenty-one kinds,
 viz. (1) the body, (2-7) the six senses (the

¹ For a full criticism of the Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine of *apoha* consult the Nyāya-mañjarī, chapter VI. Cf. also Nyāya-vārtika, 2-2-65, Bibliotheca Indica, Mīmāṃsā-vārtika, and Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra of Kaṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind), (8-13) the six objects of sense (colour, sound, odour, flavour, touch and desire, etc.), (14-19) the six cognitions (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental), (20) pleasure, and (21) pain. Of these the body is regarded as "pain" because it is the abode of all painful experiences; the senses, objects and cognitions are called "pains," because they constitute the channels through which pain reaches us; pleasure is designated as pain because it is always accompanied by the latter; and pain is by its very nature painful.

49. VĀCASPATI MIŚRA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA-
TĀTPARYA-ṬIKĀ
(ABOUT 841 A.D.).

Dharmakīrti and several other Buddhist logicians¹ having compiled treatises subversive of the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, a Brāhmaṇa logician of great erudition named Vācaspati Miśra wrote, in support of the Brāhmaṇa commentators, an elaborate gloss on the Nyāya-vārtika called the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā.²

Vācaspati, who is reputed to be a native of Mithilā (modern Darbhanga in North Behar), must have flourished in the ninth century A.D., as he compiled his Nyāya-sūci-nibandha³ in the year 898, which evidently refers to the *saṃvat* era and corresponds to 841 A.D. He preceded the Buddhist logician Ratnakīrti⁴ (about 1000 A.D.) who quotes him.

¹ यद्यपि भाष्यकृता कृतव्युत्पादनमेतत् तथापि दिङ्नाग प्रभृतिभिरर्वाचीनैः कुहेतुसन्तमस-
समुत्थापनेनाच्छादितं शास्त्रं न तत्त्वनिर्णयाय पर्याप्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, opening lines, edited by M.M. Gaṅgadhar Sastri in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

² In order to prevent interpolations into the Nyāya-sūtra, Vācaspati compiled an Index of the sūtras of the work called Nyāya-sūci-nibandha.

³ न्याय सुचीनिबन्धोऽसावकारि सुधियां सुदे ।

श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रेण वस्तुवस्तुवस्तु ।

(Nyāya-sūci-nibandha, colophon).

The year 898, if it refers to the *saṃvat* era, corresponds to 841 A.D., but if it refers to the śaka era, corresponds to 976 A.D.

⁴ Apoha-siddhi, p. 7; Kṣaṇabhāṅga-siddhi, p. 58 (included in Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by H. P. Shāstri).

Vācaspati Mīśra, whose patron was king Nṛga,¹ received instruction in philosophy from a teacher named Trilocana.² Vācaspati plainly admits that his explanation of *pratyakṣa* (perception), in so far as it refers to its division into *savikalpaka* (the determinate), and *nirvikalpaka* (the indeterminate), is derived neither from the commentary of Vātsyāyana nor from the sub-commentary of Uddyotakara, but reflects directly the teaching of his preceptor Trilocana. This Trilocana, evidently a writer on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, must have flourished before 1000 A.D. when his doctrines of generality³ (*samavāya*) and causality⁴ (*kārya*, *sahakārikāraṇa*), etc., were criticised by the Buddhist logician Ratnakīrti the famous author of *Apoha-siddhi* and *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*. Rājāśekhara (about 917 A.D.) mentions Trilocana⁵ to whom is ascribed a poem called *Pārtha-vijaya*.

Vācaspati Mīśra's *Nyāya-kaṇikā*,⁶ a work on logic, is not now available. He is said to have written commentaries on the works of all the schools of philosophy. His commentary on the *Vedānta-bhāṣya* called *Bhāmātī-ṭīkā* and that on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* called *Sāṅkhya-*

1 नरेश्वरा यच्चरितानुकारम् इच्छन्ति कर्तुं न च पारयन्ति ।
तस्मिन् महीपे महनीयकौर्त्तौ श्रीमद्भगोऽकारि मया निबन्धः ॥
(Bhāmātī, last line).

अस्माभिः

2 त्रिलोचनं गुरुस्त्रीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः ।
यथामानं यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमौदृशम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā, 1-1-4, p. 87, M.M. Gangadhar Sastri's edition).

3 यत् त्रिलोचनः । अत्र त्वं गोलादौना सामान्यविशेषाणां स्थायये समवायः सामान्यम्

(Ratnakīrti's *Apoha-siddhi*, p. 13, included in the "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts," edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Shastri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

4 त्रिलोचनस्याप्ययं संचिन्तार्यः । कार्यमेव हि सहकारिणमपैक्षते । न कार्योत्पत्तिहेतुः ।

(Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*, p. 58, included in the "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts").

⁵ The following stanza, which is said to belong to the *Sūkti-muktāvalī* of Rājāśekhara, refers to Trilocana:—

कर्तुं त्रिलोचनादन्यः कः पार्थ विजयं त्वमः ।

तदर्थः शक्यते द्रष्टुं लोचनद्वयिभिः कथम् ॥

Who else but Trilocana is able to compose a *Pārtha-vijaya*? How can its purport be perceived by the two-eyed? [It took a three-eyed *Trilocana* to compose the poem, how can a two-eyed mortal understand it?]

(Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra, Introduction, p. 53, Columbia University series, edited by Dr. G. P. Quackenbos).

⁶ Mentioned in the *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā*, p. 395, Vizianagram Sanskrit series.

tattva-kaumudī occupy a most important place in the philosophical literature of India. Being equally at home in all the systems of philosophy and yet following no one of them as his own, Vācaspati was designated as *Sarva-tantra-svatantra*, "master of all systems but reliant on no one of them in particular."

In the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā Vācaspati mentions four schools of Buddhist philosophy,¹ viz. the Mādhyamika, Vijñāna-vāda, Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika including the doctrine of the Vātsīputriya sect; and repeatedly criticises Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.²

50. VĀCASPATI OPPOSES DIGNĀGA.

Vācaspati Miśra, in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, criticises the definition of the analogue called "balancing the effect," *kārya-sama*, as given by the Buddhist logician Dignāga, about 500 A D.³ "Balancing the effect"⁴ is defined by Dignāga as an opposition which one offers by showing that the effect referring to the subject is different from the one referring to the example.

For instance, a disputant argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of exertion,
like a pot.

His respondent opposes this argument by saying that no conclusion can be drawn from it, because a sound is not an effect of exertion of the same kind as a pot, the former being caused by a vibration of winds, but the latter by a lump of clay. This sort of futile opposition is, according to Dignāga, signified by the analogue called "balancing the effect."

Vācaspati⁵ controverts Dignāga by saying that the latter's

¹ Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 1-1-23; 1-2-1; 3-1-1; 4-1-33; 4-2-35, etc.

² Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 1-1-1; 1-1-4; 1-1-5; 1-1-6; 1-1-8; 5-2-5, etc.

³ Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 5-1-37, pp. 488-489, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series, where Dignāga is called Bhadanta.

⁴ Dignāga defines *kārya-sama* (balancing the effect) as follows:—

कार्यत्वान्यत्वयोरेव यत् साध्यासिद्धिदर्शनम् ।

तत् कार्यसमम् ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap. VI, quoted by Vācaspati).

⁵ The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

འགྲུལ་འབྲས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ཡིས་ནི།

བསྐྱེད་བྱ་མ་གྱུ་བ་པར་མཐོང་གང་།

དེ་ནི་འགྲུལ་མཐོང་ས་འདི་ཡང་ནི།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap. VI, Tshad-ma-kun-las-btuṅ-pa, chap. VI, Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 13).

definition of "balancing the effect" is untenable, inasmuch as an effect of exertion, in so far as it signifies "coming into a state of existence from that of non-existence," is exactly the same in the case of a sound as in that of a pot. Moreover, if Dignāga's definition were accepted, then the Buddhistic denial of a Maker of the universe would be futile.

Those who believe in God argue as follows :—

The universe has a Maker,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

If Dignāga were to oppose this argument by saying that the universe is not a product of the same kind as a pot, his opposition, continues Vācaspati, would constitute an analogous rejoinder called "balancing the effect." In fact Vācaspati prefers the definition of "balancing the effect" as given by Akṣapāda¹ (q.v.) according to whom an effect of exertion, even when it refers to the subject alone, may be of diverse kinds.

51. VĀCASPATI CRITICISES DHARMAKĪRTI.

In the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā Vācaspati says that according to the Buddhist logician Kīrti (Dharmakīrti about 635 A.D.) there are only two kinds² of the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), which occur respectively (1) when one adduces a reason which is not a proper one (*asādhanaṅga-vacana*), and (2) when one alleges defect in that where there is really no defect (*adoṣodbhāvana*). It is not, continues Kīrti, proper to say that there are twenty-two varieties of the point of defeat inasmuch as all these are included in the two main kinds just mentioned.

Vācaspati controverts the above criticism by saying that sage Akṣapāda too laid down two kinds of the point of defeat which occur respectively (1) when one misunderstands an argument (*Vipratipatti*) or (2) does not understand it at all (*apratipatti*). While in respect of the division of the point of defeat into two

Kīrti or Dharmakīrti gives a similar definition :—

साध्येनानुगमात् कार्यसामान्येनापि साधने ।

संबन्धिभेदाद् भेदोक्तिर्दोषः कार्यसमो मतः ॥

(Quoted by Vācaspati in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 5-1-37).

¹ Nyāya-sūtra, 5-1-37.

² Vācaspati says :—According to Dharmakīrti there are twenty-two varieties of *nigrahasthāna* which come under two main heads.

आह :—

असाधनाङ्गवचनमदोषोद्भावनं द्वयोः ।

निग्रहस्थानत्वमन्यतु न युक्तमिति-तान् प्रति आह ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 5-2-1, p. 492, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

kinds, the view of Dharmakīrti does not differ from that of Akṣapāda, the two kinds as laid down by the latter are clearer than those laid down by the former. For instance, non-ingenuity (*apratibhāna*), which consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply, is recognized as a point of defeat, but it is included rather in the two kinds of the point of defeat laid down by Akṣapāda than in those laid down by Kīrti.¹ A person defeated on the score of non-ingenuity may remain speechless or may talk irrelevantly. This speechlessness (*tūṣṇīmbhāva*) and irrelevant talk (*pralapita*) are not new points of defeat, although they are recognized as such by Kīrti.

Kīrti further observed that "renouncing the proposition" (*pratijñā-samnyāsa*) as a point of defeat, is identical with a fallacy of reason (*hetvābhāṣa*), because it involves a reason which is uncertain. Vācaspati opposes him by saying that the uncertainty of reason being pointed out after the proposition has been renounced, the point of defeat must in this case be designated as "renouncing the proposition."²

Considering their special characters even Dharmakīrti³ admits that there are twenty-two varieties of the point of defeat.

52. VĀCASPATI'S EXPLANATION OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE PERCEPTIONS, *Savikalpaka* AND *Nirvikalpaka*.

Vācaspati⁴ following his preceptor Trilocana⁵ divides perception into two kinds, viz. determinate or mediate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate or immediate (*nirvikalpaka*). The determinate

¹ Jayanta similarly observes :—

अथ कौर्त्तिराह द्वाविंशतिधा नियहस्थानानि विभज्यन्ते... ..

(Nyāya-mañjarī, āhnika 12, p. 639, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

² Vācaspati says :—

तस्माद् यदुक्तं कौर्त्तिना किमिदानीं हेत्वाभासादुत्तरप्रतिज्ञासंन्यायापेक्षया तस्य प्रति-
वादिनो हेत्वाभास एव आद्यं नियहस्थानमिति तदपास्तम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, 5-2-5, p. 499, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

³ Jayanta says :—

एतेषां धर्मकौर्त्तेरपि च न विमतिर्नियहस्थानतायाम् ।

(Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 659, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

⁴ Vācaspati writes :—

अवसायात्मकपदं साक्षात् सविकल्पकस्य वाचकं, तथाहि अवसायो विनिश्चयो विकल्प इत्यनर्थान्तरम् । स एव आत्मा रूपं यस्य तत् सविकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षम् । तदेतदतिस्पृष्टत्वात् शिष्टैर्गम्यते एव इति भाष्यवार्तिककाराभ्याम् अव्याख्यातम् ।

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, p. 87).

अस्माभि स्तिलोचनगुरुद्वीतमार्गानुगमनोक्तैः ।

यथामात्रं यथावत् आख्यातमिदमौदशम् ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā, p. 87).

is knowledge which admits of specification : it is the knowledge of an object as particularised by its genus, etc., e.g. this is a *man* (an individual coming under the genus 'man'). The indeterminate perception on the contrary is that knowledge which admits of no specification : it is the knowledge of an object derived through its first intercourse with one of our senses, e.g. this is *something*.

Vācaspati further observes that the doctrine of determinate and indeterminate perceptions is very easy to comprehend, and has not on that account been explained by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* or *Uddyotakara* in his *Vārtika*. The *Niruktakāras*¹ who flourished before Vācaspati used the term *nirvikalpaka*, but they explained it as the knowledge of an object in which its general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) features were combined. Vācaspati controverts the view of the *Niruktakāras* by saying that if, in the *nirvikalpaka* stage, an object were to combine in itself its general and particular attributes, how could, in the *savikalpaka* stage, the two, viz. the general and the particular, be separated so that one might be predicated of the other in the form, "this (particular) is man (general)."

53. VĀCASPATI'S THEORY OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE AND WRONG KNOWLEDGE (*Pramā* AND *Apramā*).

Right knowledge (*Pramā* or *tattva-jñāna*) defined in the *Nyāya-vārtika*, 1-1-2, is the knowledge of a thing as it is, while wrong knowledge or error (*apramā*, *bhrama* or *mithyā-jñāna*) is the knowledge of a thing as it is not.

There are conflicting theories as to the exact nature of the wrong knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā*, 1-1-2, mentions five different theories which may be summarised as follows :—

- (1) *Ātma-khyāti* (manifestation of the self)—is a wrong knowledge in which our cognition, which exists in our mind alone, manifests itself as a thing existing outside of us. The *Yogācāra* Buddhists, who follow this theory, say that our cognition (or knowledge) alone is real, and its manifestation as external objects is a wrong knowledge.

¹ यथाह निरुक्तकाराः । निर्विकल्पकबोधेन दृष्टावकस्यापि वस्तुनो प्रदर्शनम् । तथा—

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मेर्जात्यादिर्भिर्यथा ।

बुद्ध्यावसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥

(*Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā*, p. 89, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara did not treat of the doctrine of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The *Niruktakāras* who treated them cannot be identified. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Mīmāṃsā-vārtika* (about 630 A.D.), was perhaps the earliest writer who dealt with the doctrine.

- (2) *Asat-khyāti* (manifestation of the unreal)—is a wrong knowledge in which a thing, which is non-existent or unreal, manifests itself as existent or real, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The piece of silver, being non-existent or unreal, its manifestation is a wrong knowledge. The Mādhyamika Buddhists, who hold this theory, say that all are void and the manifestation to us of our internal states and the external objects is a wrong knowledge.
- (3) *Anirvacanīya-khyāti* (manifestation of the undefinable)—is a wrong knowledge in which a thing manifests itself in such a way that we cannot define it either as existent or as non-existent, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver, our knowledge is neither that of a piece of silver (which is not present) nor that of a piece of non-silver (there being an apparent presence of a piece of silver), but that of a thing the nature of which we cannot define. The Advaita-vedāntins, who hold this theory, say that if we regard the external things as real, it will be a wrong knowledge, inasmuch as the things are undefinable, that is, neither do they possess a real existence nor are they devoid of an empirical or apparent existence.
- (4) *A-khyāti* (non-manifestation)—is knowledge in which the difference of one thing (subject) from another thing (predicate) is not manifested on account of certain defects of our senses, etc., and owing to this non-manifestation we say that the one (subject) is identical with the other (predicate), e.g. when a piece of shell is supposed by us to be a piece of silver, in the form "this is silver," there are *perception* of "this" (shell) and *recollection* of "silver" together with a non-manifestation of their difference caused by the defects of our senses, etc. This theory is upheld by the Prābhākaras.
- (5) *Anyathā-khyāti* (a converse manifestation)—is a wrong knowledge in which one thing is mistaken for another thing on the perception of those properties of the first thing which are possessed in common by the second thing, and a thing possessed of these common properties is particularised not as the first thing (whose special properties are not, owing to certain defects of our senses, etc., cognised by us), but as the second thing which presents itself to our recollection at the time, e.g. when a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver in the form "this is silver," the properties common to both (shell and silver), are supposed, by the person who commits the mistake, to abide not in "this" (shell), but in "silver" which he remembers at the time. This theory is propounded by the Naiyāyikas.

In a wrong knowledge when a person mistakes one thing (e.g. a shell) for any other thing (e.g. a piece of silver), there is an actual

perception, through imagination (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*), of that "other thing," because if he had not perceived it at all, he would not have exerted himself to pick it up. In fact when our mistake is discovered we remember that we actually perceived the thing. Hence the only rational theory, according to Vācaspati Miśra, is that of *anyathākhyāti* which satisfactorily explains the origination of wrong knowledge.

53a. VĀCASPATI'S THEORY OF Condition (*upādhi*).

Vācaspati Miśra, in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, 1-1-1, says that an inference is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its middle term with the major term. Now, what is the nature of this invariable concomitance? The Buddhists say that the middle term is in invariable concomitance with the major term, if the former stand to the latter in causal relation (*kārya-kāraṇa*) or the relation of identity (*svabhāva*).

Seeing that the Buddhistic definition is too narrow and too wide, Vācaspati sets it aside by saying that the invariable concomitance is that relation of the middle term with the major term which is freed from all conditions (*upādhi*). A condition is illustrated in the following inference:—

The hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire.

This is a wrong inference, because smoke always accompanies fire, but fire does not always accompany smoke.

The inference will, however, be right if we attach a condition to its middle term in the following way:—

The hill is full of smoke.
because it is full of fire (fed by wet fuel).

Here 'wet fuel' is a condition (*upādhi*), which is attached to the middle term 'fire.' A fire by itself may not always accompany smoke, but when it is fed by wet fuel it is always attended by the same.

This kind of condition should not qualify the middle term, which must be perfectly free from all conditions. If an inference is to be right, a disputant must remove from it all conditions which are suspected (*sāṅkita*) by himself or with which he is charged (*samāropita*) by his opponent.

53b. THE THEORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT (*kārya-kāraṇa*).

In the *Nyāya-kanikā* as also in the *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, 3-2-17, Vācaspati Miśra criticises, on one hand, those who hold that an effect (*kārya*) springs up from nothing (*asataḥ sajjāyate*) and, on the other hand, the *sāṃkhyas* who hold that an

effect pre-exists in its cause (*sataḥ sajjāyate*). He expounds the doctrine of the Naiāyikas that an effect does not pre-exist in its cause, but that from a cause something originates which did not exist before such origination.

53c. THE BUDDHIST AND JAINA SCRIPTURES CONDEMNED.

Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā*, 2-2-68, says that the author of the Brāhmaṇic scripture is God, while that of the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures is Buddha and Ṛṣabhadeva. While our God is omniscient and all-powerful, Buddha and Ṛṣabhadeva are not so. How can we then place any confidence in the latter? While the Brāhmaṇic scripture legislates for men divided into four classes and passing through four stages of life, the scriptures of the Buddhists and Jainas do not concern themselves much with the regulation of practical life. At the dissolution of the world the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures will disappear, while the tradition of the Brāhmaṇic scriptures will be kept up by God.

54. UDAYANĀCĀRYA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA-TĀTPARYA-ṬIKĀ-PARIŚUDDHI (984 A.D.).

Vācaspati Miśra was criticised by a host of Buddhist logicians, and it was to vindicate him against their attacks that Udayanācārya or Udayakara, a Brahmana logician of Mithilā, wrote a sub-gloss on Vācaspati's work called the *Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-ṭikā-pariśuddhi*.¹ He wrote several other works such as the *Kusumāñjali*, *Ātma-tattva-viveka*,² *Kiraṇāvalī* and *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa* (also called *Bodha-siddhi* or *Bodha-suddhi*).

¹ The *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā-pariśuddhi* embodies elaborate notes on the *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā* of Vācaspati Miśra whose words Udayana proposes to elucidate by the grace of the Goddess of Speech, thus:—

मातः सरस्वति पुनः पुनरेष नला
बद्धाञ्जलिः किमपि विज्ञपयाम्यवेदि ।
वाक्चेतसोर्मम तथा भव सावधाना
वाचस्पते वचसि न स्खलतो यथैवे ॥

(*Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā-pariśuddhi*, 1-1-1, edited by M.M. Vindhyesvari Prasad Dvivedin and M.M. Lakshman Śāstri, in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series.

² बद्धतर परतन्त्र प्रान्तर ध्वान्तभौत खिमित पथिकरक्षा सार्धवाहेन यत्नात् ।

इदमुदय करेण न्याय लोका गमानां व्यतिवृत्तिमवधूय व्यक्षितं वर्त्म सुप्तेः ॥

(*Ātma-tattva-viveka*, last lines).

Udayana, better known as Ācārya, was the author of another work called *Lakṣaṇāvalī*,¹ in the introduction to which he says that he composed the book in the Śaka year 906 corresponding to A.D. 984. He was born in Mañ-roni, a village 20 miles north of Darbhanga in Mithilā on the east bank of the river Kamalā.

His place and time.

55. UDAYANA COMBATS THE BUDDHISTS.

It is said of Udayana that he frequently defeated the Buddhists² in religious discussions, but the latter did not admit his victory over them. Udayana's victory over the Buddhists causes his death. One day, there was a very hot contest between him and the Buddhists on the question of the existence of God. Not being able to make them believe in God by arguments, Udayana ascended the top of a hill, taking a Brāhmaṇa and a Śramaṇa (Buddhist) with him. He hurled both of them down from the top of the hill. When falling down on the ground, the Brāhmaṇa cried aloud 'there is God,' while the Śramaṇa exclaimed 'there is no God.' It so happened that the Śramaṇa died of the fall, while the Brāhmaṇa came to the ground unhurt. This fact was considered as a convincing proof of the existence of God.

Udayana gained victory but was blamed as a murderer. Becoming penitent, he proceeded to the temple of Jagannātha at Purī. After he had lived there for three days and three nights, he was told in a dream that Jagannātha would not appear before him until he was cleansed of his sin, by performing the penitentiary rites of *tusānala* at Benares. Accordingly he went to that city, where he put an end to his life by *tusānala*, i.e. by burning himself in a slow fire. It is said that Udayana was not pleased with the decision of Jagannātha, as that deity did not show any mercy towards him in consideration of the services he had rendered to maintain his glorious existence. Udayana, while dying, thus addressed Jagannātha:—

"Proud of thy prowess thou despisest me—upon whom thy existence depended when the Buddhists reigned supreme!"³

1

तर्काम्बराङ्ग प्रमितेष्वातीतेषु शकान्तः ।
वर्षेष्टदयनश्चक्रे सुबोधां लक्षणावलीम् ॥

(*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, colophon).

² *Vide* my article on "Buddhism in India" in the Journal, Buddhist Text Society, part I, 1896.

3

येष्वर्थमद मत्तः सन् आत्मानमवमन्यसे ।
पुनर्बौद्धे समायाते मदधौना तव स्थितिः ॥

56. UDAYANA OPPOSES KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA AND DHARMOTTARA.

Kalyāṇa Rakṣita (about 829 A.D) and Dharmottarācārya (about 847 A.D), two Buddhist logicians whose accounts will be given hereafter, were opposed by Udayanācārya. The arguments advanced by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita in his *Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā* to refute the existence of God were controverted by Udayana in his *Kuṣumāñjali*. In the *Ātma-tattva-viveka* Udayana criticised the theories of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* (the momentary existence), *śrutyaprāmāṇya* (denial of the authority of the Veda), etc., propounded by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita in his *Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā*, *śruti-parīkṣā*, etc., and by Dharmottara in his *Apoha-nāma-prakaraṇa* and *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi*.

57. UDAYANA'S KUṢUMĀÑJALI.

God—*Īśvara*.

The *Kuṣumāñjali* (literally “a handful of flowers”), which is divided into five chapters called clusters, treats of the supreme soul (*Paramātmā*) or God (*Īśvara*) whose worship enables us, according to Udayana, to attain paradise and emancipation. “Although all men worship Him alike under various names, there is,” says he, “no harm in carrying on a logical investigation about Him which may also be called His worship.”

In the course of the investigation, Udayana says that there is an unseen cause called desert (*adrṣṭa*)¹ which determines our happiness and misery. When we perform a good or bad action, the merit or demerit that ensues therefrom resides in our soul under the name of *adrṣṭa* or desert. Associated with a suitable time, place and object, it produces in us pleasure or pain. Since a non-intelligent cause cannot produce its effect without the superintendence of an intelligent spirit, it is to be admitted that there is a Supreme Agent called the All-powerful God who bestows on us pleasure and pain as the effects of our desert.

¹ That there is an unseen cause called *adrṣṭa* (desert) is proved on the following grounds:—

(a) An effect proceeds from a cause. If there had been no interdependence of a cause and its effect, the latter would have been found everywhere and always. But an effect is only occasional and hence it is dependent on a cause. Our happiness and misery are dependent on a cause called *adrṣṭa*.

(b) A cause again is only an effect in relation to its preceding cause, which is linked with another cause and so on. The world having no beginning, the succession of cause and effect is eternal like a continued series of seed and plant. The desert on which our happiness and misery depend cannot also be traced to its first beginning.

Some people deny God, relying merely on the efficacy of sacrifices, etc., enjoined by the Veda. Udayana asks them: whence does the Veda derive its authority? The Veda is certainly not eternal, as everything in the world is subject to creation and destruction. Non-eternal as it is, it cannot be a source of right knowledge unless we suppose its author to be an infallible person. That person is God. Those who deny God, do thereby overthrow the authority of the Veda.

Some say that there is no God, as we do not perceive Him. Udayana silences them by stating that the non-perception of an object can prove its non-existence only if the object is one which is ordinarily perceptible. God is not ordinarily perceptible, and hence our non-perception of Him does not prove His non-existence.

It has been contended that God is no authority to us, inasmuch as He does not possess right knowledge. A right knowledge, nay, knowledge of any kind, concerns itself with an object unknown before. God's knowledge, which is not limited by time and space, cannot come under this description because it never refers to an object previously unknown. Udayana meets the contention by saying that the description of right knowledge cited above is incorrect. A right knowledge should, in his opinion, be defined as an independent apprehension which corresponds to its object in the external world. God is the source of such knowledge and is therefore the supreme authority to us.

There are many proofs to establish the existence of God. The earth being a product like a pot must have a maker. The maker must be an intelligent being possessing a will to bring atoms together and to support them. That intelligent being is God. It is He who introduced the traditional arts such as carpentry, weaving, etc., which have come down to us from time immemorial.

(c) The effects which are diverse in character imply a diversity of causes. As our happiness and misery are diverse in character, we cannot say that God or nature alone is their cause. They must be due to the diversity of our deserts.

(d) It is a universal practice to perform good actions and avoid bad actions as the means of gaining happiness and avoiding misery. The actions themselves disappear, but they leave behind them certain traces which operate in bringing about happiness and misery. The trace of a good action is called merit while that of a bad action is called demerit and the two together are called desert (*adrṣṭa*). The desert resides in (the soul of) the person who performs an action and not in the thing from which he derives happiness or misery.

The above reasons are summarised thus:—

सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वाद् वैचित्र्याद् विशद्वह्नितः ।

प्रत्यात्मनियमाद् भुक्तेरलि हेतुरलौकिकः ॥

(Kusumāñjali, stavaka I).

God having made this world causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it remakes it as a magic-show. His will manifests itself unhindered in all actions

Perceiving suitable materials (atoms) for creation, and conceiving a desire for the same, He made this wonderful universe which is supported by His will.

Udayana offers prayer to God, at the concluding part of his *Kusumāñjali*, as follows:—

“Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though repeatedly washed by the inundations of ethics and sacred texts; still in time, O Merciful One, Thou in Thy goodness wilt save those people too, because even in going to controvert Thy existence they have earnestly meditated on Thee.”¹ “As for us, O Thou Essential Beauty, though our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy, yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied: therefore, Oh Lord, haste to display thy mercy, that, our minds being fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject to the afflictions of death.”²

58. UDAYANA'S ĀTMA-TATTVA-VIVEKA.

The *Ātma-tattva-viveka* (lit. a discussion about the true nature of the soul) is otherwise called *Baud-*
An analysis of the *dhādhikāra* (a discourse concerned with
Ātma-tattva-viveka. *the Buddhists) or Baudha-dhikkāra* (Fie
 to the Buddhists). It³ proposes to refute four Buddhistic theories in order to establish a permanent soul. The four theories are: (1) *ksaṇa-bhaṅga*—that every thing is momentary; (2) *vāhyārtha-bhaṅga*—that things possess no external reality; (3) *guṇa-guṇi-bheda-bhaṅga*—that a substance is not distinct from its qualities;

1

इत्येवं श्रुतिनैतिसंज्ञवज्जलैर्भूयोऽभिराच्छास्त्रिते
 येषां नास्यदमादधासि हृदये ते शैलसाराशयाः ।
 किन्तु प्रसूतविप्रतौषविधयोऽप्युच्चैर्भवच्चिन्तकाः
 काले कावणिक लयैव रूपया ते तारणीया नराः ॥

(*Kusumāñjali*, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E. B. Cowell and M. C. Nyāyaratna, Calcutta).

2

अस्माकन्तु निसर्गसुन्दर चिराञ्चतो निमग्नं त्वयि
 लज्जानन्दनिधौ तथापि तरलं नास्यापि समुत्थवे ।
 तन्नाथ त्वरितं विधेहि कष्टाणां येन त्वदेकापतां
 यावे चेत्तसि नाम्नवान् शतशो याम्याः पुनर्यातनाः ॥

(The *Kusumāñjali*, stavaka 5, edited and translated by E. B. Cowell and M. C. Nyāyaratna, Calcutta).

³ The *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, edited by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, pp. 1, 9, 10, 24, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 45, 46, 47, 53, 69, 89, 92, 93, etc.

and (4) *anupalambha*—that the world is void. The book is divided into five sections of which the first four are concerned with the refutation of these theories, while the fifth concerns itself with the establishment of a permanent soul.

The Buddhists say that whatever is existent is momentary. A seed, for an instance, cannot continue up to the time when a plant springs out of it. The consequent cannot in fact come into being until the antecedent has ceased to exist. By the principle of *apoha* differentiation, we cognise an object as different from other objects, e.g. a cow is cognised as that which is not a not-cow. Some of the Buddhists (e.g. the *yogācāras* or *viññāna vādins*) maintain that there are no external objects corresponding to our cognitions and that the cognitions alone are real. *Ālaya-viññāna*, the abiding-cognition (or the abode of cognitions) called “ego” is the continuous flow of momentary cognitions called *pravṛtti-viññāna*. Certain Buddhists go so far as to say that there is no substance distinct from its qualities, and that the world is void. A substance could not be defined if it existed apart from its qualities; and the substance and qualities are both to be denied if they are supposed to be identical. In fact a substance exists in relation to its qualities and the latter exist in relation to the former. It is this net of relations or conditions which constitutes the veil (*samvṛti*), called the world, of which the essence is voidness.

These theories are set aside by Udayana who maintains that there is a permanent soul (*ātmā*) whose emancipation consists in getting rid of sufferings for ever. As to whether the soul is a principle of self-illumination and essence of bliss, the interrogator may consult the Upaniṣads or appeal to his own heart. The Naiyāyikas are satisfied if the soul is completely freed from the sufferings which are of twenty-one kinds.

Udayana says that the injunctions such as “do not kill” are respected by the followers of the Vedic as well as the Buddhistic religions. ‘Shaving the head,’ ‘making magic circles,’ etc., are the special practices of the Buddhists. The Buddhist scripture is disregarded in so far as it opposes the Vedas, controverts the doctrines of our great men and persuades people to build *caityas*, wear tattered robes, etc., in antagonism to our religion.

59. JAYANTA, AUTHOR OF THE NYĀYA-MAÑJARI (ABOUT THE 10TH CENTURY A.D.).

Another Brāhmaṇa logician who fought hard against the Buddhists was Jayanta, author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, an independent commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Jayanta, invincible in debate and well

Life of Jayanta.

known as *Vṛttikāra*, was the son of Paṇḍita Candra.¹ If we suppose him to be identical with his namesake the great-grandson of Śakti Svāmīn,² minister of King Muktaṭpīḍa, he must have flourished in Kāśmīra in the 10th century A.D.

He could not have lived earlier than the 9th and later than the 11th century A.D. as he quotes Vācaspati Miśra³ (841 A.D.) and Māgha⁴ (about 905 A.D.) in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, and is himself quoted in the *Ratnā-vatārikā*⁵ by Ratnaprabha (1181 A.D.), and in the *Syādvāda-ratnākara*⁶ by Deva Sūri (1086–1169 A.D.).

60. JAYANTA'S EXPLANATION OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE.

Words and their meanings.

In explaining verbal knowledge Jayanta reviews two theories⁷ called respectively the *Connection of the Expressed* (*abhihitānvaya-vāda*) and the *Expression of the Connected* (*anvitābhīdhāna-vāda*). The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, who uphold the first theory, main-

वादेष्वाप्रजयो जयन्त इति यः ख्यातः सतामप्रणीः
चन्वयो नववृत्तिकार इति यं शंसन्ति नास्मा वृषाः ।
स्त्रुर्बाप्रदिगन्तरस्य यशसा चन्द्रस्य चन्द्रलिषा
चक्रे चन्द्र कलावचूळ चरणध्यायो स धन्या इतिम् ॥

(*Nyāya-mañjarī*, chapter XII, colophon, p. 659, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

² The lineage of Jayanta is described in the opening verses of the *Kādambarī-kathāsāra* which was composed by his son Abhinanda.

³ यदपि उच्यते — नानिष्यन्नस्य सख्यो निष्यतो युतसिद्धत — इति तदपि परिहृतमाचार्यै
जातं च संबद्धं चेत्येकः काल इति वदद्भुभिः ॥

(*Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 312, edited by M.M. Gangadhar Śāstrī, in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

⁴ *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 84. Māgha is said to be a cousin of Siddharṣi, author of *Upamiti-bhava-prapañcā Kathā*.

⁵ तथा च जयन्तः —

स्वरूपादुद्भवत् कार्यं सचकार्युपहंदितात् । न हि कल्पयितुं शक्यं शक्तिं.....
(*Ratnāvatārikā*, chap. IV).

⁶ यदत्र शक्ति संसिद्धौ मज्जत्युदयन द्विपः ।

जयन्त इन्त का तत्र गणना त्वयि कौटके ॥

(*Syādvāda-ratnākara*, chap. II).

In 1348 A.D. Rājasekhara Sūri quotes Jayanta as follows :—

जयन्ताचार्यरचितो न्यायतर्कोऽतिदुस्तरः ।

(Maladhārī Rājasekhara Sūri's *Saddarśana-samuccaya*, verse 100, chapter on Śaiva darśana).

⁷ *Nyāya-mañjarī*, chapter VI, pp. 402-403, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series.

tain that verbal knowledge depends upon the connection which is automatically perceived among the meanings expressed by words individually in a sentence; that is, the words of a sentence after conveying their respective meanings disappear, and then the meanings themselves produce in us a knowledge of their mutual connection which is called verbal knowledge. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, who uphold the second theory, say that it is only in a sentence that words can express to us any meanings, and produce in us the knowledge of a mutual connection among those meanings called verbal knowledge.

Jayanta dismisses the second theory on the ground that it presupposes a word to bear various meanings in connection with various words in a sentence. It is indeed absurd to suppose that a word bears no definite meaning. He also does not completely accept the first theory inasmuch as words alone do not produce verbal knowledge, as is evident from the fact that a sentence composed of disorderly and ungrammatical words does not express a systematic meaning. As an amendment of the first theory we must assume that a sentence, if it is to convey a consistent meaning, must have, underlying it, a power called intention (*tātparya*) over and above its component words.

Jayanta opposes *sphoṭa-vāda*.

Jayanta examines *sphoṭa*,¹ the theory of phonetic explosion, which he pronounces to be untenable. The grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇa*), who propound the theory, define *sphoṭa* (explosion) as the essence of sound revealed by a letter, word or sentence. The sound-essence, which is revealed by a letter, is called *varṇa-sphoṭa*, a letter-explosion; that revealed by a word is called *pada-sphoṭa*, a word-explosion; and that revealed by a sentence is called *vākya-sphoṭa*, a sentence-explosion. As there is a constant relation between a sound and the thing signified by it, the sound-essence of a letter, word or sentence, as soon as we hear it, reminds us of a thing corresponding to the same.

Suppose a person utters the word *cow* composed of the letters *c*, *o* and *w*. As soon as we hear *c*, there is revealed to us the sound-essence *cow* in an indistinct form; and then as we go on hearing *o*, the same sound-essence is revealed though still in an indistinct form, until we hear the last letter *w* which reveals to us the sound-essence in a distinct form. This revelation of sound-

¹ Nyāya-mañjarī, śhnika 6. Cf. Bhartṛhari's Vākyapādiya, kāṇḍa 1; Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa-sāra and Śabda-kaustubha, and Max Muller's Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 402.

essence of the entire word in a distinct form is called *sphoṭa* or phonetic explosion,

A single letter, unless it is a complete word, cannot signify any thing. While some, the advocates of *pada-sphoṭa*, say that a sound-essence, significant of a thing, can be revealed only by a word (*pada*), others, the advocates of *vākya-sphoṭa*, hold that it is a sentence (*vākya*) alone that can reveal a significant sound-essence. According to the latter, a sentence is the beginning of speech, the words are mere parts of a sentence and the letters are parts of words.

Now, what is the nature of a sound-essence (*sphoṭa*)? A sound-essence is eternal and self-existent, bearing a permanent relation to the thing signified by it. It is *revealed* by a letter, word or sentence, but is not *produced* by any of them. Had there been no sound-essence, nothing would have been signified by letters, words or sentences. When we hear the word *cow*, the letters *c*, *o* and *w* may successively perish, but the sound-essence *cow*, which is eternal, persists to signify the thing called *cow*.

Jayanta, as a Naiyāyika, opposes the above theory by saying that it is a most cumbrous one. In the case of the word "cow," *c* and *o*, after being heard, no doubt pass away, but they leave on our soul (which is eternal) impressions which coupled with our audition of *w*, produce in us knowledge of the thing called *cow*. If in this way the letters themselves (as constituents of words) are sufficient to signify things, what is the necessity for admitting an additional entity called *sphoṭa*, sound-essence, which can neither be perceived nor inferred? Moreover, it is asked: Is the thing signified by a *sphoṭa* manifest by nature or does it require a cause for its manifestation? If it is manifest by nature, why do we not perceive it in all times and everywhere? If, on the other hand, it requires a cause for its manifestation, what is that cause? Jayanta says that the cause is not other than letters which constitute words. It is therefore superfluous to assume a *sphoṭa* over and above letters.

61. JAYANTA CRITICISES THE DOCTRINES OF KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.) AND DHARMOTTARA (847 A.D.).

Jayanta in his Nyāya-mañjarī (chapters V, VII, IV and III) severely criticises the doctrines of *apoha* (the knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites), *kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* (the momentary existence), *śrutyaprāmāṇya* (denial of the authority of the Veda),

Apoha, Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga,
Īśvara-bhaṅga, etc.

Īśvara-bhaṅga (the non-existence of God), etc., propounded by Kalyāṇa Rakṣita, (q.v.) in his *Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā*, *Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā*, and *Śruti-parīksā*, and by Dharmottara (q.v.) in his *Apoha-nāma-prakaraṇa*, *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi*, etc.

62. JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF SEVERAL OTHER BUDDISTIC DOCTRINES.

In the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, chapters I–III, Jayanta criticises the definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) as given by Dharmakīrti who is designated as a *Bhikṣu*, *Saugata*, *Bauddha* or *Śākya*. He tries also to refute the Buddhist theories that there are only two means of right knowledge (perception and inference) and that pleasure, pain, etc., are mere species of our cognitions from which they are not distinct. It is perhaps the disputation with Dignāga that is referred to by the expression *Bhadanta-kalaha* in chapter III. The Buddhistic objections against the soul as a separate substance are mentioned and criticised in chapters VII and IX. In chapter IX there is also a criticism of the doctrine of those Buddhists who hold that the external world is unreal. In chapter XII the *Vaibhāṣikas* are mentioned as holding that the external objects are both real and perceptible. In the same chapter we find that the *Sautrāntikas* maintain that the external objects are undoubtedly real, but they are not perceptible, as we can know them only through inference. The *Yogācāras* are referred to as saying that the so-called external objects are mere forms of our cognition which alone is real. The *Mādhyamikas* are said to hold that the world is void as our cognition is transparent and formless.

In chapter XII Jayanta observes that even Dharmakīrti maintained that Points of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) were of 22 kinds. In the same chapter as an instance of the incoherent (*apārthaka*), Jayanta cites the metaphysical views of the *Vaibhāṣika*, *Sautrāntika*, *Yogācāra* and *Mādhyamika*.

Jayanta carried on such a vehement crusade against the Buddhists that in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* he actually reproached them as follows:—

“You, *Bauddhas*, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct *caityas* (towers) to enjoy pleasure in paradise after death; you say that everything is momentary, yet you build monasteries with the hope that they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual

Reproach of the Buddhists.

guides. What a strange character the Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceit.”¹

63. ŚRIKANṬHA
(BEFORE 1409 A.D.).

About 1409 A.D. Guṇaratna, a Jaina philosopher, in his *Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* mentions a Brāhmaṇa logician named Śrīkanṭha² who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called *Nyāyālaṅkāra*.

64. ABHAYATILAKOPĀDHYĀYA
(BEFORE 1409 A.D.).

In the *Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* the Jaina philosopher Guṇaratna mentions a Brāhmaṇa logician named Abhayatilakopādhyāya³ who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra called *Nyāya-vṛtti*.

65. OTHER COMMENTATORS ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

These are the principal Brāhmaṇa commentators on the Nyāya-sūtra. Subsequently there arose a number of commentators such as Vardhamāna, author of the *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa*, Vācaspati Miśra the junior, author of *Nyāya-tattvāloka*, Viśvanātha, author of *Nyāya-vṛtti*, etc., whose names are not mentioned here as they belong to the modern school of Nyāya in respect of their style and method of interpretation.

1

नास्त्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमथ च स्वर्गाय चैत्यार्चनं
संस्काराः क्षणिका युगस्थिति श्रुतश्चैते विचाराः कृताः ।
सर्वं शून्यमिदं वस्तुनि गुरवे देहौति चादिश्यते
बौद्धानां चरितं किमन्यदियतौ दक्षस्य भूमिः परा ॥

(Nyāya-mañjarī, 7th āhnikā, p. 467, Gaṅgādhara Śāstri's edition).

2, 3 Guṇaratna observes :—

एषां तर्कप्रत्या न्यायसूत्र-भाष्य-वार्त्तिक-तात्पर्यटीका-तात्पर्य परिशुद्धि न्यायालङ्कार-
वृत्तयः । क्रमेण अक्षपाद-वात्स्यायन-उद्गीतकर-वाचस्पतिमिश्र-श्रीवद्वयन-श्री कण्व-अभयति-
लकोपाध्याय विरचिताः ५४०० ।

(*Saddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti* called *Nyāya* (Tarka)-*rahasya-dīpikā*, chap. II, p. 94, edited by Dr. L. Sualī, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*).

CHAPTER IV.

The Nyāya recognized as a Branch of Orthodox Learning.

66. A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE ĀNVIKṢIKĪ AND THE NYĀYA.

The Indian Logic at its first stage called *Ānvīkṣikī* was often looked upon with positive disfavour and subjected to adverse criticisms, as its deductions were held apparently to be sophistical and heterodox. But at the second stage when it was named *Nyāya*, it gradually got a steady foothold and an increasing number of followers, nay it succeeded, as we read in the writings of Yājñavalkya¹ and others, in gaining recognition as a branch of orthodox learning. On account of its intrinsic worth it became the most prominent of the six systems of philosophy called *Ṣaḍdarśana*. Attempting to prove the infallibility of the *Veda* and adapting itself to the *Saiva* cult the *Nyāya* got access into the orthodox community from which it received an unequivocal approbation.

67. THE NYĀYA INCLUDED IN *Ṣaḍdarśana*.

After the term *darśana* (philosophy) had come into use at the beginning of the Christian era, widely divergent systems of thought were designated by this common appellation. We learn that at a later period six systems of philosophy were specially called *Ṣaḍdarśana*. Opinions differ as to which six of the numerous systems constitute *Ṣaḍdarśana*, but it is generally agreed that the *Nyāya* system is included therein. According to the Jaina philosopher Haribhadra Sūri,² author of *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* (about 1168 A.D.), the six systems were the Buddhist, the *Nyāya*, the *Sāṃkhya* (including yoga), the Jaina, the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Jaiminiya* (comprising the *Mīmāṃsā* and the *Vedānta*). Jinadatta Sūri³ (about 1220 A.D.) reviews the same six

¹ The Yājñavalkya-saṃhitā, 1-3.

² बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं जैनं वैशेषिकं तथा ।

जैमिनीयं च षड्विधानि दर्शनानामुच्यन्ते ॥

(*Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, verse 3, Dr. Suali's edition).

³ About the date of Jinadatta Sūri, Sir R. G. Bhandarkar in his Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts for 1883-84, p. 156, observes: "Jinadatta therefore lived in the first half of the 13th century of the Christian era." Klatt in his Onomasticon, no. 44, maintains on the authority of *Sukṛta-saṃkīrtana* and *Prabandha-*

systems in his Viveka-vilāsa under the head of *Ṣaḍdarśana vicāra*. Another Jaina writer named Maladhāri Śrī Rājasekhara Sūri¹ (1348 A.D.) enumerates the same six systems in a different order, viz. the Jaina, the Sāṃkhya (including the Yoga), the Jaiminiya (comprising the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta), the Yauga or Śaiva (which is the same as *Nyāya*), the Vaiśeṣika and the Saugata or Buddhist.

The Brāhmaṇic writer Nārāyaṇa,² in his commentary called *Prakāśa* on the *Naiṣadhacarita*, speaks of *Ṣaḍdarśana* in which he evidently includes the *Nyāya*. In the *Hayaśirṣa-pañcarātra*,³ a Brāhmaṇic work supposed to have been introduced into Bengal by Rājā Vallāla Sena (about 1158–1170 A.D.) as well as in the *Gurugītā* of the Viśvasāra-tantra, the six systems comprising *Ṣaḍdarśana* are specified as the philosophies of Gotama (*Nyāya*), Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika), Kapila (Sāṃkhya), Patañjali (Yoga), Vyāsa (Vedānta) and Jaimini (Mīmāṃsā). By the term *ṣaḍdarśana* the Brāhmaṇic writers understand at present these six systems to the exclusion of the Jaina and the Buddhist which are considered by them as lying outside the pale of it.

68. THE NYĀYA SUPPORTS THE VEDA.

In the *Nyāya-mañjari*⁴ Jayanta observes that the authority of the Veda was to a large extent established through the aid of the science of reasoning called the *Nyāya*. The reasoning

Authority of the Veda established.

cintāmaṇi that Jinadatta Sūri was present at the pilgrimage of Vastupāla in *saṃvat* 1277 or 1220 A.D.

1 जैनं सांख्यं जैमिनीयं योगं वैशेषिकं तथा ।
योगतं दर्शनान्येवं नास्तिकं तु न दर्शनम् ॥

(Maladhāri Rājasekhara Sūri's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, p. 1, Yaśovijaya-granthamālā, Benares).

2 सातुं प्रयच्छति न पञ्चतुष्टये तां
तन्नाभशंसिनि न पञ्चमकोटि मात्रे ।
अङ्गं दधे निषधराड् विमतौ मतानाम्
अद्वैततत्त्व इव सत्यतरेऽपि लोकः ॥ (Naiṣadhacarita, 13–36).

In the commentary on this verse Nārāyaṇa says :—

मतानां सांख्यादि षड् दर्शनानां मध्येपरमार्थतो विद्यमानेऽपि अद्वैतरूपे तत्त्वे.....
युक्तादुक्ताविचार प्रसूयो जनो यथा अङ्गं न घटे ।

3 गौतमस्य कणादस्य कपिलस्य पतञ्जलीः ।
यासस्य जैमिनेष्वपि दर्शनानि षड्वेव हि ॥

(Hayaśirṣa-pañcarātra, a work which is quoted by Raghunandana in his *Devapratīṣṭhā-tattva*). This verse is quoted in the *Gurugītā* of the Viśva-sāra-tantra.

4 The *Nyāya-mañjari*, pp. 4–5, edited by Gaṅgādhara Śāstri, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series.

required for the establishment of such authority has been dealt with in the Nyāya more fully than in any other system of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā treats of the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions, but it does not examine their worth through the employment of reasoning. The Nyāya¹ alone demonstrates that the Veda is authoritative, because it was delivered by sages who were trustworthy persons. It is true that the Buddhists and Jainas too wrote treatises on reasoning, but these being opposed to the Veda cannot properly be included in the Nyāya, one of the fourteen branches of orthodox learning. In fact it is the work of Akṣapāda that should really be called Nyāya the supporter of Veda. The Nyāya-sūtra actually defends the Veda from the attacks of those who find in it untruth, contradiction and tautology, and declares the sacred text to be infallible like a spell or the medical science.

69. THE NYĀYA ADAPTS ITSELF TO ŚAIVISM.

In the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri² (1168 A.D.) as well as in that of Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri³ (1348 A.D.), the followers of the Nyāya philosophy have been called the Śaivas while those of the Vaiśeṣika system have been called the *Pāśupatas*. In the Vivekavilāsa, Jinadatta Sūri includes both Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas in the Śaiva sect. According to the Devīpurāṇa⁴ the Nyāya-śāstra was promulgated by the gracious Śiva himself.

¹ The Nyāya-sūtras, 2-1-53 and 2-1-69, translated by Satishchandra Vidya-bhusana, S.B.H. series, Allahabad.

² The Naiyāyikas were also called Yaugas.

अथादौ नैयायिकानां योगपराभिधानानां लिङ्गादिव्यक्तिरुच्यते ।सदा शिवभक्तत्वात्
शैवा इत्युच्यते । वैशेषिकास्तु पाशुपता इति । तेन नैयायिकशसनं शैवमाख्यायते । वैशेषिक-
दर्शनं च पाशुपतमिति ।.....

अक्षपादमते देवः सृष्टिसंसारकृष्णिवः ।

विभुर्नित्यैकसर्वज्ञो नित्यबुद्धिसमाश्रयः ॥

(Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri, edited by Dr. Suali, pp. 49-52).

³ Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya of Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri, pp. 8-11, published in the Yaśovijaya-granthamālā series, Benares.

⁴

शम्भोः कृपामनुप्राप्य यदौत्तमकरोन्मुनिः ।

तेन चान्वीक्षिकीसंज्ञां विद्यां प्रावर्त्तयत् क्षितौ ॥

आदेशेन शिवस्यैव स शिष्यान दशभिर्दिनैः ।

पाठयामास तां विद्यां नास्तिक्वमत नाशिनौ ॥

(Devīpurāṇa, Śumbha-niśumbha-mathana-pāda, chapter XVI, MSS. in the collection of Paṇḍita Pañcānana Tarkaratna of Bhātpārā).

The Naiyāyikas are called Śaivas because they look upon, as their tutelary deity, Śiva who is the creator and destroyer of the universe. As described by Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri the Naiyāyikas, identified with Śaivas, walked nude, wore matted hair, besmeared their bodies with ash and subsisted on roots and fruits. They always meditated upon Śiva and worshipped his eighteen figures, muttering the formula *om namaḥ Śivāya*, "hail! obeisance to Śiva."

Akṣapāda, author of the Nyāya-sūtra, was a son of Soma-Śarmā¹ who was Śiva incarnate. Vātsyāyana begins his Nyāya-bhāṣya with obeisance to the *Pramāṇas* (Means of Knowledge), but in the body of the book he describes God² (*Īśvara*) in a style applicable only to Maheśvara (Śiva).

Whatever might have been the faiths of Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana, there is no doubt that all the Brāhmanic Naiyāyikas from Uddyotakara downwards were Śaivas. Uddyotakara, as is evident from the colophon of his Nyāya-vārtika, was a leader of the Pāsupata Śaiva sect. The Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā of Vācaspati Miśra opens with salutation to Pinākin (Śiva) while the Nyāya works of Udayana³ contain abundant proofs that their author was a Śaiva by faith. Bhāsarvajña, author of the Nyāya-sāra,⁴ and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, author of the Tattvacintāmaṇi, begin their works with salutation to Śambhu or Śiva "the Supreme Lord and the Seer of all truths."

70. THE POPULARITY OF NYĀYA ESTABLISHED.

From the above it is clear that three distinct causes contributed to the popularity and predominance of Nyāya as a school of philosophy. The first was the intrinsic worth of the system which was acknowledged as most useful in carrying on processes

¹ Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa published under the name of Vāyupurāṇa by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, adhyāya 23, verses 200 seq.

² Nyāya-bhāṣya, 4-1-16, 22.

³ Kusumāñjali, chapter I, opening line; chapter II, last verse; chapter IV, last verse; etc.

प्रणम्य शङ्खं जज्ञतः पतिम्वरं

समस्ततत्त्वार्थविद् स्वभावतः ।

मिश्रप्रबोधाय मयाभिधास्यते

प्रमाणतद्भेद तदन्यस्तत्त्वेषु ॥

(Nyāya-sāra, p. 1, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

of reasoning and which obtained for the system the foremost rank among the schools of philosophy called *Śaḍḍarsana*. In the second place we notice that having supported the authority of the Veda the Nyāya was readily recognized as an approved branch of learning, and the charge of heterodoxy levelled against it at its early stage was proved to be baseless. Thirdly, the fact that Nyāya adopted the Śaiva cult gave it a positive stamp of orthodoxy and gained for it an unquestionable recognition.

PART II.
THE MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC
CALLED
PRAMĀṆA-ŚĀSTRA—THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
KNOWLEDGE.
(400 A.D.—1200 A.D.).

SECTION I.
The Jaina Logic (400 A.D.—1700 A.D.).

CHAPTER I.
Topics of Logic mentioned in the Jaina Canons.
1. THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC
(FROM CIRCA 599 B.C. ONWARDS).

Termination of the Ancient School.

In Part I a short account has been given of the Ancient School of Indian Logic which deals, as we have seen, with the doctrine of the soul and its salvation, as well as with the rules of debate and true reasoning. The Ancient School, which reached the height of its development at the hands of Akṣapāda about 150 A.D., extended over a period of one thousand years, beginning with Gautama about 550 B.C. and ending with Vātsyāyana about 400 A.D. It must not however be supposed that the Ancient School became extinct at 400 A.D. A host of commentators such as Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya, who flourished subsequently, kept the stream of that Logic flowing. But the thousand years from 550 B.C. to 400 A.D. represent what may be termed the period of organic growth of the Ancient School.

Formation of the Mediæval School.

Part II will represent a system of logic called the Mediæval School, the foremost exponents of which were the Jainas and the Buddhists—two powerful sects that were founded by Mahāvira and Buddha about 600 B.C. At the time of the founders, and in

subsequent times, the Jaina and Buddhist writers occasionally handled the principles of pure logic in expounding the dogmas of their own religion and metaphysics. Some of the writers even brought out regular treatises on logic, but those were either fragments or résumés of the Ancient Logic. By about 450 A.D. the Buddhist logician Dignāga and the Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara, by differentiating the principles of logic from those of religion and metaphysics, laid the true foundation of what is termed the Mediæval School of Indian Logic. This school covered a period of nearly eight hundred years from 400 A.D. to 1200 A.D. In matter and method the Mediæval School conducted by the Jainas and Buddhists differs markedly from the Ancient School which was essentially Brāhmaṇic. The Ancient Logic dealt with sixteen categories such as *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc., comprising such heterogeneous elements as doctrine of salvation and nature of the soul, etc. The Mediæval Logic, on the contrary, concerns itself with one category, viz. *pramāṇa*, which touches upon other categories only in so far as these are necessary for its proper elaboration. The doctrine of *pramāṇa* is treated in such a way that it may be equally applied to the religious systems of the Brāhmaṇas, Jainas and Buddhists. Inference, a kind of *pramāṇa*, which was briefly noticed in the Ancient Logic, receives a full treatment in the Mediæval School. Numerous technical terms are coined and great subtleties are introduced into the definition of terms, the theory of syllogism, etc. *Prameya*, the object of knowledge, is rejected on the ground that it is useless in works on logic to treat of the soul, birth, death, etc., which are comprised under this category. The Mediæval Logic thus formed is called in Sanskrit *Pramāṇa-śāstra*, the science of right knowledge.

The works on Mediæval Logic written by the Jainas constitute the Jaina Logic, while those written by the Buddhists constitute the Buddhist Logic. Seeing that Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, preceded Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, I shall first treat of the Jaina Logic.

2. MAHĀVIRA—THE FOUNDER OF JAINISM. (599–527 B.C.).

The Jainas maintain that their religion is coeval with time. According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of their passions, or *Tīrthaṅkaras*, builders of a landing place in the sea of existence. These sages preached the religion of the Jainas. The Jainas hold that in every cycle of time (*utsarpiṇī* or *avasarpiṇī kālā*¹) 24 sages are born. The first sage of the last series was

¹ Period of evolution or involution.

Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva, the 24th was Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna, who was born at Kṣatriya-kunḍagrāma in 599 B.C. and attained *nirvāṇa* at Pāvā in 527 B.C.¹ The scriptures which the Jainas obey are founded on the teachings of Mahāvīra. No one disputes this, and scholars generally regard Mahāvīra as the founder of Jainism, and hold that the theory of the existence of *Jinas* previous to him, except Pārśvanātha the 23rd Tirthaṅkara, was a subsequent invention.

3. THE JAINA SECTS—ŚVETĀMBARA AND DIGAMBARA (FIRST CENTURY A.D.).

The Jainas are divided into two sects, the *Śvetāmbaras*, those who are clothed in white, and the *Digambaras*, those who are sky-clad or naked. The *Śvetāmbaras* claim to be more ancient than the *Digambaras*, whose existence as a separate sect is said to date from A.D. 82,² i.e. 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra.

4. INDRABHŪTI GAUTAMA—A DISCIPLE OF MAHĀVĪRA (607 B.C.—515 B.C.).

The teachings of Mahāvīra as represented in the scriptures are said to have been collected³ by a disciple of his, called Indra-bhūti. This disciple is often known as Gautama or Gotama. He

¹ पणइसय वस पणमास जुदं गमिय वीरणिबुद्धो सगराजो। (Trilokasāra of the Digambara sect). “Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 605 years 5 months before the Śaka King (78 A.D.) came to the throne,” that is, in 527 B.C. As he lived 72 years he must have been born in 599 B.C.

According to Vicārasreṇī of Merutuṅga, Tirthakalpa of Jinaprabha Sūri, Vicāra-sāra-prakarana, Tapāgaccha-pattāvali, etc., of the Śvetāmbara sect—Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 470 years before Vikrama Saṃvat or in B.C. 527.

Dr. Jacobi of Bonn, in his letter dated the 21st October, 1907, kindly writes to me as follows:—

“There is however another tradition which makes this event [viz. the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra] come off 60 years later, in 467 B.C. (see *Parīṣiṣṭa Parvan*, Introduction, p. 4 f.; also *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, p. 8). The latter date cannot be far wrong because Mahāvīra died some years before the Buddha whose death is now placed between 470–480 B.C.”

² The Śvetāmbaras say:—इवांस सयाइं नवुत्तराइं तईया सिद्धिगयस्स वीरस्स तो बोद्धियाण दिट्ठी रहवीरपुरे समुण्णस्य। “The Digambara doctrine was preached in Rathavīrapura 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra” (Āvaśyaka nirvyukti—52). But the Digambaras deny this and say that the Śvetāmbaras rose in Vikrama 136 or 79 A.D. Cf. Bhadrabāhucarita IV. 55:

मते विक्रमभूपाके षट्त्रिंशदधिके शते ।

गतेऽब्दानामभूजोके सतं श्वेताम्बरभिषय ॥

अथ सप्तर्षिसम्पन्नं श्रुतार्थं जिनभाषितम् ।

द्वादशाङ्गश्रुतं खल्वं सोपाङ्गं गौतमो बध्नात् ॥

(Jaina Harivamśa Purāṇa).

was¹ a *Kevalin*² and the first of the Gaṇa-dharas³ or leaders of the assembly. His father's name was Brāhmaṇa Vasubhūti, and his mother's name was Brāhmaṇī Prthvī. He was born in the village of Gorbara⁴ in Magadha and died at Guṇava in Rājagrha (Rajgir) at the age of ninety-two, 12 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra.⁵ Assuming that Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* in 527 B.C., Indrabhūti's birth must be assigned to 607 B.C. and his death to 515 B.C.

5. THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES OF THE JAINAS.

Those scriptures of the Jainas which are generally regarded as canonical are divided into 45 *siddhāntas* or *āgamas*, classified as 11 *Āṅgas*, 12 *Upāṅgas*, etc. "For the benefit of children, women, the old, and the illiterate,"⁶ these were composed in the Ardha-Māgadhi or Prākṛta language. On the same principle the scriptures of the Buddhistic canon were originally written in Māgadhi or Pāli. It is maintained

¹ Indrabhūti Gautama and Sudharma Svāmi were the joint compilers of the Jaina scriptures. But Indrabhūti became a *Kevalin* or attained *kevalajñāna* (absolute knowledge) on the day on which Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa*. He did not therefore occupy the chair of his teacher Mahāvīra, but relinquished it to his spiritual brother Sudharma Svāmi. Cf. इन्द्रभूति प्रभूतीनां विपदीं व्याहरत् प्रभुः ॥ (Hemacandra's Mahāvīracarita, chap. v. MSS. lent by Muni Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya).

² Possessor of absolute knowledge. For a further reference to this title see R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

³ यत्प्रज्ञाप्रसरेऽतिशयिनि तथा प्रालेयशैलोऽन्वले
जैनौ गौरचरन्तिपद्यपि यथा सद्यः पदैः कोटिशः ।
अङ्गोपाङ्गमहोदया समभवत्तैलोक्यसंचारिणौ
वन्द्योऽसौ गणभञ्जगन्तयगुणनाम्नेन्द्रभूतिः सताम् ॥ ४ ॥

(Siddhajayantī-caritra-ṭīkā, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, App. 1, p. 38).

⁴ श्रीमन्तं मगधेषु गोर्वर इति ग्रामोऽभिरामः त्रिया
तत्तोल्लसत्समस्तचित्तमनिशं श्रीवौरसेवाविधौ ।
ज्योतिःसंश्रयगौतमान्वयवियत्प्रद्योतनद्योमणिं
तापोत्तौर्णसुवर्णवर्णवपुषं भक्त्येन्द्रभूतिं स्तुवे ॥

(Gotamastotra by Jinaprabha Sūri, extracted in Kāvya-mālā, 7th Guccaka, p. 110).

⁵ For particulars about Indrabhūti Gautama, vide Dr. J. Klatt's Pattāvali of the Kharataragaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 246; and Weber's Die Handschriften Verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, pp. 983 and 1030, in which are noticed Sarvarājagaṇi's Vṛtti on Gaṇadhara-sārdha-śatakam of Jinadattasūri, and Śrī-pattāvali-vācanā of the Kharataragaccha.

⁶ Haribhadra-sūri, in his Daśa-vaikālika-vṛtti (Chap. III), observes:—

बालश्रीष्टबुद्ध्यां येषां चारित्रकाङ्क्षिणाम् ।

अनुप्रचार्यं तत्त्वज्ञैः सिद्धान्तः प्राकृतः कृतः ॥

that originally the *Āṅgas* were 12 in number. The 12th *Āṅga*, which was called *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* or the presentation of views, was written in Sanskrit.¹

The *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* is not extant. It consisted apparently of five parts, in the first of which logic is said to have been dealt with. The *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* is reputed to have existed in its entirety at the time of *Sthūlabhadra*² who, according to the *Tapāgachapaṭṭāvalī*, died in the year in which the 9th *Nanda* was killed by *Candra Gupta* (i.e. about 327 B.C.). By 474 A.D. the *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* had disappeared altogether. Nothing is known as to the way in which logic was treated in the *Dr̥ṣṭivāda*.³

6. LOGICAL SUBJECTS IN THE CANONS.

The subject-matter of logic is touched upon in several of the 45 *Prākṛta* scriptures of the Jainas. In *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*. the *Bhagavati-sūtra*,⁴ *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, etc. which are *Āṅgas*, and in the *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* which is an *Upāṅga*, there is a description of *Naya*, or the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. In the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, *Bhagavati-sūtra*, etc.,⁵ there is a complete classification of valid knowledge called *pramāṇa*, *paṃāṇa*, *jñāna*, *nāna* or *hetu*.

¹ *Vardhamāna-sūri*, in his *Ācāra-dinakara*, quotes the following passage from *Āgama* :—

सुतूप दिङ्मिवायं कालिय उक्कालियं सिद्धं ।

योबाहवायणत्वं पादय सुदयं जिनवरेहिं ॥

² *Vide* *Cūṛṇika* of *Nandī Sūtra*, page 478, published by *Dhanapat Singh*, Calcutta, and *Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS.*, p. cxxxvi.

³ For a full history of the *Dr̥ṣṭivāda* (called in *Prākṛta* *Ditthivāo*) see *Weber's Sacred Literature of the Jainas*, translated by *Weir Smyth* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XX, May 1891, pp. 170-182.

⁴ In the *Bhagavati-sūtra* and *Prajñāpanā-sūtra*, *Naya* is divided into seven kinds, viz. *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛju-sūtra*, *śabda*, *saṃbhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*. For an explanation of these terms see *Umāsvāti*, who instead of dividing *Naya* into seven kinds, first divides it into five kinds, and then subdivides one of the five, viz. *śabda*, into three kinds.

⁵ In the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, knowledge (*jñāna*) is divided into (1) *Pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and (2) *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). *Pratyakṣa* again is subdivided as *Kevala jñāna* (entire knowledge) and *Akevala jñāna* (defective knowledge). The *Akevala jñāna* is subdivided as *avadhi* and *manah-paryāya*. The *Parokṣa jñāna* is subdivided as *abhinibodha* (*matī*) and *śruta*. *Vide* the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, pp. 45-48, and the *Nandī-sūtra*, pp. 120-134: both published by *Dhanapat Singh* and printed in Calcutta. See also what is said in the account of *Umāsvāti* *seq.* पमाणे चउखिहे पणत्ते, दुविहे नाणे पणत्ते, तं जहा पवक्ख चेव परीक्खे चेव ।

(*Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, chap. 6, p. 45).

The word “Hetu” is found in the Prākṛta scriptures, but its use in these works makes it clear that it had not at this period acquired a very definite significance. In the Sthānāṅga-sūtra¹ it is used not only in the sense of reason, but also as a synonym for valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) and inference (*Anumāna*). *Hetu* as identical with valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) is stated to be of four kinds, viz. :—

- (1) knowledge derived from perception (*Pratyakṣa*);
- (2) knowledge derived from inference (*Anumāna*);
- (3) knowledge derived through comparison (*Upamāna*); and
- (4) knowledge derived from verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āgama*).

When *Hetu* is used in the sense of inference (*Anumāna*), it is classified according to the following types :—

- (1) This *is*, because that *is*: There is a fire, because there is smoke.
- (2) This *is not*, because that *is*: It is not cold, because there is a fire.
- (3) This *is*, because that *is not*: It is cold here, because there is no fire.
- (4) This *is not*, because that *is not*: There is no *śimśapā* tree here, because there are no trees at all.

In the Sūtrakṛtāṅga² there is mention of *vitarka* (in Prākṛta: *viyakka*) in the sense of speculation, *tarka* (in Prākṛta: *takka*) in the sense of reasoning or debate, *pakṣa* (in Prākṛta: *pakkha*) in the sense of a party, and *chala* in the sense of quibble.

अथवा हेतु च उचिते पक्षे ते तं जहा
 पक्षे अनुमाने जवमे आगमे ।
 अथवा हेतु च उचिते पक्षे ते तं जहा
 अथि तं अथि सो हेतु अथि तं ।
 अथि सो हेतु अथि तं अथि सो
 हेतु अथि तं अथि सो हेतु ॥

(Bhagavati-sūtra, p. 336; and Sthānāṅga-sūtra, pp. 309-310, published by Dhanapat Singh and printed in Calcutta).

सखिस्सुभावं न गिरा गहीर, से सुम्हई होइ अणाणुवाई ।
 इमं दुपक्खं इममेगपक्खं आहंनु बल्लायनणं च एगं ॥ ५ ॥
 एवमेगे वियक्काहिं, नो अन्न पज्जुवासिया
 अप्पणो य वियक्काहिं, अयमंजु हि दुम्माई ॥ ११ ॥
 एवं नक्काहि साहिंता, धम्माधम्मे अकोविथा ।
 दुक्खं ते नाइतुइति, सउण्णो पंजरं जहा ॥ १३ ॥

(Sūtrakṛtāṅga, p. 62, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

In the Sthānāṅga-sūtra¹ an example, called in Prākṛta *ṇāa* (in Sanskrit *jñāta*), is divided into four kinds, viz. (1) *āharāṇa*, a complete example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified in all respects, (2) *āharāṇa-taddesa*, a limited example which bears similarity to the thing exemplified only in respect of a part, (3) *āharāṇa-taddoṣa*, a defective example, and (4) *upanyāsopanaya*, an anecdote used as an example.

In the Sthānāṅga-sūtra² the following are enumerated as expedients in a hostile debate or debate *a l'outrance*. (1) *Asakkaittā*, taking some time in making oneself ready, (2) *ussakkaittā*, gaining enthusiasm after the enjoyment of leisure, (3) *aṇulomaittā*, propitiating the authorities or making them favourable, (4) *pratilomaittā*, making the authorities hostile (against one's respondent), (5) *bhaittā*, serving the authorities, (6) *bheyaittā*, creating divisions.

In the Sthānāṅga-sūtra³ the following are enumerated as the defects (*doṣa*) of a debate :—

(1) *Tajjāta-doṣa*, the defect arising from a disputant being agitated in mind, (2) *matibhaṅga-doṣa*, the defect arising from the failure of his memory, (3) *prasāstr-doṣa*, the defect arising from the authorities, e.g. the president or the members, showing partiality, (4) *pariharāṇa-doṣa*, avoidance of the charges brought by a disputant, (5) *lakṣaṇa-doṣa*, the defect of definition [which may be too wide, too narrow or altogether incomprehensible], (6) *kāraṇa-doṣa*, the defect of arguing, (7) *hetu-doṣa*, committing fallacies, (8) *saṃkramaṇa-doṣa*, diversion to other subjects, (9) *nigraha-doṣa*, the defect of understanding, and (10) *vastu-doṣa*, the defect of the subject (of debate).

¹ चउव्विहे णाय पणत्ते, तं जहा, आहरणे, आहरणतद्देसे, आहरणतद्दोसे, उवव्वा-सोवणए ।

(Sthānāṅga-sūtra, p. 300, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

² इव्विहे विवादे पणत्ते, तं जहा, उसकइत्ता, अणुलोमइत्ता, पडिलोमइत्ता, भइत्ता, भेयइत्ता ।

(Sthānāṅga-sūtra, p. 421, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

³ दसविहे दोसे पणत्ते, तं जहा, तज्जायदोसे, मइभंगदोसे, पसत्थारदोसे परिहरणदोसे, सल्लखण-कारण-हेउदासे, संकामणं, निग्गइवत्थुदोसे ।

(Sthānāṅga-sūtra, p. 560, published by Dhanapat Singh, Calcutta).

CHAPTER II.

Early Jaina writers on Logic.

BHADRABĀHU THE SENIOR (CIRCA 433-357 B.C.).

BHADRABĀHU THE JUNIOR (CIRCA 375 A.D. OR 450-520 A.D.).

Though we come across some technical terms of Ancient Logic in the canonical scriptures of the Jainas, yet we have no proof that the Jainas undertook at that stage to write any regular work on logic. The early Jaina writers who discussed definite problems of logic, were Bhadrabāhu and Umāsvāti. An elaborate discussion of certain principles of logic is found in a Prākṛta commentary on the Daśa-vaikālika sūtra, called Daśavaikālika-nir-yukti. This commentary was the work of one Bhadrabāhu¹ of the Prācīna Gotra. For 45 years this sage lived the ordinary life of the world; 17 years he passed in the performance of religious vows (*Vratas*); and for 14 years he was acknowledged by the Jainas to be the foremost man of his age (*Yuga-pradhāna*).² He was a *Śrutakevalin*,³ that is, one versed in the 14 *Pūrvas* of the *Dṛṣṭivāda*.

The above-mentioned incidents are generally accepted as facts in the life of the author of the commentary. There is, however, some doubt as to the time in which he lived.⁴ According to the records⁵ of the *Śvetāmbaras* he was born in 433 B.C. and died in 357 B.C. The *Digambaras* maintain there were two Bhadrabāhus; that the first (Bhadrabāhu the senior) lived to 162 years from the

¹ For particulars *vide* Dr. J. Klatt's *Kharataragaccha-paṭṭāvalī* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247; Weber II, p. 999; Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS., p. lxxxiv; and Dr. H. Jacobi's edition of the *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, pp. 11-15. Bhadrabāhu (senior) seems to have lived between 380 B.C. and 314 B.C., if he was really a contemporary of King Candra Gupta (Maurya), but about 375 A.D. if he lived at the time of Candra Gupta II, called Vikramāditya, of the Gupta dynasty.

² In the *Vicāra-ratna-saṃgraha* by Jayasoma-sūri noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report on Sanskrit MSS., pp. 307-308, Bhadrabāhu is included among the *Yuga-pravaras* or *Yuga-pradhānas*.

³ For further particulars about this title see R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

⁴ In Weber II, p. 999, in which the *Gurvāvalī-sūtra* of Mahopādhyāya Dharmaśāgaragaṇi is noticed, we read of Sambhūtivijaya and Bhadrabāhu "Ubhau-pi śaṣṭhapaṭṭadharau."

⁵

अवस्थितः पूर्ववृत्तां द्वितीयः

त्रिभद्रवाङ्मय (७) गुहः शिवाय ।

कल पसर्मादिहरस्तर्षं यो

ररत्त सङ्ग धरणाचिन्ताः ॥ ११ ॥

nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, that is, up to 365 B.C., and that the second¹ (Bhadrabāhu the junior) to 515 years from the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, that is, up to 12 B.C. They do not state definitely which of these Bhadrabāhus was the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti, but they hold the view that the second was the author of several of the existing Jaina works. The *Śvetāmbara* records do not contain any mention of the second Bhadrabāhu, but in the *Rṣimaṇḍala-prakarana-vṛtti*² and *Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikā-vṛtti*,³ two commentaries of the *Śvetāmbaras*, and in the *Caturviṃśati prabandha*, it is stated that Bhadrabāhu lived in the south in Pratiṣṭhāna and was a brother of Varāhamihira. Now Varāhamihira is popularly believed to have lived in the first century B.C. It is possible therefore, even according to the *Śvetāmbaras*, that the Daśavaikālika-niryukti was the work of a commentator who, if we rely on popular belief, lived about the time of the opening of the Christian era. As a fact Bhadrabāhu could not have lived much earlier than 500 A.D. if he was a brother of Varāhamihira.

From the confusing traditions preserved by the Jainas, it may be concluded that Bhadrabāhu lived in the reign of Candragupta II, called Vikramāditya, about 375 A.D.

Whatever was his date, the author of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti wrote commentaries (niryuktis) on the following Jaina scriptures:—Āvaśyaka-sūtra, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Ācārāṅga-sūtra, Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra, Daśāśruta-skandha-sūtra, Kalpa-sūtra, Vyavahāra-sūtra, Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra, and Rṣibhāṣita-sūtra.

7. BHADRABĀHU'S SYLLOGISM.

Bhadrabāhu did not set himself to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic. His object was to illus-

निर्धूढ सिद्धान्तपथोविश्राप

स्वर् यश्च वीरात् खनगेन्द्रवर्षे १७० ।

तयोर्विनेयः कृतविश्वभद्रः

त्रैलोक्यभद्रश्च ददातु मर्क ॥ १४ ॥

(Gurvāvalī by Munisundara-sūri published in the Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā of Benares, p. 4).

¹ Vide the Sarasvatī-gaccha-paṭṭāvalī in the Indian Antiquary, October 1891, and March 1892.

² Vide Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 138. Bhadrabāhu must have lived as late as the 6th century A.D., if he was really a brother of that Varāhamihira who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya. Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya maintain that Bhadrabāhu's brother was not the same Varāhamihira that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

³ प्रतिष्ठानपुरे वराहमिहिर भद्रबाहु द्विजौ प्रज्जितौ । भद्रबाहोराचार्य पददाने बहः सन् वराहो द्विजवेषमाहृत्य वाराहौ संहितां कृत्वा निमित्तैर्जीवति ।

(Kalpa-sūtra-subodhikāvṛtti printed in Bombay).

trate the truth of certain principles of the Jaina religion. To do this, he, in his *Daśavaikālika-niryukti*,¹ elaborated a syllogism consisting of ten parts (*daśāvayava-vākya*), and then demonstrated how the religious principles of Jainism satisfied the conditions of this syllogism.

The following is an example:—

(1) The proposition (*Pratijñā*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues."

(2) The limitation of the proposition (*Pratijñā-vibhakti*)—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, according to the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras."

(3) The reason (*Hetu*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, because those who so refrain are loved by the gods and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

(4) The limitation of the reason (*Hetu-vibhakti*),—"none but those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in the highest place of virtue."

(5) The counter-proposition (*Vipakṣa*),—"but those who despise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and take life are said to be loved by the gods, and men regard doing them honour as an act of merit. Again, those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their fathers-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras and habitually take life. Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be beloved of the gods."

(6) The opposition to the counter-proposition (*Vipakṣapratishedha*),—"those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras do not deserve honour, and they are certainly not loved by

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ते उ पदत्रय विभक्तौ हेतु-विभक्तौ विवक्ष्यपडिसेहो ।

दिङ्मतो चासका तप्यडिसेहो निगमणं च ॥ १४९ ॥

(*Daśavaikālika-niryukti*, p. 74, published under the patronage of Dhanapat Singh by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay; and Dr. E. Leumann's edition of *Daśavaikālika-niryukti*, p. 649).

The Jains characterise a syllogism of ten parts as the best (*uttama*), a syllogism of five parts as the mediocre (*madhyama*), and a syllogism of two parts as the worst (*jaghanya*). Candrarabha Sūri (1102 A.D.) observes:—

अवयवावैचया जघन्य मध्यमीनुत्कृष्टास्तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति इति । तत्र हेतुप्रतिपादनमात्रं जघन्यं द्वावयवविनिवेदनं मध्यमा, संपूर्णं दशावयवकथनमुत्कृष्टम् ।

(*Nyāyāvātāra-vivṛti* on verse 20 of *Nyāyāvātāra*, p. 8, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Calcutta). Similarly Ratnaprabha Sūri (1181 A.D.) says:—

पक्षादिश्रवणश्च पक्षप्राज्ञाः । तत उत्कृष्टं दशावयवं परार्थानुमानम् इत्युक्तं भवति । मध्यमं तु त्रयावयवादारभ्य यावत् द्वावयवम् । जघन्यं पुनः साधनमात्रोपन्यास स्वरूपम् । प्रतिपाद्यानां मन्दबुद्ध्यातिव्युत्पन्नात् ।

(*Syād-vāda-ratnā-karā-vatārikā*, p. 20, Chap. III, edited by Hara Govind Das and Bechar Das in the Yaśovijaya Series, Benares).

the gods. It is as likely that fire will be cold as that they will be loved by the gods or to do them honour will be regarded by men as an act of merit. Buddha, Kapila and others, though really not fit to be worshipped, were honoured for their miraculous sayings, but the Jaina *Tīrthaṅkaras* are honoured because they speak absolute truth.”

(7) An instance or example (*Drṣṭānta*),—“the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* do not even cook food, lest in so doing they should take life. They depend on householders for their meals.”

(8) Questioning the validity of the instance or example (*Āśaṅkā*),—“the food which the householders cook is as much for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* as for themselves. If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* must share in the householders’ sin. Thus the instance cited is not convincing.”

(9) The meeting of the question (*Āśaṅkā-pratiśedha*),—“the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* go to householders for their food without giving notice and not at fixed hours. How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*? Thus the sin, if any, is not shared by the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*.”

(10) Conclusion (*Nigamana*),—“to refrain from taking life is therefore the best of virtues, for those who so refrain are loved by the gods, and to do them honour is an act of merit for men.”

8. BHADRABĀHU’S EXPLANATION OF *Syādvāda*.

Bhadrabāhu in his *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-niryukti*¹ mentions another principle of the Jaina Logic called *Syādvāda* (*Syat* “may be” and *Vāda* “assertion,” or the assertion of possibilities) or *Saptabhaṅgī-naya* (the sevenfold paralogism).

The *Syādvāda*² is set forth as follows:—(1) May be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it

1

असिद्धस्य किरियाणं
अकिरियाणं च होइ चुलसीति ।
अभाषिच सत्तही
वेषइयाणं च वत्तीसा ॥ ११ ॥

(*Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-niryukti*, skandha 1, adhyāya 12, p. 448, edited by Bhim Singh Manak and printed in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay).

Cf. *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, p. 316, published by Dhanapat Singh, Benares edition.

² Cf. *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 55. For full particulars about *Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgī-naya* vide *Saptabhaṅgī-taraṅgiṇī* by Vimala Dāsa printed in Bombay.

is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) may be, it is not and it is also indescribable, (7) may be, it is and it is not and it is also indescribable.

9. UMĀSVĀTI (1-85 A.D.).

Jaina philosophy recognises seven categories, viz. (1) the soul (Jīva), (2) the soul-less (Ajīva), (3) action (Karma), (4) bondage (Bandha), (5) restraint (Samvara), (6) destruction of the consequences of action (Nirjarā), and (7) release or salvation (Mokṣa). According to the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra¹ which with a *Bhāṣya* or commentary was composed by one Umāsvāti, these categories can be comprehended only by *Pramāṇa*, the means of valid knowledge and by *Naya*, the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints.

Umāsvāti is better known as Vācaka-śramaṇa: he was also called Nāgaravācaka, this title being probably a reference to his Śākha (spiritual genealogy). The Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya calls him Umāsvāti-vācakācārya.² He lived for 84 years, 8 months, and 6 days and ascended heaven in Samvat 142, i.e. in 85 A.D. In the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra Umāsvāti gives the following account³ of himself:—He was born in a village called Nyagrodhikā, but he wrote the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra in Pāṭliputra or Kusumapura (modern Patna). He belonged to the Kaubhīṣaṇin-gotra. His father was Svāti and he was consequently sometimes called Svāti-

¹ There are commentaries on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra by Pūjyapāda Svāmin called Sarvārtha-siddhi, by Akalaṅkadeva called Tattvārtha-vartikālaṅkāra, etc., which will be mentioned later.

² Vide Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, chapter on Jaina darśana.

³

न्यग्रोधिकाप्रसूतेन विहरता पुरवरे कुसुमनाम्नि ।
कौभौषणिना स्नातितनयेन वात्सौस्तुतेनार्थम् ॥ १ ॥
अर्हद्वचनं सम्यग्मुक्कनेषामतं समुपधार्य ।
दुःखार्तं च दुरागमविहतमतिं लोकमवलोक्य ॥ ४ ॥
इदमुच्चेर्नागरवाचकेन सत्त्वानुकम्पया हृत्स्वम् ।
तत्त्वार्थाधिगमाख्यं स्पष्टसुमास्नातिना शास्त्रम् ॥ ५ ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, chap. X, p. 233, edited by Mody Keshavlal Premchand in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta).

A similar account is found in the commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra by Siddhasenagani. This account is mentioned by Peterson in his 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xvi.

For further particulars about Umāsvāti see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xvi, where he observes that in the Digambara Pativāli published by Dr. Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary, XX, p. 341, Umāsvāmin (probably the

tanaya. He was also known as Vātsī-suta, because his mother was Umā of the Vatsagotra. In the Tīrthakalpa of Jinaprabhasūri, it is stated that Umāsvāti was the author of 500 Sanskrit prakaraṇas (treatises). He is said to have belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, though it is probable that the distinction between that sect and the Digambaras had not in his time come into existence.

10. UMĀSVĀTI'S DOCTRINE OF *Pramāṇa* (RIGHT KNOWLEDGE).

In the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra *Pramāṇa* fluctuates between the meanings of valid knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In its former sense *Pramāṇa*, according to this Sūtra, is of two kinds: (1) *Parokṣa*, indirect knowledge, which is acquired by the soul through external agencies such as the organs of sense, and (2) *Pratyakṣa*, direct knowledge, which is acquired by the soul without the intervention of external agencies. *Parokṣa*, indirect knowledge, includes *matī*¹ and *śruta*, for these are acquired by the soul through the medium of the senses and the mind. Knowledge which is attained by *Yoga* (concentration) in its three stages of *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*—is a species of *Pratyakṣa*, direct knowledge, because it is acquired by the soul not through the medium of the senses.

Umāsvāti contends² that inference (*Anumāna*), comparison

same as Umāsvāti) is included as the sixth Digambara Sūri of the Sarasvatī-gaccha, between Kundakunda and Lohacārya II. According to Dr. Hoernle (*vide* "Two Pattāvalis of the Sarasvatigaccha" by Dr. Hoernle in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XX, October 1891, p. 351) the date of Umāsvāmin's accession is 44 A.D., and he lived for 84 years, 8 months and 6 days. Dr. Hoernle adds, the Kāṣṭhāsamgha arose in the time of Umāsvāmin.

Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra with his *bhāṣya*, together with Pūjā-prakaraṇa, Jambudvīpa-samāsa and Praśamaratī, has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in one volume, which ends thus:—

इति: सिताम्बराचार्यस्य महाकवेरमाखातिवाचकस्य इति ॥

(Jambudvīpa-samāsa, p. 38, published as Appendix C to the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra in the Bibliotheca Indica series).

The Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra has been translated into English by Mr. J. L. Jaini of Indore.

¹ *Matī* is knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind.

Śruta is knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through reasoning and study.

Avadhi is knowledge of things beyond the range of our perception.

Manaḥparyāya is knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others.

Kevala is unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge.

² In the *bhāṣya* on aphorism 12, of Chapter 1 of the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Umāsvāti observes:—

अनुमानोपमानागमार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानपि च प्रमाणा नोति केचिन्नन्यन्ते तत्त्वमेतदिति
अचोचते । सर्वाण्यतानि मतिवृत्तयोरन्तर्भूतानि इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p. 15).

(*Upamāna*), verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āgama*), presumption (*Arthāpatti*), probability (*Sambhava*), and non-existence (*Abhāva*), are not separate sources of valid knowledge: he includes them under *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to his theory the majority of them are the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend; and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

It is interesting to note that according to Umāsvāti and the earlier Jaina philosophers all sense-perceptions (visual perception, auditory perception, etc.) are indirect apprehensions, inasmuch as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of the senses. The words *Parokṣa* and *Pratyakṣa* are thus used by these authors in senses quite opposite to those which they bear in Brāhmaṇic logic and in the later Jaina Logic.¹

11. UMĀSVĀTI'S EXPLANATION OF *Naya* (THE MOOD OF STATEMENTS).

In the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, *Naya*² is described as the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. It is of five kinds:—(1) *Naigama*, the non-distinguished or non-analytical, (2) *Samgraha*, the collective, (3) *Vyavahāra*, the practical, (4) *Rju-sūtra*, the straight or immediate, (5) *Śabda*, the verbal or nominal.

Naigama, the non-analytical, is the method by which an object is regarded as possessing both general and specific properties, no distinction being made between them. For instance, when you use the word "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties some of which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possessed by it in common with other trees. You do not distinguish between these two classes of properties.

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—6 of the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, Umāsvāti observes:—

चतुर्विधमित्येके ।

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 9).

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—35 he mentions the four *Pramāṇas* thus:—

यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानांपमानाप्रवचनैः प्रमाणैरेकोऽर्थः प्रतीयते स्वविषयनियमात् न च ता विप्रतिपत्तयो भवन्ति तद्व्यववादा इति ॥

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 35).

These four kinds of *Pramāṇa* seem to refer to those in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* of the Hindu logician Akṣapāda. But the same four kinds are also referred to as subdivisions of *Hetu* in the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* of the Jains, p. 309, published by Dhanapat Singh and printed in Calcutta.

¹ Here *Parokṣa* stands for *sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa* while *Pratyakṣa* for *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* (vide *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*, chapter II).

² नैमसंयमव्यवहारजुल्लभशब्दा नयाः ॥ १-२५ ॥

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 32).

Samgraha, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration generic properties only, ignoring particular properties.

Samgraha.

Vyavahāra, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only. The general without the particular is a nonentity.

Vayavahāra.

If you ask a person to bring you a plant, he must bring you a particular plant, he can not bring plant in general.

Rjū-sūtra, the straight or immediate, is the method which

Rju-sūtra.

considers a thing as it exists at the moment, without any reference to its past or

its future. It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future. All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Rjū-sūtra* recognises the entity itself (*bhāva*), but does not consider its name (*nāma*) or image (*sthāpanā*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*). The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens. An image of a king can not perform the functions of the king. The causes, which exist in me now and will necessitate my being born hereafter with a different body, can not enable me to enjoy that body now.

Śabda,¹ the verbal, is the method of correct nomenclature. It

Śabda.

is of three kinds, viz. *Sāmprata*, the suitable, *Samabhirūḍha*, the subtle, and *Evambhūta*, the such-like.

In Sanskrit a jar is called *ghaṭa*, *kumbha* or *kalasa*, and these are synonymous terms. *Sāmprata* consists in using a word in its conventional sense, even if that sense is not justified by its derivation. For example the word "*Śatru*," according to its derivation, means "destroyer," but its conventional meaning is "enemy." *Samabhirūḍha* consists in making nice distinctions between synonyms, selecting in each case the word which on etymological grounds is the most appropriate. *Evambhūta* consists in applying to things such names only as their actual condition justifies. Thus a man should not be called *Śakra* (strong), unless he actually possesses the *Śakti* (strength) which the name implies.

¹ Umāsvāti in his *bhāṣya* on 1-35 observes :—

यथार्थाभिधानं शब्दः नामादिषु प्रसिद्धपूर्वाशब्दाद् अर्थे प्रत्ययः साम्प्रतः सत्तु अर्थेषु
असंक्रमः समभिहृतः । अश्वनार्थयोरिवभूत इति ॥

(Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, p. 32).

CHAPTER III.

Jaina writers on Systematic Logic.

12. THE WRITTEN RECORDS OF THE JAINAS (COMMENCING FROM 453 A.D.).

The teachings of Mahāvīra as contained in the Jaina *Āgamas* are said to have been handed down by memory for several centuries until in Vira Saṃvat 980 or A.D. 453, they were codified in writing by Devardhi Gaṇi,¹ otherwise known as Kṣamāśramaṇa, at a council held at Valabhi (near Bhavanagara in Guzerat). According to this theory the authentic history of the Jaina literature commences from 453 A.D., and all that preceded that period is to be regarded as merely traditional.

13. SYSTEMATIC JAINA LOGIC.

During the era of tradition there existed no systematic Jaina treatise on Logic, its principles being included in the works on metaphysics and religion. With the commencement of the historical period in 453 A.D. there grew up, among the Jainas of both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, a band of scholars who devoted themselves to the study of logic with great interest and enthusiasm. They wrote treatises on logic the rules of which clashed neither with the religious dogmas of the Brāhmaṇas nor with those of the Buddhists and Jainas. These treatises, along with the similar works of the Buddhists, contributed to the formation of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic.

¹ Vide Dr. Klatt's *Pattāvali* of the Kharataragaccha in the *Indian Antiquary*, Sept. 1882, Vol. XI, p. 247; and Dr. Jacobi's *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, p. 15. See also Vinaya Vijaya Gaṇi's commentary on the *Kalpasūtra* which quotes the following text:—

बलविपुराणि नयरे ।
देवद्वि पसुद सयलसंवेदि ।
पुत्रे चागम लिङ्गि ।
नवसय असौ जानु वीराड ॥ १ ॥

(Sukhabodhikā-ṭikā to *Kalpasūtra*, p. 433, printed in Kathiwar by Hira Lal Hamsarāja).

In Devardhi Gaṇi's redaction of the *Kalpasūtra* (vide Dr. Jacobi's edition of the *Kalpasūtra*, p. 67) we read:—

Samaṇassa bhagavao Mahāvīraṇa jāva savva-dukkha-ppahīṇassa navavāsasa-yāṃ vikkamtaṃ dasamaṇa ya vāsa-sayassa, ayaṃ asī ime saṃvacchare kāle gacchaṃ iti (148).

14. SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA *alias* KṢAPAṆAKA
(ABOUT 480—550 A.D.).

The first Jaina writer on systematic logic was Siddhasena Divākara. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called *Nyāyāvatāra*¹ in thirty-two short stanzas.

Siddhasena Divākara is also famous as the author of the *Sammatitarka-sūtra* which is a work in *Prākṛta* on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the *Śvetāmbara* sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Sūri (*q.v.*) in his *Vicāra-sāra-prakarāṇa*² and by Jina Sena Sūri in the *Ādipurāṇa* dated 783 A.D.

Siddhasena, who was a pupil of *Vṛddha-vādisūri*, received the name of *Kumuda-candra*³ at the time of ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the *Līṅga*, the *Brāhmaṇical* symbol of *Rudra*, in the temple of *Mahākāla* at *Ujjainī*, and to have called forth an image of *Pārśvanātha* by reciting his *Kalyāṇa-mandira-stava*. He is believed by Jainas to have converted *Vikramāditya* to Jainism 470 years after the *nirvāṇa* of *Mahāvīra*, that is, in 57 B.C.⁴

But *Vikramāditya* of *Ujjainī* does not seem to be so old, as he has been identified by scholars with *Yaśodharma Deva*, king of *Malwa*, who, on the authority of *Alberuni*, defeated the *Huns* at *Korur* in 533 A.D. This view of scholars agrees well with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim *Hwen-thsang*, who visited *India* in 629 A.D. and says that a very powerful king, presumably *Vikramāditya*, reigned at *Ujjainī* 60 years before his arrival there.⁵ Moreover, *Varāhamihira*, who was one of the nine *Gems* at the court of *Vikramāditya*, is known to have lived between 505 A.D.

¹ *Vide* No. 741 in the list of MSS. purchased for the Bombay Government as noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 289. A manuscript of the *Nyāyāvatāra* with *Vivṛti* was procured for me from *Bhavanagara*, *Bombay*, by *Muni Dharma-vijaya* and his pupil *Śrī Indravijaya*. The *Nyāyāvatāra* with commentary and translation edited by *Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana* is available in *Calcutta* and *Arrah*.

²

पंचेव य वरिससय सिद्धसेणदिवायरो य जयपयडो ।

इवसय वीसदिर सङ्गयुक्त चञ्जराकल्पः ॥ २६ ॥

(*Vicāra-sāra-prakarāṇa*, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272).

³ Cf. *Prabhāvakacaritra* VIII, V. 57.

⁴ For other particulars about Siddhasena Divākara see Dr. Klatt's *Pattāvali* of the *Kharataragaccha* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247. *Vide* also Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's report on *Sanskrit MSS.*, during 1883-84, pp. 118, 140. Also the *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi* translated by Mr. Tawney in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of *Calcutta*, pp. 10-14.

⁵ *Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records*, Vol. II, p. 261.

and 587 A.D.¹ It is therefore very probable that Vikramāditya and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at Ujjainī about 530 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was no other than *Kṣapaṇaka*² (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally known to the Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

Siddhasena Divākara seems to have been a senior contemporary of Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (484–588 A.D.) who criticises *Dvātriṃśat-dvātriṃśikā* of which the *Nyāyāvatāra* is a part.

15. SIDDHASENA'S NYĀYĀVATĀRA.

The *Nyāyāvatāra* written in Sanskrit verse gives an exposition of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (sources of valid knowledge) and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular stand-points).

Pramāṇa—Right Knowledge.

Pramāṇa is right knowledge which illumines itself as well as other things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds: (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*). Direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) is two-fold: (1) practical (*Vyāvahārika*) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul

¹ Varāhamihira chose Śaka 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time:

सप्तसि वेदसंख्यं शककालमपास्य चैवशुक्लादौ ।

अर्द्धास्त्रमिते भानौ यवनपुरे सौम्य दिवसाद्ये ॥ ८ ॥

(*Pañcasiddhāntikā*, chap. 1, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhākara Dvivedi).

Vide also Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to the *Pañcasiddhāntikā*, p. xxx.

² The nine Gems are:—

धन्वन्तरिः क्षणिकोऽमरसिंहः शङ्खु

वेतालभट्ट घटखर्पर कालिदासः ।

ख्यातो वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिषः सभायां

रत्नानि वै वरसि नैव विक्रमस्य ॥

(*Jyotirvidābharaṇa*).

In the *Pañcatantra* and other Brahmanic Sanskrit works as well as in the *Avadānakalpalatā* and other Buddhist Sanskrit works the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as *Kṣapaṇaka*:

भगवद्भाषितं तत्तु सुभद्रेण निवेदितम् ।

श्रुत्वा क्षणिकः क्षिप्रमभूद द्वेषविषाकुलः ॥ २ ॥

तस्य सर्वज्ञतां वेति सुभद्रो यदि मङ्गिरा ।

तदेव क्षणिकश्चां त्यज्यति अमणादरात् ॥ १२ ॥

(*Avadānakalpalatā*, *Jyotiṣkāvadāna*).

through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (*Manas*), and (2) transcendental (*Pāramārthika*) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul: it is called *Kevala* or absolute knowledge.

Indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*) is also of two kinds: (1) inference (*Anumāna*) and (2) verbal testimony (*Śabda*). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable: the word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or *Laukika Śabda*. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference: for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or *Śāstraśabda*. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognised or composed by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.¹

Inference (*Anumāna*) is the correct knowledge of the major term (*Sādhya*) derived through the middle term (*Hetu*, reason, or *Liṅga*, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's own self (*Svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*Parārthānumāna*).

The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire is always an antecedent of smoke. Afterwards, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke, he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self.

If the inference is communicated to others through words, it

is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows :—

- (1) The *hill* (minor term or *Pakṣa*) is full of *fire* (major term or *Sādhya*) ;
- (2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term or *Hetu*) ;
- (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g. a *kitchen* (example or *Drṣtānta*) ;
- (4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or *Upanaya*) :—
- (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or *Nigamana*).

In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*Pakṣa*) and the predicate the major term (*Sādhya*).
 Terms of a syllogism. The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition “the hill is full of fire,” the *hill* is the minor term and *fire* major term. The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition : “the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke,” *smoke* is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (*Drṣtānta*) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (*Sādharmya*), such as “the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a *kitchen*,” and (2) heterogeneous or negative (*Vaidharmya*) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as “where there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a *lake*.”

In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (*Pakṣa*) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form :—

Having fire, | Because having smoke.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood.

If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed, is opposed by evidence, public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) of which there are many varieties.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus:—

(1) "The jar is corporeal (*paudgalika*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.

(3) "The general particular (*sāmānya viśeṣa*) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"—this is opposed to perception.

(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with public opinion.

(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

Inseparable connection or invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) is the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference: "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke," the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the constant presence of fire with smoke, is called *Vyāpti* or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds: (1) Intrinsic, and (2) Extrinsic.

Intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*), itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*), shows the inseparable connection between them, thus:—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term) :

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide.

Extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus:—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term) ;

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term) ;

(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference, but is introduced from without as a common instance

of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them.

Some logicians hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by intrinsic inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) only: hence the extrinsic inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) is superfluous.

The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Het-vābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds:—

Fallacies of the middle term.

(1) The unproved (*Asiddha*): This is fragrant, because it is a sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz. the sky-lotus, is unreal.

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*): “This is fiery, because it is a body of water.”

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anaikāntika*): “Sound is eternal, because it is always audible.”

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain, because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity.

The fallacy of example (*Drṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form, from a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) or major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them.

Fallacies of homogeneous of example.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows:—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), like *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of valid knowledge* (middle term), like a *dream* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (*hetu*), for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is not *existent* (major term), because he is not *apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like a *jar* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is *non-omniscient* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

It is stated in the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmyadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz. :—

(1) Unconnected (*Ananvaya*), such as : This person is *full of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Magadha* (example).

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between “being a speaker” and “being full of passions.”

(2) Of connection unshown (*Apradar̥śitānvaya*), such as :—

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term), as a jar (example).

Here though there is an inseparable connection between “produced” and “non-eternal,” yet it has not been shown in the proper form as :—

“Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a jar.”

(3) Of inverted connection (*Viparītānvaya*), such as :—

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term).

Here if the inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) is shown thus—

“Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar,” instead of—

“Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar,” the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection.

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example
Fallacies of heterogeneous example. (*Vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*) are of six kinds, thus :—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term) : whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid.

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term) : whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka*, is not a source of knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a

defect in the middle term (*sādhana*), for inference is really a source of knowledge though it has been cited as not such.

(3) Sound is eternal and *non-eternal* (major term), because it is an *existence* (middle term): whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence."

(4) Kapila is not *omniscient* (major term), because he is not a *propounder of the four noble truths* (middle term): whoever is omniscient is propounder of the four noble truths, as *Buddha* (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (*sādhya*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient.

(5) This person is *untrustworthy* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term): whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (*hetu*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) Kapila is not devoid of *passions* (major term), because he did *not give his own flesh to the hungry* (middle term): whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry.

It is stated in the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (*Vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz.—

(1) Unseparated (*Avyatireki*): This person is not *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term): whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a *piece of stone* (heterogeneous example).

Here, though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no invariable separation (*vyatireka vyāpti*) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker."

(2) Of separation unshown (*Apradarśitavyatireka*):

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term); as ether (example).

Here, though there is an invariable separation between "produced" and "eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as: "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether."

(3) Of contrary separation (*Viparīta-vyatireka*):

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term): whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g. ether (example).

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been: Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g. ether."

Refutation (*Dūṣaṇa*) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies

Refutation. in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The sem-

blance of a refutation (*Dūṣaṇābhāsa*) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all.

The immediate effect of *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (*Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (*Mokṣa* or final emancipation), while that of the other kinds of *Pramāṇa* (direct and indirect knowledge) is the facility which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things.

Naya—the method of descriptions.

Naya is the method of comprehending things from particular

Naya or the method of comprehending things from particular stand-standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose

as distinguished from other flowers. The *Naya* is of seven kinds: *naigama*, *saṁgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *saṁabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.

Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object

Syādvāda. through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-śruta*.

It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (*Jīva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer and enjoyer. It undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*, with which all of us are familiar and which serves to perform all practical functions, cannot be traced to its beginning or followed to its end.

16. JINABHADRA GAṆI KṢAMĀŚRAMAṆA (484—588 A.D.).

Jinabhadra Gaṇi, author of a commentary on the *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* called *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*, was born in Saṁvat 541 or 484 A.D. He was well known as *Kṣamāśramaṇa*, and continued to be pontiff from 528 A.D. to 588 A.D.¹

¹ Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxxix.

17. SIDDHASENA GAṆI
(600 A.D.).

Siddhasena Gaṇi, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was the author of a commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called Tattvārthatīkā,¹ in which the logical principles of *Pramāṇa* (the sources of knowledge), and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints), have been fully discussed. He was a pupil of Bhāsvāmin² who was a spiritual successor of Simhasūri, himself a disciple of Dinna Gaṇi. Siddhasena Gaṇi³ is generally believed to have been a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, who flourished 980 years after Mahāvīra, or about 453 A.D. But as he has in his Tattvārthatīkā quoted Siddhasena Divākara and was posterior to Simhagiri or Simhasūri, a contemporary of Vikramāditya, I am inclined to suppose that he lived after 533 A.D. or about 600 A.D.

18. SAMANTABHADRA
(600 A.D.).

Samantabhadra, who belonged to the Digambara sect of Southern India, was famous as the author of a well-known commentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called Gandha-hasti-mahābhāṣya. The introductory part of this commentary is called Devāgamastotra⁴ or Āptamīmāṃsā, and is replete with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Vāda.⁵ The Āptamīm-

¹ A palm-leaf manuscript of the Tattvārthatīkā in the temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, has been noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 83-86.

²

तत्पादरजोऽवयवः स्वप्नागमद्योमुषीकवज्जजायः ।

तत्तार्थशास्त्रटीकाभिमां अधात् सिद्धसेनगणिः ॥ ७

(Tattvārthatīkā, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 85).

³ Simhasūri is identified by Peterson with Simhagiri who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya.

(Peterson's 4th Report, pp. cxxxi and cxxviii).

Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Indra-vijaya tell me that Siddhasena Gaṇi was a contemporary of Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, who flourished 980 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra. *Vide* also Uvāśagadasāo edited by A. F. R. Hoernle, Appendix III, page 50.

⁴ In the Pāṇḍavapurāṇa Samantabhadra is extolled as the author of the Devāgamastotra:—

समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थी मातु भारतभूषणः

देवागमेन येनाय यत्ता देवागमः कृतः ॥

(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, p. 157).

⁵

चद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि ह्यहो भेदो विवक्ष्यते ।

कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वप्नात् प्रजायते ॥ १४ ॥

(Āptamīmāṃsā, verse 24).

māmsā has been cited by the Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra¹ in explaining Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of the Syādvāda doctrine in the Vedānta-sūtra.

Samantabhadra, who was styled a Kavi and whose works were commented on by Vidyānanda² and Prabhācandra, was also the author of the Yuktyanuśāsana, the Ratnakaraṇḍaka (also called Upāsakādhyayana), the Svayambhū-stotra, and the Caturviṃśati-jina-stuti. He is mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādipurāṇa composed about 838 A.D., and is referred to by the Hindu philosopher Kumārila.³ Kumārila, a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, is generally held to have lived in the 7th century A.D. Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A.D.

¹ Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī-tīkā on Śaṅkara's exposition of the Vedānta Sūtra, 2-2-33, quotes the following verse:—

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किं वृत्तचिद्विधः ।

सप्रभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकः ॥

(Bhāmatī, Bibliotheca Indica, p. 458).

The same verse occurs in the Āptamīmāṃsā as follows:—

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किं वृत्तचिद्विधः ।

सप्रभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेय विशेषकः ॥ १०४ ॥

(MSS. of the Āptamīmāṃsā, verse 104, borrowed from Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur).

² Vidyānanda at the closing part of his commentary on the Āptamīmāṃsā (called Āpta-mīmāṃsālaṅkāṭī-tīkā aṣṭasāhasrī) refers to Samantabhadra thus:—

येनाद्येषकुनीतिवृत्तिसरितः प्रेक्षावतां शोचिताः

सदाचेष्ट्यकलङ्कनीतिवृत्तिरास्तत्तार्थसार्थद्युतः ।

स औखामि समन्तभद्र यतिभट्ट भूयाद् विभुर्भानुमान

विद्यानन्दफलप्रदोऽनवधिषां साद्वादमार्गाग्रणीः ॥

(Folio 218, Āptamīmāṃsālaṅkāṭī-tīkā, Govt. Collection, in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. 1525).

Prabhācandra in his commentary on the Ratnakaraṇḍaka (or Upāsakādhyayana) observes:—

येनाज्ञानतमो विनाश्य निखिलं भव्यात्मचेतोगतं

सम्यग् ज्ञानमहाशुभिः प्रकटितः सागारमार्गोऽखिलः ।

स श्रीरत्नकरखकामलरविः संदृष्टरिच्छोषको

जीवादेव समन्तभद्रमुनिपः श्रीमत्प्रभेन्दुर्जिनः ॥

(Upāsakādhyayana with the commentary of Prabhācandra noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, pp. 137-38).

³ Vide Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 118, and J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 227.

19. SAMANTABHADRA'S ĀPTAMIMĀMSĀ.

Syād-vāda.

The Āptamīmāṃsā consists of 115 stanzas in Sanskrit, divided into ten chapters called *Paricchedas*, in the course of which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *Syād-vāda* or *Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya* has been given. The first and second parts of the doctrine, viz. *Syād-asti* ("may be, it is"), and *Syād-nāsti* ("may be, it is not"), have led to a most interesting discussion of the relation between *asti*, that is, *bhāva* or existence, and *nāsti*, that is, *abhāva* or non-existence.

Non-existence (*Abhāva*) is divided into four kinds: (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), e.g. a lump of clay becomes non-existent as soon as a jar is made out of it, so the jar is an antecedent non-existence with reference to the lump of clay; (2) subsequent non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), e.g. the lump of clay is a subsequent non-existence with reference to the jar; (3) mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *anyāpoha*), e.g. a jar and a post are mutually non-existent with reference to each other; and (4) absolute non-existence (*samavāyābhāva* or *atyantābhāva*), e.g. the inanimate is not a living object.

It is observed¹ that, on the supposition of mere existence to the entire exclusion of non-existence, things become all-pervading, beginningless, endless, indistinguishable and inconceivable. For instance, if the antecedent non-existence is denied, action and substance become beginningless, while on the denial of the subsequent non-existence, they become endless, and in the absence of

1

भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपञ्चवात् ।
 सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमभावकम् ॥ ९ ॥
 कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निरुद्धे ।
 प्रध्वंसस्य च ध्वंसस्य प्रत्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥ १० ॥
 सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोचव्यतिक्रमे ।
 अन्यत्र समवायेन व्यपदेश्येत सर्वथा ॥ ११ ॥
 अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापन्धववादिनाम् ।
 अवबोधवाक्यप्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥ १२ ॥
 विरोधान्नोभयैकार्थं स्याद्वादन्याय विद्विषाम् ।
 अवाच्यैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥ १३ ॥
 कथं चित्ते सदेवेष्टं कथंचिदसदेव तत् ।
 तथोभयमवाच्यं च उपयोगाच्च सर्वथा ॥ १४ ॥

(Āptamīmāṃsā, MSS., verses 9-14, lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur).

mutual non-existence, they become one and all-pervading, while on absolute non-existence being denied, they are to be supposed as existing always and everywhere.

In the same way on the supposition of mere non-existence to the entire exclusion of existence, it becomes impossible to establish or reject anything (since it is non-existent). If on the other hand existence and non-existence, which are incompatible with each other, are simultaneously ascribed to a thing, it becomes indescribable. Therefore the truth is as follows:—

- (1) A thing *is* existent—from a certain point of view.
- (2) It *is* non-existent—from another point of view.
- (3) It is *both* existent and non-existent *in turn*—from a third point of view.
- (4) It is *indescribable* (that is. both existent and non-existent simultaneously)—from a fourth point of view.
- (5) It *is* existent and *indescribable*—from a fifth point of view.
- (6) It *is* non-existent and *indescribable*—from a sixth point of view.
- (7) It *is both* existent and non-existent and *indescribable*—from a seventh point of view.

20. AKALAṆKADEVA (ABOUT 750 A.D.).

Akalaṇka, otherwise known as Akalaṇkadeva or Akalaṇkacandra, was a famous logician who belonged to the Digambara sect of Southern India. He was designated as a *Kavi*¹ (poet)—a title of special honour given to writers of repute. He wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā called *Aṣṭa-śatī*² which is a most precious work on the Jaina philosophy, dealing mainly with logic. Māṇikyanandi's *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra* (q.v.) was based on another work on logic, called *Nyāya-viniścaya*, written by Akalaṇka, to whom the following works are also attributed: *Tattvārtha-vārtika-vyākhyānālaṅkāra*, *Laghīyastraya*, *Akalaṇka-stotra*, *Svarūpa-sambodhana* and *Prāyaścitta*. Laghusamantabhadra³ in his *Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-ṣaṃmapada-tātparyā-ṭīkā* calls Akalaṇka as *Sakala-tārṅkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi* or "the crest-gem of the circle of all logicians."

¹ For an explanation of the term "Kavi" vide R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, page 122.

² A manuscript of the *Aṣṭa-śatī* was kindly supplied to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur early in 1907.

³ Vide *Aṣṭasāhasrī-ṣaṃmapada-tātparyā-ṭīkā* by Laghusamanta-bhadra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 217.

In the Pāṇḍavapurāṇa¹ reference is made to a legend according to which Akalaṅka was embarrassed in a controversy with a Buddhist antagonist. Finding that the antagonist was effectively prompted by Māyādevī concealed in a jar, Akalaṅka is said to have put an end to that prompting or inspiration by kicking the jar over with his foot.

Akalaṅka, though mentioned along with Dharmakīrti² as a logician, flourished at a considerably later time. He is held to have been a contemporary of Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Śubhatuṅga³ or Kṛṣṇarāja I. As Kṛṣṇarāja's son, Govind II, lived in Śaka 705⁴ or 783 A.D., Kṛṣṇarāja I, and consequently his contemporary Akalaṅka, must have flourished about 750 A.D.

21. VIDYĀNANDA (ABOUT 800 A.D.).

Vidyānanda, mentioned by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya,⁵ was a Digambara logician of Pāṭalīputra. He was the author of the Āptamīmāṃsālaṅkārti, otherwise called Aṣṭasāhasrī, an exhaustive sub-commentary on the Āptamīmāṃsā, containing an elaborate exposition of various logical principles. Vidyānanda, in the opening and the closing lines of his Aṣṭasāhasrī,⁶ makes an indirect reference

¹

अकलङ्कोऽकलङ्कः स कलौ कलयतु श्रुतम् ।

पादेन ताडिता येन मायादेवी घटस्थिता ॥

(Pāṇḍavapurāṇa, noticed by Peterson in his 4th Report, p. 157).

² वाचकमुखाविरचितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणिमूतानि तत्त्वार्थसूत्राणीति यद्येवमकलङ्क-धर्मकौर्त्यादिवत् प्रकरणमेव किं नारभ्यते किमनया सूत्रकारत्वाद्दोषद्वयविक्रया ।

(Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, by Hemacandra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 148).

³ Vide K. B. Pathak's article on "Bhartṛhari and Kumārila" in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XVIII, 1892.

It is reported that Akalaṅka and Niṣkalaṅka were two sons of Śubhatuṅga whose capital was Mānyakheta. Śubhatuṅga is another name of Kṛṣṇarāja the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king who reigned in the Deccan between 753-775 A.D. Akalaṅka forsook his father's palace and became an ascetic. (Vide Peterson's Report II, p. 79).

⁴ Vide R. G. Bhandarkar's "Early History of the Deccan," 2nd edition, p. 78.

⁵ Vide the chapter on the Jaina system in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 56.

⁶ The opening lines of the Aṣṭasāhasrī are:—

श्रीवर्द्धमानमभिवन्द्य समस्तभद्रमुद्गूतबोधमहिमानमनिन्द्यवाचम् ।

शाखावताररचितस्तुतिगोचरात्ममीमांसितं कृतिरलङ्कियते मयाद्य ॥ १ ॥

The closing lines of the Aṣṭasāhasrī are:—

श्रीमदकलङ्कशश्वरकुल विद्यानन्दसञ्जवा भूषात् ।

गुहमीमांसाङ्ककृतिरहसादौ सतादौ ॥

to Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka respectively, while in chapter X of the work he distinctly says that he followed the Aṣṭa-śati of Akalaṅka in explaining the Āptamīmāṃsā. Another logical treatise called Pramāṇa-parīkṣā is attributed to him. He was also the author of the Tattvārtha, śloka-vārtika and Āpta-parīkṣā.

He has, in his Aṣṭasāhasrī, criticised the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mīmāṃsaka and Saugata, Tāthāgata or Bauddha philosophy; and has mentioned Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti,¹ Prajñākara,² Bhartṛhari,³ Śabarasaṃvāmi, Prabhākara, Sureśvara⁴ and Kumārila. Vidyānanda was otherwise named Pātra Kesari or Pātra Kesari Svāmi, who has been praised by Jina

The lines in Chapter X referred to run thus :—

श्रीमदकलङ्कविरतां समन्तभद्रोक्तिमत्र संचेपात् ।

परमागमार्थविषयामस्तुसादृशीं प्रकाशयति ॥

(Aṣṭasāhasrī, MSS., Asiatic Society of Bengal).

¹ यदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिना :—

अतद्रूप पराहत वस्तुमात्र प्रवेदनात् ।

सामान्यविषयश्रोतं लिङ्गभेदाप्रतिष्ठितैः ।

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I).

अर्थोपयोगेऽपि पुनः स्मार्तं शब्दानुयोजनम् ।

अचक्षीर्यश्चपेक्षेत सोऽर्थो व्यवहितो भवेत् ।

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I).

² प्रज्ञाकरस्येदं वचः :—

क्रमप्रतीतेरेवं स्यात् प्रथमस्मावना मतिः ।

तत्त्वानर्थ्यात् पुनः पश्चाद् वतः कर्ता प्रतीयते ॥

(Quoted in Aṣṭasāhasrī, chap. I).

This extract may be an interpolation, or else this Prajñākara must be different from the Buddhist logician Prajñākara Gupta to be mentioned hereafter.

³

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्वे ।

अनुविद्वन्निवाभाति सर्वं शब्दे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥

(This verse of Vākyapadīya by Bhartṛhari is quoted in the Aṣṭasāhasrī, vide J B.B.R.A.S. for 1892, p. 221).

⁴ यदुक्तं हृदयारण्यक वार्तिके :—

आत्मापि सद्विदं ब्रह्म मोक्षार्थं पारोक्ष्यं दूषितम् ।

ब्रह्मापि स तथैवात्मा स द्वितीयं तरेष्यते ॥.....

इति कश्चित् श्रोत्रिणं न प्रेषावान्

(Aṣṭasāhasrī).

Cf. Preface to Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, edited by Manohar Lal, Bombay.

Sena in the Ādi Purāṇa¹ composed about Śaka 760² or A.D. 838. He is believed to have lived early in the 9th century A.D.³ at Pāṭalīputra.⁴

22. MĀṆIKYA NANDI (ABOUT 800 A.D.).

Māṇikya Nandi was a Digambara author, whose Parīkṣā-mukha-śāstra⁵ or Parīkṣā-mukhā-sūtra is a standard work on Jaina logic. As his work is based on that of Akalaṅka,⁶ he must have lived after 750 A.D. The earliest commentary on the Parīkṣāmukha-śāstra is the Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa of Prabhācandra. Vidyānanda, Māṇikya Nandi and Prabhācandra have been pronounced to be contemporaries.⁷ So Māṇikya Nandi seems to have lived about 800 A.D.

23. MĀṆIKYA NANDI'S PARIKṢĀMUKHA-SŪTRA.

The Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra is divided into six chapters thus:
 Subjects. (1) the characteristic of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa-svarūpa*); (2) direct apprehension or perception (*Pratyakṣa*); (3) indirect apprehension (*Parokṣa*); (4) the object of valid knowledge (*Viśaya*); (5) the result of valid knowledge (*Phala*); and (6) the semblances or fallacies (*Ābhāsa*).

1

भट्टकलंक त्रीपाल पात्रकेसरिणां गुणाः ।

विदुषां हृदयारुद्धा हारायन्तेतिनिर्मलाः ॥ ५३ ॥

(Ādipurāṇa, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak, J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 222).

Mr. Pathak has quoted Samyaktvaparakāśa to show that Vidyānanda and Pātrakesari were identical:—

तथा स्त्रीकवार्तिके विद्यानन्दपरनाम पात्रकेसरिस्त्रामिना यदुक्तं तच्च लिख्यते तच्चार्यं
 अज्ञानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् । (J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, pp. 222, 223).

² Vide K. B. Pathak's article on Bhartṛhari and Kumārila in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, pp. 227, 229.

⁴ Vide Brahmanemidatta's Kathākośa, life of Pātrakesari *alias* Vidyānanda.

⁵ A manuscript of the Parīkṣā-mukha-śāstra was kindly lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur (Rajputana), and subsequently another manuscript of the work was procured from the Deccan College, Poona. I have published the work in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta.

⁶ Peterson in his 4th Report, p. 155, notices Parīkṣāmukhaṁ satīkam. The Tīkā is the Prameya-ratna-mālā or Parīkṣāmukhapañjikā of Anantavīrya, which opens thus:—

अकलङ्कवचोऽम्बोधेदद्रे येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यामृतं तस्मै नमो मायिष्वनन्दिने ॥ १ ॥

⁷ Vide K. B. Pathak's article on Bhartṛhari and Kumārila in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, pp. 219, 220, 221. Mr. Pathak says that Māṇikya Nandi has mentioned Vidyānanda, but in the text of the Parīkṣā-mukha-śāstra itself I have not come across any such mention.

Valid knowledge—*Pramāṇa*.

Pramāṇa, valid knowledge, is defined by Māṇikya Nandi as the

Right knowledge.

knowledge which ascertains the nature of what was uncertain to one's self. It gener-

ally arises in the form: "I know the jar by myself," which consists of a subject, an object, an act, and an instrument. Just as a lamp illumines itself as well as the surrounding objects, so the *Pramāṇa* exhibits the knower as well as the thing known.

Pramāṇa is of two kinds: (1) direct knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) which arises through the senses, etc., and (2) indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa*) consisting of recollection (*Smṛti*), recognition (*Pratyabhijñāna*), argumentation (*Tarka* or *Ūha*), inference (*Anumāna*), and the scripture (*Āgama*). Recollection is a knowledge of the form

Kinds of right knowledge.

"that" which arises through the awaking of impressions, thus: "that Devadatta."

Recognition is a knowledge which arises from perception through recollection in the forms, "this is that," "this is like that," "this is different from that," "this is the counterpart of that," etc., thus: "this is that Devadatta," "the *bos gavaeus* is like the cow," "the buffalo is different from the cow," "this is far from that," "this is a tree," etc. Argumentation is a knowledge of the connection between the middle term and the major term based on the presence or absence of the latter, in the form, "if this is, that is, if this is not, that is not," thus smoke arises only if there is fire, but it cannot arise if there is no fire. Inference¹ is the knowledge of the major term arising through the middle term: there is fire here, because there is smoke.

Syllogism—*Vyāpti*.

Pervasion² or inseparable connection (*Vyāpti* or *Avinābhāva*)

Terms of a Syllogism.

is the universal attendance of the middle term by the major term in simultaneity or succession: thus fire and smoke may abide simultaneously or the latter may follow the former.

If the middle term and the major term exist simultaneously, the former is called *vyāpya*, pervaded or contained, and the latter *vyāpaka*, pervader or container.

But if the middle term follows the major term, the former is called effect (*kārya*), and the latter cause (*kāraṇa* or *hetu*), thus fire is the cause of smoke. Ordinarily, however, the major term is called *sādhya* or that which is to be proved, and the

¹ साधनात् साध्यविज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ ८ ॥ (Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra).

² सहस्रमभावनिश्चयोऽविनाभावः ॥ ११ ॥ (Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra).

middle term is called *sādhana* or that by which it is to be proved. Sometimes the major term is also called *dharma* or predicate, and the middle term *liṅga*, mark or sign.

The minor term is called *Pakṣa*, the place or locus in which the major term abides, or *Dharmin*, the subject, thus: "this place is fiery"; "sound is mutable": here "this place" and "sound" are the minor terms. No philosophers, who divide the middle term (reason) into three phases, should dispense with the minor term in an inference.

The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which is inseparably connected with the major term, or in other words, which cannot come into existence unless the major term exists. For instance, smoke could not come into existence unless the fire existed.

Reason—*hetu*.

The middle term or reason (*Hetu*) is divided as (1) perceptible (*upalabdhi*), and (2) imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*). Each of these again may occur in the form of an affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*pratiṣedha*).

The *perceptible* reason in the *affirmative* form admits of six subdivisions according as it is:—

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—sound is mutable, because it is factitious;
- (ii) an effect (*kārya*)—this man has got intellect, because there are (intellectual) functions in him;
- (iii) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is a shadow here, because there is an umbrella;
- (iv) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇī stars will rise, for the Kṛttikās have risen;
- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī stars certainly rose for the Kṛttikās have risen;
- (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had a mother, for he had a father; or this mango has a particular colour, because it has a particular flavour.

The *perceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of six subdivisions as follows:—

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no cold sensation, because of heat;
- (ii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no cold sensation because of smoke;
- (iii) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is no happiness in this man, because of the shaft in his heart;
- (iv) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇī stars will not rise shortly, for the Revatī [only] has risen.

- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī did not rise a moment ago, for the Puṣyā has risen.
- (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—there is no doubt of the existence of the other side of this wall, for this side of it is perceived.

The *imperceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of seven subdivisions as follows :—

- (i) identity (*svabhāva*)—there is no jar here, because it is imperceptible ;
- (ii) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no Śimśapā here, because there is no tree at all ;
- (iii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no smouldering fire here, because there is no smoke ;
- (iv) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is no smoke here, because there is no fire ;
- (v) prior (*pūrva*)—Rohinī stars will not rise in a moment, for the Kṛttikās are not perceptible ;
- (vi) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī did not rise a moment ago, for the Kṛttikās are not perceptible ;
- (vii) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—in this even balance there is no bending upwards, because it is not perceptible.

The *imperceptible* reason in the *affirmative* form may appear in the following ways :—

- (i) as an effect (*kārya*)—in this man there is some disease, because there is no healthy movement in him ;
- (ii) as a cause (*kāraṇa*)—this man is sorrowful, because he has no union with his beloved ones ;
- (iii) as an identity (*svabhāva*)—there is uncertainty here, because certainty is not discernible.

Example—*drṣṭānta*.

The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but the example (*udāharaṇa*) is not. Nevertheless for the sake of explaining matters to men of small intellect, the example (*udāharaṇa* or *drṣṭānta*), nay, even the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*), are admitted as parts of an inference. The example is of two kinds : (1) the affirmative or homogeneous (*anvayi* or *sādharmya*) which shows the middle term as covered by the major term, such as : wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen ; and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *vaidharmya*) by which the absence of the middle term is indicated by the absence of the major term, e.g. wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake.

Inference—*anumāna*.

Inference is of two kinds, viz. (1) inference for one's own self
 Two kinds of Inference. (*svārthānumāna*), and (2) inference for the
 sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). An in-
 stance of the latter kind of inference is given below :—

- (1) Sound (minor term) is mutable (major term)—proposition ;
- (2) because it is factitious (reason or middle term) ;
- (3) whatever is factitious is mutable, as a jar (affirmative or
homogeneous example) ;
- (4) sound is factitious (application) ;
- (5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion).

Or,

- (3) whatever is not mutable is not factitious, as the milk of a
barren woman's breast (negative or heterogeneous ex-
ample) ;
- (4) but sound is factitious (application) ;
- (5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion).

Verbal Testimony—*āgama*.

Testimony (*Āgama*) is a knowledge of objects derived from
 the words of reliable persons or scriptures in
 Verbal Testimony. virtue of their natural fitness or suggestive-
 ness—e.g. the north pole exists.

Scope of Valid Knowledge—*Viśaya*.

Objects of valid knowledge are either general (*sāmānya*) or
 particular (*viśeṣa*). The general is of two
 Objects of valid know- kinds : (1) homogeneous (*tīryak*), including
 ledge. many individuals of like nature, as the
 "cow" is a general notion which signifies many individual cows as
Śabalā, *Khamba*, *Mumbha*, etc. ; and (2) heterogeneous (*ūrdhvatā*),
 including many individuals of dissimilar nature, as, "gold"
 is a general notion comprising a bracelet, necklace, ear-ring, etc.
 The particular is also of two kinds : (1) relating to things (*vyati-
reka*), e.g. cow, buffalo, elephant, dog, are four particular things
 distinguished from one another ; and (2) relating to action such as
 pleasure, pain, etc., experienced by the soul.

The result or consequence of valid knowledge is the cessation
 of ignorance, enabling one to choose the
 Result of valid knowledge. desirable and reject the undesirable.

Fallacy—*ābhāsa*.

Fallacy or semblance consists of the knowledge of that which
 is different from the real thing. It is of
 Various kinds of Fallacies. many kinds, such as the fallacy—

- (1) of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*). e.g.—to mistake a post for a
man ;

- (2) of recollection (*smaranābhāsa*)—in trying to recollect Jina-datta to say: “O, that Devadatta”;
- (3) of recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*)—on seeing a greyhound to say: “this is a tiger”;
- (4) of argumentation (*tarkābhāsa*)—“whoever is his son must be black”;
- (5) of the minor term (*pakṣābhāsa*)—“sound is impermanent”: This is a fallacy of the minor term according to the Mīmāṃsakas, for they do not attribute impermanency to sound; or fire is not hot, because it is a substance as water;
- (6) of the middle term or reason (*hetvābhāsa*)—sound is eternal, because it is factitious;
- (7) of example (*drṣtāntābhāsa*)—sound is eternal, because it is corporeal, like a jar;
- (8) of verbal testimony (*āgamābhāsa*)—“there is a heap of sweetmeats on the side of the river, run you boys”; “there are a hundred elephants on his finger”; “the Jainas are allowed to eat in the night” [as a fact they are not so allowed by their scripture].

References to Philosophers.

Māṇikya Nandi in the *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* (chapter vi, aph. 56-57) has mentioned the *Laukāyatika*, *Saugata*, *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Prābhākara*, *Jaiminiya*, etc. In the 3rd chapter of the work he observes—“no philosopher, who admits three kinds of reason or middle term (*hetu*), can dispense with the minor term (*pakṣa*).”¹

He concludes his work by describing it as a mirror through which a man can see what is to be accepted and what rejected.²

24. PRABHĀ CANDRA (ABOUT 825 A.D.).

Prabhā Candra, styled a *Kavi*, a member of the Digambara sect, was the author of the famous logical treatise called *Prameya-kamala mārtanḍa* (the sun of the lotus of knowledge), the earli-

1

साध्याविनाभाविलेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥ १० ॥

को वा विधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न पचयति ॥ ११ ॥

(*Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*, MSS. lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur).

2

परीक्षासुखमादर्शं हेयोपादेयतत्त्वयोः ।

संविदे माहशो बालः परीक्षादत्तवद् व्यधाम् ॥

(*Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*, chap. VI, MSS. lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur). *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikya Nandi with the commentary of Ananta-vīrya has been edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* of Calcutta.

est commentary on the Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra of Māṇikyā Nandi. He was also the author of the Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya (or briefly Candrodaya), a commentary on the Laghīyastraya of Akalaṅka. He has in his Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa mentioned Bhagavān Upavarṣa, Śabarasvāmī, Bhartṛhari, Bāṇa,¹ Kumārila,² Prabhākara, Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti, Vidyānanda and others. He himself has been mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādi-purāṇa³ composed about Śaka 760 or A.D. 838. Prabhā Candra, as a contemporary of Māṇikyā Nandi and Vidyānanda, is believed to have lived in the first half of the 9th century A.D.

25. RABHASA NANDI (CIRCA 850 A.D.).

Rabhasa Nandi, probably a Digambara, wrote a work called Sambandhodyota, which seems to be a commentary on the Sam-bandha-parīkṣā of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. The work must have been composed after 635 A.D. when Dharmakīrti lived, and before 1444 A.D., which is the date of the copy of the work acquired for the Bombay Government.⁴

26. MALLAVĀDIN (ABOUT 827 A.D.).

He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famous author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise Nyāya-

¹ Prabhā Candra has quoted the following verse from Bāṇa's Kādambarī :—

रजोजुषे जन्मनि सत्त्वटत्तये
स्थितौ प्रजानां प्रलये तमःसृष्टे ।
अजाय सर्गस्थिति-नाश-हेतवे
चयीमयाय त्रिगुणात्मने नमः ॥

(Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, Deccan College, MSS., p. 21a, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 221).

² Prabhā Candra refers to Kumārila, otherwise called Bhaṭṭa, thus :—

तथा अर्थपत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्नरं तल्लक्षणं अर्थपत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वा अर्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते
इत्यद्वैतार्थकल्पना, कुमारिलोऽपि रतदेव भाष्यकारवचो व्याचष्टे ।

(Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in the J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 227).

³ In the Ādi-purāṇa Prabhā Candra is thus mentioned :—

चन्द्रांशुश्रवणशंसं प्रभाचन्द्रं कविं सुवे ।
तत्त्वा चन्द्रोदयं येन शब्ददालादितं जगत् ॥ ४७ ॥

(Quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in J.B.B.R.A.S., for 1892, p. 222).

On p. 227 of the same journal, the date of the Ādi-purāṇa is fixed at Śaka 760 or 838 A.D.

⁴ Peterson's Third Report, p. 407.

binduṭikā called Dharmottara-ṭippanaka. According to a Jaina legend,¹ Malla was the son of King Śilāditya's sister. He was called *vādin* or logician, because, having vanquished the Buddhists in a dispute, he re-established the Jaina faith and brought to its former glory the great figure of Ādinātha on Mount Śatruṅjaya (in Kathiwar).

A palm-leaf manuscript² of the Dharmottara-ṭippanaka is preserved at Anhilwad Patan and is said to be dated Saṃvat 1321 or 1174 A.D. According to the Prabhāvakacaritra³, Mallavādin was also the author of a work called the Padmacaritra and lived in Vira Saṃvat 884 or 357 A.D. But this is impossible, as Dharmottara (q.v.), on whose Nyāyabinduṭikā Mallavādin wrote Ṭippanaka, lived about 837 A.D. On the other hand Mallavādin is mentioned⁴ by Hem Candra Sūri, who lived during 1088—1172 A.D. It seems therefore probable that the year 884 in which Mallavādin lived does not refer to Vira Saṃvat, but to Vikrama or Śaka Saṃvat. On this supposition Mallavādin lived in 827 A.D. or 962 A.D.

27. AMṚTA CANDRA SŪRI
(905 A.D.).

Amṛta Candra Sūri,⁵ who belonged to the Digambara sect, was the author of Tattvārtha-sāra, Ātmakhyāti,⁶ etc., and lived in Saṃvat 962 or 905 A.D.

28. DEVASENA BHATṬĀRAKA
(899—950 A.D.).

Devasena,⁷ a pupil of Rāmasena, was the author of Naya-cakra, etc. He was born in Saṃvat 951 or 894 A.D., and wrote his Daṃsaṇa-sāra (Darśana-sāra) in Saṃvat 990 or 933 A.D.

¹ Peterson 4, pp. 3-4, in which is mentioned the legend from the Prabandha-cintāmaṇi (Rāmacandra's edition, Bombay, p. 273).

² इति धर्मोत्तरटिप्पणके श्रीमल्लवाद्याचार्यकृते द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः सङ्गृह्यं महाश्रीः ॥
संवत् १२२१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुद्धि १२ रवौ (Peterson's Report V, p. 3).

संवत् १२२१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुद्धि १२ रवौ अद्येह जंजावलिधाम वास्तव्यं यदाहङ्गुतयं
चाहङ्गेन धर्मायं धर्मोत्तर-टिप्पणकं लिखापितम् ॥ (Noticed in Peterson 5, App. p. 3).

³ Vide Klatt, Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol. IV, p. 67

⁴ अनु मल्लवादिनं तार्किकाः ।

तस्मादन्ये हीना इत्यर्थः ॥

(Siddha Hema Śabdānuśāsana-bhāt-ṭikā, 2-2-39)

⁵ Peterson's fourth Report, p. ix.

⁶ Ātmakhyāti, which is a commentary on the Samaya-prābhṛta of Kunda-kundācārya, has been edited by Paṇḍita Gajādhara Lal Nyāyāśāstri.

⁷ Peterson's Fourth Report, p. lvi.

29. PRADYUMNA SŪRI
(ABOUT 980 A.D.):

He¹ belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect. In Māṇikyacandra's Pārśvanātha-caritra,² his prowess in logical discussions is referred to in the following terms:—

“There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri—the first healer of disease of the world—who entirely removed all corruptions from the body of men (or detected all defects in disputation committed by men) and who, using sharp logical expressions, made his irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to be cured of the fever of pride.”

In the same work reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras of Veṅkaṭa in the presence of the king of that province. He delighted the kings of various countries by no fewer than eighty-four triumphs in discussion. He was eleventh in ascent from Māṇikyacandra Sūri, who wrote his Pārśvanātha-caritra in Saṃvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. Pradyumna must have flourished about 980 A.D., for he was the preceptor of Abhayadeva Sūri (q.v.) who lived a little before 1039 A.D.

30. ABHAYADEVA SŪRI
(ABOUT 1000 A.D.).

Abhayadeva Sūri belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect³, and was the pupil and successor of Pradyumna Sūri of the Rājagaccha. He was an eminent logician and author of Vādamahārṇava, a treat-

¹ For further particulars about Pradyumna Sūri, see Peterson's 4th Report, p. lxxix.

²

पुंसां विषयज्ञं विकारमखिलं निर्मूलसुखलयं-
स्तवाद्यः समभूदु भवामयभिषक् प्रद्युम्नस्वरिगुरुः ।
येन खेदयता प्रयुज्य तरलां तर्कोज्ज्वलां भारतीं
वादीन्द्राः प्रविलापिनो घनतरं दर्पज्वरं त्याजिताः ॥ ४ ॥
दिग्गवरसमाक्रान्तवेङ्कपटं समाददे ।
यः प्रत्यक्षं नरेन्द्रस्य जगतस्तद्वशः पुनः ॥ ५ ॥
नौरागतानिघौ राजगच्छभूर्गुणवारिधिः ।
स्वरिः प्रद्युम्नस्वर्याल्लः पूर्व वः पूर्वजोऽभवत् ॥ १८ ॥
सपादलक्षगोपालविभुवनगिर्यादिदेशगोपालान् ।
यद्युत्तराधिकारीत्या वादजयैरंजयामास ॥ १८ ॥
श्रीश्वभयदेवस्वरिस्तच्छिष्यस्तर्कभूरभूत् ।
भग्नसनाहितसुलाङ्गीर्षदास्यमशिश्रियत् ॥ १९ ॥

(Pārśvanātha-caritra as noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 57-164.)

³

तर्कप्रत्यविचारदुर्गमवनीसञ्चारपञ्चानन-
स्त्यष्टेभयदेवस्वरिरजनि श्वेताम्बरप्रामण्यैः ।

ise on logic called the Ocean of Discussions, and of a commentary on the Sammati-tarka-sūtra called Tattvārtha-bodha-vidhāyinī.¹ “He is described as a lion that roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic. That the rivers of various conflicting opinions might not sweep away the path of the good, Abhayadeva² wrote his Vāda-mahārṇava.” He was succeeded by Jineśvara Sūri, a contemporary of King Muñja.³ He was the ninth predecessor of Siddhasena Sūri, who wrote Pravacana-sāroddhāra-vṛtti in Samvat 1242 or 1185 A.D. It was probably this Abhayadeva Sūri, who was “world-renowned” and a teacher of Śānti Sūri⁴ who died in Samvat 1096 or 1039 A.D.

31. LAGHUSAMANTABHADRA (ABOUT 1000 A.D.).

He⁵ wrote a commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrī of Vidyānanda called the Aṣṭasāhasrī-ṣaṃapada-tātparya-ṭikā⁶ and seems to have belonged to the Digambara sect and lived about 1000 A.D.

सदाकृतिलालसा मधुकरौ कोलाहलाशङ्किनी
द्वित्वा विद्वरपङ्कजं श्रितवन्तौ ब्राह्मी यदीयाननम् ॥ ६ ॥
दङ् निम्नगाः सम्यग्भेदमेता
भ्रुवं करिष्यन्ति जडैः समेताः ।
इतीव रोषाय चकार तासां
ग्रन्थं नवं वादमहापर्वं यः ॥ ७ ॥
विद्वन्मण्डलमौलिमण्डनमणिः प्रेङ्खन्तपोऽहर्निषि-
निर्यन्तोऽपि जिनेश्वरः समजनि श्रीमांस्ततः सङ्गुहः ।
यः सूर्जङ्गुणपुञ्जजगतौजिष्णोः पुरः प्रक्षिलान् ।
वादे वादिवरान् विजित्य विजयश्रीसंपन्नं स व्यधात् ॥ ८ ॥

(Pārśvanātha-caritra by Māṇikyacandra, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, pp. 158–59).

¹ See R. Mitra's Catalogue, X, pp. 39–40.

² For particulars about Abhayadeva Sūri, see Peterson's Fourth Report, p. iii.

³ Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse, etc., p. 851, vv. 1, 2, and p. 121, vv. 4–5. Jineśvara Sūri was probably a spiritual brother of Dhaneśvara Sūri.

⁴

यस्याद्भुतं रागमे गुणनिधिः श्रीसर्वदेवालयः
स्मरौशोभयदेव स्मरिरचिनख्यातप्रमाणेषु च ।
तस्यैव सुगुहद्वयादधिगत (?) दत्तात्मविद्यागुह (?)
प्रत्याख्याय चिरं भुवि प्रचरतु श्रीशान्तिस्वरः कतिः ॥

(Uttarādhyayana-brhadvṛtti by Śāntyācārya, noticed by Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar in his Report on Sanskrit MSS. for 1883–84, p. 44).

See also Weber's Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, p. 827.

⁵ Vide Peterson's Sixth Report, p. xxiii.

⁶ The Aṣṭasāhasrī-ṣaṃapada-tātparya-ṭikā has been noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, pp. 216–219, where we read :—

देवं स्वामिनममलं विद्वानन्दं प्रथम्य निजभक्त्या ।
विद्वन्मण्डलमौलिमण्डनमणिः प्रेङ्खन्तपोऽहर्निषि-

32. KALYĀṆA CANDRA (ABOUT 1000 A.D.).

Kalyāṇacandra was the author of *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā* which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* (probably of Dharma-kīrti who lived about 635 A.D.). It must have existed before 1350 A.D. when Jñānacandra mentioned it in his *Ratnākarāvatārikā-ṭippaṇa*.¹

33. ANANTA-VĪRYA (ABOUT 1039 A.D.).

Ananta-vīrya was the Digambara author of a commentary on the *Parikṣāmukha* of Māṇikya Nandi called *Parikṣā-mukha-pañjikā* or *Prameya-ratnamālā*, as also a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Nyāya-viniścaya* called the *Nyāya-viniścaya-vṛtti*. He wrote the former for Śānti-śena at the request of Hirapa, son of Vijaya and Nāṇambā.² Now Śānti-śena, supposed to be identical with Śānti Sūri, died in *Samvat* 1096 or A.D. 1039. His contemporary Ananta-vīrya must, therefore, have flourished about that time.³ Ananta-vīrya must have lived before the 14th century, for he is mentioned by Mādhavācārya in the chapter on Jaina darśana in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*.

34. DEVA SŪRI (1086—1169 A.D.).

HIS LIFE.

Deva Sūri, called Vāḍipravara or the foremost of disputants, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was a pupil of Muncandra Sūri. He was the author of the well-known treatise on logic called *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* on which he himself wrote an elaborate commentary named *Syādvādaratnākara*.⁴ He totally vanquished the Digambara Kumudacandrācārya in a dispute over the

¹ तेनान्यापोहविषयाः प्रोक्ताः सामान्यगोचराः ।

अस्य व्याख्या तेनाचार्य्यं दिङ्नामेन.....प्रोक्ताः । एतदर्थं विस्तारार्थिना प्रमाणवार्तिके कस्याप्येवमङ्गीकारोऽवश्यः ॥

(*Ratnākarāvatārikā-ṭippaṇa*, p. 7, Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, Benares).

² वैजयप्रियपुत्रस्य क्षीरपस्थोपरोधतः ।

शान्तिवेषार्थमारम्भा परीक्षासुखपञ्जिका ॥ ३ ॥

(*Parikṣā-mukhaṃ saṭikam*, noticed in Peterson's Fourth Report, p. 155).

³ *Vide* the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, p. 253; and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 129.

⁴ स्याद्वादरत्नाकर इत्यसि ग्रन्थो महत्तमः ।

वादिद्वन्द्वारकश्रीमद्देवसूरिबिनिर्मितः ॥ ४ ॥

Maladhāri Rājśekhara Sūri's *Pañjikā* on *Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā*.

salvation of women [at the court of Jaya-simha-deva at Anahilla-purapattana in N. Guzerat] and thereby practically stopped the entrance of the Digambaras into that town. The dispute¹ took place in Sāmvat 1181 or 1124 A.D.

Ratnaprabha Sūri, a pupil of Deva Sūri, in his Upadeśamālā-tīkā,² composed in Sāmvat 1238 or A.D. 1181, writes:—

“Lord Śrī Deva Sūri, who was the crest-gem of the pupils of the esteemed Municandra Sūri and succeeded him in his paṭṭa (sacred chair), conquered the Digambaras in the council-room of King Jaya-simha Deva and raised a pillar of victory by maintaining the nirvāṇa or salvation of women [that is, holding that even women were capable of attaining nirvāṇa].”

1

चन्द्राष्टशिववर्षेऽत्र वैशाखे पूर्णिमादिने ।

आह्वतौ वादिशालायां तौ वादिप्रतिवादिनौ ॥

(Prabhāvakacar., XXI, v. 95, quoted by Dr. Klatt in his article on “Historical Records of the Jains” in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 254).

² Ratnaprabha Sūri observes:—

शिष्यः श्रीमुनिचन्द्रस्वरिगुरुभिर्गीतार्थचङ्कामणिः

पट्टे खे विनिवेशितस्तदनु स श्रीदेवस्वरिप्रभुः ।

आस्थाने जयसिंहदेववत्पतेर्येनास्तदिगवाससा

स्त्रीनिर्वाणसमर्थनेन विजयस्तम्भः समुत्तम्वितः ॥

तत्पङ्कप्रभवो भवन्नय गुणग्रामाभिरामोदयाः

श्रीभद्रेस्वरस्वरयः शुचिचिद्यस्तम्भानसप्रौतये ।

श्रीरत्नप्रभस्वरिभिः शुभहृदे श्रीदेवस्वरिप्रभोः

शिष्यैः सेवमकारि सम्पदकृते हृत्तिर्विशेषार्थिनाम् ॥

(Upadeśamālā-tīkā, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, p. 167).

Munisundara Sūri, in his Gurvāvalī composed in Sāmvat 1466, gives a similar account:—

येनार्दितस्तुरशीति सुवादिस्त्रीला-

लम्बीसज्जघरमानदकेलिशाली ।

वादाहवे कुमुदचन्द्रदिगम्बरिन्द्रः

श्रीसिद्धभूमिपतिसंसर्दि पत्तनेऽस्मिन् ॥ ७४ ॥

स्यादादरत्नाकरतर्कवेधा

मुदे स केषां नहि देवस्वरिः ।

यतस्तुर्विशतिस्वरिशिखं

यस्यैव नाम्ना विदितं बभूव ॥ ७५ ॥

वेदमुनीशमितेऽब्दे

देवगुरुर्जगदनुत्तरोऽभ्युदितः ।

श्रीमुनिचन्द्रगुरोरिति

शिष्या बहवोऽभवन् विदिताः ॥ ७६ ॥

(Gurvāvalī published in the Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā of Benares, pp. 18-19).

In Saṃvat 1204 or 1147 A.D. Deva Sūri founded a caitya, raised a *bimba* at Phalavardhigrāma, and established an image of Neminātha at Arāsana.¹ He was born in Saṃvat 1143 or 1086 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1174 Saṃvat or 1117 A.D., and ascended to heaven in Saṃvat 1226 or 1169 A.D.²

35. DEVA SURI'S Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra

Pramāṇa—right knowledge.

The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra³ consists of eight chapters (*paricchedas*), viz.—

(1) Determination of the nature of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (2) determination of the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (3) determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, argumentation and inference (*smaraṇa-pratyabhijñāna-tarkānumāna-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (4) determination of the nature of valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony or scripture (*āgamākhyā-pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (5) determination of the nature of objects of knowledge (*viśaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (6) determination of the consequences and fallacies of knowledge (*phala-pramāṇa-svarūpādyābhāsa-nirṇaya*); (7) determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge (*nyātma-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); and (8) determination of the right procedure of a disputant and his opponent (*vādi-prativādi-nyāya-nirṇaya*).

As this work is written on the same plan as Māṇikya Nandi's Parikṣāmukha-sūtra or Akalaṅka's Nyāya-viniścaya as well as Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra, I shall pass over the common points, mentioning only its special features.

Pramāṇa or valid knowledge is defined here as the knowledge which ascertains the nature of itself as well as other things. The intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects of

¹ Vide Peterson's Fourth Report, p. lv.; also Klatt, Ind. Ant. XI, p. 254.

² शिखिवेदशिवे जन्म दीक्षा युग्मशरेचरे ।
वेदाश्चक्रं वर्षे स्वरित्वमभवत् प्रभोः ।
रसयुग्मवौ वर्षे त्रावणे सासि संगते ।
कृष्णपक्षस्य सप्तम्यामपराह्णे गुरोर्दिने ॥
मर्त्यलोकस्थितं लोकं प्रतिबोध्य पुरन्दर-
बोधका इव ते जग्मुर्दिवं श्रीदेवस्वरयः ॥

(Prabhāvakacar., XXI, vv. 287 seq., quoted by Dr. Klatt in his article on "Historical Records of the Jains" in the Indian Antiquary, Sept. 1982, Vol. XI, p. 254). According to some authorities Deva Sūri was born in Saṃvat 1134 or 1077 A.D.

³ The Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra has been printed and published in Benares in the Jaina Yāśovijaya series.

sense is not *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), for though it can ascertain the nature of objects outside itself, it cannot ascertain its own nature, since it has no consciousness. *Pramāṇa* must certainly be *knowledge*, for it is capable of choosing what is desirable and rejecting what is undesirable. It must also be definite in character, for it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*). Superimposition is of three kinds: (1) inversion (*viparyaya*)—such as looking upon a pearl-oyster as a piece of silver; (2) doubt (*saṁśaya*)—such as: is this a post or a man? and (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) consisting in a mere cogitation in the mind as to what the thing might be.

Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) is of two kinds: (1) direct (*pratyakṣa*, perception) and (2) indirect (*parokṣa*, outside the senses). The direct knowledge or perception is of two kinds: practical (*sām-vyavahārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*). The practical direct knowledge again is subdivided as that which arises through the sense-organs (*indriya-nibandhana*) and that which does not arise through the sense-organs (*anindriya-nibandhana*) but through the mind (*manas*). Each of these passes through four stages,¹ viz.: (1) *avagraha*, distinguishing the type whether it be, e.g., horse or man, but not discerning the characteristics; (2) *īhā*, inquiring, e.g., whence came the man and from what country came the horse; (3) *avāya*, arriving at a correct identification of the above; and (4) *dhāraṇā*, recollecting the thing particularised and keeping it in mind.

The transcendental direct knowledge (*pāramārthika*) is that which comes exclusively from the illumination of the soul and is profitable to emancipation. It is two-fold: (1) *vikala* (defective) including *avadhi-jñāna* (limited knowledge), i.e. knowledge of special objects which, near or remote, are not differentiated, and *manah-paryāya*, i.e. definite knowledge of another's thoughts and the laying bare of the secrets of the heart; and (2) *sakala*, i.e. perfect, which is the unobstructed intuition of the entire aspects of a thing. One who possesses that perfect transcendental knowledge is called an *arhat*, i.e. one freed from all faults or obstructions.

Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) is of five kinds: viz., (1) recollection (*smaraṇa*); (2) recognition (*praty-abhijñāna*); (3) argumentation (*tarka*); (4) inference (*anumāna*); (5) verbal testimony or the knowledge derived from the words of a reliable person or scripture (*āgama*).

¹ The explanation of *avagraha*, etc., as given here is taken from Col. Jarrett's translation of the *Ain-i-Akbari*, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. III, p. 190, as the portion related to *pramāṇa* in the Jaina chapter of *Ain-i-Akbari* very closely resembles that in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā*. Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's explanation of these terms given on p. 93, footnote, of his Report on Sanskrit MSS., for 1883-84, is, however, different.

Inference is of two kinds : (1) *svārtha*, for one's own self, and
Inference. (2) *parārtha*, for the sake of others. *Hetu*
(reason or the middle term) is defined as

that which cannot happen except in connection with the major term. The definition that the *hetu* (middle term) is that which possesses three characteristics, is to be rejected as involving fallacies.¹ Those who maintain the threefold characteristic or division of the *hetu* (reason or middle term), cannot but admit the necessity of using the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an inference.²

According to some, as the connection or absence of connection between the middle and the major terms can be shown by internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*), the example forming the external inseparable connection (*bahirvyāpti*) is useless.³ For instance :—

The hill (minor term) is fiery (major term), because it is smoky
(middle term), as a kitchen (example).

Here the hill is an integral part of the inference, and in it may be found the necessary connection between fire and smoke. Why then should we burden our inference with an example from without ? The kitchen certainly shows the same connection ; fire and smoke are found together there : but it is not an essential part of the inference, and so for the purpose in hand the connection which it proves may be described as the external inseparable connection. We must look to logical neatness, and the economy of mental labour, since the mind is liable to be confused when the unessential is brought across its track.

The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) as

1

निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः न तु विलक्षणकादिः ।

तस्य हेतुभासस्यापि सन्नवान् ॥ ११ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra, Chap. III).

This is an attack on Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians who define the three characteristics of *hetu* as follows :—

त्रैक्यं पुनर्हितस्य अनुमेये सत्त्वमेव ।

सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम् । असपक्षे चासत्त्वमेव निश्चितम्

(Nyāyabindu, Chapter II).

² त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव तत्समर्थनं विदधानः कः खलु न पक्षप्रयोगम् अङ्गीकुरुते ॥ १२ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra, Chap. III).

³ अन्वयार्थान् हेतुः साध्यप्रत्यायने शक्तावशक्तौ च न हिर्व्याप्तिवद्भावनं व्यर्थम् ॥ १५ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra, Chap. III).

parts of the syllogism are also useless, but these together with the example are to be employed to convince men of small intellect.¹

Parts of a syllogism. *Avayava* or parts of an inference or syllogism are therefore stated to be the following :—

- (1) *Pakṣa-prayoga* (use of the minor term, otherwise called proposition, *pratijñā*)—the hill is fiery.
- (2) *Hetu-prayoga* (use of the middle term)—because it is smoky.
- (3) *Dṛṣṭānta* (example)—whatever is fiery is smoky, as a kitchen.
- (4) *Upānaya* (application)—this hill is smoky.
- (5) *Nigamana* (conclusion)—therefore this hill is fiery.

Non-existence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*) is subdivided as (1) antecedent (*prāgabdhāva*); (2) subsequent (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*); (3) mutual (*itaretarābhāva*); and (4) absolute (*atyantābhāva*). Various kinds of *ābhāsa* or fallacy are also enumerated. Under verbal testimony (i.e. *āgama*) as also under the method of one-sided interpretation (*naya*), there is given an elaborate exposition of the *Saptabhāṅginaya* (sevenfold paralogism). The mediate and immediate results of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been clearly laid down.

The results of knowledge and the practical use made of them are stated to be not illusory (*saṃvṛti*), but real (*pāramārthika*).

Fallacies of *Naya*.

Under *naya* (the method of comprehending a thing from particular points of view), the fallacies of it (*nayābhāsa*) are enumerated thus :—

- (1) *Naigamābhāsa* (the fallacy of the *naigama*)—e.g. in estimating a soul we make a distinction between its “existence” (generic property) and its “consciousness” (specific property).
Fallacies of *Naya*.
- (2) *Samgrahābhāsa* (the fallacy of the collective)—occurs when we call a thing real if it possesses the generic property alone, altogether losing sight of its specific properties, as when we say a bamboo is real so far as it is a tree, but it has no specific properties.
- (3) *Vyavahārābhāsa* (the fallacy of the practical)—e.g., the Cārvāka philosophy which makes a wrong distinction of substance, quality, etc.
- (4) *Rjusūtrābhāsa* (the fallacy of the straight or immediate)—as the Tathāgata philosophy which altogether denies the reality of things.

¹ मन्दमूर्तीषु व्युत्पादयितुं दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनान्यपि प्रयोज्यानि ॥ २९ ॥

(*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lāṅkāra*, Chap. III).

- (5) *Śabdābhāsa* (the verbal fallacy)—occurs when we recognize the distinction of times into past, present and future, but go on attaching one and the same meaning to a word in all the three cases, e.g. if we now use the word “*kratu*” (sacrifice) in the sense of “strength” which it signified a thousand years ago.
- (6) *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa* (the fallacy of the subtle)—occurs when we interpret synonymous words such as *Indra*, *Śakra*, *Purandara*, etc., signifying altogether different things.
- (7) *Evam̐bhūtābhāsa* (the fallacy of the such-like)—occurs when a thing is discarded simply because it does not, at the moment, possess the properties implied by the name, e.g. *Rāma* is not a man (a thinking animal), because he is not at present thinking.

The Soul—*ātmā*.

The soul (*ātmā*) which is the doer and enjoyer, and an embodiment of consciousness, is of the same size as its body. In every person there is a separate soul which, having got rid of the bondage of its *karma* (act-fruits), attains emancipation.

The Method of Debate.

The last chapter expounds the method of debate. Discussion (*Vāda*) consists in assertion and counter-assertion for the establishment of a certain proposition by rejecting its opposite. The disputant or the person who opens the discussion may be eager either to gain a victory or to ascertain a truth. The truth may be sought either for one's own self as a disciple seeks it, or for others as a teacher seeks it. The same remarks apply to the opponent or respondent. There are four constituents of a council of discussion, viz. (1) the disputant (*vādī*); (2) the opponent (*prativādī*); (3) the members (*sabhya*); and

Rules of Debate.

(4) the president (*sabhāpati*). The duty of the disputant and his opponent consists in establishing his own side and opposing the other side by means of proof. The members must be acceptable to both the parties in respect of the skill in grasping their dogmas; they must have a good memory, be very learned, and possess genius, patience and impartiality. Their duties consist in stating the assertions and replies of the disputant and his opponent with reference to the particular subject of discussion, in estimating the merits and demerits of their arguments and counter-arguments, in occasionally interrupting them for setting forth some established conclusions, and in, as far as possible, declaring the result of the discussion. The President must be endowed with wisdom, authority, forbearance and impartiality. His duty consists in judging the speeches of the

parties and the members, as also in preventing quarrels, etc., among them. In the event of the parties being desirous of victory alone, they may continue the discussion with vigour as long as the members wish ; but if they are eager to ascertain the truth alone, they may continue the discussion so long as the truth is not ascertained and so long as they retain their vigour.

36. HEMACANDRA SŪRI. (1088—1172 A.D.).

Hemacandra Sūri¹ (surnamed *Kalikāla-sarvajña*), born at Dhandhuka in Ahmedabad, was a pupil of Devacandra of the Vajrasākhā. He was a contemporary of King Jaya Simha and is said to have been the preceptor of Māhārāja Kumāra Pāla of Guzerat about Samvat 1199-1229. He was the author of a large number of works such as *Kāvyānuśāsana-vṛtti*, *Chandonuśāsanavṛtti*, *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi* or *Nāmamālā*, *Anekārthasaṁgraha*, *Dvāśraya-mahā-kāvya*, *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣa-caritra* (a part of which is called *Mahāvīracaritra* and the appendix called *Parīṣiṣṭaparva*), *Yogaśāstra*, *Nighaṇṭuśeṣa*, etc.

He was also the author of a most important work on logic called *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*,² on which he himself wrote a commentary. This work, which is divided into five chapters, is written in the *Sūtra* or aphoristic style, and not in the form of a *prakaraṇa* (expository treatise).

He was a spiritual brother of Pradyumna Sūri,³ was born in Samvat 1145 or 1088 A.D., took the vow (*vrata*) in 1150 Samvat or 1093 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1166 Samvat

¹ For details about Hemacandra, see Bühler's "Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Monches Hemacandra"; Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxli, and p. 82; and also Peterson's lecture on the story of Hema Candra published in the *Bombay Gazette*, August 29, 1895.

² A manuscript of the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* with a commentary by the author himself has been noticed by Peterson in his Fifth Report on Sanskrit MSS., pp. 147-148. In explaining why the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* was written in the form of aphorisms, Hemacandra in the first chapter of the commentary says:—

वाचकमुल्लिखितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणिभूतानि तत्त्वार्थसूत्राणीति यद्येवमकलङ्क-
धर्मकौर्त्त्यादिवत् प्रकरणमेव किं नारभ्यते किमनया सूत्रकारत्वाद्योपुपक्षिकया सैवं वीचः । भिन्न
वचिर्ह्ययं जनकतो नास्य स्वेच्छाप्रतिबन्धो लौकिकराजकीयं वा शासनमस्तीति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् तच्च
वर्णसमूहात्मकैः पञ्चभिरध्यायैः शास्त्रमेतद्वचयदाचार्यः । तस्य च प्रेक्षावत् प्रवृत्त्यंगमभिधातुमिद-
मादिसूत्रम् । अथ प्रमाणमीमांसा अथ इत्यस्य अधिकारार्थत्वात् ।

(Quoted in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 148).

or 1109 A.D., and ascended to heaven (died) in 1229 Samvat or 1172 A.D.¹

37. CANDRAPRABHA SŪRI
(1102 A.D.).

Candraprabha Sūri (born in Guzerat), who founded the Pūrṇimāgaccha² in Samvat 1159 or 1102 A.D., was a pupil of Jayasimha Sūri and preceptor of Dharmaghoṣa. He³ was the author of Darśanaśuddhi, otherwise called Samyaktva-prakaraṇa, of Prameya-ratna-koṣa and possibly also of Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti.⁴ He was a great logician, and in debate appeared as a lion before the opponents who resembled elephants.⁵

The Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti is an excellent commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara. In it mention is made of the Buddhist logicians Dharmottara, Arcaṭa⁶ and others, and

1 शरवेदेश्वरे वर्षे कार्तिके पूर्णिमानिशि ।
जन्माभवत् प्रभोर्व्योमवाणशंभौ व्रतं तथा ॥
रसपङ्क्तिश्च स्वरिप्रतिष्ठा समजायत ।
नन्दद्वयर्बौ वर्षेऽनसानसभवत् प्रभोः ॥

(Prabhāvakacar., XXII, v. 851 seq., quoted by Klatt, in Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 254).

² For the origin of the Pūrṇimāgaccha see Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 147.

³ For Candraprabha Sūri see also Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxvii.

⁴ The manuscript of Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, which I consulted, was obtained from Bhavanagar, Bombay, through Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya. In the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Sūri. Elsewhere I have seen it stated that it was the work of that author. The authorship must, however, for the present, remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena-Divākara-vyākhyānaka or simply Siddha-vyākhyānaka which was evidently a surname. Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya relying on the line व्याख्यात चूडामणिसिद्धनामः (quoted from Ratnaprabha Sūri's Upadeśamālā-viśeṣa-vṛtti in Peterson's Third Report, p. 168) are inclined to identify Siddha-vyākhyānaka with Siddhārṣi who lived in Samvat 962 or 905 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra by Haribhadra Sūri. For Darśanaśuddhi, vide Peterson 3, App. p. 91; and for the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti vide Peterson 3, p. xvi. The Prameya-ratna-koṣa, known to Guṇaratna, has been published in Bhavanagara under the editorship of Dr. L. Sualì of Italy. In one of its opening verses Candraprabha Sūri is thus mentioned:—

प्रमेय रत्नेकोशोऽयं क्रियते कृतिवल्गवः ।
हितार्थं घोरदिद्राणां श्रीचन्द्रप्रभस्वरिभिः ॥ २ ॥
तीर्थे वीरविभोः सुधर्मगणभृत्सन्तानलब्धोन्नति
स्वारिचोज्ज्वलचन्द्रगञ्जलधिप्रोक्तासमीतद्युतिः ।
साहित्यागमनर्कलक्षणमहाविद्यापगासागरः
श्रीचन्द्रप्रभस्वरिरद्भुतमतिर्वादीभसिंहोऽभवत् ॥ १ ॥

(Daśavaikālikatīkā by Tilakācārya, noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 65).

⁶ प्रमाणेत्यादि अनेन च सादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्ध विकलतया ध्वनेर्बहिरर्थे प्रति
प्रामाण्ययोगाद् अभिधेयादिस्वरूपनद्वारोत्पन्नार्थसंशयमुखेन ओतारः अवणं प्रति प्रोत्साह्यन्ते इति
घर्षोत्तरो मन्यते अर्षटसु आह न आवकोत्साहकमेतत् प्रामाण्याभावात् तेषां
चाप्रमाणादप्रवृत्तेः ।
(Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, on verse 1).

there is also a criticism of the views of Saugata, Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Śauddhodani, Kaṇabhakṣa, Akṣapāda, Brahama-vādī, etc.

38. NEMICANDRA KAVI (ABOUT 1150 A.D.).

Nemicandra, born in Guzerat, who combated the views of the Hindu philosopher Kaṇāda, was a great teacher of logic.¹ He was a pupil of Vairasvāmī and preceptor of Sāgarendu (Sāgaracandra) Muni (alive in Saṃvat 1200 or 1143 A.D.), as mentioned by Māṇikyacandra, Sāgarendu Muni's pupil, in his Pārśvanāthacaritra written in Saṃvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. As Māṇikyacandra flourished about 1219 A.D., his preceptor's preceptor Nemicandra² must have lived about 1150 A.D. Nemicandra was styled a *Kavi*.³

39. ĀNANDA SŪRI AND AMARACANDRA SŪRI, NICKNAMED TIGER-CUB AND LION-CUB (1093—1135 A.D.).

These two, born in Guzerat, were great logicians who, even in their boyhood, overcame their elephant-like opponents in dispute, and were nicknamed respectively *Vyāghra-śiśuka* (Tigercub) and *Simha-śiśuka* (Lion-cub).⁴ They⁵ were the twin pupils and suc-

षड्तिर्कील्ललनाविलासवसन्तिस्वच्छत्तपोऽहर्षति
स्तप्यदोदयचन्द्रमाः समजनि श्रीनेमिचन्द्रप्रभुः ।
निःसामान्यगुणैर्भुवि प्रहृष्टरैः प्रालेयश्लोच्चलैः
यश्चक्रे कणभोजिनो मुनिपतेत्यर्थं मतं सर्वतः ॥ १६ ॥

(Pārśvanāthacaritra, noticed in Peterson 3, p. 160).

The same verse is quoted almost verbatim in the Kāvya-prakāśa-saṃketa by Māṇikyacandra Sūri, noticed in Peterson 3, p. 321.

² For Nemicandra, see also Peterson 4, p. lxxi.

³ See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

⁴ Udayaprabha Sūri, who was the successor of Haribhadra Sūri through Vijaya-sena Sūri, in his Dharmābhyudaya-mahākāvya, noticed by Peterson in his Third Report, pp. 16-19, writes:—

आनन्दस्वरिरिति [तस्य बभूव] शिष्यः
पूर्वोऽपरः शमधरोऽमरचन्द्रस्वरिः ।
धर्मोदयस्य दशनाविव पापदृष्ट-
क्षोदक्षमौ जगति यौ विशदौ विभातः ॥ २ ॥
अस्त्राघवाङ्मयपद्योनिधिमन्दराद्रि-
मुद्राजुषोः किमनयोः क्षुमहे मद्दिक्कः
वाल्मेयि निर्दलितवादिगजौ जगाद
यौ आम्नसिंहशिङ्गकाविति सिद्धराजः ॥ ४ ॥

⁵ For further particulars of Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri see Peterson 4, p. vii.

cessors of Mahendra Sūri in the Nāgendragaccha, and were succeeded by Haribhadra Sūri. As Siddharāja, from whom they received their nicknames, ascended the throne in Saṃvat 1150 or 1093 A.D., they must have flourished at the beginning of the 12th century A.D. It is probably these two logicians who are referred to by the Hindu logician Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in his Tattva-cintāmaṇi under *Simha-vyāghrī-lakṣaṇa* of Vyāpti.

40. HARIBHADRA SŪRI (ABOUT 1120 A.D.).

We find mention of at least two Śvetāmbara Jaina authors bearing the name Haribhadra Sūri. One died¹ in Saṃvat 535 or 478 A.D., while the other was a pupil of Ānanda Sūri and Amara-candra Sūri of the Nāgendragaccha who lived about 1093–1135 A.D.² The second Haribhadra Sūri, who was called “Kalikāla-Gautama”³, must therefore have flourished about 1120 A.D. He must have been an eminent logician if we suppose him to be the author⁴ of the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, the Daśavaikālika-niryukti-tīkā, the Nyāya-praveśaka-sūtra and the Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti. There are strong grounds for supposing that the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya was not the work of the first Haribhadra Sūri, as it refers in the

1

पंचसय पण्तीय विक्कमकालाखी कति चत्थमिखी ।

हरिभद्रस्वरिखरो निव्वुखो दिसउ सिवसुरख ॥ १०० ॥

(Gacchotpatti-prakīrṇaka quoted in the Gāthāsāhasrī noticed in Peterson 3, p. 284).

² Klatt refers to Bühler's Sukṛtasamkirtana, pp. 24–25; see Peterson 4, pp. cxxxix, cxl.

3

सिद्धान्तोपनिषद्भिषयहृदयो धीजन्यभूमिस्तयोः

पदे श्रीहरिभद्रस्वरिभवचारिचिणामघणीः ।

आन्ता शून्यमनाश्रयैरतिचिराद्यस्मिन्नवस्थानतः

सन्तुष्टैः कलिकालगौतम इति ख्यातिर्वितेने गुणैः ॥ ५ ॥

(Dharmābhyudaya-mahākāvya by Udayaprabha Sūri noticed in Peterson 3, Appendix I, p. 18).

⁴ In the concluding lines of the Daśavaikālika-niryukti-tīkā, it is stated that the author of that work was one Haribhadra Sūri who was a *dharma-putra* of Yākinī. A similar description of Haribhadra, the author of Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, is found in the opening sentences of Guṇaratna's commentary on that work (dated about 1407 A.D.). The Caturvīṃśati-prabandha by Rājasekhara Sūri, composed in Saṃvat 1405 or 1348 A.D., makes a like reference to Haribhadra, the author of Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti. Now the *dharma-putra* of Yākinī is generally held to be a surname of the first Haribhadra Sūri whose disciples were Haṃsa and Paramahaṃsa, as is evident from Prabhācandra Sūri's Prabhāvaka-caritra dated about 1277 A.D.

In the Gacchotpatti-prakarana, Gāthā-sāhasrī, Vicāra-sāra-prakarana, Vicārāmrta-saṃgraha, Tapāgacchapattāvalī, Kharataragaccha-pattāvalī, etc., Haribhadra Sūri I. is stated to have flourished in Saṃvat 535 or 478 A.D.

Now the Nyāyāvatāra which is alleged to have been commented on by Haribhadra Sūri I. was itself composed about 533 A.D. (that is, after 478 A.D.), and Dharmakīrti, whose logical doctrines have been referred to in the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, lived about 650 A.D. These facts prove that Haribhadra, the author of Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti and Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, lived after 650 A.D.

chapter on the Bauddhādarsāna to the views of such authors as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti,¹ and others who flourished long after the 5th century A.D. The six systems (Śaḍdarśana) treated by him are (1) Bauddha, (2) Naiyāyika, (3) Sāṃkhya, (4) Jaina, (5) Vaiśeṣika, and (6) Jaiminiya.

In the Anekānta-jaya-patākā-ṭīkā² attributed to Haribhadra Sūri, there are passages quoted from the works of Dinna or Dignāga, Dharma Pāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhartṛhari, Siddhasena Divākara, Samanta Bhadra, Mallavādin and Śubha Gupta. As the last mentioned two writers lived respectively in the 9th century and the 11th century A.D., we shall not be far wrong if we place Hari Bhadra early in 12th century A.D.

Haribhadra Sūri is often described³ as having protected the

Dr. Jacobi in his letter, dated the 21st October 1907, writes to me that "Haribhadra uses the word *viraha* in the Samaraiccakahā, which is alluded to by Siddharṣi who wrote in 905 A.D."

Regarding the dates of the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, etc., he observes:—These are "unanimously ascribed to the first Haribhadra," "whose date, I believe, with Prof. Leumann, to have been wrongly referred to the Saṃvat era instead of the Valabhi or Gupta era, which commenced in 319 A.D."

According to Dr. Jacobi, therefore, the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, etc., were written by the first Haribhadra Sūri, who died in 535 Gupta Saṃvat or 854 A.D.

Dr. Jacobi's theory removes many of our difficulties, yet it is far from being conclusive, as the Jaina authors very seldom used the Gupta era. Moreover, it is inexplicable why Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya did not refer to such an excellent compendium of Indian philosophy as the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya if it existed as early as the 9th or 10th century A.D. I am therefore inclined to believe that Haribhadra Sūri II was the author of the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti, etc., while the Samaraiccakahā and other treatises might be the works of the first Haribhadra Sūri.

But I must confess that the modern Jaina Panditas such as Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya firmly believe that the author of all these works was the first Haribhadra Sūri who, according to them, flourished in 535 Vikrama Saṃvat, or 478 A.D.

1

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोद्धमधान्तं तच्च बुध्यताम् ।

चिरुपाक्षिक्तो लिङ्गिज्ञानं त्वनुमानसंज्ञितम् ॥

(Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, chapter on Bauddha-darśana. p. 38, edited by Dr. Suali).

This verse refers without doubt to the definition of *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* given by Dharmakīrti who lived about 650 A.D.

² Anekānta-jaya-patākā-ṭīkā, chap. III, p. 116, 117; p. 150; pp. 35, 76, 79, 116, 120, 159, 170, 175, 192, 192; pp. 134, 127; p. 3; p. 131; pp. 19, 38.

उक्तञ्च वादिसुखेन मङ्गवादिना सञ्चतौ ।

(Anekānta-jaya-patākā, pp. 19, 38).

यद्योक्तं वार्तिकानुसारिणा शुभगुणेन ॥

(Anekānta-jaya-patākā, p. 117).

³ Klatt in his "Paṭṭāvalī of the Kharataragaccha" in the Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247; also Peterson 3, p. 35. Also:

स्त्रीणि श्रीचरिभङ्गं तं येनार्हंस्त्रीमहत्तरा ।

चतुर्ह्रस्वप्रकरणश्रव्यामोषत माहवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Amarasvāmicarita by Muniratna Sūri noticed in Peterson 3, p. 91.

While in Broach at the Āśvāvabodhatīrtha in Saṃvat 1238 or 1181 A.D., he wrote another work called Upadeśamālāvṛtti¹ to please Bhadreśvara Sūri and in payment of the debt he owed to Vijayasena Sūri, the brother of Bhadreśvara. There he gives his spiritual descent in the Vṛhadgaccha as follows: (1) Muni-candra Sūri; (2) Deva Sūri; (3) Bhadreśvara Sūri; and (4) Ratna-prabha Sūri.²

46. TILAKĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 1180—1240 A.D.).

Tilaka Ācārya, who belonged to the Candragaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a spiritual descendant of Candraprabha Sūri through Dharmaghoṣa, Cakreśvara and Śivaprabha. He was author of several works such as the Āvaśyaka-laghu-vṛtti written in 1239 A.D., and, the Pratyeka-buddha-caritra in 1204 A.D.³

47. MALLIṢEṆA SŪRI
(1292 A.D.).

Malliṣeṇa belonged to the Nagendra Gaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the author of the Syādvādamañjarī, a commentary on Hemacandra's Vitarāga-stuti or Dvātrimśikā. The Syādvāda-mañjarī contains an exposition of the *Pramāṇa*, *Saptabhaṅgī-naya*, etc., and criticises Akṣapāda's theories of *Pramāṇa*, *Chala*, *Jāti*, *Nigrahassthāna*, etc. The doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Aulūkyā, Jaiminīya, Bhaṭṭapāda, Vedānta, Yogācāra, Mādhyamika, Cār-vāka, etc., have also been his favourite subjects of attack. At the close of his work Malliṣeṇa describes himself as a pupil of Udaya-prabha Sūri and as having composed the work in Śaka 1214 or A.D. 1292.⁴

1

श्रीरत्नप्रभस्वरिभिः शुभकृते श्रीदेवस्वरिप्रभोः ।
श्रियैः सेवमकारि सन्मदकृते इतिविशेषार्थिनाम् ॥
विक्रमादसुलोकार्क (१२६८) वर्षे माघे समर्थिता ।
एकादशसहस्राणि सार्द्धं पञ्चशतं तथा ॥

(Upadeśamālā-vṛtti, noticed in Peterson 5, p. 124).

² For other particulars of Ratnaprabha Sūri, *vide* Peterson 4, p. cii. Compare also Weber II, p. 922, note 7.

³ *Vide* Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xlviii, and Fifth Report xxvi.

4

श्रीमन्निषेणस्वरिभिरकारि तत्पदगगनदिनमणिभिः ।

इतिरिचं मगुरविमितशब्दाब्दे दीपमहसि शनौ ॥ १ ॥

(Syādvādamañjarī, p. 220, printed in the Benares Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, and edited by Dāmodara Lal Gosvāmi).

48. RĀJASEKHARA SŪRI
(1348 A.D.).

Rājasekhara Sūri, or Maladhāri Śrī Rājasekhara Sūri, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of the *Ratnāvatārikā-pañjikā*,¹ a sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokaṅkāra*, as also of two other works called *Syādvāda-kalikā* and *Caturvimśatiprabandha*.² He is also the author of a *Pañjikā* (commentary) on the *Nyāya-kandalī* of the Hindu philosopher Śrī-dhara. He studied the *Nyāya-kandalī* under the guidance of Jinaprabha,³ and completed his *Caturvimśatiprabandha* in Śaṃvat 1405 or 1348 A.D.⁴

49. JÑĀNA CANDRA
(1350 A.D.).

He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of a gloss on the *Ratnākarāvatārikā* called the *Ratnākarāvatārikā-tippaṇa*, which discusses many abstruse points of logic and criticises the views of Dignāga⁵ and others. He composed this work⁶ under orders from his preceptor Rājasekhara Sūri, who flourished in 1348 A.D. Jñāna Candra's date may approximately be fixed at about 1350 A.D.

¹ A part of the *Ratnākarāvatārikā-pañjikā* has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

² This work has been published by Hira Lal Harisaraṇa at Jāmanagara in Kathiawar.

³

श्रीमज्जिनप्रभविभोरधिगत्य न्यायकदलीं किञ्चित् ।

तस्यां विहृतिलवमहं करवै स्वरूपकाराय ॥

(*Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara with the *Pañjikā* of Rājasekhara noticed in Peterson 3, p. 273; cf. also Peterson 3, pp. 28-29).

⁴ Vide Weber II, p. 1207.

शरममनमनुमितादौ ज्येष्ठा सूचीय धवलसप्तम्याम् ।

निष्पन्नमिदं शास्त्रं श्रीम ज्येष्ठोः सुखं तन्यात् ॥

(Colophon of *Caturvimśatiprabandha*).

तेनान्यापोहविषयाः प्रोक्ताः सामान्यगोचराः ।

शब्दाश्च बुद्ध्यश्चैव वस्तुन्येषामसम्भवात् ॥

अस्य शास्त्रा तेनाचार्यदिग्भागेन

अन्यापोहविषयाः ... प्रोक्ताः ॥

Jñānacandra's *Ratnākarāvatārikā-tippaṇa*, chap. I, p. 7, published in *Yaśovijaya-granthamālā* of Benares.

⁶

रत्नाकरावतारिका वरदिप्यनं तत्

ज्ञानेन्दुरस्यतरङ्गीः समतिः प्रष्टव्ये ।

तन्निष्पन्नो रचितवान् मल्लधारिपूज्य-

श्रीराजशेखरगुरोश्च निदेशमाप्य ॥

Quoted from the MSS. of *Ratnākarāvatārikā-tippaṇa*, lent to me by Muni Dharmavijaya. A part of this work has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yaśovijaya series.

50. GUṆARATNA
(1409 A.D.).

Guṇaratna belonged to the Tapāgaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the distinguished author of a commentary on the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya¹ called Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti or Tarkarahasya-dīpikā in which the Nyāya (logic) along with other systems has been lucidly explained. He also wrote the Kriyā-ratna-samuccaya.

He is mentioned by Ratna-śekhara Sūri in the Śrāddha-pratikramaṇa-sūtra-vṛtti composed in Saṃvat 1496 or A.D. 1439.² In that work Guṇaratna is mentioned as a pupil of Devasundara, who attained the exalted position of Sūri at Anahillapattana in Saṃvat 1420 or A.D. 1363.³ Guṇaratna must, therefore, have lived between A.D. 1363 and A.D. 1439. Devasundara Sūri, teacher of Guṇaratna, was a contemporary of Muni-sundara Sūri, the famous author of the Gurvāvalī⁴ composed in Saṃvat 1466 or A.D. 1409. Guṇaratna himself says that his Kriyāratna-samuccaya⁵ was composed in Saṃvat 1466 or A.D. 1409.

Guṇaratna, in his elaborate commentary (Vṛtti) on the Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya, has mentioned Śauddhodani, Dharmottarā-

¹ Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya with Vṛtti, edited by Dr. Suali, and published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. There is another commentary on Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya called Laghuvṛtti by Maṇibhadra. It has been published in the Chowkhamba series.

² The Śrāddha-prati-kramaṇa-sūtra-vṛtti, by Ratnaśekhara Sūri, has been noticed in Peterson 3, pp. 226-227, whence the following lines are quoted:—

विद्याततपेत्याद्या जगति जगच्चन्द्ररयोऽभूवम् ।
 श्रीदेवसुन्दरगुरुतमाश्च तदनुकमाद्विदिताः ॥ १ ॥
 पञ्च च तेषां शिष्यास्तेष्व्याद्या ज्ञानसागरा गुरवः ।
 कुलमण्डना द्वितीयाः श्रीगुणरत्नः तृतीयाश्च ॥ २ ॥
 षड्दर्शनवृत्तिक्रियारत्नसमुच्चयविचारनिचयवृजः ।
 येषां श्रीसुगुरुणां प्रसादतोऽब्द षडङ्गविश्वमिते ।
 श्रीरत्नयेखरगणिर्दन्तिमिमामकृत कृतितुष्टैः ॥ १ ॥

³ Vide Dr. Klatt on the Pattāvali of the Kharataragaccha in the Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, September 1882, pp. 255-256; cf. also Weber II, p. 884; and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 157.

⁴ रसरसमनुमितवर्षे १४६६ सुनिस्तुन्दरस्वरिणा कृता पूर्वम् । ।
 मध्यस्थैरवधार्यां गुर्वालीयं जयश्रीदा ॥ ८२ ॥

(Gurvāvalī, Jaina-Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, p. 109).

⁵ काले षड्रसपूर्वं १४६६ वत्सरमिते श्रीविक्रमाकाङ्क्षते
 गुर्वादेश्वशाद्विद्वद्भ्यश्च सदा खान्योपकारं परम् ।
 ग्रन्थं श्रीगुणरत्नस्वरितनोत् प्रज्ञाविहीनोऽप्यसुं
 निर्द्वैतपद्धतिप्रधानजननैः शोधस्वयं धीधनैः ॥ ६३ ॥

(Kriyāratna-samuccaya, Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā series, p. 309)

cārya, Arcaṭa, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākara, Kamalaśīla, Dignāga, and other Buddhist authors, as well as Tarkabhāṣā, Hetubindu, Arcaṭa-tarkaṭikā, Pramāṇa-vārtika, Tattvasaṃgraha, Nyāya-bindu, Nyāyapraveśaka, and other Buddhist works on logic, etc., in the chapter on the Bauddha system. Mention has also been made, in the chapter on the Nyāya, of such Hindu logicians as Akṣapāda, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana, Śrīkaṇṭha, Abhayatilakopādhyāya, Jayanta, and of such works as Nyāya-sūtra, Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyavārtika, Tātparyāṭikā, Tātparyapariśuddhi, Nyāyālankāra, Nyāyālankāravṛtti, etc. The Nyāya-sāra of Bhā-sarvajña and the eighteen commentaries on it such as Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Nyāyakalikā, Nyāyakusumāñjali, etc., have also been mentioned.

51. ŚRUTASĀGARA GAṆI (ABOUT 1493 A.D.).

Śrutasāgara Gaṇi, author of Tattvārthadīpikā, was a pupil of Vidyānandin of the Śarasvatī Gaccha of the Digambaras. Nemi-datta, who wrote in Saṃvat 1585 or 1528 A.D., describes himself as devoted to the service of Śrutasāgara whose literary activity must be referred to about Saṃvat 1550 or 1493 A.D.¹

52. DHARMA-BHŪṢAṆA (ABOUT 1600 A.D.).

Dharmabhūṣaṇa, a disciple of Vardhamāna Bhaṭṭāraka, was a Digambara who wrote the Nyāya-dīpikā about 300 years ago. He has been mentioned in the Tarkabhāṣā by Yaśovijaya Gaṇi.

The Nyāya-dīpikā begins with a salutation to Arhat Vardhamāna. It is divided into three chapters (*Prakāśa*), viz. (1) general characteristics of valid knowledge, *pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; (2) perception, *pratyakṣa*; and (3) indirect knowledge, *parokṣa*, including recollection, *smṛti*, recognition, *pratyabhijñāna*, argumentation, *tarka*, inference, *anumāna*, tradition, *āgama*, and the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints, *naya*.

The technical terms of logic have been defined and minutely examined, and the views of other logicians, specially of the Buddhists, have been severely criticised. There are references to Sugata, Saugata, Bauddha, Tāthāgata, Mīmāṃsaka, Yauga, Naiyāyika, Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara, Dignāga, Samanta Bhadra, Akalaṅka Deva, Śālikā Nātha, Jainendra, Syādvāda-vidyāpati, Māṇikyā Nandi Bhaṭṭāraka, Kumāra Nandi Bhaṭṭāraka, Udayana and others. The following works are also mentioned:—Prameya kamala-mārtaṇḍa, Rājavārtika, Śloka-vārtika, Śloka-vārtika-bhāṣya,

¹ Peterson's Fourth Report, p. cxxiii.

Tattvārtha-sūtra, Tattvārtha-bhāṣya, Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika, Āptamīmāṃsā-vivaraṇa, Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇa-nirṇaya, Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, Parīkṣāmukha, Nyāyabindu, etc.

52a. VINAYAVIJAYA
(1613 A.D.—1681 A.D.).

Vinayavijaya was born in a Vaiśya family in Guzerat in Saṃvat 1670 or A.D. 1613. His spiritual teacher Kīrtivijaya¹ was a disciple of Hīravijaya, the well-known sūri of Akbara's time. Vinayavijaya, after prosecuting his studies in Jaina scriptures under Kīrtivijaya, proceeded to Benares to study the grammar and philosophy of the Brāhmanas. Yaśovijaya, another Jaina ascetic, whose account will be given shortly, joined him in his journey to that famous seat of Brāhmaṇic learning. After undergoing a course of training for twelve years in Benares, Vinayavijaya travelled over various parts of India until he came to Junāgaḍh in Kathiawad on his pilgrimage to the Girnar hills in 1651 A.D. He visited Surat, Marwad, etc., and died at Rander in Guzerat in 1681 A.D. Of the numerous works written by him the undermentioned treatise on Jaina Nyāya deserves a special notice : —

Naya-karṇikā—"an ear-ring of *Naya*, the method of descriptions," which was composed at Diva near Junāgaḍh in Kathiawad in 1651 A.D. for the satisfaction of *Guru Vijayasimha Sūri*.² *Naya* aims at describing things from all possible standpoints. There are altogether seven standpoints, viz. *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhīrūḍha* and *evambhūta*, explanations of which have already been given. The first four of the standpoints come under a group called *dravyāsti-kāya*, noumenal or that which refers to a substance, and the last three under a group called *pariyāyāsti kāya*, phenomenal or that which refers to an attribute. The treatise ends with the observation³ that

¹ Vide the concluding verses of the chapters of Vinayavijaya's Lokaparakāśa.

² इत्थं नयार्थकवचः कुसुमैर्जिनेन्दु-
वीरोचितः सविनयं विनयाभिधेन ।
त्रौद्वीपवन्दरवरे विजयादिदेव
सुरौमितुर्विजयसिंहगुरोश्च तुष्टे ॥ ११ ॥

(Naya-karṇikā).

³ सर्वे नया अपि विरोधन्ती मियक्ते
सङ्ख्य साधुसमर्थं भवन् भजन्ते ।
भूपा इव प्रतिभटा भुवि सार्वभौम-
पादान्मुक्तं प्रथमयुक्ति पराजिता द्वाक् ॥ ११ ॥

(Naya-karṇikā).

though the standpoints are mutually conflicting, they serve collectively to establish the dogmas of the Jaina scripture.¹

53. YAŚOVIJAYA GAṆI
(1608—1688 A.D.).


Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, a member of the Śvetāmbara sect, was a distinguished logician who flourished at Dabhoi in the Baroda State (Guzerat), approximately between 1608 A.D. and 1688 A.D. He was a spiritual descendant of Hīravijaya Sūri, the well-known Jaina High-priest of the time of the Moghul Emperor Akbar.² In about 1626 A.D. he came to Benares,³ where he studied Nyāya-śāstra in the disguise of a Brāhmaṇa ascetic. By about 1638 A.D. he confessed that he was a Jaina and was asked at once to leave the Sanskrit academies of the Brāhmaṇas. On account of his vast erudition in Logic and Metaphysics he obtained the titles of Upādhyāya, Nyāya-viśārada and Nyāyācārya. He died at Dabhoi in 1688 A.D.⁴

¹ Vide Introduction to *Naya-karnikā* edited by Mohan Lal Desai, pp. 3-4:—

The doctrine of *Naya* is often illustrated by the parable of an elephant and blind men. Several blind men desirous of knowing what an elephant was like, touched separate parts of its body and went home with the knowledge they derived in this way. Sitting down to compare notes, they discovered that there was no agreement among them as to the form of the animal. The man who had only touched its leg described it as a huge column, another man who had touched only the ear described it as a winnowing fan, and so forth. They quarrelled among one another until a person who was not blind came before them. He took great pains to explain that their knowledge was only partial, and as such caused confusion. He said that all the different aspects of a thing must be examined in order to gain the complete knowledge of the thing. "A partial knowledge," continues he, "leads to conflict while a complete knowledge establishes harmony."

²

Hīravijaya (1526-1595 A.D.).



रहिया काशीमठे जेह्यो मे भले ।

न्यायदर्शन विपुलभाव पाया ॥ (Mandharastuti).

पूर्वं न्यायविशारदबिरुदं काष्ठां प्रदत्तं बुधैः

न्यायाचार्यपदं ततः कृतशतघन्यस्य यस्मापितम् ।

शिष्यप्रार्थनया नयादिविजयप्राप्नोतमानां शिष्यः

तत्त्वं किञ्चिदिदं यशोविजय इत्याख्यातदास्यातवान् ॥

(Tarkabhāṣā).

Yaśovijaya wrote more than one hundred works (in Sanskrit and Guzerati) in which he has preserved a detailed criticism on the Logic of Mithilā and Nadia as taught in the Benares academies of the 17th century A.D. He must have been a man of extraordinary talent, or else he would not have ventured to attack Śiromaṇi, the greatest exponent of Modern Logic in Nadia. He satirises this Brāhmaṇa logician by saying¹ “woe to Bengal where there is Śiromaṇi blind of one eye!”

Conscious of his own erudition he observes in another place : “The ocean of Logic is hard to approach owing to the uproar of waves of the Didhiti—Commentary (of Śiromaṇi) ; yet, is not the water of that ocean capable of being drunk by our cloud-like genius ?”²

54. YAŚOVIJAYA’S WORKS.

Yaśovijaya was the author of several rare works on Logic such as Nyāya-pradīpa, Tarkabhāṣā, Nyāya-rahasya, Nyāyāmr̥ta-taraṅgiṇī and Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khāḍya. He also wrote a commentary on the Digambara work Aṣṭasāhasrī called Aṣṭasāhasrī-vṛtti.³

The Tarkabhāṣā, which begins with a salutation to Jina,⁴ consists of three chapters, viz. (1) Valid knowledge, *pramāṇa* ; (2) Knowledge from particular standpoints, *naya* ; and (3) Imposition, *niḥkṣepa*. There is also an occasional discussion on *vyāpti-graha*, induction or the process of ascertaining a universal connection between the middle term and the major term.

¹ अभाग्यं मौढ्यदेशस्य यच्च काणः शिरोमणिः ।

(Nyāyakhaṇḍakhāḍya, leaf 43, MSS. in possession of Vijayadharma or Dharma-vijaya Sūri).

² न्यायाम्बुधिर्दौषितिकारयुक्तिकलोलकोलाहलदुर्विगाहः ।

तस्यापि पातुं न पयः समर्थः किं नाम धौमत् प्रतिभाम्बुवाहः ॥

(Aṣṭasāhasrī vivaraṇa, leaf 82, MSS. of Vijaya-dharma Sūri and Indravijaya Sūri).

The idea of the verse may be expressed as follows :—

Indian Logic is a veritable ocean whose water is saline and which is unapproachable owing to the tumults and uproars of commentators. Is not then the water of that ocean capable of being drunk ? Why not, intelligent people, like clouds, can easily approach the ocean and drink its water pure and sweet !

³ For other particulars about Yaśovijaya, see Peterson 6, p. xiv. For his works see the Jaināgama List published in Bombay.

To perpetuate the memory of Yaśovijaya there has been established at Benares a college called Jaina Yaśovijaya-pāṭhaśālā, under the auspices of which the sacred works of the Jainas are being published in a series called Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā.

येन्द्रदन्दनं नत्वा जिमं तत्तार्थदेशिनम् ।

प्रमाणं नयनिःक्षेपैस्तर्कभाषां तनोम्यहम् ॥

(Tarkabhāṣā, Chapter I).

The Nyāyāloka begins with a salutation to Mahāvīra¹ as Paramātman (the supreme spirit) and ends with an entreaty² that its author may be freed from lust and hatred, which are the causes of all sufferings. The work discusses the nature of soul (*ātman*), emancipation (*mukti*), inference (*anumāna*), testimony (*āgama*), direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa jñāna*), indirect knowledge (*parokṣa jñāna*), validity of external things³ (*vāhyārtha-siddhi*), inherence (*samavāya*), negation (*abhāva*), ether (*ākāśa*), substance (*dravya*), etc.

The undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems are quoted:—

Naiyāyika, Uccrīṅkhala Naiyāyika, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka, Tautātita, Vedāntin, Nyāya, Yauktika, Bauddha, Aupaniṣada, Digambara, Syādvāda-rahasya, Syādvāda-ratnākara, Sammati tīkā, Jñānārṇava, Bhāṣyakāra, Jinabhadra Gaṇi Kṣamā-śramaṇa, Brhaspati, Dharmakīrti, Ācārya, Cīntāmaṇikṛt, Maṇikṛt, Miśra, Vardhamāna, and Pakṣadhara Miśra.

The Nyāya khaṇḍa khāḍya⁴ is otherwise called Mahāvīra stavana. It consists of 108 verses composed in eulogy of Mahāvīra and at the same time embodying solutions of the deepest problems of Logic.⁵ There is an elaborate commentary in prose by the author himself, elucidating many intricate points in the precise style of modern logicians. The work opens with a salutation to Mahāvīra who is called Śambhu and ends with a brief account of the author himself. The topics treated in the work are:—Soul (*atman*), emancipation (*mukti*), momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), origination (*utpatti*), destruction (*dhvaṃsa*), syādvāda, class and individual (*jāti* and *vyakti*), space and time (*deśa* and *kāla*), middle

1 प्रणम्य परमात्मानं जगदानन्ददायिनम् ।
न्यायालोकं वितनुते श्रीमान् न्यायविशारदः ॥
(Nyāyāloka).

2 कृता न्यायालोकं प्रवचनरागाद् यदर्जितं पुण्यम् ।
तेन मम दुःखहेतु रागद्वेषौ विलीयेताम् ।
(Nyāyāloka).

3 यदुक्तं बौद्धप्रधानेन,—
चित्तमेव हि संसारो रागादिक्लेशवासितम् ।
तदेव तैर्विनिर्मुक्तं भवान्त इति कथ्यते ॥
(Nyāyāloka, leaf 13, printed at Ahmedabad).

⁴ The Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khāḍya has been printed in Bombay.

⁵ येकारजापरमाथ्यकविबलविज्जवावहासुरद्रुमुपमङ्गमभङ्गरङ्गम् ।
स्वतैर्विकाशिकुसुमेखव बीर शम्भोरम्भोजयोश्चरणयोर्वितनोमि पूजाम् ।
(Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khāḍya).

term and major term (*vyāpya-vyāpaka*), knowledge and external world (*viññānavāda-vāhyārthavāda*), etc. The undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems are referred to :—

Sāṃkhya, Kaṇabhakṣa, Akṣapāda, Naiyāyika, Bauddha, Mādhyamika, Prabhākara, Mīmāṃsaka, Bhāṣya, Vārtika, Tikā, Samantabhadra, Gandhahasti, Sammati, Miśra, Bhaṭṭa, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Nārāyaṇa,¹ Nārāyaṇācārya, Śiromaṇi,² Dīdhiti-kāra, Vardhamāna, and Guṇānanda.³

The *Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivarāṇa*,⁴ which is a gloss on the *Aṣṭasāhasrī* of Vidyānanda, opens with an obeisance to Indrabhūti Gautama. The work makes reference to the undermentioned philosophers, philosophical treatises and systems :—Vācaspati, Naiyāyika, Maṇḍana Miśra, Prajñākara, Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara, Hemacandra, Vācakacakravartī (Umāsvāti), Vaidānti-paśu, Kusumāñjali, Gurumata, Murāribhaṭṭa, Murāri Miśra, Gautamiya, Udayanācārya, Bhaṭṭācārya Jarannaiyāyika, Raghudeva Bhaṭṭācārya,⁵ Bhūṣaṇasāra,⁶ etc.

¹ सत्त्वेनैव लक्षणभङ्गो वक्तव्य इत्ययमभिप्राय इति नारायणाचार्यः ।

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khāḍya, leaf 3, Bombay).

² जातेर्हि दृष्टिनिगमो गदितः स्वभावाद्
जातिं विना न च ततो व्यवहारसिद्धिः ।
उत्प्रेक्षितं ननु शिरोमणि काण्डदेः
तद्वाक्य बोधरहितस्य न किञ्चिदेव ॥

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khāḍya, leaf 42, Bombay).

³ यत्त्वेवं सति तद्वये भावभूतस्थूलकालाप्रतिसिद्धावपि प्रागभावस्य कालतया असम्भव-
धारणाय क्षणेत्यपि प्रयोजनवदिति गुणानन्देनोक्तं तदसत् ॥

(Nyāyakhaṇḍa-khāḍya, leaf 2, Bombay).

⁴ सेन्द्रभट्टः प्रणिधाय न्यायविशारदयतिर्येशोविजयः ।

विषयमद्वयसहस्रीमद्वयसहस्रं विवेचयति ॥

(*Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivarāṇa*, MSS. belonging to Vijayadharma Sūri and Indravijaya Sūri).

⁵ Raghudeva is referred to in leaves 4, 22 of *Aṣṭasāhasrī*.

⁶ The *Bhūṣaṇasāra* (*Vyākaraṇa*) is referred to in leaves 34, 35, etc.

CHAPTER IV.

Continuity of Jaina Logic.¹

55. THE CONCILIATORY CHARACTER OF JAINA LOGIC.

In the previous pages there has been given an indication of the services rendered by the Jainas and the Buddhists in the formation of the Mediæval School of Indian Logic. Since the Brāhmaṇas did not in respect of their social practices differ so markedly from the Jainas as they did from the Buddhists, their attack on the Jaina Logic was not so violent as that on the Buddhist Logic. In fact the logical theories of the Jainas are in many instances akin to those of the Brāhmaṇas. The terms *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison), *āgama* (verbal testimony), *āharaṇa* or *udāharaṇa* (example), *chala* (quibble), etc., of the Sthānāṅga-sūtra and the Sūtra-kṛtāṅga of the Jainas are in their meanings similar to, if not altogether identical with, the corresponding terms of the Caraka saṁhitā and the Nyāya-sūtra of the Brāhmaṇas. There was in the Logic of the Brāhmaṇas a casual review of the syllogism of ten members as propounded in certain works of the Jainas, but there was no protracted quarrel on that account between the two parties. The Jaina logicians quoted Brāhmaṇic authors² generally in an academic spirit. The special Jaina doctrines of *Naya* (method) and *sapta-bhaṅgī* (sevenfold paralogism), though occasionally criticised, did not receive any rude blows from the Brāhmaṇas.

The Jainas, in so far as they wrote regular treatises on Logic, did not differ much from the Buddhists in respect of their subject and style. The Nyāyāvatāra, by the Śvetāmbara Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara (500 A.D.), traverses almost the same ground as the Nyāya praveśa of the Buddhist logician Dignāga (450–530 A.D.). Rabhasa Nandi, a Digambara Jaina logician, wrote a commentary called Sambandhodyota on the Sambandha parikṣā of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (635

¹ See Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Mediæval School of Indian Logic," his edition of "Nyāya-sāra" with the Nyāya-tātparya-dīpikā of Jaya-sīma Sūri; V.A. Smith's "Early History of India" and "Akbar"; Epigraphia Indica Vol. II; and "Jaina Inscriptions" compiled by Puran Chand Nahar.

² Akṣapāda was attacked by Siddhasena Divākara in his Sammatitarka, and by Haribhadra Sūri in his Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and Anekānta-jayapatākā. Uddyotakara (Vārtikakāra) was attacked by Abhayadeva Sūri of Rājagaccha.

A.D.). The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā* of Jaina Kalyāṇa-candra is likewise a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (635 A.D.). Dharmottara-ṭippanaka is the title of a Jaina commentary by Mallavādin (about 962 A.D.) on the Buddhist work *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā* of Dharmottara (847 A.D.). If the Buddhist author Śānta Rakṣita (749 A.D.) instituted in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* an inquiry into the Jaina doctrine of soul, the Jaina author Haribhadra Sūri (1129 A.D.) gave in his *Ṣaḍdarsana-samuccaya* a complete summary of the Buddhist philosophy. In fact there was no bitter rivalry between the Jainas and the Buddhists.

56. ROYAL PATRONAGE AND PERSECUTION.

From time to time Jainism enjoyed patronage as well as suffered persecution at the hands of the rulers. King Candra Gupta,¹ who carried on controversies in the spirit of scholars, was a great supporter of the Jaina religion which spread widely in Northern India and was introduced into Mysore by Bhadrabāhu. Samprati, a grandson of Emperor Aśoka, accepted the Jaina faith which was welcomed throughout the Deccan about 215 B.C. The Śvetāmbara Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara (*Kṣapaṇaka*) was patronised at the court of Vikramāditya in Ujjainī about 500 A.D. The Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang, who visited the Pallava, Coḷa and Pāṇḍya kingdoms in 640 A.D., found that Jainism was the prevailing religion in Drāviḍa, old Trichinopoly and Malakūṭa, and that it was popular in Mathurā, Vaiśālī, Eastern Bengal and Southern Mārāṭhā country. The Digambara Jaina logician Akalaṅka Deva enjoyed favour at the court of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa King Kṛṣṇarāja I or Subhataṅga about 750 A.D. Hema Candra Sūri, surnamed Kalikālasarvajña, was the preceptor of Mahārāja Kumāra Pāla of Guzerat about 1142-1172 A.D.

In the latter half of the seventh century A.D. there occurred, however, a terrible persecution of Jainism in Southern India. King Kūṇa, Sundara or Nedumāran Pāṇḍya, who had been brought up as a Jaina, became a pupil of Saint Tirujñāna Sambandar and accepted the Śaiva faith. Displaying the zeal of a convert he persecuted with savage cruelty his late co-religionists of whom no fewer than eight thousand were put to death. Mahendra Varman of the Pallava dynasty, whose rule extended to Trichinopoly, was

¹ If we suppose this Candra Gupta to be identical with Candra Gupta Maurya, the date of introduction of Jainism into Mysore must be about 309 B.C. On the contrary if he is the same as Candra Gupta II, Mysore could not have welcomed Jainism before 375 A.D. The date of Bhadrabāhu will have to be determined accordingly.

originally a Jaina. Through the influence of a Tamil saint he accepted Śaivism, and destroyed the large Jaina monastery of Pāṭaliputtriam in South Arcot at about 610 A.D. In the Cālukya Kingdom of Vātāpi, where Jainism flourished to a certain extent during 550–750 A.D., Buddhism was supplanted by Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. King Amoghavarṣa of the Rāṣtrakūṭa line, whose capital was at Mānyakheta (in the Nizam's Dominions) devoted the last part of his life to ascetic practices and patronised the Digambara Jaina faith during 815–877 A.D. Jainism made a rapid progress in his kingdom up to the 10th century A.D. Ajaya Deva, a Śaiva King of Guzerat (about 1174–76 A.D.) mercilessly persecuted the Jainas and put their leader to death.

In spite of such persecutions the Jaina religion went on flourishing in the Hindu period up till 1200 A.D. During the Mahomedan rule which followed, Jainism remained unperturbed. No hostility from the Mahomedans. The Pathan King, Firoz Shah Tughlak (1351–1388 A.D.), was kind towards the Jainas, and the Moghal Emperors showed them great favours. Three eminent Jaina teachers—Hiravijaya Sūri, Vijaya-sena Sūri and Bhānucandra Upādhyāya—were received with high honours at the court of Akbar who is said to have been a convert to Jainism and to have prohibited the killing of animals on certain days.

57. SUPPORT OF THE JAINA COMMUNITY.

Though in all periods the Jainas enjoyed a fair share of royal patronage, the main source of their stay and strength lay in the community of Jaina laymen. The founder of Jainism left the church not entirely at the mercy of the monks (*sādhu*) and nuns (*sādhvī*), but placed it also in the hands of the laymen (*śrāvaka*) and laywomen (*śrāvikā*) called respectively the male and female devotees. In all religious and social ceremonies the lay people exercise control in the full measure. It is at their choice and with their permission that the head of the church called *Ācārya* can be appointed. The management of temples and places of pilgrimage is entrusted entirely to the lay people, who select the residence of monks and nuns.

It is on account of the mutual help of the monks and lay people that the Jaina church has continued undisturbed. The lay people, who belong mainly to the Vaiśya (merchant) community, command the wealth of India. They have uniformly supported Jaina authors, and so long as they continue, the Jaina logicians will never have to recede from literary pursuits for want of funds.

58. JAINA LOGIC WILL NOT BE EXTINCT.

We have seen that the Jaina monks were very seldom militant against the Brāhmaṇas or Buddhists. They also avoided, as far as practicable, incurring the displeasure of their rulers, and framed their ecclesiastical rules in liberal spirit to ensure the sympathy of the laity. Under such circumstances it is not at all strange that Jainism has not died and there is no fear that the Jaina Logic will ever be extinct.

SECTION II.

The Buddhist Logic. (CIRCA 570 B.C.—1200 A.D.).

CHAPTER I.

Topics of Logic mentioned in the old Buddhist Literature.

59. BUDDHA GAUTAMA (570 B.C.—490 B.C.).

The Buddhists maintain that their religion is eternal. It was taught at different cycles by sages called Buddhas (the Enlightened Ones) or Tathāgatas (those who have realized the truth). In the present cycle, called *Mahā-bhadra-kalpa* (the very blessed cycle), four Buddhas are said to have already appeared, *viz.* Krakucchanda, Kanaka Muni, Kāśyapa and Gautama, while the fifth, *viz.* Maitreya, is yet to be born.¹

Of the past Buddhas the last, *viz.* Buddha Gautama, otherwise called Śākya Muni, was born at Kapilavastu (modern Nigliva in the Nepal Terai) about 570 B.C., and attained *nirvāṇa* at Kuśinagara (modern Kuśinārā or Kasia near Gorakhpur) about 490 B.C.² He passed almost his whole life in Magadha (modern Behar): He is regarded by modern scholars as the real founder of Buddhism, while his predecessors are considered as purely mythical.

60. ORIGIN OF THE PĀLI BUDDHIST LITERATURE (490 B.C.—76 B.C.).

Buddha Gautama is said to have delivered his teachings in the Māgadhī or Pāli language. On his death these teachings were rehearsed by the Buddhist monks in three councils³ held at Rāja-

¹ *Vide* Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, second edition, pp. 88—91.

² The exact date of Buddha is unknown. According to the *Mahāvamsa*, Buddha was born in 623 B.C. and attained *nirvāṇa* in 543 B.C. The date of Buddha's *nirvāṇa* is placed by European scholars between 470—480 B.C. Cf. Dr. Fleet's article on "The Date of Buddha's Death" in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, January 1904. We shall not be far wrong if we place Buddha's birth in 570 B.C. and his *nirvāṇa* in 490 B.C. There is a positive statement in chapter V of the *Mahāvamsa* that Aśoka was installed on the throne of Magadha 218 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha. As Aśoka's installation took place about 272 B.C., the date of Buddha's *nirvāṇa* could approximately be placed in 490 B.C. Buddha, who lived 80 years, seems, therefore, to have been born about 570 B.C.

³ For an account of the first and second councils, *vide* Vinaya Pitaka, Culla

gr̥ha, Vaiśālī and Pāṭalīputra under the patronage of kings Ajātaśatru, Kālāśoka and Aśoka about the year 490 B.C., 390 B.C. and 255 B.C.¹ respectively. The texts of the teachings as discussed and settled in these councils form the sacred scripture of the Buddhists. This scripture is called in Pāli *Tipiṭaka* or *Piṭakattaya* and in Sanskrit *Tripitaka* or *Piṭakatraya*, which signifies 'Three Baskets.' It consists of the Sermon Basket (Sutta Piṭaka), Discipline Basket (Vinaya Piṭaka), and the Metaphysical Basket (Abhidhamma Piṭaka), each of which embodies a large number of distinct works.

The monks assembled in the First Council, that is, in the Council of Kāśyapa, in 490 B.C., were called (1) Theras, and the scripture canonised by them was the basis of Theravāda. Subsequently ten thousand monks of Vaiśālī having violated certain rules of Theravāda were, by the decision of the Second Council in 390 B.C., expelled from the community of the Theras. These excluded priests were called (2) Mahāsāṅghikas, who were the first heretical sect of the Buddhists. They made certain additions and alterations in the Theravāda. Afterwards, within two hundred years from the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, 14 other heretical sects² arose, viz. (3) Gokulika, (4) Ekabbohārika, (5) Paññatti, (6) Bāhulika, (7) Cetiya, (8) Sabbatthi, (9) Dhammaguttika, (10) Kassapiya, (11) Saṅkantika, (12) Sutta, (13) Himavata, (14) Rājagiriya, (15) Siddhatthika, (16) Pubbaseliya, (17) Aparaseliya, and (18) Vajiriya.

Just at the close of the Third Council about 255 B.C., the teachings of Buddha as canonised by the Theras in the form of the *Tipiṭaka*, were carried³ by Mahinda, son of Emperor Aśoka, to the island of Ceylon where they were perpetuated by priests in oral tradition. They are said to have been committed to writing⁴, for the first time in Ceylon, in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi during 104—76 B.C. Besides the *Tipiṭaka* there were numerous other works written in Pāli which have immensely added to the bulk of the Pāli literature.

Vagga, 11th and 12th Khandhakas, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, S.B.E. series, vol. XX, pp. 370, 386. For an account of the third council as also of the first and second, vide Wijesimha's translation of the Mahāvamsa, chapter V, pp. 25—29, as also chapters III and IV.

¹ The first council was held in the year of Buddha's *nirvāṇa*, while the second council took place 100 years later. Aśoka ascended the throne in 272 B.C. (vide Vincent A. Smith's Aśoka, p. 63), and it was in the 17th year of his reign, that is, in 255 B.C., that the third council took place (vide Wijesimha's Mahāvamsa, p. 29).

² For a discussion about the variant names and subdivisions of these sects, vide Wijesimha's Mahāvamsa, part I, chapter V, p. 15; and Dr. Rhys Davids' "Schools of Buddhist Belief" in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1892, pp. 1—37.

³ Vide the Mahāvamsa, chapter XII.

⁴ Vide the Mahāvamsa, chapter XXXIII. Cf. also Dr. Alwis's Lecture on the Pali Language in the Journal of the Pali Text Society, London, 1883, p. 42.

61. LOGICAL TOPICS IN THE PĀLI LITERATURE.

In the *Tipiṭaka*—nay in the whole Pāli literature¹—there is not a single treatise on Logic. *Paṭicca-samuppāda* (the Chain of Interdependent Causes or the Wheel of Life), which represents the central teaching of Buddha, throws some light on the doctrines of self (or soul) and sufferings, but none on logic or processes of reasoning. The only topic bearing upon Logic which has been touched on in the Pāli works, is the division of knowledge into six kinds. In the *Tipiṭaka*² knowledge (*Viññāṇa*³) has been classified as (1) ocular (*cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ*), (2) auditory (*sota-viññāṇaṃ*), (3) olfactory (*ghāṇa-viññāṇaṃ*), (4) gustatory (*jivhā-viññāṇaṃ*), (5) tactual (*kāya-viññāṇaṃ*), and (6) mental (*mano-viññāṇaṃ*). But this classification has not been carried far enough to lay the foundation of a Logic that deserves the name of science.

In the *Tipiṭaka* there are, however, occasional references to logical topics and to a class of men who were called *Takki* (in Sanskrit: *Tarkin*) or *Takkika* (in Sanskrit: *Tārkika*)—that is, those versed in reasoning. It is not known whether these men were Buddhists, Jainas or Brāhmaṇas, perhaps they were recruited from all communities. They were not logicians in the proper sense of the term, but they appear to me to have been sophists who indulged in quibble and casuistry.

62. Suttapiṭaka: Dīgha-nikāya: Brahmajāla sutta (490 B.C.).

In the *Brahma-jāla-sutta*,⁴ which forms a part of the *Dīgha Nikāya* of the *Sutta Piṭaka* and was rehearsed in the First Buddhist Council about 490 B.C., there is mention of certain Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who were *takki* (argumentationists) and *vīmaṃsi* (casuists) and indulged in *takka* (argumentations) and *vīmaṃsā* (casuistry). These Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas from the standpoints of their philo-

¹ Consult Mrs. Rhys Davids' article on Logic (Buddhist) in Dr. James Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

² For an explanation of *Paṭicca-samuppāda* or *Pratītya-samutpāda*, the doctrine of mutual dependence, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's article on the subject in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, Vol. VII, part I. For the division of knowledge, vide the *Anguttara Nikāya* III, 61. 8, edited by Dr. Morris in the *Pāli Text Society* series of London. Vide also the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, and compare *Pariccheda* IV of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* which, though not included in the *Tipiṭaka*, sums up the topics of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

³ *Viññāṇa* is translated as knowledge or consciousness, such as *cakkhuvīññāṇa* signifies ocular knowledge or eye-consciousness.

⁴ The *Brahmajāla-sutta*, chaps. I—III, included in *Dialogues of the Buddha*, translated by Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids, London. The *Brahmajāla-sutta*, bhāṇa-vāraṃ 1—3, included in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London.

sophical views were divided into various classes such as the eternalists (*sassata-vādā*), eternalist-non-eternalists (*ekacca-sassatikā ekacca-asassatikā*), and the annihilationists (*uccheda-vādā*).

With regard to the eternalists who were perhaps the followers of (the Sāṃkhya philosophy of) Kapila, Buddha says:—

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are
 Eternalists. eternalists, and who, on four grounds, pro-
 claim that both the soul and the world are
 eternal. . . . They are addicted to logic and reasoning
 [argumentation and casuistry], and give utterance to the following
 conclusion of their own, beaten out by their argumentations and
 based on their sophistry: “eternal is the soul; and the world, giving
 birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain-peak, as a pillar
 firmly fixed; and these living creatures, though they transmigrate
 and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in
 another, yet they are for ever and ever.”

With regard to the eternalist-non-eternalists who were per-
 haps the followers (of the Ānviṣikī) of Medhātithi-Gautama, Bud-
 dha says:—

There are, brethren, some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are
 Eternalists-non-eternal- eternalists with regard to some things, and
 ists. in regard to others non-eternalists; who
 on four grounds maintain that the soul and
 the world are partly eternal and partly not. . . . They are
 addicted to logic and reasoning [argumentation and casuistry], and
 give utterance to the following conclusion of their own, beaten out
 by their argumentations and based on their sophistry: “This which
 is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which
 is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change. But this
 which is called heart, or mind, or consciousness, is a self which is
 permanent, steadfast, eternal, and knows no change, and will remain
 for ever and ever.”

With regard to the annihilationists who were perhaps the
 followers of the Lokāyata philosophy, Buddha observes:—

There are, brethren, recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are anni-
 Annihilationists. hilationists, who in seven ways maintain
 the cutting off, the destruction, the annihi-
 lation of a living being In the first place, brethren,
 they put forth the following opinion, the following view: “Since,
 sir, this soul has form, is built up of the four elements, and is the
 offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, destroyed on the dis-
 solution of the body; and does not continue after death; and then,
 sir, the soul is completely annihilated.”

There are other classes of Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas such as

a class of fortuitous-originists (*adhicca-samuppannika*) of whom Buddha speaks as follows:—

“In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brāhmaṇa is addicted to *logic* [sophism] and *reasoning* [casuistry].” He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his *argumentations* and based on his *sophistry*: “The soul and the world arose without a cause.”

63. Suttapiṭaka : Majjhimanikāya : Anumāna sutta
(490 B.C.).

“Anumāna sutta,” which presupposes the use of the word *anumāna* in the sense of “inference” or rather “guess,” is the title of a chapter of the Majjhima Nikāya, while the word *vāda* in the sense of discussion occurs in the Upālivāda-sutta of the same Nikāya of the Suttapiṭaka.¹

64. Suttapiṭaka : Khuddaka Nikāya : Udāna
(490 B.C.).

In the Udāna, which is included in the Khuddaka Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka and is supposed to have been rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 490 B.C.—255 B.C., we read:—

“As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear, the *Takkikas* [sophists] are not corrected nor are the *Sāvakas*: owing to their evil views they are not released from misery.”²

This passage leaves no doubt that the *Takkikas* were sophists.

65. Vinaya-piṭaka : Parivāra
(490 B.C.).

The logical procedure of a Judicial Council of Monks.

Four kinds of cases for settlement (*adhikaraṇa*).

In the Parivāra,³ a work of the Vinaya-piṭaka, there is mention of four kinds of *adhikaraṇa*, cases for settlement, viz.: (1) *vivādādhikaraṇa*, a case pertaining to differences of opinion, (2) *anuvādādhikaraṇa*, a case in which one party accuses another party of the violation of a rule of good conduct; (3) *āpattādhikaraṇa*, a case in

¹ Vide Majjhima Nikāya, vol. I, 15th sutta, and vol. II, 5th sutta.

² The original of this passage runs as follows:—

Yāva sammā sambuddhā loke n’uppajjanti, na *takkikā* sujjhanti na c’āpi sāvakā, duddiṭṭhī na dukkhā pamuccare’ti.

—Udānam, vi, 10, edited by Paul Steinthal in the Pāli Text Society series, London.

³ The Parivāra, chapters IX—XIII, included in the Vinaya-piṭakam, vol. V, edited by Dr. H. Oldenberg. Vide also the Pātimokkha of the Vinaya-piṭakam.

which a monk has actually transgressed an established rule of good conduct; and (4) *kiccādhikaraṇa*, a case relating to the formal procedure of an ecclesiastical act.

Seven rules for the settlement of cases (*adhikaraṇa-samathā dhammā*).

There are laid down seven rules for the settlement of cases (*adhikaraṇa-samathā dhammā*), viz. :—

- (1) *Sammukhā vinaya*, settlement in presence, which applies to a case that must be conducted in the presence of a council of monks (*saṅgha*), the complainant and the respondent, in accordance with the sacred procedure appropriate for it.
- (2) *Sati vinaya*, settlement from recollection, which applies to a case in which an Arhat (passionless person) is implicated. Such a case, which is evidently false, may be settled simply by asking the Arhat to recollect his past misdeeds, if any. An Arhat, being totally devoid of passions, is not at all liable to the transgression of any rule. Still to try him through *sati-vinaya*, is to settle the present charge and to grant him immunity from all further charges.
- (3) *Amūlha-vinaya*, settlement for the insane, which applies to a case in which a person while committing a crime was in an abnormal state of mind, and was therefore not liable to any charge for the committal of the crime. If at the time of his trial he denies all knowledge about the crime, he will be exempted from the charge once for all.
- (4) *Patihñāya kāretabbam*, settlement by an undertaking, applies to a case in which the person implicated admits his guilt and promises to refrain from committing it in the future.
- (5) *Yebhuyyasikā*, settlement by a majority, applies to a case which is settled by the majority of votes of the members.
- (6) *Tassa pāpiyyasikā*, settlement with the prospect of further inquiry, applies to a case in which, the respondent having neither admitted nor denied a charge, the council of monks (*saṅgha*), with a view to awakening him to a sense of responsibility, declares that he will be expelled from the council any day that the charge is proved true, but will be welcomed into the council when the charge is proved false.
- (7) *Tiṇa vatthāraka*, covering over with grass, applies to a case in which a complainant and his respondent go on bringing charges and counter-charges against each other. The council of monks (*saṅgha*), finding no easy way to settle the case, hush it up without listening to either of the parties.

Of the four cases enumerated above the first may be settled by rules 1 and 5, the second by rules 1, 2, 3 and 6, the third by rules 1, 4 and 7, and the fourth by rule 1 alone.

A complaint (*codanā*).

A *complaint* (*codanā*) is intended for humiliating a person by reminding him of the nature of his criminal action. The complaint may be well founded or unfounded. It may arise from any thing seen, heard or apprehended.

The *complainant* or *plaintiff* (*codaka*) must institute his complaint at the proper time, in its true detail, in gentle and relevant terms and in good spirit.

The *respondent*, *accused* or *defendant* (*cuditaka*) must speak the truth and must not show temper.

A judicial council of monks (*saṅgha*).

A *council of monks* (*saṅgha*) engaged in trying a case, must receive the arguments of the complainant and the respondent who are the parties of the case. Deliberation (*matikamma*) must be shared in by each member of the council.

Members of a council (*saṅgāmāvacara bhikkhu*).

The monks who constitute the members of a judicial council (called in Pāli *saṅgāmāvacara bhikkhu*) must approach the council with meekness of spirit. They must know how to take their respective seats. They must refrain from irrelevant and useless talk. They may speak on good law, or they may solicit their brother monks to speak on it, or they may remain absolutely silent.

The members must ascertain the nature of the case under trial, the nature of the breach of morality, the section of the moral code applicable to the case and the nature of the personnel of the council and the parties. They must not be biassed. They should, when necessary, employ persuasion and exhortation towards the respondent and should at times express their satisfaction at his conduct.

They must not, on account of their own superiority in knowledge or seniority in age, hold anybody in contempt.

The judge or umpire (*anuvijjaka*).

The judge (*anuvijjaka*), elected by the council to act as such, must not talk rashly or in haste. He must refrain from talking of a subject which is in itself unprofitable, and which may rouse dispute or ill-feeling. He must hear attentively what the parties have to say. Having the welfare of all at heart, he must not hastily accept the version of one party as true. The complainant will say that the respondent "is guilty," *āpanno*, while the respondent himself will plead "not guilty," *anāpanno*. Instead of

discarding the statement of either of the parties, the judge must see that each party is consistent with his first statement.

The judge must satisfy himself that the complainant understands the nature of the complaint he makes. As regards the respondent the judge must not put to him questions which may refer to his preceptor, teacher, brother-priest, resident pupil, caste, name, family, tradition, clan or native place. The reason is that thereby the judge may be biassed towards or prejudiced against the respondent, and his judgment may be influenced by affection, hatred, fear or delusion.

The judge must have respect for the whole council and not for a particular individual, for justice and not for private interest, for what is really good and not for what is agreeable to a particular company in which he is interested. He must investigate the case in season and not out of season, as it is and not as it is not, gently and not rudely, with good will and with his limbs and sense-organs duly restrained.

He must control the complainant and the respondent, must take note of what they say, and must not add any thing that they do not say. He must make the languid cheerful, the timid hopeful, and the angry cool. He must not act from affection, hatred, fear or delusion. A judge who behaves himself in this way is a true follower of Buddha and is justly loved by all people.

66. Vinaya-piṭaka: Pātimokkha (490 B.C.).

As an instance of the method in which monks combined in a council (*saṅgha*) used to perform an ecclesiastical act (*kiccādhikaraṇa*), I explain the several stages and requisites of the Buddhist sabbath called *uposatha*¹ in accordance with the Pātimokkhupadesa¹ of the Vinaya-piṭaka.

Upasatha (*Sabbath*).

1. *Pubba-karaṇa*, preparation, which refers to the following requisites:—

- (a) *Sammajjanī*, brooming or cleansing the ground, on which monks are to assemble.
- (b) *Paḍīpa*, lighting a lamp, if the uposatha is celebrated in the night

¹ Vide the Pāli Pātimokkha of the Vinaya-piṭaka, and also the translation of the Vinaya texts by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg. Compare also the Tibetan version of the Pātimokkha called So-sor-thar-pa edited with the Tibetan text and an English translation by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in J.A.S.B., nos. 3 and 4, 1915. *Pubba-karaṇa* and *pubba-kicca* are explained fully in the *Kaṅkhā-vitarāṇī* and *Samantapāsādikā* of Buddhaghosa.

- (c) *Udaka*, water, for drinking or washing one's face and leg.
- (d) *Āsana*, seat, on which monks are to sit.

2. *Pubba-kicca*, the preliminary acts, which refer to the following:—

- (a) *Chanda*, vote by proxy. If a monk cannot, owing to any unavoidable cause, attend a council, he may authorize a brother-monk to exercise his vote. The formula of authorization runs thus:—
chandaṃ dammi, I give authority;
chandaṃ me hara, do ye receive my authority;
chandaṃ me ārocehi, do ye convey my authority to the council.
- (b) *Pārisuddhi*, purity. A monk who cannot attend a council of sabbath, must inform it of his purity through a brother-monk.
- (c) *Utukkhāna*, naming the season. In a year there are three seasons, *viz* the winter, summer and rain, in each of which there are celebrated eight *uposathas* (sabbaths). The third and seventh *uposathas* of every season are held on the 14th day of the moon while the remaining six are held on the 15th day of the moon. *Uposathas* are of three kinds, *viz*. those held on the 14th day of the moon, those held on the 15th day of the moon, and those held on any day, by the common consent of a council of monks, to establish amity between two contending parties.
- (d) *Bhikkhu-gaṇanā*, counting the number of monks present in a council. A council may consist of four, five, ten, twenty or more monks.
- (e) *Ovāda*, arrangement for the instruction to be imparted to a council of nuns by a monk deputed for the purpose.

3. *Pattakallam*, in season. When the *pubba-karaṇa* and *pubba-kicca* are over, the council should see whether it was the right time when every thing was in order and there was nothing objectionable.

4. *Pātimokkhuḍḍesa*, recitation of the code of monastic laws.

The introductory part of the *Pātimokkha*, called *nidāna*, is cited below:—

O brethren, listen to me, I pray. To-day is the 14th (or 15th) day of the lunar month for the celebration of sabbath by the council of monks. If it is convenient to the council, let us celebrate sabbath and recite the (rules of) *Pātimokkha*.

Have the preliminary acts been performed? O brethren, do ye now express your purity. I shall recite the *Pātimokkha*.

We shall all listen to it calmly and bear the same in mind.

Whosoever among you has committed any fault, let him confess it. If there is no fault, say nothing whatsoever. If nothing is said I am to understand that the brethren are perfectly pure. As a monk gives an answer if a question is put to him individually, so each monk is

to give an answer when I repeat my question three times in a council of monks like this. Whatsoever monk, in such a council, thus interrogated three times, does not confess a fault of which there is recollection, is guilty of uttering a deliberate lie. The uttering of a deliberate lie has, O brethren, been declared by Lord Buddha to be a sin called obstacle. Therefore a monk, who has committed a fault and desires to be cleansed therefrom, should confess it if he remembers the same. Having made confession he will reside in happiness. But if he does not confess or declare his fault, he will not be happy.

O brethren, I have recited the Introduction to the Pātimokkha. I now ask you whether you are perfectly pure. I ask you a second time and a third time. The brethren are perfectly pure; therefore they say nothing; so do I understand.

Then are recited the four rules of defeat, thirteen rules of suspension from monkhood, two rules regarding undetermined matters, thirty rules regarding sins which involve forfeiture, ninety-two rules regarding sins which require expiation, four rules regarding matters which must be confessed, one hundred and twelve rules which must be learnt (committed to memory), and seven rules for the settlement of cases. If any monk makes any confession, it is noted and considered.

5. After the Pātimokkha in its entirety has been recited, the monks should leave the sabbath hall with a feeling of universal love.

67. Abhidhamma-piṭaka: Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa (ABOUT 255 B.C.).

The Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, a work of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the Third Buddhist Council during the reign of Aśoka about 255 B.C.,¹ mentions *anuyoga* (inquiry), *āharaṇa* (illustration), *paṭiññā* (in Sanskrit: *pratiññā*, proposition), *upanaya* (in Sanskrit, too: *upanaya*, application of reason), *niggaha* (in Sanskrit: *nigraha*, humiliation or defeat), etc.,² which are the technical terms of Logic. Though Moggaliputta Tissa has not made any reference to a specific work on Logic, his mention of some of its technical terms warrants us to suppose that that science in some shape existed in India in his time, about 255 B.C.

¹ Aśoka ascended the throne of Magadha in 272 B.C. (*vide* Vincent A. Smith's *Aśoka*, p. 63). In the seventeenth year of his reign the Third Buddhist Council took place (Wijesirīma's *Mahāvamsa*, p. 29).

² *Niggaha-catukkam* is the name of a section of the first chapter of the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa. *Upanaya-catukkam* is the name of another section of that work. A passage, in which the terms *paṭiññā* and *niggaha* occur, is quoted below:—

No ca mayam tayā tathā hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṃ paṭijānantā hevaṃ niggaheṭabbo (Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, Siamese edition, p. 3, kindly lent to me by Anagārika H. Dharmapāla).

In the commentary on the above passage even *chala* (quibble), which is another technical term of Logic, has been used.

Evam tena, chalena niggāhe āropite idāni tass'eva paṭiññāya dhammena samena attavāde jayam dassetum anulomanaye pucchā sakavādisa attano nissāya paṭiññam paravādisa laddhiya okāsam adatvā. . .

68. METHODS OF DISPUTATION AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE KATHĀVATTHU.

As a specimen of the method of reasoning carried on during the time of Aśoka, the following controversy (*kathā*) between a Theravādin (a Buddhist disputant who did not admit the existence of the soul, *puggala*, as a genuine reality) and a Puggalavādin (a heretic respondent who asserted that there was a genuine reality called soul, *puggala*) is quoted from the Kathāvatthu¹:—

A case presented by a disputant in a regular form (*anuloma*).

Theravādin: Is the soul (*puggala*) known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the soul known in the same way as a genuinely real thing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge your defeat.

- (i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known.
- (ii) That which you say here is wrong, *viz.* (*a*) the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (*b*) known in the same way as any other genuinely real thing is known.
- (iii) If the statement (*b*) is not admitted, then indeed the statement (*a*) cannot be admitted either.
- (iv) In admitting the statement (*a*) but in denying the statement (*b*), you are wrong.

A rejoinder by the respondent (*paṭikamma*).

Puggalavādin: Is the soul not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing?

Theravādin: No, it is not known.

Puggalavādin: Is it unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known?

Theravādin: No, that cannot be said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder.

(Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā, published by the Pali Text Society of London, p. 13).

¹ Kathāvatthu, vol. I, pp. 1-69, edited by A. C. Taylor and published by the Pāli Text Society, London.

Compare the English translation called "Points of Controversy," by Mr. Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, published by the Pāli Text Society, London, pp. 1-70.

- (i) If the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also say that the soul is unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (ii) That which you say here is wrong, *viz.* (a) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (b) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (iii) If the statement (b) is denied, then the statement (a) cannot be admitted either.
- (iv) In admitting the statement (a) but in denying the statement (b), you are wrong.

**The rejoinder causing entanglement or defeat on the disputant
(*niggaha*).**

Puggalavādin: If in your opinion we should say that the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing but not unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known, then, you have, by your own proposition, assented to the truth of our statement and have acknowledged defeat.

- (i) Your statement—that the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known—is wrong.
- (ii) You should not say that the statement (a) is to be admitted, but the statement (b) is not to be admitted.
- (iii) If the statement (b) is not admitted, then the statement (a) cannot be admitted either.
- (iv) In admitting the statement (a) but in denying the statement (b), you are wrong.

**Application of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case
(*upanaya*).**

Puggalavādin: If the defeat we have inflicted on you is considered unfair, do ye apply your reasoning to your own case.

We said: “(a) the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but (b) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.”

You observed: “if the statement (b) is not admitted, then the statement (a) cannot be admitted either.”

Now, you say: “(a) the soul is not known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, but not (b) unknown in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.”

Following you we observe: “if you do not admit the statement (b), you cannot admit the statement (a) either.”

Conclusion (*niggamana*).

Puggalavādin : As for ourselves we do not deserve any defeat.

The following assumptions which you made are wrong :—

- (i) If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, it must also be known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (ii) It is wrong to couple the statement (*a*), viz. the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, with the statement (*b*), viz. the soul is not known in the same way as a genuinely real thing is known.
- (iii) If the statement (*b*) is denied, then the statement (*a*) must also be denied.
- (iv) If the statement (*a*) is admitted, then the statement (*b*) must also be admitted.

The defeat you propose to inflict on us is unfair. But our rejoinder is fair and demonstration well done.

The above is an instance of First Defeat (*paṭhamo niggaho*). The argument is suitably repeated in the Second Defeat (adverse controversy, *paccamaṅka-niggaho*) in which the respondent is a Theravādin. In the Third, Fourth or Fifth Defeat the question runs respectively as follows: “Is the soul known *everywhere, always or in everything* in the sense of a genuinely real thing?” “In the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Defeats *not known* is substituted for *known* in the question.

A case presented through a simple comparison (*suddhika saṃsandana*).

Theravādin : Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, and is matter also known in the same sense?

Puggalavādin : Yes.

Theravādin : Is matter one thing and the soul another?

Puggalavādin : No, that cannot be said.

Theravādin : Acknowledge defeat.

If the soul and matter be each known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be admitted. To say that the soul and matter are both known in the sense of genuinely real things but that they are not mutually distinct things, is wrong.

If the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of the four alternatives. Your position is untenable. If you cannot admit any of the four alternatives, then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the proposition that the soul is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing.

Definition of terms (*lakkhaṇāyutti-kathā*).

Theravādin : Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing ?

Puggalavādin : Yes.

Theravādin : Is the soul related or absolute, compounded or uncompounded, eternal or temporal, is possessed of form or without form ?

Puggalavādin : No, these cannot be said.

Theravādin : Acknowledge defeat.

Clearing the meaning of terms (*vacana-sodhana*).

The extension of the subject in relation to its predicate is clearly set forth in the following controversy :—

Theravādin : Is the soul (subject) known, and is that which is known (predicate) the soul ?

Puggalavādin : The soul is known, but of that which is known a portion is soul and the remaining portion is not soul.

Theravādin : Do you say this with respect to the subject also, *viz.* of the soul, a portion is known and the remaining portion is not known.

Puggalavādin : No, that cannot be said, etc.

A case presented through an analogy (*opamma-sāmsandana*).

Theravādin : Matter (*rūpa*) is, you have admitted, known as a genuinely real thing. Feeling (*vedanā*) too is known as such. Now, is matter one thing and feeling another ?

Puggalavādin : Yes.

Theravādin : Is the soul known also in the sense of a genuinely real thing, as matter is known ?

Puggalavādin : Yes.

Theravādin : Then, is matter one thing, the soul another thing ?

Puggalavādin : No, that cannot be admitted.

Theravādin : Acknowledge defeat.

If matter and feeling are both known as genuinely real things and yet are two different things, then by analogy, if the soul and matter are both known as genuinely real things, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions but not the second pair, is wrong. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is wrong.

A case presented through the four-fold method (*catukka-naya-sāmsandana*).

Theravādin : Is the soul known in the sense of a genuinely real thing ?

Puggalavādin : Yes.

Theravādin : (i) Is matter the soul ? or (ii) Is the soul in matter ? or (iii) Is the soul apart from matter ? or (iv) Is matter in the soul ?

Puggalavādin : No, that cannot be said.

Theravādin : Acknowledge defeat.

The doctrine of impermanence (*khaṇika-kathā*).

The doctrine of momentariness (*khaṇika-kathā*,¹ in its crude form is discussed in the following dialogue :—

Theravādin : Do all things exist in our consciousness for a moment only ?

Pubbaseliyas : Yes.

Theravādin : Do you mean that it is in our consciousness that there exist the earth, ocean, Sumeru, water, fire, wind, grass, twigs and trees ?

Pubbaseliyas : No.

Theravādin : Do you mean that our sense-organs have grown along with our sense-cognitions ?

Pubbaseliyas : No.

Theravādin : Do you mean that the sense organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions ?

Pubbaseliyas : Yes.

Theravādin : Do you accept the authority of the scripture which declares that there will be no cognition, if the sense-organs are conjoined with their objects but not with the mind, or with the mind but not with the objects, and that there will be cognition only when the sense-organs, their objects and the mind—all these three—are conjoined ?

Pubbaseliyas : Yes.

Theravādin : Therefore you can not say that the sense-organs are coincident in time with our sense-cognitions.

Pubbaseliyas : Should we say that things do not exist in our mind for a moment only ?

Theravādin : Yes.

¹ *Kathāvatthu*, *Khaṇika-kathā* XXII—8, pp. 620—621, edited by A. C. Taylor in the Pāli Text Society. Compare also the translation called "Points of Controversy" by S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids. Also *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 190.

Pubbaseliyas: Are all things eternal, stable, permanent and immutable?

Theravādin: No.

Pubbaseliyas: Therefore all things exist in our mind for a moment only.

69. *Milinda-pañha* alias THE Bhikṣu-sūtra
(ABOUT 100 A.D.).

The only Pāli work in which an explicit reference to Logic called *Nīti* (or *Nyāya*) occurs is the *Milinda-pañha* otherwise known as the Bhikṣu-sūtra, which was composed about 100 A.D.¹ It was translated into Chinese under the Eastern Tsin dynasty A.D. 317—420.² In the Chinese collection of the Indian books it is designated as the Nāgasena-Bhikṣu-sūtra. This work contains questions of Milinda (the Greek King Menander of Bactria) and replies of Bhikṣu Nāga Sena on various abstruse matters. In it Milinda, who was versed in Logic (*Nīti* or *Nyāya*), is thus described:—

“Many were the arts and sciences he knew—holy tradition and secular law; Hetuvidyā or Nyāya. the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, *Nyāya* and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy; arithmetic; music; medicine; the four Vedas, the Purāṇas, and the Itihāsas; astronomy, magic; causation and spells; the art of war; poetry; conveyancing—in a word, the whole nineteen.

As a disputant he was hard to equal, harder still to overcome; the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. And as in wisdom so in strength of body, swiftness, and valour, there was found none equal to Milinda in all India. He was rich, too, mighty in wealth and prosperity, and the number of his armed hosts knew no end..... The king, who was fond of wordy disputation, and eager for discussion with *casuists*, *sophists*, and gentry of that sort, looked at the sun (to ascertain the time), and then said to his ministers.”³

The following dialogue between Milinda and Nāga Sena is quoted to show what was thought to be the proper mode of carrying on debate in the days of those notable persons⁴:—

The King said: ‘Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?’
A scholarly debate. ‘If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (Paṇḍita), well; but if you will discuss as a king, no.’
‘How is it then that scholars discuss?’

¹ For discussions about date *vide* Rhys Davids’ Introduction to “the Questions of King Milinda” in the S.B.E. series, vol. xxxv. Menander seems to have belonged to the family of Enkratides and to have invaded India about 155 B.C.

² *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio’s Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1358.

³ Taken from Rhys Davids’ translation of the *Milinda-pañha* called “the Questions of King Milinda” in S.B.E. series, vol. xxxv, pp. 6–7.

Nyāya is taken as an equivalent for the original *Nīti*, causation for *Hetu*, *casuists* for *Lokāyata* and *sophists* for *Vitāṇḍa*.

Nīti means “polity,” but placed between Yoga and Vaiśeṣika it may signify *Nyāya*. Causation, *hetu*, very probably stands for *Hetu-vidyā*, *Nyāya* or Logic.

⁴ *Vide* Rhys Davids’ Questions of King Milinda in the S.B.E. series, vol. xxxv, p. 46.

‘When scholars talk a matter over with one another, then is there a winding up, an unravelling; one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake, distinctions are drawn, and contradistinctions; and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O King, discuss.’

‘And how do kings discuss?’

‘When a king, Your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: “Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!” Thus, Your Majesty, do kings discuss.’

‘Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let Your Reverence talk unrestrainedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid!’

70. ORIGIN OF THE MAHĀYĀNA (ABOUT 78 A.D.).

At the opening of the Christian era the north-western part of India was invaded by the Kuśānas, Turuṣkas or Scythians. Kaniṣka,¹ who was one of their chiefs, conquered Kāśmīra, Palhava and Delhi, and is said to have founded the era called *Śakābda* in 78 A.D. He accepted the Buddhist faith and established a new system of Buddhism called *Mahāyāna*,² the Great Vehicle. The old system of Buddhism as promulgated in the Pāli Tipiṭaka was henceforth nicknamed *Hīnayāna*, the Little Vehicle. The *Mahāyāna* gradually spread to Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan, Corea, etc., while the *Hīnayāna* continued in Ceylon and thence spread to Burmah, Siam, etc. In India both the systems prevailed.

¹ Hwen-thsang, in the 7th century A.D., records a prophecy of Buddha that 400 years after his nirvāṇa, Kaniṣka would be born: *vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, p. 90. The same prophecy is mentioned by Fa-hian about 399 A.D., showing thereby that Kaniṣka was regarded as historical even at that time. According to Tibetan books such as the *Sum-pahi-chog-byuñ*, Kaniṣka flourished in 33 B.C., that is, 400 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha which is said to have taken place in 433 B.C. Dr. J. F. Fleet holds that Kaniṣka founded the Vikrama era in 58 B.C. (*vide* Traditional Date of Kaniṣka in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, October 1906). Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar places Kaniṣka at the last quarter of the 3rd century A.D., as appears from “A peep into the early history of India” in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1897—98, p. 396. Vincent A. Smith places Kaniṣka in 125 A.D., while Sylvain Lévi assigns him an earlier date of 50 A.D. (*vide* J.R.A.S., January 1905, pp. 52—53). But Mr. Beal, Mr. Lassen, Professor Kern and others adopt the view that the Śaka era dates from Kaniṣka in 78 A.D. In the *Bṛtan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Gi*, there is *Mahārāja-Kanika-lekha*, which is a letter addressed by Maticitra (Aśvaghōṣa) to King Kaniṣka, an account of which has been published by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, no. 9, for 1910. It seems that Kaniṣka, who was a contemporary of Aśvaghōṣa and Nāgārjuna, was different from the king of that name under whose patronage the fourth Buddhist Council was held. Indeed Kaniṣka was often taken as a general name for the Kuśāna kings.

² *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. xxv; also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's “Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna” in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1900.

71. ORIGIN OF THE SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE (ABOUT 78 A.D.).

Under the patronage of Kanīṣka, a council¹ was held at Jālandhara under the superintendence of Pārśva (or Pūrṇaka) and Vasu-Mitra. It consisted of 500 monks who composed in Sanskrit three works explanatory of the Pāli *Tiṭṭaka*, viz. Sūtra Upadeśa of the Sutta Piṭaka, Vinaya Vibhāṣā of the Vinaya Piṭaka, and Abhidharma Vibhāṣā of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. These three, works written in Sanskrit, were the earliest canonical books of the Mahāyāna School.

It must not, however, be supposed that there had been no Buddhist books written in Sanskrit before Kanīṣka held his council. As a fact Kanīṣka thought it expedient to introduce Sanskrit as the medium of Buddhistic communication, because there already existed many valuable Buddhist books in that language. For instance, the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā, or rather the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, which was compiled at the council of Kanīṣka, was a mere commentary on Kātyāyanī-putra's Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra.² This last is a Sanskrit work explanatory of the Pāli Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It was composed 300 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha or 100 years before the time of Kanīṣka. Though Kanīṣka was not thus the first founder of the Sanskrit Buddhist literature, it cannot but be acknowledged that it was he, who for the first time proclaimed Sanskrit as the language of the Buddhist Canon. Since his time there have been composed innumerable Buddhist works in Sanskrit of which nine called the *Nava Dharmas*³ are specially worshipped by the Mahāyāna Buddhists.

72. LOGIC MENTIONED IN THE SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE.

None⁴ of the works composed during or before the time of Kanīṣka has come down to us in its Sanskrit original, and I have

¹ An account of this council is given by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., in an article named "Some Historical facts connected with the rise and progress of Mahāyāna School of Buddhism, translated from the Sumpahi-chog-byun" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I, part III, p. 18. *Vide* also Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 27 ; and also Monier Williams' Buddhism, pp. 68-69.

² *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, nos. 1263, 1273 and 1275. Regarding the authorship of Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā, or simply Mahāvibhāṣā, *vide* Takakusu in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 159.

³ The *Nava Dharmas* or Nine Sacred Works are :—

(1) Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, (2) Gaṇḍa-vyūha, (3) Daśa-bhūmiśvara, (4) Samādhi-rāja, (5) Laṅkāvatāra, (6) Saddharma-puṇḍarika, (7) Tathāgata-guhyaka, (8) Lalitavistara, and (9) Suvarṇa-prabhāsa.

Vide Hodgson's Illustrations of the Literature and Religion of the Buddhists, p. 19.

⁴ Dr. Rhys Davids in his Buddhist India, p. 316, observes that the three works composed at the Council of Kanīṣka are extant in European libraries.

had no opportunity of examining the Chinese or Tibetan version of the same. I cannot, therefore, say whether there is any mention of Logic in those works. But we have before us a very large collection of Sanskrit Buddhist works composed after the time of Kaniṣka. Many of these works, such as some of the *Nava Dharmas*, contain references to Logic, and several works are even replete with logical discussions.

73. THE *Lalitavistara*
(BEFORE 250 A.D.).

The *Lalitavistara*, which is one of the *Nava Dharmas*, was translated into Chinese in 221—263 A.D.¹ The Sanskrit original of it must have been prepared in India before that time. In this work Logic, under the name of *Hetu-vidyā*,² is mentioned along with the *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Vaiśeṣika*, etc., in all of which the *Bodhi-sattva* (Buddha Gautama) is said to have acquired distinction.

74. THE *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*
(ABOUT 300 A.D.).

The *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*³ is a very sacred work, as it is one of the *Nava Dharmas*. The exact date of it is unknown, beyond the fact that it was translated into Chinese in 443 A.D.⁴ The approximate date seems to be 300 A.D., for, it mentions four heretical schools, refuted later by Ārya Deva.⁵ The four schools, as mentioned in the Chinese *Tripitaka*, are (1) the *Sāṃkhyas* who believe

¹ The *Lalitavistara* was translated into Chinese four times. The first and third translations were lost by 730 A.D. The first was prepared under the Han dynasty A.D. 221—263, the second under the Western Tsin dynasty A.D. 265—316, the third under the earlier Sun dynasty A.D. 420—479, and the fourth under the Thān dynasty A.D. 683. *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, nos. 159 and 160.

² निर्घण्टौ निगमे पुराणे इतिहासे वेदे व्याकरणे निरुक्ते शिक्षायां हन्दि यज्ञकल्पे ज्योतिषि सांख्ये योगे क्रियाकल्पे वैशेषिके वैशिके अर्थविद्यायां वार्हस्पत्ये आसुर्ये चासुरे नृपपक्षिते हेतुविद्यायां जतुयन्ते सर्वत्र बोधिसत्त्व एव विशिष्यते स्म ।

Lalitavistara, edited by Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series, Calcutta, Chapter XII, p. 179.

³ The Sanskrit original of this work has been published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta under the editorship of Rai Sarat Chandra Das and Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. The work also exists in Chinese and Tibetan. Hwentsang mentions the *Laṅkāvatāra*; *vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Book XI, p. 251. *Vide* an account of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1906.

⁴ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, nos. 175, 176 and 177.

⁵ Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, nos. 1259, 1260 and Appendix I, no. 4.

in oneness,¹ (2) the Vaiśeṣikas who believe in difference, (3) the Nirgrantha-putras who believe in both, and (4) the Jñātiputras who believe in neither.²

The Laṅkāvatāra speaks in a prophetic style of the *Naiyāyikas* (logicians) and *Tārkikas* (dialecticians). Thus in Chapter II of the work Mahāmāti asks Buddha:—

“ Say how in time to come *Naiyāyikas* will flourish ? ”³

“ How is *tarka* (reasoning) corrected, and how is it carried on ? ”⁴

“ What is the nature of the doctrine that draws conclusion from a reason and an example ? ”⁵

In Chapter X of the work we read:—

“ Whatever is produced is destructible: this is the conclusion of the *Tārkikas*. ”⁶

¹ Here the word Sāṃkhya stands for the Upaniṣad or Vedānta. The Sāṃkhya as mentioned in the Mahābhārata really teaches the doctrine of oneness. Even Viṣṇu Bhikṣu, the author of Sāṃkhya-bhāṣya, admits that the Sāṃkhya philosophy is not opposed to the doctrine of oneness. Cf.

एकमेवाद्वितीयं तच्चम् इति श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रवादस्तु सर्वतत्त्वानां पुरुषे विद्यापनेन शक्तिशक्तिमदभेदेनेत्यविरोधः । (Sāṃkhya-bhāṣya, Chap. 1, Sūtra 61).

² Vide Bunyiu Nanjio, no. 1259. Cf. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, A.S.B. MSS., leaf 135:—

सांख्या वैशेषिका नग्रा विप्राः पाशुपतास्तथा ।

असत्सद्गुडं पतिता विविक्तार्थं विवर्जिताः ॥

³ The Sanskrit original runs as follows:—

नैयायिकाः कथं ब्रूहि भविष्यन्ति चनागताः ।

(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Asiatic Society of Bengal's MSS. Chap. II, leaf 11). The Tibetan version runs thus:—

ङ्गै'प'ङ्ग'स'गु'र'ङ्ग'ए'ल्ल'सु'र ।

स'र'द'स'दु'स'ङ्ग'र'गु'र'प'स'सु'र'स ॥

(Bksh-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V, Asiatic Society of Bengal's xylograph).

⁴ कथं हि श्रूयते तर्कः कथं तर्कः प्रवर्तते ।

(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Chap. II, leaf 11, A.S.B. MSS.).

ङ्ग'र'ङ्ग'स'गु'र'ङ्ग'ए'ल्ल'सु'र ।

(Bksh-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V).

⁵ दृष्टान्तं हेतुभिर्युक्तः सिद्धान्तो देशना कथम् ?

Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, p. 36, Buddhist Text Society's edition).

⁶ कृतकस्य विनाशः स्यात् तार्किकाणामयं नयः ॥

(Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Chap. X, leaf 143, A.S.B. MSS.).

सु'स'ङ्ग'ङ्ग'स'गु'र'ङ्ग'ए'ल्ल'सु'र ।

र'ङ्ग'ङ्ग'स'गु'र'ङ्ग'ए'ल्ल'सु'र ॥ (Bksh-hgyur, Mdo, vol. V).

In Chapter II, the doctrine of idealism¹ (*viññāna-vāda*) is explained. According to this doctrine our knowledge alone is real and the so-called external objects are mere manifestations of it. Knowledge (*viññāna*) is stated to be of two kinds, viz. (1) the potential knowledge (*khyāti-viññāna*) which remaining in us from time immemorial as a mass of potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions tends to produce the so-called external objects; and (2) the objectified knowledge (*vastu-prativikalpa viññāna*) or knowledge which is manifested as external objects through the act-force (*karma*) inherent in our aforesaid potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions.

These two kinds of knowledge combined constitute what is called *pravṛtti-viññāna*, presentative knowledge which produces the external world drawing us towards it. The seat of *pravṛtti-viññāna* is called *ālaya-viññāna*, the basic knowledge. While the latter is compared to an ocean, the former is compared to high winds which agitate it.

This basic knowledge, *ālaya-viññāna*, is otherwise called an ego (*aham*). As we pass on our *pravṛtti-viññāna* changes but our ego persists. By means of concentration (*yoga*) we can understand the true nature of the ego. It alone is perfect (*pariniṣpanna*). Non-ego or the external world is false (*parikalpita*) and conditional (*paratantra*). When emancipated, our *pravṛtti-viññāna* totally disappears, but the ego or *ālaya-viññāna* continues.² The

¹ *Viññāna-vāda* is called in Tibetan *nam-par-śes-paḥi-lta-wa*, ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ལྟ་བུ།. It is designated in Sanskrit as *yogācāra-darśana* corresponding to Tibetan *mal-hbyor-paḥi-lta-wa*, མཎ་ལྷོར་པའི་ལྟ་བུ།. *Pravṛtti-viññāna* is called in Tibetan: *len-paḥi-nam-par-śes*, ལེན་པའི་ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།, signifying knowledge as received. *Ālayaviññāna* is called in Tibetan: *kun-gshi-nam par-śes-pa*, ཀུན་གཤིན་ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།, signifying knowledge which constitutes the basis or foundation of all. *Pariniṣpanna* is called in Tibetan: *yoṅs-grub*, ཡོངས་གཏུག, complete in itself; *paratantra*: *gshan-dwañ*, གཤན་དབང་, dependent on others; and *parikalpita*: *kun-brtags*, ཀུན་བརྟགས་, fanciful or erroneous.

² It is perhaps not quite accurate to say that when emancipated the ego or *ālaya* of the *viññāna-vādins* becomes identical with the void or *śūnyatā* of the *Mādhymikas*, because while the former look upon *ālaya* as perfect (*pariniṣpanna*), the latter do not consider *śūnyatā* to be so.

The *ālaya* of the *viññāna-vādins* corresponds to *ahamkāra* (and *puruṣa*) of the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy. In emancipation *ahamkāra*, according to the *Sāṃkhyas*, disappears, but *ālaya* according to the *viññāna-vādins* persists. The *sāṃkhyas* do however assume an additional principle called *puruṣa* (soul) which continues to exist. This contrast with the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine is noted in the following passage of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*:—

आलयविज्ञाने पुनर्निबध्यमाने निर्विशिष्टः तीर्थं करोष्वेदवादेन अयं वादः स्यात् । ... कारणं पुनः महामते प्रधानपुरुषादिकालानुप्रवादः ॥

(*Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, Chap. II, p. 45, edited by Sarat Chandra Das and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana).

ego, unruffled by the external world and freed from all potentialities, reminiscences, tendencies or impressions, attains its pristine purity. This is its emancipation or final rest.

In chapter VI of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* entitled *kṣaṇika-parivarta* (a chapter on momentariness), there is a clear explanation of the theory that everything is momentary. In a passage of the *sūtra* the author observes as follows ¹:—

“A momentary thing is that which is inactive, distinct in itself, and not liable to cessation. By calling things momentary, I mean that they are not produced. I do not, O fools, say that they are destroyed after being produced.”

75. EIGHTEEN SECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS.

We have previously found that within 200 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha there arose in India 17 heretical sects besides the orthodox priesthood called the Theras. In course of time some of these sects disappeared while new ones grew up, the result being that at the time of Kaniska, about 78 A.D., the Buddhists had already been divided into 18 sects ² grouped into four classes as follows:—

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| <p>I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda
 (1) Mūla Sarvāstivāda
 (2) Kāśyapiya
 (3) Mahīśāsaka
 (4) Dharma-guṇṭiya
 (5) Bahuśrutiya
 (6) Tāmraśāṭiya
 (7) Vibhajyavādin</p> <p>II. Ārya Sammitiya
 (8) Kurukullaka
 (9) Āvantika
 (10) Vātsīputriya</p> | } | <p>Belonging to the <i>Vaibhāsika</i>
School of Philosophy.</p> |
|--|---|---|

¹

निर्वापारं क्षणिकं विविक्तं क्षयवर्जितम् ।

अनुत्पत्तिश्च धर्माणां क्षणिकार्थे वदाम्यहम् ।

उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं भङ्गं न वै देहेषु वास्त्रिणाः ॥

(*Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, Chap. VI, p. 99, Bengal Asiatic Society's MSS.).

² *Vide* the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I, part III, p. 18; Takakusu's I-tsing, pp. xxiii, xxiv and xxv; Rhys Davids' article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1891, p. 411, and 1892, pp. 1—37; Rockhill's Buddha, p. 181 f; Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 270—274; and Wijesimha's Mahāvamsa, part I, Chapter V, p. 15.

III. Ārya Mahāsāṃghika

- (11) Pūrva-śāila
- (12) Aparā-śāila
- (13) Haimavata
- (14) Lokottaravādin
- (15) Prajñaptivādin

Belonging to the *Sautrāntika*
School of Philosophy.

IV. Ārya Sthavira

- (16) Mahāvihāra
- (17) Jetavanīya, and
- (18) Abhayagirivāsin.

All the sects mentioned above belonged to the *Hīnayāna*, though later on they joined the *Mahāyāna* too.

76. FOUR SCHOOLS OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

The philosophical views of the sects mentioned above were gradually formulated into two schools, viz. the (1) *Vaibhāṣika* and (2) *Sautrāntika*. The *Mahāyāna* sect of the Buddhists founded by Kaniṣka established two other schools of philosophy, viz. the (3) *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra*. So there were altogether four schools of philosophy, two of the *Hīnayāna* and two of the *Mahāyāna*.¹

Vaibhāṣika was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda (Pali: Sabbatthivāda) sect²
Vaibhāṣika.

who, as their name implies, admitted the reality of the world—internal and external. In fact the *Vaibhāṣika* said that our cognition and its corresponding external object were both real. The fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyanī-putra's *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*,³ or simply *Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*, composed 300 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha. The next work of this sect is the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*,⁴ or simply *Vibhāṣā*, compiled at the council of Kaniṣka about 78 A.D. It was from this *Vibhāṣā* that the name *Vaibhāṣika*⁵ was derived. *Vibhāṣā* means "commentary," and the

¹ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. I, pp. 121, 139 n; and Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. xxii.

² Vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. xxi. The Ārya Saṃmitīyas, at any rate their subclass called the Vātsīputriyas, were followers of the *Vaibhāṣika* philosophy. The Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya vārtika-tātparyatīkā* 3-1-1 quotes the opinions of the *Vaibhāṣikas* who were called Vātsīputras.

³ This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan: vide Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*, nos. 1273, 1275.

⁴ This work, too, exists in Chinese and Tibetan: vide Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*, nos. 1263, 1264.

⁵ Compare the explanation of *Vaibhāṣika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha-darśana*, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24. Vide also Satis Chandra Vidya-bhusana's "Mādhyamika School" in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta* for 1895, part II, p. 4.

Vaibhāṣika philosophy seems to have been so called because it was based on the commentaries rather than on the original texts of the teachings of Buddha. Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra-śāstra*,¹ otherwise called *Koṣa-kāraṇa-śāstra*, composed about 489 A.D.,² is a most learned work of the *Vaibhāṣika* philosophy.

Sautrāntikas admit cognition and therefrom infer the existence of the external objects. The name Sautrāntika.³ *Sautrāntika*³ was derived from *Sūtrānta*, called in Pāli *Suttanta*, meaning "original text." The *Sautrāntika* philosophy seems to have been so called, because it was based on the original text of the teachings of Buddha rather than on the commentaries thereon. The text, on which the *Sautrāntika* philosophy was based, belonged to the sect of Ārya Sthaviras, called in Pāli Theras, who held the First Council in 490 B.C., and possibly also to the sect of the Mahāsāṃghikas⁴ who were the first dissenters in 390 B.C. The philosophical principles of this school are said to have been formulated in Kāśmīra⁵ during the reign of Kaniṣka about 78 A.D. by a sage named Dharmottara or Uttara-dharma.⁶ But the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang who visited India early in the 7th century A.D., states that the renowned teacher Kumāralabdha⁷ of Takṣaśilā (Taxila in the Punjab) was the founder of the *Sautrāntika* school and wrote several very valuable treatises on it. He is supposed to have lived about 300 A.D., as he was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (q.v.), Ārya Deva (q.v.), and Āśvaghoṣa. There was another very famous teacher named Śrīlabdha⁸ who wrote *Vibhāṣā-śāstra* (or commentary on a work) of the *Sautrāntika* school. Hwen thsang saw in Ayodhyā the ruins of a Saṅghārāma where Śrīlabdha resided.

¹ This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan; *vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no. 1265.

² *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, no. 95. For Saṅgha-bhadra, *vide* also Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. 193—194.

³ Compare the explanation of the term *Sautrāntika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha-darśana*, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 26. *Vide* also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Mādhyaṃika School" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta for 1895, part II, p. 4.

Vide Rhys Davids' Buddhist India, p. 168, and Beal's Fahian and Sungyun, p. 143.

⁴ *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, p. 161.

⁵ *Vide* the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I, part III, pp. 18, 19; and Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 59.

⁶ For the Dhammuttariya or Dharmottara sect, *vide* Wassilief's Buddhism, p. 233; and Mahāvamsa, part I, chapter V, p. 15, Wijesinha's foot note.

⁷ *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. II, p. 302; and Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 78, where Kumāra-lābha stands for Kumāra-labdha.

⁸ *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. 225, 226; and Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 67.

Yogācāras maintained that the external objects were unreal

but the reality of our cognition could not
Yogācāra. be denied. The word¹ *yogācāra* (called in

Tibetan : *rnal-hbyor-wa* [ta-wa) is compounded of *yoga* meaning 'meditation' and *ācārā* meaning 'practice.' The *yogācāra* or the contemplative system was so called, because it emphasised the practice of meditation as the means of attaining *bhūmis*² or the seventeen stages of Buddhistic Perfection. The chief dogma established in it is *ālaya-vijñāna*,³ the basis of conscious states, which is the same as our 'ego' or 'soul.' It is not known who was the founder of the *yogācāra* school, but in the Tibetan and Chinese books⁴ the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, *Mahāsamaya sūtra*,⁵ *Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa* and *Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya* have been named as the prominent old works of the system. Maitreya-nātha and Ārya Asaṅga were the early teachers of it. The *yogācāra* school seems to have originated about 300 A.D. when the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* etc. were composed.

Mādhyamikas held that our cognition and its corresponding
external object were neither absolutely real

Mādhyamika.

nor totally unreal. The name *Mādhyamika*⁶

(called in Tibetan : *Dwu-ma*) was derived from *madhyama*, the

¹ The *yogācāra* philosophy is generally known in China, Tibet and Nepal as *yogācārya*. For an account of this system, *vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 356; Dr. Schlagintweit's *Buddhism*, chap. V. Compare explanation of the word *yogācāra* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, chapter on Buddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24. *Vide* also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "the Mādhyamika School" in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1895, part II, p. 4.

² *Vide* *Dharmasaṅgraha* LXIV and LXV, edited by Max Müller and Wenzel.

³ For an explanation of *ālaya vijñāna*, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's note on p. 2 of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra*, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition, and also see p. 45 of the same work.

⁴ *Vide* section *Ydo* of the *Bstan-hgyur*; Lama Tāranātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 111 f; Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, no. 1; Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. I, p. 226, vol. II, pp. 220, 275; and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 371.

⁵ *Vide* Schlagintweit's *Buddhism*, chap. V.

⁶ Compare—

अतो भावाभावान्नद्वयरहितत्वात् सर्वसंभावानुत्पत्तिलक्षणा प्रून्यता मध्यमा प्रतिपन्नमध्यमो
मार्ग इत्युच्यते ॥

(*Mādhyamikā vṛtti*, chap. XXIV, p. 185, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition).

Compare the explanation of the term *Mādhyamika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya, in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, chapter on Buddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24; and also Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *History of the Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna* in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1897, part IV, pp. 7—20.

Vide Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Descriptive list of works on the Mādhyamika Philosophy, no. I" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, no. 7, 1908.

middle. The *Mādhyamika* philosophy was so called because it avoided two extremes, i.e. advocated neither the theory of absolute reality, nor that of total unreality, of the world, but chose a *middle path*, inculcating that the world had only a conditional existence. The school is said to have been founded by Ārya Nāgārjuna about 250—320 A.D. In fact the doctrines of the school are contained in older works such as the *Prajñāpāramitā*. The *Mādhyamika-kārikā* by Nāgārjuna, *Mūla-madhyama-vṛtti* by Buddha Pālita, *Hastabala* by Ārya Deva, *Madhyama-hṛdaya-kārikā* by Bhavya, *Madhyama-pratītya-samutpāda* by Kṛṣṇa, *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* by Candra Kīrti and *Mādhyamikāvatāra-ṭikā* by Jayānanta—are the principal works of the *Mādhyamika* School. *Mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti-akutobhaya*, a work of Nāgārjuna, was translated into Tibetan, under orders of the great king *Dpal-lha-tsan-po*, by the Indian sage *Jñāna-garbha* and the Tibetan official interpreter *Kluhi-rgyal-mtshan*. The translation closes by mentioning eight expounders of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, viz. Ārya Nāgārjuna, Sthavira Buddha Pālita, Candra Kīrti, Dev Śarmā, Guṇa-śrī, Guṇa-mati, Sthira-mati and Bhavya (or Bhāva-viveka).

CHAPTER II.

Early Buddhist Writers on Logic.

77. RISE OF THE BUDDHIST LOGIC.

With the growth of the four philosophical schools just mentioned, the study of Logic spread far and wide in the Buddhist community. The adherents of each of the schools considered it advantageous to employ logical arguments in defending their own dogmas and attacking those of their opponents. This is clear from the writings of Nāgārjuna and Ārya Deva of the Mādhyamika School, and Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the yogācāra. The arguments employed in the course of the defence and attack of the schools served to popularise the Ancient Logic of Akṣapāda, and to produce a band of logicians among the Buddhists.

78. ĀRYA NĀGĀRJUNA (ABOUT 250—320 A.D.).

Nāgārjuna or rather Ārya Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika School, was a great logician. He was born at Vidarbha (modern Berar) in Mahākośala,¹ during the reign of King Sadvāha or Sātavāhana² [of the Andhra dynasty],³ and passed many of his days in meditation in a cave-dwelling of the Śrī-parvata,⁴ that bordered on the river Kṛṣṇā. He was a pupil of Śāraha and is said to have converted a powerful king, named Bhoja Deva,⁵ to Buddhism.

¹ *Vide* Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. II, Book VIII, p. 97, and Book X, p. 210; Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, pp. 201—202; and Wassiljew quoted by Schiefner in the *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, p. 301.

² Sadvāha is the same as Sātavāhana, which is a general name of the kings of the Andhra dynasty.—*Vide* Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Early History of the Dekkan, second edition, pp. 25—37.

Nāgārjuna wrote an instructive letter to Sātavāhana, whose private name in Chinese was Sh'-yen-tōh-cia. This letter is called Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva Suhrillekha. It was translated into Chinese in 434 A.D. An English translation of this letter has appeared in the Journal of the Pali Text Society of London, 1883, pp. 71—75. The Tibetan version of *Suhrillekha*, called Bśes-pahi-spriñ-yig (sent by Nāgārjuna to his friend Udayibhadra), is contained in the *Bṛtan-hgyur*, Milo, gi.

³ The Andhra kings ruled the northern portion of the Madras Presidency and the whole of Kalinga, and overthrew the Kanva dynasty in northern India about 31 B.C. They remained powerful up to 436 A.D. They were Buddhists, and it was by them that the magnificent marble stūpa at Amarāvati was erected.—*Vide* Sewell's Lists of Antiquities in Madras, vol. II, pp. 141—146.

⁴ For an account of Śrī-parvata or Śrī-śaila see Hwen-thsang's Life, Introduction, p. xi, by Beal; Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, p. 84; Wilson's *Mālatī-Mādhava*, act I; and Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's Notes on Ratnāvalī, pp. 27—29.

⁵ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 66, 69—73.

Nāgārjuna is said to have lived four hundred years¹ after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is, in 33 B.C. But he does not appear to me to have had so early a date, as he was one of the early patrons or founders of the university of Nālandā,² which had not, perhaps, come into existence in the 1st century B.C., and was insignificant³ even in 399 A.D., when the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hian came to visit India. Nāgārjuna called in Tibetan “*Klu-sgrub*” is stated by Lama Tārānātha to have been a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, who is supposed to have reigned about 300 A.D.⁴ The latest date that can be assigned to Nāgārjuna is 401 A.D.,⁵ when⁶ his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva.

¹ It is prophesied in the Mañju-śrī-mūla-tantra (called in Tibetan *Hjam-dpal-rtsa-rgyud*) that:—

དེ་བཞིན་གཤམས་པ་གྲུ་འདས་ནས །
ལོ་ནི་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ལོ་ན་པ་ན །
དགེ་སྲོང་གྲུ་ཞེས་དེ་འབོད་འབྱུང་ །
བརྟན་པ་ལ་ནི་དད་ཅིང་ཡན །

(Quoted in the Introduction to *Śeṣ-rab-sdon-bu* published in Calcutta).

“Four hundred years after Buddha’s departure from the world there will appear a Bhikṣu, named Nāgārjuna, who will do good to the believers in the doctrine.”

It should be noted that according to some books of Tibet, Buddha was born in 514 B.C., lived 81 years and attained *nirvāṇa* in 433 B.C. Nāgārjuna, who was born 400 years after the *nirvāṇa*, must, at this calculation, be placed in 33 B.C.

² *Vide* Tārānātha’s *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 66, 69—73.

³ Fa-hian describes Nālandā as a mere village *Nā-lo*: *vide* Beal’s *Travels of Fa-hian and Sung-yun*, p. 111.

⁴ According to Lama Tārānātha, Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, whose genealogy is thus traced:—

Akṣa Candra	}	Ruled in Aparāntaka.
Jaya Candra		
Nemi Candra		
Phaṇi Candra	}	Ruled in Magadha.
Bhaṁśa Candra		
Śāla Candra		
Candra Gupta		

The six kings, beginning with Akṣa Candra to Śāla Candra, are stated to have been weak and insignificant, while Candra Gupta, the seventh king, is described as having been very powerful. This Candra Gupta, who “did not take refuge in Buddha,” may be the same who founded the Gupta era in 19 A.D. The reigns of his predecessors were very short. Nemi Candra may be assigned to about 300 A.D.—*Cf.* Tārānātha’s *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 80—83

⁵ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio’s *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, No. 3.

⁶ For an account of some of the works on the Tantra by Nāgārjuna, *vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana’s Introduction to the *Sragdharā-stotra* in the “*Bibliotheca Indica*” series. For the latest researches, in the medical works, of Nāgārjuna, see Dr. Palmyr Cordier’s “Introduction A L’Etude des Traites Medicaux Sanscritas”

79. NĀGĀRJUNA'S Mādhyamika-kārikā.

(ABOUT 300 A D).

The middle path doctrine—Madhyama-mārga.

The Mādhyamika-kārikā¹ is the first regular work on the Mādhyamika philosophy.

The doctrine, which permeates this work, is that of the middle path² which is to be comprehended from four aspects, viz. (1) in contradistinction to onesidedness, (2) as the abnegation of onesidedness, (3) as unity in plurality, and (4) in the sense of absolute truth.

As we cannot conceive of being (existence) independently of non-being (non-existence), it will be taking an onesided view if we are to say that the world *exists* or that it *does not exist*. The middle path furnishes a contrast to this onesidedness by avoiding the two extremes of being and non-being. This is the first aspect of the middle path.

Denying the two extremes the middle path reveals itself through a complete harmony between them, that is, it transcends the extremes of being and non-being which are unified. This is the second aspect of the middle path.

The middle path, which unifies all particulars, does not lie beyond them. The particulars attain their characters of particularity only through our conception of the unity among them.

printed in Hanoi, 1903; and for his hymns such as धर्मपातुस्त्व, निरुपमस्त्व etc., *vide* *Bsan-hgyur*, *Bstod-pa*, vol. *Ka*.

For an account of other works, *vide* the article "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No. 3," by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, vol. III, No. 7, 1907. For the philosophical works of Nāgārjuna, see Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, no. 3.

The Nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra or Hetu-vidyā nyāya dvāra śāstra, as noticed in Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Nos. 1223, 1224, is not a work of Nāgārjuna but of Dignāga.

¹ The Mādhyamika-kārika with the *Vṛtti* of Candrar Kirti has been published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta. It has also appeared in the St. Petersburg Buddhist Text Series under the editorship of Professor Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's translation of the *Kārikās* with notes appeared in several numbers of the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1895-1900.

2

अतो भावाभावस्तद्विरहितत्वात् सर्वस्वभावानुत्पत्तिश्च

प्रत्यक्षा मध्यमा प्रतिपदु मध्यमोन्मात्रं इत्युच्यते ॥

(Mādhyamika *vṛtti*, chap. XXIV, p. 185, Buddhist Text Society's edition, Calcutta).

For an Indian account of the Mādhyamika philosophy or the middle path doctrine, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's articles on the subject published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, 1895-1900. For the Chinese account, see Dr. T. Suzuki's article named "the Mādhyamika School in China" published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society*, part IV, 1898.

Had there been no unifying principle, the particulars would have ceased to be such. This is the third aspect of the middle path.

By "middle path" it is not to be understood that there is something between the two extremes of being and non-being. In fact, we must avoid not only the two extremes, but also the middle.¹ The middle path, which discards all limitations, expresses the human conception of the absolute truth. This is the fourth aspect of the middle path.

The absolute (*sūnyatā* or *void*)² is demonstrated through the assumption of two truths—the conditional (*saṃvṛti*) and the transcendental (*paramārtha*).³ Judged by the transcendental truth no object comes into being or dissolves into non-being. It is from the point of view of the conditional truth alone that we can speak of the existence or non-existence of an object. As a fact no object has a nature or self-existence: objects come into existence in virtue of certain relations or conditions. Taking a substance and its qualities we find that the latter exist in relation to the former, and the former exists in relation to the latter. So a whole exists in relation to its parts, and the latter exist in relation to the former. Proceeding in this way we find that the world is an aggregate of relations or conditions in virtue of which it revolves like a water-wheel. These conditions being causes of confusion, the whole world is no better than an illusion.

Origination and cessation, persistence and discontinuance, The conditional and the unity and plurality, coming and going—transcendental truth. these are the eight fundamental conceptions of relation or condition.⁴ These conceptions, which are in es-

1

आर्य समाधिराजं चोक्तं भगवताः —

अस्तीति नास्तीति उभेऽपि अन्ताः ।

शुद्धीति अशुद्धीति इमेऽपि अन्ताः ॥

तस्मादुभेऽन्त विवर्जयित्वा ।

मध्येऽपि स्थानं न करोति पण्डितः ॥

(Quoted in *Mādhyamikā Vṛtti*, Chap. V, p. 41, Buddhist Text Society's edition, Calcutta).

² *Sūnya-vāda* is called in Tibetan: *ston-pa-nid*, མཆོད་པ་འདྲིའོ། *Samvṛti satya* is called in Tibetan: *Kun-rdsob-bden-pa*, ཀུན་རྒྱལ་བ་དོན་པ། *Paramārtha satya* is called: *don-dam-pahi-bden-pa*, དོན་དམ་པ་འདྲིའོན་པ།

Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's article on the "absolute" in Dr. Hastings' Dictionary of Religion, J and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

3

इत्येते समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोकसंवृत्तिसत्यञ्च सत्यञ्च परमार्थतः ॥

(*Mādhyamikā Vṛtti*, chap. XXIV, p. 180, Buddhist Text Society's edition, Calcutta).

4

अनिरोधमनुत्पाद मनुष्ये दमशास्त्रतः

अनेकार्थमनानार्थ मनागममनिर्गमम् ।

sence unreal, give rise to our prejudices and wrong judgments. There nestles in them the principle of unrest and misery, and as people cling to them, their life is an everlasting prey to the pendulous feeling of exultation and mortification.

Where there is conditionality, there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible. Therefore, to attain truth, conditionality must be completely cast aside. When our mind is purified from the smirch of conditionality, there will come out the serene moon-light of "suchness" (*tathatā*) or transcendental truth (*paramārtha*), otherwise known as the void or absolute (*śūnyatā*).

It may be asked as to whether there is actually a thing called "suchness," "transcendental truth," or "the absolute." The answer will be that the thing which lies beyond conditionality, cannot be expressed in terms of "is" and "is not" or "being" and "non-being." It avoids the two extremes of "being" and "non-being," nay, it unifies both by underlying each of them. This so-called thing (*śūnyatā*) is called *Nirvāṇa*,¹ which is an unconditional condition in which all contradictions are reconciled. Attempts have been made to express this condition by the term "Infinite," "Eternal," "Profound," "Unconditioned," "Absolute" or "Blissful," but in reality no language can give adequate expression to it.²

80. NĀGĀRJUNA'S REFERENCES TO THE LOGICAL DOCTRINES OF AKṢAPĀDA.

In the *Mādhyamika-kārikā* Nāgārjuna has occasionally referred to certain technical terms of Ancient Technicalities of Logic. Logic, such as *punarukta* (repetition) in

यः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवं
देशधामास सम्बुद्धसं वग्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

(*Mādhyamika-sūtra*, chap. I).

1

न चाभावोऽपि निर्वाणं
कुत एवास्य भावना ।
भावाभाव परासर्ग-
क्षयो निर्वाण सुच्यते ॥

(*Ratnāvalī* quoted in *Mādhyamikā vṛtti*, p. 194).

2

अनन्तरस्य धर्मस्य श्रुतिः का देशना च का ।
ब्रूयते तस्य यच्चापि समारोपादनन्तरम् ॥

(*Mādhyamikāvṛtti*, chap. V).

chapter II, *siddha-sādhana*¹ (demonstration of what has already been established) in chapter III, and *sādhya-sama* (*petitio principii*) as well as *parihāra* (avoidance) in chapter IV.

There is also a criticism of Akṣapāda's doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (evidence). Akṣapāda says that just as a lamp illumines itself and other objects, so does a *pramāṇa* establish itself as well as other objects. Nāgārjuna opposes him by saying that a lamp cannot illumine itself as there is no darkness in it. If a lamp could remove darkness even without coming in contact with it, why could it not, standing here, remove the darkness of the entire universe?²

81. NĀGĀRJUNA'S VIGRAHA-VYĀVARTANĪKĀRIKĀ (ABOUT 300 A.D.).

Vigraha-vyāvartanīkārīkā is a work on the Mādhyamika philosophy which eventually criticises the Nyāya-theory of *pramāṇa*, the evidence or means of knowledge, as laid down by Akṣapāda. The work, the Sanskrit original of which is lost, is called in Tibetan *Rtsod-pa-bzlog-paḥi tshig-lehur-byas-pa*, signifying memorial verses on quelling disputes. It consists of folios 26—29 of the *Bstan-hgyur Mdo*, tsa. The original Sanskrit text, which had been composed by Ārya Nāgārjuna, was translated into Tibetan by the Indian sage Jñāna-garbha and the Tibetan interpreter Ka-wa-dpal-brtsegs. Subsequently the translation was recast by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Jayānanta and the interpreter Khu-mdo-sde-dpal.

¹ The following verse refers to the fallacy of *sādhya-sama* :—

विषये यः परौद्धारं कृते शून्यतया बदेत् ।

सर्वं तस्यापरिहृतं समं साध्यम जायते ॥

(Mādhyamika-kārikā, chapter IV).

² Akṣapāda says :—

न प्रदीप प्रकाशवत् तत्त्वित्तेः

(Nyāya sūtra, 2-1-19).

Nāgārjuna says :—

प्रदीपः स्वपरात्मनोः सम्प्रकाशयिता यथा ।

प्रदीपे नान्यकारोऽस्ति यच्च चासौ प्रतिष्ठितः ॥

अप्राप्यैव प्रदीपेन यदि वा निवृत्तं तमः ।

इदं सर्वं लोकांश्च स तमो निवृत्तिनिश्चयति ॥

(Mādhyamika Kārikā, chap. VII, p. 47, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition).

Bunjiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no. 1251.

Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, tsa, folios 27—28.

Cf. Prof. H. U's Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, pp. 84—85.

The Chinese version of the Vighraha-vyāvartanī kārikā is noticed by Bunyiu Nanjio under the name of Vivāda-śamana-śāstra. It was translated into Chinese by the sage Vimokṣa-prajña and others in 541 A.D.

In the Vighraha-vyāvartanī kārikā (as reproduced in Tibetan) Nāgārjuna criticises the validity of *pramāṇa*, the evidence or means of knowledge, as follows:—

If you establish objects through a *pramāṇa*, the *pramāṇa* itself must be established through another *pramāṇa* and that again by a fresh *pramāṇa*, until you commit the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, you attempt to establish objects without a *pramāṇa*, your tenet (viz. that objects are established through *pramāṇa*) falls to the ground.

A *Pramāṇa* is not self-established. Had it been so, there would have been a complete cessation of gloom or ignorance. The view that a *pramāṇa* establishes itself as well as other objects, is untenable. A fire, which is cited as an illustration, can illumine other objects by removing darkness which besets them, but it cannot illumine itself inasmuch as a fire never co-abides with darkness.

A *pramāṇa* cannot be so called, if it is totally independent of *prameya* (objects). If, on the other hand, a *pramāṇa* is dependent on *prameya* (objects), how can it, having no self-existence, establish the latter? etc., etc.

82. NĀGĀRJUNA'S *Pramāṇa-viheṭana* OR *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana* (ABOUT 300 A.D.).

To Nāgārjuna is attributed the composition of a logical treatise called *Pramāṇa-viheṭana* or *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana*, which literally signifies “the quelling of *pramāṇa*,” and which was in fact a review of the definition of the sixteen categories as given by Akṣapāda. The Sanskrit original of this work is not available. There is however extant the Tibetan version of a commentary on the work called *Prāmāṇa-viheṭana-ṭeppitaka-vṛtti* or *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana-sambhāṣita-vṛtti* dated probably about 650 A.D. It extends over folios 415—418 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, ha. In Tibetan the commentary is called *Tshad-ma-rnam-par-hjoms-pa mdor-bśad-pahi-hgrel*, which literally signifies “a magic-stick commentary on *Pramāṇa-viheṭana*, or *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana*.”¹

¹ Called by P. Cordier in his Tibetan Catalogue as *Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana-ṭeppitaka-vṛtti*.

This work does not perhaps represent the views of Nāgārjuna but refers to those of the commentator.

The commentator, whose name is not mentioned, pays obeisance to Mañju-śrī-kumāra-bhūta and introduces his work as follows:—

To please the learned people, I give an exposition of the viheṭana or vidhvāmsana [i.e. Pramāṇa-viheṭana or Pramāṇa-vi-dhvāmsana].¹

Then he observes that the instructions on Nyāya delivered by Nāgārjuna are put together to constitute the present work.

He further observes that Nāgārjuna, who bore special marks of greatness, proceeded once for the dissemination of culture to the region of the Nāgas. They exhibited their magical powers which could not overcome him. Beholding his super-human greatness Upendra, king of the Nāgas, offered him his daughter, while the other Nāgas worshipped him in a befitting manner. They took orders and coming to the region of men practised the austerities of monks.

The commentator reproduced Nāgārjuna's definition of the categories which are stated in Tibetan as follows:—

(1) Tshad-ma (*pramāṇa*), (2) gshal-bya (*prameya*), (3) the-tshom (*saṃśaya*), (4) dgos-pa (*prayojana*), (5) dpe (*drṣṭānta*), (6) grub-pahi-mthah (*siddhānta*), (7) cha-śas (*avayava*), (8) rtog-ge (*tarka*), (9) gtan-la-phab-pa (*nirṇaya*), (10) smra-wahi-mthah (*vāda*), (11) rtsod-pahi-mthah (*jalpa*), (12) rnam-par-rtsoḍ-pahi-mthah (*vitandā*), (13) gtan-tshigs-ltar-snañ-wa (*hetvābhāsa*), (14) tshig-dor (*chala*), (15) ltag-gcod (*jāti*), and (16) tshar-gcod-pa (*nigraha sthāna*).

A syllogism (*cha-śas*, *avayava*) is shown to consist of three members, viz. a proposition, a reason, and an example. It may be put in the affirmative or negative way.²

The reasons³ (*gtan-tshigs*, *hetu*) may appear in one of the following relations, viz. (1) an effect (*hbras-bu*, *kārya*), (2) an identity (*rnam-bshin*, *svabhāva*), and (3) non-perception (*mi-dmigs*, *anupalabdhi*).

An example⁴ (*dpe*, *drṣṭānta*) is defined as the place in which

1

མཁས་པ་དགའ་བ་བརྒྱུད་པའི་ཁྱེར །

རྣམས་པར་འཇོམས་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་བྱ །

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 415).

² ཚེས་ཅན་གྱི་རྒྱས་པ་དང་གཏན་ཚུགས་དང་དཔེ་དང་བསྟན་བྱ་རང་ཉིད་གྱིས་ལྡན་པ་དང་ ། ཇིས་སྤྱོད་བྱ་དང་ ། ལྟོག་པ་དེས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་རྒྱས་པའོ །

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 417).

³ It is doubtful whether this was the original doctrine of Nāgārjuna. It might be a later development known to the author of the vṛtti.

⁴ དཔེ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་གཏན་ཚུགས་གྱི་སྟོན་པ་ཁྱེད་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པའི་གཞིར་འདྲིང་པ །

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, ha, folio 417).

is decisively shown the connection between the reason (middle term) and its universal companion the predicate (major term).

83. *Upāya-kaśālyā-hṛdaya-śāstra*.
(ABOUT 300 A.D.).

The *Upāya-kaśālyā-hṛdaya-śāstra*,¹ the Essence of Skill in the Accomplishment of Action, is stated to be a work on the art of debate by Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. In Chinese this work is called Fān-pien-sin-lun. It was translated into Chinese by Ci-cia-ye and Thān-yāo in A.D. 472.

Seeing that the Vaiśeṣika and other systems were obscure in their terminology, Nāgārjuna, it is reported, undertook to write this book to give a clear exposition of the art of debate. The book is divided into four chapters styled respectively as (I) an elucidation of debate [*vāda-viśadīkaraṇa*], (II) an explanation of the points of defeat [*nigraha-sthāna*], (III) an explanation of the truths [*tattva-vyākhyāna*], and (IV) the analogue or far-fetched analogy [*jāti*].

(I) The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively of (1) an example (*udāharaṇa*), (2) a tenet, truth or conclusion (*siddhānta*), (3) the excellence of speech (*vākya-praśamsā*), (4) the defect of speech (*vākya-doṣa*), (5) the knowledge of inference (*anumāna* or *hetu-jñāna*), (6) the appropriate or opportune speech (*samayocita-vākya*), (7) the fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (*duṣṭa-vākyānusaraṇa*).

(1) The *example* is necessary to clear the reasons of a disputant and his respondent. It is of two kinds: (1) the affirmative or homogeneous example (*anvayī udāharaṇa*), and (2) the negative or heterogeneous example (*vyatirekī udāharaṇa*).

(2) The *tenet, truth or conclusion* is of four kinds, viz. (1) that accepted by all the schools (*sarvatantra siddhānta*), (2) that accepted by a particular school (*pratitantra siddhānta*), (3) that accepted hypothetically (*adhikaraṇa siddhānta*), and (4) that which is implied or accepted on assumption (*abhy-upagama siddhānta*).

The means, by which the tenets, truths or conclusions are established, are called *pramāṇas* (the sources of valid knowledge) which are of four kinds, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and scripture (*āgama*).

This definition is criticised by Uddyotakara in his *Vārtika* on *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1-1-37.

¹ Some suspect that the work was not composed by Nāgārjuna whose name, though mentioned by some Chinese editors, does not appear in the Chinese version. In the absence of any introduction to the Chinese version we cannot deny altogether the authorship of Nāgārjuna. Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, no. 1257.

- (3) A *speech is said to be excellent* if its words are neither inadequate nor redundant, and its reason and example well expressed.
- (4) A *speech is said to be defective* if its words are inadequate, or redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings or different words to convey the same meaning.
- (5) The *inference* is of three kinds, viz. (1) *ā priori* (*pūrvavat*), (2) *ā posteriori* (*śeṣavat*), and (3) *commonly, seen* (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*). The respective examples are: on seeing a cloud one infers that there will be rain; on seeing a swollen river one infers that there was rain; and on seeing a man move from one place to another, one infers that the sun, who rises in the east and sets in the west, must have moved.
- (6) The *appropriate or opportune speech* consists in its being pertinent to the subject and occasion, e.g. in the discussion as to whether there will be rain to-morrow, one may appropriately speak of the condition of the sky of the previous day.
- (7) The *fallacies* signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect perception, inference, or comparison, or which deviate from the scripture. There are various kinds of fallacies designated respectively as follows:—
 - (a) The *quibble in respect of a term* (*vāk-chala*), e.g. a man pretends to use the term *nava-kambala* in the sense of nine blankets while he really means a new blanket.
 - (b) The *erratic reason or undistributed middle term* (*savyabhicāra*), e.g. to say that all external things are non-eternal is to employ an erratic reason, because the sky is an external thing which is eternal.
 - (c) *Balancing the doubt or false assumption* (*samsāya-sama*), e.g. there is doubt as to a certain tall object being a post or a man, and yet if we proceed to act on the assumption that it is a man, we commit the fallacy of false assumption.
 - (d) The *mistimed* (*kālātīta*), e.g. we attempt to prove the eternity of the Veda on the ground that sound is eternal, when no proof has been given for the eternity of sound.
 - (e) *Balancing the point in dispute or begging the question* (*prakaraṇasama*), e.g. the soul is eternal, because it is distinct from the body [It is a matter of dispute if a thing which is distinct from the body is eternal or not].
 - (f) *Balancing the predicate* (*sādhya-sama*), e.g. the sky is eternal, because it is intangible.
 - (g) *Showing absurdity* (*vyāghāta-pradarsana*), e.g. the five objects are non-eternal, because they are apprehended by the senses: the four elements being also so apprehended are non-eternal. If you say so it will follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell, because they are apprehended by the mind: this is absurd.
 - (h) The *contradictory* (*viruddha*)—either in respect of the example or in respect of the conclusion.

- (8) The *adoption of a fallacious reason*—If in the course of one's argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties and disgrace.

(II) "The points of defeat" are the following :—

- (1) The unintelligible (*avijñātārtha*), (2) non-ingenuity (*apratibhā*), (3) silence (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), (4) saying too little (*nyūna*), (5) saying too much (*adhika*), (6) the meaningless (*nīrarthaka*), (7) the inopportune (*aprāptakāla*), (8) the incoherent (*apārthaka*), (9) hurting the proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*).

(III) "An explanation of the truths" deals mainly with the admission of an opinion (*matānujñā*).

(IV) The "analogue" or far-fetched analogy is of various kinds as follows :—

- (1) Balancing an excess (*utkarṣa-samā*), (2) balancing a deficit (*apakarṣa-samā*), (3) balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇya-samā*), (4) balancing the non-reason (*ahetu-samā*), (5) balancing the co-presence (*prāpti-samā*), (6) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāpti-samā*), (7) balancing the doubt (*samśaya-samā*), and (8) balancing the counter-example (*pratidrṣtānta-samā*).

84. ĀRYA DEVA (ABOUT 320 A.D.).

Deva,¹ or rather Ārya Deva, was the next writer on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. He is otherwise known as Kaṇaripa, Kāṇa Deva, Nīla-netra and Piṅgala-netra. He was born in Southern India and was an eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna. According to Hwen-thsang,² he visited the countries of Mahākośala, Srughṇa, Prayāga, Coḷa and Vaiśālī, in all of which he won great renown by defeating the Tīrthikas and preaching the true doctrines of Buddha. According to Lama Tārānātha,³ Deva resided for a long time in Nālandā, where he was a Paṇḍita. He flourished during the reign of Candragupta, whose date is supposed to be about 320 A.D.⁴ The latest date that can be assigned to Deva is 401 A.D.,⁵ when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. He wrote numerous works on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, such as the *Śāntaka śāstra*, *Bhrama-prama-*

¹ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 4; and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 321, vol. II, pp. 225—226.

² Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, Book IV, pp. 186—190, Book V, p. 231; vol. II, Book X, pp. 210, 227, Book XII, p. 302, Book VIII, pp. 98—102.

³ Vide Lama Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 83—86 and 93.

⁴ Vide Nāgārjuna. Cf. Dr. Jacobi's "Dates of philosophical sūtras," J.A.O.S. for 1911, p. 2.

⁵ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 4.

thana-yukti-hetu-siddhi,¹ etc., all of which bear evidences of his knowledge of Logic.

85 MAITREYA
(ABOUT 400 A.D.).

Maitreya,² or rather Maitreya-nātha, who was an eminent teacher of the Yogācāra School, was called in Chinese 'Mirok' and in Tibetan 'Byams-pahi-mgon-pa.' He was the author of several works such as the Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa which was translated into Chinese during 414—421 A.D., the Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya which was translated into Chinese in 646—647 A.D., and the Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā which was translated into Tibetan during 1059—1109 A.D. Maitreya, who lived 900 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is, about 400 A.D.,³ is reported by Hwen-thsang to have communicated the materials of three Buddhist treatises to Ārya Asaṅga while the latter was residing in a monastery in Ayodhyā.⁴

86. MAITREYA'S Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā.⁵

Maitreya strongly supported the doctrines of momentariness (*kṣaṇika-vāda*) and voidness (*śūnya-vāda*). This is evident from the Abhisamayālaṅkāra kārikā in which he says that when we attain perfect wisdom our thought neither precedes nor follows it, just as a lamp which removes darkness neither precedes nor follows the same. Profound indeed are the eight characters of objects.⁶ Profound is the origination of an object, and so are its

¹ Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet No. 3" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, new series, vol. III, No. 7, 1907.

² Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, no. 1; Dr. P. Cordier's Tibetan Catalogue, p. 273.

³ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," by Dr. Sugiura, p. 30.

⁴ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, pp. 355—56. The three treatises are:—

Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya, Sūtrālaṅkāra-ṭīkā, and Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra.

⁵ The Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, a Sanskrit text of which is available in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, was translated into Tibetan by Paṇḍita Amara Gomin and the interpreter Blo-lan-śes-rab during 1059—1109 A.D. It extends over folios 1—14 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, ka. The author of the work is named in Sanskrit as Maitreya-nātha and in Tibetan as Byams-pahi-mgon-pa.

cessation and suchness. The knowable, knowledge, action, means and expedients are all profound. Inasmuch as the objects partake of the character of a dream, there is no reality underlying our existence and its emancipation

Taking one's stand on the dreamy character of objects, one while practising charity, etc., realizes that these are void. One perceives in a moment that a dream and a seer of the dream are not connected but are non-dual in their essence.¹

The knowledge of objects and their connection and separation, is momentary.²

87. MAITREYA'S TREATISE ON the Art of Debate.

In the 15th volume of Maitreya's *Ṣaptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya*³ there is a treatise on the art of debate. It consists of seven chapters styled respectively as follows:—

1. *The subject of debate.*

In beginning a debate on a subject, we must first see that the subject is a useful one. A useless subject should be abandoned.

2. *The place of debate.*

Debate should not be entered upon in any and every place. It should be carried on in the presence of scholars, in the palace of a king or the office of a minister or in a council (*pariṣad*).

ज्ञेयज्ञा ने च चर्याण मदुयोपाय कोशले ।

खमोपमत्वाद् धर्माणामवशान्त्य रक्त्पना ॥

(Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, Chap. IV, p. 22, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of Bengal).

1

खमोपनेषु धर्मेषु स्थित्वा दानादिचर्याया ।

खलक्षणत्वं धर्माणां क्षणेनैकेन विन्दति ॥

खमन्तर्हि नैव द्वययोगेन नेक्षते ।

धर्माणामवशान्त्य क्षणेनैकेन पश्यति ॥

(Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, Chap. VII, p. 28, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of Bengal).

2

धर्मज्ञानान्वयज्ञान क्षान्तिज्ञान क्षणात्मकः ।

(Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā, Chap. III, p. 14, MSS. of the Asiatic Society of Bengal).

³ It is perhaps this work which is called *yoga* by Dr. Sugiura; *vide* its Chinese version Yuka Ron, Book XV.

3. *The means of debate.*

The thesis (*sādhya* or that which is to be established) is of two kinds, viz. (1) that concerning one's self (*ātma-sambandha*), and (2) that concerning others (*para-sambandha*). The proof (or that which helps in establishing the thesis) may be of eight kinds as follows:—

- (1) A proposition, tenet or conclusion (*siddhānta*), (2) reason (*hetu*), (3) example (*udāharana*), (4) the affirmative example (*sādharmya*), (5) the negative example (*vaidharmya*), (6) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (7) inference (*anumāna*), and (8) scripture (*āgama*).

4. *The qualifications of a debater.*

- (a) The debaters must be versed in each other's scriptures.
- (b) They must not, under any circumstances, use sordid or disrespectful language. In addressing each other they should employ words of dignity.
- (c) They must remain fearless.
- (d) They must speak continuously without any break, and must be intelligible to the entire audience.
- (e) They must speak in harmony—sometimes slowly and sometimes aloud—to please the audience.

5. *Points of defeat (nigrahasthāna).*

- (a) If a debater at first opposes an assertion and afterwards speaks in agreement with it, he is defeated.
- (b) If a debater being unable to defend the subject, which he has been discussing introduces another subject, he is defeated.
- (c) If a debater talks irrelevantly (*atīta-vākya*), he is defeated.

6. *Attending a place of debate.*

- (a) A person, in proceeding to a place of debate, should consider whether the debate will be of any benefit to him.
- (b) He should, before proceeding there, consider whether the debate will exercise any good influence on the debater, the opponent, the umpire, and the audience.
- (c) He should consider whether the debater and his opponent are persons worthy of carrying on debate through the process of a proposition (*siddhānta*), a reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharana*), etc.

7. *Confidence of a Debater.*

The debater should appear to the audience in such a way that he is, as it were, sure to gain victory. He should be understood by them to be one who knows the scripture of both the parties, who is self-possessed and full of enthusiasm, and who can speak without a break.

It is evident from the titles of the chapters just mentioned that Maitreya mainly discussed the practical questions of Logic. But occasionally there was mixed with the discussions some Pure Logic also. A thesis [*pratiññā*], according to Maitreya, is to be supported by a reason [*hetu*] and two examples [*drṣṭānta*]. Validity of the reason and of the examples requires that they be based either (1) on fact or perception [*pratyakṣa*], (2) on inference [*anumāna*], or (3) on holy saying [*āgama*]. Analogy or Comparison [*upamāna*] is omitted. The form of his reasoning is illustrated as follows:—

- (1) Sound is non-eternal,
- (2) Because it is a product,
- (3) Like a pot, but not like ether [*ākāśa*],
- (4) A product like a pot is non-eternal,
- (5) Whereas, an eternal thing like ether is not a product.¹

88. ĀRYA ASAṄGA (ABOUT 405—470 A.D.).

Asaṅga,² called in Chinese Mucak and in Tibetan Thogs-med, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar).
 His life. He was at first an adherent of the Mahīśāsaka³ sect and followed the *Vaiṣṇavika* philosophy of the *Hīnayāna*. Later on he became a disciple of Maitreya and adopted the *Yogācāra* philosophy of the *Mahāyāna*. He is said to have lived for some years as a paṇḍita in Nālandā⁴. He lived about 450 A.D.⁵ The latest date that can be assigned to him is 531 A.D.,⁶ when one of his works, called the *Mahāyāna-samparigrahaśāstra*, was translated into Chinese. Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A.D. saw the ruins of *Saṅghārāmas* in Kauśāmbī and Ayodhyā, where Asaṅga resided for some years.⁷ He wrote 12 works, most of which still exist in Chinese and Tibetan versions.⁸

A short summary of the Logic of Asaṅga is found in the 11th volume of *Prakaraṇārya vācā śāstra*⁹ and
 His logical views. 7th and 16th volumes of *Mahāyānābhidharma-saṃyukta-saṅgīti-śāstra*. The first work called in Chinese

¹ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 30.

² Vide Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227 and 236.

³ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 357.

⁴ Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 122.

⁵ Asaṅga is approximately placed at 450 A.D. as he was the eldest brother of Vasubandhu (q.v.) who lived about 480 A.D.

⁶ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 5.

⁷ See Beal's Buddhist Records, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227, 236.

⁸ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 5.

⁹ Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos. 1177, 1178.

Hhien-yān-shān-ciāo-lun (signifying 'a śāstra on expounding the holy teaching') was composed by Bodhisattva Asaṅga. It was translated into Chinese by Hwen-thsang (Yuan-chwang) of the Thān dynasty in A.D. 645—646. The second work called in Chinese Tā-shān ō-phi-tā-mo-tsā-tsi-lun was compiled by Bodhisattva Sthitamati. It was translated into Chinese by Hwen-thsang of the Thān dynasty in A.D. 646.

In logical views Asaṅga follows Maitreya except in respect of the theory of proof (*sādhaka* or that which helps in establishing a thesis). A proof is subdivided by Asaṅga as follows: (1) A proposition (*pratijñā*), (2) a reason (*hetu*), (3) an example (*udāharana*), (4) an application (*upanaya*), (5) a conclusion (*nigamana*), (6) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (7) comparison (*upamāna*), and (8) scripture (*āgama*).

The first five subdivisions constitute what is called an inference (*anumāna*).

Asaṅga's form of reasoning, which is somewhat different from Maitreya's, is given below:—

- (1) Sound is non-eternal,
- (2) Because it is a product,
- (3) Like a pot (but not like ether);
- (4) Because a pot is a product it is non-eternal; so is sound,
as it is a product;
- (5) Therefore we know sound is non-eternal.

89. VASUBANDHU (ABOUT 410—490 A.D.).

Vasubandhu,¹ called in Chinese Seish and in Tibetan Dwyig-gñen, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar), where a tablet to his memory was seen by Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A.D. His father's name was Kauśika. He began his career as a *Vaibhāṣika* philosopher of the Sarvāstivāda sect, but was later converted by his eldest brother Asaṅga to the *Yogācāra* school of the *Mahāyāna*. He passed many years of his life in Śākala, Kauśāmbī and Ayodhyā, in the last of which places he died at the age of eighty years. He was a friend of Manoratha, a master of the *Vaibhāṣika* Śāstra, who flourished in the middle of the thousand years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is before 500 A.D. He was a contemporary of another *Vaibhāṣika* teacher, named Saṅghabhadra, who lived about 489 A.D.²

¹ Vide Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. I, pp. 98, 105, 172, 193, 225, 236; and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 210.

² Saṅgabhadra translated *Vibhāṣā-vinaya* into Chinese in 489 A.D. Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix II, No. 95.

Vāmana,¹ who lived at the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th century A.D., quotes a verse alluding to Vasubandhu as a counsellor (possibly of Kumāra Gupta during 413—455 A.D.). A biography² of Vasubandhu was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese during 557—569 A.D. Paramārtha,³ the translator of the biography (499—569 A.D.), tells us that Vasubandhu, who was patronised by Vikramāditya (possibly Skanda Gupta), died at the age of eighty years during the reign of Bālāditya Narasimha Gupta (485—490 A.D.). He was therefore a contemporary of Kumāra Gupta, Skanda Gupta, Pura Gupta and Bālāditya (from about 410 A.D. to about 490 A.D.).

Vasubandhu was the author of a large number of very valuable works,⁴ some of which are available in Sanskrit and the rest in Chinese and

Tibetan translations.

In the 7th century A.D. while Hwen-thsang was travelling in India, he saw three works on the art of debate attributed to Vasubandhu.⁵ The Sanskrit originals of these works as well as their Chinese versions are now lost. The works were styled in Chinese as (1) Ronki (*Vāda-vidhi*—the method of debate), (2) Ronshiki (*Vāda-mārga*—the course of debate), and (3) Ronshin (*Vāda-kausalā*—the expedients of debate).

90. VASUBANDHU'S Tarka-Śāstra.

Besides these three works, there was a treatise on Logic called

Mr. Takakusu, in a very learned article called "Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu" published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, says that Saṅghabhada, contemporary of Vasubandhu, was the translator of the Samantapāsādikā of Buddha-ghoṣa into Chinese in 488 A.D.

1

सामिप्रायलं यथा,—

सोऽयं संप्रति चन्द्रगुप्तनयचन्द्रप्रकाशो युवा ।

जानो भूपतिराश्रयः कृतधियां दिष्टा कृतार्थश्रमः ॥

आश्रयः कृतधियामित्यत्र च सुबन्धु साचिब्योपक्षेपपरत्वात् सामिप्रायलम् ।

(Kāvyālaṅkāra-sūtra-vṛtti, 3-2-2, p. 85, Benares Sanskrit series).

² Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1463 and Appendix I, No. 6. The statement that there was an older translation of the life of Vasubandhu by Kumārajīva A.D. 401—409, but that it was lost in 730 A.D., cannot be accepted without further testimony. Takakusu says that "some catalogues mention by mistake that such a work was then in existence": vide Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 39.

³ Vide Takakusu in J.R.A.S. 1905, pp. 33—53; Prof. K. B. Pathak in Indian Antiquary, pp. 170—171, for June 1911; V. A. Smith's Early History of India, pp. 293 and 327 (3rd edition); and Dr. Hoernle's correspondence in the Indian Antiquary for September 1911, p. 264.

⁴ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 6.

⁵ Vide Dr. Sugiura's "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 32.

Tarka-śāstra¹ composed by Vasubandhu. There exists a Chinese version of this work called Zu-shih-lun.

An analysis of the Tarka-śāstra. The Chinese version was prepared by

Paramārtha of the Chan dynasty in A.D.

550. The Tarka-śāstra consists of three chapters dealing respectively with (1) the five parts of a syllogism (*pañcāvayava*), (2) the analogous rejoinder (*jāti*), and (3) the points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*).

In chapter I, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (*pratijñā*), a reason (*hetu*), an example (*udāharaṇa*), an application (*upanaya*), and a conclusion (*nigamana*), which constitute the five parts of a syllogism.

Though according to the Tarka-śāstra a syllogism consisted of five parts, in the Ronki, quoted by Kwei-ke, Vasubandhu maintained that a thesis could be proved by two parts only, *viz.* a proposition and a reason, and that, therefore, the necessary terms in a syllogistic inference were only three, *viz.* the minor term (*pakṣa*), the major term (*sādhya*), and the middle term (*hetu*).²

In chapter II, there is an account of the Analogous Rejoinder (*jāti*) which is subdivided under three heads as follows :—

A. A rejoinder on the basis of reversion (*viparyaya-khaṇḍana*) which consists of (1) balancing the homogeneity (*sādharmya-samā*), (2) balancing the heterogeneity (*vaidharmya-samā*), (3) balancing the thesis (*sādhya-samā*), (4) balancing the unquestionable (*avarṇya-samā*), (5) balancing the mutual absence (*aprāpti-samā*), (6) balancing the non-reason (*aḥetu-samā*), (7) balancing the demonstration (*upapatti-samā*), (8) balancing the doubt (*saṁśaya-samā*), (9) balancing the non-difference (*aviśeṣa-samā*), and (10) balancing the effect (*kārya-samā*).

B. A rejoinder on the ground of meaninglessness (*nirartha-khaṇḍana*) which consists of (11) balancing the point in dispute (*prakaraṇa-samā*), (12) balancing the counter-example (*pratidr-ṣṭānta-samā*), and (13) balancing the infinite regression (*prasaṅga-samā*).

C. A contrary rejoinder (*viparīta-khaṇḍana*), which consists of (14) balancing the non-produced (*anutpatti-samā*), (15) balanc-

¹ Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1252.

² The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara probably refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to some logicians *antarvyāpti* (internal inseparable connection) consisting of *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term and *hetu* or middle term, is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that *drṣṭānta* or example is altogether useless. Siddhasena Divākara writes :—

अन्तर्यामिन्वा साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्वचिबदाहृतिः ।

अर्था स्यात्तदसङ्गावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥ १० ॥

(Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara, edited by Dr. Satish Chandra Vidya-bhusana and published by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta).

ing the eternal (*nitya-samā*), and (16) balancing the presumption (*arthāpatti-samā*).

Chapter III deals with twenty-two kinds of points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*) enumerated below:—

(1) Hurting the proposition (*pratijñā-hāni*), (2) shifting the proposition (*pratijñāntara*), (3) opposing the proposition (*pratijñā-virodha*), (4) renouncing the proposition (*pratijñā-saṁnyāsa*), (5) shifting the reason (*hetvantara*), (6) shifting the topic (*arthāntara*), (7) the meaningless (*nirarthaka*), (8) the unintelligible (*aviññātārtha*), (9) the incoherent (*apārthaka*), (10) the inopportune (*apṛāpta-kāla*), (11) saying too little (*nyūnatā*), (12) saying too much (*adhika*) (13) repetition (*punarukta*), (14) silence (*anānu-bhāṣaṇa*), (15) ignorance (*ajñāna*), (16) non-ingenuity (*apratibhā*), (17) evasion (*vikṣepa*), (18) admission of an opinion (*matānuijñā*), (19) overlooking the censurable (*pāryanuyojyopēkṣaṇa*), (20) censuring the non-censurable (*nīranuyojyānuyoga*), (21) deviating from a tenet (*apasiddhānta*), and (22) the semblance of a reason or fallacy (*he'vābhāsa*).

It is to be regretted that neither the Ronki nor its Sanskrit original is available. Vasubandhu seems, however, to have used two forms of syllogism, viz. a syllogism of five parts at the time of a debate and a syllogism of two parts on an ordinary occasion. The two forms are exhibited below:—

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| A syllogism of five parts. | (1) Sound is non-eternal. |
| | (2) Because it is a product. |
| | (3) Products are non-eternal like a pot, which is a product and is non-eternal, |
| | (4) Sound is an instance of a product. |
| | (5) Therefore sound is non-eternal. |
| A syllogism of two parts. | (1) Sound is non-eternal. |
| | (2) Because it is a product. |

CHAPTER III.

Systematic Buddhist Writers on Logic.

91. THE COMMENCEMENT OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC (450—1200 A.D.).

In the previous chapter we have seen that from the origin of Buddhism in the 6th century B.C. to its expansion into four philosophical schools in the 4th century A.D., there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to that science in the works on philosophy and religion. Nāgārjuna, about 300 A.D., wrote a tract on Logic which was a mere review of the common topics of the Ancient School of Brāhmaṇic Logic. During 400—500 A.D., Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu handled Logic, but their treatment of it was merely incidental, being mixed up with the problems of the *Yogācāra* and *Vaiśiṣṭika* schools of philosophy. Vasubandhu's three works¹ on Pure Logic mentioned by Hwen-thsang are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged. With 450 A.D. began a period when Logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to that branch of learning. The works brought out by these writers, along with those brought out by the Jainas, constitute the Mediæval School of Indian Logic. Dignāga is the earliest known writer of this school.

92. ĀCĀRYA DIGNĀGA—FATHER OF MEDIÆVAL LOGIC (CIRCA 450—520 A.D.).

A portrait of Dignāga.

Dignāga is justly regarded as the Father of Mediæval Logic. Both in matter and in manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness of his insight and the soundness of his critical acumen combined to stamp him with an individuality all his own. No praise seems too high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be styled as the first and last of Indian logicians. His likeness recovered from Tibet is reproduced below.

The likeness of Dignāga reproduced here is taken from the Tibetan *Bṣtan-
hgyur* (*Ṭdo*, Ce, folio 1) which was put in its present
Recovered from the form by the celebrated Lama Bu-gton, who passed the
land of snow. last days of his life at the monastery of Sha-lu, twelve
miles south-east of Tashi-lhun-po. Bu-gton, who lived at the close of the thirteenth

¹ *Vide* Book II, Chapter I, under the head "Vasubandhu."

century A.D., must have copied the likeness from some earlier specimen, which was taken to Tibet during her intercourse with India between 600 A.D. and 1200 A.D.

A peculiarity of this likeness is its cap. In the early Buddhist Church monks were not allowed to wear any head-dress (*vide* the Pātimokkha rules of the Vinaya Piṭaka). With the introduction of Mahāyāna in the first century A.D. by Kaniṣka, a great change was effected in the dress of monks, and caps of various shapes were invented. The hat worn here is called Panchen-shwa-gmar¹ or "Paṇḍita's red cap," with a pointed peak and long lappets. The lappets of the cap were lengthened in proportion to the rank of the wearer.

It is not known when the "Paṇḍita's cap" was first introduced. It is said to have been taken to Tibet in 749 A.D. by Śānta Rakṣita. "Paṇḍita" was a degree which was conferred by the Vikramaśīlā University on its successful candidates. It is not known what title the University of Nālandā conferred on its distinguished



བུ་མཁན་ལྷ་མོ་མཆོག་གི་མཆོག་།
སྤྱི་བ་དཔོན་ཕྱོགས་སྤྱི་བ་ལ་མཆོག་།

¹ *Vide* Waddell's Lamaism, pp. 194—196.

students. Perhaps in that University, too, the title "Paṇḍita" was recognized and "Paṇḍita's cap" was possibly a distinctive badge of the scholars of that famous University where Dignāga distinguished himself in philosophical controversies.

The woollen *shawl* in the figure is indicative of the fact that after Buddhism had spread into cold climes, monks like Brāhmaṇic sages were allowed to put on suitable warm clothes. There is also in the palms of the image a thunderbolt called in Sanskrit *Vajra* and in Tibetan *Ṛdorje*, which is a remover of all evils. The halo round the head of the image indicates that Dignāga was a saint.

93. LIFE OF DIGNĀGA.

Dignāga, or rather Ācārya Dignāga, is called in Tibetan *Phyogs-glañ*. He¹ was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in *Simhavaktra* near *Kāñcī*, modern Conjeeveram in the Madras Presidency. By *Nāgadatta*, a Paṇḍita of the *Vātsīputrīva* sect, he was admitted to the religious system of that sect and attained erudition in the *Tripitaka* of the *Hīnayāna*. Afterwards he became a disciple of Ācārya Vasubandhu with whom he studied all the *Piṭakas* of the *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna*. He miraculously saw the face of Mañjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning, from whom he received inspiration in the Law (Dharma). A few years later he was invited to *Nālandā* where he defeated Brāhmaṇa *Sudurjaya* and other *Tīrtha* dialecticians and won them to the doctrine of Buddha. Since he had refuted chiefly the *Tīrtha* controversialists he was called a "Fighting Bull" or a "Bull in discussion" (Sanskrit: *Tarka-puṅgava*, and Tibetan: *Rtsod-paḥi-khyu-mchog*). He travelled through *Orissa* and *Mahārāṣṭra* to the south, meeting the *Tīrtha* controversialists in discussions. In *Mahārāṣṭra* he is said to have resided frequently in the Ācāra's Monastery.² In *Orissa* he converted *Bhadra Pālita*, Treasury-minister of the King of the country, to Buddhism. He was a man of vast learning and wisdom, and practised during his life-time twelve tested virtues. He lived a considerable part of his life in *Andhra* (*Telingana*) in the Madras Presidency. He is said to have died in a solitary wood in *Orissa*.

Dignāga must have lived before 557—569 A.D.³ when two of

¹ Vide *Lama Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 130—135. *Lama Tārānātha* also relates that Dignāga frequently resided in *Orissa* in a cavern of a mountain called *Bhoraśilā* where he used to give himself up to contemplation. He was specially versed in incantation formulas. It is stated that the stem of a myrobalan tree called *Muṣṭiharitakī* in the garden of *Bhadra Pālita* in *Orissa* entirely withered, but it revived in seven days after Dignāga had uttered an incantation for its restoration. For a fuller account of Dignāga vide *Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Dignāga and his Pramāṇa-samuccaya"* in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. I, No. 9, 1905.

² Vide *Watters' On Yuan Chwang*, Vol. II, p. 122.

³ Vide *Bynyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, App. 1, No. 10, where Dignāga is called *Jina*. The Chinese name of Dignāga has been wrongly rendered as *Jina* by Japanese writers as well as by the Rev. Mr. Beal.

his works were translated into Chinese. The early limit of his date is 480 A.D. when his teacher Vasubandhu lived. Dignāga flourished possibly about 500 A.D. when the Buddhist kings of the Pallava¹ dynasty ruled the eastern coast of Southern India.

We have already seen that Dignāga travelled in Nālandā, Orissa, Mahārāṣṭra and Dakṣiṇa (Madras), entering everywhere into disputes with controversialists. He attacked his opponents as frequently as he was attacked by them. His whole life was passed in giving blows and receiving counter-blows. Even his death did not terminate the great intellectual war in which he had been engaged: though he could no longer offer any violence, his opponents continued to fall upon him with force. Mark the volleys on his dead body coming from no mean warriors! Kālidāsa,² the prince of poets, warns his poem to avoid the "rugged hand" (*sthūla-hasta*) of Dignāga. Uddyotakara,³ the eminent logician, calls Dignāga "a quibbler" (*Kutārkika*). Vācaspati Miśra⁴ describes him as "an erring one" (*bhrānta*) and speaks of his "blunders" (*bhrānti*). Mallinātha⁵ compares him with a "rock" (*adri-kalpa*). Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Pārtha-sārathi Miśra⁶ turn their arrows against him. The Vedāntins and Jainas⁷ were not in-

¹ On the downfall of the Andhras in 436 A.D., the Pallavas rose to power. They were in their turn driven out of their northern possessions, the kingdom of Veṅgi, by Kubja Viṣṇuvardhana of the Eastern Chalukya dynasty. During 552—589 A.D., Kāñci, the capital of the Pallava kings, was captured by Vikramāditya I. of the Western Chalukya dynasty. *Vide* Sewell's Lists of Antiquities, Madras, Vol. II, pp. 141, 146, 148, 149 and 211, 212.

² *Vide* Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha, verse 14.

यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां
शमाय शास्त्रं जयतो जगद ।
कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिष्ठमिहेतुः
वरिष्ठते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

Uddyotakara's Nyāya-vārtika, Introductory stanza, p. 1, in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Compare also Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-4, pp. 43—44; 1-1-5, p. 52; 1-1-6, pp. 60—61; 1-1-7, p. 63, etc.

⁴ *Vide* Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, edited by Gangadhara Sastri, 1-1-1, pp. 1, 31; 1-1-4, pp. 76—77, 97—98, 102; 1-1-5, p. 102; 1-1-6, p. 135, etc.

⁵ Mallinātha's commentary on verse 14 of the Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha.

⁶ *Vide* Pārtha sārathi's gloss on verses 59—60, Anumānapariccheda of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's vārtika on the 5th Sūtra of Jaimini.

⁷ *Vide* the works of Prabhācandra and Vidyānanda referred to in the J.B.B. R.A.S., Vol. XVIII, p. 229. The Digambara Jaina logician Dharma-bhūṣaṇa, in controverting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *Sāmānya*, generality, quotes in support of his own conclusion the following verse of Dignāga:—

न याति न च तन्नास्ते न पश्चादस्ति नाश्वत् ।
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसक्ततिः ।
इति दिग्नागदूषितदूषणप्रसरप्रसङ्गात्

(Quoted in Dharmabhūṣaṇa's Nyāya-dīpikā, Chapter III).

active in their hostility. Even Dharmakīrti,¹ a Buddhist sage, attempted to oppose him. Dignāga must have been a very strongly built man, both physically and mentally, otherwise he could hardly have lived for a single day under assaults from so many sides. Those of his works which still exist enable us to measure, to some extent, his strength and his weakness.

94. DIGNĀGA'S *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.²

The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* is one of the grandest literary monuments of Dignāga. It is said to have been composed while he was residing on a solitary hill near Veṅgi in Andhra³ (modern Telingāna) in the Madras Presidency. Seeing that the Śāstras on Dialectics written earlier by him remained scattered about, he resolved to collect them. Accordingly, putting together fragments from particular works, he engaged himself in compiling in verse a compendium called the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. While he was writing the opening lines, the earth trembled and all the places were filled with light and a great tumult was audible. A Brāhmaṇa named Īśvara-kṛṣṇa⁴ surprised at this wonder came to

Dignāga and Īśvara-
kṛṣṇa.

The same verse has been quoted in a little altered form by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya as follows :—

न याति न च तत्रासौदक्षि पश्चाद् वांशवत् ।

जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमद्यो व्यसनमन्ततिः ॥

(Sarvadarśana saṁgraha, chapter on Bauddhadarśana).

¹ Vide the head "Dharmakīrti" which follows.

² For an account of the composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* vide Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 13, 133; and the Tibetan *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan* edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., pp. 62, 75, 100 and LXVII.

³ Vide Hwen-thsang's *Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. II, pp. 218, 219 and 220, where the Chinese term for Dignāga is wrongly rendered as Jina. Hwen-thsang gives the following account of the composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*:—"When Dignāga began to compose a useful compendium [presumably the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*] for overcoming the difficulties of the *Hetu-vidyā-śāstra*, the mountains and valleys shook and reverberated; the vapour and clouds changed their appearance, and the spirit of the mountain appeared before him, asking him to spread abroad the *śāstra* (*Hetuvidyā*). Then the Bodhisattva (Dignāga) caused a bright light to shine and illumine the dark places. Surprised at this wonder, the king of the country (Andhra) came near him and asked whether he was entering into *nirvāṇa*. When the king spoke of the infinite bliss of *nirvāṇa* Dignāga resolved to enter into it. Mañjuśrī, the god of learning, knowing his purpose was moved with pity. He came to Dignāga and said: "Alas! how have you given up your great purpose, and only fixed your mind on your own personal profit, with narrow aims, giving up the purpose of saving all." Saying this he directed him to explain the *Yogācāryabhūmi-śāstra* and *Hetuvidyā-śāstra*. Dignāga receiving these directions, respectfully assented and saluted the saint. Then he devoted himself to profound study and explained the *Hetuvidyā-śāstra* and the *Yoga* discipline.

⁴ Īśvarakṛṣṇa here referred to was very probably the author of the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.

Ācārya Dignāga, and finding that he had gone out to collect alms, wiped out the words he had written. Dignāga came and rewrote the words and Īśvara-kṛṣṇa wiped them out again. Dignāga wrote them a third time and added: "Let no one wipe these out even in joke or sport, for none should wipe out what are of great importance: if the sense of the words is not right, and one wishes to dispute on that account, let him appear before me in person." When after Dignāga had gone out to collect alms, the Brāhmaṇa again came to wipe out the writings, he saw what was added and paused. The Ācārya returning from his rounds for a meal met the Brāhmaṇa: they began a controversy, either staking his own doctrine. When he had vanquished the Tīrtha (Brāhmaṇa) several times and challenged him to accept the Buddhist doctrine, the Tīrtha scattered ashes, pronouncing incantations over them, and burnt all the goods of the Ācārya that happened to lie before him; and while the Ācārya was kept back by fire, the Tīrtha ran away. Thereupon Dignāga reflected that, since he could not work the salvation of this single individual, he would not be able to work that of others. So thinking he was on the point of giving up his purpose of compiling the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* when the Bodhisattva Ārya Mañjuśrī miraculously appeared before him in person and said:—

"Son, refrain, refrain: the intellect is infected by arguing with mean persons. Please know that when you have demonstrated it, this Śāstra cannot be injured by the host of Tīrthas. I undertake to be your spiritual tutor till you have attained the stage of perfection. In later times this śāstra will become the sole eye of all the śāstras."¹

So saying Mañjuśrī disappeared, and Dignāga resumed his work and completed *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.

The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*² is a Sanskrit work written in *anustubh* metre. The Sanskrit original of it is lost,

The Tibetan version of
Pramāṇa-samuccaya.

but a Tibetan translation still exists. The translation was prepared by an Indian sage named Hema (or Kanaka) Varma (in Tibetan: Gser-gyi-go-cha) and a Tibetan interpreter named Dad-pahi-śeś-rab in the monastery of Śeś-pahi-dge-gnaś. It occupies folios 1—13 of the *Bstan-hgyur*,

1 བྱ་མ་ཐེད་མ་ཐེད་སྒྲུ་པོ་དམན་དང་འཕྲད་ལས་ལྷོ་གྲོས་ངན་སྒྲུ་སྒྲེ།
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བརྟན་ནས་འཆས་འདི་ལ་སྒྲུ་གས་ཚགས་ཀྱིས་གནོད་མི་རྒྱས་པར་ཤེས།
ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ས་ས་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་དགེ་བའི་བཞེས་སུ་ང་འགྱུར་གྱི།
བྱི་མའི་དུས་སུ་བརྟན་བཅོས་ཀུན་གྱི་མིག་གཅིག་དུ་ནི་འདི་འགྱུར་རོ།

Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., p. 101.

² Probably the same as "The Śāstra on the grouped inferences," *vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. 167.

section Mdo, volume Ce.¹ In Tibetan it is called Tshad-mahi-Mdo-kun-las-btuṣ-pa (= Pramāṇa-sūtra-samuccaya) or briefly Tshad-ma-kun-las-btuṣ-pa (= Pramāṇa-samuccaya) signifying a compilation of aphorisms on Pramāṇa, valid knowledge. It begins thus:—“Bowling down before Sugata—the teacher and protector—who is *Pramāṇa* incarnate, and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake of expounding Pramāṇa (valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, compiled from my own works.”² In the closing lines it is stated that “Dignāga, the subduer of controversialists in all regions and the possessor of elephantine strength, compiled this from his own works.”³

It is divided into six chapters which are named respectively: (1) Perception (Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa*, Tibetan: Mñon-sum); (2) Inference for one's own self (Sanskrit: *Svārthānumāna*, Tibetan: Raṅ-don-gyi-rje-dpag); (3) Inference for the sake of others (Sanskrit: *Parārthānumāna*, Tibetan: Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rje-dpag); (4) Reason and example (Sanskrit: *Hetu-drṣṭānta*, Tibetan: Gtan-tshigs-daṅ-dpe); (5) Negation of the opposite (Sanskrit: *Apoha*, Tibetan: Tshan-sel-wa); and (6) Analogue (Sanskrit: *Jāti*, in Tibetan: ltag-gcod).

Chapter I—Perception.

In opposition to Akṣapāda who propounded four *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge), Dignāga⁴ states in Chapter I of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya

¹ The volume Ce of the Bṣtan-hgyur, section Mdo, was put at my disposal by the India Office, London, through Mr. Thomas.

² ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པ་འགྲོལ་པ་ལ་ཕན་པར་བཞེད།
ལྷན་པ་བདེ་གཤེགས་རྒྱལ་ལ་བྱུག་འཚལ་ནས།
ཚད་མ་རྒྱལ་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་གཞུང་གྱུན་ལས།
བཏུས་ཏི་རྣམ་ཚུགས་འཕྲོར་ནས་འདིར་གཅིག་བྱ།

(Bṣtan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 1).

³ བྱུགས་ནས་གྱུན་གྱི་ལས་ཀྱི་གལ་བ་ནས།
འཛམས་པར་བྱེད་ལ་གྲང་བའི་རྣམས་ལྷན་པ།
བྱུགས་ཀྱི་གྲང་བའི་གཞུང་གྱུན་ལས་བཏུས་པ།

(Bṣtan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 13).

⁴ མངོན་སུམ་དང་ནི་ཇིས་སྤྲུང་པ་ག་
ཚད་མ་དག་ནི་མཚན་ཏིང་ག་ཏིས།
གཞལ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་རབ་སྤྱོར་ཕྱིར་
ཚད་མ་གཞན་ནི་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།

(Tshad-ma-kun-las-btuṣ-pa, Chapter I).

that *pramāṇas* are only two, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). All objects being known through them, there is no other *pramāṇa*.

Dignāga does not give any formal definition of Perception, which is well known as the knowledge of objects derived through the channel of the senses. But he describes Perception as that which, being freed from preconception, is unconnected with name, genus, etc.¹ Suppose a man in twilight mistakes a rope for a snake: his knowledge of the snake is a preconception and is not, according to Dignāga, an act of Perception. Dignāga contends that Perception is not connected with the name, as we can perceive a thing without knowing its name. It is also unconnected with genus, so that the perception of a thing consists of the knowledge of its individual characteristics alone. Suppose I see a cow. This cow, which I see, is a peculiar one. Its infinite peculiarities can only be realised by me who have seen it. If I proceed to indicate this cow to other persons by saying that I saw a cow which is named *Dittha* or which is red, etc., I can only convey to those persons the idea of a cow of a certain class, that is, a cow possessing the common characteristics of a class of cows, but can never express to them the individual cow which I saw. Hence it follows that (a result of) Perception cannot be properly expressed by name, genus, etc. But very different is the case with inference. Knowledge derived through inference is general, and can be well expressed by name, genus, etc., whereas that derived through Perception is particular, and is incapable of being properly communicated to others by name, genus, etc.

The Sanskrit original may be restored as follows:—

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानञ्च प्रमाणं हि द्विलक्षणम् ।
प्रमेयं तच्च सिद्धं हि न प्रमाणान्तरं भवेत् ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Chapter I).

¹ In Chapter I of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Dignāga describes Perception as follows:—

अद्वैतं क्षुब्धं ह्येव यद्वैतं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
सिद्धं दृष्टं चैव प्रमाणं न प्रमाणान्तरं ॥

The Sanskrit equivalents for those two lines are as follows:—

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोदं
नामजात्याद्यसंयुतम् ॥

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Chapter I).

The first of these lines has actually been quoted, and Dignāga's whole theory of Perception severely criticised, by the Hindu logician Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika*, 1-1-4.

Dignāga reviews the doctrines of perception of the Yogins¹ (or Yogācāras called in Tibetan *Rnal-hbyor-pa*) and the Sāṃkhyas (called in Tibetan *Graṅs-can-pa*) or Kāpilas² (called in Tibetan

Perceptions as defined
in other schools.

Ser-skyā-wa).

Akṣapāda, whom Dignāga designates as Naiyāyika (in Tibetan :

Dignāga criticises the
definition of perception
as given by Akṣapāda and
Vātsyāyana.

rigs-pa-can), defines *perception*³ as knowledge which arises from the intercourse of sense-organs with their objects, being determinate, unnameable and non-erratic. Vāt-

syāyana in his *Bhāṣya*, commentary,⁴ admits that this definition enumerates only the special factors of perception. The soul (*ātman*), etc., which co-operate in producing not only perception but also inference, etc., are general factors and as such not mentioned in the definition. As to the objection that the definition fails to enumerate even the special factor of perception, *viz* the mind (*manas*) which through its intercourse with the soul, pleasure, etc., brings about their perception, Vātsyāyana observes that the mind is included in the sense-organs, it has been designated a sense-organ in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and the designation has been tacitly

རང་རིག་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཡིན།

རྟོག་པ་འབྱུང་རྟོག་པ་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་མཁ་བརྟན།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

གང་ཆོ་རྟོན་དང་དབང་པོ་ཡིད།

སྐྱེས་པུ་སྐྱེ་བ་པ་འདུ་བྱེད་ལྟན།

སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡི་ཆོག་པ་ལ།

མངོན་སུམ་བཤེད་པ་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

³ The definition of the Naiyāyika is quoted by Dignāga as follows :—

རིག་པ་པ་ཅན་རྟོག་པ་ནི་——

དབང་པོ་དང་རྟོན་གྱི་པ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་རིག་པ་པ་པ་སྟེ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་འབྱུག་པ་མེད་པ་ཞེན་པའི་

བདག་ཀྱིས་ཅན་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་མོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རྟོ།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

⁴ The Sanskrit original runs as follows :—

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारिव्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

(Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-4).

तच्चैतन्मन्त्रवत् आत्मनःसन्निकर्षजमेवानवधारणज्ञानमिति । आत्मादिषु सुखादिषु च प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं वक्तव्यम् । अनिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं हि तदिति इन्द्रियस्य वै सतो मनस इन्द्रियेभ्यः पृथगुपदेशो धर्मभेदात् । मनसश्चेन्द्रियभावाद्वाच्यं लक्षणान्तरमिति । तज्ज्ञानर-समाचाराच्चैतत् प्रत्येत्यमिति परमतमप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतमिति हि तन्मथुक्तिः ।

(Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1-1-4)

accepted in the Nyāya philosophy according to the scientific axiom, viz. "if I do not oppose a theory of my opponent, it is to be understood that I accept it."

Dignāga laughs at Vātsyāyana by saying that the Naiyāyika (Akṣapāda) takes pride in borrowing his definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) from the Sūtra of the Vaiśeṣikas,¹ viz. that perception is knowledge which arises from the intercourse of the soul with the mind, the mind with a sense-organ, and the sense-organ with its object. The Naiyāyika is however careful not to connect his perception with generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) on which, as pointed out by Dignāga, the Vaiśeṣika's intercourse is dependent. Oh! what a strange consistency.

¹ Dignāga quotes the Vaiśeṣika definition as follows:—

ज्ञेयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं —

मद्वयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं ।

ज्ञेयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं सङ्गोपादानं ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

The Sanskrit original should stand thus:—

आत्मैन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षाद् यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ।

But it is actually found in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra as follows:—

आत्मैन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ।

(Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 3-1-18, p. 121, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad).

In another place of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra in connection with the perception of pleasure, etc., the definition of perception, which includes the mind, is stated as follows:—

आत्मैन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् सुखदुःखे ।

(Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 5-2-15, p. 181, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad).

In the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, the mind (मनस्) is explicitly mentioned as a sense-organ:—

अन्तर्यामि इन्द्रियाणि प्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि षट् ।

(Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, p. 186, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series).

Dignāga quotes the explanatory portion of the Vaiśeṣika definition as follows:—

ज्ञेयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं ।

ज्ञेयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं सङ्गोपादानं ॥

ज्ञेयव्यवहारसंज्ञायाः सङ्गोपादानं सङ्गोपादानं ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

The Sanskrit original of this portion should stand thus:—

सामान्यविशेषापेक्षश्च द्रव्यगुणकर्मोपेक्षश्च हि प्रत्यक्षमिति न योजितम् ।

Compare Praśasta-pāda who gives a definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is similar to the one criticised by Dignāga:—

सामान्यविशेषद्रव्यगुण कर्मविशेषणापेक्षाद् आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षात् प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते ।

(Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, p. 186, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

As to the mind it is not, says Dignāga, a sense-organ, and pleasure (*sukha*), etc., are not objects of knowledge. The view, that the Naiyāyika, not having opposed the mind as a sense-organ, tacitly accepts it as such, is untenable. If non-opposition was a proof of assent, it was useless for the Naiyāyika to have mentioned the other sense-organs.¹

Chapter II—Inference for one's self.

Inference (called in Sanskrit *anumāna* and in Tibetan *rjes-dpag*) is of two kinds, *viz.* inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others.

An inference for one's self² (*svārthānumāna*, *rañ-don-gyi-rjes-dpag*) is defined as the knowledge of a thing derived through its mark or sign of three characters.

The mark or sign (reason or middle term) should possess one of the following three characters :—

- (1) *Effect* (*kārya*, *hbras-bu*)—the mark may be an effect of the thing to be inferred (predicate or major term); *e.g.* smoke of fire.
- (2) *Identity* (*svabhāva*, *rañ-bshin*)—the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred; *e.g.* a *śimśapā* identical with a tree.

¹ Dignāga observes :—

བདེ་མཁས་གནས་བྱ་མེད་པའམ་
དབང་པོ་གནས་ཡོད་ཡིད་དབང་པོ་
བཀག་པ་མེད་ཀྱི་རྩ་ཐོབ་ཅེ་ན
དབང་པོ་གནས་ཀྱི་ཚུ་རྟོན་མེད །

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter I).

The original Sanskrit text of the verse is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus :—

न सुखादि प्रमेयं वा मनो वास्तीन्द्रियान्तरम् ।
अनिषेधादुपात्तं चेद् अन्येन्द्रियतमं तथा ॥

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā, 1-1-4).

What Dignāga meant to say is :—

The Nyāya-sūtra distinctly mentions the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch as sense-organs, but says nothing as to whether the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ or not. The presumption from this silence is that the mind is not a sense-organ according to the Nyāya-sūtra.

But Vātsyāyana, the famous Hindu commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, interprets the silence in a quite different way, concluding therefrom that the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ according to the Nyāya-sūtra.

Dignāga contends “ if silence was a proof of assent why did the Nyāya-sūtra not remain silent regarding the other five sense-organs too ? ”

²

རྩོམ་དཔག་ནམ་ག་རྟེས་རང་རྟོན་ནི །
ཚུལ་གསུམ་རྟོགས་ལས་རྟོན་མཐོང་བའོ །

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

- (3) *Non-perception (anupalabdhi, mi-dmigs-pa)*—non-perception of the mark may be due to the non-existence of the thing to be inferred; e.g. non-perception of a pot is a mark of non-existence thereof.

Dignāga mentions the views of some logicians who from smoke, which is the middle term, infer *fire*, the major term, which is inseparably connected with it, and also of others, who from smoke infer the *connection* between fire (the major term) and the hill (the minor term). He argues against the first mentioned logicians saying that if they infer *fire* from smoke they gain no new knowledge from this inference, for it is already known that smoke is inseparably connected with fire. His argument against the other logicians is that they are not able to infer the *connection*, for connection implies two things, whereas here only one thing, *viz.* the hill, is visible, but the other, *viz.* fire, is not visible. What then do we really infer from smoke? Dignāga says it is not fire nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the *fiery* hill that is inferred.¹

Dignāga writes :—

རྟགས་ནི་འབྲུག་པ་མེད་པ་འཁྱེར།
 ས་ཅིག་ཆོས་གནས་དཔྱག་བྱས་ཟེར།
 ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་བྱུང་པ་འཁྱེར།
 ས་ཅིག་འབྲེལ་བ་འདྲིང་པ་ཡིན།
 ཆོས་ལ་རྟགས་ནི་བྱུང་ཅེ་ན།
 གནས་དེས་ཅེ་ནིག་དཔག་བར་བྱེད།
 ཅེ་ནེ་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་དེ་ཉིད།
 ཅེ་ཁྱེར་ཇིས་སུ་དཔྱག་མེ་བྱེད།
 འབྲེལ་པ་ལ་ཡང་ག་ཉིས་པོ་མེད།
 དེ་ལྟར་ལ་ནི་རྟགས་པ་ཐོས།
 བཟོད་མེན་དོན་གྱིས་གཟུང་པར་འགྱུར།
 འདི་ལ་རྟགས་དང་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན།
 རྟགས་ཀྱི་མི་འབྲུག་པ་ཡང་ན།
 ཆོས་དང་གནས་ཏུ་བརྟན་པར་བྱ།
 དེ་ལ་བྱུང་ན་ཆོས་ཅན་ནི།
 དེ་དང་ལྟར་པར་རྟགས་པར་འགྱུར ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are as follows :—

केचिद् धर्मान्तरं मेयं लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारतः ।
 संबन्धं केचिद्वैच्छन्नि सिद्धत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिणो ॥
 लिङ्गं धर्मं प्रसिद्धं चेत् किमन्यत् तेन मौयते ।
 अथ धर्मिणि तस्यैव किमर्थं नानुमेयता ॥

Chapter III—Inference for the sake of others.

An inference for the sake of others¹ (called in Sanskrit *parār-
thānumāna* and in Tibetan *gshan-gyi-don-*

Definition. *thunamana* and in Tibetan *gsnañ-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-dpag*) takes place when a person demonstrates to others the conclusion drawn by him through an inference for one's self.

The predicate² or major term (called in Sanskrit *anumeya* or *sādhya* and in Tibetan *dpag-bya* or *bsgrub*

Predicate. bya) is the object which is desired by one's self to be predicable of (attributed to) the subject (or minor term) and which is not opposed to perception, inference or verbal testimony; *e.g.* the hill is *fiery*.

संबन्धेऽपि द्वयं नास्ति षष्ठी श्रूयते तद्वति ।
 अवाच्येऽनुगृह्यैतत्त्वात्त्र चासौ लिङ्गसंगतः ॥
 लिङ्गस्यायभिचारस्तु धर्मेणान्यत्र दिश्यते ।
 तत्र प्रसिद्धं तद्वृत्तं धर्मेणं गमयिष्यति ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tikā, I-1-5.

¹ Dignāga observes :—

གཞན་གྱི་དོན་གྱི་ཚུལ་དཔག་ནི།
 རང་གིས་མ་ཐོང་དོན་གསལ་བྱེད་ཡིན།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

The Sanskrit original of this verse runs thus : —

परार्थानुमानन्तु स्वदृष्टार्थप्रकाशनम् ।

(Quoted in Śloka-vārtika-tīkā, p. 252).

Praśastapāda defines parārthānumāna thus:—

पञ्चावयवेन वाक्येन स्वनिश्चितार्थं प्रतिपादनं परार्थानुमानम् ।

(Prasastapāda Bhāṣya, p. 231, edited by M.M. Vinḍhyeśvari Prasad Dvivedin, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

² Dignāga observes:—

རང་གི་རོ་ཕ་ཁོ་ན་བརྟན་
 བདག་པའོད་རང་གི་ཆེས་ཅན་ལ།
 མཛོན་སྤུམ་རྟོན་དང་རྗེས་དཔག་དང་
 ཡིད་ཆེས་གསལ་པས་མ་བསམ་བཤོ།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

The Sanskrit original should run thus :—

स्वरूपेणैव निर्देश्यः
स्वयमिष्टः स्वधर्म्मिणि ।
प्रत्यक्षार्थानुमानेन
चाप्रवाचाऽनिराकृतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

The law of extension.—The law of extension of the middle term (called in Sanskrit *pakṣa-dharma*¹ and in Tibetan phyogs-choṅ), which refers to the local area of a reason or middle term in relation to its minor and major terms, is stated as follows:—

- (1) The reason or middle term must cover the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*).
- (2) The reason or middle term must be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.
- (3) The reason or middle term must be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*) of the predicate or major term.

Nine Reasons.—It is possible to conceive of nine reasons or middle terms² which are present in or absent from the homologues or heterologues wholly or partly. The reasons or middle terms, which are wholly or partly present in the homologues but wholly absent from the heterologues, are valid, their opposites are contradictory and the others are uncertain.³

A table of nine reasons, in reference to their homologues and heterologues, is given below:—

ཕྱགས་ཅོས་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ཡོད་མེད་དང་
 རྣམ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་།
 རྣམ་གསུམ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ལ་ཡང་
 ཡོད་མེད་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཕྱིར་རྟོག་པར་འོ།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra as follows:—

सपक्षे सङ्गसन् द्वेधा
 पक्षधर्मः पुनस्त्रिधा ।
 प्रत्येकमसपक्षे च
 सदसद् द्विविधतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭikā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-35, p. 198, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series).

² In the commentaries on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-35, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra both severely criticize Dignāga's theory of Nine Reasons. Dignāga too reviews the definitions of a proposition (*pratijñā*) as given by Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsaka.

³

རེད་གང་མཐུན་ཕྱགས་ལ་ཡོད་དང་
 རྣམ་གཉིས་རེ་མེད་ལ་མེད་པ་།
 རེ་རྟགས་རེ་ལས་བརྒྱུ་ག་པ་ནི
 འགལ་བ་གཤམ་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཀྱིད་ ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

The Sanskrit originals quoted by Vācaspati run thus:—

तत्र यः सन् सजातीये
 द्वेधा चासन् तदत्यये ।

Nine reasons.

No.	Homologue of the major term (<i>sapakṣa</i>).	Heterologue of the major term (<i>vipakṣa</i>).	Nature of the reason.
1	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is uncertain.
2	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the heterologue.	The reason is valid.
3	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is uncertain.
4	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the homologue.	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is contradictory.
5	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the homologue.	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the heterologue.	The reason is uncertain.
6	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the homologue.	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is contradictory.
7	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is wholly present (<i>sat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is uncertain.
8	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is wholly absent (<i>asat</i>) from the heterologue.	The reason is valid.
9	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the homologue.	The reason is partly present (<i>sadasat</i>) in the heterologue.	The reason is uncertain.

Illustration of the nine reasons.—The nine reasons¹ are illustrated by Dignāga in his Hetucakra (Wheel of Reasons) in which he assumes the following as reasons (or middle terms) and major terms respectively :—

Reasons or middle terms (*hetu*¹)—(1) knowable (*prameya*), (2) a product (*kṛtaka*), (3) non-eternal (*anitya*), (4) produced

स हेतु विपरितोऽस्माद्
विबुद्धोऽन्यत्वं निश्चितः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, quoted in Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-tīkā on 1-1-35, p. 198, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

¹ The Sanskrit originals are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, as follows :—

(*krta*), (5) audible (*śrāvaṇa*), (6) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (7) non-eternal (*anitya*), (8) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), and (9) tangible (*sparsaja*).

Predicates or major terms (*sādhya*¹)—(1) eternal (*nitya*), (2) non-eternal (*anitya*), (3) a product of effort (*yatnaja*), (4) eternal (*nitya*), (5) non-eternal (*anitya*), (6) eternal (*nitya*), (7) a non-product of effort (*ayatnaja*), (8) non-eternal (*anitya*), and (9) eternal (*nitya*).

Application of the Law of Extension.—Applying the Law of Extension to the Table of Nine Reasons or the Wheel of Reasons we find that the second and the eighth reasons are valid, and the remaining seven are invalid inasmuch as these are either contradictory or uncertain. Take the case illustrating the first reason in the Wheel of Law. . It stands thus:—

Sound is eternal,
Because it is knowable,
Like ether and like a pot.

Here “knowability,” the reason, is wholly present in “sound” which is the subject and in “ether” which is a homologue of “eternal” the predicate. But being wholly present also in “a pot” which is a heterologue of the “eternal,” knowability becomes an uncertain reason. Take the case illustrating the eighth reason which stands thus:—

This sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Like a pot, unlike lightning and ether.

Here “a product of effort” abides in “this sound” which is the subject, and in “a pot” which is a homologue of “non-eternal” the predicate, but does not abide in “lightning” which is also a

प्रमेय कृतकानित्यकृत श्रावण यत्नजाः ।

अनित्य यत्नजस्यर्था नित्यत्वादिषु ते नव ॥

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā on 1-1-35, p. 198, Vizianagram Sanskrit series).

The Tibetan version runs thus:—

श्रावणं पुं पुं पुं मे ईश्वरं
पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं ।
मे ईश्वरं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं
पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं पुं ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chap. III).

The Sanskrit originals are quoted by Vācaspati Miśra from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III, thus:—

नित्यानित्यप्रयत्नोत्तममध्यम त्रिक शास्त्रताः ।

अयत्नानित्यनित्याश्च प्रमेयत्वादि साधनाः ॥

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā on 1-1-35).

homologue and in "ether" which is a heterologue of the predicate. Here the reason is partly present in the homologue and wholly absent from the heterologue and as such is valid.

Chapter IV—Reason and Example.

From a certain point of view, the reason or middle term (called in Sanskrit *hetu* and in Tibetan *gtan-tshigs*) is of two kinds,¹ viz. affirmative (*anvayi*) and negative (*vyatireki*). The affirmative reason signifies that the thing signified by it is invariably accompanied by the thing signified by the predicate or major term, e.g. the hill is fiery, because it is smoky (where *smoke* is an affirmative reason). The function of the negative reason is stated thus: wherever there is absence of the thing signified by the major term, there is also absence of the thing signified by the reason or middle term, e.g. the hill is not smoky, because it is not fiery.

A person who desires to produce in others, as in his own self, a definite conclusion, should state (in words) the subject, the predicate and the reason as also their mutual connection, in reference to the Law of Extension.²

In pointing out the connection of the reason with the major term he should state examples³ (called in Sanskrit *dṛṣṭānta* and in Tibetan *dpe*) which are of two kinds, viz. affirmative or homogeneous (*anvayi* or

གཏན་ཚིག་མ་བཟུང་བྱའི་རྗེས་འགྲོ་བ །
བཟུང་བྱ་མེད་ལ་མེད་པ་རྟེས །

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter IV).

རང་ལ་ངེས་བཞིན་གནན་དག་ལ་
ངེས་པ་བརྟེན་དུ་པར་འདྲིང་པ་ཡིས །
ཕྱོགས་ཚུལ་ཉིད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
བཟུང་བྱ་བཞིན་བྱ་གནན་དག་སྤང་ །

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter IV).

A similar idea is expressed in the Nyāyāvatāra of the Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara :—

सन्निवृत्तवदन्येषां निश्चयोत्पादनं बुधैः
परार्थं मानमाख्यातं वाक्यं तदुपचारतः ॥ १० ॥

(Nyāyāvatāra, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta).

3

དེ་ཕྱིར་དཔེ་ནི་གཏིས་ཡིན་ན །
... ..

རྗེས་འགྲོ་བརྟེན་ག་པ་གཏིས་དག་ཏུ །

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter IV).

sādharmya) and negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *vaidharmya*). An illustration of the examples is given below :—

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky.
That which is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen (affirmative example),
But that which is not fiery is not smoky, as a lake (negative example).

The two examples are in fact identical as they both point out the connection of the reason with the predicate or major term.

Chapter V—Apoha—negation of the opposite.

According to the doctrine of *Apoha*¹ (called in Tibetan *gshan-sel-wa*), an entity is defined as being the negation of its opposite, e.g. a cow is that which is not a not-cow. There is, in this connection, a review of the mutual relations of substance (*dravya*, *rdsas*), quality (*guṇa*, *yon-tan*), action (*karma*, *las*), particularity (*viśeṣa*, *bye-brag*, or, *khyad*), generality (*sāmānya*, *spyi*), and inherence (*samavāya*, *hdu-wa*).

According to Dignāga, Comparison² (*upamāna*, *ñer-hjal*) is useless as it is not a separate source of knowledge. He says that when we recognise a thing through perception of a similar thing, we really perform an act of Perception. Hence Comparison or Recognition of Similarity is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception.

Credible Word³ or Verbal Testimony (*śabda*, *yiḍ-ches-tshig*, *sgra-las-byuñ-wa*, or, *ñag-don*) is also rejected as not being a separate source of

1 བྱས་མོགས་བཞེན་དུ་རང་དོན་ལ །

གནན་མེད་བས་ནི་ཇོད་པར་བྱེད །

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter V).

2 རྟེན་འཇམ་བཞེན་དུ་དོན་མེད་ཡིན །

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter IV).

Vide a very interesting discussion on it in the *Nyāyavārtika*, 1-1-6, where the Brāhmaṇa Logician Uddyotakara defends the *Nyāya-sūtra* and the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* from the attacks of Dignāga.

3 ལྟུང་སྤྱད་བ་ཇོས་དཔག་ལས །

ཚད་སྤྱད་གནན་མིན་ད་ལྟར་དེ །

(*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, chapter V).

Compare—

तच्चानुमानमेवेदं बोद्धेर्वैशेषिकैः श्रितम् ॥

(*Śloka-vārtika*, *śabda pariccheda*, verse 15).

knowledge. Dignāga asks: "What is the significance of a Credible Word? Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is credible, or that the fact he averred is credible?" "If the person," continues he, "is credible, it is a mere inference. On the other hand if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception." Hence Dignāga concludes that Credible Word or Verbal Testimony is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference.¹

The mark (middle term)² is present where the thing to be inferred (major term) or its homologue is present, but absent where the thing or its homologue is non-existent, e.g. smoke is present only where there is fire or any thing homogeneous with it, but absent where there is no fire nor any thing homogeneous with the same.

Chapter VI—Analogues or Far-fetched analogy.

In this chapter there is an explanation of the Analogue³ or Far-fetched Analogy (called in Sanskrit *jāti* and in Tibetan *ltag-gcod*) which is of various kinds³; such as (1) *prāptisamā* (phrad-mtshuṅs), (2) *aprāptisamā* (ma-phrad-mtshuṅs), (3) *varṇyasamā*

शब्दानुमानयोरैकं धूमादग्नानुमानवत् । २३ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेक प्रत्यक्ष दर्शनात् ।

सम्बन्धपूर्वकत्वाच्च प्रतिपत्तिरितो यतः ॥ २४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षान्यप्रमाणत्वाच्चदृष्टार्थ बोधनात् ।

सामान्यविषयत्वाच्च त्रैकाग्र्यविषयश्रयात् ॥ २५ ॥

(Ślokavārtika, śabda pariccheda).

1 ཡིད་ཆེས་རྒྱལ་ནི་མི་བསྟན་པ་ །

སྟོན་པ་ཆེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཉིད་ ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Sanskrit original is quoted by Vācaspati Miśra thus:—

आप्तवाक्याविशंबाद् सामान्यादनुमानता ॥

(Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-tīkā on Nyāya-sūtra, 1-1-7).

Vide Uddyotakara's rejoinder in the Nyāyavārtika, 1-1-7.

2 ཆེས་དཔག་བྱ་དང་དེ་མཚུངས་པ་ །

ཡིད་དང་མེད་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་ ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Sanskrit originals of these lines, which have been quoted and criticised by Uddyotakara, run as follows:—

अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये । सङ्गावो नास्मिताऽसति ॥

(Nyāyavārtika, 1-1-5, p. 58, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta).

³ For an explanation of these terms vide the Nyāya-sūtra.

(*brjod-mtshuṅs*), (4) *avarṇya-samā* (*ma-brjod-mtshuṅs*), (5) *anutpatti-samā* (*ma-skyes-mtshuṅs*), (6) *kārya samā* (*hbras-mtshuṅs*), (7) *sādharmya-samā* (*chos-mthun-mtshuṅs*), (8) *vaidharmya-samā* (*chos-mi-mthun-mtshuṅs*), (9) *vikalpa-samā* (*rnam-rtog-mtshuṅs*), (10) *upalabdhisamā* (*dmigs-pa-mtshuṅs*), (11) *saṁśaya-samā* (*the-tshom-mtshuṅs*), (12) *arthāpatti samā* (*don-rtogs-mtshuṅs*), (13) *sādhya-samā* (*b-grub-bya-mtshuṅs*) and (14) *prasaṅga-samā* (*thal-wa-mtshuṅs*). So no other kinds of *analogue* are said to be enumerated in the Tīrthika works.

95. DIGNĀGA'S Nyāya-praveśa.

The Nyāya-praveśa¹, or rather "Nyāya-praveśo-nāma pramāṇa-prakarana," is another excellent work on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost. There exists a Tibetan translation of it which extends over folios 13—188 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. The translation was prepared by the great Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Sarvajña-śrī Rakṣita and the Śākya monk Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzañ, in the great Śā-skya monastery of Western Tibet. The work in Tibetan is called *Tshad-ma-rigs-par-hjug-pahi-ngo* signifying the "Door of Entrance to Logic." It opens thus:—

"Demonstration and refutation together with their fallacies are useful in arguing with others; and Perception and Inference together with their fallacies are useful for self-understanding: seeing these I compile this Śāstra."²

A Syllogism—Nyāyāvayava.

Parts of a Syllogism.³

Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noticed below:—

¹ I consulted the Nyāya-praveśa in the volume *Ce* of the Tibetan *Bstan-hgyur* which was placed at my disposal by the India Office, London. I have also brought a copy of the Nyāya-praveśa from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in May 1907. This is probably the same as "Nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra": *Vide* Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 186, and Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Nos. 1223 and 1224. Cf. Dr. Sugiura's "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," pp. 36, 60, where Śaṅkara Svāmin's Nyāya-prāveśa-tarka-śāstra is noticed.

²

ཐུབ་པ་དང་ནི་སྤྱན་པའི་ཉིད།
ལྟར་རྒྱང་བཅས་པ་གནས་ཉིད་སྤྱིར།
མཛོན་སྤྱོད་དང་ནི་རྟོག་སྤྱོད་པ།
ལྟར་རྒྱང་བཅས་པ་བདག་རིག་ལྱིར།
ཅེས་པ་བརྟན་བཅོས་བསྐྱུ་པའོ།

(Nyāya-praveśa).

³ In Tibetan: *Rigs-pahi-yan-lag* (རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག) and in Sanskrit: *Nyāyāvayava* (न्यायवयव)।

Reasoning, according to the Nyāya-praveśa, is carried on by means of a minor term, a major term, a middle term and two examples. The minor term is also called the subject (in Sanskrit: *pakṣa* or *dharmin*, and in Tibetan phyogs or choṣ-can). The major term is otherwise called the predicate (in Sanskrit: *sādhya* or *dharma*, in Tibetan: *bsgrub-par-bya* or choṣ). The middle term is also called the reason or mark (in Sanskrit: *hetu*, *liṅga* or *sādhana*, in Tibetan: *gtan-tshigs* or *bsgrub-par-byed*). The example (called in Sanskrit: *dr̥ṣṭānta*, in Tibetan: *dpe-brjod*) is of two kinds, viz. (1) homogeneous (in Sanskrit: *sādharmya*, in Tibetan: choṣ-mthun-pa) and (2) heterogeneous (in Sanskrit: *vaidharmya*, in Tibetan: choṣ-mi-mthun-pa).

The form of reasoning is as follows:—

Form of a Syllogism.

- (1) This hill is fiery,
- (2) Because it has smoke,
- (3) All that has smoke is fiery like a kitchen, and whatever is not fiery has no smoke, like a lake.

Here 'hill' is the minor term, 'fiery' the major term, 'smoke' the middle term, 'kitchen' a homogeneous example, and 'lake' a heterogeneous example.

The Minor Term.

Thesis. A minor term and a major term linked together constitute a proposition, e.g.

The *hill* (minor term) is *fiery* (major term).

A proposition which is offered for proof is a Thesis.

There are certain types of thesis which cannot stand the test of proof and are therefore fallacious.

The Fallacies of Thesis.¹

The following theses are fallacious:—

(1) A thesis incompatible with perception, such as: "sound is inaudible."

(2) A thesis incompatible with inference, such as: "A pot is eternal."

(Really "A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product.")

(3) A thesis incompatible with the public opinion, such as: "Man's head is pure, because it is the limb of an animate being." (Or, "money is an abominable thing." I or some men like me may say "money is an abominable thing," but the world does not say so).

¹ In Tibetan: phyogs-ktag-gnan (ཕྱོགས་ཀླུང་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་); and in Sanskrit: pakṣā-bhāsa (पक्षभास)।

(4) A thesis incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine, such as: A Vaiśeṣika philosopher saying "sound is eternal."

(5) A thesis incompatible with one's own statement, such as: "My mother is barren."

(6) A thesis with an unfamiliar minor term, such as: The Buddhist speaking to the Sāṃkhya, "Sound is perishable." (Sound is a subject well known to the Mīmāṃsaka, but not to the Sāṃkhya).

(7) A thesis with an unfamiliar major term, such as: The Sāṃkhya speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul is animate."

(8) A thesis with both the terms unfamiliar, such as: The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Buddhist, "The soul has feelings as pleasurable, etc."

(The Buddhist deals neither with the soul nor with its feelings).

(9) A thesis universally accepted, such as: "Fire is warm." (This thesis cannot be offered for proof, as it is accepted by all).

The Middle Term and the Major Term.

Three Characteristics of The Middle Term (*hetu*) must possess the Middle Term.¹ three characteristics, viz.:—

(1) The whole of the minor term (*pakṣa*) must be connected with the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot, but unlike ether.

In this reasoning, "product" which is the middle term includes the whole of "sound" which is the minor term.

(2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, *e.g.*

All things produced are non-eternal, as a pot.

(3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, *e.g.*

No non-non-eternal (that is, no eternal) thing is a product, as ether.

If we suppose the minor term or subject to be 'S,' the middle term or reason to be 'R,' and the major term or predicate to be 'P,' then the above-mentioned three characteristics of the middle term may be symbolically set forth as follows:—

- (1) All S is R.
- (2) All R is P.
- (3) No R is non-P.

¹ Called in Tibetan: *ṡtan-tshigs-ni-tshul-gsum* (གྲླེན་པ་གསུམ་) and in Sanskrit: *Liṅgasya trairūpyam* (लिङ्गस्य त्रैरूप्यम्)।

Now, the negative aspect of the middle term, *viz.* no R is non-P, only confirms the truth conveyed by one of the positive aspects, *viz.* all R is P. Hence we may put aside the negative aspect, and exhibit the positive aspects as follows :—

- (1) All S is R.
- (2) All R is P.

Again, in the above instance 'R' and 'P' may be taken in their whole extent or partially. So the two positive aspects mentioned above may be fully exhibited as follows :—

- (1) (a) All S is all R.
(b) All S is some R.
- (2) (a) All R is all P.
(b) All R is some P.

Combining aspect (1) and aspect (2) together, we find that a syllogism may be of any one of the following forms :—

- (1) All S is all P (conclusion) :
Because All S is all R,
All R is all P.
- (2) All S is some P (conclusion) :
Because All S is all R,
All R is some P.
- (3) All S is some P (conclusion) :
Because All S is some R,
All R is all P.
- (4) All S is some P (conclusion) :
Because All S is some R,
All R is some P.

Hence we find that Dignāga admits only two conclusions, *viz.*

- All S is all P, and
- All S is some P.

The second and third of the characteristics mentioned above indicate the relative extension of the middle term and major term. They show that the middle term is universally, invariably, or inseparably connected with the major term. This universal, invariable, or inseparable connection between them is called in Sanskrit *Vyāpti* and in Tibetan *Khyab* which was, as far as I find, first discovered by Dignāga.

Supposing that the middle term or reason is R, and the major term or predicate is P, the connection between the two terms may be symbolically set forth as follows :—

- (1) All R is all P, and
- (2) All R is some P.

Fourteen Fallacies.

Owing to the violation of one or more of the three characteristics, there occur Fallacies of the Middle Term.¹ which may be of fourteen kinds as follows:—

A. The *unproved* (Sanskrit: *Asiddha*, Tibetan: Ma-grub) which occurs:

(1) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by both the parties, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is *visible*.

(Neither of the parties admits that sound is visible).

(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognized by one party only, *e.g.*

Sound is evolved,
Because it is a *product*.

(The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit that sound is a product).

(3) When the truth of the middle term is questioned, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because there is *vapour*.

(Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire, and may or may not be connected with it otherwise).

(4) When it is questioned whether the middle term is predicable of the minor term, *e.g.*

Ether is a substance,
Because it has qualities.

(It is questioned whether ether has qualities).

B. The *uncertain* (Sanskrit: *Aniścita*, Tibetan: Ma-ñes-pa) which occurs:

(5) When the middle term is too general, abiding equally in the major term as well as in the opposite of it, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is *knowable*.

(The 'knowable' is too general, because it abides in the eternal as well as the non-eternal. This is a fallacy of being too general, called in Sanskrit: *Sādhāraṇa*, and in Tibetan: Thun-moñ).

(6) When the middle term is not general enough, abiding neither in the major term nor in its opposite, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is *audible*.

¹ In Tibetan: *Gtan-tshig-Itar-gnañ* (གྲན་མཐོག་མཐོག་མཐོག་) and in Sanskrit: *Hetvābhāsa* (हेतुभास) ।

(This is a fallacy of being not general enough, called in Sanskrit: *Asādhāraṇa*, and in Tibetan: Thun-mon-ma-yin).

(7) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in all things heterogeneous from, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is not a product of effort,
Because it is *non-eternal*.

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort, such as lightning, and abides in all things which are not non-products of effort).

(8) When the middle term abides in some of the things heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is a product of effort,
Because it is non-eternal.

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort, as lightning, and abides in all things which are products of effort).

(9) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in some heterogeneous from, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal.

(Some incorporeal things are eternal as ether, but others are not as intelligence).

(10) When there is a non-erroneous contradiction, that is, when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons, *e.g.*

The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Mīmāṃsaka :

"Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product."

The Mīmāṃsaka speaking to the Vaiśeṣika :

"Sound is eternal,
Because it is always audible."

(Both of the reasonings are correct, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are classed as *uncertain*).

C. The *contradictory* (Sanskrit: *Viruddha*, Tibetan: Hgal-wa) which occurs :

(11) When the middle term is contradictory to the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Product is inconsistent with eternal).

(12) When the middle term is contradictory to the implied major term, *e.g.*

The eyes, etc., are serviceable to some being,
Because they are made of particles,
Like a bed, seat, etc.¹

(Here the major term "serviceable to some being" is ambiguous, for, the apparent meaning of 'some being' is 'the body,' but the implied meaning of it is 'the soul.' Though things 'made of particles' are serviceable to the body, they are not, according to the Sāṃkhya, serviceable to the soul which is attributeless. Hence there is contradiction between the middle term and the implied major term).

(13) When the middle term is inconsistent with the minor term, *e.g.*

Sāmānya (generality) is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action ;

Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action.

Like generality-particularity—(*Sāmānya* or generality does not depend upon one substance, etc).

(14) When the middle term is inconsistent with the implied minor term, *e.g.*

Objects are stimuli of action ;
Because they are apprehended by the senses.

("Objects" is ambiguous, meaning (1) things and (2) purposes. The middle term is inconsistent with the minor term in the second meaning).

The Example.

Dignāga's theory of examples. Examples converted to universal propositions.

An example before the time of Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen (example).

Dignāga converted an example into a universal proposition, that is, a proposition² expressive of the universal, invariable or

¹ This example may lead us to presume that the author of Nyāya-praveśa knew Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārikā which is the oldest of the works on Sāṃkhya philosophy that have come down to us.

² The universal proposition, that is, the proposition expressive of the universal relation between the middle term and the major term, serves as the major premise in a syllogism of the celebrated Greek logician Aristotle. It was long unknown in India. Dignāga's discovery of the universal proposition marks a new era in the

inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, which stand to each other in the causal relation or in the relation of inherence, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because it has smoke,
All that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen (homogeneous example).

The above example is homogeneous. A heterogeneous example is thus given:—

Whatever is not fiery has no smoke as a lake.

Examples have already been stated to be of two kinds, *viz.*

(1) Homogeneous and (2) Heterogeneous.

Fallacies of the homogeneous example.¹

Each of these kinds becomes fallacious under certain circumstances. Fallacies of

the homogeneous example are the following:—

(1) An example not homogeneous with the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal.

Because it is incorporeal,

That which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms.

(The atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle Term).

(2) An example not homogeneous with the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal,

That which is incorporeal is eternal as intelligence.

(Intelligence cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Major Term).

(3) An example homogeneous with neither the middle term nor the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,

Because it is incorporeal,

That which is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot.

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither incorporeal nor eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle and Major Terms).

(4) A homogeneous example showing a lack of universal connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,

Because he is a speaker,

history of Indian Logic, and shows a great development of the principle of induction.

¹ Called in Tibetan: Chog-mthun-dpe-ltar-snañ-wa (མོས་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་བྱ) and in Sanskrit: Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभास) ।

Whoever is a speaker is passionate, as a certain man in Magadha.

(Though a certain man in Magadha may be both a speaker and passionate, there is nevertheless no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. This is a fallacy of Absence of Connection, called in Sanskrit: *Ananvaya*, in Tibetan: *Rjes-su-hgro-wa-med*).

(5) A homogeneous example showing an inverse connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Whatever is non-eternal is a product of effort, as a pot.

(The pot cannot serve as an example, because though it is both non-eternal and a product of effort, the connection between the major term and the middle term has been inverted, *i.e.* all products of effort are non-eternal: but all non-eternals are not products of effort. This is a fallacy of Inverse Connection called in Sanskrit: *Viparītānvaya*, in Tibetan: *Rjes-su-hgro-wa-phyin-ci-log-pa*).

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example.¹

Fallacies of the heterogeneous example are the following:—

(6) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as intelligence.

(Intelligence is non-eternal, yet incorporeal. This is a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example).

(7) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as atoms.

(The atoms are not incorporeal, yet they are eternal. This is a fallacy of included Major Term in a heterogeneous example).

(8) An example heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

¹ Called in Tibetan: *Chog-mi-nythun-dpe-ltar-gnan-wa* (ཆོག་མི་ལུ་ཐུན་དཔེ་ལྟར་གྲུ་བ་) and in Sanskrit: *Vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* (वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभास) ।

(A pot is neither eternal nor incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of Included Middle and Major Terms in a heterogeneous example).

(9) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker, as a piece of stone.

(This is called a fallacy of Absence of Disconnection of a heterogeneous example).

(10) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal, as ether.

The example should be inverted as :

Whatever is non-non-eternal, *i.e.* eternal, is not a product, as ether. This is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example.

All the three kinds of fallacies—of the Thesis, Middle Term and Example—are fallacies of reasoning. Refutation (called in Sanskrit : *Dūṣaṇa*, and in Tibetan : *Sun-hbyin*) consists in finding out in the reasoning of the opponent any one of the fallacies aforementioned. Fallacy of Refutation (called in Sanskrit : *Dūṣaṇābhāsa*, and in Tibetan : *Sun-hbyin-ltar-snañ-wa*) consists in alleging a fallacy where there is no fallacy at all.

Perception and Inference.

Perception and Inference are the two kinds of valid knowledge for one's own self. Perception (called in Sanskrit : *Pratyakṣa*, and in Tibetan : *Mñon-sum*) is knowledge derived through the senses. It is free from illusory experiences and is not connected with name, genus, etc. Inference (called in Sanskrit : *Anumāna*, and in Tibetan : *Rjes-su-dpag*) is the knowledge of objects derived through a mark (Tibetan : *Rtags*) or middle term which has three characteristics. There are Fallacies of Perception as well as of Inference (called respectively *Pratyakṣābhāsa* and *Anumānābhāsa* in Sanskrit, and *Mñon-sum-ltar-nañ* and *Rjes-dpag-ltar-snañ* in Tibetan).

96. DIGNĀGA's Hetu-cakra-hamaru.

(*Logic of Nine Reasons*).

The Hetu-cakra-hamaru¹ is another small treatise on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost, but a Tibetan translation is preserved in the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, folios 193-194. The Tibetan translation was prepared by the sage Bodhisattva of Za-hor and the Bhikṣu Dharmāśoka. The work in Tibetan is called *Gtan-tshigs-kyi-hkhor-lo-gtan-la-dwab-pa* signifying "the Wheel of Reasons put in order."² It begins thus:—

"Bowing down to the Omniscient One (Buddha), who has destroyed the net of errors, I explain the system of three characteristics of the Reason (or Middle Term)."³

In this work Dignāga has analysed all nine possible relations between the middle and the major terms and has found that there are among them two relations which conform to the three characteristics of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations are at variance with those characteristics. Accordingly he has concluded that only two relations are valid as will be evident from the annexed diagram.

97. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti.

The Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which extends over folios 13—96 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. The Tibetan translation was prepared, at the command of king Rigs-ldan-rgyal-po, by the famous Indian sage Vasudhara Rakṣita, who was as it were the crest-gem of logicians, and the Tibetan interpreter Sha-ma-dge-bśñen-sin rgyal. In Tibetan it is called *Tshad-ma-kun-las-btus-pahi-hgrel-wa*. It is divided into six chapters corresponding to those of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya itself. At

¹ I brought a copy of the Tibetan version of the Hetu-cakra-hamaru from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in June 1907. This work is probably the same as the Hetu-dvāra-śāstra: vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 187.

² The *Hetu-cakra* is also called in Sanskrit *Pakṣadharmā-cakra* and in Tibetan *Phyogs-chos-dguhi-hkhor-lo*.

the end of the work it is stated that "led on by the command of Mañjunātha (the god of learning), Dignāga the great dialectician of sharp intellect, wrote this śāstra which is as deep as the ocean."

There is another translation of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti* in Tibetan extending over folios 96—183 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. It was prepared by the Indian sage Hema or Kanaka Varma (called in Tibetan *Gser-gyi-go-cha*) and the Tibetan interpreter *Dad-pa-śeṣ-rab* in the monastery of *Śi-wahi-dge-gnas*.

98. *Pramāṇa-śāstra Nyāya-praveśa*.

*Pramāṇa-śāstra Nyāya-praveśa*¹ is another work by Dignāga. It was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter *Tha-sam-tsan*. The Chinese version² was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar *Dge-śeṣ-sin-gyan* and the Tibetan monk *ston-gshon* in the *sa-skya* monastery of Western Tibet. The very venerable Chinese monk *Dharmaratna* (called in Tibetan *Chos-kyi-rin-chen*), who edited the Tibetan version, compared it thoroughly with the Chinese version. The Sanskrit original of the work appears to be lost but the Tibetan version still exists. It consists of folios 188—193 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. In Tibetan the work is called *Tshad-mahi-bstan-bcos-rig-pa-la-hjug-pa* signifying "An Entrance to the Science of Logic." The Chinese title of the work is *Gyen-min-gshihi-ciñ-lihi-lun*.

99. *Ālambāna-parīkṣā*.

The *Ālambāna-parīkṣā*³ is another work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which consists of one folio only (folio 180)

¹ At the kind suggestion of Prof. H. Ui (*vide* his *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 68), I have re-examined the *Pramāṇa-Nyāya-praveśa* (fully entitled as *Nyāya-praveśo-nāma-pramāṇa-prakarana*) and *Pramāṇa-śāstra-Nyāya-praveśa* (fully called *Pramāṇa-śāstra-Nyāya-praveśo-nāma*), and find that they are identical in their contents. One was translated into Tibetan direct from Sanskrit and the other through the Chinese language. The original Sanskrit work, of which these two are translations was perhaps called simply *Nyāya-praveśa*. The *Bstan-hgyur* ascribes this work to Dignāga who dealt in it with fourteen fallacies besides other subjects. The *Hetu-cakra*, which treats of nine reasons, is a part of it. The *Nyāya-praveśa* and the *Hetu-cakra* combined together constitute Dignāga's "Logic of nine reasons and fourteen fallacies."

² The *Nyāya-praveśa* corresponds to Nos. 1223 and 1224 of Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka. No. 1223 represents I-tsing's translation of the *Nyāya-praveśa* brought out in 711 A.D., while No. 1224 is Hwen-thsang's translation finished in 648 A.D.

³ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This is probably the same as "*Ālambāna-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra*": *vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1173, and Takakusu's I-tsing, p. 188.

of the Bṣtan-hgyur, section Mdo, volume Ce. The work in Tibetan is called Dmigs-pa-brtag-pa signifying "An Examination of the Objects of Thought." It begins with an invocation to Buddha and all Bodhisattvas.

100. Ālambaṇa-parīkṣā-vṛtti.

The Ālambaṇa-parīkṣā-vṛtti¹ is a commentary on the Ālambaṇa-parīkṣā by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version which is embodied in the Bṣtan-hgyur, section Mdo, volume Ce, folios 180—182. The work in Tibetan is called Dmigs-pa-brtag-pahis-hgrel.

101. Trikāla-parīkṣā.

The Trikāla-parīkṣā² is a work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version in the Bṣtan-hgyur, section Mdo, volume Ce, folios 182—183. This version was prepared by the great Paṇḍita Śāntakara Gupta and the interpreter-monk Tshul-hkhrim-rgyal-mtshan. The work in Tibetan is called Dus-bsum-brtag-pa signifying "An Examination of Three Times."

102. PARAMĀRTHA (498 A.D.—569 A.D.).

Paramārtha,³ born in 498 A.D., was a Buddhist ascetic (*Śramaṇa*) at Ujjainī in Western India. He was placed by Jivita Gupta I or Kumāra Gupta, as an interpreter at the disposal of a Chinese mission sent to Magadha by the Liang Emperor Wu-ti in 539 A.D. Paramārtha taking a large number of Sanskrit manuscripts went to China with the mission which spent several years in India. He reached Canton in 546 A.D. and was presented to the Emperor in 548 A.D. He arrived in 546 A.D. at Nankin where he translated numerous works into Chinese. His death took place in China in 569 A.D.

In 550 A.D. he translated Vasubandhu's *Tarka-śāstra* into Chinese. He is said to have translated the *Nyāya-sūtra* too. It

¹ I have consulted the xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This work is probably the same that is called by Takakusu "The Śāstra on the Meditation of the Three Worlds": *vide* Takakusu's I-sing, p. 187. The "worlds" evidently stand for "times."

³ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, Nos. 104, 105. Cf. V. A. Smith's *Early History of India*, p. 313, third edition, *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka No. 1252.

is further reported that he wrote a work called *Nyāya-bhāṣya*¹ or an explanation of the *Nyāya-sūtra* in five volumes.

103. ŚAṆKARA SVĀMIN (ABOUT 550 A.D.).

Śaṅkara Svāmin,² as it appears from Chinese records, was a pupil of Dignāga. He seems to have been a native of Southern India. Logic is said to have been handed down by Dignāga through Śaṅkara Svāmin and ten other masters to Śīlabhadra, who was the head of the Nālandā University, and the favourite teacher of the Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-thsang, in 635 A.D. According to the Chinese Tripitaka Śaṅkara Svāmin was the author of a work called *Hetuvidyā Nyāya-praveśa-śāstra*, or *Nyāya-praveśa Tarka-śāstra*,³ which was translated into Chinese by Hwen-thsang in 647 A.D. This work seems to be different⁴ from the “*Nyāya-praveśa*” or more fully the “*Nyāya-praveśa-nāma-pramāṇa-prakaraṇa*” which, as we have seen, is ascribed by the Tibetans to Dignāga.

104. DHARMAPĀLA.

(ABOUT 600—635 A.D.).

Dharmapāla,⁵ a logician, was a native of Kāñcīpura in Drāviḍa (modern Conjeeveram in Madras). He was the eldest son of a great minister of the country. From his childhood he exhibited much cleverness, and as he was a young man the king and queen of the country condescended to entertain him at a feast. In the evening of that day his heart was oppressed with sorrow and, assuming the robes of a Buddhist recluse, he left home and applied himself with unflagging earnestness to learning. He was admitted into the University at Nālandā in which he acquired great distinction. Subsequently he became the head

¹ Professor H. Ui observes:—

He (Paramārtha) also translated.....the *Cañ-shwo* (or *lun*-) *tao-li-lun* (one vol.); and he wrote a commentary (5 vols.) on the last, called the *Explanation of the Cañ-lun*. All have been lost.....*Cañ-shwo* (or *lun*) *táo-li-lun*.....may have been the translation of *Nyāya*.....that the commentary consisted of five volumes suggests the five *adhyāyas* of *Nyāya-sūtra*. (*Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 84).

² *Vide* Dr. Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, pp. 36, 37.

³ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, No. 1216, and Appendix I, No. 13.

⁴ The Tibetans do not know Śaṅkara Svāmin at all. The Chinese pilgrim I-tsing, who visited India during 671—695, speaks of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but does not mention Śaṅkara Svāmin. Even Hwen-thsang in his *Travel* does not mention him. Śaṅkara Svāmin's *Nyāya-praveśa Tarka-śāstra* seems to correspond to No. 1216 of Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue*. Is the original Sanskrit text of 1216 different from that of 1224?

⁵ *Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. 1, p. 237; vol. 11, pp. 110—223, 229 and 230. *Vide* also Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. lvii, and Bunyiu Nanjio's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, No. 16.

of the University. He must have retired from Nālandā before 635 A.D., when Hwen-thsang visited it, and found that Śīlabhadra had succeeded him in the headship of the University. Dharmapāla conjointly with Bhartṛhari composed a *Beḍā-vṛtti* on Pāṇini's grammar.

He was a follower of the Yogācāra philosophy, and was the author of several works such as (1) *Ālambaṇa-pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra-vyākhyā*; (2) *Vidyāmātra-siddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā*; and (3) *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā* which was translated into Chinese in 650 A.D. Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A.D., found in Kauśāmbī the ruins of a monastery where Dharmapāla had refuted the arguments of the heretics.

105. ĀCĀRYA ŚĪLABHADRA
(635 A.D.).

Śīlabhadra¹ belonged to the family of the king of Samatāṭa (Bengal), and was of the Brāhmaṇa caste. He was a pupil of Dharmapāla at the Nālandā University of which subsequently he became the head. The Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-thsang, was his pupil² in 635 A.D. Śīlabhadra was a great logician and master of śāstras.

106. ĀCĀRYA DHARMAKĪRTI
(ABOUT 635—650 A.D.).

The excellent Dharmakīrti,³ called in Tibetan Chos-grags, according to the accounts of all earlier
Darmakīrti's life. sages, was born in the south in the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi.⁴ Since, however, there is now no country of that name, and since on the other hand all the orthodox and heterodox alike name Trimalaya as the birth-place of Dharmakīrti, it is to be accepted that in olden times Trimalaya was called the kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi. His father was a Tīrtha of the Brāhmaṇa caste, Parivrājaka Korunanda by name. Endowed from childhood up with a very keen intellect he attained to great skill in the fine arts, in the Vedas and Vedāṅgas, in the art of healing, in grammar, and in all the theories of the Tīrthas. When only sixteen or eighteen years old, he was already deeply versed in

¹ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. 11, p. 110; and Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 181.

² Vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. xlv.

³ Vide Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 175—185.

⁴ Cūḍāmaṇi is probably the same as Coḍa or Chola country in the Eastern Deccan. As a fact Dharmakīrti was born in the Deccan. Vide *Pramāṇa-vārtikā-kārikā*.

the philosophy of the Tīrthas. Occasionally he attended lectures of the Buddhists, and realised that the teachings of Buddha were without faults. There grew up in him a strong inclination towards Buddhism. He donned the dress of a Buddhist Upāsaka (devotee). When the Brāhmaṇas inquired the reason of this he praised the excellence of Buddhism for which he was out-casted. Thereupon he came to Madhyadeśa¹ (Magadha), was received into the Saṅgha (priesthood) by Ācārya Dharmapāla, attained to great learning in the three Piṭakas, and knew in all 500 sūtras and dhāraṇīs by heart.

Dharmakīrti, desiring to become acquainted with the secret doctrine of the Tīrtha system, donned a slave-attire and went southward. On inquiring who was versed in the Tīrtha system, he was informed that the Brāhmaṇa Kumārila was an incomparable master of the same. The assertion that Kumārila was an uncle of Dharmakīrti is unsupported by Indian authority. Kumārila had received a large fortune from his king, owned many rice-fields, five hundred male slaves and five hundred female slaves and many hundred men. When Dharmakīrti, after entering their service, performed the work of fifty slaves indoors and outdoors, Kumārila and his wife were satisfied. They allowed him to hear the secret doctrines. Obtaining knowledge of the secret teaching from Kumārila, he left his house. With the wages which he received from Kumārila for his special services he gave a great feast to the Brāhmaṇas in the night of his departure.

Thereupon he challenged the followers of the system of Kaṇāda named Kaṇāda Gupta and other followers of the Tīrtha system and entered upon debates with them. The debates lasted for three months, during which he withstood all his opponents and converted many of them to Buddhism. Upon this Kumārila was enraged and appeared with 500 Brāhmaṇas for debate. He proposed the condition that whoever was defeated should be killed. Dharmakīrti, who did not desire the death of Kumārila, induced the latter to enter upon the condition that whoever was defeated should accept the doctrine of the winner. Putting

¹ In Tibetan literature Madhya-deśa signifies Magadha (Behar). But Manu defines Madhya-deśa as the country lying between the Himālayas on the north, the Vindhya mountains on the south, Prayāga in the east, and the river Sarasvatī on the west :

चिसवद्विन्ध्ययोर्मध्यं यत् प्राग् विनशनादपि ।

प्रत्यगेव प्रयागाच्च मध्यदेशः प्रकीर्तितः ॥

(Manusmṛhitā 2 : 21).

In this connection *vide* a very learned article named "Note on the Middle-Country of Ancient India" by Rhys Davids in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, January 1904.

Dharma (doctrine) up as the prize they began the debate, and finally Dharmakīrti was victorious. Kumārila and his 500 followers became followers of Buddha.¹

Dharmakīrti further withstood the Nirgranthas (Jainas), Rāhuvratin and others, who lived within the range of the Vindhya mountains.² Returning to Dravali (Drāviḍa) he challenged by criers those who were ready for debate. The majority of the Tirthas fled; and some actually confessed that they were not equal to the fight. He re-established all the religious schools that had fallen into decay in that country, and lived in the loneliness of the forest given up to meditation.

Dharmakīrti towards the end of his life erected a vihāra in the land of Kaliṅga, and after having converted many people to the Law (*Dharma*) passed away. Those of his pupils, who by their lives had become like Brahma, carried him to the cemetery for cremation. Then there fell a heavy rain of flowers, and for seven days the whole country was filled with fragrance and music.

This Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) and the Tibetan king Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po are said to have been contemporaries, which statement might be accepted as authoritative.

From this account it is evident that Dharmakīrti was a pupil of Dharmapāla. As the latter lived in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti must also have lived about that time. This date agrees well with the statement that Dharmakīrti was a contemporary of the Tibetan king Sroṅ-

¹ This tradition, which is recorded in the Chog-byun of Tārānātha, is repeated in the *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, as follows:—

དེའི་ཚེ་གཞོན་ནུ་རྩེ་ལས་ཐོས་ནས་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལྗོངས་ལས་ཐོས་པའི་ཚེ་ཁོ་ལོ་ལྟ་བུར་
མེད་པའི་དམ་བཅས་ལྗོངས་ལྟ་བུར་སྤྱད་ཆེ་ནང་པར་གཞུགས།

(*Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, p. 106).

The extract may be translated thus:—Upon this Kumārila was enraged and appeared with 500 attendants for debate. Being defeated he and his attendants became, in pursuance of his extraordinary pledge, followers of Buddha.

² While sojourning in the Vindhya mountains Dharmakīrti was invited by a neighbouring king who, as a token of honour, had the following inscription recorded on his gate:—

གཤམ་ཏི་ཚེས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ་ཡི།
སྤྱོད་པའི་ཏི་མ་རྩལ་པ་ན།
ཚེས་ནམས་གཉིད་ལྟོག་ཡང་ན་ཤི།
ཚེས་མ་ཡིན་ནམས་ད་གཤོད་ལོངས།

(*Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 106).

If Dharmakīrti, the sun among disputants, sets and his doctrines sleep or die, the false doctrines of the Tirthikas will then rise.

tsan-gam-po who lived during 627—698 A.D.¹ It seems that in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti was very young as Hwen-thsang does not mention him. On the other hand I-tsing, who travelled over India during 671—695 A.D., declares eloquently how “Dharmakīrti made further improvement in Logic”² after Dignāga. The Brāhmanic logician Uddyotakara³ is attacked by Dharmakīrti. The Mīmāṃsaka Sureśvarācārya,⁴ author of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika, and the Digambara Jaina Vidyānanda, author of the Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā,⁵ have on the contrary criticised the definition of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) as given by Dharmakīrti, who is sometimes designated by the shorter name Kīrti. Vācaspati Miśra⁶ too quotes Dharmakīrti to criticise him.

107. Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā.

Dharmakīrti is the author of numerous works on Logic. The Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā is one of them. A verse⁷ of this work was quoted by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th

¹ Vide Wassilief, p. 54; and Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 183.

² Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lviii.

³ Vide K. B. Pathak's “Bhartṛhari and Kumārila,” *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, vol. xviii, p. 229.

⁴ Cf.

विश्वेव लविनाभावादिति यदर्थकौर्त्तिना ।

प्रत्यक्षायि प्रतिज्ञेयं हीयेतासौ न संशयः ॥

(Sureśvara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika, chap. vi.)

⁵ Vide *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, 1895—97, p. 56.

⁶ Cf.

यथाह यदर्थकौर्त्तिः—

तस्माद्धार्ये न च ज्ञाने स्वाभाससुखात्मनः ।

एकत्र प्रतिषिद्धत्वाद्भ्रष्टमपि न संशयः ॥

(Vācaspati's Bhāmātī on Vedānta-sūtra, 2-2-28).

⁷ The verse runs thus :—

भेदश्च भान्निविज्ञानैः इत्येवेन्द्राविवादये ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā quoted in Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasamgraha, chapter on Bauddha darśana).

The Tibetan version of the verse runs as follows :—

རྟོག་ཤིས་འཕྲུལ་བས་རྒྱ་བ་གཏེས ॥

མེད་པར་ཐ་དད་མཐོང་བ་བཞིན ॥

(Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, folio 239. Vide Louis de la Vallée Poussin's *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, p. 34).

century A.D. The following story is told regarding the composition of this work :—

It is said that Dharmakīrti studied many dialectic śāstras, but his spirit was not satisfied. Once at the house of one Īśvara Sena,² a pupil of Dignāga, he heard the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. Having heard it for the first time, he at once became as proficient as Īśvara Sena who had minutely studied the work. When he heard it the second time, he became like Dignāga, the author of the work, and when he heard it the third time, he recognized several errors in the work. When he mentioned them to Īśvara Sena, the latter so far from being displeased, told him that he was at liberty to condemn all the mistakes of the work and to prepare a critical commentary on it. With the permission thus received he composed a metrical commentary on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* called the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā*.

The Sanskrit original of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ of it in the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, volume Ce, folios 194—258. This translation was prepared by the Indian sage Subhūti-śrī-śānti and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-wahi-blo-gros. The work in Tibetan is called *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-tshig* signifying “Memorial Verses explanatory of *Pramāṇa* or Sources of Knowledge.” The work is divided into four chapters as follows :—(1) Inference for one’s own self (in Tibetan : *Raṅ-gi-don-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit : *Svārthānumāna*); (2) Establishment of *Pramāṇa* (in Tibetan : *Tsad-ma-grub-pa*, in Sanskrit : *Pramāṇa-siddhi*); (3) Perception (in Tibetan : *Mñon-sum*, in Sanskrit : *Pratyakṣa*); and (4) Words for the sake of others (in Tibetan : *Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-tshig*, in Sanskrit : *Parārtha-vākya*). The colophon⁴ of the work runs as follows :—“Here is finished

¹ Vide Tārānātha’s *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, p. 176.

² It seems that Īśvara Sena, in whose house Dharmakīrti heard the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, was not a direct pupil of Dignāga, for, while Dignāga lived about 500 A.D., Dharmakīrti lived about 635 A.D.

³ I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

⁴ རྩོམ་མ་རྒྱུ་འགྲུལ་ཆོག་ལེན་པ་བྱས་པ།

ལུག་ལྷོ་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་དུ་བྱུང་བ།

གཞུང་ལུགས་ངན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཆོས་ཤིན་ཏུ་འབྱུག་པར་འཇུག་པ།

སྤྱན་པའི་གྲགས་པས་སའི་རྩེང་མ་ལུས་པ་བྱས་པ།

འགྲུར་ལྷ་མེད་པའི་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་དཔལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་མཛེད་པ་རྩོགས་སོ།།

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā* in *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, leaf 258).

Vide Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana’s Introduction to “Bilingual Index of *Nyāyabindu*” published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta.

the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā* of Śrī Dharmakīrti who was born in a family of the Deccan, who exposed largely the errors of all the vicious texts (of the Tīrthikas), whose fame filled the entire earth, and who as a great sage had no rival.”

108. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti*.

There was a sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā* called *Pramāṇa vārtika-vṛtti* by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost. There exists, however, a Tibetan translation¹ of it in the *Bṣtan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 420-535. In Tibetan the work is named *Tshad-ma-rnam hgrrel-gyi-hgrrel-wa*. In the concluding lines of the work Dharmakīrti is described as “a great teacher and dialectician, whose fame filled all quarters of the earth and who was, as it were, a lion, pressing down the head of elephant-like debaters.”²

109. *Pramāṇa viniścaya*.

Pramāṇa-viniścaya, quoted³ by Mādhavācārya, is another work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the *Bṣtan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

² དེགས་པ་ཅེན་པོ་སའི་རྩེད་མ་ ལུས་པ་ན་ ལྷ་པའི་ རྩེད་པོ་ ཆེན་པོ་ བོ་གནོན་པར་ མཛད་པའི་ སེང་གེ་ རྟོགས་མ་ ལུས་པར་ རྟོན་པར་ རྟགས་པ་ ཅན་དཔལ་ ལྷོབ་དཔོན་ ཆོས་རྟགས་ ལྷུང་བ །

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti* opening lines).

³ The following verses of *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* were quoted in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha darśana*, by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century A.D. :—

नान्बोऽनुभावो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः ।
 प्राज्ञप्राज्ञकवैधुर्यात् स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥ (क)
 सद्योपलब्धनिबन्धमाह अभेदो नीलतद्विधोः ॥ (ख)
 अविभातोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
 प्राज्ञप्राज्ञकसंविन्निभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥ (ग)

(*Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, chap. I).

Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his “*Le Bouddhisme d’après les sources brahmaniques*,” pp. 32 and 34, identifies the above verses with their Tibetan versions as follows :—

ལྷོ་ཡིས་ཀླམས་སྟེང་བ་གཞན་ཡོད་མེད །
 དེ་ཡི་སྟེང་བ་གཞན་ཡོད་མེན །
 གཟུང་དང་འཛིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ལྷུང་ །
 དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྷན་རང་ཉིད་བསམ ། (ཀ)
 ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་པ་ངེས་པའི་ལྷུང་ །
 རྩོད་དང་དེ་ལྷོ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན ། (ཁ)

work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ of it in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ce*, folios 259—347. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-ldan-tes-rab in the matchless city of Kāśmīra. The work in Tibetan is called *Tshad-ma rnan-par-ñes-pa* signifying “Determination of Pramāṇa or Sources of Knowledge.” The work is divided into three chapters as follows:—(1) System of Perception (in Tibetan: *Mñon-sum-gtan-la-dwab-pa*, in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa-vyavasthā*); (2) Inference for one’s own self (in Tibetan: *Ran-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit: *Svārthānumāna*); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan: *Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit: *Parārthānumāna*). In the concluding lines Dharmakīrti is described as a great sage of unrivalled fame born in Southern India.

110. Nyāya-bindu.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NYĀYA-BINDU.

Nyāya-bindu is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work

Subjects.

was discovered among the palm-leaf manuscripts preserved in the Jaina temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, and has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta by Professor Peterson. There exists a Tibetan translation² of the work in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ce*, folios 347—355. The work in Tibetan is called *Rigs-pahi-thigs-pa* signifying “A Drop of Logic.” It is divided into three chapters as follows: (1) Perception (in Tibetan: *Mñon-sum*, in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa*); (2) Inference for one’s own self (in Tibetan: *Bdag-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit: *Svārthānumāna*); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan: *Gshan-gyi-don-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sans-

སྒྲ་བདག་རྒྱལ་པར་དབྱར་མེད་ཀྱང་ ॥

མཐོང་བ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལྟ་རྒྱལ་གྱིས་ ॥

གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རྟོག་པ་རྒྱལ་ ॥

ཐམས་ཅད་དང་བཅས་བཞིན་རྟོགས་འགྱུར་ ॥ (ག)

(Pramāṇa-viniścaya, chap. I, embodied in the Tibetan *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ce*, folios 272, 274 and 273 respectively).

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of the *Nyāya-bindu* embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London, as also the excellent edition of F. J. Sher-batski. The Sanskrit edition of the *Nyāya-bindu* and *Ṭikā* (by F. J. Shere-bataki) is also available now. Compare a “Bilingual Index of *Nyāyabindu*” by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

krit: *Parārthānumāna*). Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below.

Perception.

In chapter I, it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge. Definition of Perception. Valid knowledge is of two kinds: (1) Perception (in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa*) and (2) Inference (in Sanskrit: *Anumāna*). Perception, which is knowledge derived through the senses, etc., is described as that which is free from preconception (*kalpanā*) and devoid of error (*abhrānta*). Preconception refers to the experiences of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched, e.g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself or a rope may appear as a snake. Error is caused by such causes as darkness, quick motion, journey by boat, shaking, etc.; for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move. Perception is of four kinds: (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind; (3) self-consciousness; and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*); for instance, a cow which I see is a peculiar one possessing an infinite number of qualities which distinguish it from all cows, whereas a cow which I infer is a general one possessing certain qualities in common with other cows: that is, perception is individual knowledge while inference is general knowledge. According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies. This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves the object to be absolutely real (*paramārtha-sat*), as it shows that it possesses some practical efficiency, and this characteristic also shows that perception is a source of valid knowledge for it exactly corresponds to the object perceived.

Inference for one's self.

In chapter II, Inference for one's own self (*Svārthānumāna*) is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason or middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics. In the instance 'this hill has fire, because it has smoke,' the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term.

Forms or characteristics of the middle term. The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following:—

- (1) The middle term must abide in the minor term, e.g.

The hill has fire.
Because it has smoke.
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake.

In this reasoning there must be 'smoke' on the 'hill.'

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homologous with the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' abides in a kitchen which is homologous with things that contain fire

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterologous from the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' does not abide in a lake which is heterologous from things that contain fire.

Three kinds of the middle term. The middle term is of three kinds according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus :—

(1) Identity (in Tibetan : Raṅ-bshin, in Sanskrit : *Svabhāva*), *e.g.*

This is a tree,
Because it is śimśapā.

(2) Effect (in Tibetan : Hbras-bu, in Sanskrit : *Kārya*), *e.g.*
Here there is fire, because there is smoke.

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan : Mi-dmigs-pa, in Sanskrit : *Anupalabdhi*), which is of 11 kinds as follows :—

(i) Non-perception of identity (*Svabhāvānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here is no smoke, because it is not perceived (though smoke is of such a nature that it is perceptible if existent).

(ii) Non-perception of effect (*Kāryānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here.

(iii) Non-perception of the pervader or container (*Vyāpakānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there is no Śimśapā, because there is no tree at all.

(iv) Perception contrary to identity (*Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

There is no cold sensation here, because there is fire.

(v) Perception of the opposite effect (*Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there is no cold sensation, because there is smoke.

(vi) Perception of contrary connection (*Viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes.

(vii) Perception contrary to the effect (*Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire.

(viii) Perception contrary to the container (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Here there is no icy sensation, because there is fire.

(ix) Non-perception of the cause (*Kāraṇānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*

There is no smoke, because there is no fire.

(x) Perception contrary to the cause (*Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

Hair on his body does not stand erect, because he sits near a fire.

(xi) Perception of effect contrary to its cause (*Kāraṇa-viruddhakāryopalabdhi*), *e.g.*

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect, because there is smoke here.

Inference for the sake of others.

In chapter III, Inference for the sake of others (*Parārthānumāna*) is defined as the declaration of

Definition of Inference
for the sake of others.

the three-formed middle term in words:
that is, when the reason is set forth in

words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others.

Inference is a kind of knowledge; and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they are not themselves knowledge, they produce it. Inference for the sake of others is of two kinds: (1) positive or homogeneous (in Sanskrit: *Sādharmyavat*); and (2) negative or heterogeneous (in Sanskrit: *Vaidharmyavat*), as follows:—

(a) Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product,

All products are non-eternal as a pot (positive).

(b) Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product,

No non-non-eternal, *i.e.* eternal (thing) is a product as ether (negative).

The minor term (*Pakṣa*) is that to which the relation of the major term is to be proved, as—This hill

Thesis.

has fire, because it has smoke. In this

reasoning 'hill' is the minor term which is to be proved as having 'fire' which is the major term. A minor term and its corresponding major term combined together, constitute a proposition which, when offered for proof, is called a thesis.

Fallacies of the thesis
or Pakṣābhāsa.

There are four fallacies of the thesis
(*Pakṣābhāsa*).

A thesis is fallacious if it is incompatible with—

(1) Perception, *e.g.* Sound is inaudible;

(2) Inference, *e.g.* Sound is eternal;

(3) Conception, *e.g.* The moon is not *luna* (*Śaśi a-candra*); or

- (4) One's own statement. e.g. Inference is not a source of knowledge.

It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics. Fallacies of the middle term (*Hetrābhāsa*) occur even if one of the characteristics is unproved, uncertain or contradictory, thus—

A. Unproved (*asiddha*).

- (1) Sound is eternal, because it is visible.

(Visibility of sound is admitted by neither party).

- (2) Trees are conscious, because they die if their bark is taken off.

(This peculiar kind of death of trees is not admitted by the opponent).

- (3) The hill has fire, because it has vapour.

(Vapour as an effect of fire is questioned).

- (4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere.

(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere).

B. Uncertain (*anaikāntika*).

- (1) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is knowable.

(The knowable is too general, because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal).

- (6) A certain man is omniscient,
Because he is a speaker.

(The reason is not general enough, for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient).

C. Contradictory (*viruddha*).

- (7) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal,' that is, the middle term is opposed to the major term).

- (8) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product.

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal').

Example is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous. Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows:—

Fallacies of the homogeneous example.

- (1) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like action.

(Action cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal, that is, because it is excluded from the major term).

- (2) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like atoms.

(Atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal, that is, because they are excluded from the middle term).

- (3) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like a pot.

(Pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal, that is, because it is excluded from both major and middle terms).

- (4) This man is passionate.
Because he is a speaker,
Like the person in the street.

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is questionable whether he is passionate, that is, it involves doubt as to the validity of the major term).

- (5) This man is mortal,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

- (6) This man is non-omniscient,
Because he is passionate,
Like the person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate and non-omniscient).

- (7) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a certain person.

(This example is unconnected (*ananvaya*), for there is no inseparable connection between being 'passionate' and being a 'speaker').

- (8) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot.

(This example involves the fallacy of 'connection unshown,' *apradarśitānvaya* : the connection should be shown as follows : All products are non-eternal like a pot).

- (9) Sound is a product,
Because it is non-eternal.
All non-eternal things are products like a pot.

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *vīparitānvaya* : the real connection should be shown as follows : All products are non-eternal like a pot).

Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example.

Refutation (Dūṣaṇa) consists in pointing out in the reasoning of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above. The fallacies or semblances of refutation are the analogues or futilities called in Sanskrit *Jāti*.¹

In the concluding lines of the *Nyāyabindu* it is stated by the translators that "Dharmakīrti vanquished the entire Tīrthikas as Śākyamuni had subdued the large army of Māra ; and as the sun dispels darkness, the *Nyāyabindu* has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is, the Tīrthika doctrine)—wonderful !²

Dharmakīrti criticises Dignāga.

The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a kind of fallacy called contradiction which Implied contradiction. is admitted by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Opposition of the middle term to the implied major term (in the event of the major term being ambiguous) is noted by Dignāga in his *Nyāya-praveśa*³ as another kind of fallacy called implied contradiction (in Sanskrit: *iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛt-viruddha*, and in Tibetan: *chos-kyi-khyad-par-phyin-ci-log-tu-sgrub-par-byed-*

¹ For *Jāti* vide *Nyāya-sūtra*, Book I, aphorism 58.

²

གྲུ་ཐུབ་པས་བདུན་གྱི་ཐེ་པོ་ཆེ །

ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་སྤྲོད་གསུངས་པ །

ཏེ་མས་སྤྲུལ་རུམ་འགྲུ་པའི་ཐེགས་པ་ཡིས །

བདག་གི་ལྟ་བ་རྒྱུར་ལུང་རོ་མཚར་ཏིང །

(*Nyāya-bindu*).

³ Vide *Nyāya-praveśa*, Fallacies of the Middle Term, concluding lines.

pa). Dharmakīrti in his Nyāya-bindu rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind.¹

An illustration of the second or implied contradiction is given thus:—

The eyes, etc., are for the use of another,
Because they are composite things,
Like a bed, seat, etc.

Here the major term “another” is ambiguous, inasmuch as it may signify either a composite thing (e.g. the body) or a non-composite thing (e.g. the soul). There would be a contradiction between the middle term and the major term if the word “another” were used by the speaker in the sense of a non-composite thing, but understood by the listener in the sense of a composite thing. The reasoning would then involve a contradiction of the middle term to the desired or implied major term.

Dharmakīrti² in his Nyāya-bindu considers this case as an illustration of the first or natural contradiction. A word, which is the major term of a proposition, can, as such, admit of only one meaning, and if there is ambiguity between the meaning expressed and the meaning implied the real meaning is to be ascertained from the context. If the meaning implied is the real one, there is a natural contradiction between the middle term and the major term.

Dignāga³ mentions yet another fallacy called the “non-erroneous contradiction” (*viruddhā vyabhīcāri*, called in Tibetan: *hgal-wa-la-mi-hkhrul-pa*) which he includes among the

Non-erroneous contradiction.

¹ तत्र च द्वितीयोऽपि इद्विधानलक्ष्णं विरुद्धः ।...स इह कस्माद्भोक्तुः अन्ययोरेव अन्तर्भावात् ।

(Nyāya-bindu, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 413.

अथं च विरुद्ध आचार्यं दिङ्नागेन उक्तः । स कस्मात् वार्तिककारेण सता लया नोक्तः ।

(Nyāya-bindu-tikā, Peterson's edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, chapter III, p. 78).

Compare K. B. Pathaka's “On the authorship of the Nyāya-bindu” in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XIX, p. 51.

² Nyāya-bindu, A.S.B., chapter III, pp. 113--114.

³ Fide Nyāya-praveśa in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, leaf 185. See ante Nyāya-praveśa, fallacy of the middle term.

विरुद्धावभिचार्यपि संशयहेतुवत्तः । स इह कस्माद्भोक्तुः अनुमानविषये ऽसम्भवात् ।

ननु आचार्येण विरुद्धावभिचार्यपि संशयहेतुवत्तः । क तर्हि आचार्यं दिङ्नागेन अथं हेतुदोष उक्त इत्याह ।... तस्मादाश्रयमाश्रयमनुमानमाश्रित्य विरुद्धावभिचार्यवत्तः ।

(Nyāya-bindu-tikā, p. 84

Compare also Journal, Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. XIX, p. 49.

"fallacies of uncertainty." It takes place when two contradictory conclusions are supported by what appear to be valid reasons, *e g.* :

A Vaiśeṣika philosopher says :—

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product.

A Mīmāṃsaka replies :—

Sound is eternal,
Because it is audible.

The reasons employed in the above cases are supposed both to be correct according, respectively, to the tenets of the Vaiseṣika and Mīmāṃsā Schools. but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are uncertain and, as such, fallacious.

Dharmakīrti¹ in the Nyāya-bindu rejects this fallacy of "non-erroneous contradiction," on the ground that it does not arise in connection with inference and is not based even on the scripture. A reason or middle term, which is valid, must stand to the major term in the relation of identity, casuality or non-perception, and must lead to a correct conclusion.

Two conclusions which are contradictory can not be supported by reasons which are valid. Two different sets of scripture too can not be of any help in the establishment of two contradictory conclusions inasmuch as a scripture can not override perception and inference, and is authoritative only in the ascertainment of supersensuous objects. The non-erroneous contradiction is therefore impossible.

In opposition to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti² maintains that 'ex-

The function of an example is not a part of a syllogism, as it is included in the middle term, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky,
Like a kitchen.

In this reasoning the term 'smoky' includes a 'kitchen,' as well as other similar things, hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example 'kitchen.' Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti, the example has this much 'value' that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term: thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.

111. Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa.

The Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 355—375. The work in Tibetan is called Gtan-tshigs-kyi-thigs-pa signifying "A Drop of Reason." The work is divided into three chapters as follows:—

(1) Relation of identity between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: Raṅ-bshin-gyi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Svabhāva-hetu*); (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: Hbras-buḥi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Kārya-hetu*); and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan: Mi-dmigs-paḥi-gtan-tshigs, in Sanskrit: *Anupalabdhi-hetu*).

112. Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya.

The Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya is another treatise on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 384—416. The work in Tibetan is called Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-pa, signifying the "Method of Discussion." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Jñāna-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dge-waḥi-blo-gros. The translation was retouched by the great Paṇḍita Dīpaṅkara (of Vikramaṇipura in Bengal, born in 980 A.D. and started for Tibet in 1040 A.D.) and the interpreter-monk Dar-ma-grags.

¹ ... उक्तम् अभेदेन... पुनर्विशेषेण दर्शनीयावुक्तौ ।

(Nyāya-bindu, p. 116).

² I have consulted the copy embodied in the Bstan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

³ I have consulted the work embodied in the Bstan-hgyur of the India Office, London.

113. *Santānāntara-siddhi*.

The *Santānāntara-siddhi*, also called *Tantrāntara-siddhi*, is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 416—420. The work in Tibetan is called *Rgyud-gshan-grub-pa* signifying "Proof of the Continuity of Succession." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Simha and the Tibetan official interpreter *Dpal-rtsegs*.

114. *Sambandha-parīkṣā*.

The *Sambandha-parīkṣā* is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 375—377. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-brtag-pa* signifying "Examination of Connection." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Jñāna-garbha and the interpreter *Vande-nam-mkhaṣ*.

115. *Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti*.

The *Sambandha-parīkṣā-vṛtti*² is a commentary on the *Sambandha-parīkṣā* by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-brtag-pahi-hgrel-wa*.

116. DEVENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 650 A.D.).

Devendrabodhi, called in Tibetan *Lha-dwañ-blo*, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti,⁴ and so lived about 650 A.D. He wrote the following work on Logic:—

The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā*, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-dkah-hgrel*, signifying "An Explanation of Difficulties in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti." The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Che, folios 1—380. The translation was

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the copy embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

³ I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur* of the India Office, London.

⁴ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 186—187.

⁵ I consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

prepared by the Indian sage Subhūti-śrī and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dge-waḥi-blo-groṣ.

This story ¹ is told regarding the composition of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā* :—

Dharmakīrti chose Devendrabodhi to write a commentary on his *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. After Devendrabodhi had finished the commentary for the first time and had shown it to Dharmakīrti, the latter erased it with water. After he had compiled it a second time, Dharmakīrti burnt it in fire. He then compiled it a third time and gave it to Dharmakīrti with the observation ; “ Since the majority of men are incompetent and time is fleeting, I have written this commentary for the people of lighter understanding.” This time Dharmakīrti allowed the work to exist.

117. ŚĀKYABODHI (ABOUT 675 A.D.).

Śākyabodhi² is stated to have been a pupil of Devendrabodhi. He seems to have lived about 675 A.D. He was the author of the following work :—

The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-tīkā*, called in Tibetan : *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-bśad*, which is an annotation on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā* of Devendrabodhi. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ which covers volumes Je and Ñe of the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*. The translation was prepared by the interpreter Dge-waḥi-blo-groṣ.

118. VINĪTA DEVA (ABOUT 700 A.D.).

Vinīta Deva,⁴ called in Tibetan *Dul-lha*, lived in Nālandā during the time of king Lalita Candra, son of Govi Candra, and Dharmakīrti died during the time of Govi Candra. Vimāla Candra, the father of Govi Candra, was married to the sister of Bhartṛhari, who sprang from the ancient royal family of Malwa. Supposing this Bhartṛhari to be identical with the famous grammarian of that name who died in 651—652 A.D.,⁵ we may place his contemporary Govi Candra in the middle of the 7th century A.D. This is exactly the time when Dharmakīrti died. Hence we may conclude that Lalita Candra, son of Govi Candra,

¹ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 186—187.

² *Vide* Tārānāth's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, p. 187.

³ I consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

⁴ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 195—198, 272; *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan* edited by Sarat Chandra Das, pp. xlviii, 108.

⁵ *Vide* Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. lvii.

flourished towards the end of the 7th century A.D. Vinīta Deva, contemporary of Lalita Candra, must also have lived about this time, a view which harmonises with the date of Dharmakīrti on whose works Vinīta Deva wrote commentaries.

Vinīta Deva, who was the famous author of the Samayabhedoparacana-cakra, wrote the following works on Logic:—

Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan: *Rig-paḥi-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-hgrel-wa*, which is a detailed commentary on the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but a Tibetan translation¹ of it exists in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *She*, folios 1—43. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jina Mitra and the interpreter of Shu-chen named Vande-ye-še-sde.

Hetu-bindu-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan: *Gtan-tshigs-kyi-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-hgrel-wa*, which is a detailed commentary on the Hetu-bindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *She*, folios 116—205. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Prajñā Varma and the interpreter-monk of Shu-chen named Dpal-brtseg-rakṣita.

Vādā-nyāya-vyākhyā, called in Tibetan: *Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-paḥi-hgrel-wa*, which is a commentary on the Vāda-nyāya (otherwise called Tarka-nyāya) of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folios 39—65. The work opens thus: “Who is self-perfected in sweet logical discussion, supreme in patience, affection, charity and self-restraint, and who is the most excellent of logicians—to him (Buddha) bowing down I compose a commentary on the text of Vāda-nyāya.”

Sambandha-parīkṣā-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan *Hbrel-pa-brtag-paḥi-rgya-cher-bśad-pa*, which is a copious commentary on the Sambandhaparīkṣā of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folios 1—24. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jñāna-garbha and the Tibetan interpreter Vande-nam-mkhas. The work opens thus:—

“Who is entirely unconnected with the world, and is yet designated as the supreme teacher of it—to him bowing down fully I explain the Sambandha-parīkṣā.”

Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan *Dmigs-pa-brtag-*

¹ This work was brought down to Calcutta by the British Mission to Tibet during 1904. I examined it by permission of the Government of India. It is now deposited in the British Museum, London.

² I examined this work, by permission of the Government of India, when it was brought down to Calcutta by the British Mission to Tibet, 1904.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

paḥi-hgrel-bśad. is an annotation on the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* of Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folios 186—200. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śākya-simha and the interpreter *Vande-dpal-brtsegs* of Shu-chen. The work opens thus:—

“Meditating on the merciful Omniscient One, and saluting him by my head, I compose the *Ālambana-parīkṣā-tīkā*.”

It ends thus:—

“Here is finished the *Ālambana-parīkṣā-tīkā*, which is a clean work of the teacher *Vinīta Deva* who weighed all sorts of *ālambana* (objects of thought), and is a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the *Tirthika* elephants.”

Santānāntara-siddhi-tīkā, called in Tibetan: *Rgyud-gshan-grub-paḥi-hgrel-bśad*, being a commentary on the *Santānāntara-siddhi* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Tshe*, folios 1—21. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage *Viśuddha-simha* and the interpreter of Shu-chen named *Dpal-rtsegs-rakṣita*.

119. RAVI GUPTA (ABOUT 725 A.D.).

Ravi Gupta,³ called in Tibetan: *Ñi-ma-sbaś*, was born in *Kāśmīra*. He was a great poet, dialectician and *Tāntric* teacher, who established 12 great religious schools in his native country and *Magadha*. He was a contemporary of king *Bharṣa* of *Vārendra*, and flourished before *Jayanta*, the author of *Nyāya-mañjarī*.⁴ He must have lived in the first quarter of the eighth century A.D., for his disciple the famous *Tāntric* monk *Sarvajña Mitra*⁵ lived in the middle of that century. Ravi Gupta is mentioned in the inscription of *Vasanta Sena*⁶ as the *Sarva-daṇḍa-nāyaka* and *Mahāpratihāra* in the Gupta *saṃvat* 435 corresponding to 754 A.D. He was the author⁷ of the following work on Logic:—

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² I have consulted the India Office xylograph of the Tibetan version.

³ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 146, 147, 243; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzañ*, part i, pp. 90, 101, 118, xxxvii.

⁴

एवेन रविगुप्तोऽपि परिचानमुच्यते ।

चणिकलचमादिलसमुत्प्रेक्ष्यपण्डितः ॥

(*Nyāya-mañjarī*, chap. VII, p. 462, edited by M.M. Gaṅgādhara Śāstri).

⁵ *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Sragdharā Stotra*, Introduction, p. xxx, printed in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta.

⁶ *Indian Antiquary*, vol. IX, p. 167.

⁷ For Ravi Gupta's *Ārya-kośa* see Rockhill's *Buddha*, p. 228; and for his

Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti called in Tibetan: Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-pa, which is an annotation on the Pramāṇa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur. Mdo, Tshe, folios 132—252.

120. JINENDRABODHI
(ABOUT 725 A.D.).

In the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Re, there is the Tibetan version of a work called Viśālāmala-vatī-nāma-pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā. This version was prepared by the Tibetan interpreter Rdo-rje-rgyal-mtshan with the assistance of Dpal-ldan-blo-gros.

The author of the original work was Jinendrabodhi, called in Tibetan Rgyal-dwañ-blo-gros, who was comparable to the Bodhisattva (Bodhisattva-deśīya.). He is perhaps the same person who wrote the well-known *Nyāsa* on the grammar of Pāṇini in the eighth century A.D.

121. ŚĀNTA RAKṢITA
(749 A.D.).

Śānta Rakṣita,² called in Tibetan: Shi-wa-htsho, was born in the royal family of Za-hor [in Bengal or near Lahor?]. The exact date of his birth is unknown, but it is stated that he was born at the time of Go Pāla who reigned up to 705 A.D. and died at the time of Dharma Pāla who became king in 765 A.D. He followed the Svatantra Mādhyamika school, and was a Professor at Nālandā. He visited Tibet at the invitation of King Khri-sroñ-deu-tsan who was born in 728 A.D. and died in 864 A.D. The king, with the assistance of Śānta Rakṣita, built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye³ in Tibet, modelled after the Odantapura Vihāra of Magadha. Sam-ye was the first regular Buddhist monastery in Tibet and Śānta Rakṣita was its first abbot. He worked in Tibet for 13 years, that is, until 762 A.D. He was known there under the name of Ācārya Bodhisattva, and was the author of the following works on Logic:—

Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipaṇcitārtha, called in Tibetan: Rtsod-pahi-rigs-pahi-hbrel-pa-don-rnam-par-hbyed-pa, an elaborate commen-

works on Tantra, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Sragdharā Stotra*, Introduction, pp. v—vii.

¹ I have consulted the copy of the India Office, London.

² Vide Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan edited by Sarat Chandra Das, G.I.E., Calcutta, p. 112.

³ For Sam-ye, བསམ་ཡས་ vide Csoma de Koros's *Tibetan Grammar*, p. 183; Sarat Chandra Das in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1881, Part I, p. 226; and Waddell's *Lamaism*, p. 28.

tary on the Vāda-nyāya of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Tshe*, folios 21—131, and in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folios 65—186. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monks venerable Śeṣ-rab and Hbro-señ-kar (who was a native of the province of Hbro or Dö) in the holy monastery of *Bsam-yaṣ* (Sam-ye). The work opens thus:—

“Who constantly dispersing darkness by the ray of the heap of various pure precious qualities, exerted himself in fulfilling the desire of various sentient beings and rejoiced to do good to the entire world—to that Mañju-śrī bowing down in reverence, I compose this concise and stainless Vāda-nyā-vṛtti-vipaṇcitārtha.”

Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā, called in Tibetan: *De-kho-na-nīd-bṣduṣ-paḥi-tshig-lehur-byas-pa*, a work containing memorial verses on a summary of the *Tattvas*. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *He*, folios 1—146. The translation was prepared by the Indian Paṇḍita Guṇākara-śrī bhadra (belonging to the religious circle first instituted by the great king Lalitāditya in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra) and the great Tibetan interpreter the Śākya monk Lha-bla-ma-shi-wa-hod in the province of Guge (S.-W. Tibet). The work reviews various systems of philosophy such as the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, etc.³

¹ I have consulted the xylograph of this work contained in the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907. For a detailed account of this work *vide* my “Sāṃkhya Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas” in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. iii, No. 8.

³ *Tattvasaṃgraha* herein noticed is quite different from the *Tattvasammāsa*, a Brāhmaṇic work on the Sāṃkhya philosophy, a manuscript of which is contained in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Dr. George Bühler, during his explorations of the *Bṛhat-jñāna-kośa* in the temple of *Pārśva-nātha* at *Jesalmir*, found in 1873 a *Poṭhi*, consisting of 189 ancient palm-leaves showing the characters of the 12th or 13th century, and bearing on the outside corner the title *kaṃala-śīla-tarka* (*vide* Dr. G. Bühler's correspondence with Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, Vol. i, part ii, p. x). The real name of the work, according to Dr. Bühler, is *Tarka-saṃgraha*. Now, this *Tarka-saṃgraha* is nothing but *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śānta Raksita with the commentary, by *Kaṃala Śīla*. The introductory part (*Maṅgala*) of the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, as noticed by Dr. Bühler, runs as follows:—

प्रकृतौशोभयात्मादि [क्रिया] रक्षितं चलम् ।

कर्मा तत्फलसम्बन्ध व्यवसादिसमाश्रयम् ॥

गुणद्वयक्रियाजातिसमवायाद्युपाधिभिः ।

शून्यमारोपिताकारशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरम् ॥

स्पष्टलक्षणसंयुक्त प्रमाद्वितथनिश्चितम् ।

अथौचसापि नांशेन निश्चीभूतापरात्मकम् ॥

The work is divided into 31 chapters, viz. : (1) examination of nature (in Sanskrit: *Svabhāva-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Rañ-bshin-brtag pa); (2) examination of the sense-organs (in Sanskrit: *Indriya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Dwañ-phyug-brtag-pa); (3) examination of both (in Sanskrit: *Ubhaya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Gñis-ka-brtag-pa); (4) examination of the theory that the world is self-existent (in Sanskrit: *Jagat-svabhāva vāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Hgro-wa-rañ-bshin-du-ṣmra-wa-brtag-pa); (5) examination of Brahma the presiding deity of sound (in Sanskrit: *Śabda-Brahma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Sgrahi-tshañs-pa-brtag-pa); (6) examination of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Puruṣa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Skyes-bu-brtag-pa); (7) examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-puruṣa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Rigspa-can-dañ-bye-brag-paṣ-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa); (8) examination of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Mīmāṃsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Spyod-pa-paṣ-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa); (9) examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Ser-skye-paṣ-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa); (10) examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Digambara-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Nam-mkhaḥi-gos-can-gyis-kun-tu-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa), (11) examination of the Upaniṣad-doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Upaniṣad-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: U-pa-ni-ṣa-di-kaṣ-brtags-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa); (12) examination of the Vātsīputra doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: *Vātsīputra-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Gnas-maḥi-buṣ-bdag-brtag-pa); (13) examination of the permanence of entities (in Sanskrit: *Sthira padārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Brtan-paḥi-dños-po-brtag-pa); (14) examination of the relation between *Karma* and its effect (in Sanskrit: *Karma-phala-sambandha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Laṣ-dañ-hbraṣ-buḥi-hbrel-pa-brtag-pa); (15) examination of the meaning of the word 'substance' (in Sanskrit: *Dravya-padārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Rdsas-kyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa); (16) examination of the meaning of the word 'quality'; (in Sanskrit: *Guṇa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Yon-tan-gyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa); (17) examination of the meaning of the word *Karma* (in Sanskrit: *Karma-śabdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Laṣ-kyi-tshig-gi-don-brtag-pa); (18) examination of the meaning of the word generality or genus (in Sanskrit: *Sāmānya-śabdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: Spyih-tshig-gi-don-brtag-po); (19) examination of the meaning of the words 'generality,' and 'particularity' (in Sanskrit:

entity), etc. The last colophon appears to him to be स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद (examination of the doctrine of self-evidence). These are the very subjects treated in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. So the two works are identical.

Sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: *Ṣpyi-dan-bye-brag-gi-tshig-gi-don brtag-pa*); (20) examination of the meaning of the word 'co-existent cause' (in Sanskrit: *Samarāya-śabdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Hdu-wahi-tshig-don-brtag-pa*); (21) examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' (in Sanskrit: *Śab-dārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Ṣgra-yi-don-brtag-pa*); (22) examination of the definition of perception (in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Mñon-sum gyi-mtshan-ñid-brtag-pa*); (23) examination of inference (in Sanskrit: *Anumānaparīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Rjes-su-dpag-pa-brtag-pa*); (24) examination of other kinds of valid knowledge (in Sanskrit: *Pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Tshad-ma-shan-brtag-pa*); (25) examination of the doctrine of evolution (in Sanskrit: *Vicartavāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Hgyur-war-smra-wa-brtag-pa*); (26) examination of the three times (in Sanskrit: *Kālatraya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Duṣ-gsum brtag-pa*); (27) examination of continuity of the world (in Sanskrit: *Saṃsārā-santati-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Hjig-rten-rgyud-pahi-brtag-pa*); (28) examination of external objects (in Sanskrit: *Vāhyārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Phyi-rol-gyi-don-brtag-pa*); (29) examination of Śruti or Scripture (in Sanskrit: *Śruti-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Thos-pa-brtag-pa*); (30) examination of self-evidence (in Sanskrit: *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Raṅ-laṣ-tshad-ma-drtag-pa*); and (31) examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses (in Sanskrit: *Anyendriyātūlārtha-darśana-puruṣa-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Gshan-gyi-dwañ-po-laṣ-hdaṣ-pahi-don mthoñ-wa-can-gyi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa*).

122. KAMALA ŚILA (ABOUT 750 A.D.).

Kamala Śila,¹ also called Kamala Śrīla, was a follower of Śānta Rakṣita. He was for some time a Professor of Tantras in Nālandā whence he was invited to Tibet by king Khri-sron-deu-tsan (728—786 A.D.). While in Tibet he vindicated the religious views of Guru Padma-sambhava and Śānta Rakṣita by defeating and expelling a Chinese monk named Mahāyāna Hoshang. He was of wide fame and the author of the following works:—

Nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pakṣe-saṃkṣipta, called in Tibetan *Rigs-pahi-thigs-pahi-phyogs-sña-ma-mdor-bśdus-pa*, a summary of criticisms on the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan transla-

¹ Vide *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, part i, p. 112, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, and also the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society* of Calcutta, vol. i, part i, p. 10, and Waddell's *Lamaism*, p. 31.

tion in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, She, Folios 106—115. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha Simha and the interpreter monk of Shu-chen named Dpal-rtsegs-rakṣita.

Tattva-saṃgraha pañjikā, called in Tibetan De-kho na-ñid-bśduṣ-paḥi-dkaḥ-hgrel, a commentary on the Tattva-saṃgraha of Śānta Rakṣita. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² of part I of this work in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, He, Folios 146—400, and part II of it in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ye, Folios 1—385. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Devendra Bhadra and the interpreter monk Grags-hbyor-śeṣ-rab.

123. KALYĀṆA RAKṢITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.).

Kalyāṇa Rakṣita,³ called in Tibetan Dge-bśruṅ, was a great dialectician and teacher of Dharmottarācārya. He flourished during the reign of Mahārāja Dharma Pāla who died in 829 A.D. He was the author of the undermentioned works⁴:—

Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā, called in Tibetan Thams-cad-mkhyen-pa-grub-paḥi-tshig-lehur-byas-pa, signifying “memorial verses on the attainment of omniscience.” It is contained in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 201—202, and begins with a salutation to Sarvajña.

Vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā, called in Tibetan phyi-rol-gyi-don-grub-pa-ceṣ-bya-waḥi-tshig-lehur, which signifies memorial verses on the reality of external things. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 202—210. The translation was prepared by the Vaibhāṣika teacher Jina Mitra of Kāśmīra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita.

Śruti parikṣā, called in Tibetan Thos-pa-brtag-paḥi-tshig-lehur-byas-pa, which signifies ‘memorial verses on the examination of Śruti or verbal testimony.’ The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 210—211.

¹ I have consulted the copy brought down by the British Mission to Tibet in 1904.

² I consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907.

³ *Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 216—219: and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzaṅ, p. 114. The particle ‘bśruṅ’ signifies “protected” and is an equivalent for Sanskrit “Rakṣita.” But Schiefner has taken it as an equivalent for “Gupta.” This does not seem to be correct, for the Tibetan equivalent for Gupta is “gbaṣ.”

⁴ I have consulted Kalyāṇa Rakṣita's works in volume Ze of the Bstan-hgyur lent to me by the India Office, London.

Anyāpoha vicāra kārikā, called in Tibetan *Gzhan-la brtag-paḥi-tshig-lehur-byas-pa*, which signifies 'memorial verses on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites.' The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, Folios 211—213.

Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā, called in Tibetan *Dwañ-phyug-hjig-paḥi-tshig-l-hur-byas-pa*, which signifies 'memorial verses on the refutation of God.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, Folios 214—215

124. DHARMOTTARĀCĀRYA (ABOUT 847 A.D.).

Dharmottara¹ (Ācārya Dharmottara or Dharmottarācārya), called in Tibetan *Choṣ-mchog*, was a pupil of Kalyāṇa Rakṣita and of Dharmākara Datta of Kāśmīra. He appears to have flourished in Kāśmīra while Vana Pāla was reigning in Bengal about 847 A.D., and is mentioned by the Brāhmaṇa logician Śrīdhara² about 991 A.D. and by the Jaina philosophers Mallavādin the author of *Dharmottara-ṭippanaka* about 962 A.D.³ and Ratnaprabha Śūri⁴ the famous author of *Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā* dated 1181 A.D. Dharmottara was the author of the following works:—

Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā, called in Tibetan *Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-rgya-cher-hgrel-wa*, a detailed commentary on the *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original⁵ of this work was preserved in the Jaina temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, and has been published by Professor Peterson in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta. There exists a Tibetan translation⁶ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *She*, Folios 43—106. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jñāna-garbha and an interpreter-monk of Shu-chen

¹ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, p. 225; and *Dpag bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 114.

² *Vide* *Nyāya-kandali*, p. 76, Vizianagaram Sanskrit series.

³ The Jaina logician Mallavādin (q.v.) wrote a gloss called *Dharmottara-ṭippanaka* on Dharmottarācārya's *Nyāyabinduṭikā*. The year 884 in which Mallavādin flourished corresponds to 827 A.D. or 962 A.D. according as we take it to refer to Vikrama-saṃvat or Śakasaṃvat. On one supposition Mallavādin was a contemporary of Dharmottara and on the other he flourished a century later.

⁴ *यच्च धर्मोत्तरानुसारी प्राह । प्रबोजनसादिवाक्येन साक्षादाख्यायते इति न चने ।*
(*Syādvāda-ratnākarāvatārikā*, p. 10, Jaina Yaśovijaya series of Benares).

⁵ The palm-leaf manuscript of the *Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā* preserved in Cambay bears the date of saṃvat 1229 or 1173 A.D. (Peterson's Third Report, p. 33).

⁶ I consulted the copy brought down by the British Mission to Tibet during 1904. The Tibetan version has also been edited by F. J. Sherbatski and printed in Russia.

named Dharmāloka, and afterwards recast by the Indian sage Sumati-kīrti and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Blo-lḍan-śeṣ-rab. Nyāyabindu-ṭikā begins thus:—"Sugata, the conqueror of lust, etc., has overcome this world, the source of series of evils beginning with birth: may his words dispelling the darkness of our mind attain glory."¹

Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-brtag-pa, signifying 'an examination of Pramāṇa or the sources of valid knowledge.' The work begins with salutation to Sugata. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 215—253. The translation was prepared by monk Blo-lḍan-śeṣ-rab.

Apoha-nāma-prakaraṇa, called in Tibetan Gshan-sel-wa, signifying 'a treatise on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 254—266. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Bhavyarāja and the interpreter-monk Blo-lḍan-śeṣ-rab, in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

Pāra-loka-siddhi, called in Tibetan H̄jig-rten-pha-rol-grub-pa, signifying 'proof of the world beyond.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 266—270. The translation was prepared by the great Paṇḍita Bhavyarāja and the interpreter-monk Tshab-ñi-ma-grags during the lifetime of Śrī Harṣa Deva (king of Kāśmīra, 1089—1101 A.D.) in the great incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work begins thus:—

"Some say that the world beyond is possessed of the characteristics of a complete separation from the link of consciousness which began from before birth and continued after death, etc."

Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi, called in Tibetan Skad-cig-ma-h̄jig-pa-grub-pa, signifying 'proof of the momentariness of things.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 270—282. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Bhavyarāja and the interpreter-monk Blo-lḍan-śeṣ-rab.

Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭikā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-

जयन्ति जातिव्यसनप्रबन्ध प्रसूतिहेतोर्जगतो विजेतुः ।

रात्राश्चरातेः सुगतस्य वाचो मनसस्तत्त्वज्ञानवसादधानाः ॥

(Nyāyabinduṭikā, chap. I).

² I have consulted the India Office copy.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy.

125. मुक्त-कुम्भ
(AFTER 900 A.D.).

The Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā is called in Tibetan Skad-
cig-ma-hjig-grub-paḥi-rnam-hgrel. The Sanskrit original of the
work appears to be lost, but a Tibetan translation⁴ is embodied
in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 232—301. This version was
prepared by the Indian sage Vināyaka and the interpreter-monk
Grags-hbyor-śeṣ-rab.

126. ARCATA
(ABOUT 900 A.D.).

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² སྒྲོལ་དཔལ་ཆོས་མཆོག་རྟེན་གྱི་དཔལ་ཆོས་མཆོག ། (Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, We, Folio 138).

³ The name Muktākumbha is restored from Tibetan.

⁴ I have consulted the work belonging to the India Office, London.

⁵ *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Jaina Logic* under "Guṇaratna Sūri."

⁶ *Vide* Dr. Suali's edition of the *Śaddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti*, chapter on *Bauddha darśana*.

⁷ अर्थाद्वैतचतुरः पुनराह । इह प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिः प्रयोजनवत्तया व्याप्ता... (Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatārikā, chap. i, p. 17, published in Jaina Yāśovijaya granthamālā of Benares).

⁸ *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition of the Nyāyāvatāra with vivṛti which has been published by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta.

Arcata was the author of the following work on Logic:—

Hetu-bindu-vivaraṇa, called in Tibetan Gtan-tshigs-thigs-paḥi-hgrel-wa, being a commentary on the Hetu-bindu of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, She, Folios 205—375. It is divided into four chapters treating respectively of (1) Identity (in Tibetan: Rañ-bshin, and in Sanskrit: *Svabhāva*); (2) Effect (in Tibetan: hbras-bu, and in Sanskrit: *Kārya*); (3) Non-perception (in Tibetan: Mi-dmigs-pa, and in Sanskrit: *Anupalabdhi*); and (4) Explanation of Six Characteristics (in Tibetan: Mtshan-ñid-drug-bśad-pa, and in Sanskrit: *Ṣaḍlakṣaṇa-vyākhyā*). In the beginning of the work it is stated that Arcaṭa was a Brāhmaṇa, and from the concluding part it appears that he lived in Kāśmīra. The Tibetan version ends thus:—

“In the city of Kāśmīra, the pith of Jambudvīpa, the commentary (on the work) of Dharmakīrti, who was the best of sages, was translated. From this translation of Pramāṇa the pith of holy doctrines, let the unlearned derive wisdom.”²

127. AŚOKA
(ABOUT 900 A.D.).

Āśoka, otherwise known as Paṇḍita Āśoka or Ācārya Āśoka, is called in Tibetan Mya-nan-med. It is stated that through his spiritual instructions³ Candrarāma (q.v.) was able to behold the face of Avalokiteśvara the Lord of supreme mercy and Tārā the saviouress.

Āśoka quotes Dharmottara⁴ (q.v.) and must therefore have flourished after 847 A.D. We may approximately place him at about 900 A.D.

¹ The volume *She*, containing this work, was brought down by the British Mission to Tibet in 1904. I borrowed it from the Government of India.

[illegible]

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, She, folio 375).

[illegible]

Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 95, Sarat Chandra Das's edition, Calcutta).

⁴ तदेतत् सकलमालोभ भक्षणधर्मात्तरेणैदमुक्तम् । न चात्रावयवः क्रियावान् । अवयवेषु च क्रियावत्स विभागो जायते ।

(*Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, in six Nyāya Tracts, edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Shastri, Calcutta p. 8.)

He wrote two logical treatises,¹ viz. *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* (Refutation of the whole) and *Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā* (Horizon of the refutation of generality extended). The first work, viz. *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, which begins with a salutation to Samantabhadra, upholds the theory that the whole (*avayavī*) is a mere collection of its parts (*avayava*) beyond which it has no separate existence.² There is no eternal relation³ called inherence (*samavāya*) existing between a whole and its parts.

The second work, viz. *Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā*, begins with a resolution to oppose those who maintain that there is a category named generality (*sāmānya*) which, being one and eternal, abides in many individual objects. It is argued that though we can see fingers as individual things, we cannot see fingeriness as a generality pervading all fingers.

That Aśoka had to defend himself against the attacks of many Brāhmaṇa philosophers is evident from the last verse of his *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* which runs as follows:—

“Having uprooted the numerous thorns of criticism fabricated by wicked intellects, I have cleansed the broad moral path of our Teacher. Let people removing their spites, move on by this path.”⁴

128. CANDRA GOMIN (JUNIOR).
(ABOUT 925 A.D.).

Candra Gomin,⁵ called in Tibetan: Zla-wa-dge-bśhen, was born in a Kṣatriya family in the east as
His life. Vārendra (modern Rajshahye in Bengal).

He was endowed with a very keen intellect and acquired distinction in literature, grammar, logic, astronomy, music, fine arts

¹ The two treatises *Avayavi-nirākaraṇa* and *Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā* are included in the “Six Nyāya Tracts,” edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Shastri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.

² ननु भवद्भिरसन्नेव अवयवौ प्रतिज्ञायते स कथं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः ।

(*Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, p. 78).

आपकन्नित्य मेकञ्च सामान्यं येः प्रकल्पितम् ।

मोक्षप्रवृत्तिर्दे तेषां तदभावाः प्रसाध्यते ॥

(*Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā*, Calcutta, p. 64).

एवं मया बड्धु दुर्धर्माणि निर्मिषेयुः

प्रत्युदयेषु अलु दूषणकण्डकेषु ।

आचार्यैर्नौतिपथ एव विशोषितोऽयम्

उत्सार्यमत्सरमनेन जनः प्रयातु ॥

(*Avayavi-nirākaraṇa*, p. 93).

⁵ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 145—146, 148—153; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan* edited in the original Tibetan by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta, pp. 95—96.

and the science of medicine. Under Ācārya Sthiramati he learnt the Sūtra and Abhidharma Piṭakas of the Buddhist scripture, and was converted to Buddhism by the Vidyādhara Ācārya Aśoka. He had an ardent faith in the Buddhist god Avalokiteśvara and the goddess Tārā.¹ He was offered in marriage a daughter of the king of Vārendra. Being told that she was named Tārā, which was the name of his tutelary deity, he, thinking it improper to accept her hand shrank from her with fear. Upon this the king became angry and put Candra Gomin into a chest which was thrown into the Ganges. The chest was carried down until it stopped at an island at the place where the Ganges flows into the ocean. Candra Gomin with deep reverence offered a prayer to goddess Tārā by whose blessing he got out of the chest. He resided in the island, which was in course of time named Candra-dvīpa² or the island of Candra. He as a Buddhist devotee (*upāsaka*) established there stone-images of Avalokiteśvara and Tārā. At first only fishermen (*kaivarta*) settled in the island, but afterwards other people came to live there. Gradually the island became a town.

There was another Candra Gomin called Candra Gomin the senior who went to Ceylon and on his way back found in Southern India, in the house of Vararuci, Nāga Śeṣa's (Patañjali's) Bhāṣya on Pāṇini's grammar. Finding that it contained "many words but few thoughts," he himself composed a commentary on Pāṇini, which was named Candra-vyākaraṇa.³ Afterwards he came to Nālandā—the store-house of knowledge—and met there Candra-kīrti, the famous commentator on the Mādhyamika Philosophy of Ārya Nāgārjuna. Candra Gomin himself was a follower of the Yogācāra system expounded by Ārya Asaṅga. While Candra Kīrti and Candra Gomin entered upon philosophical discussions people used to observe⁴: "Alas! the text

¹ For Candra Gomin's "Ārya-Tārā-antarbeli-vidhi" vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Sragdharā-stotra*, Introduction, pp. xx, xxi.

² Candra-dvīpa is situated in the district of Barisal in South-eastern Bengal at a place where the Padmā, which is a main outlet of the Ganges, falls into the ocean. Vārendra, in which Candra Gomin was born, is identical with the Rajshahye division in North-eastern Bengal through which the Padmā flows.

³ For Candra-vyākaraṇa vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Kaccāyana and "Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography, as preserved in Tibet"* in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. iii, No. 2, 1907. The Candra-vyākaraṇa in the original Sanskrit has been printed in Germany.

⁴ ཀྱུ་མ་འཕགས་པ་གྲུ་སྒྲུབ་གཞིང་ ॥

ལ་ལའི་སྒྲན་ལ་ལ་ལའི་དྲག་ ।

མི་ཕམ་འཕགས་པ་ཐོགས་མེད་གཞིང་ ।

སྒྲུ་པོ་གུན་ལ་བདུད་རྩི་རྩོད་ ।

Upag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 96.

of Ārya Nāgārjuna is medicine to some but poison to others, whereas the text of invincible Ārya Asaṅga is very ambrosia to all men." It is further stated that Candra Gomin threw the original manuscript of his grammar into a well at Nālandā, thinking that it was not better than the one which Candra Kīrti had written. At that time Tārā and Avalokiteśvara appeared before him saying: "Though Candra Kīrti is overwhelmed with pride as a sage, your work is more useful than all others and will do immense good to the world." They raised the manuscript from this well, which was thence reputed as "Candra's well" (in Sanskrit: *Candra-kūpa* and in Tibetan: Tsandrahi-khron-pa), the water of which was wont to be drunk by people in the belief that thereby their intellect would become sharp. Candra Kīrti was, however, a great admirer of Candra Gomin. When the latter arrived at Nālandā the monks refused to give him a reception, saying that it was not proper for priests to welcome a mere devotee (*upāsaka*). Hearing this, Candra Kīrti brought three chariots, two of which were occupied by himself and Candra Gomin respectively, while in the third was placed an image of Mañjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning. The chariots passed through the town in a great procession, attended by the whole body of priests who came really to recite hymns to Mañjuśrī, but apparently to accord a fitting welcome to Candra Gomin.¹ It is not known as to whether the Candra Gomin lived at a time when Śīla, son of Śrī Harṣa, reigned in Kanoj and Siṃha of the Licchavi dynasty reigned in Vārendra. The famous poet Ravi Gupta was a contemporary of Bharṣa, son of Siṃha. Śrī Harṣa seems to be the same as king Harṣa Vardhana who was a contemporary of Hwen-thsang and reigned in 647 A.D. His son Śīla seems, on a rough calculation, to have reigned in 700 A.D., when his contemporary Candra Gomin must also have lived. Jaina Hema Candra Sūri, who lived during 1088—1172 A.D., refers to Candra Gomin while Jayāditya,² the famous author of the *Kāśikā-vṛtti*, who died in 661—662 A.D.,³ does not mention him. This may be explained on the supposition that Candra Gomin lived after Jayāditya, but preceded Hema Candra.

The other Candra Gomin called Candra Gomin the junior seems to have lived about 925 A.D., as his preceptor Ārya Aśoka (q.v.) flourished about 900 A.D. It is not known with certainty as to whether Candra Gomin, the author of *Candra Vyākaraṇa*, was identical with the sage of that name who was a contem-

¹ *Vide* Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzañ, pp. 95—96.

² *Vide* Professor F. Kielhorn's "Indra Gomin and other grammarians" in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. xv, June 1886, pp. 181, 184.

³ *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. lvii.

porary of Candra Kīrti. But it may be asserted safely that Candra Gomin, the logician, was different from either.

Candra Gomin was the author of the following work on Logic: *Nyāyāloka-siddhi*, or *Nyāya-siddhyāloka*, called in Tibetan: *Rigs-pa-grub-paḥi-sgron-ma*, signifying "a lamp of logical reasoning." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folios 200—201. The translation was prepared by Paṇḍita Śrī Sita-prabha and the interpreter-monk Vairocana.

129. PRAJÑĀKARA GUPTA (ABOUT 940 A.D.).

Prajñākara Gupta,² called in Tibetan *Śeṣ-rab-hbyuñ-gnas-shas*, lived at the time of Maha Pāla, who died in 940 A.D. He was a lay devotee and is quite different from Prajñākara Maṭi, who was a monk and keeper of the southern gate of the university of Vikrama-śilā during the reign of Canaka in 983 A.D. Prajñākara Gupta was the author of the following works:—

Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan*, which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ which is divided into two parts. The first part extends over Folios 1—352 of volume *Te*, and the second part Folios 1—328 of volume *She* of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*. The translation was prepared by the great Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Bhavya-rāja and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-lan-śeṣ-rab*. Subsequently, it was looked through by Sumati and the interpreter *Blo-lan-śeṣ-rab*. The translation has the advantage of having been assisted by numerous sages of the great monastery of Vikramaśilā in Middle India, under the supervision of the great wise Paṇḍita Śrī Sunaya-śrī Mitra and also of the wise Paṇḍita Kumāraśrī of the model city of Kāśmīra.

Sahāvalambha-nīścaya, called in Tibetan *Lhan-cig-dmigs-pa-ñes-pa*, signifying "the ascertainment of objects and their knowledge arising together." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, Folios 301—308. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Paṇḍita Śānti Bhadra and the Tibetan

¹ I have used the India Office copy.

² *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 230, 235; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 116.

³ I consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim, which I visited in June, 1907.

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ of the village of Señ-dkar in the province of Hbro (Do).

130. ĀCĀRYA JETĀRI
(940—980 A.D.).

Jetāri¹ or Ācārya Jetāri, called in Tibetan Dgra-las-rgyal-wa, was born of a Brāhmaṇa family. His father, Garbhapāda, lived in Vārendra at the court of Rājā Sanātana, who was a vassal to the Pala kings of Magadha. Being expelled by his kinsmen, Jetāri became a Buddhist devotee and worshipped Mañjuśrī, by whose grace he became a perfect master of sciences. He received from king Maha Pāla the royal diploma of Paṇḍita of the University of Vikramaśilā.

The famous Dīpaṅkara or Śrījñāna Atiśa is said, when very young, to have learnt five minor sciences from Jetāri. Maha Pāla reigned up to 940 A.D. and Dīpaṅkara was born in 980 A.D. Their contemporary, Jetāri, must have lived between those dates².

He was the author of the following works³ on Logic :—

Hetu-tattva-upadeśa, called in Tibetan Gtan-tshigs-kyi-de-kho-na-ñid-bstan-pa, signifying “instruction on the real nature of the middle term in a syllogism.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 344—354. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Paṇḍita Kumāra-kalasa and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ.

Dharma-dharmi-viniścaya, called in Tibetan Chos-dañ-chos-can-gtan-la-dwab-pa, signifying “determination of the minor and major terms.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 354—359.

Bālāvatāra-tarka, called in Tibetan Biś-wa-hjug-pahi-rtog-ge, signifying “children’s introduction to Logic.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 359—372. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Nāga Rakṣita and the Tibetan interpreter of the province of Sum-pa (in Amdo) named Dpal-mchog-dañ-pohi-rdo-rje. The work begins thus :—

“Who by the lustre of his sermon has completely dispersed and cleared the veil of the gloom of ignorance, who is a single

¹ Vide Tārānātha’s Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 230—233 : and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 116.

² Vide the “Journal” of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. i, part i, p. 8.

³ The Volume Ze, of the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, containing Jetāri’s works, was lent to me by the India Office, London.

lamp to three worlds—may that Bhagavān long remain victorious.”¹ It consists of three chapters named respectively: (1) Perception; (2) Inference for one’s own self; and (3) Inference for the sake of others.

131. JINA
(ABOUT 940 A.D.).

Jina, called in Tibetan *Rgyal-wa-can*, was the author of the following work:—

Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi rgyan-gyi-hgrel-bśad*, a voluminous work, the Tibetan version of which occupies volumes De and Ne of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Ḥdo*. This version was prepared by Paṇḍita Dīpaṅkara Rakṣita of Vikramaśīlā (who arrived in Tibet in 1045 A.D.) and the Tibetan interpreter, Byaṅ-chub-śes-rab of Shaṅ-shuṅ.

Jina, the author of the original work, is probably the same as Jina Bhadra of Koṅkana,² who was a contemporary of Vāgīśvarakīrti, about 940 A.D.

132. RATNAKĪRTI
(ABOUT 940—1000 A.D.).

Ratnakīrti,³ called in Tibetan *Rin-chen-grags*, was a Professor at the University of Vikramaśīlā. As he was a teacher of Ratnākara Śānti (q.v.) he must have flourished about 950 A.D. This Ratnakīrti, designated as *Mahāpaṇḍita*, deeply erudite, is different from the sage of that name who was patronised by King Vimala Candra of Bengal, Kāmarūpa and Tirhut about 650 A.D.

Ratnakīrti criticises the views of Dharmottara,⁴ Nyāya-

གང་གིས་གསུང་རབ་པོ་དེར་གཏི་མུག་གིས་॥

མུན་པའི་རབ་པོ་མ་པར་གྱིས་མཛད་གསལ་॥

ས་གསུམ་གནས་ན་ལྷོན་མ་གཅིག་བྱ་ཡི་॥

བཅོམ་ཐོན་པད་ས་དྲ་ཡུན་རིང་རུལ་གཏར་ཅིག་॥

(*Bstan-hgyur*, *Ḥdo*, Ze, folio 359).

² Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 235.

³ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 234—235, and 172, 174: also *Upag-ḥsam-ljon-bzañ*, p. 105, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta.

The colophons of *Apoḥasiddhi* and *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi* run as follows:—

कतिरियं महापण्डितरत्नकीर्तिपादानाम् ॥

नाकारस्य न वाङ्मस्य तत्त्वतो विधिबाधनम् ।

वचिरेव हि संख्या रुढत्यापि तु नादवेः ॥

bhūṣaṇa¹ and Vācaspati Misra² on the subjects of *apoha* (exclusion) and *kṣaṇa-bhaṅga* (momentariness).

He wrote two logical treatises,³ viz. *Apohasiddhi* and *Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi*, one of which begins with a salutation to Lokanātha and the other to Samanta Bhadra. The first work, which deals with the doctrine of *apoha*⁴, propounds that a word while denoting a thing positive excludes it from all other things different from it, that is, a word bears a negative denotation along with a positive one. The second work⁵ attempts, through affirmative and negative inferences, to prove that all things are momentary by showing that they do not require three moments for their production, continuance and destruction.

Ratnakīrti is said to have written two other treatises, viz. *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*⁶ and *Citrādvaitasiddhi*

133. RATNA VAJRA
(ABOUT 979—1040 A.D.).

Ratnavajra,⁷ called in Tibetan Rin-chen-rdo-rje, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kāśmīra. His ancestors were deeply versed in the śāstra of the Tīrthikas. His father, Hari Bhadra, was the first convert to Buddhism in his family. Ratnavajra, who was an *upāsaka* (lay devotee), studied by himself up to the 36th year of his life all the Buddhist sūtras, mantras and sciences. After this he came to Magadha and Vajrāsana (Buddha-Gayā)

एवेन यद् धर्मांतरः—आरोपितस्य वाच्यत्वस्य विधिनिषेधौ। इत्यलौकिकम्-
अनागमम् अतार्किकौय कथयति - तदपहसितम्।

(Apohasiddhi, pp. 16—17).

¹ यच्च न्यायभूषणेन सूत्र्यादिग्रहणे तदुपकार्याशेषवस्तुराशिग्रहप्रसङ्गननुक्तं तदभि-
प्रायानवशादनफलम् ..

(Apohasiddhi, pp. 11, 14. Also Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi, p. 58.)

² यदप्यवोचद् वाचस्पतिः जातिमत्य व्यक्तयः...

(Apohasiddhi, p. 4, pp. 7, 8, 10). Also Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi, p. 58, Calcutta edition.)

³ The Apohasiddhi and Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi are included in the "Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts," edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Shāstri in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta.

⁴ नास्माभिरबोधशब्देन विधिरेव केवलोऽभिप्रेतः। नापि अन्यव्यावृत्तिमात्रं किन्तु अन्योपोह-
विशिष्टोविधिः शब्दानामर्थः ॥

(Apohasiddhi, p. 3, Calcutta edition).

⁵ प्रकृतेः सर्वधर्माणां यदोषान्मुक्तेरिच्छते।

स एव तीर्थनिर्माथी क्षणभङ्गः प्रसाधतः ॥

(Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi, p. 77, Calcutta edition).

⁶ Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, pp. 68, 71.

⁷ Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 240.

where he beheld the face of Cakra-saṃvara, Vajravarāhī and many other deities, by whose grace he completely mastered the Buddhist śāstras. He received the royal diploma of the University of Vikramaśilā and was appointed a gate-keeper of the university. Afterwards he came back to Kāśmīra, whence he went through Udyāna (Kabul) to Tibet, where he was known by the name of Ācārya. He flourished during the reign of Canaka, and his approximate date may be placed between 970 A.D. and 1040 A.D. He was the author of the following work :—

Yukti-prayoga, called in Tibetan Rigs-paḥi-sbyor-wa, signifying “application of reasoning” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 372—373. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śrī Śubhūti-śānta and the interpreter-monk of Shu-chen, named Tiñ-ñe-hḍsin-bzañ-po.

134. JINA MITRA
(ABOUT 1025 A.D.).

Jina Mitra² was a native of Kāśmīra who, together with Sarvajña Deva, Dāna-śīla and others, visited Tibet and helped the Tibetans in the work of translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan. Jina Mitra lived about 1025 A.D., when his contemporary king Mahī Pala reigned in Bengal. He wrote the undermentioned work on Logic :—

Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha, called in Tibetan Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-don-bḥdus-pa, which contains the purport of Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, She, Folios 115—116. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Surendrabodhi, and the interpreter of Shuchen, named Vande-yeś-ṣe.

135. DĀNAŚĪLA
(ABOUT 1025 A.D.).

Dānaśīla,⁴ also called Dānaśrīla, was born in Kāśmīra about 1025 A.D., when Mahī Pala II was reigning in Bengal. He was a contemporary of Parahita Bhadra, Jina Mitra, Sarvajña Deva and Tilopā. He visited Tibet and co-operated in the propaganda

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of the India Office, London.

² Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 226; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzañ*, pp. xvi, 115.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 225—226; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzañ*, p. xlv.

of the translations of Sanskrit books into Tibetan. He was the author of the following work on Logic :—

Pustaka-pāṭhopāya, called in Tibetan *Gles-bam-bk'lag-paḥi-thabs*, signifying the method of reading books. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folio 270. The translation was prepared by the author himself.

136. JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ MITRA
(ABOUT 1040 A.D.).

Jñāna-śrī Mitra,² designated as a great pillar of the University of Vikramaśilā, was born in Gauḍa. He was at first admitted into the Śrāvaka school of Buddhism, but afterwards imbibed faith in the Mahāyāna. Dīpaṅkara or Śrī-jñāna Atīśa (born in 980 A.D.) is said to have been much indebted to him. Jñāna-śrī Mitra was appointed a gate-keeper of the university of Vikramaśilā by Canaka who reigned in Magadha. Jñāna-śrī Mitra was attached to the University of Vakramaśilā even in 1040 A.D. when Dīpaṅkara Atīśa left for Tibet. Naropā while visiting Vikramaśilā got down from his conveyance leaning on the right arm of Atīśa and left arm of Jñāna-śrī Mitra. The Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century quotes³ Jñāna-śrī, who is perhaps the same as Jñāna-śrī Mitra. He was the author of the following work on Logic :—

Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva-siddhi, called in Tibetan *Rgyu-daṅ-hbras-buḥi-ṇo-wo-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of the relation of cause and effect.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 413—418. The translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ. Subsequently, it was retouched and published by the Nepalese Paṇḍita Ananta-śrī and the interpreter-monk afore-mentioned.

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 235—242; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, pp. 117—120.

³ *Vide* the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha-darśana* :—

तदुक्तं ज्ञानप्रिया

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तस्य भावा अप्ती ।

सत्ताश्चिरिद्वार्थकर्माणि नितेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा ॥

नायैकैव विद्यान्यथा परकृतेनापि क्रियादिर्भवेत् ।

देष्टा.पे क्षणभङ्गसन्ततिरतः साध्ये च विश्राम्यति ॥

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

137. JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ BHADRA
(ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

Jñāna-śrī Bhadra,¹ called in Tibetan Ye-śes-dpal-bzan-po, was a great logician. He was born in a Brāhmaṇa family of Kāśmīra² and became afterwards a convert to Buddhism. As junior to Naropā he lived about 1050 A.D. He visited Tibet where he was employed in translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan. In the land of the Lamas he was well known under the name of "Kha-che-jñāna-śrī"³ or Kāśmīrian Jñāna-śrī. He was the author of the following work on Logic:—

Pramāṇa vinīścaya-ṭikā⁴ called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-par-ñes-paḥi-hgrel-bśaḍ, which is a commentary on the Pramāṇa-vinīścaya of Dharmakīrti and which begins with a salutation to Sarvajña. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *We*, Folios 188—322. The translation was prepared by the author himself with the co-operation of the interpreter-monk Chos-kyi-brtson-bgruṣ.

138. RATNĀKARA ŚĀNTI
(ABOUT 1040 A.D.).

Ratnākara Śānti,⁵ called Kalikāla-sarvajña, was known to the Tibetans as Ācārya Śānti or simply Śāntipa. He was ordained in the order of the Sarvāstivāda school of Odantapura, and learnt the Sūtra and Tantra at Vikramaśilā from Jetāri, Ratnakīrti⁶ and others. Thereafter he was appointed by King Canaka (who died in 983 A.D.) to be a gate-keeper of the University of Vikramaśilā, where he defeated the Tīrthika disputants. At the invitation of the king of Ceylon he visited that island where he spread the Buddhist doctrine. He was the author of a work on

¹ Jñāna-śrī Bhadra was perhaps the same as Jñāna-siddha Bhadra mentioned in the *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 117.

² *Vide* the Colophon of *Pramāṇa-vinīścaya-ṭikā*. *Vide* also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No. 3" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. New series, Vol. iii, No. 7, 1907.

³ *Vide* *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 408.

⁴ I consulted the Tibetan version of this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim.

⁵ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 234, 235; and *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, pp. 117, cx. The Tibetan equivalent for the name Ratnākara Śānti is རིན་ཆེན་འགྲུང་གནས་ཤིང་།

⁶ This Ratnakīrti is different from the sage of that name who was patronised by King Vimala Candra of Bengal, Kāmarūpa and Tirhut, about 650 A.D. (*vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 172, 174; *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 105, Calcutta edition; and my discussion under the head Vinita Deva in the *Buddhist Logic*). This earlier Ratnakīrti, known through a commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, wrote *Kalyāṇa-kāṇḍa* and *Dharmavi-nīścaya* embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ku.

Chanda (prosody) called *Chando-ratnākara*¹ and of the following works² on Logic :—

Viñāpti-mātra siddhi, called in Tibetan *Rnam-par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-do-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of a mere communication of knowledge.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 335—338. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Paṇḍita Śānti Bhadra, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-hod of the province of Hbro (Do). Subsequently, it was published by the same Paṇḍita and *Klog-skyas-śes-rab-brtsegs*.

Antar-vyāpti,³ called in Tibetan *Nañ-gi-khyab-pa*, signifying 'internal inseparable connection.' It is embodied in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 338—344. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hod. The work argues that the inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term can be conceived without the aid of an example in which the things signified by the two terms co-abide, nay, without the aid even of a minor term in which we are to prove the co-presence of the things, e.g. fiery because smoky.

139. YAMĀRI (ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

Yamāri was specially versed in Grammar and Logic. But he was very poor. Once, being unable to support his family and children, he came to Vajrāsana (Buddha-Gayā). There he related his poverty to a Yogin, who replied: "You Paṇḍits despise Yogins and do not solicit dharma from them, hence this has come to pass." Saying this, he uttered the Vasudhara benediction in virtue of which Yamāri rose to opulence. He afterwards received the royal diploma of the University of Vikramaśilā.⁴ He lived during the time of Naya Pāla who reigned in 1050 A.D. He was the author of the following work :—

¹ For an account of the *Chandoratnākara* see Satischandra Vidyabhusana's "Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography as preserved in Tibet," in J.A.S. B., New series, vol. III, no 2, 1907.

² The volume Ze of the *Bstan-hgyur*, section *Mdo*, containing *Ratnākara* Śānti's works, was lent to me by the India Office, London.

³ The Sanskrit original of 'Antarvyāpti' or more fully 'Antarvyāpti-samarthana' has recently been edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Shastri, M.A., C.I.E., of Calcutta, in the Bibliotheca Indica series. It begins thus:—इह सत्त्वमर्थतयाकारित्वं तदितरलक्षणयोगात् । तच्च क्रमयोगपश्चात्त्यां व्याप्तं परस्परव्यवच्छेदलक्षणत्वादनयोः । प्रकारान्तरेण करणसम्भवात् । It ends thus:—सत्त्वमर्थतिसमयनं समाप्तमिति । कृतिरित्य रत्नाकरशान्तिपादानाम् ॥

⁴ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 247, 253.

Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-rgyan-gyi-hgrel-bśad, which is an annotation on the Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra of Prajñākara Gupta. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a very voluminous Tibetan translation which covers volumes Phe, pp. 104—342 and the whole of volumes Be, Me, and Tse of the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo. The translation was prepared by Paṇḍita Sumati and the interpreter Blo-lan-śes-rab in the monastery of Śñe-than near Lhasa. The volume Be ends thus:—"From the immeasurable merit acquired by me by composing this regular annotation, may the world, subduing its adversary death, obtain the indestructible and perfected Nirvāṇa."¹

140. ŚĀṆKARĀNANDA
(ABOUT 1050 AD.).

Śāṅkarānanda,² called in Tibetan Bde-byed-dgah-wa, was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Kāśmīra. He was learned in all sciences, and was above all an expert in Logic. He intended to write an original work on Logic refuting Dharmakīrti, but in a dream he was told by Mañjuśrī: "Since Dharmakīrti is an Ārya (an elect), one cannot refute him, and if thou seest m stake in him, it is the mistake of thine own understanding." Thereupon Śāṅkarānanda repented and composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-vārtika in seven chapters. He flourished³ during the time of Naya Pāla, who reigned in 1050 A.D. He was the author of the following works on Logic:—

Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā, called in Tibetan Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-bśad, being an annotation on the Pramāṇa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ which covers volumes Pe, pages 103--354 and Phe, pages 1—104 of the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo.

1

འཕྲིན་པ་ཞེན་ཏེ་ཀླ་འདི་ནི་བྱས་པ་ལས ॥
བསོད་ནམས་ཚད་མེད་བསམས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ ॥
དེས་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གཤིན་ཇེའི་དབྱ་འཛོམས་ནི ॥
མི་ཟད་རབ་བསྐྱབ་གཉིས་མེད་ཐོབ་པར་ཤོག ॥

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Be, folio 303).

² Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 247, 349; and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, pp. 107, 120.

³ Some maintain that Śāṅkarānanda was a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti. On this point Lama Tārānātha observes:—"The Brāhmaṇa Śāṅkarānanda appeared at a much later time, and to call him a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti would be a great confusion."—Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 188.

⁴ I consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang, in Sikkim, in 1907.

Sambandha-parīkṣānusāra, called in Tibetan *Hbrel-pa-brtag-pahi-rjes-su-hbrañ-wa*, which is a commentary on the Sambandha-parīkṣā of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 24—39. The translation was prepared by the great Indian Paṇḍita Parahita, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk *Dgañ-wa-hi-rdo-rje*.

The work begins thus :—

“By whom connection with the world has been renounced, in whom there are no “I” and “mine,” who is called free from concerns—to that Omniscient One I bow down.”²

Apohasiddhi, called in Tibetan *Sel-wa-grub-pa*, signifying “establishment of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites” The Sanskrit original of his work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 308—334. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Paṇḍita Manoratha and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-ldan-śes-rab* in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work opens thus :—

“The Omniscient One who is free from all mistakes and who looks to the interests of living beings in all times, saluting him and relying on his mercy, I elucidate the puzzle of ‘self’ and ‘others’ connected with the doctrine of *Apoha*.”⁴

Pratibandha-siddhi, called in Tibetan *Hbrel-pa-grub-pa*, signifying “establishment of the causal connection.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the *Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Folios 334—335. The translation was prepared by Paṇḍita Bhāgya-rāja and the interpreter *Blo-ldan-śes-rab*.

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of India Office, London.

²

གང་གིས་འབྲུག་པ་སྤངས་ཀྱང་པ །

འགྲོ་བ་བདག་དང་བདག་གི་མེ །

གཟུང་འཛིན་མེད་པ་ཅན་གསུངས་པ །

ཀུན་མཁྱུན་དེ་ལ་བྱུག་འཆམ་ལོ །

(*Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, folio 24).

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴

ཀུན་མཁྱུན་འབྲུག་བྱལ་བྱས་གསུམ་གནས་པ་ཡི །

ཇོན་ཅོམས་ཇི་གཞིན་གཟིགས་པ་ལ་བརྟུན་དེ །

བརྩོ་ལ་གནས་ནས་སེལ་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི །

བདག་གཞན་རབ་རྩ་སྒྲིབ་པའི་འབྲུག་བསལ་བྱས །

(*Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, folio 308).

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy.

141. ŚUBHAKARA GUPTA
(ABOUT 1080 A.D.).

Śubhakara Gupta was a disciple of Abhayākara Gupta, high-priest of the monastic University of Vikramaśilā. He flourished during the reign of Rāma Pāla¹ and resided for some time at the shrine of Eṭapuri erected by Rāma Pāla's wife. As the reign of Rāma Pāla commenced about 1080 A.D. Śubhakara Gupta must have lived at the end of the 11th century A.D.

He wrote a treatise on Logic in which he closely followed Dharmakīrti. His logical views are quoted and criticised by the Jaina logician Haribhadra Sūri² who designates him as Śubha Gupta

142. MOKṢĀKARA GUPTA
(ABOUT 1100 A.D.).

Mokṣākara Gupta, called in Tibetan Thar-paḥi-hbyun-gnas-sbas, was the High-priest of the great monastery of Jagaddala³ at the confluence of the Gaṅgā (Padmā) and the Karatoyā (perhaps near Bogra in North Bengal). He seems to have flourished early in the 12th century A.D., after the termination of the rule of the Pāla kings. He wrote the undermentioned work on Logic:—

Tarka bhāṣā, called in Tibetan Rtog-gehi-skad, signifying 'technicalities of Logic.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 373—413. The translation was prepared by the interpreter-monk Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-brtan-po without the co-operation of any Paṇḍita. The work is divided into three chapters named respectively: (1) Perception; (2) Inference for one's own self; and (3) Inference for the sake of others. It begins thus:—

1 རྩ་མ་བླ་ལའི་བརྩམ་མས་བུལ་བའི་ཨེ་ཏ་ཤུ་རེ་ལྷ་ཁང་དུ་བསྐྱོམ་མཛད་ཅིང་སྟོབ་བུ་བྱ་ན་གར་གུལ་ཏ་
དང་མོད་ཀྱི་ག་ལོ་སྟགས་དང་བཅས་

(Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan, p. 120, edited by S. C. Das).

² Haribhadra Sūri observes:—

यथोक्त वार्तिकानुसारिणा शुभगुप्तेन। रूपान्तरं खल्वक्षणादन्यन् विकल्पेन सामान्य-
लक्षणाख्यम् उभयोर्वैकल्याचोः प्रतिभासते स्मरतीव सत्यर्थे अपोद्वात्रये तच्च रूपान्तरे संकेतः।

(Anekāntajaya-patātākāṭikā, p. 117).

³ འཛིན་ག་ཏུ་ལའི་གུལ་ཁང་ཆེན་པོའི་སྟགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་དགེ་བར་ཐར་པའི་འབྲུང་གནས་སྐས་པས་གྱུར་བའི་

(Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 413).

For the identification of Jagaddala see Rāma Pāla-carita.

I have consulted the India Office copy.

“ Bowing down to the Teacher, the Lord of the world, I elucidate Tarkabhāṣā for the sake of introducing children of small intellect to the system of Dharmakīrti.”¹

ཐཱ་མ་འཇིག་རྟེན་དབང་བཅུད་ནས
 བྱེས་པ་ཡིད་གཞུངས་རྒྱུང་པ་རྟེན་སེམས།
 ཚེས་ཀྱི་བྲགས་པའི་ཕྱགས་མཉན་ཕྱིར
 རྟོག་གཏི་མཛད་ནི་རབ་གསལ་བུ། ॥

(*Bstan-hgyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folio 373).

CHAPTER IV.

The Decline of Buddhist Logic.¹

143. THE CONTENTIOUS SPIRIT OF BUDDHIST LOGIC.

Unlike the Jainas, the Buddhists, in upholding their logical tenets, offered a bold challenge to the Brāhmaṇas. In the second century A.D., the Brāhmaṇic logician Akṣapāda brought out his comprehensive work on Logic called Nyāya-sūtra in which there was an explanation of sixteen categories, including four means of valid knowledge and five members of a syllogism. The Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna, who flourished in the 3rd century A.D., affirmed in opposition to Akṣapāda that a syllogism consisted of three members only. The Brāhmaṇic commentator Vātsyāyana (about 400 A.D.) attempted in vain to defend the position of Akṣapāda until he was overthrown by the Buddhist logician Dignāga who reduced the sixteen categories of Nyāya-sūtra to one, viz. *pramāṇa*, and the four means of valid knowledge to two, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. "It was to dispel the error of Dignāga" that the Brāhmaṇic logician Uddyotakara wrote his Nyāya-vārtika about 635 A.D. He in his turn was assailed by the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti who defended Dignāga.

After Uddyotakara there occurred a long gap in the succession of Brāhmaṇa writers on Logic until in the 9th century A.D. Vācaspati Miśra wrote his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā. By that time the Buddhist Logic had achieved a great triumph as is evident from the Buddhist writings of Devendra Bodhi, Śākya Bodhi, Vinīta Deva, Ravi Gupta, Jinendra Bodhi, Śānta Rakṣita, Kamala Śīla, Kalyāṇa Rakṣita and others. In the 9th and 10th centuries Dharmottara, Arçta and other Buddhist logicians, having attacked the Brāhmaṇic authors, Udayanācārya, a Brāhmaṇa of Mithilā brought out, at the close of the 10th century A.D., his Ātma-tattva-viveka, etc., to refute the views of the Buddhists. Subsequently a large number of logicians such as

¹ Vide V. A. Smith's "Early History of India," my "Indian Missionaries to Foreign Lands in the Buddhistic Age"; my papers on "The influence of Buddhism on the development of Nyāya Philosophy" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, part III for 1898, on "Anuruddha Thera—a learned Pāli author of Southern India in the 12th century A.D.," in J.A.S.B., Vol. I, No. 4, 1905; and on "Ancient Indian Logic: an outline," published in Bhandarkar Commemorative Volume; Dr. Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka; Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner; and "Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan," edited by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta.

Jina Mitra, Prajñākara Gupta, Jetāri, Śaṅkarānanda and Mokṣākara Gupta appeared in the field to vindicate the Buddhist Logic from the attack of Brāhmaṇas. For nearly 800 years from 300 A.D. to 1100 A.D. the Buddhists fought valiantly against the Brāhmaṇas. But at last their principles of thought were almost entirely absorbed into the Brāhmaṇic Logic which left no room for an independent existence of the Buddhist Logic.

144. LOSS OF ROYAL PATRONAGE.

From time to time Buddhism received encouragement and favour from the rulers. As already stated Patronage in the past. the first, second, third and fourth Buddhist Councils were held in Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī, Pāṭalīputra and Jālandhara under the patronage of kings Ajāta-śatru (about 490 B.C.), Kālāśoka (about 390 B.C.), Aśoka (255 B.C.) and Kaniṣka (about 78 A.D.) respectively. The Græco-Bactrian king Menander supported Buddhism, which he accepted as his religion about 150 B.C. King Śrī Harṣa of Kanauj (606—647 A.D.) while revering Śiva and the Sun entertained a special faith in Buddha whose doctrines he defended with much care and enthusiasm.

The Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna (about 300 A.D.) received help from Sātavāhana, a king of the Andhra dynasty. Vasubandhu, another Buddhist logician, was patronised in the 5th century A.D. by certain kings of the Gupta dynasty, viz. Kumāra Gupta, Skanda Gupta, Pura Gupta and Bālāditya. Dignāga, the foremost of Buddhist logicians, was backed up about 500 A.D. by King Simha Varman of the Pallava dynasty.

Though Śaśaṅka Narendra Gupta, King of Central Bengal and a worshipper of Śiva, burnt the Bodhi tree at Buddha-Gayā, destroyed the foot-prints of Buddha at Pāṭalīputra and smashed numerous Buddhist temples and monasteries about 600 A.D., Buddhism could not be totally extirpated by him. The kings of the Pāla dynasty, who ruled in Bengal and Behar during 750—1119 A.D., were Buddhists who bestowed great patronage on the Buddhist teachers and monastic communities.

Since the middle of the 6th century A.D. a great change took place in religion in the Deccan with the accession of the Cālukya kings on the throne at Vātāpi. Buddhism, which had a stronghold there, slowly declined and was gradually superseded by Jainism and Brāhmaṇism. During the two hundred years of Cālukya rule the Paurāṇic forms of Brahmanism grew in popularity.

Numerous temples dedicated to Śiva or Viṣṇu were built and many manuals of worship were compiled. The Rāṣṭrakūṭa King Amoghavarṣa, whose reign extended from 815 A.D. to at

least 877 A.D., was a follower of Digambara Jainism. Under him and his successors Buddhism languished until it finally disappeared in the 12th century A.D.

Unlike the earlier kings the later rulers of the Pallava dynasty, from the 10th century onwards, became worshippers of Śiva, whose emblem the bull was adopted by them as their family crest.

In 1019 A.D. Gāṅgeya Deva of the Cedi race set up a kingdom in Tirhut (Mithilā). He died in 1040 A.D. and was succeeded by his son Karna Deva who was a contemporary of Naya Pāla about 1038—1065 A.D.). Nānya Deva who was a Pramāra Kṣatriya of Karnāta succeeded Karna Deva and reigned in Mithilā from 1089—1125 A.D. These kings, who overthrew Buddhism, brought about the revival of Brāhmaṇism in Mithilā.

Vijaya Sena, a member of the Karnāṭaka Kṣatriya race and a contemporary of Nānya Deva of Mithilā, wrested from the Pāla kings a large part of Bengal about 1119 A.D. Vijaya and his successors Vallāla Sena, Lakṣmaṇa Sena and others who ruled in Bengal up to 1197 A.D. re-established the Brāhmaṇic religion in Bengal in opposition to their predecessors the Pāla kings who had been Buddhists.

Buddhism having thus lost all patronage, the Buddhist Logic could not prosper.

145. ADVENT OF THE MAHOMEDANS.

The Mahomedan invasion is said to have exerted a considerable influence on the disappearance of Buddhism from India. About 1021 A.D. the Hindu Shahiya dynasty of Kāśmīra was extirpated by the Mahomedans, and during the two centuries following there occurred great political disorders in the country. These circumstances led to the decline of Buddhism in Kāśmīra.

Lama Tārānātha, while speaking of Kamala Rakṣitā, observes that Magadha, a stronghold of Buddhism, was attacked by the Turuṣkas (Mahomedans) at the end of the 10th century A.D. while the Buddhist University of Vikramaśilā was burnt by Bakhtiar Khiliji about 1197 A.D. A large proportion of the Buddhist population thought it expedient to embrace the Mahomedan faith. The Buddhists having in large numbers turned Mahomedans, it became impossible for their Logic to attain a further development.

146. THE BRĀHMANIC PREACHERS.

In the seventh century A.D. and onwards many Brāhmanic preachers began to flourish in Southern India to revive the Brāhmanic religion there. The attempts made by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (about 630 A.D.) and Śaṅkarācārya (about 785 A.D.) to re-establish the Brāhmanic faith there are too well known to need a detailed notice. Early in the 12th century A.D. Rāmānuja, the celebrated Vaiṣṇava preacher, flourished in Srīperumātur, 18 miles east-north east of Kāñcīpura (Conjeeveram), and converted the kings of the Cālukya and Cola dynasties to his religion.

As regards Northern India, I have already referred to the efforts made by Udayanācārya of Mithilā in the 10th century to replace Buddhism by the Brāhmanic faith. It is a matter of common knowledge how in the 15th century A.D. Caitanya founded the Vaiṣṇava sect in Bengal and Śaṅkara Deva founded the Mahāpuruṣa sect in Assam. It is not necessary to give here a detailed account of the other sects that were founded in India to supplant Buddhism.

The Brāhmanic faith of new orders being thus established, there were left very few Buddhist writers who could continue to work in the field of Logic.

147. SHELTER IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

While Buddhism was undergoing persecution in India, it was accorded a warm reception in foreign countries. Thousands of enterprising monks visited Nepal, Tibet, China, Mongolia, Corea, Japan, Ceylon, Burmah, Siam, Sumatra, Java, etc., where they were cordially welcomed and accepted as revered preceptors. The Buddhist monks being thus attracted in large numbers, to foreign countries, the field of Buddhist Logic in India was entirely deserted and suffered to grow wild and barren.

Buddha instructed his followers, the monks, to take up the lives of missionaries, saying: "Go ye, Bhikkhus and wander forth for the gain of the many, the welfare of the many, in compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain, for the welfare of gods and men. Proclaim, O Bhikkhus, the doctrine glorious. Preach ye a life of holiness, perfect and pure." Following this instruction many monks turned missionaries. From the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha to the middle of the third century B.C. the Buddhist missionaries were busily engaged in carrying on their propaganda in India. It was about 260 B.C. that Buddhism was carried abroad. The Maurya emperor Aśoka despatched missionaries not only to all his protected states such as those of the Gāndhāras and Kāmbojas, but also to the

Spread of Buddhism
in Asia, Europe and
Africa.

Hellenistic monarchies of the Yona country (Graeco-Bactria), Syria, Egypt Cyrene, Macedonia and Epirus governed respectively by Diodotus, Antiochos Theos, Ptolemy Philadelphos, Magas, Antiochos Gonatas and Alexander as is evident from his edicts.

To preach Buddhism in Ceylon Aśoka sent his own son Mahinda and own daughter Saṅghamittā with a number of priests to that island. Among the numerous learned missionaries that subsequently visited Ceylon the names of Buddha Ghōṣa of Gayā (about 431 A.D.) and Anuruddha Thera of Kāñcīpura (12th century A.D.) deserve a special notice.

Strabo the historian tells us that a Buddhist monk named Zarmana Chagos (Śramaṇācārya), a native of Barygaza (Broach) near Guzerat, went at the head of an embassy from the Indian king Poros to the court of Augustus Caesar at Rome about 29 B.C.

During the reign of the Kuśāna king Kanīṣka and his successors, Buddhist missionaries went in large numbers to Khotan, Khasgar and other provinces of Central Asia.

Buddhism was first known to China in the 2nd century B.C. But it was not till the time of Kanīṣka that arrangements could be made to send missionaries in large numbers to the celestial empire. It will be an impossible task to enumerate the missionaries that visited China during the thousand years of the Christian era. As late as in the 10th century A.D. Dharmadeva of Nālandā visited China where he translated many Sanskrit works into Chinese and received in 1001 A.D. a posthumous title of great honour. Dāna Pāla, a monk of Udyāna, who arrived in China in 980 A.D., was the recipient of a similar honour from the Chinese Emperor. Dharmarakṣa, a learned Buddhist monk of Magadha, who reached China in 1004 A.D. and received a special title of honour from the Chinese Emperor, translated numerous Sanskrit works into Chinese until he died in 1058 A.D. Instances may be enormously multiplied to show how Buddhist monks were received with honour in China.

In the 7th century A.D. Thon-mi-sam-bhota, a minister of king Sroṅ-tsan-gam-po of Tibet, visited Magadha, while in the 8th century A.D. the Indian sages Śānta Raksita and Kamala Śīla of the university of Nālandā and Guru Padma Sambhava of Udyāna were invited at the court of Khri-sroṅ-deu-tsan who ruled in Tibet from 728 A.D. to 864 A.D. About 1038 A.D. Lha-tsun-byañ-chub, a king of Tibet, sent an envoy named Rgya-tshon-señ-ge to invite Dīpaṅkara Śrī-jñāna or Atiśa of Vikramaśīlā and to accompany him to Tibet. In the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th centuries A.D. the number of Buddhist monks of Bengal and Behar that visited Tibet was enormously large. They were usefully employed with the co-operation of lamas to translate Sanskrit books into Tibetan. The Tibetan versions prepared by them were afterwards collected together to constitute the two encyclopaedias of Bkaḥ-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur that were edited

by the great Tibetan sage Bu-ston of the monastery of Shālu near Tashi-lhun-po under orders of the Tibeto-Chinese-Mongol Emperor Kublai Khan in 1270 A.D.¹

Numerous Buddhist monks were also graciously received in Corea, Mongolia, Japan, Nepal, Burma, Siam, Java, Sumatra, etc.

Buddhism in other countries.

148. EXTINCTION OF THE BUDDHISTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES IN INDIA.

I have shown that some of the Buddhists were received with hospitality in foreign countries while others became followers of Islam. The few that remained reverted to the Brāhmanic faith of the Tāntrika, Śaiva or Vaiṣṇava order. The Buddhist systems of thought were absorbed into the Brāhmanic systems, and the Modern School of Brāhmanic Logic was the result of a combination of the Brāhmanic *Nyāya* and the Buddhist science of *Pramāṇa*. The vitality of Buddhism as a separate organism was lost in the 13th century A.D. after which we hear no more of Buddhist logicians.

1 མདོར་ན་ཐོད་བྱ་བྱ་པ་འཛུགས་ནི། Indian Paṇḍitas, who were engaged in translating Sanskrit works into Tibetan, included the following:—

Śānta Rakṣita, Padma-sambhava, Dharmakīrti, Vimala Mitra, Buddha Guhya, Śānti Garbha, Viśuddhi Siṃha, Kamala Śīla, Kusara, Śaṅkara Brāhmaṇa, Śīla Mañju (of Nepal), Ananta Varman, Kalyāṇa Mitra, Jina Mitra, Surendra Bodhi Śīlendra Bodhi, Dāna Śīla, Bodhi Mitra, Muni Varma, Sarvajña Deva, Vidyākara Prabha, Śraddhākara Varma, Mukti Mitra, Buddha Śrī, Buddha Pāla, Dharma Pāla, Prajñā Pāla, Subhāṣita, Prajñā Varma, Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna, Dāna Śrī, Smṛtijñāna-kīrti, Saṅgha Śrī, Jñāna Śrī of Kāśmīra, Candra Rāhula, Dhīra Pāla, Atulya Dāsa, Sumati Kīrti, Amara Candra, Bindu Kalasa, Kumāra Kalasa, Kanaka Varma, Sadbhārata, Jayānanta, Gayādhara, Amogha Vajra, Soma Nātha, Śūnyatā-samādhi Vajra, Jñāna Vajra, Prajñā Guhya, Mahāyāna Vajra, Bāla Candra, Mantra Kalukṣa, Sugata Śrī, Yamāri, Vairocana, Mañju Ghosa, Ravi Kīrti, Prajñā Śrījñāna, Gaṅgādhara, Dhana Gupta, Samanta Śrī, Niṣkalaṅka Deva, Jagat-mitra Nandi, Buddha Śrījñāna, Śākya Śrībhadrā of Kāśmīra, Vibhūti Canda, Dāna Śīla, Saṅgha Śrī, Sambhoga Vajra, Ratna Śrī, Mahāsana of Nepal, Vajra Kīrti of Nepal, Gayā Śrī of Nepal, Kīrti of Nepal, Kumāra, Saṅātana Śrī, Sādhu Kīrti, Vinaya Śrī, Śīla Śrī, Maṇḍala Śrī, Vimala Śrī, Darpaṇa Ācārya, Jaya Deva, Lakṣmīkara, Ratna Śrī, Ananta Śrī, Rāhula Śrī of Tāmra Dvīpa and Kīrti Paṇḍita.

(Vide *Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan*, p. 408).

PART III.

THE MODERN SCHOOL OF INDIAN LOGIC.

SECTION I.

Prakaraṇa—Manual of Logic.

CHAPTER I.

The Nyāya-Prakaraṇa reduces its Categories to one.

1. THE NEO-BRĀHMANIC AGE (CIRCA 900 A.D.—1920 A.D.).

In part II we have seen how Jainism and Buddhism exercised, for several centuries, a potent influence on the system of philosophy and culture of the Brāhmaṇas. In the Deccan, the decline of Buddhism commenced in the seventh century A.D., while in North India the Buddhists became almost extinct by 1200 A.D. The Brāhmaṇas, who survived them, organized their society on a secure basis. They took back into their folds some of their members who had embraced Buddhism or Jainism, but there arose the necessity of making strict rules for the maintenance of the integrity of their society and for the prevention of new admissions into it. It was at this period that different Brāhmanic legislators of different provinces composed treatises imposing laws, restrictions, and injunctions upon people of their province suited to their new local conditions. Thus there grew up a number of different schools of thought and culture, with local colourings of their own, which were quite different from the old schools so universal in their character and application. It may be observed that social exclusiveness became more marked in the Hindu Society at this period with the advent of the Muhammadans in India.

2. COMPOSITION OF THE *Prakaraṇas*, MANUALS OF LOGIC.

Placed in this new environment, the Brāhmanic writers, often under the patronage of local landholders, applied themselves to the study and teaching of Logic in quite a new spirit. The treatises on Logic, which were composed by them, borrowed their forms from the works of the mediaeval school, while for their subject-matter they went back to the works of the ancient school.

The works so composed in this period were technically called *Prakaraṇas*¹ or Manuals of Logic. In the *Parāśara Upapurāṇa* quoted in the commentaries on *Nyāya-sāra* and *Saptapadārthī*, the *prakaraṇa* is defined as a book which concerns itself with the topics of a portion of a *śāstra* which may deal even with matters not included in the *śāstra*, e.g. the *Nyāya-sāra* and *Saptapadārthī*—two very early manuals of Logic—treat in a very lucid way most topics of the *Nyāya sūtra* and *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* respectively, and at the same time some topics not included in those *sūtras*. Many matters which are elaborately treated in the works of the ancient school have been dismissed with scant ceremony in the logical manuals, while some subjects which were merely referred to in the former, have been clearly explained in the latter; for instance, the topics of *chala* (quibble), *jāti* (analogue) and *nigrahasthāna* (points of defeat), which occupied so much space in the works of the ancient school, drew very little attention from the authors of the manuals. On the other hand, the syllogism (*avayava*) which was briefly treated in the ancient works has been elaborately explained in the manuals. This treatment of certain subjects in preference to other subjects was most probably due to the influence of the Jaina and Buddhist systems of Logic which intervened. In respect of their styles also the ancient works differed considerably from the manuals: while the style of the former was mostly aphoristic, the style of the latter was expository. The *parakaraṇas* (manuals) are in fact remarkable for their accuracy and lucidity as well as for their direct handling of various topics in their serial orders. Definitions of terms are broad and accurate and not full of niceties.

3. FOUR CLASSES OF *prakaraṇas*.

The manuals of Logic called *Prakaraṇas* may be principally divided into four classes: (1) The *Nyāya* works treating only of the *pramāṇa* to which the remaining fifteen categories were subordinated; (2) the *Nyāya* works which embody in them the categories of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy; (3) the works which treat of six or seven *Vaiśeṣika* categories assimilating in them the *Nyāya* category of *pramāṇa*, and (4) the works which treat certain topics of the *Nyāya* and certain topics of the *Vaiśeṣika*. Most of the authors on manuals considered it necessary to combine such subjects of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* as would give us a complete

¹

नन्वेवं शास्त्रप्रकरणयोः को भेद इति चेत् ।

शास्त्रैकदेशसंबद्धं शास्त्रकार्यान्तरं द्धितम् ।

आहुः प्रकरणं नाम ग्रन्थभेदं विपश्चितः ॥

(*Saptapadārthī*, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, p. 9).

theory of valid knowledge as well as of the objects which would give rise to that knowledge.

4. NYĀYA-PRAKARAṆA DEVELOPING THE CATEGORY OF *pramāṇa*.

The Jaina and Buddhist writers, who founded the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic, dealt with only one category, viz. *pramāṇa*, the means of valid knowledge. Following them some of the Brāhmanic writers chose only one category, viz. *Pramāṇa*, which they developed in such a way that it could assimilate in itself the remaining fifteen categories of the ancient school. Certain categories, such as *Prāmeya* (objects of knowledge), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitandā* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), and *nigrahasthāna* (the point of defeat) had to be excluded, while other categories were conveniently stuck on to *Pramāṇa* as its sub-divisions. These Brāhmaṇa writers, of whom accounts will shortly be given, were the true representatives of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. The earliest of these writers seem to have been Bhā-sarvajña,¹ who flourished about 950 A.D.

5. BHĀ-SARVAJÑA (ABOUT 950 A.D.).

The first Brāhmanic writer, who attempted to reduce the sixteen categories to one, was Bhā-sarvajña, the celebrated author of Nyāya-sāra.

Nothing is definitely known about the age in which he flourished or the country which he adorned by his birth. He seems to me to have been a native of Kāśmīra. His name, which is very peculiar, bears a close resemblance to the names of Sarvajña Mitra² and Sarvajña Deva³, who lived in Kāśmīra about 775 A.D. and 1025 A.D. respectively.

As the reputed author of Nyāya-sāra, he is mentioned by the Jaina sages Guṇaratna⁴ (1409 A.D.), and Maladhāri Rājaśekhara⁵ (1348 A.D.).

¹ Bhāsarvajña's Nyāya-sāra with Jaya Simha's Nyāyatātparya-dīpikā has been edited by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of Calcutta.

² Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's edition of Sragdharā stotram, published in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Introduction, p. xxx.

³ Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic," pp. 134—135.

⁴ भासर्वज्ञं प्रणौते न्यायसारेऽष्टादशटीकाः । तासु सुखा टीका न्यायभूषणाद्या न्याय-कलिका जयन्तरचिता न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलितर्कश्च ।

(Guṇaratna's Saddarśana-vṛtti, edited by Dr. L. Suali, p. 94).

भासर्वज्ञो न्यायसारतर्कसूत्रविधायकः ।

न्यायसाराभिधे तर्को टीका चष्टादशकुटाः ॥

During their times there were already eighteen commentaries on the Nyāya-sāra. One of them is named Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa, which I believe to be identical with the work of same name quoted by the Buddhist sage Ratnakīrti,¹ preceptor of Ratnākara Śānti,² who lived about 1000 A.D. This is therefore the latest date that we can assign to Bhā-sarvajña. The earliest limit may be fixed at 650 A.D. when there lived the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti³ whose controversy about the fallacy of "non-erroneous contradiction" (*viruddhāvyabhicāri*) is referred to in the Nyāya-sāra.⁴ Bhā-sarvajña was evidently junior to Trilocana, whose fallacies of example have, according to Rāghava Bhaṭṭa, been quoted by him.⁵ On these and other considerations I am inclined to believe that Bhā-sarvajña lived about 950 A.D.

Bhā-sarvajña who attempted to reconstruct Brāhmanic Logic on the plan of Buddhist Logic, must indeed have flourished in Kāśmīra in the 10th century A.D. when Brāhmanism and Buddhism flourished there side by side.

6. BHĀ-SARVAJÑA'S NYĀYA-SĀRA.

The well-known logical treatise, which proceeded from the pen of Bhā-sarvajña, was designated as Nyāya-sāra follows no particular work. Nyāya-sāra, the Essence of Logic. It occupied a remarkable position in the history of Indian Logic. Following the method current in his time, Bhā-sarvajña undertook in his Nyāya-sāra, to treat only of *Pramāṇa* which he divided into three kinds: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*āgama*). This threefold division of *Pramāṇa* furnished a contrast to Akṣapāda who recognized a fourth

न्यायभूषणनाम्नी तु टीका तासु प्रसिद्धिभाक् ।

(*Śaṅkarasāstra-samuccaya* by Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri, published in the Yaśovijaya Granthamālā, Benares).

¹ Ratnakīrti observes:—

यच्च न्यायभूषणेन स्वर्यादिग्रहे तदुपकार्याशेषवस्तुराशिग्रहप्रसङ्गननुक्तं तदभिप्रायानवगाहनफलं ।

(Ratnakīrti's *Apoḥasiddhi*, edited by M.M. Hara Prasad Sastri, p. 11, A.S.B.)

² *Vide* Part II on Buddhist Logic.

³ Dharmakīrti observes:—

विषयव्यभिचारौ अपि संशयहेतुवत्तः ।

⁴ Bhā-sarvajña writes:— (Nyāyabindu, edited by Peterson, p. 115).

एकत्र तुल्यलक्षण विषयहेतुद्वयोपनिपातो विषया व्यभिचारौ इत्येके ।

(Nyāya-sāra, edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, p. 12)


⁵ *Vide* Rāghava Bhaṭṭa's commentary on the Nyāya-sāra in reference to the passage:

अन्ये तु समदेहदारेण अपरान् अष्टावुदाहरणाभासान् वर्णयन्ति ।

(Nyāya-sāra, p. 13, Vidyabhusana's edition).

kind named comparison (*upamāna*). It brought Bhā-sarvajña close to the Sāṃkhyas and Jainas who admitted three kinds of *Pramāṇa*, but distinguished him from the Buddhists who dealt with only two, viz. perception and inference. Like the Buddhist and Jaina writers, he divided inference into that for one's self (*svārthānumāna*) and that for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*), and like them he gave an account of the fallacies of the minor term, the fallacies of example, etc. Quibble, analogue, etc., which had been prominent topics in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, were not altogether overlooked by Bhā-sarvajña who dealt with them in connection with an inference for the sake of others. Salvation (*mokṣa*) was described by him as the soul's attainment of eternal pleasure. In this respect he agreed with the *Prābhākaras* who affirmed that pleasure could be eternal, but differed from *Akṣapāda* who denied the eternality of pleasure.

The scheme laid down in the *Nyāya-sāra*, for the reduction of sixteen categories into one, may be exhibited in the tabular form thus :—



From the above it is evident that Bhā-sarvajña embodied in his *Pramāṇa* all the categories of the *Nyāya-sūtra* except *prayojana* (4) and *siddhānta* (6) which did not, according to him, constitute its integral parts and *dṛṣṭāntā* (5) which was included in *avayava* under the name of *udāharaṇa*.

7. CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-SĀRA.

Perception—*pratyakṣa*.

In the opening lines of the *Nyāya-sāra*, Bhāsarvajña says :—

Salutation. “Bowling down to Śambhū (Śiva) the
supreme Lord of the universe, who by

nature knows all truths, I shall explain *Pramāṇa*, and its division and definition, in order that children may understand them well.”¹

Pramāṇa is defined in the work as the means of right knowledge freed from doubt and error. It is of three kinds, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*āgama*).

Perception, which is the means of direct cognition, may be either contemplative (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) or ordinary (*a-yogi-pratyakṣa*). The ordinary perception is that which exhibits gross objects through their intercourse with our senses brought about by a favourable combination of light, space, time, nature, etc.

The intercourse may be of six kinds, viz., (1) union, (2) united-inherence, (3) united-inherent inherence, (4) inherence, (5) inherent inherence, and (6) particularity—all of which have been explained before.

The *contemplative perception* exhibits objects which are too remote in time and space or too fine in nature. It is the perception of a saint, who may or may not be in a state of contemplation at the time.

While in a state of contemplation the saint perceives infinite objects through the mere union of his soul with his mind in consequence of his merit, etc. But while he is not in contemplation, he perceives objects through the union of four, three or two causes, viz. the soul, the mind, a sense and an object, or the soul, the mind and a sense, or merely the soul and the mind. In the olfactory, gustatory, visual and tactual perceptions there is a union of four causes. In the auditory perception there is a threefold union, viz. the soul, the mind and the ear (the sound which inheres in the ear being identical with the same). In the perception of pleasure, etc., there is a union of merely two causes, viz. the soul and the mind.

Perception may also be divided as determinate or mediate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate or immediate (*nirvikalpaka*). The determinate perception is knowledge of an object indicative of a relation of the object to its name, genus, quality, action, etc., e.g. this is Devadatta. The indeterminate perception is the knowledge which exhibits the mere essence of an object independent of its relation

1

प्रणम्य शङ्कुं जगतः पतिम्परं

समस्ततत्त्वार्थविदं स्वभावतः ।

शिष्य प्रबोधाय मयाभिधास्यते

प्रमाण तद्भेद तदन्यलक्षणम् ॥

(Opening lines, Nyāya sāra).

to a name, genus, etc., e.g. the knowledge produced by the first union of a sense with its object or the knowledge of a saint while he is in a state of contemplation.

Inference—*anumāna*.

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its inseparable connection with another thing which lies within their range. "The hill is fiery, because it is smoky"—this is an inference in which we ascertain fire from smoke with which it is inseparably connected.

The inseparable connection (in Sanskrit *avinābhāva*) is also designated as pervasion or invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). It is of two kinds: (1) affirmative (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*). The affirmative invariable concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the middle term by the major term in all cases. The negative invariable concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*) is the accompaniment of the absence of the major term by the absence of the middle term in all cases. In the affirmative universal proposition "wherever there is smoke, there is fire"—smoke is the middle term which is in all cases accompanied by fire the major term; and in the negative universal proposition "wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke"—the absence of fire is in all cases accompanied by the absence of smoke.

Inference is of two kinds, viz. (1) inference for one's self (*svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). The first does not stand in need of demonstration but the second does. The demonstration consists of a syllogism of five parts: (1) a proposition, (2) a reason, (3) an example, (4) an application, and (5) a conclusion. A proposition is the statement of the subject (minor term) of which something is desired to be established, e.g. sound is non-eternal. A reason is the statement of the mark which enables us to establish something. The reason may be exclusively affirmative (*kevalānvayi*), exclusively negative (*kevala vyatireki*) and affirmative negative (*anvaya-vyatireki*).

The subject or minor term (*pakṣa*) is that in which it is doubtful whether the quality of the major term abides. A homologue (*sapakṣa*) is that in which the quality of the major term is known, with certainty, to abide. A heterologue (*vipakṣa*) is that in which, it is known with certainty, that the quality of the major term does not abide. The essential nature of a syllogism (*pakṣa-dharmartā*) refers to the character of the pervasion of the middle term by the major term.

Take the following syllogism :—

The hill is fiery,
because it is smoky,
like a kitchen or like a lake.

Here “hill” is the subject or minor term on which the existence of fire is to be proved; “kitchen” is a homologue in which fire is known with certainty to abide; and “lake” is a heterologue in which, we are sure, fire does not abide.

Exclusively affirmative is the reason which abides in the minor term of which there are homologues but no heterologues, e.g., this is *nameable*, because it is knowable.

Exclusively-negative is the reason which abides in the minor term of which there are no homologues and which is distinct from the heterologues, e.g. the earth is different from other elements, because it possesses *smell*.

Affirmative-negative is the reason which abides in the minor term and its homologues but does not abide in the heterologues of the minor term, which is not counterbalanced and the sphere of which is not opposed by evidences, e.g. the hill is fiery, because it is *smoky*.

Hetvābhāsa—fallacy of the reason.

Fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) is that which possesses the appearance of a reason but not its essential characters.

Fallacy of reason. It is of various kinds as mentioned below :—

A. UNPROVED (*asiddha*).

Unproved (*asiddha*) is the reason whose existence in the minor term has not been known with certainty. It is of following kinds :—

- (1) Unproved in respect of its nature (*svarūpāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is *visible*.
- (2) Unproved on account of its abiding in a different locus (*vyādhikarānāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because a *pot* is a product.
- (3) Unproved in respect of the substantive (*viśeṣyāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a *visible thing* possessing generality [sound possesses generality (soundness), but it is not visible].
- (4) Unproved in respect of the adjective (*viśeṣanāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it possesses generality *which is visible* [soundness is not visible].
- (5) Unproved in respect of a part (*bhāgāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is produced by effort. [The first

- sound-wave is produced by effort, but the succeeding sound-waves do not, it is said, depend on it].
- (6) Unproved in respect of the abode (*āśrayāsiddha*), e.g. there is primordial matter, because it evolves into the universe. [The Naiyāyikas do not admit that primordial matter (*Prakṛti*) is the prime source of the universe].
 - (7) Unproved in respect of a part of the abode (*āśrayaikadeśāsiddha*), e.g. the primordial matter, soul and God are eternal, because they are not products. [The Naiyāyikas admit the soul and God to be eternal but not the primordial matter *Prakṛti*].
 - (8) Unproved on account of the substantive being useless (*vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it possesses *generality* which is a product. [To say that "soundness is a product" is not only useless but also incorrect].
 - (9) Unproved on account of the adjective being useless (*vyartha-viśeṣanāsiddha*), e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a product *which is possessed of generality*. [It is superfluous here to say that "a product is possessed of generality"].
 - (10) Unproved on account of the reason being doubtful (*sandigdhaśiddha*), e.g. a person without ascertaining whether there is *smoke* or *mist* says: this place is fiery, because it *smoky*. [Here if the smoke turns out to be mist, the inference will be invalid].
 - (11) Unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful (*sandigdha viśeṣyāsiddha*), e.g. Kapila is still overwhelmed with passions, because *true knowledge has not yet grown in him* who is a person. [It is doubtful as to whether true knowledge has not grown in him].
 - (12) Unproved on account of the adjective being doubtful (*sandigdha-viśeṣanāsiddha*), e.g. Kapila is still overwhelmed with passions because he is a person *who is always devoid of true knowledge*. [It is doubtful as to whether he is always devoid of true knowledge].

The fallacies called *unproved* mentioned above are of two descriptions according as the lack of truth involved in them is recognized by both the parties or one of the parties engaged in a debate.

B. THE CONTRADICTIONARY (*viruddha*).

Contradictory (*viruddha*) is the reason which abides in the minor term as well as in the opposite of it.

If there are homologues to the minor term, the contradictory reason may be of four kinds as follows:—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologue (but not in its homologue), e.g. sound is eternal, because it is a product [like ether (homologue)

and like a pot (heterologue). Productivity abides in sound as well as in its heterologue the pot].

- (2) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue (but not in its homologue), e.g. sound is eternal because it is a thing which possesses generality and is cognized by our external senses. [Here an instance of the heterologue is a pot (*a*) which is non-eternal, (*b*) which possesses generality *potness*, and (*c*) which is cognized by our external senses. "Pleasure" cannot be an instance of the heterologue, because though non-eternal it is not cognized by our external senses. So the reason abides only in a part of the heterologue. We cannot cite *potness* as a homologue, because though *potness* is eternal and cognized by our external sense, it does not possess generality *potness-ness*].
- (3) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term as well as in a part of its heterologue but not in its homologue, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is a product of effort. [The first wave of sound is a product of effort, but the succeeding waves are not products of the same nature. So the productivity of effort abides only in a part of the minor term. Similarly it abides only in a part of the heterologue. "Pot" is a heterologue which is a product of effort, but "grass" is a heterologue which is not a product of effort.
- (4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term, but in the whole of its heterologue (and not in its homologue), e.g. the earth is eternal, because it is a product. [Productivity abides in the earth which is gross, but not in the earth which is subtle or atomic. At the same time it abides in all things which are non-eternal or heterologues to the minor term].

While there are no homologues, the contradictory reasons are four as follow :—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term as well as in its heterologues, e.g. sound is a special quality of ether as it is knowable. [Knowableness abides in sound as well as in its heterologues such as smell. There are no homologues, because nothing but sound is a special quality of ether].
- (2) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term and in a part of its heterologues, e.g. sound is a special quality of ether, because it is a product of effort. [Productivity of effort abides in the first sound-wave but does not abide in the succeeding sound waves, it abides in some heterologues as pot, etc., but not in other heterologues as the soul, etc.].
- (3) The reason which abides in the minor term and in a part of its heterologues, e.g. sound is a special quality of ether,

because it is cognizable by the external senses. [All sounds are cognizable by the external senses. It is only some heterologues such as a pot, cloth, etc., that are cognizable by the external senses while other heterologues such as pleasure, pain, etc., are not so cognizable].

- (4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term, but in the whole of its heterologues, e.g. sound is a special quality of ether, because it does not arise from words. [Some sounds arise from words such as those which we read in books, while others do not, such as the sounds of a drum. No sound, which is not a special quality of ether, arises from words].

C. THE UNCERTAIN (*anaikāntika*).

Uncertain (*anaikāntika*) is the reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues: its subdivisions are the following:—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term, its homologues and heterologues, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.
- (2) The reason which abides in the minor term, in a part of its homologues and in a part of its heterologues, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is perceptible. [(1) Perceptibility abides in "sound," (2) it abides in some of the non-eternal as a pot, but does not abide in some of the non-eternal as the binary compound of atoms, and (3) it abides in some of the eternal as generality, but does not abide in some of the eternal as ether]
- (3) The reason which abides in the minor term and its homologues as well as in a part of its heterologues, e.g. this is a cow, because it has horns. [Horns abide in "this" as well as in its homologues cow, calf, etc. They abide with some of the heterologues such as a buffalo, but do not abide in other heterologues such as a horse].
- (4) The reason which abides in the minor term and its heterologues and in a part of its homologues, e.g. this is not a cow, because it has horns.
- (5) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term, a part of its homologues and a part of its heterologues, e.g. the earth is non-eternal, because it is perceptible. [Perceptibility abides in earth which is gross, but not in earth which is subtle (atomic). It abides in some homologues as a pot, but not in other homologues as a binary compound of atoms. Similarly it abides in some heterologues as generality but not in other heterologues as ether].
- (6) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term, a part of its homologues and in the whole of its heterologues, e.g. space, time and mind are substances, because they are incorporeal. [Incorporeality abides in space and time but

not in mind which is an atom in dimension. It abides in some homologues as soul, ether, etc., but not in other homologues as earth, water, fire and air. It abides in all heterologues as quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence].

- (7) The reason which abides in all homologues and heterologues, but only in a part of the minor term, e.g. ether, time, space, soul and mind are not substances, because they are devoid of special qualities of momentary character. [The devoidance of special qualities of momentary character abides in space, time and mind but not in ether and soul, sound and intelligence which are respectively the special qualities of ether and soul being momentary. It abides in all homologues as quality, action, generality, particularity and inherence, and also in heterologues as earth, water, fire and air]

D. NON-TRIED OR NON-CONCLUSIVE (*anadhyavasita*, or *anupasaṃhāri*).¹

Non-tried (*anadhyavasita*) is the reason which abides in the minor term alone, without a definite connection with the major term. It is subdivided as follows:—

- (1) The reason which abides in the minor term of which there are neither homologues nor heterologues, e.g. all are non-eternal, because they are existent. [“All” having included every thing there is no homologue or heterologue left behind. The reason “existence” does however abide in “all”].
- (2) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are neither homologues nor heterologues, e.g. all are non-eternal, because they are products. [“All” which includes everything, has neither homologues nor heterologues. The reason “product” abides in non-eternal things but not in eternal things both of which are comprised by “all”].
- (3) The reason which abides in the minor term of which there are both homologues and heterologues, e.g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a special quality of ether. [Sound which is a special quality of ether, has homologues which are however not qualities of ether].
- (4) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term of which there are both homologues and heterologues, e.g. all substances are non-eternal, because they are possessed of

¹ Mr. V. P. Vaidya observes:—“This *hetvābhāsa* is mentioned by *Bhāsarvajña* alone, except by *Śaṅkara Mīśra*, who, about the 15th century, says that it is the same as *anupasaṃhāri-anaikāntika*, which latter did not take its name and form in the time of *Bhāsarvajña*.

(*Nyāya-sāra*, p. 30, V. P. Vaidya's edition).

activity. [There is activity in earth but not in ether, although both are substances. There is no activity in quality and action which are homologues and in generality, particularity and inherence which are heterologues of the non-eternal].

- (5) The reason which abides in the minor term and has homologues but no heterologues, e.g. all products are eternal, because they are originated. [There is no heterologue of "all products" which constitutes the minor term. Ether, which is a homologue, is not originated].
- (6) The reason which abides in a part of the minor term and has homologues but no heterologues, e.g. all products are eternal, because they are composed of parts. ["Pot" and intelligence are both products, one is composed of parts but the other is not. There is no heterologue of "all products" which constitutes the minor term. Ether is a homologue but it is not composed of parts].

E. MISTIMED OR INCOMPATIBLE REASON (*kālātyayopadiṣṭa*¹ or *bādhita*).

Mistimed or incompatible is the reason which abides in the minor term as opposed by evidences. It is subdivided as follows:—

- (1) Opposed by perception, e.g. this fire is non-warm, because it is a product.
- (2) Opposed by inference, e.g. the atoms are non-eternal, because they are corporeal.
- (3) Opposed by scripture, e.g. wine should be drunk by Brāhmaṇas, because it is a liquid thing like milk.
- (4) Partly opposed by perception, e.g. all heats are non-warm, because they have forms. [Heat of fire is warm but that of moon-stone is non-warm].
- (5) Partly opposed by inference, e.g. fluidity, colour, taste, smell and touch abiding in eternal things are eternal, because they abide in atoms which do not occupy space, etc.
- (6) Partly opposed by scripture, e.g. bodies of all celestial sages are earthy, because they are bodies like those of ours. [Bodies of some celestial sages are earthy, those of others watery, fiery, etc.]

F. BALANCING THE CONTROVERSY (*prakaraṇa-sama*).

Balancing the controversy (*prakaraṇa-sama*) is the reason which possesses its three forms, but establishes one's own side as well as the opposite side, e.g.

¹ Mr. V. P. Vaidya observes:—"This fallacy is known in later works as *bādhita*. According to later writers "*kālāṭīta*" is the name of the fallacy.

(Nyāya-sāra, p. 31).

- (1) Sound is eternal,
- (2) because it is sound,
- (3) like ether,

or,

- (1) sound is non-eternal,
- (2) because it is sound,
- (3) like a pot.

G. NON-ERRONEOUS CONTRADICTION—*viruddhāvyabhicārī*.

Some say that there is a fallacy called non-erroneous contradiction which occurs when there is an advancement of two contradictory reasons of equal characters, e.g. a disputant says :—

Ether is eternal, because it is an incorporeal substance, like the soul.

His opponent says :—

Ether is non-eternal, because it is the abode of a special quality cognized by one of our external senses, like a pot.

The non-erroneous contradiction is a fallacy with reference to one party, but is a good reasoning with reference to the other party.

Example—*udāharaṇa*.

An example (*udāharaṇa*) is the statement of a complete illustration. It is of two kinds, viz. (1) homogeneous or affirmative (*sādharmya*), and (2) heterogenous or negative (*vaidharmya*). An affirmative example is the statement of an illustration in the positive or direct order, e.g.

- (1) sound is non-eternal,
- (2) because it possesses acuteness, etc.,
- (3) whatever possesses acuteness, etc., is non-eternal, like pleasure, etc. (affirmative example).

A negative example is the statement of a complete illustration in negative or indirect order, e.g.

- (1) Sound is non-eternal,
- (2) because it possesses acuteness, etc.,
- (3) whatever is not non-eternal does not possess acuteness, etc., like ether etc. (negative example).

A fallacious example (the fallacy or semblance of an example, *udāharaṇābhāsa*) is one which appears as an example but is really devoid of its essential character.

Fallacies of an affirmative example. The fallacies of affirmative example are the following :—

- (1) An example defective in the major term (*sādhya-vikala*), e.g. the mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal like an atom.

- (2) An example defective in the middle term (*sādhana-vikāla*), e.g. the mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal like an *action*.
- (3) An example defective in both the major and middle terms (*ubhayavikāla*), e.g. the mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal, like *ether*.
- (4) An example which is supportless (*āśraya-hīna*), e.g. the mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal, like the *horn of a hare*.
- (5) An example which is non-pervasive (*avyāpti*), e.g. the mind is non-eternal, because it is corporeal, like a *pot*. [There is no pervasion or universal connection between corporeality and non-eternality.]
- (6) An example whose pervasion is inversely stated (*viparīta-vyāpti*), e.g.
 - (i) the mind is non-eternal,
 - (ii) because it is corporeal,
 - (iii) whatever is non-eternal is corporeal like a *pot*. [This should have been stated thus: whatever is corporeal is non-eternal, like a *pot*].

Fallacies of negative example.

The fallacies of negative example are similarly of six kinds specified below :—

- (1) An example of excluded major term, e.g. whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal as an *atom*.
- (2) An example of excluded middle term (*sādhanāvyāvṛtta*), e.g. whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal, as an *action*.
- (3) An example of excluded major and middle terms (*ubhayāvyāvṛtta*), e.g. whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal, as a *pot*.
- (4) An example which is without support (*āśraya-hīna*), e.g. whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal, as a sky-flower.
- (5) A non-pervasive example (*avyāptyabhidhāna*), e.g. whatever is not non-eternal is not corporeal, as *ether*.
- (6) An example with inverse pervasion (*viparīta-vyāptyabhidhāna*), e.g. whatever is not corporeal is not non-eternal, as *ether*.

Other fallacies of example.

Bhā-sarvajña¹ mentions another four kinds of fallacious examples of the affirmative form as follow :—

- (1) An example of doubtful major term, e.g. this person will exercise sovereignty, because he is sprung from the lunar race, like a certain prince of that race.
- (2) An example of doubtful middle term, e.g. this person is

¹ Rāghava Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the Nyāya-sāra says, that these eight kinds of fallacious examples (four of the affirmative form and four of the negative form) were laid down by Trilocana, who must therefore have flourished before Bhā-sarvajña. (Cf. V. P. Vaidya's edition of Nyāya-sāra, notes, p. 35).

not omniscient, because he is passionate like the man on the street.

- (3) An example of doubtful major and middle terms, e.g. this person will go to heaven, because he has accumulated merits, like Devadatta.
- (4) An example whose support is doubtful, e.g. this person is not omniscient, because he speaks evil, like Devadatta's son who will be born.

Similarly there are four kinds of fallacious examples of the negative form based on their doubtful character.

Bhā-sarvajña¹ closely follows the Nyāya-sūtra in his explanation of *upanaya* (application), *nigamana* (conclusion), *nirṇaya* (ascertainment), *kathā* (disputation), *vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (wrangling), *vitandā* (cavil), *jāti* (analogue), *nigrahassthāna* (point of defeat), etc.

Verbal testimony—*āgama*.

Verbal testimony or reliable assertion (*āgama*) is the means of knowing things accurately through indicatory signs (or convention). It is of two kinds, according as the assertion refers to matter open to our senses or to matter beyond our senses. The authoritativeness of the first kind of assertion is evident from the action one takes on hearing the assertion, e.g. a boy runs to receive a mango when he is asked by his father to do so. The authoritativeness of the second kind of assertion is inferred from its having proceeded from a person who possesses supersensuous knowledge, and is, as such, reliable, e.g. one performs sacrifice on the strength of the Vedic injunction that a son is born when a sacrifice is performed for the same.

The three means of right knowledge have been explained. All other so-called means are included in them, e.g. presumption (*arthāpatti*) and probability (*sambhava*) are included in inference, rumour (*aitihya*) and muscular movement (*ceṣṭā*), in verbal testimony, and negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) in any of the three according to circumstances. Muscular movement alleged to be a means of knowledge is only an action substituted for a word or assertion.

Emancipation—*mokṣa*.

Prameya.

The object of our knowledge (*prameya*) is of four kinds as follows:—

¹ Bhā-sarvajña uses the word *āgama* as a synonym for *śabda*. In reality one signifies "scripture" which enables us to know things beyond our senses, and the other signifies "the assertion of a reliable person."

- (1) That which is fit only to be avoided, viz. misery or suffering (*duḥkha*), of which there are twenty-one varieties already explained.
- (2) That which causes misery or suffering, viz. ignorance (*avidyā*), lust (*trṣṇā*), merit (*dharma*) or demerit (*adharma*).
- (3) The cessation of misery or suffering.
- (4) The means for the removal of misery or suffering, viz. the true knowledge of soul (*ātmā*).

The soul is of two kinds, viz. the individual soul (*apara ātmā*) and the supreme soul (*para ātmā*). The

Soul. individual soul, which has to undergo sufferings from the bondage of the world, attains final emancipation (*mokṣa*) through the knowledge of the supreme soul called Śiva. In the state of final emancipation the individual soul, being finally freed from misery, enjoys eternal pleasure.

8. COMMENTARIES ON THE NYĀYASĀRA.

Of the eighteen commentaries on Nyāyasāra enumerated by Jaina writers some are noticed below :—

- (1) Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa the oldest commentary mentioned by Maladhāri Rāja Śekhara (1348 A.D.) and Guṇaratna (1409 A.D.) and quoted by the Buddhist sage Ratnakīrti in his Apohasiddhi (about 1000 A.D.), and by the Jaina sage Jayasimha Sūri, in his Nyāyatātparyadīpikā. No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.
- (2) Nyāyakalikā by Jayanta, mentioned by Guṇaratna in the Śaddarśana samuccaya Vṛtti (1409 A.D.). No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.
- (3) Nyāyakusumāñjali tarka mentioned by Guṇaratna in the Śaddarśana samuccaya Vṛtti (1409 A.D.). No manuscript of it has yet been recovered.
- (4) Nyāyasāratikā by Vijaya Simha Gaṇi. A manuscript of it has been recovered from Bikaner. (Vide S. K. Bhandarkar's Catalogue of MSS. in the Deccan College, 1888, p. 58).
- (5) Nyāyasāratikā by Jayatirtha (vide India Office Catalogue, No. 3132—1412).
- ¹(6) Nyāyasārapadapañjikā by Vāsudeva. A manuscript of it has been recovered from Kāśmīra. (Vide S. R. Bhandarkar's Catalogue of MSS. in the Deccan College, 1888, p. 95). Another manuscript of it written in Kāśmīri character is to be found in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal bearing No. 1552. In the opening lines ²

¹ Vide Rāja Śekhara's Śaddarśana samuccaya and Guṇaratna's Śaddarśana samuccaya vṛtti.

² The opening lines of the Nyāyasārapadapañjikā run as follows :—

देवदेवमभिवन्द्य भास्वरं
योगिहृद्दुदयेकमन्दिरम् ।

Vāsudeva speaks of himself as the author of the work and in the colophon he is stated to be a native of Kāśmīra.

- (7) *Nyāyasāravicāra* by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava. A manuscript of it dated¹ Śaka 1174 A.D. 1252 is contained in the library of the Queen's College, Benares.
- (8) *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*² by Jayasīṃha Sūri, a Jaina of the Svetāmbara Sect, who lived in the fourteenth century A.D. as his *Kumārapālacaritra*³ is dated Saṃvat 1422 or A.D. 1365.

वासुदेवविदुषा विरच्यते
न्यायसारपदपञ्जिका मया ॥

¹ The *Nyāyasāravicāra* ends as follows :—

शके चतुःसप्तति संख्यके शतैः
शताधिकैरभ्यधिके च पञ्चभिः ।
द्विषाति तैस्तत्र बभूव वत्सवैः
भ्रुवं विचारः परिसाधि राघवः ॥

इति सारंगसुतवादीन्द्रशिष्यन्यायनिपुणतर्कविचारचतुरभङ्गराघवविरचिते न्यायसारविचारे
द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥

The verse may be interpreted to give Śaka 1174 (A.D. 1252) or Śaka 1274, 1352 A.D.).

² *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* with the text of *Nyāyasāra* has been edited by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series, Calcutta.

³

श्रीविक्रमसहपाद् द्वि द्वि मन्वष्टेऽयमजायत ।

यन्मः सप्तविंशतीषट्सहस्राण्यनुष्टुभाम् ॥

(*Kumārapāla Caritra Praśasti*, Chap. X).

CHAPTER II.

Nyāya-prakaraṇas embodying Vaiśeṣika categories.

9. THE NYĀYA INCORPORATES THE VAIŚEṢIKA.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophy rendered considerable help to the development of the Nyāya (Logic) and many of the sūtras of the Nyāya philosophy presuppose those of the Vaiśeṣika. In fact the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophies of the Ancient and Mediaeval periods supplemented each other in respect of their subjects and styles. Hence the two philosophies were called *samāna-tantra* or allied systems. At last the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophies actually coalesced. The six or seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika were entirely absorbed in the treatise on Nyāya philosophy and the Nyāya categories of *pramāṇa* in its developed form were actually absorbed in the treatises on Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

As instances of Nyāya absorbing the Vaiśeṣika categories, we may cite the cases of *Tārkikarakṣā* by Varadarāja and *Tarkabhāṣā* by Keśava Miśra. Varadarāja, who deals with all the sixteen categories of Nyāya, includes in the second category, viz. *Pramēya*, not only the twelve objects of Nyāya, such as, “ātman,” etc., but also the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, such as *dravya*, etc. Keśava Miśra on the other hand brings the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika under “*artha*”, which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyāya category “*Pramēya*.” A short account of the two works is given here.

10. VARADARĀJA (ABOUT 1150 A.D.).

Varadarāja¹ wrote a work on Logic called *Tārkikarakṣā*, or “Protection of Logicians.” He seems to have been a native of Andhra or Telingana, in the Madras Presidency. Varadarāja must have flourished after the 10th century A.D., possibly also after the 11th century A.D., as he mentions *Trilocana*, *Vācaśpati Miśra*,²

¹ Varadarāja wrote a commentary on Udayana’s *Kusumāñjali* called *Nyāya Kusumāñjali ṭīkā*. Compare

एतच्च ग्रन्थद्वयैव स्यष्टीकृतं न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिटीकायामित्यास्तां तावत् ।

(Mallinātha’s commentary on *Tārkikarakṣā*, edited by M.M. Vindhyeśvari Prasād, page 46).

²

आलोच्य दुस्तरगभीरतरान् प्रबन्धान्
वाचस्यैवदयनस्तथा परेषाम् ।

Udāyanācāryya, Śalikānātha, Viśvarūpa, Jayanta, Nyāyācāryya (Śivāditya), Bhā-sarvajña,¹ and Bhūṣaṇakāra. On the other hand, he is mentioned by Mādhvacāryya² in the Sarvadarśana saṁgraha, composed in the 14th century A.D. Very probably he flourished about 1150 A.D., shortly after which Jñāna Pūrṇa or Jñāna Deva, a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin, wrote a commentary on the Tārkkikarakṣā called Laghudīpikā.³ Viṣṇu Svāmin is said to have been the original founder of a Vaiṣṇava sect called in later times the Vallabhācāri. The immediate disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin was Jñāna Deva who was succeeded consecutively by Nāma Deva and the junior Trilocana.⁴ Perhaps there followed a few other preceptors before Vallabhācāryya, son of Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Andhra (Telingana), occupied the seat of guru at the end of the 15th century A.D. As Vallabhācāryya lived between 1450 and 1530 A.D., and as several preceptors intervened, the date of Varadarāja, if placed in 1150 A.D., will not be far wrong.⁵

11. TĀRKIKARAKṢĀ.

The Tārkkikarakṣā, which at once begins its subject, is divided into three chapters, the first of which deals with the first fourteen categories of Nyāya, viz. (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya*, (3) *saṁśaya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *dṛṣṭānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *nirṇaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitandā*, (13) *hetvābhāsa*, and (14) *chala*. The second chapter deals with the fifteenth category, viz. *jāti*, while the third chapter treats of the sixteenth category viz. *nigrahasthāna*.

सारी मयाच समष्टिज्ञान वावकूके

नित्यं कथासु विजिगीषुभिरपि धार्यः ॥

(Tārkkikarakṣā, p. 364, edited by M.M. Vindhyaśvarī Prasād, Benares).

¹ Varadarāja quotes Bhā-sarvajña thus :—

यथाङ्कः,— तस्मै प्रमाणं शिवः । (Tārkkikarakṣā, p. 58).

² Vide Sarvadarśanasamgraha, chapter on Pūrṇa-prajña-darśana in which we read :—

तार्किकरक्षायां च,—

धर्मस्य तद्वत्तद्रूप विकल्पानुपपत्तिः ।

धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वं भङ्गो नित्यसमो भवेत् ॥

सर्वैर्धर्म्यं निजावासं सर्वविद्या निसेवितम् ।

श्रीयज्ञेश्वरद्वरेः स्तुतुं श्रीविष्णुस्वामिगुरुं नमः ॥

इति श्रीज्ञानपूर्णकृता वरदराजीयसारसंग्रहटीका लघुदीपिका समाप्ता ॥


⁴ Vide Imperial Gazetteer.

⁵ Vide Dr. Venis' prefatory notice to Tārkkikarakṣā, edited by M.M. Vindhyaśvarī Prasād, Benares.

Prameya, according to the Nyāya-sūtra, signifies *ātman*, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala*, *duḥkha*, and *apavarga*, but, according to Varadarāja, it incorporates also the six predicaments of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, viz. the substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and co-existence or inherence (*samavāya*).

The categories of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are thus combined together, but the combination is far from being satisfactory. It is evident that the categories of the Vaiśeṣika and objects coming under Prameya of the Nyāya overlap each other. Moreover there is hardly any truth in the statement¹ that the knowledge of the sixteen categories of Nyāya is the direct means of our attaining emancipation, whereas that of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika is only an indirect means, because *ātman* (the soul), *manas* (the mind), *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge), *duḥkha* (pain), etc., are included in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems.

Varadarāja's scheme of combination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems is shown below :—



Valid knowledge—*pramāṇa*.

The sixteen categories of Nyāya have already been explained. Varadarāja, in his Tārīkīkarakṣā, introduces here and there some peculiar discussions which are mentioned here. For instance, the Buddhists define valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as that which is not non-correspondent with our practical activity,² e.g. my knowledge of a cup of water is valid if the activity prompted by it is fruitful. Varadarāja condemns

मोक्षे साक्षाद्वदन्त्यादिसंपादितं लक्षितम् ।

तन्नाम्नरानुसारेण वदकं द्रव्यादि लक्ष्यते ॥

(Tārīkīkarakṣā, p. 130).

‘अविश्वविद्विज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति सौगताः ।

Tārīkīkarakṣā, p. 13, edited by M.M. Vindhyaśvarī Prasād, Benares).

this definition by observing that it is too narrow. For instance, it cannot apply to our inferential knowledge of a thing that existed in the past or will exist in the future. We can test the validity of our knowledge only of a thing that exists in the present time. With regard to a past or future thing¹ we can draw an inference, but cannot prove the validity of the inference inasmuch as there is no practical activity prompted by it.

Inference—*anumāna*.

According to Varadarāja, inference (*anumāna*)² is the knowledge of a thing derived through its invariable concomitance with another thing. Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)³ also called inseparableness (*avinābhāva*), is that relation which is devoid of condition (*upādhi*).⁴

The Naiyāyikas say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with another thing is based on their uniform agreement in presence and absence, e.g. smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire, because where there is smoke there is fire and where there is no fire there is no smoke. In opposition to this definition the Buddhists⁵ say that the invariable concomitance of one thing with another thing is really based on their mutual relation of cause

¹ अविसंवादनमिति तदसत् ।

भूतभविष्यद्विषयेषु अनुमानेषु अव्याप्तेः ।

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 14).

² व्याप्तिग्रहणसापेक्षं प्रमितेः साधनं विदुः ।

अनुमानमिति ।

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 64).

³ व्याप्तिः सम्बन्धो निरुपाधिकः ।

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 65).

⁴ *Upādhi*, condition, is thus defined:—

साधनाथापकाः साध्यसमव्याप्ता उपाधयः ॥

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 66).

It is of two kinds: (1) sure (*niscita*) and (2) suspected (*śaṅkita*). I do not quote here the definition of these terms as they will recur in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

⁵ सौगतास्तु तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामेवाविनाभावः । ... यथाहः,—

कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात् ।

अविनाभाव नियमो दर्शनाच्च नदर्शनात् ॥

तदुक्तम् । अकार्यानाम्नो रसादेरकारणानाम्भूततत्पक्षानुमानस्य लोके बहुलमुपलब्धेः ।

(Tārkikaraksā, p. 82).

This verse is quoted from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā*. The Tibetan version runs as follows:—

कुं'द'द'स'सु'दे'द'द'स'द'द'स

द'द'द'द'द'द'द'द'द'द'द'द' ।

and effect or identity in essence, e.g. there is rain, because there was cloud (cloud being the cause of rain); and this is a tree, because it is a *śimśapā* (*śimśapā* being a species of tree which is its genus).

Varadarāja condemns the Buddhists by saying that their definition is untenable. We infer the form of an orange from its taste, though between the taste and form there is neither the causal relation nor the relation of identity in essence.

Syllogism—*avayava*.

In explaining the seventh category, viz. *avayava*¹ parts of a syllogism, Varadarāja says that according to the Mimāṃsaka, a syllogism, which consists of three parts, may either begin with an example or end with the same, as follows:—

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,
The hill is smoky,
Therefore the hill is fiery.

or

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky,
All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen

The Saugatās (Buddhists) are said to maintain that a syllogism consists of only two parts, viz. an example and an application in the following form:—

All that is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,
This hill is smoky.

The sign—*liṅga*.

A sign, reason or middle term (*liṅga* or *hetu*) which is in invariable concomitance with the predicate or major term (*sādhya*), possesses five characteristics as follows:—

Five characteristics of the middle term.

- (1) *Pakṣadharmatā*, the existence of the sign in the subject or minor term, e.g. the hill has smoke.

मेदङ्गमिदमुददेश्यम्

समर्द्धव्यसमिद्धसमर्द्धव्यसमिद्ध ॥

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā*, Bṛtan-hgyur, Mdo, Ce, leaf 196; also Prof. De La Vallee Poussin's French translation of *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, p. 4, in *La Bouddhisme*).

1

चीनुदाहरणान्तान् वा यदोदाहरणादिकान् ।

मीमांसकाः सौगतास्तु सीपनीतिमुदाहृत्य ॥

(*Tārkikarākṣā*, p. 175).

- (2) *Sapakṣe sattvam*, existence of the sign in homologue, e.g. that which has smoke has fire, as a kitchen.
- (3) *Vipakṣe asattvam*, non-existence of the sign in heterologues, e.g. that which has no fire has no smoke, as a lake.
- (4) *Abādḥita viśayatvam*, the object of the sign not being incompatible, e.g. there is no incompatibility for smoke abiding in the hill.
- (5) *Asatpratipakṣatvam*, there being no counterbalancing sign, e.g. there is nothing else which counterbalances smoke in respect of proving fire.

In the case of an exclusively affirmative or exclusively negative inference, the sign bears only four characteristics, as it does not then abide in the heterologue or homologue.

In the logical work called *Lakṣaṇamālā*¹ a sign (*liṅga*) is defined as that which is in invariable concomitance with the major term freed from any condition (*upādhi*), e.g. smoke is the sign of fire, but fire is not necessarily a sign of smoke unless it is nourished by wet fuel (here wet fuel is the condition).

Debate—*kathā*.

In treating of the tenth category, viz. *vāda*, Varadarāja gives an elaborate exposition of debate (*kathā*)² which is defined as a number of sentences spoken by more persons than one as constituting the subjects for their judgment. The six requisites for a council of debate are the following :—

- (1) A set of rules as to a certain thesis and its proof.
- (2) The method to be followed in carrying on a particular debate.
- (3) Specification of the disputant and his respondent.
- (4) Election of the President and members of the Council.
- (5) Determination of the points of defeat involved wholly or partly in a debate.
- (6) Agreement as to the stage of termination of a debate.

Some logicians hold that the requisites for a council of debate are only four, viz. (1) the disputant, (2) the respondent, (3) the president, and (4) the members.

¹ निव्याधिकसाध्यसम्बन्धशालिलिङ्गमिति लक्षणमालायाश्च ।

(*Tārīkarakṣā*, page 179, edited by M.M. Vindhyeśvari Prasād Dvivedi, Benares). The *Lakṣaṇmālā* is said to be the works of Śivāditya Miśra.

²

विचारविषयो नानावक्तृको वाक्यविसरः ।

कथा तथाः पट्टज्ञानि प्राञ्चलवारि केचन ॥

(*Tārīkarakṣā*, p. 206).

If it is intended to record a debate, a writer (*lekhaka*) must be employed with the approval of the disputant and his respondent.

The disputant (*vādi*) must be equal to the respondent (*prati-vādi*) in respect of his learning. A debate, in which an expert stands against an ordinary person, is useless, inasmuch as the conclusion drawn from such a debate could have been obtained from the expert alone.

The members (*sabhya*), acceptable to both the parties and conversant with their tenets, must be freed from affection and aversion. They must be capable of receiving, retaining and demonstrating the purport of others' speech, while their number must be uneven and not less than three. Their duty is to control the debate, to point out the excellence or defect of the debates, to awaken one who is broken-hearted and to repeat a speech to one who is slow.

The president (*sabhāpati*) must be satisfactory to the disputant, the respondent and the members. Capable of showing favour or frown, he must not be influenced by affection or aversion. His duty is to announce to the council the conclusion of a debate when it comes to a close.

Persons coming by chance before a council of debate may, if the parties agree, point out irregularities, etc., in the debate. They cannot however be admitted into the council as its regular members to settle the main points at issue. This procedure applies to a council¹ of fair debate or discussion, but in the case of wrangling and cavil even chance-comers act as regular members.

A debate is of three kinds, viz. (1) discussion (*vāda*), (2) wrangling (*jālpa*), and (3) cavil (*vitandā*).

Kind of debate.

A wrangling or cavil may be stopped by exposing the points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) which are necessarily involved in them.² A discussion end³ only when one points out in it a fallacy of reason, *hetvābhāsa*, or a point of defeat called censuring the non-censurable. The seven points of defeat which may

¹ तथा च स्मरन्ति,—

रागद्वेषविनिर्मुक्ताः सप्रपञ्चवयोऽपि वा ।

वयोपविष्टा विप्राः स्युः सा यज्ञसदृशौ सभा ॥

(Tārkikarākṣā, p. 208).

यत्ने सन्नाविनः सर्व्वे समुद्भावाश्च निग्रहाः ।

विच्छेदकाः कथायां च द्वयोर्जल्पवितण्डयोः ॥

(Tārkikarākṣā, p. 362).

वादे कथावसानस्य हेत्वाभासो हि कारणम् ।

तथा निरनुयोज्यानामनुयोग इति द्वयम् ॥

(Tārkikarākṣā, p. 363).

be pointed out in a discussion are :—(1) saying too little, (2) saying too much, (3) deviating from the tenet, (4) opposing the proposition, (5) silence, (6) repetition, and (7) the inopportune. The seven points of defeat which are not to be pointed out in a discussion are :—(1) evasion, (2) non-ingenuity, (3) ignorance, (4) shifting the reason, (5) overlooking the censurable, (6) shifting the topic, and (7) the admission of an opinion.

The six points of defeat which are impossible in a discussion are :—(1) shifting the topic, (2) the unintelligible, (3) hurting the proposition, (4) renouncing the proposition, (5) the meaningless, and (6) the incoherent.

12. COMMENTARIES ON TĀRKIKARAKṢĀ.

Sārasaṅgraha.—A “summary of essences” (*sārasaṅgraha*), is the name of a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* by Varadarāja himself. Varadarāja wrote also a commentary on *Nyāyakuśumāñjali* called *Sārasaṅgraha-ṭikā*.

Laghudīpikā.—Jñānapūrṇa is the author of a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* called *Laghudīpikā*, “a light lamp.” He seems to have flourished in about 1200 A.D. as he was a disciple of Viṣṇu Svāmin,¹ who lived in about 1200 A.D. He mentions Jayanta² and Viśvarūpa.

Niṣkaṇṭakā.—A commentary on *Tārkikarakṣā* called *Niṣkaṇṭakā*, the thornless, was composed by sage named Mallinātha, who lived in Kolācala. The sage in his commentary on *Kirātārjunīya* mentions Pijūṣavarṣa whose date is unknown. Mallinātha must have lived before śaka 1580 or A.D. 1658, when a manuscript of the aforesaid commentary on *Kirātārjunīya* was copied.³ He seems to have preceded also Dinakara Miśra, whose commentary on *Raghuvamśa* was composed in 1385 A.D. Mallinātha is generally supposed to have lived in the 14th⁴ century A.D. Mr. A. C. Burnell thinks that Mallinātha’s son lived during the reign of Pratāpa Rudra,⁵ of the Kākāṭīya dynasty in 1310 A.D.

सर्वैश्वर्यं निजावासं सर्वविद्यानिर्षेवितम् ।

श्रीयज्ञेश्वरहरः स्तुतुं श्रीविष्णुस्वामिगुरुं नमः ॥

Colophon to *Laghudīpikā* on *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 364, edited by M.M. Vindhyeśvari Prasād, Benares.

² तस्मिन् विश्वरूपजयन्तयोर्मते कथाभेदाधिशेषमाह ।

Laghudīpikā on *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 356, edited by M.M. Vindhyeśvari Prasād, Benares.

³ The copy of the manuscript is preserved in Benares College.

⁴ Macdonell’s *History of Sanskrit Literature*, page 324.

⁵ *Vide* preface to *Vamśa Brāhmaṇa*, edited by Mr. A. C. Burnell, and M.M. Vindhyeśvari Prasād’s preface to *Tārkikarakṣā*, page 19.

13. KEŚAVA MĪŚRA
(ABOUT 1275 A.D.).

Keśava Mīśra was the author of a Nyāya treatise called *Tarkabhāṣā*. He was a native of Mithilā and a preceptor of Govardhana Mīśra who wrote a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā*, called *Tarkabhāṣā Prakāśa*. Padmanābha Mīśra, author of *Kiraṇāvalī Bhāskara* and *Kaṇāda-rahasya Muktaḥāra*, was an elder brother of Govardhana.¹ Hence it follows that Keśava Mīśra, Padmanābha and Govardhana were contemporaries.² Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar in his *Reports of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, 1882-1883, observed Cinna Bhaṭṭa was the author of a commentary on *Tarkabhāṣā* called *Tarkabhāṣā Praveśikā* and that he lived in Vijayanagar at the Court of King Harihara at the latter half of the 14th century. Padmanābha, brother of Keśava, is said to have been younger to Vardhamāna whom he mentions in his *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara*. So Padmanābha lived between the beginning of the 13th century and end of the 14th century A.D. Probably he lived at the end of the 13th century A.D.

14. *Tarkabhāṣā*—TECHNICALITY OF LOGIC.

Categories—*padārtha*.

Keśava Mīśra opens his work thus—"In order that even dull people may get admittance into the science of Logic, I bring out this *Tarkabhāṣā* (Technicality of Logic) replete with concise arguments."

The *Tarkabhāṣā* deals with the sixteen categories of the Nyāya sūtra, viz. (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *prameya*, (3) *saṁśaya*, (4) *prayojana*, (5) *dṛṣṭānta*, (6) *siddhānta*, (7) *avayava*, (8) *tarka*, (9) *nirṇaya*, (10) *vāda*, (11) *jalpa*, (12) *vitandā*, (13) *hetvābhāsa*, (14) *chala*, (15) *jāti*, (16) *nigrahasthāna*. The second

Tarkabhāṣā incorporated the Vaiśeṣika categories.

¹ Govardhana Mīśra, his *Tarkabhāṣā Prakāśa*, observes :—

विजयश्रीतनूजन्मा गोवर्द्धन इति श्रुतः ।
तर्कानुभाषां तनुते विविच्य गुह्यं निर्मितम् ॥
श्री विश्वनाथानुज पद्मनाभानुजौ गरीयान् बलभद्रजन्मा ।
तनोति तर्कानधिगत्य सर्वान् श्रीपद्मनाभाद्विदुषोविनोदम् ॥
उपदिष्टा गुह्यचरणैरस्युद्धा बर्धमानेन ।
किरणावक्ष्यामर्यास्तन्वन्ते पद्मनाभेन ॥


(Quoted in preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 1, edited by Surendralal Goswami, Benares).

² Surendralal Goswami's preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 4.

The *Tarkabhāṣā* has also been edited with a learned introduction by Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series. The book has been translated into English by M.M. Dr. Ganga Nath Jha, in the Indian Thought, Allahabad.

category, namely *prameya*, includes (a) *ātman*, (b) *śarīra*, (c) *indriya*, (d) *artha*, (e) *buddhi*, (f) *manas*, (g) *pravṛtti*, (h) *doṣa*, (i) *pretyabhāva*, (j) *phala*, (k) *duḥkha*, and (b) *apavarga*. The word *artha*, in the Nyāya sūtra signified five objects of sense, viz. (1) *gandha* (smell), (2) *rasa* (taste), (3) *rūpa* (colour), (4) *sparśa* (touch), and (5) *śabda* (sound). In order to incorporate the Vaiśeṣika categories into Nyāya, Keśava Mīśra explained *artha* as signifying (1) *dravya*, (2) *guṇa*, (3) *karma*, (4) *sāmānya*, (5) *viśeṣa*, and (6) *samavāya*. Though the sixteen categories of the Nyāya are included in the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, the two sets of categories are separately stated and the Vaiśeṣika categories are explained identically with *artha*. Keśava confesses that he adopts this overlapping division for a special purpose. The scheme of combination of the two sets of categories is shown below :—

- (1) pramāṇa, (2) prameya, (3) saṁśaya, (4) prayojana, (5) dṛṣṭānta, (6) siddhānta,
(7) avayava, (8) tarka, (9) nirṇaya, (10) vāda,
(11) jalpa, (12) vitandā, etc.



Instrument—*karana*.

Under the first category, Keśava defines instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) as a cause which is most effective in bringing about a result. A thing is said to be the cause (*kāraṇa*) of another thing, if it is a necessary antecedent of the latter, that is, if it necessarily exists before the latter and does not bring about anything else, e.g. threads constitute the cause of a cloth. Suppose an ass had existed at a place where a cloth was made; the ass, whose existence there was not necessary, is not a cause of the cloth; and the ass is an irrelevant antecedent. Similarly the colour of the threads is not a cause of the cloth, inasmuch as it brings about something else, viz. the colour of the cloth. In so far as the cloth itself is concerned, it is produced by the threads alone.

An effect (*kārya*) is defined as that necessary consequence which is not brought about by something else, e.g. a cloth is an effect of threads.

Cause—*kāraṇa*.

The cause is of three kinds as follows:—

- (1) The material, constituent or inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) is that in which an effect inheres, that which constitutes

the effect or that which forms the material out of which the effect is produced, e.g. threads are such a cause of the cloth. Inherence (*samavāya*) is the relation of two things which one, as long as it is not destroyed, continues to subsist in the other. The relation of inherence (*samavāya*) exists between its parts and a whole, the qualities and substance, action and an actor, the individual and a class, its specific qualities and the eternal substance.

- (2) The non-material, non-constituent or non-inherent cause (*asamavāyī kāraṇa*)—is that which inheres in the material cause and whose efficiency is well known, e.g. the conjunction of the threads is a non-material cause of the cloth, the colour of the threads is a non-material cause of the colour of the cloth. Colour inheres in threads and its efficiency in producing the colour of the cloth is well known.
- (3) The efficient, instrumental or general cause is that which as a cause is distinct from both the preceding ones, e.g. the loom is the instrumental cause of the cloth. Of the several causes the most efficient is called an instrumental (*nimitta*) cause.

Perception—*pratyakṣa*.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is of two kinds :—

(1) *Nirvikalpaka*, non-determinate, non-effective or abstract, and (2) *savikalpaka*, determinate, reflective or concrete. The Buddhists admit only the first kind of perception and reject the second kind. They say that our perception is certainly indeterminate and individual, it has for its object an individual which alone can come in contact with our senses. A determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) is according to them an impossibility, because it has for its object a generic entity which cannot come in contact with our senses. We can perceive an individual cow but cannot perceive the cowness generic to all individual cows. In fact the Buddhists altogether deny a genus or generic entity. If, for instance, the genus cowness at all exists, it is to be defined as that which is excluded by non-cowness, i.e. which is not horse-ness, tigerness, etc.

Now if we are unable to perceive cowness because it pertains to all cows, how can we perceive non-cowness which covers a still wider area? Keśava's reply to the objection of the Buddhists is that even a genus is to be regarded as an entity, like an individual, which is, as such, capable of coming in contact with our senses.

Inference—*anumāna*.

Inference is consideration from sign. A sign (*liṅga*) is that which indicates the predicate (*sādhya*) by the force of their

invariable concomitance, e.g. smoke is a sign of fire, inasmuch as there is an invariable concomitance of smoke with fire in the form "wherever there is smoke there is fire." Consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the knowledge that the sign pervaded by the predicate abides in the subject, Inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is the knowledge which is derived through consideration, e.g. this hill has fire, because it has smoke, which is in invariable concomitance with fire. Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the constant association of the sign with the predicate, e.g. the co-presence of smoke with fire. The concomitance or co-presence must be natural and not conditional (*aupādhika*).¹

Comparison—*upamāna*.

Comparison or analogy (*upamāna*) is the knowledge of a certain thing as similar to another thing, derived through the remembrance of an indicative declaration on the subject, e.g. a man who has heard from a forester that a *bosgavaeus* (*gavaya*) is like a cow, goes into a forest and sees an animal like a cow. Remembering the declaration of the forester, he ascertains that the animal he sees is a *bosgavaeus*. This knowledge is analogical or comparative knowledge derived through an analogy or comparison.

Word—*śabda*.

Word (*śabda*), if it is the assertion of a trustworthy person, is a means of right knowledge, e.g. the Veda is a means of right knowledge, inasmuch as it was spoken by God who is supremely trustworthy.

15. COMMENTARIES ON THE TARKABHĀṢĀ.

There are numerous commentaries on the *Tarkabhāṣā*; such as, those by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Guṇḍu Bhaṭṭa, Bhinnī Bhaṭṭa, and Murāri Bhaṭṭa.

The following commentaries are also well known: *Ujjaḍālā* by Gopīnatha, *Tarkabhāṣā bhāva* by Roma Vilva Veṅkaṭa Buddha, *Nyāya saṁgraha* by Rāma Liṅga, *Sāramañjari* by Mādhava Deva, *Paribhāṣā-darpaṇa* by Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa, *Tarkabhāṣā prakāśikā* by Bāla Candra, *Yuktimuktāvali* by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa about 1700 A.D. (Nāgeśa was a contemporary of Hari Dīkṣita, a grandson of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita who lived between 1619 A.D. and 1659 A.D.). *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* by Cinna Bhaṭṭa about 1390 A.D. (Cinna Bhaṭṭa, son of Sahaja Sarvajña, and brother of Sarvajña, must have flourished about 1390² A.D. when his patron Harihara, King of

¹ A condition (*upādhī*) will be explained later.

² Vide Surendralal Goswami's preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, page 3.

Vijayanagar, lived). *Tattva Prabodhini* by Gaṇeśa Dīkṣita, *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikā* by Kaunḍinya Dīkṣita, *Tarkadīpikā* by Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, *Tarkabhāṣā-prākāśikā* by Govardhana Miśra, *Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśikā* by Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma, and *Nyāyapradīpa* by Viśvakarmā.¹

¹ *Vide* Surendralal Goswami's Preface to *Tarkabhāṣā*, pp. 9-13.

CHAPTER III.

The Vaiśeṣika Prakaraṇa embodying the Nyāya Category of Pramāṇa.

16. THE VAIŚEṢIKA INCORPORATES THE NYĀYA CATEGORY.

There appeared numerous treatises on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy which incorporated in them the Nyāya category of *pramāṇa*. In some of the treatises the Nyāya category of *pramāṇa* was included in the Vaiśeṣika category of *guṇa*, while others brought it under *ātman*, which was included in the category *dravya*. Some ingenious writers kept the categories of the Vaiśeṣika separate from the Nyāya category of *pramāṇa*, but they made them the subjects of distinct chapters of one and the same treatise. This incorporation of the Nyāya category of *pramāṇa* into the categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy must have commenced after the tenth century A.D. Lakṣaṇāvalī, written by Udayana in that century, deals with seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika, including *abhāva*, without any reference to the Nyāya category of *pramāṇa*. The Nyāya category of *pramāṇa* is included by Vallabhācārya in the Vaiśeṣika category of *guṇa*.

17. VALLABHĀCĀRYA (ABOUT 12TH CENTURY A.D.).

The exact date of Vallabhācārya is unknown. He seems to have lived in the twelfth century A.D. In the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* he mentions Kīrti (Dharmakīrti), Tutāti and Vyomācārya as well as Udayanācārya,¹ the famous author of *Kiraṇāvalī*, who flourished in 984 A.D. As Bhāsarvajña² and Bhūṣaṇa³ are also mentioned, Vallabha could not have flourished before the 10th century A.D. The latest limit of his time is the 13th century A.D., when Vardhamāna Upādhyāya wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* called the *Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāśa*. The *Nyāyalīlāvatī* is mentioned in a Kanarese poem written by a poet of the time of King Ciṅghaṇa of the Yādava dynasty who reigned in Devagiri

¹ यथा भेर्याकाशसंयोगस्योभयवितर्केऽपि नभसि शब्दजनननियम इति किरणावलीकारः । *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, page 39, edited by Maṅgeśa Rāmakṛṣṇa Telang (Nirṇaya Sagara Press, Bombay). Compare also pages 56 and 97 of the same.

² तदिदमनाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य यद्वसुधाचार्यमप्यवसन्त्यते । *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, page 33. Compare also page 40.


³ तदिदं चिरन्तन वैशेषिकमतद्वेषणं भूषणकारस्यातिचपाकरम् । *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, page 33. Compare also pages 25, 46 and 102.

from 1210 to 1247 A.D.¹ This Vallabhāchāryā is different from Vallabhāchārya who founded a Vaiṣṇava sect.

18. Nyāyalīlāvatī.

The Nyāyalīlāvatī, which is an expository treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, opens with a salutation to Puruṣottama. It deals with six categories, viz. (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) action (*karma*), (4) generality (*sāmānya*), (5) particularity (*viśeṣa*), and (6) inherence (*samavāya*). Under the category *guṇa* there comes *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge) which is divided as *vidyā*, right knowledge, and *avidyā*, wrong knowledge. The means for ascertaining right knowledge are called perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*). Presumption (*arthāpatti*), probability (*sambhava*), tradition (*aitihya*), are not separate means of right knowledge.

The Nyāya doctrine of *pramāṇa*² (means of knowledge) is thus included in the categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The scheme of incorporation is shown below :—



19. COMMENTARIES³ ON THE NYĀYALĪLĀVATĪ.

The following commentaries on the Nyāyalīlāvatī are available :—

¹ Vide Mr. M. R. Bodās's introduction to Tarkasaṃgraha, pp. 41-42.

² A valuable account of *pramāṇa* is available in the Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, and in the Maṇimekalai canto 29.

³ Vide Maṅgeśa Rāmkrṣṇa Telang, preface to Nyāyalīlāvatī, page 2.

- (1) Nyāyalīlāvati-prakāśa by Vardhamāna-Upādhyāya (about 1215 A.D.).
- (2) Nyāyalīlāvati-didhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1500 A.D.).
- (3) Nyāyalīlāvati-kaṇṭhābharana by Śaṅkara Miśra (about 1492 A.D.).
- (4) Nyāyalīlāvati-prakāśaviveka (gloss on Vardhamāna) by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa (about 1570 A.D.).

20. ANNAM BHAṬṬA (1623 A.D.).

Annam Bhaṭṭa is the author of an excellent Vaiśeṣika treatise called Tarkasaṃgraha and of a commentary thereon called Dīpikā, which two, taken together, are often designated as Annambhaṭṭīyam. The Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa Prakāśa, a commentary on the Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa of Udayana, is also ascribed to him. The prevailing tradition in Southern India¹ is that Annam Bhaṭṭa was an Andhra (Telugu) of North Arcot (Chittur) district, who settled down in Benares at beginning of the 17th century A.D. He refers in his Dīpikā to King Tribhuvanatilaka, a Pallava chief of Kāñci. A manuscript of Tarkasaṃgraha² was, as appears from Weber's Berlin Catalogue, copied in the year 1724 A.D.³ He is supposed by some to have written a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi. He could not have flourished before the 17th century A.D.

21. Tarkasaṃgraha.

Annam Bhaṭṭa opens his Tarkasaṃgraha with a salutation^{*} to Siva thus:—"Placing the Lord of the universe in my heart and making obeisance to my preceptor, I compile this Tarkasaṃgraha to enable beginners to understand the dialectical philosophy easily." The work deals with seven categories, viz. (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) action (*karma*), (4) generality (*sāmānya*), (5) particularity (*viśeṣa*), (6) inherence

¹ The above information was supplied by Mr. Ramanan of Vedaraniyam (Tanjore) to Hon'ble Sir P. Arupāchalam, Kt., M.A., C.S., Bar-at-Law, of Colombo, who kindly communicated the same to me in August 1909.

² Tarkasaṃgraha was translated into English by J. R. Ballantyne in Benares.

³ The colophon of the manuscript gives the date Śaivāt 1781 (A.D. 1724).

तपोमास्यसिधे कृष्णे चन्द्रनागाब्धिचन्द्रके ।

वाराणस्यां मिते वर्षे स्वार्थमिष्टदुर्लभसख वै ॥

Weber's Berlin Catalogue No. 683, p. 203.


^{*} निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुह्यवन्दनम् । बालानां सुखबीधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

Tarkasaṃgraha, opening lines, edited by Mr. M. R. Bodas, Bombay).

(*samavāya*), and (7) non-existence (*abhāva*). Quality is of twenty-four kinds, of which *buddhi* (intellect or knowledge) is one. *Buddhi* or knowledge is of two kinds, experience (*anubhava*) and *smṛti* (recollection). *Anubhava* or experience may be right or wrong. The right experience (*yathārthānubhava*) is of four kinds, viz. (1) perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inferential knowledge (*anumiti*), (3) comparative knowledge (*upamiti*), and verbal knowledge (*śabda*). The means by which these four kinds of knowledge are derived are called respectively (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) *anumāna* (inference), (3) comparison (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, together called *pramāṇa*, are thus included in *buddhi*, which is one of the twenty-four qualities. This sort of inclusion of the *pramāṇa* in the categories of the Vaiśeṣika is not altogether satisfactory, inasmuch as they do not completely fit into each other.

The scheme of incorporation is shown below :—



The seven categories and their numerous subdivisions are most lucidly treated.

A right experience (*yathārthānubhava*) is defined as the experience of a generic nature as abiding in its subject, e.g. in the case of a piece of silver, the experience that "this is silver," that is, this is the subject in which "silverness" abides, is a right experience.

An instrument (*karāṇa*) is defined as a special cause which is in operation, that is, which brings about an effect, *e.g.*, he cuts a tree with an axe. Here Instrument and Cause. axe is the instrument. A cause (*kāraṇa*) is that which invariably precedes an effect, which cannot otherwise take place, *e.g.* "clay is the material cause of a pot."

An effect (*kārya*) is the counterpart of an antecedent which dissolves into non-existence, *e.g.*, "a pot is the effect of clay."

A cause is of three kinds: (1) a material or intimate cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), (2) non-intimate or non-co-existent cause (*asamvāyikāraṇa*), and (3) the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*),¹ all of which will be explained later.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge which is produced from the intercourse of the sense organs with their objects. It is of two kinds: (1) indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and (2) determinate (*savikalpa*). The Perception. intercourse is of six kinds, which will be explained later.

Inference (*anumāna*) is the means for deriving inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is the knowledge which arises from consideration (parāmarśa). Consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the knowledge that the reason or the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, *e.g.* this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with the fire. Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the constant association of the middle term with the major term, *e.g.*, wherever there is smoke, there is fire. *Pakṣadharmatā* (subjective law) refers to the fact that the smoke abides in the hill. As the Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not form a subject of this volume, the topics of *Tarkasaṃgraha* are not treated here.

22 COMMENTARIES ON TARKASAṂGRAHA:—

- (1) *Tarkasaṃgraha-dīpikā* (or *Tarkadīpikā*) by Annam Bhaṭṭa.
- (2) *Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā* by Ananta Nārāyaṇa.
- (3) *Siddhānta-candrodaya* by Śrīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjati Dīkṣita.
- (4) *Tarka-phakkikā* by Kṣamākalyāṇa. Kṣamākalyāṇa was a pupil of Jinalābha Sūri and wrote his commentary on both *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Tarkadīpikā* in 1772 A.D.
- (5) *Nyāya-bodhini* by Govardhana Miśra.
- (6) *Nyāyārtha-laghubodhinī* by Govardhana Raṅgācārya.
- (7) *Tarkasaṃgraha-ṭīkā* by Gaurīkānta.

¹ *Samavāyikāraṇa* corresponds to Aristotle's *material* cause. *Asamavāyikāraṇa* corresponds to Aristotle's *formal* cause. *Nimittakāraṇa* corresponds to Aristotle's *efficient* cause. The final cause is the thing in its completeness, as a pot, when it has actually been made.

- (8) Padakṛtya by Candraja Simha.
- (9) Tarkasaṁgraha-tattva-prakāśa by Nilakaṇṭha. [Perhaps he is the same person who wrote a commentary on the Mahābhārata in Mahārāṣṭra in the 16th century A.D.].
- (10) Nirukti by Jagannātha Śāstrin.
- (11) Nirukti by Paṭṭābhirāma.
- (12) Tarkasaṁgraha-vākyārtha-nirukti by Mādhava Padābhirāma.
- (13) Tarkasaṁgraha-candrikā by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa Gāḍgil.
- (14) Tarkasaṁgrahopanyāsa (vākyavṛtti) by Meru Śāstri Godbolé.
- (15) Nyāya-bodhinī by Śuklaratnanātha.
- (16) Tarkasaṁgraha-ṭikā by Ramānātha.
- (17) Tarkasaṁgraha-taraṅgiṇī by Vindhyeśvari Prasāda.
- (18) Tarkasaṁgraha-ṭikā by Viśvanātha.
- (19) Tarka-candrikā (prabhā) by Vaidyanātha Gāḍgil.
- (20) Tarkasaṁgraha-ṭikā (Hanumanti) by Hanumat, son of Vyāsa. He was a Karnatic from Mysore who lived for some time in the Gwalior Court about 80 years ago.
- (21) Tarkasaṁgraha-vyākhyā by Murāri.
- (22) Tarkasaṁgraha-ṭikā, author unknown.
- (23) Tarkasaṁgraha-śaṅku, ditto.
- (24) Nyāya-candrikā, ditto.
- (25) Tarkasaṁgrahopanyāsa, ditto.
- (26) Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa (gloss) by Nilkaṇṭha Śāstrin, author of Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-ṭikā.
- (27) Surata-kalpataru (gloss) by Śrinivāsa.
- (28) Ṭikā by Gaṅgādhara Bhaṭṭa.
- (29) Ṭikā by Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭa.
- (30) Ṭikā by Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa.
- (31) Tattvārtha-dīpikā by Vādhulaveṅkaṭa Guru.
- (32) Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa by Nilakaṇṭha. This Nilakaṇṭha, who also wrote a commentary on Tattva-cintāmaṇi, is the last representative of the School of Gaṅgeśa; born at Pānya near Ahobala in the district of Kurnool, he died in Benares in 1840. His son (born 1816, died at Benares in 1887) wrote a commentary on the Tarkasaṁgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa of his father, entitled Bhāskarodaya. Bhāskarodaya-ṭikā is a gloss on the Nilkaṇṭhi-ṭikā (see below No. 33) of Tarkadīpikā written by the son of Nilakaṇṭha in Benares about 25 years ago.
- (33) Nilakaṇṭhīṭikā, a gloss on Tarkadīpikā, by Nilkaṇṭha, who was a Tailanga, and who wrote about 70 years ago, while residing at Benares.
- (34) Bhāśyavṛtti on Tarkasaṁgraha by Meru Śāstri, who was a Maratha. He died in Benares about 60 years ago.
- (35) Tarkasaṁgraha-candrikā by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa.

23. VIŚVANĀTHA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA
(1634 A.D.).

Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, or simply Pañcānana, was the author of a Vaiśeṣika treatise called *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*¹ (determination of categories), and of a commentary on the same called *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (rows of pearls of logical truths). Viśvanātha, as it appears from his *Piṅgala-prakāśikā*,² as also from other sources, was the son of Vidyānivāsa and a brother of Rudra Vācaspati. Vidyānivāsa lived in 1588 A.D.³ when a book called *Dānakāṇḍā* was copied for him by a scribe called Kavicandra. Viśvanātha himself composed the *Gautamasūtravṛtti* at Vṛndāvana in the year 1634 A.D.⁴ He was a native of Navadvīpa and an adherent of the Nyāya School of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.⁵

24. BHĀṢĀPARICCHEDA.

Viśvanātha opens his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with a salutation to Śrī Kṛṣṇa,⁶ and while in his *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* he invokes the blessings of Śiva. The

¹ The *Bhāṣāpariccheda* has been edited and translated into English by Dr. G. Roer in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, Calcutta.

² In the *Piṅgala-prakāśikā* Viśvanātha says :—

विद्यानिवासस्तनोः कतिरेषा विश्वनाथस्य ।
विदुषामतिस्त्रक्षधिया समत्सराणां मुदे भविता ॥
सर्वेषां मौलिरत्नानां भट्टाचार्यमहात्मनां
एतद्विद्यानिवासनां दानकाण्डाख्यपुस्तकम् ।
ओमेन्दुशरशीतांशुमितशके विशेषतः
शूद्रेण कविचन्द्रेण विलिख्य परिशोधितम् ॥

(*Vide* Eggeling's *India Office Catalogue*, Vol. III, page 409B; and M.M. Hara Prasād Śāstri's *Nepal Catalogue*, Preface, p. xvi).

रसबाणतिथौ शकेन्द्रकाले
वज्रले कामतिथौ शुचौ धिताहे ।
अकरोन्मुनिस्त्रचट्तिमेतां
ननु वृन्द्याविपिने स विश्वनाथः ॥

(*Vide* M.M. Hara Prasād Śāstri's article on *Bhāṣāpariccheda* in the *J.A.S.B.*, Vol. VI, No. 7).


एषा मुनिप्रवरगौतमस्त्रचट्तिः
श्रीविश्वनाथ कतिना मुगमाख्यवर्णा ।
श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रचरणाम्बुज चक्षुरीक-
श्रीमच्छिरोमणि वचः प्रचरैरकारि ॥

(*J.A.S.B.*, Vol. VI, No. 7, page 313).

ब्रह्माद्या निखिलार्चिताजिदश सन्दोहाः सदाभीष्टदाः ।
अज्ञानप्रशमाय यच्च मनसो वृत्तिं समस्तां दधुः ॥

Bhāṣāpariccheda deals with seven categories, viz. (1) *dravya* (substance), (2) *guṇa* (quality), (3) *karma* (action), (4) *sāmānya* (generality), (5) *viśeṣa* (particularity), (6) *samavāya* (inherence), and (7) *abhāva* (non-existence). *Dravya* or substance is subdivided *kṣiti* (earth), *ap* (water), *tejas* (light), *marut* (air), *vyoma* (ether), *kāla* (time), *dik* (space), *ātman* (soul), and *manas* (mind). The eighth substance called *ātman* or soul is the seat of intellect or knowledge (*buddhi*) and several other qualities. *Buddhi* is of two kinds: apprehension (*anubhūti*) and remembrance (*smṛti*). Apprehension includes perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

The Nyāya doctrine of *pramāṇa*, as represented by perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony, is incorporated in the categories of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The scheme of incorporation is shown below.



25. TARKĀMṚTA (ABOUT 1635 A.D.).

The *Tarkāmṛta* ¹ by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra is an important treatise on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which begins with a salutation to

¹ *Tarkāmṛta* edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Maheś Chandra Nyāyaratna in Calcutta. It has been translated into Bengali by Babu Rājendra Nāth Ghose in Calcutta.


Viṣṇu.¹ A man who is desirous of attaining emancipation should, according to Jagadīśa, possess a true knowledge of the soul (*ātman*). In acquiring this knowledge, one should also be conversant with things which are connected with and opposed to the soul.

In the first part of the Tarkāmṛta called *Viśaya-kāṇḍa* (section on subjects), Jagadīśa divides things into two kinds, viz. (1) positive (*bhāva*) and (2) negative (*abhāva*). The positive things or *bhāvas* are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*). The negative things or *abhāvas* are of two kinds, viz. (1) relative non-existence (*sam-sargābhāva*), and (2) reciprocal non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*). The first kind is subdivided as: (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), (2) subsequent non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), and (3) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*).

The second part of the Tarkāmṛta, called *Jñāna-kāṇḍa*, section on knowledge, treats of right knowledge (*pramā*), which is derived through four means called respectively, (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*anumāna*), (3) comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) verbal testimony (*śabda*).

The manner in which the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the four *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya have been combined, is ingenious and reasonable. The categories do not coalesce with each other, but are treated as a consistent whole.

A scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya categories is given below :—



Vaiśeṣika combined with Nyāya.

26. LAUGĀKṢI BHĀSKARA.

Laugākṣi Bhāskara, well versed in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophies, was the son of Mudgala and nephew of the poet Rudra. His proper name was Bhāskara, his surname being Lau-gākṣi. From the fact that he mentions the temple of Viśveśvara and the pool of Maṇikarnikā,—the two most sacred spots in Benares,—we may reasonably suppose that Laugākṣi Bhaskara lived in that sacred city.¹

His age may be placed probably in the 17th century.

27. TARKAKAUMUDĪ.

His Tarkakaumudī, which opens with a salutation to Vāsudeva, pays due obeisance to Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda. He divides categories into seven kinds, viz. (1) substance (*dravya*), (2) quality (*guṇa*), (3) action (*karma*), (4) generality (*sāmānya*), (5) particularity (*viśeṣa*), (6) inherence (*samavāya*), and (7) non-existence (*abhāva*). *Buddhi* (intellect or knowledge), which is a quality of the soul, is of two kinds—apprehension (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). Apprehension is of two kinds, (1) right apprehension (*pramā*) and (2) wrong apprehension (*apramā*). The means of acquiring right apprehension or *pramā* is *pramāṇa*, which is of two kinds, viz. (1) (*pratyakṣa*) and (2) inference (*anumāna*).

The doctrine of *pramāṇa*, which forms the main subject of the Nyāya philosophy, is thus amalgamated with the doctrine of seven categories, forming the subject-matter of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

¹ Laugākṣi Bhāskara mentions Maṇikarnikā, the bathing place, and Viśveśvara, the presiding deity of Benares, in quite a familiar tone:—यथा सा मणिकर्णिका, स विश्वेश्वर etc. (Tarkakaumudī, page 6. edited by Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī Pansikar, Bombay).

CHAPTER IV.

Works treating of certain topics of the Nyāya and certain topics of the Vaiśeṣika.

28. THE NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA PROMISCUOUSLY AMALGAMATED.

Some manuals of Logic dealt neither with the entire categories of the Vaiśeṣika, nor with those of the Nyāya. Some important topics or sub-topics of the two systems were selected by them and elucidated in an abstruse and recondite style. These manuals assumed more or less the nature of critical notes on the important or controversial topics of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies. Śaśadhara's Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa (about 1300 A.D.) is a most important work of this kind.

29. ŚAŚADHARA (ABOUT 1125 A.D.).

Śaśadhara, styled Mahopādhyāya Śaśadhara,¹ is reputed to have been a native of Mithilā. The time in which he flourished is not definitely known. Probably he flourished before Gaṅgeśa but after Udayana whose words he quotes under the designation of *kecit* (some). Śaśadhara and Maṇidhara were, according to a Bengali tradition, two logicians, whose definitions of *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) were criticised by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in the 12th century A.D., under the title of *śimha-vyāghroktā-lakṣaṇa* or definitions as given by "the Lion" and "the Tiger." In reality it was the Jaina logicians, Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri, who were called the Lion (*śimha*) and the Tiger (*vyāghra*), not Śaśadhara and Maṇidhara. According, however, to the Bengali tradition, Śaśadhara lived in the 12th century A.D.

30. NYĀYA-SIDDHĀNTA-DĪPA.

The only logical treatise of Śaśadhara that has come down to us, is Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa (a lamp of logical truths) which opens² with a salutation to

¹ Vide the colophon of the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa, in the possession of M.M. Vindhyaśvari Prasād Dvivedi of Benares. It runs thus:—

इति मन्त्रोपाध्याय शशधरकृतं न्यायप्रकरणं समाप्तम् ।

²

ध्वंसितनरसिद्धान्तध्वान्तं

गौतममतेकसिद्धान्तम् ।

नत्वा नित्यमधौशं

शशधर शर्मा प्रकाशयति ॥

From the manuscript of Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa, in the possession of Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Adhīśa (Śiva). It deals with the topics of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy in a promiscuous way. This is evident from the titles of the various chapters of the work, *viz.* (1) invocation of blessings (*maṅgalācaraṇa*), (2) controversy on darkness (*andhakāra-vipratipatti*), (3) examination of causality (*kāraṇatā-vicāra*), (4) the power in generality as maintained by the Tautātikas (*jāti-śakti-vādi-tautālikāmata*), (5) ascertainment of powers and conditions (*śakti-nirūpaṇa* and *upādhi*), (6) natural power (*sahaja-śakti*), (7) power of the content (*ādheya-śakti*), (8) nature of the mind (*manastattva-nirūpaṇa*), (9) word as a means of knowledge (*sahaja-pramāṇa*), (10) an aggregate of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*), (11) nature of emancipation (*apavarga-nirūpaṇa*), (12) the inseparable meaning (*siddhārtha*), (13) power of connected words (*anvita-śakti-vādimata*), (14) refutation of the perceptibility of air (*vāyu-pratyakṣa-tvādi-mata-khaṇḍana*), (15) controversy about indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-vipratipatti*), (16) gold as a fiery thing (*suvarṇa-taijasa-prakarṇa*), (17) the etymologo-conventional use of a word as “mud-born” (*pañkaja iti padānām yogarūḍhitva-kathana*), (18) inference, consideration, etc. (*anumiti, liṅgaparāmarśādi-nirūpaṇa*), (19) determination of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti-nirūpaṇa*, etc.). The work ends with an examination of non-existence (*abhāva*) as a means of knowledge.

Commentary.

There is a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa called Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa-ṭīkā by Śeṣānanta.

31. MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA

(ABOUT 1331—1391 A.D.).

Mādhavācārya flourished in 1391¹ A.D. (1313 Śāka). He is the well-known author of Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, Jaiminiya-nyāyamālā-vistara, Kāthā-nirṇaya and Parāśarasmr̥ti-vyākhyā. He was elected² the head of the *smārta* order in the *maṭha* of Sringeri, in the Mysore territory, founded by Śaṅkara. He is said by some to have been brother of Sāyana, while others hold that he was the same as Sāyana,³ though essentially he was a writer on Mīmāṃsā

¹ Vide Preface to Vivaraṇa-pramēya-saṁgraha printed in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

² Preface to Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, translated by E. B. Cowell and A. G. Gough, pp. vii-viii.

³ Perhaps Mādhava was born in the family of Sāyana. Compare—

श्रीमत्सायणदुग्धाब्जिकौस्तुभेन मन्त्रोजसा ।

क्रियते माधवार्येण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः ॥

पूर्वेषामतिदुस्तराणि सुतरामालीढा शास्त्रान्यसौ

श्रीमत्सायणमाधवः प्रभुरपन्यास्यत् सतां प्रीतये ।

(Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha, opening lines).

philosophy. His preceptor was Sarvajña-*viṣṇu*, son of Śarṅga-*pānī*.¹ He is mentioned here because he has supplied, among other things, some important information about the Nyāya philosophy. Besides giving a complete exposition of the Nyāya system under the head of *Akṣapāda*darśana, Mādhava throws a good deal of light on Logic of the Cārvākas and Buddhists.

32. SARVADARŚANA-SAMGRAHA,—AKṢAPĀDA DARŚANA.

In the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* under the title of *Akṣapāda*darśana, Mādhava has given a brief exposition of the sixteen categories treated in the Nyāya-sūtra. The Nyāya philosophy was so called, because it specially treated of *Nyāya*, otherwise called *avayava* (syllogism), which formed the predominant feature of the system and proved useful in the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge.²

INFERENCE AS A MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE.

Cārvāka denies inference as a means of right knowledge.

The view of Cārvāka darśanta.

Those who maintain the authority of inference (*anumāna*), accept something as a sign or middle term, which is supposed to abide in the minor term, and to be in invariable concomitance with the major term. The invariable concomitance must be freed from all conditions, whether they are sure (*nīścita*) or suspected (*sandigdha*). Now this concomitance by its mere existence cannot produce inference. The concomitance, if it is to produce inference, must be known. How do we then know this concomitance? We cannot know the concomitance by means of perception, which does not cognize past and future events. We cannot employ inference, the validity of which has not yet been established. Verbal testimony, which is included in inference, cannot help us in this matter. Comparison is useless. Hence, the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term cannot be known by any of the so-called four means of knowledge.

श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनयं निखिलागमज्ञं

सर्वज्ञविष्णुगुरुमन्त्रहमाश्रयेऽहम् ॥

(*Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, opening lines).

² ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थबोद्धशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते सत्यं तथाप्यसाधारणेन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानु-
भाहकतया सर्वकर्मनुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथाव्यपदेशो युज्यते । *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, *Akṣapāda*darśanam, p. 130, edited by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati, Calcutta.

Similarly, the invariable concomitance has also been described as freed from conditions (*upādhi*). A condition (*upādhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not constantly accompany the middle term, *e.g.* the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel (where wet fuel is a condition). A condition may be fully defined as that (1) which does not constantly accompany the middle term, (2) which constantly accompanies the major term, and (3) is constantly accompanied by the major term. That the condition must be equipollent in extension with the major term is evident from the statement of the Great Doctor (probably Udayanācārya) who says: "When an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in an object, the non-equipollent concomitance, if it is not covered by the equipollent concomitance, is inadmissible, that is, not conducive to the true conclusion."¹

A thing is said to be in equipollent concomitance (*samavyāpti*) with another thing, when the two are equal in their extensions, *e.g.*, "this is nameable because it is knowable," where "knowable" and "nameable" are equal in their extensions. Similarly, "this hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel," where "smoke" and "fire nourished by wet fuel," are equal in their extensions; that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire nourished by wet fuel; and wherever there is fire nourished by wet fuel, there is smoke.

A thing is said to be in non-equipollent concomitance (*viṣamavyāpti*) with another thing, when the two are unequal in their extensions, *e.g.*, "this hill has fire, because it has smoke," where the fire is greater in extension than smoke, that is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, but wherever there is fire there is not necessarily smoke, as in a red-hot iron ball.

Now an equipollent concomitance and a non-equipollent concomitance do both abide in smoke in the following instances:— (1) the hill has smoke because it has fire, and (2) the hill has smoke because it has fire nourished by wet fuel.

In the first instance smoke is in non-equipollent concomitance with fire, whereas in the second instance smoke is in equi-

¹ Varadarāja in his commentary on Tārkikarākṣā called Sārasaṅgraha quotes this verse as an example of the fallacy *hetvābhāsā*, called *aprayojaka* (inadmissible), which is identified in the conditional (*upādhi*); quoted in the Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha chapter I, Cārvāka-darśana.

समासमाविनाभाववेकचसो यदा तदा ।

समेन यदि नो व्याप्तयोर्द्वौ नोऽप्रयोजकः ॥

The portion which is added to the middle term or subtracted from the major term is called an *upādhi* (condition), *anyathāsiddhi* (conditionality) or *aprayojaka* (inadmissible). Tārkikarākṣā, page 232, edited by Vindhyaśvarī Prasad, Benares.

pollent concomitance with "fire nourished by wet fuel." The first instance is inadmissible, because in it, the reason "fire" is not covered by the reason of the second instance, viz. "fire nourished by wet fuel."

Again (1) the hill has fire because it has smoke, (2) the hill has fire nourished by wet fuel, because it has smoke. The first is an instance of non-equipollent concomitance, while the second is that of an equipollent one. The first instance here, is not inadmissible, because the reason of it, viz. "smoke," is covered by the reason of the second instance, which is also smoke.

The middle term can on no account be greater in extent than the major term, but may be equal in extent to or less in extent than that term.

Now this absence of conditions referred to above cannot be known through perception, specially in the cases of past and future instances. *Cārvāka* says that the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result is accidental, just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc. As it is impossible to know the concomitance which is invariable and unconditional, the inference as a means of knowledge cannot be established.

THE INFERENCE AS A MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE CANNOT BE DENIED.

The Buddhists maintain that the concomitance (*avinābhāva*), which is invariable and unconditional, is known through the relation of identity (*svabhāva*) or causality (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*). No effect can, they say, be produced without a cause, for, if it could, it would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of all kinds.

Through the relation of cause and effect, which is unalterable, we can ascertain that the middle term is invariable concomitance with the major term. In like manner the invariable concomitance is known through the relation of identity, e.g., the *śiśu* is a tree, wherever we observe the attribute of a *śiśu* we observe also the attribute of "arboreity." A *śiśu* cannot lose its arboreity without losing its own self. Though there are differences between a *śiśu* and a tree, they are essentially the same. We are therefore quite competent to say that a *śiśu* is a tree and that the relation between the two is that of identity. We cannot however say, that a jar is a jar or that there is a relation of

identity between the jars. We cannot predicate one thing of another thing, if there is no difference whatever between the two. It is therefore proved that we can infer one thing from another thing through the relation of cause and effect or when the two things are in essence the same.

The Buddhists further maintain that inference as a means of knowledge can on no account be denied. It would be a mere assertion, if a person were to say that inference is not a means of knowledge. To think of inference as a means of knowledge and yet to deny it involves him in an absurdity, as if, he were saying that his mother was barren.

SECTION II.

Tarka-Sāstra—the Science of Dialectics.

CHAPTER I.

Formation of the Tarka-Sāstra.

33. THE NYĀYA CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH THE VAIŚEṢIKA.

In the previous section, while treating of the *Prakaraṇas*, we have found that it is impossible to combine the Nyāya with Vaiśeṣika, the categories of the two systems being altogether different. The sixteen categories of the Nyāya cannot assimilate the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika nor can the latter assimilate the former. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika categories cannot be assimilated in any other way. It was, therefore, found necessary to keep them separate, though a futile attempt was made by the authors of the *Prakaraṇas* to combine in some way the categories of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

34. ADOPTION OF *Pramāṇa* ALONE.

After their struggle with the Buddhists and Jains for over a thousand years the Brāhmaṇas found it expedient, in treating of the Nyāya, to take up only one topic, viz. *pramāṇa*, to the exclusion of the remaining fifteen topics. The division of *pramāṇa* into two sub-divisions, viz. Perception and Inference, was rejected. Akṣapāda's division of *pramāṇa* into four sub-divisions, viz. perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony, was retained. Great ingenuity was shown to establish the authorities of the four *pramāṇas*. Whole arguments from the Buddhistic and Jaina works were collected to establish inference while the works of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy were resorted to in establishing the authority of verbal testimony.

35. ADOPTION OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA PRINCIPLES.

The theory of *pramāṇa* became very subtle when it adopted the principles of generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*samavāya*), negation (*abhāva*), etc. Thus in perceiving the colour of a jar we must admit a relation called inherence; an invariable concomitance may be of a general form or special forms; and whatever thing is perceptible by a sense, the non-existence of that thing is also perceptible by the same sense.

Thus the Nyāya theory of perception, etc., considered from the standpoint of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, became very subtle and intricate.

36. SUBTLETY OF MEANINGS AIMED AT.

A hair-splitting subtlety in the discussion of meanings of terms is the distinguishing characteristic of the Tarka-śāstra (the science of dialectics). Thus Akṣapāda defines a proposition in quite a simple style as "the laying down of what is to be established." But in elucidating the meaning of a proposition Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha, Gadādhara and others produce definitions which are terribly long and intricate. The subtle explanation is, however, an excellent training for the intellect.

37. FINE DEFINITION OF TERMS.

The technicalities of Tarka-śāstra have repelled students of Sanskrit from its study. The immemorial practice has been for Naiyāyikas to explain verbally to their pupils the meaning of each term as it turns up in the course of their teaching.

The old works on Nyāya dealt with things, while the modern ones deal only with the verbal description or definition of things. Modern Logicians do not trouble themselves about the nature of things. They are satisfied if they can evolve a correct definition, and in their verbal definitions they evince a subtlety and skill, which to a certain extent compensate for the paucity of their materials.

38. THE USE OF TECHNICAL TERMS.¹

In bringing out the subtlety of meanings and in giving fine definitions, the modern logicians have invented numerous technical terms of which some are given here.

ativyāpti—Being too wide.

anugata-dharma—Common property.

anugama—Generalisation.

anuyogitā—The quality of being an *anuyogi*. When a thing stands to another thing in a particular relation, that upon which it stands is called *anuyogi*, while it itself is called *pratiyogi* (counterpart) in regard to the relation. Thus a jar standing on the ground in the relation of union is called *pratiyogi* and the ground is the *anuyogi* of the relation.

anyathā-siddhi—Concomitant circumstances which are not causes.

¹ Vide Rajendra Candra Śāstrin's *Muktāvali* Vol. II, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Maheś Chandra Nyāyaratna's *Brief notes on the modern Nyāya system of Philosophy*, and also M.M. Gangānāth Jhā's *Indian Thought*.

avacchinna—That which is qualified or determined by some attribute.

avacchedaka—A quality or attribute which is determined by the special characters of a thing. Thus *daṇḍatva* is the special character of *daṇḍa* as a *hetu*.

avyāpti—Being too narrow.

kurvad-rūpatva—Causing activity, i.e. the property which abides in a cause actually producing its effect.

pratiyogi—The thing of which a negation is predicated, e.g. a jar is the *pratiyogi* of the negation of the jar.

vyāpti—Pervasion or invariable concomitance.

And there are numerous others.

Some of the characteristics of the Tarka-śāstra have been already given above.

Cintāmāṇi by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya is the earliest work on Tarka-śāstra, though Jānakīnātha Cudāmāṇi's Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjari is another excellent work on the same subject.

CHAPTER II.

Tattva-cintāmaṇi the earliest Work on Tarka-śāstra.

39. IMPORTANCE OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI.

The Tattva-cintāmaṇi ("a thought-jewel of truth"), otherwise known as Pramāṇa-cintāmāṇi ("a thought-jewel of valid knowledge"), of which a short summary in English is given in the following pages, was written by a Brāhmaṇa logician of Mithilā named Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. It introduces a new era in the development of Logic in India and is justly reckoned as the first work on the Modern School of Hindu Logic. In modern India Sanskrit scholarship is not considered of any worth unless it is accompanied by a knowledge of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi or at least a portion of it. The study of this work develops to an enormous extent the discursive faculty in the reader and enables him to argue with hair-splitting distinctions and subtleties.

The book, since its first composition in the 12th century A.D., has been a subject of close study by the Paṇḍits of Mithilā, and about the middle of the 15th century its study was introduced into Bengal by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, who had been educated in the academies of Mithilā. Since 1503 A.D., when the university of Navadvīpa was established, the Tattva-cintāmaṇi was much popularised in Bengal through the endeavours of the famous Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others. Gradually the book was introduced into Madras, Maḥārāṣṭra and Kāśmīra, and in a couple of centuries it became known all over India. The influence of this epoch-making book can be traced in the works on almost all the branches of Sanskrit learning that have appeared during the last five hundred years. Unfortunately no attempt has yet been made to present the contents of the work in English, Bengali, Hindi or any other modern language, perhaps on account of the bewildering abstruseness of its style and thought.

40. GAṆGEŚA—THE AUTHOR OF THE TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI. (1200 A.D.).

The Tattva-cintāmāṇi is the immortal work of Gaṅgeśa, also called Gaṅgeśvara, surnamed Upādhyāya, who was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa. He was born in a village named Karion on the banks of the river Kamalā, twelve miles south-east of Darbhanga. It is said that Gaṅgeśa while young was altogether illiterate. He propitiated the goddess Kālī, on the cremation ground adjacent to

his uncle's house, and acquired from her, as a boon, deep erudition in the science of Logic.

Gaṅgeśa mentions the name of Śivāditya Miśra,¹ the well-known author of *Saptapadārthī*, and makes frequent quotations from *Ratna-kośa*,² which is a work on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Nothing is definitely known about the Gauḍa Mīmāṃsaka³ or Śrīkara⁴ mentioned by him. Gaṅgeśa must have flourished after 1093-1150 A.D., the period when Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri,⁵ whose opinions he has quoted, flourished. As he criticises the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, he must have been posterior also to Śrī Harṣa who lived in Kanauj in the Court of King Jayacandra in 1186 A.D.⁶ The earliest date that has been assigned to Gaṅgeśa is before the first quarter of the 13th century A.D., when his son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya lived, in other words Gaṅgeśa is assigned to the last quarter of the 12th century A.D.⁷

¹ *Vide* *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*, p. 830.

² The *Ratnakōśa*, a work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, has been quoted not only by Gaṅgeśa in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* (*śabda-khaṇḍa*, *ākhyāta-vāda*, p. 830, and *anumāna-khaṇḍa*, p. 885), but also by Vardhamāna in the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* and by Raghunātha Śiromani in the *Anumāna-dīdhiti*. Glosses on *Ratnakōśa* are said to have been written both by Harirāma and Gadādhara. This *Ratnakōśa* is different from the *Advaita-ratna-kośa*—a work on the Vedānta philosophy by Akhaṇḍānanda—as well as from the *Prameya-ratna-kośa*, a work on Jaina philosophy by Candraprabha Sūri (1102 A.D.).

³ *Vide* *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *śabda-khaṇḍa*, *śabda-prāmāṇya-vāda*, p. 88.

⁴ *Vide* *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *śabda-khaṇḍa*, *jāti-śakti-vāda*, p. 569.

⁵ *Vide* S. C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa's 'Indian Logic: Mediæval School', pp. 47-48. Ānanda and Amaracandra, nicknamed respectively *Vyāghraśiśuka* and *Simhaśiśuka*, have been referred to by Gaṅgeśa in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* under *śiṃha-vyāghroktalakṣaṇa* of *vyūpti*. (*Vide* p. 396 above.)

⁶ *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* is quoted in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *anumāna-khaṇḍa*, p. 233, *Bibliotheca Indica* Series. For Śrī Harṣa and Jayacandra, see the *Indian Antiquary*, 1911-12: *Prācīna-lekha-mālā*, nos. 22-23; and *B.B.R.A.S.* of 1875, p. 279. Jayacandra was killed by *Sahabuddin Ghorī* in 1194 A.D.

⁷ According to the *Dhanukhā* inscription *Maheśa Thakkura*, brother of *Bhagīratha Thakkura*, the well-known author of a sub-commentary on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, lived in 1556 A.D. Considering that in the succession of the generations of pupils *Bhagīratha Thakkura* was seventh in descent from Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, and allowing an average life of thirty years for each generation, we may assume that Gaṅgeśa lived 180 years before *Bhagīratha*, that is, about the year 1376 A.D.

The succession of pupils from Gaṅgeśa is as follows:—

1. Gaṅgeśa; 2. Vardhamāna; 3. Yājñapati; 4. Hari Miśra; 5. Pākṣadhara; 6. (a) Vāsudeva, (b) Rucidatta, (c) Candrapati (?); 7. (a) Maheśa Thakkura, (b) Bhagīratha Thakkura; 8. A pupil; 9. Bhavanātha; 10. Śaṅkara Miśra.

The inscription is found on a stone-slab attached to a well at the village *Dhanukhā* near *Janakapura* in *Darbhanga*. It runs thus:—

चासीत् पण्डितमण्डलाग्रगणितो भूमण्डलाखण्डलो,
जातः खण्डबलाकुलो गिरिसुताभक्तो महेशः कृतो ।
भाके रघुतुरङ्गमनुतिमहो संलक्षिते चायने,
वागदेवो लपथाशु वेन निधिलादेशः समस्तो जितः ॥

[Those who maintain that Gaṅgeśa lived in the fourth quarter of the 12th century A.D.¹ base their contention on the mention of Vardhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa, in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha in the 14th century A.D.² and upon an interpretation of the expression *śakābdā la saṃ 1509*, occurring in a manuscript of Pakṣadhara Miśra's commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-cintāmaṇi, as equivalent to 1278 A.D.³ Now the verse on the authority of which Vardhamāna is supposed to have been mentioned in the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha is obviously an interpolation, and the expression *śakābdā la saṃ 1509*, written in very modern characters, refers in my opinion *not* to Lakṣmaṇa saṃvat 159, corresponding to 1278 A.D., but to śaka year 1509 corresponding to 1587 A.D., the word *la saṃ* being either redundant or signifying simply a year. In fact, if Gaṅgeśa had been older than the author of the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, his work would have been reviewed, or at any rate referred to, in it.]

41. THE TEXT OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆĪ.

Book I.—Perception—*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*.

The Tattva-cintāmaṇi is divided into four books dealing respectively with (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) Comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) Verbal testimony (*śabda*), which are the four means of deriving valid knowledge. The first book, which treats of perception, opens with stanzas saluting God Śiva.⁴

The śaka 1478 referred to here corresponds to 1556 A.D. That Maheśa Ṭhakkura was a brother of Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura appears from the opening lines of the Dravya-prakāśikā by the latter.

¹ Vide M. M. Chakravarti's History of Navya-nyāya, J.A.S.B. for 1915, p. 265 ; Rājendra Nath Ghose's Vyāpti-pañcaka, Introduction, p. 33.

² Vide Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Pāṇiniya-darśana.

³ प्रत्यक्षालोका (Pratyakṣāloka), which is a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Tattva-cintāmaṇi by Pakṣadhara Miśra, was, according to its colophon, copied in the Śaka year 1509 (corresponding to 1587 A.D.) and *not* in the Lakṣmaṇa saṃvat 159 (corresponding to 1278 A.D.), as the date contained in the colophon runs thus :—

शुभमस्तु औरस्तु शकाब्दा ॥ ल सं १५०९ ते आवणस्त १ ॥

गुणातीतोऽपौशस्त्रिगुणसचिवस्त्र्यक्षरमयः

विमूर्तिर्यः स्वर्गस्थितिविलयकर्माणि-तनुते ।

कृपापारावारः परमगतिरेकस्त्रिजगतां

नमस्तस्मै कस्मैचिदमितमद्विज्ञे पुरभिदे ॥ १ ॥

अध्वौचान यमाकलय्य गुरुभिर्ज्ञात्वा गुरुणां मतं

विन्नादिष्वविलोचनेन च तयोः सारं विलोकाविलम् ।

तन्ने दोषगणेन दुर्ममतरं सिद्धान्तदीक्षागुरु

गङ्गेश्वरानुते मितेन वचसा त्रीतस्त्रचिन्तामणिम् ॥ २ ॥

Invocation of Blessings—*Maṅgala-vāda*.

Salutation is offered to Śiva to invoke his blessings. The invocation is of three kinds, *viz.* bodily, vocal, and mental. The bodily invocation consists in saluting a deity, the vocal in reciting the eulogy of the deity, and the mental in meditating on him. "All polite people," says Gaṅgeśa, "must observe the decorum of invoking blessings if they wish to bring their work to a successful completion." Though we do not find any explicit text in the Veda enjoining invocation of blessings, yet from the laudable practice of good people we can easily infer the implicit existence of such a text. It should be stated that the invocation of blessings is not the immediate cause of the completion of a work but is the means of removing obstacles which beset the work. In the case of an atheist finishing his work successfully without any invocation of blessings, we are to suppose that there were no obstacles in his way, or that he performed the invocation in his previous life. The case of a theist invoking blessings and yet failing to finish his work, is explained on the supposition that he encountered enormous obstacles which his feeble invocation could not remove. The *Kādambarī*, which opens with a profuse invocation of blessings, furnishes an illustration of a work remaining unfinished, owing to the excess of obstacles in its way.

The Validity of Knowledge—*Prāmāṇya-vāda*.

In determining the true meaning of *pramāṇa* (the means of valid knowledge) one must understand the true meaning of the word *pramā* (valid knowledge). *Pramā* or valid knowledge is the knowledge of a thing as it is,—it is the knowledge of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject, that is, abiding in every one of its individual embodiments. For instance, to know a piece of silver to be as such, is valid knowledge inasmuch as "silverness," which is a generic nature, really abides in the individual silver which is its subject.

Two questions arise here: (1) whence is the validity of knowledge derived, and (2) how are we conscious of the validity? To the first question the *Mīmāṃsakas* (*Prāabhākaras*) reply by saying that knowledge derives its validity from its own general grounds (or causes). As to the second question they say that knowledge is self-evident, that is, the very grounds, out of which arises consciousness of knowledge, produce also the consciousness of its validity, and this consciousness of validity prompts us to activity.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the first reply by saying that if the validity

of knowledge were derived from the general grounds of knowledge itself, then invalid knowledge would have been identical with valid knowledge. The second reply is also opposed on the ground that if we were conscious of the validity of knowledge along with our consciousness of knowledge itself, there could not have arisen in us doubt with regard to the validity of any kind of knowledge specially in the unhabitual condition. But there often arises in us knowledge of a dubious character, and the Mīmāṃsakas cannot satisfactorily explain the production of this dubious knowledge or doubt. If there is consciousness of knowledge, there is, according to them, along with it a consciousness of its validity which leaves no room for doubt, and if, on the other hand, there is no consciousness of knowledge, there cannot arise any consciousness of its dubiousness. Hence Gaṅgeśa concludes that the validity of knowledge is not derived from its general grounds (or causes). It is, according to him, derived through its special cause called instrument. The general grounds of knowledge are the union of the tactual surface with the mind and that of the latter with the soul, while the special causes are different. The special cause of perception is the intercourse of a sense-organ with its object without any hindrance, that of inference is consideration (or the knowledge of premisses), that of comparison is the knowledge of similarity, and that of verbal testimony is the knowledge of consistency. Our knowledge of colour, for instance, is valid if there is the contact of our eye with the colour without any hindrance. Gaṅgeśa further observes that our consciousness of the validity of a particular knowledge does not arise from our consciousness of the particular knowledge itself, but from a different source, *viz* inference from the fruitful correspondence between our knowledge (idea) and the activity prompted by it. "This knowledge (idea)," says he, "is valid because it is conducive to activity which is fruitful; whatever is not conducive to activity which is fruitful, is not valid knowledge." Suppose, for instance, a person cognises from distance a white thing to be a piece of silver. His knowledge will be valid if it harmonises with his actual experience when he approaches the piece of silver. Our consciousness of the validity of a particular knowledge arises therefore from our consciousness of the fruitful correspondence or harmony between the particular knowledge (idea) and the activity which it leads to.

Invalid Knowledge—*Anyathākhyāti*.

Gaṅgeśa says that invalid knowledge or error, in Sanskrit

apramā, *anyathākhyāti*,
bhrama, or invalid know-
ledge.

apramā, *anyathā-khyāti* or *bhrama*, is the knowledge (experience) of a thing as it is not,—it is the knowledge (experience) of a generic nature, which does not abide in its

own subject, but which abides in the subject of another generic nature. For instance, to know a pearl to be a piece of silver is invalid knowledge, inasmuch as the generic nature "silverness" does not abide here in the piece of silver which is its own subject, but abides in a pearl which is the subject of another generic nature, viz. "pearlness."

The Mīmāṃsakas (*Prābhākaras*) do not admit invalid knowledge or error. All knowledge, according to them, is valid and, as such, prompts us to activity. In the case of a person who takes a pearl to be a piece of silver by saying "this is silver," we should bear in mind that he acquires the knowledge of "this" (pearl) through perception and that of "silver" through recollection. But he, owing to some defect, is not conscious of the distinction between "this" (pearl) and "silver," that is, between "perception" and "recollection"; and this non-consciousness of distinction leads him to activity.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the Mīmāṃsakas by saying that the non-consciousness of distinction cannot account for the activity to which the person is prompted. There are here, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, grounds for activity, counter-activity and non-activity. The knowledge of "silver," for which the person is solicitous, must cause in him an activity, while the knowledge of "this" (pearl), for which he is not solicitous, must cause in him a counter-activity, and the non-consciousness of distinction (which is absence of knowledge) causes in him neither activity nor counter-activity, but leaves him in non-activity. The non-consciousness of distinction is not therefore the cause which leads him to activity.

According to Gaṅgeśa, when a person takes a pearl to be a piece of silver by saying "this is silver," he acquires the knowledge of both "this" (pearl) and "silver" by means of perception (the first through the ordinary intercourse between the sense-organ and its object, and the second through the transcendent intercourse whose character is knowledge). He, through some defect (of his eye, etc.), identifies "this" (pearl) with "silver," that is, becomes conscious of the generic nature "silverness" as abiding in "this" (pearl), which is not its own subject. Here his knowledge is invalid, or, in other words, he commits an error. When a person, on the other hand, takes a piece of silver to be silver by saying "this is silver," he identifies "this" with "silver," or, in other words, becomes conscious of the generic nature "silverness" as abiding in "silver" which is its own subject. His knowledge is valid.

Whether a particular knowledge is valid or invalid, it must be of a determinate character, if it is to lead us to activity. Determinate knowledge is the knowledge of a generic nature as abiding

in a subject. As already stated, when the generic nature abides in its own subject, the knowledge is valid : but when it abides in the subject of another generic nature, the knowledge is invalid. A valid determinate knowledge (*pramā*) leads us to activity which is fruitful, while an invalid determinate knowledge (*apramā*) leads us to activity which does not end in fruition. In explaining the cause of activity, whether fruitful or fruitless, we must assume determinate knowledge, and in accounting for fruitless activity we must assume error. Moreover, it is a matter of experience that in our consciousness, valid or invalid, of the form “this is silver,” there is only one kind of knowledge, *viz.* determinate knowledge, and it will be cumbrous to assume two kinds, *viz.* perception and recollection.

Intercourse between Senses and their Objects—*Sannikarṣa*.

Ordinary Preception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*).

Perceptual knowledge, or, more simply, perception, has been defined (by Akṣapāda) as knowledge which arises from the intercourse of a sense with its object, and which is non-erratic, being either reflective (mediate) or non-reflective (immediate). This definition, according to Gaṅgeśa, is too wide in so far as it includes recollection and inference of the soul, and is also too narrow in so far as it excludes perception by God. To avoid such defects Gaṅgeśa proposes to define perception as a direct apprehension. When, for instance, a visual perception takes place, there arises in us a corresponding knowledge of the form “I apprehend direct.” Perception is further defined by Gaṅgeśa as knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge. The instrumental causes of inference, comparison and verbal testimony are respectively the knowledge of premisses, the knowledge of similarity and the knowledge of consistency ; but the instrumental cause of the perception is a sense-organ which is not knowledge.

The word perception, which ordinarily signifies perceptual knowledge or rather the means by which we derive perceptual knowledge, does sometimes stand for the whole process in which a sense in intercourse with its object produces knowledge. The senses are six, *viz.* (1) the eye, (2) the ear, (3) the nose, (4) the tongue, (5) the tactual surface, and (6) the mind. Their objects are respectively the following :—(1) colour, (2) sound, (3) odour, (4) savour, (5) touch (of warmth, coldness, hardness, softness, etc.), and (6) feeling (of pleasure, pain, etc.). Correspondent with the senses there are six kinds of knowledge (perception), *viz.* the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual and mental (internal).

The intercourse, or rather the ordinary intercourse, which is the connection of a sense with its object, is of six kinds as mentioned below :—

- (1) *Union (saṃyoga)*, e.g. in the visual perception of a jar there is a union of our eye with the jar.
- (2) *United-inherence (saṃyukta-samavāya)*, that is, inherence in that which is in union, e.g. in the visual perception of the colour of a jar there is a union of our eye with the jar in which colour inheres.
- (3) *United-inherent-inherence (saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya)*, that is, inherence in that which inheres in what is in union, e.g. in the visual perception of the “colourness” (the generic nature of colour) of a jar there is a union of our eye with the jar in which inheres colour wherein again abides “colourness” in the relation of inherence.
- (4) *Inherence (samavāya)*, e.g. in the auditory perception of sound there is the inherence of sound in the ether which pervades the cavity of our ear.
- (5) *Inherent-inherence (samaveta-samavāya)*, that is, inherence in that which inheres, e.g. in the auditory perception of “soundness” (the generic nature of sound), there is the inherence of “soundness” in sound which again inheres in the ether of our ear-cavity.
- (6) *Particularity (viśeṣanā)*, e.g. in the perception of non-existence of a jar on a ground, there is a union of our eye with the ground which is possessed of non-existence of the jar.

Transcendent Perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*).

The supersensuous or transcendent perception does not take place through any of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse described above. But it is produced through an intercourse which is transcendent. The transcendent intercourse is of three kinds, viz. (1) the intercourse whose character is general (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*); (2) the intercourse whose character is knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*); and (3) the intercourse which is produced by meditation (*yogaja*).

Intercourse (perception) whose character is general.—In the perception of all individuals possessing a generic nature, the knowledge of the generic nature constitutes the intercourse. This is a transcendent intercourse whose character is general. When, for instance, there is an intercourse of our eye with a case of smoke, there arises in us a perception of smoke of all times and all places. The process by which this perception takes place is as follows :—

The intercourse between our eye and the case of smoke is an ordinary one called union (*saṃyoga*) and that between our

eye and “smokeness” (the generic nature of smoke) is also an ordinary one which is called united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*). But the intercourse between our eye and all cases of smoke is not an ordinary one. It is a transcendent intercourse, as there is no ordinary union of our eye with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The intercourse consists here of the knowledge of “smokeness”, a generic nature which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This sort of intercourse which consists of the knowledge of a generic nature, is called a transcendent intercourse whose character is general. The objection that if there were a transcendent intercourse (perception) whose character is general, we could become omniscient, inasmuch as in perceiving an object of knowledge we could perceive all objects of knowledge, is untenable because, though we can perceive all objects of knowledge comprehended under a generic nature, we cannot perceive their mutual differences, and as such cannot be omniscient.

Intercourse (perception) whose character is knowledge.—If in the perception of a thing the knowledge of the thing itself constitutes the intercourse, it is called an intercourse whose character is knowledge. On seeing a piece of sandal-wood we often say that it is fragrant. How does this visual perception of fragrance take place? The answer is that when the eye comes in union with the piece of sandal-wood, there arises within us a kind of knowledge (recollection) of fragrance which serves as the intercourse for our perception of the same. This is an instance of what is called in Western Psychology an “indirect perception”.

Some say that the case cited above may be explained by the intercourse whose character is general, and there is no necessity for our assuming another intercourse whose character is knowledge. On seeing a piece of sandal-wood there arises in us the recollection of fragrance and “fragrancy” (the generic nature of fragrance), which abide in sandal-wood in the relations of inherence (*samavāya*) and inherent-inherence (*samaveta-samavāya*) respectively. From the recollection of “fragrancy”, through the intercourse whose character is general, there arises in us the perception of all individual fragrances including the fragrance of this particular piece of sandal-wood.

In reply Gaṅgeśa says that, though, through the intercourse whose character is general, we can somehow explain the perception of fragrance, we cannot through this intercourse explain the perception of “fragrancy”. Had there been a “fragranciness” (which is the generic nature of *fragrancy*), we could have, through the intercourse whose character is general, derived the perception of “fragrancy”. But there is no generic nature of “fragrancy”, which is itself the generic nature of fragrance. We cannot therefore perceive

“fragrancy” through the intercourse whose character is general. It is through the intercourse whose character is knowledge that we can perceive “fragrancy”, the recollection of which serves as the intercourse for such perception.

Intercourse (perception) produced by meditation.—It is of two kinds, viz. (1) the intercourse (perception) of an ascetic who has attained union with the Supreme Being, and (2) that of an ascetic who is endeavouring to attain such union. The first ascetic enjoys a constant perception of all things, while the second ascetic can secure perception only when he is attended with mediation.

Inherence—*Samavāya-vāda*.

In the visual perception of the colour of a jar, the intercourse that exists between our eye and the colour has been designated as united-inherence. It is not possible to understand the meaning of this term unless we understand the meaning of inherence. Inherence (*samavāya*) is an intimate relation between two things which cannot exist separately. Of the two things one exists only as lodged in the other. Such things are the whole and its parts, the substance and its qualities or action, the community and individuals, and the eternal substances and their final particulars. The relation that exists between these things is called inherence, e.g. threads inhere in the cloth, colour inheres in the jar, and so on. The knowledge of a whole as composed of parts, or of a substance as possessing qualities, etc. is determinate knowledge. In such knowledge we have to consider three things, viz. the subject, the predicate, and the relation that exists between them. For instance, in our determinate knowledge of the form “the man has a stick,” the man is the subject and the stick is the predicate, while the relation that exists between them is union. Similarly in our determinate knowledge of the form “the flower has colour,” the flower is the subject and the colour is the predicate, but the relation that exists between them is not union but inherence. When two things can be separated from each other, the relation between them is union, but when they cannot be mutually separated their relation is inherence. In fact colour is not united with flower but inheres in it.

The Invalidity of Non-perception—*Anupalabdhyaprāmānya-vāda*.

Some say that non-existence is not perceptible by any of our senses and that the knowledge of non-existence of a thing arises through non-perception of the thing itself. For instance, the way in which the knowledge of non-existence of a pot arises is as follows: Had there been a pot here, it would have been per-

ceived : since it is not perceived, there is no pot here. The non-perception of a pot is therefore the means of knowing the non-existence of the pot. Gaṅgeśa does not admit non-perception to be a means of knowledge. Non-existence, according to him, is perceived by our senses through the intercourse of particularity. For instance, in the perception of non-existence of a pot on the floor, there is the union of our eye with the floor in which abides non-existence of the pot as a particularity, that is, there is perception of the floor as possessed of the non-existence of the pot. The sense employed in the perception of a thing is the same as that which is employed in the perception of its non-existence. Whatever thing is perceptible by a sense, the non-existence of that thing is also perceptible by the same sense, *e.g.* a colour and its non-existence are both perceived by the eye, a sound and its non-existence by the ear, an odour and its non-existence by the nose, a savour and its non-existence by the tongue, warmth and its non-existence by the tactual surface, and pleasure and its non-existence by the mind.

Non-existence (or negation)—*Abhāva-vāda*.

Some say that there is no separate entity called non-existence (*abhāva*), that perception of what is ordinarily called the “non-existence of a thing” depends upon the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) of non-existence of the thing, and that the intercourse through which we perceive the thing, must be the same as that through which we perceive its non-existence, *viz.* union, etc. For instance, our perception of the non-existence of a pot (in the form “there is no pot on the floor”) does not presuppose a separate entity called “non-existence”, but rests entirely on “the floor” which is the locus of the non-existence of the pot, and is carried on through the intercourse of union.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that we must admit a separate entity called non-existence, that our perception of what is ordinarily called the non-existence of a thing, does not rest entirely on the locus of the non-existence of the thing, and that the intercourse through which we perceive the non-existence of the thing is not union etc., but particularity (*viśeṣanātā*). In the instance cited above our perception of the non-existence of the pot does not rest on “the floor”, that is, the non-existence of the pot is not identical with the floor. Had the one rested on the other, or had the two been identical, there would have been perception of the non-existence of the pot even when the pot was on the floor, and further there would have been a disturbance of the relation of container and contained that exists between the two. Since this contingency is disastrous, we must admit that there is something on the ground which operates in our failure to perceive the

pot. This something is “non-existence” which is a separate entity lying over and above the floor. Our failure to perceive a thing does not therefore rest on the mere locus of the thing, but on the locus as possessed of this something or “non-existence.” The relation that exists between the locus and non-existence is that of particularity (*viśeṣaṇatā*). When we perceive the non-existence of a pot on the floor our eye comes in union with the floor on which abides the non-existence of the pot in the relation of particularity. The intercourse in this case is, therefore, of united particularity (*saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*). Similarly the relation of particularity is to be associated with inherence, united-inherence, etc.

Every non-existence has a counterpart, *e.g.* with reference to the non-existence of a pot and that of a piece of cloth, the pot and the piece of cloth are respectively the counterparts. The perception of a non-existence is subject to that of its counterpart. The process, by which we perceive non-existence through the relation of particularity, involves knowledge of its counterpart which is produced through memory or from any other source. In our perception of the non-existence of a pot on the floor, there arises in us first of all recollection of the pot, and as soon as our eye comes in union with the floor we perceive the non-existence of the pot on the same.

Non-existence is of two kinds: (1) universal, and (2) reciprocal. The universal non-existence is sub-divided into (a) the antecedent, (b) the subsequent, and (c) the absolute. The antecedent non-existence is that which has no beginning but has an end, *e.g.* a jar is in antecedent non-existence before it is made up. The subsequent non-existence has a beginning but no end, *e.g.* a jar is in subsequent non-existence after it is destroyed. The absolute non-existence is that whose counterpart is viewed in relation to all the three times—past, present, and future, *e.g.* there is no jar on the floor. The reciprocal non-existence is the non-existence of identity, *e.g.* a jar is not a pot.

Causes of Perception—*Pratyakṣa-kāraṇa-vāda*.

The causes of perception are the following:—

- (1) A union of the mind with the tactual surface and the soul.

Causes of knowledge in general. While a person is in deep sleep there is produced in him no knowledge, as there is then a union of his mind with the soul alone but not with the tactual surface. The mind abides at that time near the heart in a *nāḍī* called pericardium which is without a tactual surface. In recollecting a thing our mind is in union with both the tactual surface and the soul.

- (2) A union of the mind with the senses and an intercourse of

the senses with their objects, *e.g.* in the perception of a colour there is a union of our mind with the eye which is in intercourse with the colour.

- (3) Proportionate extension of the objects of sense, that is, the objects must not be of infinite extension as ether, or of no extension as atoms. The ether and atoms are not perceived but inferred, the former being the locus of sound, and the latter the final particulars of things.
- (4) An obviousness or manifest form of an object of sense, *e.g.* a colour, if it is to be perceptible, must possess obviousness. A meteor, which is obscured in the midday blaze, cannot be perceived. Similarly, a fire which exists in the latent condition in a heated frying-pan, is not perceptible.
- (5) A special connection of light with the object of sense, *e.g.* a pot, if it is to be perceptible, must have sufficient light on its front rather than on its back.
- (6) Absence of obstacles, *e.g.* too much proximity or too much distance, is often obstructive to our perception.

The Atomic Nature of the Mind—*Manonutva-vāda*.

The senses through the instrumentality of which we perceive colour, sound, odour, savour and touch, are the eye, ear, nose, tongue and tactual surface respectively. The sense which operates as an instrument in our perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, intellect and volition, is the mind, which is called the internal sense in contrast to the other five senses which are external.

The mind is atomic in extension, inasmuch as we cannot perceive various objects at one and the same time. Although there may exist intercourse of our external senses with their corresponding objects, no perception will be produced until the mind comes in union with them. Had the mind been of infinite extension, or even of proportionate extension, it could have come into union with all the five external senses at once so as to give rise to the five kinds of perception simultaneously. But everybody is aware that it is impossible for more than one kind of perception to arise at one and the same time. This shows that the mind can come into union with only *one* external sense at a time, or in other words, the mind is atomic in extension.

Those who deny the atomic nature of the mind on the ground that sometimes, *e.g.* in eating a large cake soaked in milk and sugar, we find the operations of the mind united with several senses simultaneously, should be told that the operations, which they suppose to be simultaneous, do really take place in succession, as the hundred leaves of a lotus are pierced one after another by a needle.

The Doctrine of Self-consciousness—*Anu-vyavasāya-vāda*.

Some philosophers maintain that any particular kind of knowledge performs by itself all its practical functions and does not depend upon another knowledge for the same. For instance, all practical functions connected with a pot can, according to them, be performed when there is knowledge of the pot, but we cannot perform those functions when there is no such knowledge. It is therefore knowledge which performs all its practical functions. We must not however suppose that all practical functions are performed by all kinds of knowledge promiscuously. In fact each kind of knowledge is, by its very nature, related to a particular object which enables us to perform its corresponding functions.

Some others, who hold the doctrine of triangular perception (*tripuṭī-pratyakṣa-vādinah*), say that each kind of knowledge is self-manifest and that it manifests itself in the form "I know this," which involves an assumption of a knower (the soul), a knowable (the object), and knowledge (the act), and as such performs all its practical functions.

Gaṅgeśa, in opposing the above views, says that a particular kind of knowledge cannot by itself perform its practical functions, but is dependent upon another sort called self-consciousness (*anu-vyavasāya*) which enables it to perform the same. Our knowledge, continues Gaṅgeśa, arises in the form "this" or "pot," but not in the form "I know this" or "I know the pot"; and until it assumes the latter form no practical functions can be performed. He therefore lays down that after the origination of knowledge of the form "this" or "pot," there arises another knowledge called self-consciousness of the form "I know this" or "I know the pot," which performs all practical functions. This latter variety, called self-consciousness, arises through the intercourse of the previous knowledge with our mind. The intercourse is united-inherence (*saṃyukta-samavāya*), inasmuch as there is a union of the mind with the soul in which resided the previous knowledge in the relation of inherence. In fact the latter knowledge or self-consciousness is the mental (or internal) perception of the previous knowledge.

Immediate Perception—*Nirvikalpaka-vāda*.

Perception is of two kinds, *viz.* (1) the immediate, non-reflective or abstract (*nirvikalpaka*) and (2) the mediate, reflective or concrete (*savikalpaka*). The immediate is perception of an indeterminate character. It is perception of a subject and its generic nature as separate from each other, *e.g.* the perception of a mere "pot" or mere "potness" without any mutual connection.

Even the mere “pot” or mere “potness” is of the form “something” of which it is absurd to talk as a “pot” or “potness.” On the intercourse of a sense with its object the first perception that takes place is immediate or non-reflective. It is supersensuous, that is, not cognisable by any of our senses, not even by the mind. It has been defined as knowledge which is devoid of all connection with name, generic nature, etc., which indicates no relation and involves no specification.

Mediate Perception—*Savikalpaka-vāda*.

The mediate or reflective perception is of a determinate character. It indicates a subject and its generic nature through their relation to each other, *e.g.* “this is a pot” where “potness” (the generic nature) abides in “this” (the subject) in the relation of inherence. The perception of the form “this is a pot” is therefore mediate or reflective.

The doctrine of mediate or reflective perception may be set forth as follows :—

Immediate perception—the perception of “pot” and “potness” as separate from each other.

Mediate perception—the perception of “potness” as abiding in “this” in the form “this is a pot.”

Self-consciousness—the mental perception of the knowledge of “potness” as abiding in “this,” in the form “I know this is a pot.”

Book II.—Inference—*Anumāna-khaṇḍa*.

THE DETERMINATION OF INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE—*Anumiti-nirūpaṇa*.

Inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is that knowledge which is derived through another kind of knowledge, *viz.* that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here “hill” is the minor term which is also called the subject, locus or side; “fire” is the major term, also called the predicate or probandum; and “smoke” is the middle term, also called the reason or mark. The knowledge of the form “the hill is full of smoke” is inferential knowledge inasmuch as it is derived through another kind of knowledge, *viz.* that of the smoke which, as being in invariable concomitance with fire, abides in the hill. This other knowledge, *viz.* that smoke, in invariable concomitance with fire, abides in the hill, is an instance of what is called

consideration, knowledge of premises or inference (parāmarśa or anu-māna). It is the intercourse or operation through which we arrive at the inferential knowledge. The whole process of arriving at that knowledge is also sometimes called inference.

Inference distinct from Perception.

Some say that perception is the only means of knowledge and that there is no separate means of knowledge called inference. Their reasons are as follows :—

- (1) There cannot be any knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term ;
- (2) The middle term may be erratic owing to its connection with a condition accepted or disputed ; and
- (3) We often associate the middle term with the major term through a mere probability which involves no certainty.

Gaṅgeśa sets aside the above view by saying that there are other means of knowledge over and above perception, and that inference is at any rate one means of knowledge. The doctrine of invariable concomitance, etc., will be treated later. In support of inference as a means of knowledge it will suffice at present to observe the following arguments :—

1. One cannot establish the invalidity of an inference unless one *infers* the invalidity from the similarity of the inference with things previously known as invalid. This process presupposes inference as a means of knowledge.

2. The statement that “inference is not a means of knowledge” is of no use to an expert who is aware of the invalidity of inference. It may be advanced usefully before a suspicious or an erring person. Now, how are we to know that the person is in suspicion or error? It is certainly not through perception but through inference.

3. “Inference is not a means of knowledge”: is this statement valid or invalid? If it is valid, we must admit verbal testimony to be a means of knowledge. If on the other hand it is invalid, inference is to be admitted as a means of knowledge. Both the alternatives are incompatible with the opponent’s view.

4. Moreover if inference is not valid, perception, too, cannot be valid. The validity being an object of inference, how can we, in the absence of inference, ascertain the validity of perception? If again perception were by itself valid, then there could not arise any doubt about its validity.

Perception is, therefore, not the only means of knowledge, but inference also is one of the means.

Inferential knowledge having been based upon an invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term, it is

necessary to define the phrase “invariable concomitance.” In Sanskrit it is called *vyāpti* which is rendered by such expressions as pervasion, inseparable connection, perpetual attendance, constant co-presence, etc.

Five Provisional Definitions of Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāpti-pañcakam*.


1. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in the locus of the non-existence of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Diagram I.




Diagram II.



Here smoke (the middle term) is absent from all regions outside the region of fire (the major term) as shown in diagram I. Gaṅgeśa observes that the definition is defective inasmuch as it does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference, such as “all are nameable, because they are knowable”, illustrated in diagram II, in which outside the region of the nameable there is nothing from which the knowable may be absent.

Diagram III.



2. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in that locus of the non-existence of the major term which is not the locus of the major term itself, *e.g.*

This is occupied by the ape, because it is the tree.

Here "the tree" is the middle term, and "occupied by the ape" is the major term. In diagram III the tree is totally absent from the region not occupied by the ape. The part of the tree not occupied by the ape is excluded from the locus of the non-existence of the major term by the clause "which is not the locus of the major term itself." This definition too is defective, because it, like the previous one, does not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference.

3. Invariable concomitance is the non-co-presence of the middle term with that reciprocal non-existence whose counterpart abides in the locus of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

In diagram I. we find that smoke is not co-present with anything which is non-existent in reciprocity to fire. Water, book, cloth, table, etc., are all non-existent in their reciprocal relation to fire, that is, they are not fire.

Gaṅgeśa observes that this definition too is defective, as it does not cover the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. In diagram II. we find that there is no reciprocal non-existence whose counterpart is the region of the nameable.

4. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term forms the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the locus of the non-existence of the entire major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here smoke forms the counterpart of the non-existence of smoke which abides in the region of the non-existence of entire fire.

According to Gaṅgeśa this definition is defective, as it fails to explain the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. In diagram II. we find that there is no non-existence of the knowable which abides in the region of the non-existence of the nameable.

5. Invariable concomitance is the non-presence of the middle term in what is not the locus of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire.
because it is full of smoke.

Here smoke is not present in anything which is not the abode of fire. This definition too, according to Gaṅgeśa, is defective, as it does not meet the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. In diagram II. we find that there is no non-presence of the knowable in what is not included in the region of the nameable.

Definition of Invariable Concomitance given by “Lion” and “Tiger”—*Siṃha-vyāghroḥta-vyāptilakṣaṇa*.

1. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus in which there is the non-co-presence of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here fire is always co-present with smoke in the locus of the latter. It never occurs that in the locus of smoke there is no fire.

2. Invariable concomitance is the state in which the middle term has not a locus which is different from the locus of the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

The locus of smoke is never different from that of fire, that is, the former never extends beyond the latter.

Gaṅgeśa observes that both these definitions are defective, inasmuch as their import is to show that the middle term has not a locus which is also not the locus of the major term. On the contrary we find that the middle term has often a locus which is not the locus of the major term. For instance, smoke on a hill has a locus which is not the locus of fire in a kitchen.

Non-existence whose Counterpart is Qualified by a Nature abiding in a Different Locus—*Vyādhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnābhāvaḥ*.

Most of the definitions of invariable concomitance given above were defective inasmuch as they did not cover the case of an exclusively affirmative inference. They involved such phrases as “non-existence of the major term” and “difference of locus of the major term” which could not apply to an exclusively affirmative inference in which the major term was all-pervading. To make the “non-existence of the major term” and “difference of locus of the major term” possible, even in an exclusively affirmative inference, some logicians assume a non-existence whose counterpart is qualified by a nature abiding in a locus different from the counterpart. The expression “there is no fire possessing the nature of a pot” signifies that “there is non-existence of a fire as qualified by the nature of a pot” which, according to them, is quite correct inasmuch as the nature of a pot abides in the relation of inherence in a pot and not in fire. Similarly “there is no nameableness possessing the nature of a pot” signifies that “there is non-existence of nameableness as qualified by the nature of a pot.” Though nameableness (major term) is all-pervading we have, they say, been able to talk of its non-existence by assuming the nature of a pot to abide in it (instead of it in the pot).

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view in four ways:—(1) On the assumption of a non-existence of this form, invariable concomitance has to be defined as the state in which the middle term has not the co-presence with a non-existence whose counterpart is qualified by a nature which is the nature of the major term. This definition, in which the counterpart and the major term are identical, does not involve a non-existence of the form proposed. The definitions already condemned cannot also be defended by the assumption of this non-existence. (2) This sort of non-existence is not well known and cannot be established by any evidence. (3) The counterpart of the non-existence is said to be qualified by a quality which does not abide in it. This is impossible because our knowledge of non-existence depends on that of its counterpart as possessed of the nature. (4) And to assert a non-existence of this form is as absurd as to say that there is no hare-horn (*śaśa-śṛṅga*) in a cow.

Other Objectionable Definitions of Invariable Concomitance—*Pūrvapakṣah.*

Gaṅgeśa examines and condemns twelve other definitions of invariable concomitance called objectionable definitions given by previous logicians.

The Conclusive Definition of Invariable Concomitance—*Siddhānta-lakṣaṇam.*


Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term which is not qualified by the nature of the counterpart of that absolute non-existence, which abides in the same locus with the middle term, but abides in a different locus in respect of that counterpart, e.g.

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Diagram IV.



Diagram V.



Here there is co-presence of smoke (the middle term) with fire (the major term) which is not qualified by the nature of a pot, and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with smoke, but abides in a different locus in respect of the pot.

This definition covers the case of an exclusively affirmative inference inasmuch as it does not involve a non-existence of the major term, and the major term is not the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with the middle term. Looking at diagram V, we find that there is co-presence of the knowable with the nameable which is not qualified by the nature of a pot (though the pot is qualified by the nature of the nameable), and the absolute non-existence, whose counterpart is the pot, abides in the same locus with the knowable, but in a different locus in respect of the pot.

Non-existence of the General Form—*Sāmānyābhāvaḥ*.

Some say that even the conclusive definition given above is defective inasmuch as in seeking to establish the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire we notice that fires are manifold owing to the difference of their loci, *e.g.* the fire of a kitchen, of a sacrificial ground, and so on. There is non-existence of these fires, except one, in the locus of a particular case of smoke. This, by making fire the counterpart of that non-existence which abides in the same locus with smoke, altogether upsets the conclusive definition.

Gaṅgeśa in reply says that though in the locus of smoke there is the non-existence of various fires, the natures which qualify the counterparts of those non-existences are not one and the same, *viz.* the nature of fire in general. They are different, that is, particular fires have particular natures, as for instance, the nature of the fire of a kitchen is different from that of the fire of a sacrificial ground, and so on. It is therefore necessary to admit a non-existence of fire of the general form—such as ‘there is no fire’ distinguished from non-existences of particular forms as ‘there are not such and such fires.’ A non-existence of the general form is the non-existence whose counterpart is not of a particular nature. Had the non-existence of the general form been a name merely for the sum total of particular non-existences then there would not have arisen in us a doubt of the form—‘is not there a colour in air?’ It is perfectly known to us that in air there are no particular colours as red, yellow, etc.; yet we entertain a doubt in our mind as to whether there is not in air a non-existence of colour of the general form.

Invariable Concomitance of Special Forms—*Viśeṣa-vyāptih*.

It is to be admitted that there is non-existence of the fire of a hill in the locus of smoke of a sacrificial ground, and there is non-existence of the fire of a sacrificial ground, in the locus of smoke of a hill. There is no invariable concomitance of smoke with fire if the two occupy different loci, that is, if the locus of smoke is different from that of the fire. But nobody can deny the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire if the two occupy the same locus, *e.g.* there is an invariable concomitance of smoke of a hill with the fire of the same. Though there is no invariable concomitance of all cases of smoke with all cases of fire, there is the concomitance of particular cases of smoke with their corresponding fires. The comprehensive connection of smoke with fire is not, by this particular concomitance, disturbed, for there is no smoke without fire.

This sort of invariable concomitance, called the invariable concomitance of special forms, may be defined as follows:—

1. Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term which is different from the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which does not abide in the locus of that counterpart, but abides with the middle term in the latter's own locus.

2. Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term, the locus of which is different from that of the counterpart of the reciprocal non-existence which abides in the locus of the middle term.

3. Invariable concomitance is the connection of the middle term with the major term which is different from the counterpart of that reciprocal non-existence which abides in the same locus with the middle term.

4. Invariable concomitance may also be defined as the co-presence of the middle term with the major term when there is no condition attached to the middle term.

5. Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term which co-abides with that absolute existence whose counterpart is that which is qualified by the nature of the counterpart of the absolute non-existence abiding in the same locus with the middle term.

6. Invariable concomitance is the possession of that nature which establishes the connection (that is, brings about the co-presence) of the middle term with the major term.

The Means of Apprehending Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāpti-grahopāyaḥ*.

Some logicians maintain that repeated observations of one thing as accompanying another thing are the means of appre-

hending invariable concomitance of the one with the other, *e.g.* we apprehend the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire after we have observed repeatedly that the one accompanies the other.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view on the following grounds :—

(1) Of the repeated observations each one separately cannot be the cause of apprehension of invariable concomitance owing to lack of unity among the observations. As the successive observations perish quickly there is nothing which unites them together to cause in us an apprehension of invariable concomitance. The impression left in our mind by the past observations are no doubt competent to produce recollection and recognition of equal things, but they cannot produce apprehension of invariable concomitance which involves unequal things such as occurrence of smoke in a kitchen, a sacrificial ground, a hill, etc.

(2) What again is the meaning of repeated observations ? Does it mean observation in numerous places, or observation of numerous instances, or observation of the same instance numerous times ? None of these alternatives are of any help to us in apprehending invariable concomitance. Can we establish invariable concomitance of colour with savour, even if we have observed them together in numerous places ? Can numerous instances of colour observed along with savour in the same place (as a pot) entitle us to establish invariable concomitance between them ? As regards the observation of an instance numerous times, it may be asked how many times ? There is certainly no fixity as to the number of times. There cannot in fact be an invariable concomitance of a pen with the floor even if they have been observed together a hundred times.

2. Some other logicians say that a reasoning (*tarka*) coupled with the observation of co-accompaniment (*sahacāra*) is the means of our apprehending invariable concomitance. For instance, smoke is in invariable concomitance with fire inasmuch as we observe the former co-accompanied by the latter ; and by applying our reasoning we further find that had there been no inseparable connection between smoke and fire, we could have seen the former without the latter, but as such a contingency is an absurdity, there is certainly an invariable concomitance of smoke with fire.

According to Gaṅgeśa the above view is untenable inasmuch as a reasoning, being itself based on an apprehension of invariable concomitance, cannot be the cause of the same. Unless a person apprehends the invariable concomitance of one thing with another thing, his reasoning, which is to reveal the absurdity of all contrary apprehensions, cannot come into operation. We could argue *ad infinitum* without being able to ascertain whether reasoning

preceded the apprehension of invariable concomitance, or the latter preceded the former.

Conclusion as to the Means of Apprehending Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāptigrahopāya-siddhānta*.

The observation of co-accompaniment attended with the absence of knowledge of exceptions is the means of apprehending invariable concomitance, *e.g.* there is invariable concomitance of smoke with fire as the former constantly accompanies the latter without any exceptions.

The knowledge of exceptions may assume the form of a certainty or doubt. In the former alternative we cannot at all apprehend invariable concomitance, and in the latter there is great difficulty in apprehending it. Doubt arises from two sources, *viz.* sometimes from the suspicion of a condition (*upādhi*) and sometimes from the recognition of common properties and non-recognition of special properties. As an instance of the latter source we may point out a tall object which in the twilight produces in us a doubt as to whether it is a man or a post, because we recognize in it tallness which is the common property of a man and a post without the recognition of locomotion, etc., which are the special properties of a man. As an instance of the former source, we may cite the case of a fire which, if wet fuel is attached to it as a condition, may be inseparably connected with smoke. In asserting the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire¹ we are therefore in doubt as to whether wet fuel is not a condition.

In certain instances the doubt does not arise at all on account of absence of such defects as myopia, long distance, etc. In certain other instances the doubt is removed by the employment of reasoning. For instance, our doubt as to whether there is invariable concomitance of fire with smoke, is removed by reasoning as follows: Had fire constantly accompanied smoke there would have been smoke in a red-hot iron-ball; but in it there is fire and no smoke; so there is no invariable concomitance of fire with smoke (but there is that of smoke with fire).

The reasoning which is to remove doubt, is to be carried on only as long as the doubt is not removed. The charge of *regressus ad infinitum* brought against the reasoning employed to establish invariable concomitance, does not apply to the present case, in which reasoning ceases with the disappearance of doubt and does not continue up to the commencement of the processes establishing invariable concomitance.

¹ There is invariable concomitance of smoke with fire but not of fire with smoke; that is, wherever there is smoke there is fire, but not *vice versa*.

Reasoning (or Confutation)—*Tarka*.

The processes of reasoning (or confutation) may be illustrated as follows :—

Interrogation.—Can smoke abide without fire ?

Reasoning.—If smoke could abide without fire, it would not have been a product of fire

Re-interrogation.—Is smoke a product of fire ?

Reasoning.—If smoke were produced neither from fire nor from non-fire, then it would have been a non-product. But it is not so.

Doubt.—Smoke then may have been produced either from fire or without a cause.

Incompatibility.—Why a person, who thus indulges in doubt, is nevertheless led on to activity ? If he doubts whether an effect may or may not be produced without a cause, why does he seek for a fire to obtain smoke, and for food to get satisfaction ? His own activity indicates that he is well aware of the connection between a cause and its effect. Why does he then entertain doubt ? It is incompatible with his own activity. There is no doubt that smoke as an effect cannot be produced without a cause. Smoke is in fact a product of fire without which it cannot abide.

Comprehensiveness of Invariable Concomitance—*Vyāptyanugamaḥ*.

Comprehensiveness (*anugama*) is the nature which exhibits in one form all the various kinds of invariable concomitance previously defined. The invariable concomitance involving reciprocal non-existence is a comprehensive one, and is on account of shortness to be accepted as the cause of inference. Of the five provisional definitions of invariable concomitance the third and the fifth, and of those of the invariable concomitance of a special form, the second and the third involve reciprocal non-existence. The conclusive definition of invariable concomitance may also be so modified as to involve reciprocal non-existence. Of these the third definition of the invariable concomitance of a special form is very short by far.

Intercourse whose Character is General—*Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*.

We observed that there is invariable concomitance of smoke of a kitchen with fire of the same, and similarly there is invariable concomitance of smoke of a sacrificial ground with fire of the same. Though we thus observe that there is invariable concomitance of particular cases of smoke with particular cases of fire, we cannot infer fire on a hill by seeing smoke there, until we can establish the invariable concomitance of all cases of smoke with

all cases of fire. We can establish the invariable concomitance of all cases of smoke with all cases of fire, if we assume the knowledge of "smokeness" (the generic nature of smoke) as the intercourse for our perception of all cases of smoke, and the knowledge of "fire-ness" (the generic nature of fire) as the intercourse for our perception of all cases of fire. This sort of intercourse which consists of the knowledge of a generic nature is called an intercourse whose character is general. It is described by some logicians as an ordinary intercourse of particularity, while others describe it as a transcendent intercourse. The logicians, who hold the first view, say that in perceiving a particular smoke by means of our eye there is the intercourse of union, while in perceiving "smokeness" there is the intercourse of united-inherence, and in perceiving all cases of smoke (at all times and in all places) through the knowledge of "smokeness" there is the intercourse of particularity. All these cases of intercourse are ordinary ones.

The logicians, who hold the second view, say that in the perception as a particular smoke and "smokeness" there are no doubt ordinary intercourses of union and united-inherence respectively, but in the perception of all cases of smoke through the knowledge of "smokeness" the intercourse is a transcendent one. It cannot be an ordinary intercourse because of all cases of smoke the present ones can be perceived by our eyes independent of the knowledge of "smokeness," while the past and future cases of smoke with which our eyes are not connected, cannot be perceived at all through any of the six ordinary intercourses. Therefore the intercourse, *viz.* the knowledge of "smokeness", through which we perceive all cases of smoke, is a transcendent one whose character is general. Hence the apprehension of invariable concomitance of a particular case of smoke with a particular case of fire refers through the intercourse whose character is general to all cases of smoke and all cases of fire.

Conclusion about the Intercourse whose Character is General.—
Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-siddhāntaḥ.

If the intercourse, whose character is general, were not accepted, there could not arise any doubt as to whether there were instances in which smoke (the middle term) did not accompany fire (the major term). As to the cases of smoke which were present, we could perceive their co-accompaniment with cases of fire, and they could leave no room for doubt regarding any case of exception. As for the past and future cases of smoke, or the cases of smoke of distant places, we could not know them as they were beyond the range of our eyes. In the absence of knowledge of those cases of smoke it would be impossible for us to entertain any doubt as to whether they constantly accompanied fire. Doubt


being impossible, there could not be any reasoning employed to remove it. Hence we could not apprehend an invariable concomitance. But if the intercourse whose character is general, is admitted, we can explain the perception of all cases of smoke through the intercourse of "smokeness." It is possible for doubt to arise in respect of some of these cases of smoke through non-recognition of their special properties. We must therefore admit intercourse whose character is general.

The Conditional Middle Term—*Upādhi-vādaḥ*.

The middle term, if it is to be in invariable concomitance with the major, should be devoid of condition, that is, should be unconditional. A condition (*upādhi*) is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, *e.g.*

The hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire (nourished by wet fuel).

Diagram VI.




Here smoke is the major term, fire is the middle term and wet fuel is a condition. The wet fuel constantly accompanies smoke, but does not always accompany fire. For instance, the fire in an ignited iron-ball is not accompanied by wet fuel at all.

"Accompanying the major term" signifies the state of not being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the major term, that is, the state of not being absent from the locus of the major term. "Not accompanying the middle term" is the state of being the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which abides in the locus of the middle term, that is, the state of being absent from the locus of the

middle term. In diagram VI. "wet fuel" is not absent from the region of smoke, but it is present in some regions of fire and absent from the remaining regions of the same.

"Mitrā has many sons of whom one is black, and the rest fair-complexioned. The son conceived at a time when Mitrā ate vegetables, is black, but other sons that were conceived while she did not eat vegetables but drank milk, are fair-complexioned." In diagram VII, we find that "eating vegetable" is a condition which accompanies Mitrā's black son, but does not accompany her fair-complexioned sons.

Diagram VII.



He is black,
because he is a son of Mitrā
(who eats vegetables).

Some say that "eating vegetables" is not a condition inasmuch as it does not always accompany blackness; for instance, the blackness of a pot is not the result of eating vegetables. Gaṅgeśa meets the objection by saying that the blackness marking Mitrā's son is not of the same nature as the blackness which abides in a pot. A "condition" is, according to him, to be clearly defined as follows:—

A condition is that which constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term, in respect of an entity of a fixed nature.

Condition is of two kinds, *viz.* (1) sure, and (2) suspected. A condition is said to be "sure" when we know with certainty that it constantly accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term; and it is said to be "suspected" when there is doubt as to its accompanying the major term or as to its not accompanying the middle term. An instance of a suspected condition is given below:—

The earth has a maker,
because it is a product (caused by a body).

Here "caused by a body" is a condition which constantly accompanies a maker (if the maker is a person, but not if the maker

is a collection of atoms), but does not always accompany a product (for instance, a product like a pot is caused by a body, but a product like a lightning is not so caused). The condition, *viz.* 'causing by a body', is therefore a suspected one.

A condition is not in itself a defect, but its attachment to the middle term indicates that that term is erratic and the conclusion drawn therefrom wrong.

The State of Being the Locus or Minor Term—*Pakṣatā*.

The state of being the locus or the minor term (*pakṣatā*) has been defined by some logicians as the state in which it is doubtful whether the major term abides in it or not. Seeing that the connection of the major term with the locus or minor term, may not necessarily involve a doubt, Gaṅgeśa prefers to define the minor term as that whose connection with the major term is not known with certainty in consequence of the absence of a desire to know the connection. *E.g.* in the proposition "the hill is full of fire", the hill is the minor term whose connection with fire was hitherto neither investigated nor known. The minor term is so named not merely if there is an absence of knowledge of its connection with the major term, but also if the absence of knowledge is due to the absence of a desire to arrive at the knowledge. We cannot treat the minor term as such merely by establishing with it a connection of the major term if that connection has already been known, but we shall be justified in treating it as the minor term if there is in us a desire again to establish the connection.

A homologue, a similar locus, a homogeneous affirmative or positive example (*sapakṣa*), is that in which the major term is known with certainty to abide, *e.g.* the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, as a kitchen.

A heterologue, a dissimilar locus, a heterogeneous or negative example (*vipakṣa*), is that in which the major term is known not to abide, *e.g.* the hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke; where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as a lake.

Consideration or Knowledge of Premises—*Parāmarśaḥ*.

Consideration (*parāmarśaḥ*) is the knowledge that the middle term, in invariable concomitance with the major term, abides in the minor, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here consideration consists of the knowledge that in the hill abides smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire. This knowledge (consideration) is the cause of inference.

The ancients held that smoke actually perceived together with the knowledge that it is in invariable concomitance with fire was the cause of inference. But Gaṅgeśa opposes this view by saying that if smoke actually perceived were the cause, then inference could not take place from smoke that had been destroyed or that had not yet arisen. On hearing that there *will be* smoke here, a person can at once infer that there *will be* fire here, although he does not actually perceive the smoke which is not present. It is therefore not smoke itself but the knowledge of it that is the cause of the inference. In other words, the middle term actually perceived together with the knowledge that it is in invariable concomitance with fire, is not the cause of inference, but consideration or knowledge that in the minor term abides the middle term which is, in invariable concomitance with the major term, such a cause.

An Exclusively Affirmative Inference—*Kevalānvayyanumānam*.

Inference is of three kinds, *viz.* (1) an exclusively affirmative inference (*kevalānvayyanumānam*), (2) an exclusively negative inference (*kevalavyatirekyanumānam*), and (3) an affirmative negative inference (*anvaya-vyatirekyanumānam*).


The exclusively affirmative is an inference in which there is no negative example. It may also be defined as an inference in which the major term is not the counterpart of that absolute non-existence which has an abode; or, as an inference in which there is no non-presence of the major term, *e.g.*

This is nameable,
because it is knowable—(*vide* diagram II).

An Exclusively Negative Inference—*Kevalavyatirekyanumānam*.

An exclusively negative inference is the inference in which the major term has no affirmative example. It may also be defined as the inference in which the major term does not abide in anything else but in the minor term, *e.g.*

Diagram VIII.



An Affirmative-Negative Inference.

The affirmative-negative is an inference in which the major term has both affirmative and negative examples, *e.g.*

The hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke,
as a kitchen and not as a lake.

Presumption—*Arthāpatti*.

The Mīmāṃsakas say that presumption (*arthāpatti*) is a separate means of knowledge. On hearing that “Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat in the day”, we at once conclude that he eats in the night. Since a person cannot become fat unless he eats either in the day or in the night, and, since he does not eat in the day, it follows by presumption that he eats in the night.

Gaṅgeśa does not admit presumption to be a separate means of knowledge, but includes it in the negative inference¹ which establishes the absence of the middle term through the absence of the major term. Here the absence of eating in the night would have been followed by the absence of that fatness which is attended with non-eating in the day.

Inference for One's Self—*Svārthānumāna*.

Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference for one's self (*svārthānumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*). A person having himself repeatedly observed in the kitchen and other places the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, goes near a hill and sees smoke on it. He recollects that, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and thereupon knowledge arises in him that “this hill has smoke which is in invariable concomitance with fire.” This knowledge is called “consideration of the sign” (*liṅgaparāmarśa*) or simply “consideration” (*parāmarśa*), from which follows the knowledge that “this hill has fire”, which is called inferential conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for one's self.

Inference for the sake of Others—*Parārthānumāna*.

When a person, having inferred fire from smoke, demonstrates it to others by the employment of a syllogism, it is called “an inference for the sake of others.” The process of this inference is as follows:—

¹ A person to be fat must take his food either in the day or in the night—(A proposition).

Devadatta, who is fat, does not take his food in the day—(E proposition).

Therefore Devadatta must take his food in the night. (This is a disjunctive categorical syllogism.)

- (1) The hill is full of fire,
- (2) Because it is full of smoke,
- (3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen,
- (4) This hill is full of smoke,
- (5) Therefore this hill is full of fire.

The demonstration given above produces in other people "consideration of the sign", which necessarily makes them admit that the hill has fire.

Syllogism—*Nyāyāḥ*.

Syllogism (*nyāya*) is the name for a collection of five sentences which give rise to knowledge that produces consideration. It is set forth as follows:—

- (1) This hill is full of fire—*Proposition*.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke—*Reason*.
- (3) All that is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen—*Example*.
- (4) This hill is full of smoke—*Application*.
- (5) Therefore this hill is full of fire—*Conclusion*.

After these five sentences have been employed there arises in the mind of the listener consideration of the form, 'this hill is full of smoke, which is in invariable concomitance with fire', from which follows the conclusion, "this hill is full of fire." Syllogism is therefore the name for the entire collection of these five sentences, each of which is called a part or member.

Parts of a Syllogism—*Avayavāḥ*.

A part or member (*avayavāḥ*) is a sentence that gives rise to knowledge which contributes to the production of an entire knowledge which produces consideration. On the employment of the five sentences there arises, at first, knowledge from each of them separately. Then arises collective knowledge from the five sentences combined together. This collective knowledge which produces consideration is based on each of the five sentences called a part or member. The parts are five, *viz.* (1) the proposition, (2) the reason, (3) the example, (4) the application, and (5) the conclusion.

The Proposition—*Pratijñā*.

The proposition (*pratijñā*) is a sentence which causes knowledge, whose object is the same as that of the conclusion and which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge which produces consideration, *e.g.*

This hill is full of fire.

It may also be defined as a sentence which gives rise to an inquiry necessitating the mention of the reason, *e.g.* this hill is full of fire. (Why so? because it is smoky.)

The Reason or Middle Term—*Hetuḥ*.

The reason or middle term (*hetuḥ*) is a word, with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge whose object is not the *probandum* (major term) but which contributes to the production of the entire knowledge that gives rise to consideration, *e.g.* because it is full of smoke (*i.e.* by or from smokiness).

The reason is of two kinds : (1) the affirmative (*anvayī*) and (2) the negative (*vyatirekī*). The affirmative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of an affirmative invariable concomitance, *e.g.* because it has smoke (*i.e.* by or from “smokiness”), all that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen. The negative reason is a member with the instrumental or ablative suffix attached to it, which produces knowledge that necessitates the mention of the member expressive of a negative invariable concomitance, *e.g.* because it has smoke, (*i.e.* by or from “smokiness”), all that has no fire has no smoke, as a lake.

Example—*udāharaṇam*.

The example (*udāharaṇam*) is a word which, while producing knowledge of connection of the form that the locus of the middle term is constantly occupied by the major term, causes another knowledge which proceeds from the sentence expressive of consideration,¹ *e.g.*

All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen,
[So this hill has smoke].

Application—*upanayaḥ*.

The application (*upanayaḥ*) is a member which produces consideration, *e.g.* All that has smoke has fire, this hill too has smoke.

Conclusion—*Nigamanam*.

Conclusion (*nigamanam*) is a sentence which, while causing the knowledge which gives rise to consideration, produces knowledge of the major term as indicated by that of the middle term through its invariable concomitance with the major term and

¹ *i.e.* application (*upanayaḥ*), the sentence expressive of consideration.

its nature of abiding in the minor term, *e.g.* In this hill there is smoke, which is in invariable concomitance with fire. Therefore in this hill there is fire, or therefore this hill is full of fire.

Fallacies—*Hetvābhāsāḥ*.

A General Definition of Fallacy—*Hetvābhāsa-sāmānya-niruktiḥ*.

A person can ascertain truths and achieve victory by exposing fallacies in the argument of his opponent. It is therefore necessary to define a fallacy, which in Sanskrit is called *hetvābhāsa*, a semblance of reason, a fallacy of reason or a fallacious reason.

A fallacy is an object of knowledge which obstructs an inference. It is in brief a defective reason. There are five kinds of fallacy or defective reason, viz. (1) the erratic or uncertain (*savyābhicāra* or *anaikānta*), (2) the contradictory (*viruddha*), (3) the counterbalanced (*satpratipakṣita*), (4) the unproved or inconclusive (*asiddha*), and (5) the incompatible (*bādhita*). The defects involved in the above reasons are respectively the following:—(1) the erraticalness or uncertainty (*vyābhicāra*), (2) contradiction (*virodha*), (3) counterbalance (*satpratipakṣa*), (4) absence of proof or inclusiveness (*asiddhi*), and (5) incompatibility, (*bādhā*).

The Erratic Reason—*Savyābhicāraḥ*.

The erratic (*savyābhicāra*) is a reason or middle term in which abides a character, the possession of which causes that presence of two alternatives which produces doubt in the *probandum* or major term. The nature refers to the constant accompaniment with, or absence from, both the major term and its non-existence. The erratic reason is subdivided into (1) that which is too general (*sādhāraṇa*), (2) that which is non-general or not general enough (*asādhāraṇa*), and (3) that which is non-exclusive (*anupasaṁhārī*).

A reason is said to be *too general*, if it abides in the locus of the major term as well as in that of its absence, *e.g.*

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire.

Here the reason “fire” abides in the region of smoke (as in a kitchen) as well as in the region of the absence of smoke (as in an ignited iron-ball).

A reason is said to be *non-general* or *not general enough*, if it abides neither in the locus of the major term nor in that of its absence, *e.g.*

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of ether.

Here the reason is ether, which has no locus. Ether abides neither in the locus of fire nor in that of the absence of fire.

A reason is said to be *non-exclusive*, if it is destitute of an example, whether affirmative or negative, *e.g.*

All things are impermanent,
because they are knowable.

Here we cannot cite any example, as “all things” is the subject.

The Contradictory Reason—*Viruddhaḥ*.

The contradictory (*viruddhaḥ*) is a reason which is the counterpart of that non-existence which constantly accompanies the major term, *e.g.*

This hill is full of fire,
because it is full of water.

Here the reason is contradictory, inasmuch as water is the counterpart of the *non-existence of water*, which constantly accompanies fire.

The contradictory may also be defined as a reason (middle term) which is constantly accompanied by the absence of the *probandum*, major term.

The Counterbalanced Reason—*Satpratipakṣitaḥ*.

If, at the time of the consideration of a reason which seeks to establish the *existence* of the *probandum* or major term, there occurs the consideration of another reason which seeks to establish the *non-existence* of that term, the first reason is a counterbalanced one,—in fact, *both* the reasons are counterbalanced, *e.g.*

One reason—Sound is eternal, because it is audible.

Opposite reason—Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product.

In the above instances, as consideration of both the sides prevails, there is no real inference. The inference from one reason being of as much force as that from the other reason, the two inferences neutralize each other.

The Unproved Reason—*Asiddhaḥ*.

The unproved (*asiddhaḥ*) reason is of three kinds: (1) unproved on the part of its locus or the subject (*āśrayāsiddhaḥ*), (2) unproved with regard to its own nature (*svarūpāsiddhaḥ*), and (3) unproved in respect of accompaniment (*vyāpyatvāsiddhaḥ*).

(1) A reason is said to be unproved on the part of its locus, if the characteristic distinguishing the locus does not belong to it, *e.g.*

This golden hill is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here the reason "smoke" is unproved, as its locus is unreal, on account of the "goldenness" not belonging to a hill.

(2) A reason is said to be unproved with regard to its own nature, if it does not abide in the locus or minor term, *e.g.*

The lake is full of fire,
because it is full of smoke.

Here the reason is unproved, as smoke from its very nature does not abide in a lake.

(3) A reason is said to be unproved in respect of constant accompaniment, if its generic nature is not useful in establishing its invariable concomitance with the major term. It is subdivided as follows:—

(a) Unproved on the part of the major term (*sādhyaśiddhi*) which occurs when there is a useless adjective appended to that term, *e.g.*

This hill is full of golden fire,
because it is full of smoke.

"Golden" is useless.

(b) Unproved on the part of the reason (*hetvasiddhi*) which occurs when there is a useless adjective appended to it, *e.g.*

This hill is full of fire,
because it is full of blue smoke.

"Blue" is useless.

(c) Unproved in respect of invariable concomitance (*vyāptyaśiddhi*) which occurs when there is a condition attached to the reason, *e.g.*

This hill is full of smoke,
because it is full of fire nourished by wet fuel (which is a condition attached to the reason).

The Incompatible Reason—*Bādhitaḥ*.

An incompatible reason (*bādhitaḥ*) occurs when there is the knowledge that the major term, which is assigned to the minor term, does not really abide in it, *e.g.*

Fire is cold,
because it is a substance.

The incompatible reason, which is of ten kinds, occurs under the following circumstances:—

(1) The minor term being incompatible with perception (*pakṣaḥ pratyakṣa-bādhitaḥ*), *e.g.*

A pot is all-pervading,
because it is existent.

- (2) The minor term being incompatible with inference (*pakṣaḥ anumāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

An atom has parts,
because it has a shape.

An atom has in fact no shape and no parts.

- (3) The minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony (*pakṣaḥ śabda-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

The golden mountain (Meru) is stony,
because it is a mountain.

- (4) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogī-pratyakṣa-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Fire is non-warm,
because it is a product.

- (5) The minor term being incompatible with the inference which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogy anumāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Sound is inaudible,
because it is a quality (of ether).

- (6) The minor term being incompatible with comparison which establishes the counterpart of the major term (*pakṣaḥ sādhyā-pratīyogyupamāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Bos-gavaeus-ness is not the connotation of the term
bos-gavaeus,
because it is a general notion.

- (7) The minor term being incompatible with the evidence which is analogous to the evidence that establishes the major term *pakṣaḥ sādhyā-grāhaka-pramāṇa-jātīya-pramāṇa-viruddhaḥ*), e.g.

The skull of a deceased person is pure,
because it is the limb of a being that had life, as a
conch-shell.

[The scripture declares a conch-shell to be pure but not the skull of a deceased person.]

- (8) The minor term being incompatible with perception which establishes the middle term (*pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhaka-pratyakṣa-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

Water and air are warm,
because they are possessed of touch, unlike that of the
earth.

- (9) The minor term being incompatible with inference which establishes the middle term (*pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhakānumāna-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

The mind is all-pervading,
because it is a seat of union which is a non-coexistent cause of knowledge.

- (10) The minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony which establishes the middle term (*pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhakaśabda-bādhitaḥ*), e.g.

The Rājasūya sacrifice should be celebrated by Brāhmaṇas,
because it is the means of conquering heaven.

[From verbal testimony the Rājasūya sacrifice is ascertained to be a duty of the Kṣatriyas and not of the Brāhmaṇas].

Fallacies are serviceable as they point out Inefficiency—*Hetvābhāsānām-asādhakatā-sādhakatva-nirūpanam*.

A fallacy when exposed is a good reply to an opponent, whose argument is thus pointed out to be inefficient. Quibbles and far-fetched analogies are not good replies as they are of no use in this respect. Far-fetched analogies are moreover self-destructive.

Inference of God—*Īśvarānumānam*.

By inference we can prove the existence of God, the Maker of the universe. The inference employed for this purpose is as follows :—

The universe has a maker,
because it is a product, as a pot.

The causes which operate in the case of a product may be stated thus :—

There must be (1) a direct knowledge (perception) by an agent himself of the materials which constitute a product, (2) a desire on the part of the agent to make it, and (3) an act of making it.

For instance, in making a product called a pot there are in the potter, (1) a perception of the pieces that constitute a pot, (2) a desire on his part to make it, and (3) his actual making of it.

Similarly in the case of a product called a binary atomic compound (*dvyanuka*) there must be (1) perception by an agent of the atoms which constitute the compound, (2) a desire in him to make it, (3) and his actual making of it. Now atoms are supersensuous, and, as such, cannot be perceived by man. Hence the maker of the binary atomic compound is an agent, who is not man but God.

Book III. Comparison—*Upamāna-khaṇḍa*.

A man, who does not know the signification of the word *bos-gavaeus*, hearing from an elder that the word *bos-gavaeus* signifies an animal which is like a cow, goes into a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Recollecting the instructive assertion of the elder, he institutes a comparison by which he arrives at the conclusion that the animal which he sees is the thing signified by the word *bos-gavaeus*. The means by which this conclusion has been arrived at is called comparison (*upamāna*). This means is the knowledge of likeness between a cow and a *bos-gavaeus*. The word comparison is ordinarily taken to signify the whole process.

The intercourse or operation (*vyāpāra*), in the case of comparison, consists in the recollection of the instructive assertion of the elder, *viz.* that the word *bos-gavaeus* signifies an animal which is like a cow. The result of comparison (*upamiti*) is the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named.

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that likeness (*sādrśya*) is a distinct object which is not included in the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. The signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is, according to them, an animal which possesses likeness to a cow. Gaṅgeśa opposes this view by saying that it is cumbersome. A thing is said to bear likeness to another thing, if it, while possessing the special property of the latter thing, is different from the same in the generic nature. Such being the definition of likeness, we have to admit an infinite number of likenesses corresponding to the thing to which they refer. The real signification of the word *bos-gavaeus*, according to Gaṅgeśa, is not an animal which possesses likeness to a cow but an animal which possesses the generic nature of a *bos-gavaeus* (that is, which is a type of all *bos-gavaeus*). Hence the result of comparison consists of knowledge of the relation between the word *bos-gavaeus* and the animal which possesses the generic nature of a *bos-gavaeus*.

Some say that the knowledge of the signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is derived through perception. This is absurd. Though the relation between the word *bos-gavaeus* and the animal called *bos-gavaeus* may be perceived in a particular case with which our eyes are in union, it is impossible for us to perceive such a relation in other cases which are beyond our eyes. Therefore the knowledge of signification of the word *bos-gavaeus* is not derived through perception, but through a separate means of knowledge, called comparison.

Neither can the knowledge of signification of the word *bo-
gavaeus* be derived through inference, inas-
Comparison is not infer- much as in the case of comparison know-
ence. ledge is derived through the knowledge
of likeness, independent of knowledge of invariable concomi-
tance which is indispensable to an inference. Moreover in the
case of knowledge derived through comparison there is in us a
self-consciousness of the form "I compare", but not of the form
"I infer."

Book IV. Verbal Testimony—*Śabda-khaṇḍa*.

Definition of Verbal Testimony—*Śabda-nirūpaṇam*.

Speech¹ (*śabda*) is a means of valid knowledge if it is uttered
by a person as an outcome of the true knowledge of its meaning.
e.g. the speech, the *horse runs*, is a means of valid knowledge if
it has been uttered by a person who knows its meaning. The
means by which or the process through which the valid knowledge
is derived is called verbal testimony (*śabda-pramāṇam*). A speech
uttered by a person who does not know its meaning may produce
knowledge the validity of which is uncertain.

Verbal Knowledge—*Śabda-bodhaḥ*.

Any knowledge derived from a speech is called verbal know-
ledge (*śabda-bodhaḥ*). It is the knowledge of the mutual connection
of things signified by words which possess expectancy, consis-
tency, contiguity and potentiality, and convey intention. The
process through which verbal knowledge is produced is described
as follows:—

In a speech—*ghataḥ asti* (there is a pot)—are to be noted the
following:

- (i) At first there is the *hearing*² of (*śabdasya śravaṇam*) words in
the speech, viz. *ghata + h + as + ti* (there + is + a + pot).
- (ii) Then there is the *recollection of things* (*arthasya smaranam*)
signified by the words, viz. the recollection of "pot" signi-
fied by the word *ghata*, of "one" signified by *h* (a modi-
fication of the first-case-ending *su*), of "existing" signi-
fied by *as* and of "the state of abiding" signified by *ti*,
(a verbal termination of the third person, singular number,
present tense).
- (iii) Afterwards there is the knowledge of the *mutual connection*
of things thus recollected (*samsarga-bodhaḥ*), that is, the
knowledge that 'pot' as qualified by oneness is an abode

¹ "Speech" signifies "the knowledge of speech."

² The words need not always be actually *heard*, for sometimes we may recol-
lect them from a written statement.

of existence. The knowledge in this third step is specially called a verbal knowledge.

- (iv) Lastly there is *self-consciousness* (*anuvyavasāya*) of the knowledge in the following form: "I am the possessor of the knowledge of pot which as qualified by oneness is an abode of existence."

Speech as a means of Valid Knowledge—*Śabda-prāmāṇyavādaḥ*.

(a) *Can it be denied that speech is a means of valid knowledge?*

A means, otherwise called an instrument (*kaṛaṇa*), is that cause which, when brought into operation, necessarily produces its effect. Speech is not, according to the Buddhists, such a means, inasmuch as it does not, even when uttered by a person who knows its meaning, produce knowledge, unless it is attended with expectancy, consistency, etc. Therefore "speech is not," say the Buddhists, "a means of valid knowledge."

Speech is indeed a means of valid knowledge, and Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by asking whence, if the Buddhists do not admit speech to be a means of valid knowledge, they derive the validity of their own speech, *viz.* "speech is not a means of valid knowledge." The verbal testimony being denied, their speech cannot be proved as valid, and as such cannot be advanced against any party. On the contrary if their speech is admitted as valid, they will have to abandon their contention that "speech is not a means of valid knowledge." The contention of the Buddhists is therefore baseless, and speech is indeed a means of valid knowledge. But speech, if it is to be a means of valid knowledge, must not be a bare one: it should be attended with expectancy, consistency, etc.

Speech is mentioned as the means or instrument because it is the main cause in the production of valid knowledge, while expectancy, consistency, etc., are mere attendant causes or conditions. It should be stated here "that only one cause without attendant conditions cannot produce any effect.

(b) *Is verbal testimony included in perception?*

The Buddhists, while not claiming their speech to be valid, say that it serves at any rate to produce in us a mental perception of the form "speech is not a means of valid knowledge" by causing the recollection of things signified by it. When we hear the speech, *viz.* "speech is not a means of valid knowledge," there arises in us a knowledge (recollection) of the things signified by it, and, through the intercourse whose character is knowledge, we actually perceive the thing in our mind. The function of verbal testimony being thus performed by mental perception, there is no necessity for assuming the former as a distinct means of valid knowledge.

(c) *Verbal testimony is not included in perception.*

Gaṅgeśa holds that speech which is attended with expectancy, etc., and produces recollection of things signified by it, must be accepted as a means of valid knowledge quite distinct from perception. Just as in the perception of a colour our eye is the means or instrument, its union with the colour is the intercourse, and the perceptual knowledge is the result, so in verbal testimony, speech is the means or instrument, the recollection of things signified by it is the intercourse and the verbal knowledge is the result. Speech therefore serves the same purpose in verbal testimony as the sense-organs do in perception, in other words, speech is the means of verbal knowledge, and considering the distinct nature of this means we must admit verbal testimony to be a distinct means of valid knowledge.

(d) *Is verbal testimony included in inference?*

The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that verbal testimony is not a distinct means of valid knowledge but is included in inference. In deriving knowledge from speech we first hear the words constituting the speech and then recollect the things signified by the words. The knowledge of the mutual connection of things thus recollected, which is designated as verbal knowledge, is, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, derived from inference. Suppose one utters a speech thus: "he beat the cow with a stick." On hearing this speech the listener may, say the Vaiśeṣikas, infer as follows:—

- (1) The words constituting this speech must have been preceded by knowledge of the mutual connection of things as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words,—*proposition*.
- (2) Because they are possessed of expectancy, etc.; and convey the intention of the speaker,—*reason*.
- (3) The words of all speeches possessing expectancy, etc. and conveying the intention of a speaker are preceded by the knowledge of the mutual connection of things as intended by the speaker and recollected by his words, just as the words of a speech, *viz.* "bring a pot" uttered by me (the listener),—*example*.

If we can thus derive knowledge of the speech by means of inference, there is, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, no necessity for admitting a separate means of knowledge called verbal testimony.

(e) *Verbal knowledge is not included in inference.*

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view as follows:

The inference as shown above is not valid, inasmuch as it does not involve knowledge (recollection) of actual things as in the case of verbal testimony, but the knowledge of things recollected, *i.e.* the knowledge of knowledge (recollection) of the

things. This is not only cumbersome but also fallacious. Our activity in respect of a thing arises from our knowledge of the thing itself, but not from our knowledge of knowledge of the thing, which, as in the case of knowledge of error, may not contain in itself the cause of activity. Moreover, verbal knowledge is not, like inferential knowledge, dependent on the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the words of a speech and knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified by them, but results immediately from the words as soon as expectancy, consistency, etc., existing among them have been known. Again, after verbal knowledge has been produced, there arises self-consciousness of the form “ I know from *the speech* ” but not of the form “ I know through *inference*.”

It has already been observed that a speech cannot produce verbal knowledge unless the words composing it possess expectancy, consistency, contiguity and potentiality and convey intention.

Expectancy—*Ākāṅkṣā-vādaḥ*.

A word is said to bear the relation of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) to another word if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its interconnection in a speech. For instance. *Devadattaḥ grāmam gacchati* (Devadatta goes to the village) is a speech in which the word *Devadattaḥ* (in the nominative case) is expectant for the word *gacchati* (‘goes’, the verb), and this latter in its turn is expectant for *grāmam* (‘village,’ in the objective case). In the same way the crude word *Devadatta* is expectant for *ḥ* (the same as *su*, the first-case-ending), the crude word *grāma* for *am* (the second-case-ending) and *gaṁ* (the root) for *ti* (the verbal suffix). A crude word (*nāma*) and a case-ending (*vibhakti*), a root (*dhātu*) and a verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*), and a verb (*kriyā*) and a case (*kāraka*) are expectant for each other.

Consistency—*Yogyatā*.

Consistency (*yogyatā*) consists in a word not bearing a meaning which is incompatible with the meanings of other words in a speech. For instance, no verbal knowledge is derived from such a speech as *agninā siñca* (sprinkle with fire) because it is incompatible with fire being an instrument in the act of sprinkling. Consistency may be certain or doubtful, but in either case there will be verbal knowledge.

Contiguity—*Āsattiḥ*.

Contiguity (*āsattiḥ*) consists in the enunciation of words, which are connected with each other, without a long pause between

them, *e.g.* the speech, *viz.* “bring water”, will convey no meaning if one utters the word “bring” now, and the word “water” after an hour.

Intention—*Tātparyam*.

Intention (*tātparyam*), which indicates the wish of a speaker, consists in the utterance of a word to convey knowledge of a special thing. If at the time of eating a meal, one says “bring *saindhava*” we are to understand by the word *saindhava* a quantity of salt and not a horse.

The Non-eternity of Sound—*Śabdānityatā-vādaḥ*.

Sounds (*śabda*) such as *k*, etc., are multifarious, inasmuch as we find that a sound uttered by a man is different from the corresponding sound uttered by a parrot. On the ground that sounds are many, each of which is produced and destroyed, we must admit them to be non-eternal. In fact such an expression as ‘the uproar that arose in the market has now ceased’ proves beyond a doubt that sound is liable to destruction.

Sound destroyed and not concealed—*Ucchanna-pracchanna-vādaḥ*.

If sounds are destructible, their aggregates, the speeches, must also be so. The Veda, a collection of speeches, is consequently non-eternal. The Mimāṃsakas say that, though the Veda as a collection of speeches is liable to destruction, as it has come down through succession of teachers, its continuity is uninterrupted. Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that from allusions occurring in the socio-religious institutes (*smṛti*) and from usages that have prevailed from olden times we can infer that once there existed certain branches of the Vedas which have since disappeared. Therefore the Veda is non-eternal.

The Veda is defined by Gaṅgeśa as a collection of valid speeches which are not the outcome of knowledge of things signified by words, and the things signified by which are not the objects of those kinds of knowledge which are derived from means other than verbal testimony.

Injunction—*Vidhi-vādaḥ*.

The Veda is the foundation of our good customs inasmuch as it is the source of all injunctions. An injunction (*vidhi*) is a speech which produces in a person such conviction as induces him to perform or desist from performing the act signified by the speech, *e.g.* “Let a person, who wishes to go to heaven, perform a horse-sacrifice” is an injunction. “Let not a man drink wine” is another injunction.

According to Kumārila the conviction, which in an ordinary speech represents the purpose of the speaker, and in the case of the Vedic speech (not emanating from any person) the potentiality of the speech itself, consists of an idea of the form : “this speech directs me to perform or to desist from performing the act signified by it.”

Prabhākara says that the conviction consists of the belief that merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being earned by our efforts.

Gaṅgeśa, who is not satisfied with any of the above explanations, maintains that the conviction produced in the person consists of the consciousness (a) that the act signified by the speech is capable of being performed by him, (b) that the performance of it will fulfil the object of his desire, and (c) that no serious inconvenience will accompany the performance.

All logicians agree, however, in holding that the conviction is produced by the potentiality of the hortative particle *liṅ* (corresponding to the English word “let”) in the speech itself.

Merit and Demerit—*Apūrva-vādaḥ*.

Prabhākara says that the conviction produced by a Vedic speech, consists first of the belief that the merit or demerit that accrues from the act signified by the speech, is capable of being acquired by our efforts. This belief is followed by the presumption that the act from which merit or demerit accrues, is such as can be performed by us. Gradually there arise two other beliefs, viz. (1) that the act, if performed, will fulfil the object of our desire, and (2) that there is no serious inconvenience involved in the act.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that it is cumbersome to assume that so many kinds of belief are produced from a speech to induce us to perform or desist from performing the act signified by it. Let us, for the sake of brevity, assume that the conviction produced by a speech consists merely of the belief that the act signified by the speech is such as can be performed by us. This belief in the theory of Gaṅgeśa includes in it two other beliefs, viz. that the act is capable of fulfilling our desire and that there is no serious inconvenience involved in it.

Potentiality—*Śakti-vādaḥ*.

The relation that exists between a word and the thing referred to by it is a special relation¹ called *indication* (*vṛtti*). It

¹ The relation is not an ordinary one, e.g. the word (sound) jar does not produce in us the recollection of either although the former abides in the latter in the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

is on account of this special relation that we are, on hearing the word *pot*, able to recollect the thing known as a pot. This special relation possessed by a word is generally called its *potentiality* (*śakti*). Nice distinctions are however often made in this matter. The special relation is described as being of two kinds, viz. (1) signification (*saṃketa*) and (2) implication (*lakṣaṇā*). The signification is again subdivided into, (a) permanent and (b) occasional. The permanent signification which a word bears is called specially its *potentiality* (*śakti*). This potentiality, which is the capacity of a word to refer to (i.e. produce recollection of) a particular thing, depends upon the will of God manifesting itself in the form: "let such and such a thing be understood by such and such a word." For instance the potentiality of the word *pot* consists in its producing the recollection of an earthen vessel. The occasional signification is called *technicality* (*paribhāṣā*) which depends upon the will of man manifesting itself in the form: "such and such a thing is to be understood by such and such a word." A word is said to be *technical* if it produces recollection of a particular thing as desired by man. For instance *nadī* is a technical word for nouns ending in *ī* or *ū*. The distinction between the permanent and occasional significations is overlooked by those logicians who maintain that words derive their signification, or rather potentiality, not from the will of God but from the will of man. There is according to them as much potentiality in an ordinary word as in a technical one. The potentiality of a word is ascertained from the following sources:—

- (1) *Grammar* (*vyākaraṇa*), e.g. in the sentence: *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra cooks), the potentiality of the crude word *Caitra*, the nominative case-ending *ḥ*, the root *pac* and the verbal suffix *ti* is ascertained from grammar.
- (2) *Comparison* (*upamāna*), e.g. in the sentence: "a bos-gavaeus is like a cow," the potentiality of "bos-gavaeus" is ascertained through comparison.
- (3) *Dictionary* (*koṣa*), e.g. the potentiality of the word *pika* to refer to the quality of blueness is ascertained from dictionary.
- (4) *Reliable assertion* (*āpta-vākya*), e.g. that the word *pika* signifies a black cuckoo is ascertained from the word of a competent scholar.
- (5) *Usage* (*vyavahāra*), e.g. on hearing "bring a table," "take, away a table," etc., and on seeing the table brought and taken away, one understands the potentiality of the word "table."
- (6) *Context* (*vākya-śeṣa*), e.g. if in a sentence the meaning of the word *yava* (which may refer to a barley-corn or a panic seed) is not clear, we can ascertain its true meaning (as a barley-corn) by a reference to the remaining sentences in which it is spoken of as having ears.

- (7) *Description (vīrti)*, e.g. when we describe a belligerent nation as a warlike one, we can understand the potentiality of the word "belligerent."
- (8) *Association* with well-known words, e.g. the potentiality of the word *pika* to refer to a bird is easily understood when the word is associated with some well-known words such as : "in this mango-tree the *pika* sings sweetly."

We have seen that each word possesses the potentiality of producing the recollection of a thing dependent upon the will of God or man. Now the question arises as to whether the potentiality refers to the genus of the thing or to the thing as an individual. If we suppose that the potentiality refers to an individual, we shall have to assume, say the Mīmāṃsakas, an infinite number of potentialities corresponding to the individuals to which they refer. If, on the other hand, we assume that the potentiality refers to a genus, we shall have to assume only one potentiality corresponding to the genus which will also include individuals without which it cannot stand.

Gaṅgeśa opposes the above view by saying that we could not recollect individuals unless the potentiality resided in them. On the supposition of the potentiality referring to an individual, it is not, continues he, necessary to assume an infinite number of potentialities, as one and the same potentiality refers to all the individuals which are comprehended under one genus. Hence, he concludes that the potentiality really refers to the individuals coming under a genus and possessing a form.

Words possessed of potentiality may be specified as follows :—

- (1) The *etymological (yauḡika)* is a word which is understood by the potentiality of its component parts alone, e.g. the word *dātā* (giver) refers to the agent of giving.
- (2) The *conventional (rūḍha)* is a word which is understood by the potentiality of its entirety independently of that of its parts, e.g. the word *go* signifies a cow (and not 'the agent of going' which is the meaning of its parts).
- (3) The *etymological-conventional (yoga-rūḍha)* is a word which is understood by the potentiality of the whole harmoniously with the potentiality of its parts, e.g. the word *paṅkaja* signifies a water-lily, which is born in the mud.
- (4) The *etymological-conventional (yauḡika-rūḍha)* is a word which is understood either by the power of its entirety or by that of its parts, e.g. the word *udbhīd* signifies a germ, the sprouting of a seed or a sacrifice.

Implication—*Lakṣaṇā*.

By implication (*lakṣaṇā*) a word refers to a thing which is related to another thing which is the signification of the word, but which does not signify the intention of the speaker, e.g. the

word 'Ganges' in the sentence, 'the cow-keeper dwells on the Ganges,' does not signify the current which is referred to by the potentiality of the word but signifies the bank which bears to the current the relation of proximity. Similarly the word 'crow' in the sentence, 'protect the curd from the crow' signifies by implication any thing that injures the curd.

Compound Words—*Samāsa-vādaḥ*.

In Sanskrit the compound word (*sāmāsa*) is of six kinds, viz.: (1) an *attributive compound* (*bahuvrīhi*), (2) a *determinative compound* (*tatpuruṣa*) including the negative determinative compound (*nañ-tatpuruṣa*), (3) a *descriptive compound* (*karmadhāraya*), (4) a *numeral compound* (*dvigu*) including the *unified numeral compound* (*samāhāra*), (5) an *aggregative compound* (*dvandva*) comprising the *mutually aggregative compound* (*itaretara*), the *unified aggregative compound* (*samāhāra*), and the *residual aggregative compound* (*ekaśeṣa*) and (6) an *indeclinable compound* (*avyayībhāva*).

In the attributive compound the first word possesses its fixed potentiality and the second word, which through its potentiality points out a thing, refers also by implication to another thing, e.g. *citra-gum ānaya* (lit. bring the brindled-cow-man) signifies "bring the man having a brindled-cow." The first word *citra* (brindled) refers through its potentiality to the quality of "brindledness" while the second word *go* (cow) besides pointing out, through its potentiality, the thing called "cow" refers also by implication to its owner.

Grammarians maintain that, when two words are combined together to form an attributive compound, the combination possesses the potentiality of referring to a thing which is connected with but lies beyond the things signified by its component words, e.g. *citra-gu* (brindled-cow) refers to "ownership" over and above the quality of being "brindled" and the "cow." Gaṅgeśa holds that in an attributive compound all potentialities lie in the words which are combined together to form the compound, and there is no potentiality in the combination itself.

In the determinative compound the second word possesses its fixed potentiality while in the first word there are both potentiality and implication, e.g. *rāja-puruṣaḥ* (a "king-officer", that is, an officer of the king) signifies an officer belonging to the king in which the word *rāja* refers to a "king" as well as to "connection with him."

In the descriptive compound in which the component words stand to each other in the relation of identity, there is no special rule for the possession of potentialities by them, e.g. *nīlotpalam* (blue-lotus). The same is the case with the numeral compound, e.g. *pañca-guṇam* (five cows).

In the aggregative compound there is no special rule for the assumption of potentiality or implication by the component words, *e.g.* *yama-varuṇau* (Yama and Varuṇa).

In an indeclinable compound there are both potentiality and implication in the last word, *e.g.* *upakumbham* (near the jar).

Verbal Suffixes—*Ākhyāta-vādaḥ*.

A verbal suffix (*ākhyāta—ti, tas, anti*, etc.) used after a root, refers to the effort favourable to what is signified by the root, *e.g.* *Caitraḥ pacati* (Caitra cooks) signifies that Caitra is possessed of efforts favourable to cooking. If the agent is an inanimate thing the verbal suffix refers by implication to the operation favourable to what is signified by the root, *e.g.* *ratho gacchati* (a chariot moves) signifies that the chariot is possessed of the operation favourable to moving.

The Roots—*Dhātu vādaḥ*.

The root (*dhātu*) of a verb refers to the operation favourable to the effect of what is signified by the verb, *e.g.* the root *gam* (going) in the sentence, *viz. sa grāmaṁ gacchati* (he goes to the village) refers to moving, which is favourable to his connection with the village, which is the effect of his going. In the case of an intransitive verb the root refers merely to the operation, *e.g.* *sa tiṣṭhati* (he stays) in which *sthā* signifies merely 'staying.'

Prefixes—*Upasarga-vādaḥ*.

The prefix (*upasarga*) by itself does not bear any meaning but points out the speciality of meaning borne by the root that follows, *e.g.* *vi* in *viṣayate* (completely conquers) signifies a completeness of conquest.

Validity of the Four Means of Knowledge—*Pramāṇa-catustāya-prāmāṇya-vādaḥ*.

Some say that a gesture (*ceṣṭā*) is a means of valid knowledge. But this is absurd, inasmuch as a gesture merely reminds us of words which produce knowledge. That a deaf person is sometimes prompted to activity by a gesture, must be due to the fact that he infers the desire of the man who makes the gesture. So a gesture is included in either verbal testimony or inference. Similarly tradition (*aitihya*) and rumour (*janāśruti*) are not distinct from verbal testimony while presumption (*arthāpatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) are comprised in inference.

CHAPTER III.

COMMENTARIES ON THE TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI.

42. THE POPULARITY OF TATTVA-CINTĀMAṆI.

The popularity of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi is attested in unmistakeable terms by the numerous commentaries, sub-commentaries and glosses that have grown around the book since its first appearance. The text of the work covers about 300 pages, but its expository treatises extend to over 1,000,000 pages. In the following pages are enumerated some of the important expository treatises, and the accompanying table shows their mutual relationship.

43. THE MITHILĀ SCHOOL.

The Mithilā School of Nyāya flourished from the 12th to the 15th century A.D. The great masters were Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna, Pakṣadhara and others. Their style of writing was terse and they discussed the meaning of *vyāpti* more than did their predecessors. In the 16th century Nyāya studies waned in Mithila and made progress in Nadia. The Principal Naiyāyikas¹ of Mithila School are mentioned below.

44. VARDHAMĀNA UPĀDHYĀYA (1250 A.D.).

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya was the son² of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, and surnamed Mahopādhyāya³ or Mahāmahopādhyāya⁴. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa, commentary on Tattva-cintāmaṇi.
- (2) Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa, a commentary on Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-pariśuddhi.

¹ Vide my *Logic in the University of Nadia* (1907), *Yaśovijaya Gaṇi*, from the Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. 9, 1910. Also *History of Navya-nyāya in Bengal and Mithila* by Rai Manmohan Chakravarti Bahadur and Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscript in Madras Sanskrit College.

² *Lilāvati-prakāśa*, Ind. Off. Cat., p. 668, No. 2080, verse 2 :—

न्यायाम्बोज पतङ्गाय मौनसापारदश्चने ।

गङ्गेश्वराय गुरवे पित्रेऽजभवते नमः ॥ २ ॥

³ Vide *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, No. XIII, Pāṇini-darśana.

⁴ Jaydeva speaks of Vardhamāna as Mahāmahopādhyāya-caraṇāḥ. Vide *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, Bibliotheca Indica, 1—6—674.

- (3) Nyāya-parīṣiṣṭa-prakāśa, commentary on Udayanācārya's Nyāya-parīṣiṣṭa.
- (4) Prameya-nibandha-prakāśa, which may be the same as the Prameya-tattva-bodha.
- (5) Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa.
- (6) Nyāya-kusumañjali-prakāśa.
- (7) Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa.
- (8) Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-prakāśa.

Vardhamāna Mahopādhyāya is named in the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha of Mādhavācārya, under No. XIII, Pāṇini-darśana, so he must be older than the second half of the 14th century.¹ He must be older than Jayadeva, who commented on two of his Vaiśeṣika works. Jayadeva's time cannot be later than the third quarter of the 13th century. He speaks of Varddhamāna reverently as *Mahāmahopādhyāya-caraṇāḥ*: and so a fair interval must have elapsed between the two. Vardhamāna's time thus falls probably in the first quarter of the 13th century.

45. PAKṢADHARA MIŚRA (1275 A.D.).

Pakṣadhara Miśra whose early name was Jaydeva was born in Saisava, 16 miles east of Darbhanga, on the Kamalā. His father's name was Mahādeva Miśra and mother's name was Sumitrā. He was a pupil of his uncle Hari Miśra.² He was called Pakṣadhara on account of his gaining victory in a debate which he conducted for a fortnight or a pakṣa. With regard to Pakṣadhara it is observed: "Saṅkara and Vāchaspati are comparable to Śiva and Brihaspati, but there was none who could be compared to Pakṣadhara."³ He was the author of the following works:—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka.
- (2) Dravya-padārtha on the Dravya-kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa.
- (3) Līlāvatī-viveka on the Līlāvatī-prakāśa.

In spite of his being a logician, he was the author of two charming Sanskrit plays, viz. *Prasanna Rāghava* and *Candrāloka*.⁴

¹ According to Rai Manmohan Chakravarti Bahadur he must be older than the second half of the 14th century A.D., vide his *History of Navya-nyāya in Bengal* (September 1915), p. 266.

²

अधौत्य जयदेवेन हरिमित्रात् पिब्यतः ।

तत्त्वचिन्तामणेरित्यं चालोकोऽयं प्रकाश्यते ॥

(तत्त्वचिन्तामण्यालोक, opening lines).

³ शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः शङ्करवाचस्पती सदृशौ । पञ्चधरः प्रतिपक्षौ लक्ष्मीभूतो न च कापि ।

येषां कोमलकान्तकौशलकला लीलावती भारती ।

तेषां कर्कशतर्कवक्रवचनोद्गारेऽपि किं हीयते ॥

(Prasanna Rāghava, Introduction).

Pakṣadhara had two disciples named Vāsudeva Miśra (his nephew), and Rucidatta Miśra. He must be older than *la sam* 1509¹ the date of copying of his Pratyakṣāloka, which, according to some, corresponds with 1278 A.D. He might be placed in the third quarter of the thirteenth century.²

It is traditionally known that Pakṣadhara lived in the court of Raja Bhairava Sinha of Mithilā and was a class-fellow of Vidyapati. But as Bhairava Sinha lived in 1435 to 1450 A.D., Pakṣadhara, if the tradition be true, must have lived in the middle of the 15th century A.D. He is said to have copied a manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa in 1452 A.D.³

46. VĀSUDEVA MIŚRA (ABOUT 1275 A.D.).

He was nephew and pupil of Jayadeva Miśra, and he wrote a commentary on the famous Tattva-cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, called Tattva-cintāmaṇi-tika in order to vindicate the work of his teacher, Jayadeva or Pakṣadhara Miśra.⁴ He is called Nyāya-sidhāntā-sārābhijña (versed in the quintessence of logical truth) in the colophon of his work.⁵ Being a nephew of Pakṣadhara he probably lived in the fourth quarter of the 13th century.

¹ R. Mitra, Notices V. p. 299, No. 1976, (प्रत्यक्षालोक). The date is written curiously, and runs thus:—शुभमस्तु शकाब्दा ॥ लसं १५०९ ॥ तें आवणस्य ६ ॥ Some think that 1509=159=*la sam* 159+1119=1278 A.D. But I think it probable that 1509=1509+78=1587 A.D., *la sam* means a year.

² It is traditionally known that Pakṣadhara was a contemporary of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Navadvīpa; and it is asserted by the Darbhanga Rajas that Mahēśa Ṭhakkura, from whom they trace their descent lived in 1556 A.D. during the time of Akbar; and that Śaṅkara Miśra was a disciple of Mahēśa Ṭhakkura. But the contrary evidence is equally strong. Rai Manmohan Chakraverti Bahadur fixes the date as given in the manuscripts of Pakṣadhara's Pratyakṣāloka to be Śāka *la sam* 159 or 1278 A.D. and Śaṅkara Miśra's Bhedaprakāśa as copied in Samvat 1519 or 1462 A.D. This date is accepted in this work.

³ बाणैर्वेद्युतैः सशम्भूनयनैः संख्यागते ज्ञायने ।

श्रीमद् गौडमहोदयतो गुरुदिने मार्गे च पचेसिते ॥

(A palm-leaf manuscript of Viṣṇupurāṇa from Mithilā, colophon).

⁴ जयदेवगुरोर्वाचि ये केचिदोषदर्शिनः ।

प्रबोधाय मया तेषां दौष्टौभूयाभिदीप्यते ॥

(Introductory verse).

⁵ इति न्यायसिद्धान्तसाराभिज्ञमिश्रविरचितपञ्चधरमिश्रभाट्टपुत्रन्यायसिद्धान्तसाराभिज्ञवासुदेव-
मिश्रविरचितायां चिन्तामणिटीकायाम्...

(Colophon of Anumānakhaṇḍa).

47. RUCIDATTA MIŚRA
(ABOUT 1275 A.D.).

He was a pupil of Pakṣadhara or Jaydeva Miśra.¹ His parents were named Devadatta and Reṇukā and he had two brothers named Śaktidatta and Matidatta.² The name of his family is given as Sodarapurakula.³

Two of his works are now extant: (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, a commentary on the famous work of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, (2) *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-prakāśa-makaranda*, a commentary on the commentary of Vardhamāna on the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya.

A Ms. copy of a portion of his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa* is said to be as old as 1370 A.D.⁴ He had the title *Mahāmahopādhyāya* added to his name. As a pupil of Pakṣadhara he may be placed in the fourth quarter of the 13th century A.D.

48. BHAGĪRATHA OR MEGHA THAKKURA
(ABOUT 1400 A.D.).

He was the second among the three elder brothers of Maheśa Thakkura and he was the author of a commentary, called *Jalada*, on the *Kusumāñjali-prakāśa* of Vardhamāna. It is also called *Kusumāñjali-prakāśa-prakāśikā*. Besides this, he prepared two other commentaries on Vardhamāna's work. They are (1) *Kiraṇāvali-prakāśa-prakāśikā*; (2) *(Nyāya)-lilāvati-prakāśa-vyākhyā*. He seems to have lived about 1400 A.D.

49. MAHEŚA THAKKURA.
(ABOUT 1400 A.D.).

He was born in Bhaur, 17 miles N.E. of Darbhanga on the Kamalā. He was son of Dhīrā and Candrapati,⁵ and younger

अधीत्य रुचिदत्तेन जयदेवाज्जगद्गुरोः ।

चिन्तामणौ ग्रन्थमणौ प्रकाशोऽयं प्रकाशते ॥

(*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, Introductory verse 2.)

श्रीदेवदत्ततनयो विनयोपगूढः

श्रीरेणुका विरलगर्भपुटोपजातः ।

श्रीशक्तिदत्तमतिदत्तसहोदरो यः

सोऽमुं चकार रुचिदत्तकृती प्रकाशम् ॥

(*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, Śabda-khaṇḍa, verse 2 at the end.,

³ इति श्रीसोदरपुरकुलसमुद्भूतमहाभट्टोपाध्यायश्रीरुचिदत्तविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणि प्रकाशे.....(Colophon of *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*. *Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*.)

⁴ See Peterson's Sixth Report, p. 76, No. 190.

⁵

जनकविषयजन्मा राजसम्मान पात्रं

brother of Mahādeva, Bhagīratha and Dāmodara.¹ He belonged to the Khandwāl family. He wrote a commentary called Darpaṇa on the Āloka of Pakṣadhara Miśra on Gangeśa's work, of which only the chapter on perception is extant. He was also the author of several Smṛti works, such as Tīrtha-cintāmaṇi.

His work on logic, the Darpaṇa, is held as an authority in Śaṅkara Miśra's Tri-sūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā.² He lived between Pakṣadhara and Śaṅkara or between 1270 and 1450 A.D.

One of his pupils, Raghunandanadāsa Rāya, was a great logician, who at the suggestion of Akbar went out to all quarters for discussion. Akbar, being pleased, installed him in the province of Mithilā, which he however made over to Maheśa Thakkura, his teacher as preceptor's fee (गुरुदक्षिणा). So the latter became a landholder and founder of the Darbhanga Raj family.

50. ŚAṅKARA MIŚRA
(1450 A.D.).

He was born in Sarisava in Darbhanga. He was the son of Bhavanātha Miśra, *alias* Ayācī Dube, who was eager to live on the bank of the Gangeś towards the close of his life, the Ganges being about 40 miles south of Darbhanga forming its southern boundary. He refers to his father's instructions in this introductory verses of several of his work³. He was nephew of Jīvanātha and pupil of Raghudeva Upādhyāya or Kaṇāda⁴ as of well as Maheśa Thakkura.

महि...धौराचन्द्रपत्योस्तनूजः ।

अवचयदनुमाना लोकमात्रित्य नित्य-

प्रमथित खलदपौ दर्पणं श्रीमहेशः ॥

(Anumānāloka-darpaṇa, verse 1 at the end)

1

ज्येष्ठा महादेवभगौरयदासीदरा यस्य वयोगुणाभ्याम् ।

(स) दर्पणं निर्मितवानसीषां सद्बोद्धरो विष्णुपरो महेशः ॥

(Anumānāloka-darpaṇa of Maheśa Thakkura, verse 2 at the end.)

2

प्रकाशदर्पणीद्योतकद्विर्व्याख्या दत्तोऽन्वया ।

तथापि योजनामात्रमुद्दिष्टायं समोऽयमः ॥

(Tri-sūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā, Introductory verse 2,)

Quoted by H. Śāstri, Notices, Vol. III, pp. 68-9, No. 136.

अधीतमश्यापितमार्जितं यशो

न शोचनीयं किमपीह भूतले ।

अतःपरं श्रीभवनाथ शर्मणो

मनोमनोहारिणि जाह्नवीतटे ॥

4

याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे सम्यग् व्युत्पादितोऽस्यहम् ।

कणादभवनाथाभ्यां ताभ्यां मम नमः सदा ॥

(Vaiśeṣika-Sūtropaskāra, Intro. verse.)

He was a contemporary of Narendrasimha Rāya. He was the author of various works on various subjects.

(1) Paṇḍita-vijaya, in which he speaks of himself thus :

बालोऽहं जगदानन्दः न मे बाला सरस्वती ।

अपूर्णे पञ्चमे वर्षे वर्णयामि जगन्मयम् ॥

- (2) Ātma-tattva-viveka-kalpa-latā, a commentary on Udayanācārya's polemical treatise.
- (3) Ānanda-vardhana, a commentary on Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, which is referred to in Pragalbhācārya's commentary thereon.
- (4) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work on Nyaya.
- (5) Tri-sūtri-nibhanda-vyākhyā, a commentary on the commentary of Udayanācārya on the first three sūtras of Gotama.
- (6) Nyāya-līlāvati-kaṇṭhābharāṇa, a commentary on the Nyāya-līlāvati of Vallabhācārya.
- (7) Bheda-prakāśa or Bheda-ratna-prakāśa, a criticism of the non-dualistic Vedānta. It is criticised in its turn in the Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka of Sarvajñātma-muni.
- (8) Gaurī-digambara-prahasana, a small comedy on the marriage of Śiva and Pārvati, which was played at the instance of his father.¹
- (9) Vaiśeṣika-sūtropaskāra, a popular commentary on the Kaṇāda-sūtras.
- (10) Vēdi-vinoda, contains a discussion on the categories of Nyāya.
- (11) Bauddha-dhikkāra-tikā.
- (12) Abheda-dhikkāra, a refutation of non-dualistic Vedānta.

Besides these, he wrote three important works on smṛti. He lived towards the close of the fifteenth century.

Śaṅkara must be older than 1462 A.D., in which year a MS. of the Bheda-prakāśa was copied. As Guru of the jurist Vardhamāna-Upādhyāya he cannot be much older than this time. He may be placed in the second and third quarters of the fifteenth century.

51. VĀCASPATI MIŚRA (THE YOUNGER OR JUNIOR) (ABOUT 1450 A.D.).

He is known as Abhinava Vācaspati Miśra. Though he is more famous as a smṛti-writer, yet he wrote ten works in philosophy, as he himself has said in his Pitr-bhakti-taraṅgiṇī. He flourished in Mithilā about 400 years ago, and was the Paṇḍit or court-officer of the kings Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra (who reigned in the third and fourth quarters of the fifteenth century).

¹ H. Śāstri, Notices, vol. III, p. 52, No. 83.

Of the ten works. four at least are traceable :—

- (1) *Anumāṇa-khaṇḍa-tika*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work, giving the substance of both the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā views.
- (2) *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍoddhāra*. It is, as the name implies, a commentary on Śrī Harṣa's famous criticism of the Nyāya-sūtras.
- (3) *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra*, a gloss on the Nyāya-sūtras.
- (4) *Śabda-nirṇaya*, a treatise on the nature of words.

No MS. has yet been found of this last work, but the name is known from his *smṛiti* work called *Dvaita-nirṇaya*.

52. MISARU MIŚRA (ABOUT 1475 A.D.).

He is the author of an original treatise on the Vaiśeṣika system, named *Padārtha-candra*. The work deals, as the name implies, with the seven categories. But the actual authorship of this work, like that of his work on *smṛiti* (the *Vivāda-candra*), is attributed to Lachimā Devī, who was the chief queen of Candrasimha¹, the younger step-brother of Bhairavasimha Deva. So it seems that our author flourished in the third quarter of the 15th century.

It is to be noted here that Misaruka, the author of the *Nyāya-dīpaka*, is a different person.

53. DURGĀDATTA MIŚRA (ABOUT 1550 A.D.).

He wrote the *Nyāya-bodhini*², an elementary work, on the first principles of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems combined. Though we have as yet no data to fix his exact time, it seems most probable that he flourished in the 16th century.

54. DEVANĀTHĀ THAKKURA (1562 A.D.).

He is the author of the *Tattva-cintāmanyāloka-parīśiṣṭa*, which, as the name implies, aimed at supplying the shortcomings of Jayadeva's *Āloka* on Gaṅgeśa's work. From the date of a copy

¹

श्रीचन्द्रसिंहवृत्तपतेर्दयिता लक्ष्मिमाम्हादेवी ।

रचयति पदार्थचन्द्रं मिसरुमिश्रोपदेशेन ॥

R. Mitra, Notices, IX, 12, No. 2901, introd. verse 2.

² R. Mitra, Notices, V, p. 84, No. 1764 and IX, p. 129, No. 3029: H. Śāstri Notices III, p. 75, No. 116.

of his work (*viz. la samvat* 443 or 1562 A.D.)¹ made by his order, it is ascertained that he must have lived in the third quarter of the 16th century.

55. MADHUSUDANA THAKKURA
(1575 A.D.).

He is the author of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka-kaṇṭhakoddhāra*,² a refutation of the hostile criticisms of Pakṣadhara in his *Āloka* on Gaṅgeśa's work.

His date must fall between that of the younger Vācaspati Miśra on whose *Dvāita-nirṇaya* he wrote another *Kaṇṭhakoddhāra* and *la samvat* 491 or 1610 A.D., the date of a Ms. of his work. Thus roughly speaking, he flourished in the third quarter of the 16th century.

56. THE NADIA SCHOOL
(1600—1800 A.D.).

The Nadia School of Nyāya flourished during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries under the great masters Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurānāth Tarkavāgiśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. They explained the *Tattva-chintamaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa in a critical way.

Before the Navadvīpa Naiyāyikas, the Mithilā Logicians stooped down. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and others made the language of Nyāya quite stereotyped and made the use of *avacchedaka* and *avacchinna* very extensive. Their pride and abnormal growth of critical faculty put the logicians of all other provinces into the shade. The principal logicians of Nadia School are mentioned below.

57. VĀSUDEVA SĀRVABHAUMA
(ABOUT 1450—1525 A.D.).

Vāsudeva was born at Nadia in the middle of the 15th century A.D. His father, Maheśvara Viśārada, gave him a sound education in Sanskrit grammar, literature and jurisprudence. With a view to prosecuting his studies in Logic (Nyāya), Vāsudeva, while about 25 years old, went to Mithilā, where he was admitted into the academy of Pakṣadhara Miśra, the foremost logician of the place at that time. After finishing his studies in Mithilā he was subjected to a difficult test called *Śalaka-parikṣa*, "probe-examination," in the course of which he had to explain any leaf of a manuscript that was pierced last by the probe as it was pushed into the manuscript. One by one he explained one hundred

¹ See R. Mitra, Notices, V, p. 84, No. 1764, IX, p. 129, No. 3029. See H. Śāstri, Notices, III, 75, No. 116.

² See Śāstri, Notices, III, p. 75, No. 116.

such leaves and his teacher was so much pleased that he conferred on him the title of Sārvabhauma.

Finding that the Professors of Mithilā did not allow outsiders to copy their works on Logic, Vāsudeva committed to memory the entire Tattva-cintāmaṇi and the metrical portion of the Kusumāñjalī, and, being afraid that his life would be in danger on the way back from Mithilā, he, on the pretext of coming to Nadia, went secretly to Benares where he studied for some years the Vedānta philosophy, returning home at the close of the 15th century A.D.

Having transcribed the above mentioned two works from memory Vāsudeva set up the first great academy of Logic in Nadia, where students flocked in large numbers. He had two distinguished pupils, viz. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the highest authority on modern Logic, and Chaitanya,¹ the founder of Vaisnavism in Bengal.

In his old age Vāsudeva is said to have accepted the Vaiṣṇava tenets preached by his pupil Caitanya. He passed the closing portion of his life in Orissa, where he was patronised by king Gajapati Pratāpa Rudra about 1520 A.D.² He was the author of a work on Logic called Sārvabhauma-nirukti, which is a commentary on Gangeśa.

Though an academy of Logic was thus for the first time opened outside Mithilā and schools of it gradually multiplied in the

¹ *Caitanya Caritāmṛta*, Madhya-līla, Chap. VI. Caitanya while beholding Jagannāth at Puri fell down senseless in consequence of his ecstasy. He was taken by Sārvabhauma to his house. He regained consciousness and Sārvabhauma asked him to be a student of Vedānta under him. Caitanya consented. After a course of studies for seven days Caitanya observed that the Vedānta Sūtras like the Upaniṣads were clear to him, but the commentaries of Śaṅkara as explained by Sārvabhauma, eclipsed the Sūtras. A discussion followed and Sārvabhauma became a convert to Vaiṣṇavism.

পূৰ্বে মহাপ্ৰভু সবে

চলিলা দক্ষিণে ।

প্রতাপরুদ্র রাজা

বোলাইল সার্বভৌমে ॥ Madhya-līla, X.

নৌমি নং গৌৰচন্দ্ৰং

যঃ কৃতকং কৰ্কশায়ম্ ।

সার্বভৌমং সৰ্ব্বভূমা

মন্তিভূমানামাশ্চরৎ ॥ *Ib.*, VI, 31.

² *Vide* Rajendra Lal Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit MSS., Vols. I—IX, L 2854 ; Śāstri X-XI.

heart of Bengal, all was not gained. It yet remained for the academies of Nadia to acquire a university character and authority. To procure that power for Nadia, it was necessary that a representative from it should vanquish the teachers of Mithilā in philosophical controversy. That honour it was reserved for the genius and patriotic perseverance of Raghunātha Śīromaṇi to win for his country.

58. RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMAṆI
(1477—1547 A.D.).

Raghunātha was born in Nadia about the year 1477 A.D. While he was about four years old he lost his father. His mother supported him with the greatest difficulty. When a boy of five years, Raghunātha once at the order of his mother had to fetch fire from the academy. He did not take with him any vessel for carrying the fire. Accordingly when a student in the academy offered him a spoonful of blazing charcoal, Raghunātha instantly picked up a handful of sand on which he asked the charcoal to be placed. Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, being astonished at his marvellous presence of mind and thinking that some extraordinary work was reserved to be done by him, took up the entire charge of maintaining and educating the boy. While Raghunātha began to learn the consonants he used to ask why *k* should precede *kh*, and his teachers had to explain to him the rules of phonetics and grammar along with the alphabet. After finishing grammar, literature, lexicon and jurisprudence Raghunātha began assiduously to study Logic under Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and discussed with him the knotty points of that branch of learning. He used sometimes to sit in deep meditation on problems of Logic under banyan trees in the neighbouring field, which he did not quit until his doubts were cleared. Soon he surpassed his teacher in many respects and demonstrated the worthlessness of the latter's commentary on Logic. To exact a charter for the academy of Nadiya to confer degrees, Raghunātha went with the permission of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma to Mithilā in the disguise of a pupil, and entered the academy of the famous teacher, Pakṣadhara Miśra, who was still alive. Raghunātha who was blind of one eye was ridiculed by the students of the academy: "Indra is thousand-eyed, Siva is three-eyed, all others are two-eyed, verily why art thou one-eyed?"

However, getting admittance into the academy, Raghunātha very soon demonstrated his own worth and was promoted to the highest class. The teacher found him a hard pupil to deal with, and many were the controversies the brilliant pupil carried on with him. Matters soon came to a crisis. One day in the course of a hot and protracted disputation before all the numerous students and doctors, the renowned teacher, foiled and exasperat-

ed, insulted his brilliant pupil-polemic with the savagery of a schoolman. Raghunātha's nature rebelled against the treatment he had received—treatment undeserved by him and unworthy of the teacher. Brooding in silence over his wrongs, Raghunātha's proud nature proposed vengeance on his adversary, teacher now no longer. That very night, armed with a drawn sword, he went and hid himself in Pakṣadhara's house. At midnight, thinking the moment opportune, he went up the stairs and looking about descried Pakṣadhara lounging on the terrace with his wife at his side. Raghunātha hesitated in his fell purpose. It was a most glorious night in autumn when the full moon was shining in all her glory. The sky was serene and transparent and all nature was hushed. All were happy save the two unfortunate logicians—one brooding sadly on the imminent loss of his reputation and the other sorely anxious to achieve glory for himself. The young would-be murderer was perplexed for a while but instantly rushed in fury from his hiding place towards the couple. Suddenly he stopped. He was no hardened old sinner. He paused to listen. As the teacher and his wife were gazing at the full moon, the wife admired her beauty and asked her husband saying: "My lord, is there anything as bright as this grand queen of the night?" The teacher replied: "There is one thing, my dear, which is quite as bright, even more so; I was all the evening thinking of such a thing; there has come from Bengal a young logician who has for some time been a difficulty at Mithilā. He has this morning vanquished me by an obstinately conducted argument. His intellect in my opinion is more luminous than the full-moon herself." Raghunātha overheard this conversation. The sword fell from his involuntarily opened palm and he came and fell at the feet of his startled teacher. Pakṣadhara forgave him and embraced him warmly and on the next morning before the entire academy confessed himself beaten by the young Bengali logician. This confession in fact entitled Raghunātha to confer degrees. His triumph took place about the year 1514 A.D., from which the foundation of the university of Nadia is reckoned. On his return he established a college at Nadia.

The above story¹ is traditional only, but some particulars that he was blind of one eye are confirmed by contemporaneous writers.²

¹ This story about Raghunath Śiromaṇi and Pakṣadhara is widely known in this country. It appeared in "Mookerjee's Magazine," New series, Vol. 1, 1872, kindly lent to me by Babu Sanjib Chandra Sanyal. But depending on the date of manuscripts ascertained from the manuscripts themselves, we find that Raghunath and Pakṣadhara were not contemporaries.

² अभास्यं गौडदेशस्य यत्र काणः शिरोमणिः ।

(Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khāḍya, leaf 43; ms. in possession of Vijayadharma or Dharmavijaya Sūri.)

Yasovijaya in another place speaks of Raghunātha as follows :—

“The ocean of Logic is hard to approach owing to the uproar of waves of the Dīdhiti-commentary (of Śiromaṇi); yet is not the water of that ocean capable of being drunk by our cloud-like genius ? ”¹

Raghunātha must be earlier than 1602 A.D. in which year a manuscript of Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma's sub-commentary on his Anumāna-dīdhiti was copied. He must have lived at the close of the 15th century and beginning of the 16th century when Caitanya lived. He died about 1547 A.D. at the age of 70 years.

- (1) His foremost work is Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti. It is a critical commentary on the Tattva-cintāmaṇi of Gangeśa Upādhyāya. In this work Raghunātha calls himself “the crest-gem of logicians” (Tārkika-śiromaṇi). Elsewhere he is called crest-gem (Śiromaṇi). Mss. of this work are found all over India. It was commented upon by many writers, at least a dozen and half, of whom the majority came from provinces outside Bengal.

His other works are :—

- (2) Bauddha-dhikkāra-śiromaṇi (which is a commentary on the Ātma-tattva-viveka of Udayanāchārya).
- (3) Padārtha-tattva-nirupāṇam or Padārtha-khaṇḍa.
- (4) Kirāṇavali-prakāśa-dīdhiti.
- (5) Nyāya-līlāvati-prakāśa-dīdhiti (or °vistārikā).
- (6) Avacchedakatva-nirukti, an original treatise.
- (7) Nañvāda.²
- (8) Ākhyāta-vāda.³
- (9) Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya-dīdhiti.

59. HARIDĀSA NYĀYĀLAŅKĀRA BHATṬĀCĀRYA (1480—1540 A.D.).

Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra was a pupil of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, and therefore lived about 1520 A.D.

Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra must be older than Śaka 1521, or 1599 A.D., in which year a ms. of his Maṇyāloka-ṭīppaṇi (śabda) was copied. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā, a commentary on Udayana's Kusumāñjali verses.

¹

न्यायानुदीधितिकारयुक्तिकलोलकोलाहलदुर्विमाहः ।

, तस्यापि पातुं न पयः समर्थः किं नाम धौमत् प्रतिभाम्बुवाहः ॥

(Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa, leaf 82, ms. of Vijayadharmasūri and Indravijaya Sūri.)

² Published in the Chowkhamba Series.

³ Published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.

- (2) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work.
 (3) *Maṇyāloka-tippaṇī* (or *vyākhyā*), a sub-gloss on Jayadeva's commentary, the *Āloka*.

In the Śāṅkara Matha of Puri there is a copy of the second work prepared during 1599, 1600 and 1607 A.D.¹

60. JĀNAKĪNĀTHA ŚARMĀ
 (1550 A.D.).

He wrote the *Nyāya-śiddhānta-mañjarī*, an elementary treatise on the four kinds of proof. Probably it was composed in 1550 A.D. This work mentions Śivāditya Miśra, Murāri Miśra and Cintāmaṇi. He has been commented upon a dozen times. He is called Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi or Nyāya-cūḍāmaṇi.

61. KAṆĀDA TARKAVĀGĪŚA
 (ABOUT 1560 A.D.).

According to tradition Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi were co-pupils of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. In the introductory verse of *Bhāṣā-ratnam* Kaṇāda salutes one Cūḍāmaṇi. Is this Jānakinath Cūḍāmaṇi? In that case Kaṇāda's date falls about 1560 A.D.

Kaṇāda wrote the following works:—

- (1) *Maṇi-vyākhyā*,² a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*.
 (2) *Bhāṣā-ratnam*, on the seven Categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.
 (3) *Āpa-śabda-khaṇḍanam*, another Vaiśeṣika work.³

62. RĀMAKRṢṆA BHATṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTI
 (ABOUT 1560 A.D.).

Hall says that he was the son of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. He himself calls Śiromaṇi his Guru⁴ or preceptor. He must be older

1

शके त्रिगुणविशिष्टचक्षुषाभिनाये
 कन्दर्परायपदवीक इदं लिखेत् ।

(Quoted in *Navadvīpa-mahimā*).

² For the *Maṇi-vyākhyā*, see R. Mitra, *Notices IV*, p. 167, *Sans. Coll. Cat. III*, p. 327, No. 582 (Śaka 1705); and H. Śāstri, *Notices V*, p. 13, No. 14. For the *Bhāṣā-ratna*, see R. Mitra, *Notices IV*, p. 119, No. 1531, intro. verse 1:—

चूडामणिपदाम्नीजधमरौभूतमौलिना ।

संक्षिप्तं त्रीकणादेन भाषारत्नं वितन्यते ॥ १ ॥

For No. 3, See Peterson's *Sixth Report*, p. 74, No. 773.

³ For some traditional account of Kaṇāda, see H. Śāstri's *Introduction to his Notices*, Vol. I, p. xviii.

⁴ *Ind. Off. Cat. No. 2068*, introd. verse 2;

than 1603 A.D., the date of a manuscript of his *Guṇa-Śiromaṇi-prakāśa*. He in all probability flourished in 1560 A.D. He was the author of *Guṇa-śiromaṇi-prakāśikā*¹ and possibly also of *Nyāya-dīpikā*.

63. MATHURĀNĀTHA TARKAVĀGĪŚA.
(ABOUT 1570 A.D.).

Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa lived about 1570 A.D.² His father, Sri Rāma Tarkālaṅkāra³, was a pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Mathuranātha, who was a pupil of Sri Rāma Tarkālaṅkāra as well as of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, wrote numerous valuable commentaries on Logic which are known under the general name of *Māthuri*. They are very lucid and easy, and for this reason are not much appreciated by the scholars of Nadia. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi rahasya*.⁴ This work is familiarly known in Bengal as *Phakkikā* or *Māthuri*.
- (2) *Tattvacintāmaṇy āloka-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka*.
- (3) *Didhiti-rahasya*.
- (4) *Siddhānta-rahasya*.
- (5) *Kiraṇāvali-prakāśa-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Vardhamāna's work.
- (6) *Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa*.
- (7) *Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-didhiti-rahasya*.
- (8) *Bauddha-dhikkāra-rahasya*.
- (9) *Ayur-daya-bāvanā*.
- (10) (?) *ādi-kriya-viveka*.

Mathurānātha mentions *Sundara Upādhyāya* and *Harinātha Upādhyāya*, but nothing is known about these.

(?) यन्मूलमेव सुकृतानि तथोः कृतानि
व्यासादयः सदसि नित्यमुदाहरन्ति ।
तस्मात्तदं गुणविवेचनमाकलय
ब्रूते शिरोमणिगुरोरिह रामकृष्णः ॥ १ ॥

¹ Ind. Off. Cat., No. 2069.

² Vide Notices of Sanskrit Mss. in Bengal, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. xvi.

³ The beginning of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-rahasya* runs thus :—

न्यायान्वयिभिरुक्तैस्तु हेतुं श्रीराममखिलसम्पत्तेः ।
तानि चिमुवनगीतं तर्कालङ्कारमादराञ्जला ॥ १ ॥
श्रीमता मथुरानाथ तर्कवागीश श्रीमता ।
विशदीकृत्य दर्शयन्ते प्रत्यक्षमणिफल्गिका ॥ २ ॥

⁴ This work has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.

64. KRṢṆADĀSA SĀRVABHAUMA BHATṬĀCĀRYA
(ABOUT 1575 A.D.)

Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma was older than 1602 A.D., when the manuscript of his *Anumāna-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī*¹ was composed. As the note differs in reading the dīdhiti he must be considerably later than Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Roughly speaking, he flourished in 1575 A.D. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's commentary.
- (2) *Anumānāloka-prasāriṇī*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka* (*Anumāna-khaṇḍa*).

65. GUṆĀNANDA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1570 A.D.).

He has been criticized by the Jaina logician, Yasovijaya Gani² (1608—1688 A.D.), in his *Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khāḍya*. Guṇānanda must be older than 1622 A.D., in which year a manuscript of his *Guṇavivṛti-viveka* was copied. He was considerably later than Raghunātha Śiromaṇi whose works he commented on, and he may be placed roughly at about 1570 A.D. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) *Anumāna-dīdhiti-viveka*.
- (2) *Ātma-tattva-viveka-dīdhiti-ṭīkā*.
- (3) *Guṇa-vivṛti-viveka*.
- (4) *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-viveka*.³
- (5) *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti-viveka*.
- (6) *Śabdāloka-viveka*.

66. RĀMABHADRA SĀRVABHAUMA
(ABOUT 1680 A.D.).

Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī praises his father's teachings as better than those contained in

¹ This work is being printed in the Bib. Ind. Series ; for No. 2 see p. 8 :—

विचारस्तु अनुमानालोकप्रसारिणामनुसन्धेयः ।

² Guṇānanda is mentioned by Yasovijaya in his *Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khāḍya*, leaves 2, 11, 56, 70, 80. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Yasovijaya Gani* (1910,) p. 468.

³ He was the author of *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-viveka*, which begins :—

नमः कर्म्मणिष्ठिते वेदप्रामाण्यहेतवे
निरस्ताखिलबाधाय प्रमात्रे विश्वकर्म्मणे ॥
गुणानन्देन विदुषा विश्वार्थे प्रतिपक्षिकं
विविचक्रे प्रयत्नेन कुसुमाञ्जलिकारिकाः ॥

the Prakāśa and the Makaranda.¹ From his famous *tol* were produced such learned scholars as Jayarāma Nyāya-pañcānana and Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra. He is older than 1613 A.D.², when, a manuscript of his Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa was copied. He was later than Raghunātha. He probably flourished in 1680 A.D. He was the author of the following works:—

- (1) Dīdhiti-ṭikā.
- (2) Nyāya-rahasya.
- (3) Guṇa-rahasya.
- (4) Nyāya-kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā.
- (5) Padārtha-viveka-prakāśa, a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's Padārtha-khaṇḍana.
- (6) Sat-cakra-krama-dīpikā.

67. JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLANKĀRA (ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra was the fourth in descent from Sanātana Mīśra, the father-in-law of the famous Caitanya. As Caitanya was born in 1485 A.D., Sanātana must have lived about the same time. Allowing 30 years for each generation, we find that Jagadīśa was born about 1605 A.D. The date of his literary activity may be approximately fixed at about 1635 A.D. This date agrees well with the fact that a work of his named Kāvya-prakāśa-rahasya was copied by a pupil of his in Śaka 1599 or 1657 A.D.

Jagadīśa was a naughty boy in his early years. At the age of 18 years he began to learn the alphabet under an ascetic. Thereupon he entered the academy of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, where he finished his studies in Logic. Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra calls himself the pupil of a Sārvabhauma,³ who should be identified with Rāmaḥadra Sārvabhauma, as Jagadīśa quotes his Nyāya-rahasya with the remark that it was his Guru's.⁴ Jagadīśa

¹ The Kusumāñjali-vyākhyā, Sans. Coll. Ms. Cat. III. 318, intro. verses and 3:—

भवानीभवनाथाभ्यां पिबभ्यां प्रणमाम्यहं ।
यत्प्रसादादिदं शास्त्रं करचौरोपमं कृतम् ॥ २ ॥
मकरन्दप्रकाशे या व्याख्या मलिनकोऽथवा ।
ततोऽधिकां पितुर्वाङ्मनाऽप्युक्तमयमुद्यमः ॥ ३ ॥

² Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p. 241, No. 399, final colophon.

इति श्रीरामभद्र सार्वभौमकृतपदार्थतत्त्वविवेचनप्रकाशः समाप्तः ॥
संवत् १६७० समये आश्विनशुक्लद्वादश्यां लिखितमिदं पुस्तकं परोपकारार्थम् ॥

³ The Maṇi-mayūkha, Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p. 324, No. 575, intro. verse 2:

सार्वभौमस्य गुरोः पदाङ्गं विद्यार्थिनाथ कल्पतरुः प्रणम्य ।
विनिर्दिष्टं श्रीजगदीशविज्ञैर्विद्योत तामाद्यमणैर्मयुखः ॥ २ ॥

⁴ For his Guru's work, see the Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, Cal. ed., p. 25:—

इति पुनर्न्यायरहस्ये अक्षरवचरणाः ।

Tarkālaṅkāra was older than 1631 A.D., the date of a copy of his manuscript of Tarkāmṛta. As he was a pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, his date falls about 1625 A.D.

He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā, familiarly known as Jāgidiśī.¹
- (2) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha, a commentary directly on Gaṅgesa's works, of which only portions have survived.
- (3) Nyāyādarśa or Nyāya-sārāvalī, dealing with the doctrine of causality.
- (4) Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā on the force of words, etc., a grammatico-philosophical treatise.²
- (5) Tarkāmṛta.
- (6) Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭikā or Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya.
- (7) Nyāya-līlāvatī-dīdhiti-vyākhyā.

68. ŚABDA-ŚAKTI-PRAKĀŚIKĀ (ELUCIDATION OF THE POWER OF WORDS).

In illustration of Jagadīśa's style of argument, I give below an English translation of the first five couplets of the Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā. This will give some idea of the *śabda*, verbal knowledge, as explained by Jagadīśa :—

VERBAL KNOWLEDGE (*śabda-bodha*).

1. The Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā, delighting the learned, is composed by Jagadīśa, who was versed in debate as well as in the dogmas.
2. The goddess Sarasvatī who is gracious and approaches all persons and is able to fulfil their ends, makes herself manifest immediately, when she is worshipped.

or,

Words, which possess the three requisites of mutual interdependence, juxtaposition and compatibility in their signification, become at once a means of knowledge to any man who hears them.³

3. Knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified by correspondent words is neither perception nor inference, being limited in its scope.

4. Word or verbal testimony is the knowledge of the mutual connection of things signified (presented) by correspondent words. This knowledge is neither perception nor inference, for, in the case of

¹ Published in the Chowkhamba series.

² Printed in Calcutta (Saka 1769) and in Benares; later (1918) by the Calcutta University.

³ This verse is capable of this double meaning.

perception, knowledge of things is derived through the contact of sense and in the case of inference through consideration (recognition of sign). Such is not the case here. Here arises the knowledge only of those things which are signified by corresponding words.

In the case of verbal testimony there is (1) the hearing of words, then (2) there is the recollection of things signified by the words, *e.g.* *ghato'sti*. Here from *ghaṭa* + *su* + *as* + *ti*, there is recollection of *ghaṭa* a pot, *su* one, *as* existing and *ti* abode; (3) there is knowledge of the mutual connection of the four things thus recollected, i.e. *ghaṭa* (pot) as the abode of oneness and existence. This is verbal knowledge, testimony or word.

Then there is mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*) of the knowledge thus: I am the possessor of the verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa*, as an abode of oneness and existence.

Some may say that verbal knowledge is simply the recollection of things signified by words. This is impossible, for there cannot be any recollection of the mutual connection of things if there was no perception of the mutual connection of those things. Hence it is necessary to admit an extra means of knowledge, namely, "verbal knowledge."

Verbal knowledge is not inference; compatibility pertains to things, whereas correspondence pertains to words. These two combined together do not abide in any one thing, and cannot therefore be the cause (sign) in an inference. Each one of these separately too cannot be the cause, for compatibility can abide in non-correspondent words where there is no verbal knowledge. Correspondence does not abide in things at all and cannot therefore be the cause in an inference.

There is a cow: hearing this expression we may, according to a modern Vaiśeṣika, make the following inference:—

The Vaiśeṣika position.	A cow is existent, because it is recollected by words conducive to the knowledge of the mutual connection between itself and existence, just like a pot.

Or we may say: A cow is existent because it is recollected by the word *go* connected with existence, just as an eye.

If we can thus draw knowledge of the expression by means of inference, what is the necessity for admitting a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony?

Naiyāyika's reply.	In verbal testimony the recollection of things signified by words is the cause (sign); but not the knowledge of things recollected by words. In inference the knowledge of sign is the cause. Therefore, where we have such knowledge as "the word <i>cow</i> is not the thing of which I am reminded by the word <i>cow</i> connected with the word

existence," we can draw (from the expression *there is a cow*) verbal knowledge but *not* inference, because there is no knowledge of the sign (middle term, reminding us of the connection of *cow* and *existence*) in the abode.

That is, where we have no previous knowledge of a cow as connected with existence, we can on hearing, "there is a cow", draw verbal knowledge, but not inference, because the knowledge of a cow as connected with existence is not recollected by me, not having seen *cow* and *existence* together previously. Therefore verbal testimony is a means of knowledge different from inference.

Inference cannot serve the purpose of verbal knowledge so far as mental perception of the knowledge (अनुभवसाध) is concerned. *There is a cow*: by this expression we first draw knowledge of the mutual connection of *cow* and *existence* (in the form: *a cow exists*), and then we have mental perception of the knowledge as: I hear that a cow exists. If you say that this form of mental perception is wrong and that verbal knowledge is really included in inference, I may say, as there is no fixed rule, that inference is included in verbal knowledge. Just as you incorporate verbal knowledge in inference by contriving a general proposition on the recollection of things through words, I shall include inference too in verbal knowledge by postulating correspondence between words recollected by things.

In an inference where the thing signified by the major term is unfamiliar, knowledge of the general proposition (major premise) is derived by means of a heterogeneous example, *e.g.* "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire." This inference is carried on by a heterogeneous example, thus: "whatever has smoke has fire, as a hill." Here the knowledge of the major term, *viz.* the thing signified by "no smoke" (absence of smoke) did not exist before the inference was drawn, hence there was no knowledge of the word "no smoke" (absence of smoke) as also there was no knowledge of the thing of which it was a sign. Consequently the knowledge derived from the expression, "the lake has not smoke because it has not fire", is not drawn through verbal testimony but through inference. Therefore inference is to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge.

It is true there was no knowledge of the thing signified by the major term, but the *word* of which the thing was a sign could be recollected by means of an association. Hence there is no necessity for admitting inference as a separate source of knowledge.

All verbal testimony cannot be included in inference. The

Reply 1. expression "being different from a *pot*" affords the verbal knowledge (testimony) of the form: "possessing distinction as counterpart of a *pot*."

This knowledge cannot be drawn from inference, for inference cannot take place where there is no minor term, as here. Hence it is necessary to admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony.

If you say that the knowledge can be drawn from inference thus: the distinction is counterpart of a pot as it is recollected by another word correspondent with the same distinction. This is absurd, for the inference merely affords knowledge of distinction which is counterpart of the pot, but not of the thing which possesses the distinction. But, if you admit a separate means of knowledge named verbal testimony, then the peculiar knowledge of the expression can be easily drawn from correspondence, etc.

“Being different from a pot”: here *different* may, by a secondary application (अनुव्यवसाय), refer to anything other than a pot, i.e., non-pot.

Objection. As a single word cannot afford any verbal knowledge, we may form connection with any other word, such as a “cloth.” Consequently now we can make the inference of this form: “a cloth is non-pot.”

If you say so, statements arrive at absurdity, e.g. if the word “different” itself could afford the knowledge of “non-pot,” the words “from a

Reply. pot” would be useless. Similarly, if in the expression “there is (exists) a pot,” a pot itself, by a secondary application, could afford the knowledge of “an existing pot,” the word “is” (exists) would be useless.

Consciousness that it is the assertion of a competent person, is the cause of verbal knowledge. Knowledge of an expression is based on the belief that the expression is that of a competent person.

Opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas.

On hearing the expression “there is a pot”—a listener can derive verbal knowledge only if he is conscious that it is the expression of a competent person, otherwise not; or, in other words, the consciousness that a certain expression is that of a competent person precedes verbal knowledge. Now if the conclusion (*viz.*, that there is a pot) thus precedes verbal knowledge and there is no desire for drawing an inference, there cannot be any. Consequently it is to be admitted that verbal knowledge is a separate means of knowledge. Also that verbal knowledge is not right knowledge, for right knowledge concerns itself with things which are unknown, but not with things which are known to the competent person. Therefore verbal knowledge is not right knowledge.

If right knowledge does not concern itself with things already known, then in the case of a series

Objection. of perceptions right knowledge cannot abide in the series beginning with the second perception. For the

thing already known by the first perception is the object of knowledge at the second perception.

Right knowledge which concerns itself with things unknown is the correct knowledge which is different from that which is produced after knowledge of the same form in a series.

Reply. In the case of a series of perceptions, the series beginning with the second perception was produced no doubt after the first perception, but the first perception did not follow any. Therefore the first as well as the following perceptions are right knowledge. This rejects recollection as right knowledge, for all recollection takes place after a previous perception. Then verbal knowledge is also not right knowledge, for that succeeds a knowledge of the same form or kind, *viz.* the consciousness that it is the assertion of a competent person.

5. The belief that something has been asserted by a competent person cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge, because it depends on the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence remains really unknown before verbal knowledge occurs. And verbal knowledge occurs even when there is doubt as to whether a certain assertion is that of a competent person. If the cause of verbal knowledge was the belief that something was the assertion of a competent person who was aware of the meaning of a sentence as signifying connection of one thing with another thing, then verbal knowledge could not be inference as the knowledge of the conclusion preceded the same. In fact it is not necessary that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence should precede verbal knowledge. Otherwise the Vedic text which is a competent assertion would be a mere reiteration, not being a source of right knowledge because it would indicate what was already known. Therefore the belief in the assertion of a competent person is not the cause of verbal knowledge.

The belief, *viz.* it is the assertion of a competent person, is the cause of verbal knowledge which is derived from human speech, but not of that verbal knowledge which is derived from the Vedic text. Then the Veda will not be devoid of authority.

Objection. It is cumbrous to suppose that consciousness of the assertion of a competent person is the cause in one place but not in the other. This difference of hypothesis is unnecessary. The belief that it is the assertion of a competent person is not the cause of verbal knowledge, because that knowledge takes place even where there is doubt of the connection of one thing with another or where there is doubt that a certain expression is the assertion of a competent person.

Answer.

In verbal knowledge, even if the assertion of a competent

Objection.

person is not the cause, context must be admitted to be the cause. Otherwise the word *ghaṭa* would have afforded the verbal knowledge, viz., "an object connected with *ghaṭa*", even though we had not the belief that it was pronounced with the desire of expressing the same. Hence we must admit that, in ascertaining the meaning of expression *ghaṭa*, we must have knowledge of the context (intention) of the form: "it was pronounced, with the intention of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*." Hence verbal knowledge is not inference, because the true meaning of the expression is contained in the context, and so conclusion precedes the so-called inference, which is absurd.

Even if knowledge of the context was the cause of verbal

Answer.

knowledge, the true meaning of the expression (viz., one thing as connected or qualified by another thing) is not contained in the former when there is the knowledge, viz., the word *ghaṭa* is not pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*, even if there be verbal knowledge of *ghaṭa* (viz., an object specified as *ghaṭa*); because there is knowledge of context of the form, it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as "knowable." But this does not take place; wherefore knowledge of context of the form: "it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object specified as *ghaṭa*" must be admitted as the cause of the verbal knowledge of an object specified as *ghaṭa*. Now, the true meaning is not contained in the knowledge of the context. Therefore there is no harm in admitting an inference beyond verbal knowledge.

The word *saindhava* in the expression "bring *saindhava*" would indicate salt and not a horse if the expression is used at the hour of meal. Hence the cause of such verbal knowledge is admitted to be the knowledge of context of the form: "This word *saindhava* has been pronounced with the desire of indicating salt." That knowledge of context arises from knowledge of the particular occasion, such as that of meal, etc. Therefore in regard to verbal knowledge we may take knowledge of the occasion as the cause but not an extra cause named knowledge of context. If you say that knowledge of occasion is not comprehensive, hence knowledge of context should be adopted as being comprehensive, it would also be absurd, for knowledge of context too is non-comprehensive.

Suppose the belief: "it is pronounced with the desire of expressing an object called *ghaṭa*", exists elsewhere in the word *ghaṭam*, but not in the word which is heard now; or there exists in it the belief: "it is not pronounced with the desire of

expressing an object called *ghaṭa*”; and suppose the belief, “it is,” exists in the word *ghaṭam* which existed at another time, but not in the one which exists now, in such cases there is no verbal knowledge. Therefore each expression must be taken as indicating an object called *ghaṭa* which exists at the time of the expression. Hence owing to the expressions being different on different occasions, knowledge of context becomes different. Therefore we may rather admit knowledge of occasion as the cause, but not knowledge of context.

Knowledge of context must be admitted as the cause of verbal knowledge, because where there is uncertainty or absence of knowledge of context there is no verbal knowledge. Moreover knowledge of context is the regulator of the knowledge of one meaning where a word admits of different meanings, and is the establisher of secondary meaning.

Therefore if knowledge of context is the cause of verbal knowledge, then the meaning of an expression having already been contained in the context, the conclusion is presupposed there. Therefore verbal knowledge is not inference. Though verbal knowledge is different from inference, it is not right knowledge because there is no “knowing what was unknown.”

Knowledge of context is not the cause of verbal knowledge.

Naiyāyikas' reply. A poet uses a word in one sense, while a thoughtful person may take it in a different sense, though the poet had no knowledge of context in that sense. A parrot which has no knowledge of context utters words which produce verbal knowledge in us.

In the complete ‘set’ the author has said that verbal knowledge is produced by correspondent words. But it should be added that verbal knowledge arises from significant corresponding words. Now he gives the definition and division of significant words.

A certain word is significant in a certain sense, if that word with the association of another word produces verbal knowledge of the thing which is presented by its own power or by the power of its marks. Significant words are of three kinds: crude word, suffix and indeclinable. In the expression *paṭaḥ* (पटः), the word (पट) *paṭa* in association with the suffix *su* (सु) produces verbal knowledge of the form पटः (cloth) as possessing oneness, i.e. one piece of cloth.

69. RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI.

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and grandson of Vidyāvācaspati¹ who had been honoured by the

¹ Vidyāvāchaspati is named as a smṛtic writer in Raghunandana's Durgotsava tattva.

king of Gauḍa. Viśvanāthā Siddhāntapañcānana was his younger brother, and Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravartī was his son. By order of his father, Vidyānivāsa, copies of the *Kalpa-taru*, the smṛtic digest of Lakṣmīdhara (Naiyatakālika and Dāna-khaṇḍas) were copied in Śaka 1510 or 1558 A.D. His time is further fixed by the poem composed in honour of Bhāvasīmha, whose father, Mānasīmha, was governor of Bengal, from the 38th to the 50th year of Akbar's reign or from 1593 to 1605 A.D. Rudra must therefore have lived at the beginning of the 17th century. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati should be distinguished from Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa, grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa whose philosophical treatise is often called *Raudrī*. Rudra Nyāyavāchaspati was the author of the following works :—

- (1) *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-parīkṣā*.
- (2) *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-vivṛti-parīkṣā*.
- (3) *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā*.
- (4) *Bhāva-vilāsa*, a poem in praise of the prince Bhāvasīmha, a son of Mānasīmha, the Rājput Governor of Bihar and Bengal.
- (5) *Bhramara-dūtam*.
- (6) *Vṛndāvana-vinoda-kāvya*.

70. JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Jayarāma was a pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvābhauma¹. His title Nyāyapañcānana is sometimes shortened into Pañcānana.

Jayarāma, with Devanātha Tarkapañcānana, is mentioned as an authority in the rhetorical *Eka-śaṣṭhyalaṅkāra-prakāśa*, and in the *Alaṅkāra-sāra-sthiti* of Bhīmasena Dīkṣita², composed in Samvat 1712 during the rule of Ajitasīmha in Jodhpur. He is older than 1659 A.D., the year in which the *Padārthamālā* was composed. As pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvābhauma, he lived about 1700 A.D.

He was patronised by Rājā Rāmkrṣṇa of Krishnagar who obtained from the Pandits of Nadia the hereditary title of Nava-

¹ The *Anumāna-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 620, No. 7900, and Peterson's Sixth Report, p. 15) introd. verse :—

श्रीविश्वेश्वरेश्वरमङ्गलसुखं भूयोऽभिवन्द्यादरान्
बुध्नीधाय च रामभद्रचरणद्वन्द्वारविन्दद्वयम् ।
गूढज्ञानघनारतामविषयप्रदोधिनीदीधितिम्
तस्माच्छ्रीजयराम एव तनुते गूढार्थविद्योतनम् ॥ १ ॥

² Madras Catalogue, No. 43037, introd. verse 2 :—

शक्तिर्न शक्तिवादस्याख्या या सूक्तडासत्तौ ।
शरणं जयरामगुरोश्चरणं स्मरणस्य सन्निधीकरणम् ।

dvipādhipati (Lord of Nadia). Jayarāma's Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā was composed in Samvat 1750 or 1693 A.D.

He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-gudhārtha-vidyotana, a sub-commentary on Śiromaṇi's Dīdhiti.
- (2) Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka-viveka, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's Āloka.
- (3) Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā, a commentary on sūtras 4 to 7 of Gotama's Nyāya-sūtra.
- (4) Sabdārtha-mālā, on śabda or words.

And in Vaiśeṣika—

- (5) Guṇa-dīdhiti-vivṛti, a sub-sub-commentary on the Dīdhiti, the sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary on Udayanācārya's Kiraṇāvali.
- (6) Nyāya-kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā, a commentary on Udayanācārya's Kārikās or verses.
- (7) Padārtha-maṇi-mālā, or Padārtha-māla, an original treatise examining the Vaiśeṣika categories. It was the best known of his works and was commented upon by Janārdaṇa Vyāsa and Laugākṣi Bhāskara.

And in rhetoric :—

- (8) Kāvya-prakāśā-tilaka, a philosophical commentary on the rhetorical work of Mammata.

71. GAURĪKĀNTA SĀRVABHAUMA (ABOUT 1725 A.D.).

Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma was born in the northern part of Gaur¹ and got favours from the king for composing many nibandhas. He was older than 1714 A.D., the date of a manuscript of his Ānanda-laharī-tarī. He was later than Tāntrika Pūrṇānanda whose Shyama Rahasya is quoted in the said Tari and who wrote the Śākta-krama in 1571 A.D. Gaurikānta must have flourished in the first quarter of the 17th century A.D. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Bhāvārtha-dīpikā, a commentary on the Tarkabhāṣā of Keśava Miśra.
- (2) Sad-yukti-muktāvali.

¹ The Ānanda-laharī-tarī (R. Mitra, Notices VII, p. 245, No. 2490), endorse and colophon :—

यो नानाविधशक्तकनिपुणश्चक्रे निबन्धान् बहून्
पूजां भूरिमहोभूजां सदसि यो लेभेऽतिभीमान् कविः ।
यो गौडीतरदैशदियाज इह औ सार्वभौमो महान्
महाचार्य इमां स एष विदधे टीकां सुदे बाग्विदां ॥ १ ॥

- (3) Ānanda-laharī-tarī.
- (4) Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana-viṭikā.

72. BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

Bhavānanda, as a preceptor of Rāghavendra, must be a generation older than the latter. Rāghavendra was a contemporary of Kṛpārāma favoured by the Delhi Emperors Jehāngīr and Shāh-jehān. Bhavānanda must have lived in the first quarter of the 17th century. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā, familiarly known as Bhavānandī.
- (2) Pratyak-āloka-śāra-mañjarī.
- (3) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā.
- (4) Kāraka-vivecana.

73. HARIRĀMA TARKAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1625 A.D.).

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa is sometimes called Tarkālaṅkāra, Tarkālaṅkāra-vāgīśa and Nyāyalaṅkāra-tarkavāgīśa. He was the teacher of Raghudeva Nyāyalaṅkāra and of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. He must be older than 1654 A.D., the date of a manuscript of his Vāda-buddhi-vicāra, a section of his Tattvā-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā. As a teacher of Raghudeva, he might be placed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā-vicāra.
- (2) Ācārya-mata-rahasya-vicāra.
- (3) Ratna-koṣa-vicāra or vāda as it is sometimes named.
- (4) Sva-prākāśa-rahasya-vicāra or Bhaṭṭa-mata-siddhānta-vicāra.

74. VIŚVANĀTHA SIDDHĀNTAPAÑCĀNANA
(ABOUT 1634 A.D.).

Viśvanātha was the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and a younger brother of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya. He composed his Bhāṣāpariccheda in 1634 A.D. He was the writer of the following works :—

- (1) Alaṅkāra-pariṣkāra.
- (2) Nañ-vāda-ṭikā.
- (3) Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti.¹

¹ Published under the authority of the General Committee of Public Instruction, Bengal.

- (4) Suvartha-tattvāloka or Kāraka-cakra.
- (5) Nyāya-tantra-bodhinī or Nyāya-bodhinī.
- (6) Padārtha-tattvāloka. a commentery on Raghunātha's Padārtha-khaṇḍana.
- (7) Bhāṣā-pariccheda.¹
- (8) Pingala-prakāśa.²

75. RĀMABHADRA ŚIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1660 A.D.).

Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa was a grandson of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra and was the author of a commentary called Subodhinī on the Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā of the latter. As Jagadīśa lived about 1635 A.D., his grandson Rāmabhadra flourished approximately about 1660 A.D. He calls himself Navadvīpiya³ on a resident of Navadvīpa.

76. GOVINDA NYĀYAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1650 A.D.).

Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa was a descendant of Vāsudeva Sārva-bhauma and was the senior logician of his time. He was patronised by Rājā Rāghava of the town of Revi which was afterwards called Krishnagar. Rājā Rāghava dug a tank at Dignagara in 1669 A.D. Govinda calls himself son of Nyāyavācaspati⁴ who is no other than Rudra Nyāyavācaspati. Roughly. he lived in 1650 A.D. He was the author of the following works:—

- (1) Nyāya-saṁkṣepa.
- (2) Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā.
- (3) Possibly Samāsa-vāda.

¹ J.A.S.B., 1910, p. 313. M. M. Shastri's article on Bhāṣā-pariccheda Published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of Calcutta.

² In the Pingala-prakāśa Viśvanātha says:—

विद्यानिवाससूत्रोः कृतिरेषा विद्यनाथस्य ।

³ Sans. Coll. Cat., III, p. 226, No. 461, introd. verse 2:—

गिरिमिव गुरुमिह नत्वा तत्कृतशब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिकासु ।

श्रीरामभद्रकृतौ कुर्वते टीकां सुदे सुधीयः ॥ २ ॥

and the final colophon:—इति नवद्वीपीय सङ्ग्रहोपाध्याय श्रीरामभद्रसिद्धान्त[वागीश-
in R. Mitra, No. 794] भट्टाचार्य विरचिता शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिकासुबोधिनी समाप्ता ।

⁴ The Nyāya-saṁkṣepa (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 644, No. 1893), intro. verse 3:—

न्यायवाचस्पतेः सूत्रोरियं गोविन्दशर्मणः ।

कृतिः कृतधियां भूषादमन्दानन्ददायिनी ॥

77. RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLĀṆKĀRA
(ABOUT 1650 A.D.).

Raghudeva was a disciple of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa.¹ Raghudeva is older than 676 A.D., the date in which Anumiti-parāmarśa-vāda was copied. He is older than Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-1688 A.D.) who quotes him in his Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-vīvaraṇa.² He probably flourished in 1650 A.D. He was the author of the following works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-guḥhārtha-dīpikā.
- (2) Navīna-nirmāṇa.
- (3) Dīdhiti-ṭikā.
- (4) Nyāya-kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā.
- (5) Dravya-sāra-saṅgraha.
- (6) Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā.

78. GADĀDHARA BHATṬĀCHĀRYA
(ABOUT 1650 A.D.).

Gadādhara, whose father was Jīvācārya, was born in the middle of the 17th century A.D. in the district Lakshmipasa, Bogra, in Eastern Bengal. He came to Nadia and became a pupil of the famous logician Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. On the death of the teacher, Gadādhara became the head of his academy. But the students in Nadia did not at first accept him as their teacher as he was a man of Eastern Bengal and did not belong to a family of hereditary Pandits. Gadādhara left the academy and established a new college on a public street, where he also set up a garden of flowers. As soon as any student came to collect flowers from the garden, Gadādhara used to deliver lectures on logic, addressing a tree there. Charmed with his exposition of the knotty points of logic, young men came and secretly enrolled themselves as his pupils. Soon after this he composed an excellent gloss on the Dīdhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi which made his fame spread far and wide, and he was recognized as the chief logician of his time. Gadādhara has been called “the prince of Indian Schoolmen”, with whom modern Logic reached its climax. He was such a thoroughgoing logician that when asked on his death-bed to think of the prime cause of the Universe instead of thinking on God he is said to have repeated the words “atoms, atoms, atoms.” He wrote numerous commentaries on Logic which are known under the general name of Gadādhari.

¹ The Nāñ-vāda-vyākhyā (Madras Catalogue, No. 4254) introd. verse, 1 :—

शिवं प्रणम्य तत् पश्चात् तर्कवागीश्वरं गुहम् ।

अथैव रघुदेवेन नञ्वादे सुविवेचनम् ॥ १ ॥

² J.A.S.B., 1910, p. 468. Satis Chandra Vidyabhushana's article on Yasovijaya Gaṇi.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya must be older than 1625 A.D.,¹ the date of a manuscript of his Vyutpatti-vāda. His Śakti-vāda was commented upon by a pupil of Jayarāma. He probably flourished in 1650 A.D. He is a resident of Navadvīpa and is often called Gauda-deśīya.

His collected works are called Gadādhari and are spread all over India, especially Southern India. He was the author of the following chief works :—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā.
- (2) Tattva-cintāmaṇi-vyākhyā.
- (3) Tattva-cintāmanyāloka-ṭīkā.
- (4) Mukta-vaḷi-ṭīkā.
- (5) Ratna-koṣa-vāda-rahasya.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's other works are :—

- (6) Anumānā-cintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-ṭīkā.
- (7) Ākhyāta-vāda.
- (8) Kāraka-vāda.
- (9) Nāñ-vāda.²
- (10) Prāmānya-vāda-dīdhī-ṭīkā.³
- (11) Buddhi-vāda.
- (12) Mukti-vāda.
- (13) Vidhi-vāda.
- (14) Viś-ayatā-vāda.
- (15) Vyutpatti-vāda.
- (16) Śakti-vāda.⁴
- (17) Smṛti-saṁskāra-vāda.
- (18) Śabda-prāmānya-vāda-rahasya.⁵

79. NṚSĪMHA PAÑCHĀNANA (ABOUT 1675 A.D.).

Nṛsīṁha Pañchānana Bhaṭṭācārya was older than 1673 A.D. when his Bhūṣā was composed. He probably lived about 1675 A.D. He wrote Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-bhūṣā a commentary on Jānakīnātha's work. He praises highly one Govinda⁶ perhaps son of Rudra.

¹ Gadādhara, lived in the time of Rāghava Rāy, grandson of Bhavānanda Rāy of Nadia Rāj, who built the Dighi of Dignaga, in Śaka 1591 (1669 A.D.) and also granted land in Śaka 1553.

² Published in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

³ Published in the Śāstra Mukta-vaḷi series of Kanci.

⁴ Published at Benares.

⁵ Published in the Śāstra Mukta-vaḷi series of Kanci.

⁶ The Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-bhūṣā, introd. verse 2 (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 641, No. 1976) :—

श्रीमच्छ्रीधुत गौड़मच्छलनदीविद्यात सत्कीर्तिता-

सत्काशं प्रतिमः परं सुप्रतिमो गोविन्दनामाभिधाः ।

80. RĀMDEVA CIRANJĪVA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Rāmdeva who is generally known as Cirañjīva must be older than 1703 A.D., when his Kāvya-vilāsa was composed. He is generally believed to have lived about 1700 A.D. He was the author of the following works:—

- (1) Vidvānāmoda-taraṅgiṇī.
- (2) Kāvya-vilāsa.
- (3) Mādhava-campu.
- (4) Vṛtta-ratnāvalī.

81. RĀMARUDRA TARKAVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Ramrudra, or simply Rudra, was the grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa and son of Śrī Rāma or Rāmeśvara. He was probably a pupil of Madhusūdana. He probably lived about 1700 A.D. He was the author of the following works:—

- (1) Tattva-cintāmaṇī-dīdhiti-ṭikā,
- (2) Vyutaptti-vāda-vyākhyā.
- (3) Kāraṇādyaṛtha-nirṇaya-ṭikā.
- (4) Dinakarya-prakāśa-taraṅgiṇī.
- (5) Tattva-saṅgraha-dīpikā-ṭippaṇī.
- (6) Siddhānta-muktāvalī-ṭikā.

82. ŚRĪ KRṢṢA NYĀYĀLAṆKĀRA
(ABOUT 1650 A.D.).

Śrī Krṣṣa Nyāyālaṅkāra was a son of Govinda Nyāyavāgīśa and author of the Bhāva-dīpikā, a commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī.

83. JAYARĀMA TARKĀLAṆKĀRA
(ABOUT 1700 A.D.).

Jayarāma Tarkālaṅkāra was born in the district of Pabna in Eastern Bengal. His father was a court pandit at Putia. He was a pupil of Gadādhara and wrote a commentary on the Śaktivāda in the year 1700 A.D.

तत्समुच्चैर्लिंग एव सुदृढौ भावं तु पञ्चाननो

वाङ्मनां हितकांक्षया समुद्यतिः प्राप्तायसिद्धांभिते ॥

And the final colophon : संवत् १७३० ज्येष्ठ वदि ४ शुक्ले समाप्तोऽयं पुस्तकः ॥

84. RUDRARĀMA
(ABOUT 1750 A.D.).

Rudrarāma was a son of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa and therefore lived about 1725 A.D. He was the author of:—

- (1) Vāda-pariccheda.
- (2) Kāraka-vyūha.
- (3) Citta-rūpa.
- (4) Adhikaraṇa-candrikā.
- (5) Vaiśeṣika-śāstriya-padārtha-nirūpaṇa.

85. “BUNO”¹ RĀMANĀTHA
(ABOUT 1780 A.D.).

At the close of the 18th century there were two scholars in Nadia who both bore the name of Rāmanātha Tarkasiddhānta—one was versed in Logic and the other in Jurisprudence. The logician, who had his school in a wood on the outskirts of the town, was called *Buno* (wild) Rāmanātha in contradistinction to the jurist, who lived at the centre of the town.

Buno Rāmanātha was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. He was a man of extraordinary genius, but has left no work behind him. His circumstances were very poor, yet he did not seek help from any body. He had sometimes to live on boiled tamarind leaves only.

Once Maharāja Śiva Chandra of Krishnagar, wishing to patronise him, came to Nadia and asked him; “Are you in any difficulty?” Buno Rāmanātha replied “No, thanks; I have repeatedly gone through the Tattvacintāmaṇi but have met with no difficulty.” Then the Maharāja said; “I did not enquire of any difficulty of yours in Logic, but I desire to know whether you have any pecuniary wants.” The reply again was: “No, thanks.”

86. KRṢṢṢA KĀNTA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA
(ABOUT 1780 A.D.).

He was a pupil of Rāma Nārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana and was equally versed in Logic and Jurisprudence. He wrote the following works:—

- (1) Nyāya-ratnāvalī.
- (2) Dāyabhāga-ṭīka.
- (3) Gopāla-līlāmṛta.
- (4) Caitanya-candrāmṛta.
- (5) Kāminī-kāma-kautuka.

¹ *Buno* is the Bengali colloquial equivalent for Sanskrit *vanya* signifying “wild.”

(6) Upamāna-cintāmaṇi-ṭikā.

(7) Śabda-sakti-prakāśikā-ṭikā.

He flourished during the time of Maharajā Girīśa Chandra of Krishnagar. He was too conscious of his genius. On his death-bed when he found that his end was drawing nigh, he said :—

“Let many stars shine in the sky, let lamps too spread their lustre in every house, let the little fireflies glitter from quarters to quarters; alas! the sun having set, what things do not shine before people!”¹

87. RĀJACUḌĀMAṆIMAKHIN.

Writers of Navya Nyāya have spread all over the country. In Madras Rājacūḍāmaṇimakhin² who was a minister in the Court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore, wrote a Tattva-cintāmaṇi-darpaṇa in 1630 A.D.

88. DHARMARĀJĀDHVARIN.

Dharmarājādhvarin, a native of Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam, wrote a commentary on the Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa of Rucidatta.³

89. GOPĪNĀTHA MAUNI.

(ABOUT 1650 A.D.).

He wrote Śabdāloka-rahasya, Tarkabhāṣā-ṭikā, and Padārthaviveka-ṭikā. He was a Maratha and lived in Benares during the time of Raja Jai Singh. He calls himself Lord of the Lily of Logic.⁴

अधिगगनमनेकाक्षारका दोत्रिभाजः
 प्रतिगृहमपि दीपा दर्शयन्तु प्रभुत्वम् ।
 दिशि दिशि विलसन्तु क्षुद्रखद्योतपोताः
 सवितरि परिभूते किञ्च लौकैर्यलोकि ॥
 अधीत्य निखिलं शास्त्रमग्रजादौश्वरेष्टिनः ॥
 राजघूडामणिमखौ कुरुते मणिदपेणम् ॥
 तत्र कण्डरमणिक्लृप्तमरत्ननिवासिना ।
 मणिप्रकाशविट्तिर्धर्मराजेन तन्यते ॥
 दशानामपि टीकानां भङ्गं कुर्वन् कश्चित् कश्चित् ।
 अनुमानप्रकाशस्य विट्तिं करवाण्यहम् ॥

⁴ Śabdāloka begins thus :—

सतामस्मिन् गहने प्रबन्धे परं परिहासकरः प्रयासः ।
 तथाप्यशक्ये मम साहसिक्ये सेवा समालम्बनमम्बिकायाः ॥
 उपदिष्टं पिष्टचरणैः स्वयमपि निष्टङ्कितं यत्नैः ।
 शब्दालोकरहस्यं ओपीनाथो विवेचयति ॥

90. KṚṢṆA BHATṬA ĀḌE.

Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Āḍe was a Maratha, who wrote a gloss on Gadādhari called Gadādhari-karṣikā¹ and one on Śiromaṇi's Tat-tvacintāmaṇi while residing at Benares, where he died about 150 years ago. The gloss has been printed in Telegu characters.

91. MAHĀDEVA PUNTAMKAR
(ABOUT 1790 A.D.).

He was a Maratha resident in Poona and flourished about 125 years ago, during time of the end of the Peshawas (1795 A.D.) He wrote glosses on Bhavānandi-ṭikā.²

and ends :—

पितृर्ज्ञानपतेर्ब्रह्मात्मन आख्यातवानहं
तन्न भव्यापि नव्यासाविति त्याज्या मनोषिभिः ॥

इति श्री महासहोपाध्याय व्यायकुमुदिनीपति श्रीगोपीनाथविरचितं शब्दालोकरहस्यं ।
समाप्तं ॥

The MS., which is in Benares College, dated Samvat 1750, ends वन्द्यै नमः । विश्वेश्वराय नमः । अन्नपूर्णायै नमः ।

Gopinātha was also the author of पदार्थविवेक टीका which begins :—

अभेद भावनोद्रेकादभेदं देहगोचरं
विभक्तौ दम्पती कौचित् वाञ्छितार्थप्रदौ स्तुमः ॥

ends :—

राज्ञःश्रीजयसिंहस्य गिरावाचेरि संज्ञके ।
सिद्धान्ततत्त्वसर्वस्वं गोपीनाथो विनिर्मिमे ॥

इति श्रीगोपीनाथ मौनिनः कृतो पदार्थविवेकटीकायां द्रव्यपदार्थः ।

¹ Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa's Gadādhari-karṣikā begins thus :—

श्रीकृष्णं सुन्दरानम्य कृष्णो नारायणानुजः
गदाधरमतार्थानां विप्यर्णी तनुतेऽङ्गताम् ॥
राज्ञनाथी हृष्यशर्मा पण्डितेभ्यः कृताञ्जलिः
याचते भूय ज्ञानम्य दूष्यं बुद्ध्या वचो मम ॥

² In one of the opening lines he states as follows :—

नन्वा पदाम्भोज युगं शिवस्य
स्मृत्वा गुरोश्चाखिलयुक्तिजातम् ।
कृत्वातिगूढार्थविभावनं च
आख्यायते व्याप्तिरहस्यमच ॥

ends :—

श्रीमत् पुष्पाक्षोपनायकमुकुन्दपण्डितात्मजमहादेवपण्डितविरचिते भवानन्दीप्रकाशे उपा-
धिवादः समाप्तः ॥ गुजरोपनामकेशवपण्डितात्मजवासुदेवपण्डितस्य सत्यमिदं पुस्तकम् ॥

92. RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĀSTRĪ (PARVATA)
(ABOUT 1815 A.D.).

He was a Maratha, who wrote a gloss on Gadādhari-pañcavāda¹ while residing at Poona about 70 years ago.

¹ व्याप्तिपञ्चकं, पञ्चता, अवयव, सामान्य निश्चिन्ति ।

CHAPTER IV.

Present state of the Science of dialectics.

(1700—1900 A.D.).

93. PATRONAGE OF THE MAHARAJA OF NADIA.

Nadia is still the best centre where students from all parts of India come to study Nyāya, for it represents the best traditions of Nyāya at the present time. Towards the end of the seventeenth century Mahārāja Rāmakṛṣṇa Rāya of Nadia, having granted valuable landed properties to the Pandits, specially the Nyāya Pandits of Nadia, enlisted their sympathy and was styled Navadvīpādhipati, overlord of Navadvīpa.

Mahārāja Kṛṣṇacandra Rāya of Nadia (1728—1782) was the last land-holder to encourage Pandits with monetary help. His council-room was adorned by Harirāma Tarkasiddhānta and Kṛṣṇānanda Vācaspati of Navadvīpa, Vanēśvara Vidyālaṅkāra of Guptipārā, Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana of Trivenī and Rādhāmohana Goswami of Śāntīpura. There lived in the time of his son, Mahārāja Sivacandra Rāya (1782—1788) such famous Pandits as Śāṅkara Tarkavāgīśa and others. Māhārāja Īśvaracandra Rāya (1788—1802), Mahārāja Girīśacandra Rāya (1802-1842), and the Mahārājas of Burdwan and Nāture, gave a little encouragement, but it was not adequate.

94. THE PORTUGUESE TAKE AN INTEREST IN DIALECTICS.

The Jesuit missionaries, who lived in India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, took a great interest in Sanskrit and much valuable information is available from the accounts which they have left. The Portuguese Jesuits, while sending manuscripts from Pondicherry and Chandernagore to the King's Library at Paris, remark in 1732, that most of the manuscripts were collected from Navadvīpa. One missionary says: "The founder of the Nyāya School, which means disputation, is a famous Brāhmaṇa called Gautama." "Whatever research I made," says he, "I could not get his principles or aphorisms. I have obtained a commentary on them, which we have sent. The Nyāya School is the only one in vogue in the kingdom of Bengal, and it is for this reason that a large number of books by the authors of this sect are sent."

The missionary goes on to observe:—

"Gaṅgeśa is very famous; he is the author of the Cintā-

mañi, the name of which has clung to him. It is a book containing the whole of dialectics, according to Gotama's sentiments. Gaṅgeśa's dialectics have caused people to forget all the other parts of philosophy and to neglect the best authors, who are almost unknown since the decadence of letters under the Mogols."¹

Father Pons remarks :—

“The School of Nyāya (reason or judgment) has surpassed all the others in Logic, especially from the time, some centuries back, that the Academy of Nadia, in Bengal, became the most celebrated of India, thanks to its famous Professors, whose works have spread in every direction. . . . Nowadays they teach in the Nyāya schools hardly anything else besides Logic, which the Brāhmaṇas have stuffed with an endless number of questions, a great deal more subtle than useful. It is a chaos of minutiae, as Logic was in Europe about two centuries ago. The students spend several years in studying a thousand varieties of subtleties on the members of the syllogism, the causes, the negations, the genera, the species etc. They dispute stubbornly on suchlike trifles and go away without having acquired any other knowledge. The Nyāya has in consequence been given the name of *Tarkaśāstram*.”²

Anquetil Du Perron, who had known Father Mosac at Chander-nagore since 1756, says that Father Mosac learnt Sanskrit at Nadia University and that his translation of the four Vedas, specially the Yajur Veda forms a part of his vast and learned collections.³

At the time the Portuguese searched for the books, the following works of Nyāya were prevalent in Bengal :—

- (1) Kusumañjālī, of Udayana.
- (2) Commentary on Kusumañjālī by Vardhamāna.
- (3) Dravya-kiraṇāvalī of Udayana.
- (4) Commentary on Dravya-kiraṇāvalī by Vardhamāna.
- (5) Guṇa-kiraṇāvalī of Udayana.
- (6) Commentary on Guṇa-kiraṇāvalī by Vardhamāna.
- (7) Commentary on Gotama-sūtra of Vacaspati.
- (8) Līlāvātī with Commentary.
- (9) Vādārtha in one volume comprising (i) Devatā-vāda, on the nature of the gods ; (ii) Mukti-vāda, on salvation ; (iii) Prāgabhāva, on future contingent things ; (iv) Viśiṣṭha-

¹ Written on the 16th January, 1732.

² Letter of Father Pons, missionary of the Society of Jesus, to Father Du Holde, of the same Society at Carical on the coast of Tanjour, in the East Indies, the 23rd of November, 1740 (translated by Father H. Hosten).

³ Mosac died at Pondicherry, 4th December, 1779, aged 75, a humble, able and deeply learned missionary, he was little communicative though very conciliating. See Anquetil Du Perron, *Mem. de l'Ann. des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres*, XLIX, p. 685. Anquetil Du Perron, *Zend Avesta*, I, pt. 1, p. xxxviii, Paris, 1771, translated by Father H. Hosten.

- vaiśiṣṭha-vāda, on the qualities; (v) Vidhi-vāda, true meaning of laws, etc.
- (10) Bauddhādhikāra of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in the volume of Kusumāñjali.
 - (11) Vādārtha-khaṇḍana showing that there is no other cause but God.
 - (12) Ākhyāta-vāda of Mathuranātha, on some points of grammar.
 - (13) Apūrvā-vāda, on fate.
 - (14) Śakti-vāda, on power.
 - (15) Siddhānta-muktāvalī.
 - (16) Cintāmaṇī by Gaṅgeśa.
 - (17) Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa by Raghunātha.
 - (18) Commentary on Pratyakṣa and Anumāna-khaṇḍa of Mathurānātha.
 - (19) Mathurānātha on Vidhi-vāda.
 - (20) Bhavānanda on Anumāna.
 - (21) Bhavānanda on Śabda.
 - (22) Gadādhara the Master on the Pratyakṣa of Śiromaṇi.
 - (23) Gadādhara the Master on Anumāna of Śiromaṇi.
 - (24) Some special works of Gadādhara the Master.
 - (25) Jagadīśa on Anumāna of Śiromaṇi.¹

96. BRITISH GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGES NYĀYA.

India came into the possession of British in 1757 A.D. Since then the students of Navadvīpa have received grants from the British Raj. In the year 1829 this was stopped, but was again restored in 1830 by the Governor-General in Council at the request of H. H. Wilson, the great orientalist.²

¹ The manuscripts were bought by Jesuit missionaries of Pondicherry and Chandernagore for the library of the King of France. These were sent to Paris on the 16th and 24th January, 1732. They are also mentioned in Abbe Jourdain's Journal. The accounts about sending these have been translated by Father H. Hosten through whose kindness I got access to the account and lists of books.

² The correspondence quoted below shows how great was the work done at a nominal expense. At present Bengal Government spends 28,000 Rupees annually for Sanskrit Tols. In every Province including Benares, pecuniary aid is being given to Tols:—

THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF REVENUE IN CALCUTTA.

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College.

RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH,

That your petitioners from the establishment of the College of Nuddea, they always received Sicca Rupees one hundred from the late zemindar Rajah Kissen Chunder Bahadoor, and during his zemindary being disposed off, your petitioners even obtained their said allowance from the Sirkar of the Honourable Company, but which being stopped from the month of June last, your petitioners had presented a petition before his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and whereupon it was ordered that your petitioners must submit their representation through the Collector to the Board and then to the Government. Your poor petitioners in conformity of the said order, represented their case before the Collector at Nuddea and who has been pleased to report on the subject on the 27th

The Government is spending lots of money for the maintenance of the chairs of Nyāya in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, at

day August 1829 has before the Commissioner W. Money of the Moorshidabad Division and who also being kindly pleased to report on the subject before your Board. Your petitioners do not know what they have stated within, but they your petitioners now confidently trust on the generosity of your Boardship.

As your petitioners hold the respective documents of obtaining their said allowance from the Sirkar of the Honourable Company and accordingly which they have even received without any molestation thereof.

Your petitioners therefore now most humbly pray, that your honour will be so kindly pleased as to take this your petitioners deplorable case into your worship's kind and merciful consideration and be pleased to do the needful order as to retain and continue their said pension as they have obtained all along and thereby they might be able to acquire a competent knowledge of their progress etc., and by such an act of benevolence your petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray.

CALCUTTA, }
February 1830. }

To

A. STERLING, Esq.

The humble petition of Sib Chandra Siromoni and other students belonging to the Nuddea Sanskrit College.

RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH,

That it is about a month ago your petitioners had presented a petition before His Excellency the Governor-General in Council respecting their allowance of Sicca Rupees one hundred which was restored by the late zemindar Rajah Kissen Chunder Bahadoor being since stopped; your (petitioner) being out of their pittance are under utmost trouble without any remedy thereof, the petition they your petitioners heard and believes has been referred to you for the adjustment of their prayer; if so the fact your petitioners humbly pray of your worship will be so kindly pleased as to do the needful order for the succession of their said allowance through the Collector of that district as that is has been all along carried and by your such an act of humanity your petitions shall ever pray for your welfare and increase of wealth.

CALCUTTA.

(No. 1031.)

To

W. W. BIRD AND W. FAME, Esq.,

Sudder Board of Revenue.

GENTLEMEN,

With reference to your letter, dated the 12th February last, relative to a monthly allowance of 100 rupees paid from Treasury of the Collector of Nuddea for the support and instruction of students, resorting from distant parts of the country to that place, I am directed by the Governor in Council to transmit to you for information the accompanying copy of a letter and of its enclosures from the Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, dated the 16th ultimo, on that subject. You will be pleased to instruct the Collector to continue the pension in question to the Nuddea students and to discharge the arrears which may have accrued from the date on which the payment of it was stopped.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(SD.) W. H. MACNAGETEN,
Off. Deputy Secy. to Govt.

FORT WILLIAM, }
The 3rd August, 1830. }

Navadvīpa, Bhātpārā, Puri and other places. Public examinations have been instituted for the encouragement of Nyāya along with other branches of learning.

A subsidy has also been granted to the Asiatic Society of Bengal for publication of Sanskrit books, including dialectical works.

At present all the works and dialectics are being collected. English, French, German and other scholars are collecting Sanskrit books including books on dialectics.

There are heaps of manuscripts in the libraries of Europe, such as the British Museum, India Office, the Imperial Academy of Vienna, the Imperial Academy of St. Petersburg, Musée National of Paris, etc. Catalogues are being prepared, and great facilities are being given for the study of dialectical works.

97. RISE OF VERNACULAR DETRIMENTAL TO NYĀYA.

On account of the great attention given to vernaculars at the present day the study of Nyāya is declining. Great encouragement is being given to vernacular studies. The Dacca University Committee observes¹ that “the Bengali language has made great progress under British Rule, and its further development should be regarded as one of the duties of the state universities of the Bengal Presidency.” The Calcutta University has already recognized—as the result of the zealous and devoted work of Sir Asutosh Mukerjee—the vernaculars up to the M.A. standard. Several well-organized societies such as the Bangīya Sāhitya Pariṣad and the Sāhitya Sabhā have been founded to cultivate the Bengali language. Nyāya written in Sanskrit is not much appreciated. Nyāya written in an easier language is acceptable, but even then the diction of such works cannot be easy.

97. THE UNIVERSITIES ON THE WESTERN MODEL.

As a result of long controversies dating from 1792 A.D. the Calcutta University was founded in 1854. The universities of Calcutta and other places have made suitable arrangements for the study of western learning. Nadia and other archaic universities are declining, being unable to make headway against the more scientific methods of study which are developing under the influence of Calcutta and of the other universities, established by the Imperial British Government, with the object of encouraging eastern and western learning side by side. In spite of the strenuous efforts made by the British Government to foster study and research in indigenous Logic, it is at its lowest ebb, as the degrees of

¹ Dacca University Committee Report, Chap.VII, p. 31.

a modern university are held in greater regard than those of the archaic universities of Mithilā and Nadia, because, it is often alleged, that in comparison with the Logic of Europe, Indian Logic though subtle, is cumbrous in its method, forbidding in its language, and less profitable in its material results.

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TAXILA.

A,

Takṣaśilā or Taxila was the capital of a province of Gāndhāra and is situated near the river of Sadheri in the Rawalpindi district. The high antiquity of Taxila can be best gathered from the fact that it was famous in the time of Buddha as a University town in India and that Gāndhāra, of which it forms a part, is mentioned in both the Rig-veda and the Atharva-veda, and in the Upanishads and Buddhist literature. In historical times¹ we notice it came under the sway of Cyrus the Great (558—530 B.C.), who is said to have conquered it along with other provinces of Gāndhāra. It is said to have remained in the possession of his successor, Cambyses, who ruled the Persian empire from 530 to 522 B.C. It remained a Persian province for nearly two centuries; and after the downfall of the empire in 331 B.C., it, along with other provinces, came under the sway of Alexander the Great. Herodotus relates that Skylax was first sent by Darius (probably about 510 B.C.) to conduct a fleet of ships from a tributary of the Indus into the Gāndhāra country. Ctesias (415-319 B.C.) resided at the Persian Court for 17 years as physician during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes Memnon, during which time Gāndhāra is said to have remained a Persian province. An interesting relic of Persian influence at Taxila is an inscription in Aramaic character of the fourth or fifth century B.C., which is the only Aramaic record that has yet been found in India.²

Early in the spring of 326 B.C. Alexander with his army entered into the territories of the king of Taxila, who had already tendered his submission. Later on we find it to be a part of the Magadha Empire under the Mauryas, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that Aśoka was viceroy of Taxila. The territory of Gāndhāra, including Taxila, was again conquered by Euthydemus or Democritus and was subsequently wrested from the family of Greek princes by Eucratides. The inscriptions and coins further show that the family of Eucratides was supplanted

¹ E. J. Rapson's 'Ancient India.'

² 'A Guide to Taxila' by Sir John Marshall.

by the Śaka satraps in Taxila, but the princes continued to hold the Kabul valley until the last vestiges of their rule, which had survived the attacks of the Śakas, were swept away by the Kushans.

There is a copper-plate inscription of the satrap of Taxila, Pātīlā by name, which records the deposit of the relics of Buddha and a donation made in the 78th year of some (Parthian ?) era (probably corresponding to 93 B.C.) during the reign of king Mogo or Manes. There has been discovered a column-inscription of one Heliodorus, a Greek native of Taxila and a Vaishnava convert which runs as follows :—

“This Garuda-column of Vāsudeva (Vishnu) the god of gods, was erected here by Heliodorus, a worshipper of Vishnu, the son of Dion, and an inhabitant of Taxila, who came as Greek Ambassador from the great king Antialcidas to king Kaśīputra Bhāgabhadra, the Saviour, then reigning, prosperously in the fourteenth year of his kingship.”

B.

“Three immortal precepts (footsteps) . . . when practised lead to heaven—self restraint, charity, conscientiousness.”¹

Taxila was one of the great cities of the East, and was famous as the principal seat of Hindu learning in Northern India, to which scholars of all classes flocked for instruction, especially in medical science.² In the *Mahāvagga*

Taxila the great seat of Hindu learning and culture.

VIII. 3 (Dr. Oldenberg's ed.), we find Jīvaka, who was a physician to Buddha, was educated in surgery and medicine at Taxila. Ample references have been met with in the Jātakas that people received education in lieu for school-fees or service rendered to their teachers. Jīvaka, the physician of Buddha is said to have received education by rendering service to the physicians at Taxila.³ Generally the three Vedas and eighteen Vidyās or *sippas* were taught there.

Philostratus in his life of Apollonius of Tyana gives an account of that philosopher's visit to India. The account tells us that the philosopher had a Babylonian guide, named Damis; that Phrontes, king of Taxila, spoke in Greek and that up to 12 years of age he was educated in the Greek fashion and was sent afterwards to the Brahmins. Also that Taxila was about the size of Nineveh and walled like a Greek city

Mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at Taxila.

¹ Sir John Marshal, K.C.I.E., in the journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1909, p. 1053.

² *Vide* Archaeological discoveries at Taxila by Sir John Marshall.

³ *Vide* my Buddha-deva, pp. 160—170 and 220—223, also Jātakas, Vol. I, p. 259, Vol. V, pp. 161, 210, 457.

and was the residence of a sovereign, who ruled over what of old was the kingdom of Porus. From Taxila to the hill of Saphoi the villagers also spoke Greek. That the people living in Saphoi knew the Pythagorean philosophy. We also learn from the narrative that the Greek and the Indian philosophers were mutually acquainted with each other's systems, and held each other in high honour. The Brahmins specially loved the Greeks and looked upon them as akin to themselves in mind and disposition. There was inter-communication between India, Babylon, and Egypt. Apollonius's journey shows that overland journeys from Babylon to India was constantly made by travellers. That the Babylonians were in the habit of making this journey regularly, is clearly indicated by the fact that Philostratus engaged the services of a Babylonian guide. That the Indian king showed much courtesy to the travellers and that such visits were frequently made, is clearly proved by the fact that travelling allowances paid to the guides formed a recognised and well-known item of expenditure of the frontier sovereign.

Arrian, Strabo, Ptolemy, Dionysius, Pliny, Fa-Hien and Hieun-Tsang all have spoken of this place. Hieun-Tsang, who visited Taxila in the 7th century A.D. says that the royal family was extinct; that formerly it was in subjection to Kapisa and latterly was a tributary to Kashmir, and that the nobles contended for power by force. After the 9th century we hear no more of Taxila.¹

¹ Beal's 'Buddhist records of the Western World'; 'Early History of India' by V. A. Smith; Buddha-deva by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan; Arrian, etc., Jātaka; Archæological Survey; B. C. Law's, 'Taxila,' volume 12, No. I, etc.

APPENDIX B.¹

INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYLLOGISM IN INDIAN LOGIC.

1. TARKA-ŚĀSTRA OF GOTAMA (ABOUT 550 B.C.).

The Nyāya-sūtra, which is supposed to be the earliest work extant on Nyāya philosophy, treats of four distinct subjects, viz. (1) the art of debate (*tarka*), (2) the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (3) the doctrine of syllogism (*avayava*), and (4) the examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines (*anyamata-parīkṣā*). The first subject, ample references to which are met with in the old Brahmanic, Buddhistic, and Jaina works, seems to have been first handled by a sage named Gotama or Gautama, who is reputed to have flourished in Mithilā (North Behar) about 550 B.C. The second subject, which is also referred to in old books, was associated with the art of debate at a very early stage. These two subjects, combined together, constitute the Tarka-śāstra (the philosophy of reasoning), popularly known as Gautamī-vidyā (the Gotamīde learning).²

2. THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA OF AKṢAPĀDA (ABOUT 150 A.D.).

The third subject, the doctrine of the Syllogism, does not appear to have been known in India a considerable time before the Christian era. The fourth subject refers to numerous philosophical doctrines that were propounded from time to time up to the second century A.D.³ Gotama's Tarka-śāstra, after these two subjects had been introduced into it, became, about the second century A.D., designated as the Nyāya-sūtra—the aphorisms on logic. The term "Nyāya" in the sense of logic occurs in the Mahābhārata (Ādi-parva, adhyāya 1, verse 67; adhyāya 70, verses 42-4; and Sānti-parva, adhyāya 210, verse 22); Viṣṇu-purāṇa (3rd pt., adhyāya 6); Matsya-purāṇa (3, 2); Padma-purāṇa (Uttara-

¹ This is a reprint, in an altered form, of an article published in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

² For Gotama or Gautama as the founder of Tarka-śāstra, see Naiṣadhacarita, Bk. xvii, verse 75; Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khaṇḍa, ch. 263; and Skanda-purāṇa, Kālikā-khaṇḍa, ch. xvii.

³ Some philosophical doctrines of the third and fourth centuries A.D. were incorporated into the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda by Vātsyāyana the first commentator (about 400 A.D.), through the introduction of certain sūtras of his own, making fathered upon Akṣapāda.

khaṇḍa, ch. 263); Yājñavalkya-saṁhitā (I, 3), etc., in passages which are presumed to have been written after the second century A.D. We are not surprised to find that the Mahābhārata mentions even a syllogism,¹ called a speech of five parts, in which Nārada is said to have been an expert, when we consider that the Great Epic refers also to the voracious Romans called Romaka,² who, according to it, "came adorned with helmets and clad in endless garments to pay tributes" to Yudhiṣṭhira on the occasion of his coronation at Delhi. It is quite possible that the passage which refers to the syllogism was written after the intercourse of Rome with India had commenced and possibly after the second century A.D.

In the early commentaries³ on the Nyāya-sūtra, the author of the sūtra is distinctly named as Akṣapāda, while in the Padma-purāṇa⁴ and other works Gotama or Gautama is credited with the authorship of the sūtra Ananta-yajvan,⁵ in his commentary on the Piṭrmedha-sūtra, observes that Gautama and Akṣapāda were the same person, while the Nyāya-koṣa⁶ mentions a legend to account for the name as applied, according to it, to Gautama. As no credible evidence has been adduced in either case, I consider the identification as fanciful, and maintain that Gotama or Gautama was quite different from Akṣapāda; but that both of them contributed to the production of the Nyāya-sūtra, one at its early stage and the other in its final form. Indeed, Akṣapāda, unlike Gotama or Gautama, is reported in the Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa⁷ to have been a son of Somaśarmā, who resided at Prabhāsa, near Broach, in Kathiawar, on the sea-coast.

3. WHEN WAS THE SYLLOGISM FIRST USED IN INDIA?

Though Akṣapāda introduced into the Nyāya-sūtra the doctrine of the syllogism, he was by no means the first promulgator of the doctrine—nay, not even its first disseminator. The doctrine⁸

¹ Pañcāvayava-yuktasya vākyasya guṇa-doṣavit (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 5).

² Auśnikānantavāsāśmāca Romakān puruṣādakān (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 16).

³ Vide the concluding verse of the Nyāya-bhāṣya (about 400 A.D.), the opening verse of the Nyāya-vārttika (about 630 A.D.), and the opening lines of the Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyā-tīkā (about 976 A.D.).

⁴ Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khaṇḍa, ch. 263.

⁵ Vide Weber's *History of Indian Literature*, p. 85.

⁶ Nyāya-koṣa, 2nd ed., Bombay.

⁷ The Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa, published under the name of Vāyu-purāṇa by A.S.B., adhyāya 23, verses 201-3.

⁸ Seeing that the Greek word "Syllogismos" and the Sanskrit word "Sāṁkhyā" or "Sāṁkhya" are identical in signification, one may say that Aristotle derived his doctrine of the Syllogism from the Sāṁkhya Philosophy of Kapila. But the Sāṁkhya Philosophy is not known to have dealt with the doctrine of the Syllogism at all.

was carried to great perfection in Greece by Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. (384–322 B.C.). That it was known even in India prior to Akṣapāda is apparent from a notice of the same in the Caraka-saṁhitā,¹ about 78 A.D. In fact, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact date at which the syllogistic reasoning was first used in India. It is also a problem of enormous difficulty to determine whether there is any genetical connexion between the syllogism as propounded in the Indian Logic and that propounded in the Greek Logic. Of the four subjects treated in the Nyāya-sūtra already referred to, the first, second, and fourth are undoubtedly of Indian origin. As to the third subject (syllogism), some scholars say that it, too, is of indigenous growth, as it forms a part of inference, a kind of *pramāṇa*, which originated in India. But on investigation into the history of the development of inference and the syllogism we find that in origin they were altogether distinct, though ultimately there was an amalgamation between them.

4. NO CONNEXION BETWEEN AN INFERENCE AND A SYLLOGISM AT THEIR EARLY STAGE.

The notice of inference (*anumāna*) in old books such as the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra (3, 1, 9 and 9, 2, 1) and the Caraka-saṁhitā (Sūtra-sthāna, ch. xi, and Vimāna-sthāna, ch. viii) is very meagre. The Nyāya-sūtra (1, 2, 5), which gives a more comprehensive account, defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by perception and as being of three kinds, *viz.*: (1) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) like the prior (*pūrvavat*), *e.g.* on seeing clouds one infers that there will be rain; (2) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) like the posterior (*śeṣavat*), *e.g.* on seeing a river swollen one infers that there was rain; and (3) (knowledge which arises from the perception of what is) commonly seen (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa*) *e.g.* on seeing an animal possessing horns one infers that it also possesses a tail. The inference, as illustrated here from the Nyāya-sūtra, was in essence a guess or conjecture which was neither a source of absolutely valid knowledge nor in any way connected with a syllogism. In order, therefore, to ascertain whether there is any genetical connexion between the syllogism of Indian Logic and that of the Greek Logic, I shall analyse here the two syllogisms side by side, with occasional references to the rules controlling them.

¹ Concerning the date of the Caraka-saṁhitā see *Journal Asiatique*, tom. viii, pp. 447-51, 1896, where M. Sylvain Lévi maintains on the authority of Chinese books that Caraka, the author of the Caraka-saṁhitā, lived at the Court of Kanishka (in Jālandhara, Punjab). I provisionally take the date of Kanishka to be 78 A.D.

15. *The Syllogism in Indian Logic conforms to the logical rules of Aristotle.*

A. CARAKA-SAMHITĀ
(78 A.D.)

a. *Demonstration and Counter-demonstration.*

The Caraka-samhitā (Vimāna-sthāna, ch. viii), which contains the earliest information available on syllogism, analyses a demonstration (*sthāpanā*) and a counter-demonstration (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*) as follows:—

DEMONSTRATION (*sthāpanā*).

(1) Proposition (*pratijñā*). The soul is eternal.

(2) Reason (*hetu*). Because it is non-produced.

A. ARISTOTLE
(384–322 B.C.)¹

a. *Demonstrative and Refutative Enthymemes.*

Aristotle, in his Rhetoric (bk. ii, p. 194, Welldon's ed.), speaks of two species of enthymemes, viz. demonstrative and refutative, which correspond respectively to the demonstration and counter-demonstration of the Caraka-samhitā. The demonstrative enthymeme of Aristotle, like the demonstration of the Caraka-samhitā, consists in drawing conclusions from admitted propositions, while the

¹ Dr. B. M. Barua, a distinguished pupil of mine, differs from me on this point. He would however hold that syllogistic forms existed prior to the time of the Greek influence. As an authority he points out the following passages from the Mahāpadāna Suttantā (Dīgha. II, No. 1) where the *Dhammatā* doctrine put in the syllogistic forms involves the double process of deduction and induction:—

Deductive method:—

All Buddhas are equal in all respects,
One Buddha lost his mother on the seventh day of his birth,
All Buddhas lost their mothers on the seventh day of their birth,

Inductive method:—

All past Buddhas had lost their mothers on the seventh day of their birth,
The present Buddha lost his mother on the seventh day of his birth,
All future Buddhas will lose their mothers on the seventh day of their birth.

Thus by the law (*Dhammatā*) all Buddhas lose their mothers on the seventh day of their birth. This conclusion though formally correct is materially absurd.

My other pupil, Mr. Hirendra Lal Sen Gupta, M.A., a distinguished student of the Mahāyāna philosophy, in the Calcutta University, agrees with the above view and as illustrations he alludes to the numerous passages of controversy in the Dīgha Nikāya, Vol. I, Suttas 1 and 2, one of which having a crude form of syllogism thus:

My being wrong is a hindrance to me.
The sense of remorse is due to my being wrong.
The sense of remorse is a hindrance to me.

These illustrations according to Dr. Barua and Mr. Sen Gupta goes to prove that the ancient Hindus knew the syllogism before the Greeks came to India.

In reply I may say that one may use language involving Syllogism, yet one may not be aware of the art of Syllogism. Syllogism being a simple course of reasoning, men all over the world may use expressions illustrative of Syllogism. It was the Hindus and the Greeks that systematised the expressions and made a law out of them and I believe the Greeks preceded the Hindus in making that law.

(3) Example (*dṛṣṭānta*). That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether.

(4) Application (*upanaya*). The soul is non-produced.

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*). Therefore the soul is eternal.

COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*).

(1) The soul is non-eternal.

(2) Because it is cognized by the senses.

(3) That which is cognized by the senses is non-eternal, as a pot.

(4) The soul is cognized by the senses.

(5) Therefore the soul is non-eternal.

The Caraka-saṁhitā, which analyses demonstration and counter-demonstration into five members, does not give any clear definition of those members. "Dṛṣṭānta," which in the old Tarka-śāstra signified an instance familiar to the learned and the fool alike, was adopted designate the third member, although in its old sense it did not indicate the principle of connexion (between the middle term and the major term) involved in the member.

refutative enthymeme of Aristotle, like the counter-demonstration of the Caraka-saṁhitā, consists in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent with those of one's adversary.

The enthymeme is defined by Aristotle (in his Rhetoric, bk. i, p. 16, Welldon's ed.) as a syllogism with its constituent parts fewer than those of a normal syllogism, that is, a syllogism of which the major premise, minor premise, or the conclusion is suppressed as being well known to the audience, who can supply the same of their own accord.

The demonstration in the Caraka-saṁhitā is obviously a combination of an enthymeme which comprises the first two parts of the demonstration and an example which comprises the last three parts of it. This is quite in conformity with the rule of Aristotle, who (in his Rhetoric, bk. ii, p. 184, Welldon's ed.) observes that an example may be used as a supplement to an enthymeme to serve the purpose of a testimony which is invariably persuasive. This rule may be illustrated as follows :—

Enthymeme.

(1) The soul is eternal,

(2) Because it is non-produced.

Example.

(3) That which is non-produced is eternal, as ether,

(4) The soul is non-produced,

(5) Therefore the soul is eternal.

B. AKṢAPĀDA
(ABOUT 150 A.D.).¹

b. *Analysis into five members*
(*Avayava*).

Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-sūtra (1, 1, 32) mentions the five parts of a demonstration under the name of *avayava* (members) as follows :—

(1) Proposition (*pratijñā*). This hill is full of fire.

(2) Reason (*hetu*). Because it is full of smoke.

(3) Example (*udāharana*). That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

(4) Application (*upanaya*). This hill is full of smoke.

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*). Therefore, this hill is full of fire.

c. *Example (udāharana)*.

Akṣapāda calls the example an *udāharana* which he divides into two kinds, viz. affirmative (*sādharmya*) and negative (*vaidharmya*). An affirmative example is defined in the Nyāya-sūtra (1, 1, 36) as a familiar instance, which, being similar to the minor term, possesses the property of that term as co-present (with the reason). A negative example is defined (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 37) as a familiar instance, which is contrary to what has been stated in the case of the affirmative example, that is, in which there is an absence of the property implying an absence of the reason. The definition may be illustrated as follows :—

B. ARISTOTLE.

Analysis of syllogism and demonstration (analytics).

The term *avayava*, used by Akṣapāda to signify parts or members of a syllogism or demonstration, corresponds to the term *analytics*, which refers to the section of the *Organon* in which Aristotle analyses the syllogism and demonstration into their principles (*vide* O.F. Owen's translations of the *Organon*, Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch. i, p. 80).

c. *Example (paradeigma)*.

The affirmative example (*sādharmya udāharana*), as defined by Akṣapāda, corresponds exactly to the example (*paradeigma*), as explained by Aristotle (in his Prior Analytics, bk. ii, ch. xxiv, p. 232). An example, according to Aristotle, occurs when the major term is shown to be present with the middle, through something similar to the minor; but it is necessary to know that the middle is with the minor, and the major with what is similar, *e.g.* :—

(1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

(2) The hill is full of smoke.

(3) Therefore the hill is full of fire.

¹ Concerning the age of Akṣapāda, *vide* introduction to Daśapadārthī, translated by Mr. Ui and edited by Dr. F. W. Thomas (in the press).

Affirmative Example.

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen (affirmative conclusion).

- (1) The hill is not smoky.
- (2) Because it is non-fiery.
- (3) That which is non-fiery is not smoky, as a lake (negative conclusion).

Negative Example.

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) That which is not full of fire is not full of smoke, as a lake.

The reason (*hetu*), as expounded by Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 34, 35), is of two kinds, *viz.* affirmative and negative. An affirmative reason is the means which, through its homogeneity or connexion with the example, establishes what is to be established, while a negative reason is the means which, through its heterogeneity or separation from the example, establishes what is to be established. The definitions may be illustrated as follows:—

Affirmative Reason.

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

Negative Reason.

- (1) The hill is not full of smoke.
- (2) Because it is not full of fire.
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

The negative example and negative reason expounded by Akṣapāda (in the Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 35, 37) possess apparently no counterparts in the *Organon* (Prior Analytics) of Aristotle. From the illustration of the example and reason (affirmative and negative) given by Akṣapāda it appears that he admitted the universal affirmative conclusion in what is called by Aristotle the "first figure" and the universal negative conclusion in the first and second figures. Now, if a conclusion in the first figure is to be negative, the major premise must be negative, and, if a conclusion in the second figure is to be negative, the minor premise must be negative (*vide* Prior Analytics, bk. i, chs. iv, v, pp. 85-94). Considering that the major and minor premises of Aristotle correspond respectively to the example and reason of Akṣapāda, it becomes absolutely necessary to admit a negative example and a negative reason as counter-parts of the negative major premises and the negative minor premise.

C. NĀGĀRJUNA (250-300 A.D.).
MAITREYA (400 A.D.)¹

C. ARISTOTLE.

d. Function of an Example.

The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, in his *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-sāstra* (Chinese version, ch. i, sect. 1), gives an elaborate explanation of example (*udāharāṇa*), which is either affirmative or negative, and which must, according to him be mentioned to make clear the reasons of the disputant and his respondent. The Buddhist philosopher Maitreya, in his *Yoga-caryā-bhūmi-sāstra* (Chinese version, vol. xv), treats of proofs (*sādhaka*) which include a proposition (*siddhānta*), a reason (*hetu*), and an example (*udāharāṇa*, affirmative or negative). Though in the commentaries (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 1, 1, 37, and *Nyāya-vārttika*, 1, 1, 37) on the *Nyāya-sūtra* the "application" and "conclusion" are considered as essential parts of a syllogism, inasmuch as these on the strength of the general principle involved in the example, reassert the reason and restate the proposition in a decisive way; Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, on the other hand, reject them as superfluous on the ground of their not being different from the reason and proposition.² The three members of a syllogism expounded by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya are as follows:—

d. Use of an Example.

The three members of a syllogism, as explained by Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, and others, constitute what is called an example. Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* (bk. ii, p. 184, Welldon's ed.), observes that it is proper, in default of enthymemes, to make use of examples as logical proofs, these being the natural means of producing conviction. In the *Prior Analytics* (bk. ii, ch. xxiv, p. 233, O. F. Owen's ed.), it is further observed that the example differs from induction in that the latter proves the universal from a complete enumeration of individuals, while the former attempts to prove it from a single individual or from some selected individuals, and in that the induction steps at the universal, while the example draws syllogistically a conclusion in respect of the minor term, *e.g.* :

- (1) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.
- (2) The hill is full of smoke
- (3) Therefore the hill is full of fire.

The above may also be put in the reverse order as follows :

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

¹ Vide S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 68, 73.

² It is perhaps the view of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, and surely also of Dignāga, that is referred to under the name of "Bauddha" in the *Nyāya-vārttika*, 1, 1, 37.

- (1) The hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) That which is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.

We may also regard the syllogism expounded by Nāgārjuna and Maitreya as comprising an enthymeme and an example, for the example sometimes consists of only one proposition.¹

D. VASUBANDHU
(ABOUT 450 A.D.).

e. Syllogism of two members.

Vasubandhu in his Tarka-śāstra (Chinese version, ch. 1) treats of syllogism as consisting of five members, but in his Ronki (Vādaividhi), as quoted by Kwei-ke² he is said to have maintained that a syllogism consists of two members only, viz. the proposition and the reason, and that the terms necessary for a syllogism are only three, viz. the minor, the major, and the middle. In the Nyāya-vārttika (1, 1, 37) and the Nyāya-vārttika - tātparya-ṭikā (1, 1, 37)³ Vasubandhu, designated as Subandhu, is stated to have held that a syllogism consists of only two members, and that the example is quite superfluous. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara⁴ (in his Nyāyāvatāra, v. 20) refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to experts in logic a

D. ARISTOTLE.

e. A perfect Syllogism.

The form of syllogism laid down by Vasubandhu conforms in the main to the rules laid down by Aristotle with regard to a perfect syllogism, viz. that every syllogism consists of two premises and one conclusion, so that there are altogether three terms in a syllogism (*vide* Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch. xxv, pp. 140—2). A syllogism is defined by Aristotle (in Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch. i, p. 92) as a sentence (or speech) in which, certain things being laid down, something different from the premises necessarily results in consequence of their existence, e.g.

Premises.

- (1) All that is full of smoke is full of fire.
- (2) This hill is full of smoke.

¹ George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, *Analytica Priora*, ii, ch. vi, p. 275, observes in a footnote as follows: "If we turn to ch. xxvii, p. 70, a. 30—4, we shall find Aristotle on a different occasion disallowing altogether the so-called syllogism from example."

² Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, p. 32.

³ *Vide* S. C. Vidyabhusana's "Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāyabhāṣya" in the *Indian Antiquary* for April, 1915.

⁴ Nyāyāvatāra (verse 20), edited by S. C. Vidyabhusana and published by the Indian Research Society, Calcutta. Siddhasena Divākara flourished about 500—33 A.D. *Vide* S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, p. 15.

proposition can be proved without any example, if there is invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term, and in the absence of such invariable concomitance the proof is impossible even with the example.

Such being the view of Vasubandhu, his syllogism is of the following form:—

- (1) This hill is full of fire.
- (2) Because it is full of smoke.
- (3) All that is full of smoke being full of fire.

Conclusion.

- (3) Therefore this hill is full of fire.

E. DIGNĀGA

(ABOUT 590 A.D.).¹

f. Inference for one's self and inference for the sake of others.

Asaṅga in his Prakaraṇārya-vācā-sūtra (Chinese version, vol. xi) omits inference altogether and substitutes for it a syllogism of five members. Dignāga in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya retains inference under the name of an inference for one's self and affiliates syllogism to inference by calling it an inference for the sake of others.²

g. Definition of the minor term.

In the Pramāṇa-samuccaya,³ ch. iii, Dignāga defines a minor term (*pakṣa*) as that of which the major term is chosen to be

E. ARISTOTLE.

f. The dialectic proposition and demonstrative proposition.

The distinction made by Dignāga between an inference for one's self and that for the sake of others corresponds exactly to the distinction made by Aristotle (in his Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch. i, p. 81) between a dialectic proposition and a demonstrative proposition.

g. Explanation of a proposition.

Just as in an inference for one's self the predicability of the major term in respect of the minor term is a matter of ques-

¹ Vide S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, p. 80.

² Rañ-don-ni tshul-gsum-rtag-las don-mthoñ-waho.

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. ii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 5).

Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-dpag-ni rañ-gis mthoñ-don-gsal-byed-yin

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. iii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 9).

³ Vide Tangyur, Mdo. xcv, fol. 7.

predicated. The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara ¹ (500-550 A.D.), in his *Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 14, says that in an inference for the sake of others the minor term is to be defined as that of which it is assumed that the major term is predicable. In an inference for one's self, on the other hand, the minor term is to be defined, according to old Indian logicians, as that of which it is questionable whether the major term is predicable.

tion or doubt, while in an inference for the sake of others it is a matter of assumption, so also in the *Organon* of Aristotle (Prior Analytics. bk. i, ch. i, p. 81) the dialectic is an interrogation of contradiction, while the demonstration is an assumption of one part of the contradiction. In the *Organon* (De Interpretatione, ch. xi, pp. 87-8, O. F. Owen's edition) a dialectic is stated indeed to be an interrogation, for a choice should be given from the interrogation to enunciate this or that part of the contradiction. This statement coincides with the definition of Dignāga, according to whom the debater chooses the major term as predicable of the minor.

h. Three characteristics of the middle term.

In an inference for one's self, as well as in that for the sake of others, the middle term, if it is to lead to a valid conclusion, must possess the following characteristics ² :—

(1) The middle term must cover the minor term, *e.g.* the hill is smoky.

(2) The middle term must be present in places in which there is the major term, *e.g.* that which is smoky is fiery.

(3) The middle term must be absent from places where there is an absence of the major term, *e.g.* that which is not fiery (non-fiery) is not smoky.

h. The middle term in a syllogism.

The characteristics laid down by Dignāga correspond exactly to those laid down by Aristotle. In the *Organon* (Prior Analytics, bk. i, ch. iv, pp. 85-6, O. F. Owen's edition) it is stated that, when three terms so subsist with reference to one another that the minor is covered by the middle and the middle is or is not covered by the major, then there is necessarily a perfect syllogism of the major and the minor.

This statement may be illustrated as follows :—

¹ *Sādhyaābhyupagamah pakṣaḥ* (*Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 14, edited by S. C. Vidya-bhusana). *Sandigdha-sādhya-dharmatvam pakṣatvam* (quoted in the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, *anumāna-khaṇḍa*, p. 407, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

² (1) *Phyogs-kyi-chos-ñid-daṅ*, (2) *Mthun-paḥi-phyogs-ñid-la yod-par-ñes-pa-daṅ*, (3) *Mi-mthun-paḥi-phyogs la-med-pa-ñid-du-ñes-pa-yaṅ-ño*, (Dignāga's *Nyāya-pra, veśa*, Tangyur, *Mdo*, xcv, fol. 183b).

The above characteristics, as applicable to an affirmative or negative conclusion, may be illustrated as follows: —

A

- (1) This hill is fiery.
- (2) Because it is smoky.
- (3) That which is smoky is fiery.

B

- (1) This hill is not smoky.
- (2) Because it is non-fiery.
- (3) That which is non-fiery is not smoky.

F. DHARMAKĪRTI¹
(600-50. A.D.).

*Demonstration through three kinds of middle term.*²

The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāya-bindu*, ch. ii, divides the middle term (*linga*, sign)³ into three kinds in accordance with the relations which it bears to the major term. The relations are as follows:—

(1) Selfsameness, inherence, or “being the essence of that” (*svabhāva, samavāya, tādātmya*), which occurs when the predicate (or major term) is in essence wholly included in the subject, (or middle term), e.g. this is a tree, because it is *śimsapā*.

(2) Effect, also called “origination from that” (*kāryya, tadutpatti*), which occurs when the predicate (major term) and the sub-

A

- (1) That which is smoky is fiery.
- (2) This hill is smoky.
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery.

B

- (1) That which is non-fiery is not smoky.
- (2) This hill is non-fiery.
- (3) Therefore this hill is not smoky.

F. ARISTOTLE.

Demonstration through the medium of essence and cause.

The two relations, viz. “selfsameness” (or “inherence”) and “effect”, as expounded by Dharmakīrti, correspond to the two relations, viz. “*per se*” (inherence) and “causal”, as expounded by Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics* (bk. i, ch. iv, pp. 253-5, and bk. i, ch. xxiv, p. 301).

(1) *Per se* (essence or inherence).—The predicate (major terms) is said to be related to the subject (middle term *per se* essentially), if the properties of the former are inherent in the definition of the latter.

(2) The causal.—The predicate (major term), which is essentially present with the subject (middle

¹ Vide S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 103-5.

² Dignāga in his *Pramāṇa samuccaya*, Chap. II.

³ *Triṇyeva ca līṅgāni, anupalabdhiḥ svabhāva-kāryye ceti* (*Nyāyabindu*, ch. ii, p. 164, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

ject (middle term) stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. *e.g.* all that is smoky is fiery.

(3) Non-perception¹ (*anupalabdhi*), *e.g.* whatever thing (being perceptible) is not perceived is non-existent.

j. Nature of the universal proposition.

The relations which establish invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term are the bases of universal propositions. "Invariable concomitance" is designated in Sanskrit as *vyāpti* (pervasion or co-presence), *nāntarīyaka* (non-separation), and *avinābhāva* (the relation owing to which one cannot exist without the other).

term), is said to be the cause of the latter.

j. Nature of the universal proposition.

The proposition in which the predicate is related to the subject *per se* or *causally* is a universal one. Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics (bk. i, ch. iv, pp. 253-5, O. F. Owen's edition) calls that (the) universal (major term) which is predicated "of every" and "*per se*", that is, which being predicable of the middle term *per se* is predicated of it in every instance. In the Posterior Analytics (bk. i, ch. xxiv, p. 301) Aristotle further observes that the universal (major term) is the cause of the middle term, which is essentially co-present within it. In Prior Analytics, bk. i. ch. xxiv, pp. 138-9, Aristotle says that in all syllogisms we must have a universal proposition (premise) which is shown by the universal term.

¹ Dharmakīrti and his followers, who say that non-existence is *inferred* and not perceived, assume non-perception as a middle term (sign). But the majority of Indian logicians maintain that non-existence of a thing is *perceived* by the same sense by which the thing itself is perceived. Hence non-perception is not acknowledged by them as a middle term (sign).

G. UDDYOTAKARA
(600-50 A.D.)¹

k. *Syllogism from a sign (līṅga-parāmarśa).*

Uddyotakara, who completely incorporated syllogism into inference in his *Nyāya-vārttika*,² defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by the perception of the middle term (sign) and recollection of its invariable concomitance with the major term in the following form: "I perceive that this hill has smoke, which I remember to be invariably concomitant with fire, and hence I infer that this hill has fire." The above may be properly put in the following form:—

- (1) Whatever is smoky is fiery.
- (2) This hill is smoky.
- (3) Therefore this hill is fiery.

The first part (major premise) of the above inference is called *vyāpti* (a universal proposition); the second part (minor premise) is called *upanaya* (an application of the universal); and the third part is called *anumiti* (inferential knowledge or conclusion). The first two parts (premises) constitute what is

G. ARISTOTLE.

k. *Enthymeme from a sign.*

Aristotle, in his *Prior Analytics* (bk. ii, ch. xxvii, pp. 238-40), speaks of two kinds of enthymemes, viz. the enthymeme from a sign and that from a likelihood. Now, the enthymeme from a sign³ in the first figure (especially if the sign is infallible, *tekmerion*) leads to a conclusion which is necessarily true. It is this kind of enthymeme from a sign that corresponds to the syllogism from a sign⁴ (*līṅga-parāmarśa*) as expounded by Uddyotakara.

Just as in the *Nyāya-vārttika* of Uddyotakara the syllogism (*parāmarśa*) comprises only the first two parts of an inference, so also in the Arabic Logic,⁵ (e.g. in bk. iii of the *Risalah Shamsiyyah*, dated about 1250 A.D.) the syllogism (*qayas*) comprises only the two premises and not the conclusion. It may be added that the Arabic Logic of the schools of Baghdad (ninth century A.D.), Kufa (750 A.D.), and Bassora (700 A.D.) is re-

¹ Vide S. C. Vidyābhusana's "Uddyotakara, a contemporary of Dharma-kīrti", in J.R.A.S., July 1914.

² *Līṅga-līṅgī-sambandha-darśanāntaram līṅga-darśana-sambandha-smṛtibhir līṅga-parāmarśo viśiṣyate . . . Smṛtyanugrhitō līṅga-parāmarśo 'numānam bhavati* (*Nyāya-vārttika*, I, 1, 5, p. 47, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

³ Dr. George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, *Analytica Priora*, ch. vi, pp. 291-2, gives a lucid explanation of a sign.

⁴ Dr. George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, *Analytica Priora*, ch. vi, p. 292, states in a footnote as follows: "Aristotle throws in the remark (a. 24) that, when one premises only of the Enthymeme is enunciated, it is a sign; when the other is added, it becomes a syllogism. In the examples given to illustrate the description of the Enthymeme that which belongs to the first figure has its three terms and two propositions specified, like a complete and regular syllogism."

⁵ The *Risalah Shamsiyyah* was published under the name of "The Logic of the Arabians" in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series by Dr. A. Sprenger.

called by Uddyotakara *parāmarśa*¹ (syllogism) or *līṅga-parāmarśa* (syllogism from a sign), and all the three parts combined together are designated as *parāmarśa rūpanumāna*² (a syllogistic inference). Since the time of Uddyotakara no further development has been made in the form of the syllogistic inference, except that the three parts of it have been called respectively the instrument (*karaṇa*), operation (*vyāpāra*), and consequence (*phala*). The first two parts (premises) combined together have been uniformly designated as *parāmarśa* (syllogism or enthymeme).

puted to have been derived from the *Organon* of Aristotle, as taught in a developed form in the Syro-Persian School of Gundeshapur³ in Susiana about 350 A.D.

According to certain Roman commentators⁴ too, the premises alone constitute the syllogism.

6. *Migrations of the Logical Theories of Aristotle from Alexandria into India (175 B.C.-600 A.D.)*

Considering the antiquity of the syllogism as propounded by Aristotle and the close connexion that exists between it and the syllogism promulgated in the Hindu Logic, we may fairly conclude that the latter was greatly influenced by, if not based on, the former. Aristotle's works⁵ were brought down to Alexandria (in Egypt) by Callimachus, the celebrated librarian of Ptolemy Philadelphus during 285-247 B.C., and it seems that copies of some of these works reached India through Syria, Susiana, Bactria, and Taxila in subsequent times. From the stages in the development of the syllogism in Hindu Logic, as indicated above, it will appear that Aristotle's works migrated into India during three distinct periods. The first period extends roughly from 175 B.C. to 30 B.C., when the Greeks occupied the north-western parts of

¹ Tasmāt smṛtyanugṛhīto *līṅga parāmarśo* 'bhīṣṭārtha-pratipādako bhavātīti (Nyāya-vārttika, 1, 1, 5, p. 47, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

² Tad idam antimam pratyakṣam pūrvābhyām. Pratyakṣābhyām smṛtyanugṛhyamānam *parāmarśa-rūpam anumānam* bhavati (Nyāya-vārttika, 1, 1, 5, p. 46, *Bibliotheca Indica*).

³ Vide C. Huart's *Arabic Literature*, pp. 137, 280.

⁴ George Grote, in his *Aristotle*, vol. i, *Analytica Priora*, i, ch. v, p. 206, says that Aristotle includes in a syllogism the two premises as well as the conclusion. But on the same page he quotes in a footnote the opinion of Julius Pacius (ad. *Analyt. Prior i*), who said that the syllogism consisted of the two premises alone and the conclusion was not a part thereof, but something distinct and superadded.

⁵ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. i, p. 498.

India¹ and had their capital at Śākala, officially called Euthydemia (modern Sialkot) in the Punjab. The work of Aristotle of which we find a trace in this period is the Art of Rhetoric, which was evidently a favourite subject of study among the Indian Greeks, and from which the syllogism of five members as illustrated in the Caraka-saṁhitā, referred to above, seems to have been derived. It is worthy of note that the first trace in India of Aristotle's syllogism is met with in a work the author of which was the chief physician to King Kaniṣka, who reigned in the Punjab, if not exactly in the city of Śākala, at any rate near to it. The second period extends from about 39 B.C. to 450 A.D., when the Romans, masters of Alexandria, Syria, and Persia, carried on a brisk trade between Alexandria and India. The work of Aristotle which comes to our notice in this period is the Prior and Posterior Analytics (and possibly also the De Interpretatione), from which Akṣapāda, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga seem to have, as shown above, borrowed the definition of some of the most important logical terms, the explanation of the various structures of the syllogism and the idea of a universal position, the basis of a true syllogism. The two chief among these logicians, Akṣapāda and Dignāga, were inhabitants of Kathiawar (Prabhāsa) and Conjeeveram (Kāñchī), which were the principal seaports on the eastern and western coasts of India, frequented by merchants and travellers from Alexandria. It is probable that the Prior Analytics was widely read in those days, either in the original or in vernacular translation. The introduction of different parts of the Greek Prior Analytics into Indian Logic must needs have been gradual, as these had to be assimilated into and harmonized with the parts previously ingrafted into Indian thought and language. The third period extends from about 450 A.D. to 600 A.D. when the Syro-Persian school of Gundeshapur,² established in Susiana (Persia) in 350 A.D. on the dispersion there of some of the best works of the school of Alexandria, was in the height of its glory and spread its light all around. But it is not quite certain whether any influence was exerted at this period.

I have endeavoured in the preceding pages to show that the works of Aristotle were very well known in India during the first six centuries of the Christian era. As regards the remarks of Cicero and Strabo, quoted by Sir A. Grant, that most of Aristotle's "writings had been lost,"³ I have to state that after the death of Aristotle his entire works were bought up by Callimachus⁴ for the

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xviii, p. 599.

² *Vide* Huart's *Arabic Literature*, p. 137.

³ Sir Alexander Grant's article on Aristotle in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. ii, p. 512.

⁴ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. i, p. 498.

library of Alexandria, where they were duly appreciated and whence they gradually spread to India and other countries. To the scholars at Athens and Rome these works were practically lost, until copies of some of them reached the island of Rhodes, where they were edited by Andronicus in 50 B.C. Even the edition of Andronicus was not available in the Middle Ages to the Greeks and Romans, who depended for their knowledge of Aristotle on the Latin translation of Boethius (480-525 A.D.). But the original works of Aristotle seem to have been carefully preserved in Alexandria, and on the downfall of the Greeks and Romans they found their way into Syria and Persia, whence they reached the Arabic school of Bagdad about the beginning of the ninth century A.D. The original Greek texts of Aristotle's works after these strange vicissitudes reached the country of their birth via Constantinople about 1204 A.D. The presumption, therefore, is that from the third century B.C. to 1200 A.D. Aristotle's works were more extensively read and better appreciated in the East than in the West.

APPENDIX C.¹

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDĀ.

(ABOUT 300—850 A.D.).

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Bara-gaon,² 7 miles north of Rajgir, in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pāli literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna, about 300 A.D., and Ārya Deva, about 320 A.D., were the earliest scholars to take an interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brahmana named Suviṣṇu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 108 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline.³ About 400 A.D. the Chinese pilgrim, Fahian,⁴ visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Śāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D. another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang, visited Nālandā and halted⁵ there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Śīlabhadra. According to him⁶ the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.⁷ After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, five kings, named Sakrāditya, Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the establishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing, they found the day too short, day and night

¹ From the author's "Indian Logic: Medieval School" (Appendix A).

² *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India, p. 468.

³ *Vide* Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 70—86.

⁴ *Vide* Beal's Fa-hian, p. 111.

⁵ *Vide* Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India, p. x.

⁶ *Vide* Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. ii, pp. 168—170.

⁷ It must have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to Buddha himself.

they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. "Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding."¹ Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati,² Prabhāmitra and Jinamitra, and Jñānacandra and Śilabhadra.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A.D.), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā with more than 3,000 resident monks. The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations.³

Nālandā assumed the character of a university from about 450 A.D.⁴ Bālāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula, who reigned first in Śākala and afterwards in Kāśmīra. Now Mihirakula⁵ began his reign in 515 A.D., and his contemporary, Bālāditya, must also have lived about that time. There were three predecessors of Bālāditya who built monasteries at Nālandā. Of them, the earliest, named Śākrāditya, must have reigned about 450 A.D. if we suppose 25 years as the average duration of the reign of each of them. The year 450 A.D. is then the earliest limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is

¹ *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. ii, pp. 164—165.

² This Sthiramati seemed to be the one mentioned by I-tsing (*vide* Takakusu, p. 181). He flourished after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

³ *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, pp. xxxiii, 65 and 154.

⁴ *Vide* Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. i, p. 289.

Takakusu, in his "Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu," published in the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland," January 1905, maintains that Bālāditya came to the throne in 481 A.D., but this statement is by no means final. The date (452—480 A.D.) of Vikramāditya, Bālāditya's father, is also open to dispute.

⁵ Dr. D. B. Spooner observes:—

Nālandā, as is widely known, was one of the principal seats and centres of Buddhist culture and Buddhist learning in the Gupta period of Indian history, and for some centuries thereafter. The precise date of its foundation as "University" is now unknown, but from the circumstance that the Chinese pilgrim, Fa Hien, makes no particular mention of the place, whereas the pilgrim who followed him, Hieun Thsang, describes the place at length, leads modern scholars to infer that it must have risen in the interval between the visits of these two, namely, somewhere about the middle, perhaps, of the fifth century A.D. (p. 33 of the "Annual report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Eastern Circle, for 1915-16.

750 A.D., when Kamalaśīla (*q.v.*) was the professor of Tantras at Nālanda. But as we read in the accounts of Vikramasīla that there was for some time an intercourse between that university and Nālandā, we may suppose that the latter continued to exist approximately until 850 A.D.

According to Tibetan accounts¹ the quarter in which the Nālandā University, with its grand library, was located, was called Dharmagañja (Piety Mart). It consisted of three grand buildings called Ratnasāgara, Ratnodadhi, and Ratnarañjaka, respectively. In Ratnodadhi, which was nine-storeyed, there were the sacred scripts called Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, and Tāntrik works such as Samāja-guhya, etc. After the Turuṣka raiders had made incursions in Nālandā, the temples and *Caityas* there were repaired by a sage named Mudita Bhadra. Soon after this, Kukutasiddha, minister of the king of Magadha, erected a temple at Nālandā, and, while a religious sermon was being delivered there, two very indigent Tīrthika mendicants appeared. Some naughty young novice-monks in disdain threw washing-water on them. This made them very angry. After propitiating the sun for 12 years, they performed a *yajña*, fire-sacrifice, and threw living embers and ashes from the sacrificial pit into the Buddhist temples, etc. This produced a great conflagration which consumed Ratnodadhi. It is, however, said that many of the Buddhist scriptures were saved by water which leaked through the sacred volumes of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Tantra.

¹ *Vide* Pag-sam jon-zang, edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., at Calcutta, p. 92.

APPENDIX D.¹

A LIST OF KINGS OF THE PĀLA DYNASTY OF BENGAL AND BEHAR.

(From Tibetan sources.)

In the Tibetan books,² such as *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, *Lama Taranatha's Chos-byun*, etc., we find a short account of the kings of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal. Go Pāla, the founder of the dynasty, lived principally in Puṇḍra-varḍhana. His successor, Deva Pāla, annexed Varendra to his kingdom. Deva Pāla's grandson, Dharma Pāla, conquered Magadha and annexed it to Bengal. Dharma Pāla's power is said to have extended in the east to the ocean, in the west to Delhi, in the north to Jālandhara, and in the south to the Vindhya ranges. It is stated that during his reign Śānta Rakṣita died. Now Śānta Rakṣita visited Tibet during the reign of Thi-srong-deu-tsan in 749 A.D., and worked there for 13 years, that is, till 762 A.D. His death must therefore have taken place after 762 A.D. Dīpaṅkara Śrījñāna *alias* Atiśa, High-priest Vikramaśīlā, who was a contemporary of king Naya Pāla of Magadha, visited Tibet in company with Nag-tsho-lotsava in 1040 A.D. during the reign of Lha-tsun-byañ-chub, son of Lha-lama-ye-śes-hod, who held his court at Tholing in Nāri. These facts throw a good deal of light on the dates of the Pāla kings.³ It is further stated that the death of Mahī Pāla is exactly synchronous with that of the Tibetan king Khri-ral. Now Khri-ral (or Ral-pa-can) died in 899 A.D.⁴ This fixes the date of the death of Mahī Pāla. As the period of reign of each of the kings that preceded and succeeded Mahī Pāla is definitely stated by Lama Tārānātha, and also by the author of the *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the dates of the Pāla kings. Proceeding in this way, we can fix the dates as follows :—

1. Go Pāla	660—705 A.D.
2. Deva Pāla	705—753 A.D.
3. Rasa Pāla	753—765 A.D.

¹ From the author's "Indian Logic, Medieval School" (Appendix B).

² *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, von Schiefner, pp. 202—252; and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., pp. 112—121.

³ *Vide* the 16th volume of *Klon-rdol-gsun-hbum*, and Sarat Chandra Das's "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

⁴ *Vide* the Chronological Table extracted from the *Vaiduryakarpo* in Csoma de Koros's *Tibetan Grammar*, p. 183.

4.	Dharma Pāla	765— 829 A.D.
5.	Masu Rakṣita	829— 837 A.D.
6.	Vana Pāla	837— 847 A.D.
7.	Mahī Pāla	847— 899 A.D.
8.	Mahā Pāla	899— 940 A.D.
9.	Śamu Pāla ¹	940— 952 A.D.
10.	Śreṣṭha Pāla or Praiṣṭha Pāla			952— 955 A.D.
11.	Canaka	955— 983 A.D.
12.	Bhaya Pāla	983—1015 A.D.
13.	Naya Pāla	1015—1050 A.D.
14.	Amra Pāla	1050—1063 A.D.
15.	Hasti Pāla	1063—1078 A.D.
16.	Kṣānti Pāla	1078—1092 A.D.
17.	Rāma Pāla	1092—1138 A.D.
18.	Yakṣa Pāla	1138—1139 A.D.

The researches on the Pāla kings, by the late Dr. Rājendra Lāl Mitra, arrived at a conclusion which is somewhat different from mine. Dr. Mitra's list of Pāla kings ² is given below :—

1.	Go Pāla..	855— 875 A.D.
2.	Dharma Pāla	875— 895 A.D.
3.	Deva Pāla	895— 915 A.D.
4.	Vigraha Pāla I	915— 935 A.D.
5.	Nārāyaṇa Pāla	935— 955 A.D.
6.	Rāja Pāla	955— 975 A.D.
7.Pāla	795— 995 A.D.
8.	Vigraha Pāla II	995—1015 A.D.
9.	Mahī Pāla	1015—1040 A.D.
10.	Naya Pāla	1040—1060 A.D.
11.	Vigraha Pāla III	1060—1080 A.D.

¹ Probably the same as Nārāyaṇa Pāla who, in the Bhagalpur plate, is styled "the lord of Aṅga."

² *Vide* Dr. Rājendra Lāl Mitra's "Indo-Aryans," vol. ii, p. 232.

APPENDIX E.¹

THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF VIKRAMAŚILĀ. (ABOUT 800—1200 A.D.).

Vikramaśilā,² mentioned in Sanskrit Sragdharāstotra-ṭikā,³ Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa,⁴ Tibetan Tangyur,⁵ etc., was a great collegiate monastery, or rather University, founded by king Dharma Pāla at the close of the 8th century A.D. It was situated on a precipitous hill⁶ in Behar at the right bank of the Ganges, possibly at Śīla-saṅgama, now called Pātharghātā near Colgong in the Bhagalpur district. Dharma-pāla endowed the university with rich grants sufficing for the maintenance of 108 resident monks besides numerous non-resident monks and pilgrims. At the head of the university was always a most learned and pious sage. Thus at the time of Dharma Pāla, Ācārya Buddha-jñāna-pāda directed the affairs of the university, and during 1034—1038 A.D. Dīpaṅkara or Śrījñāna Atiśa

¹ From the author's "Indian Logic : Medieval School" (Appendix C).

² Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus, von Schiefner, pp. 234—242, 259—261; Pag-sam-jon-zang, pp. 113, 117, 118; and Sarat Chandra Das's article in the "Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta", vol. i, part i, pp. 10—12; and his "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

³ The colophon of the Sragdharāstotra-ṭikā runs as follows:—

श्रीमद्विक्रमशीलदेवमहाविहारोय राजगुरुपण्डितभिचु श्रीजिनरत्नितकता बालार्कस्तुति-
टीका परिसमाप्ता (Sragdharāstotra, edited in the Bibliotheca Indica series by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, p. 50).

4 वाराणस्यां नगर्थ्यां च विहारे यत्र ख्यातिके ।
तदा विक्रमशीलसि विहारे वसदुत्तमः ॥
धर्मश्रीमित्र नामास्यं भिक्षुः पण्डितकच्चुकः ।
धर्मं दिदेश्यामास नामसङ्गोति च कथाम् ॥

(Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa, edited by M. M. Hara Prasad Sastri, chap. vi, 320—321).

⁵ Numerous Sanskrit works such as तारैकविंशतिकाङ्गसूत्रे संचेप, तारा-चिरमसोचम्, etc., were translated into Tibetan in the monastery of Vikramaśilā, as is evident from the Tangyur, Rgyud, La, Folios 11—26, 54, etc.

⁶ At the distance of a day's sail below Sultanganj there is a steep hill called Pātharghātā overhanging the Ganges, which here is *uttaravāhīnī* (or flows towards the north). This corresponds exactly with the account of Vikramaśilā given in Tibetan books. There are also ruins of Buddhist images at Pātharghātā. For its old name Śīlasaṅgama vide Francklin's "Site of Ancient Pali-bothra," pp. 54—55, Appendix, p. xiii. General Cunningham identifies Vikramaśilā with modern Silao, which is a small village three miles to the south of Bargaon (ancient Nālandā) and six miles to the north of Rajgir in the subdivision of Behar (vide Report of the Archaeological Survey, vol. viii, p. 83). But this identification does not tally with the description found in Tibetan books, for the Ganges never passed by Silao, nor is there any hill near to it.

was at its head, and Sthavira Ratnākara was the superior of the monastery. The famous Tibetan scholar Nag-tshul-khrims-rgyal-wa, better known as Nag-tsho Lotsava, who came to take Dipaṅkara Srijñāna *alias* Atiśa to Tibet, resided in the monastery of Vikramaśīlā for three years, 1035—1038 A.D.¹ Kamalakulīśā, Narendra-śrī-jñāna, Dāna Rakṣita, Abhayakara Gupta, Śubhakara Gupta, Sunāyakaśrī, Dharmākara Śānti and Śākya-śrī Paṇḍita also belonged to the university of Vikramaśīlā. Provision was made specially for the study of grammar, metaphysics (including logic) and ritualistic books. On the walls of the university were painted images of paṇḍitas eminent for their learning and character. The distinguished scholars of the university received a diploma of "Paṇḍita" from the kings themselves. For instance, the distinguished logicians, Ācārya Jetāri of Vārendra and Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra, were granted such a diploma. The most erudite sages were appointed to guard the gates of the university. These were six in number, each of which had to be guarded by scholars designated "Gate-keepers" (called in Tibetan Go-sruṅ, corresponding, perhaps, to our Dvāra-paṇḍita). During the reign of Canaka (855—983 A.D.) the undermentioned eminent logicians acted as gate-keepers:—

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| (i) At the eastern gate | .. Ācārya Ratnākara Śānti. |
| (ii) At the western gate | .. Vāgīśvarakīrti, of Benares. |
| (iii) At the northern gate | .. The famous Naropa. |
| (iv) At the southern gate | .. Prajñākaramati. |
| (v) At the first central gate | .. Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra. |
| (vi) At the second central gate | .. Jñāna-śrimitra of Gauḍa. |

The university of Vikramaśīlā is said to have been destroyed by the Mahomedan invader Bakhtiar Khilji² about 1203 A.D. when Śākya-śrī-paṇḍita, of Kāśmīra, was at its head.

¹ Vide Klon-rdol-gsuṅ-hbum, vol. xvi.

² Vide the Tibetan English Dictionary compiled by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, p. 869; Waddell's "Lamaism," p. 16.

The Turuṣkas or Mahomedans attacked Magadha several times. Thus Tārānātha, speaking of Ācārya Kamala Rakṣita who was at the head of the Vikramaśīlā university at the end of the 10th century A.D., observes:—"A minister of the Turuṣka king, out of the Karna land in the west, together with 500 Turuṣkas, drew to Magadha to plunder. They plundered the sacrificial materials, but when they began to walk all in a body to the Ācārya (Kamala Rakṣita) the Ācārya got into a rage and walked up along, throwing a jug, filled with water, over which he had spoken the mantras. On the spot a great and indomitable storm collected, out of the wind came forth many black men armed with swords who fell upon the Turuṣkas; the minister himself perished spitting blood, and various contagious illnesses repulsed the others in such a way that none of them could reach their native country, and a great terror came over the Tīrthas and Turuṣkas—Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus, von Schiefner, pp. 266, 261.

APPENDIX F.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MITHILĀ.

(1175—1575 A.D.).

In the Rāmāyana, Mahābhārata and in Buddhistic literature, Mithilā or Tirhut figures as a renowned kingdom. Mithilā was protected on the north by the impenetrable jungles of the Himalayas. On the other three sides the three rivers Gandaki, Ganges and Kauśaki¹ surrounded it, while the land itself is intersected by small rivers. On account of the natural protection, Tirhut was not attacked by foreign invaders frequently though we hear that in the 13th century it was attacked by the ninth Malik Izzuddin-Tughril (1233—1244 A.D.) When Vijaya Sen was reigning in Bengal, Nānyadeva² of the Karnatak dynasty was ruling in Mithilā in 1097 A.D. He was defeated by king Vijaya³ from whom again Nānyadeva's son, Gangadeva, recovered Mithilā. Nānyadeva reigned for 36 years and died in 1125 A.D. He was succeeded by Gangadeva. He was succeeded by his son, Nṛsimhadeva. The kings that succeeded Nṛsimhadeva were Rām Simha, Śakti Simha, Bhūpati Simha and Hara Simha. Their reign comprised 216 years. Roughly speaking the Karnāta dynasty reigned from 1150—1395 A.D. Then the Kāmeśvara dynasty succeeded whose reign extended from 1350—1515 A.D. They are:—(1) Kameśvara, (2) Bhāgīśvara, (3) Gaṇeśvara, (4) Vīsimhadeva (5) Kīrtisimha, (6) Bhavasimhadeva, (7) Devasimha, (8) Śīvasimha, (9) Padmasimha, (10) Harasimhadeva, (11) Nṛsimha or Narasimha, (12) Dhīrasimha, (13) Bhairava, (14) Rāmabhadradeva, (15) Lakṣmīnāthadeva. Then followed Maheśvara Thakkura, who founded a line of Rajas in 1556, during the time of Emperor Akbar

¹ History of Mithilā during the pre-Mughal period and History of Navya-Nyāya and Smṛit, November and December, 1915. Rai Monmohan Chakravarti Bahadur; *vide* also University of Nadia by Satis Chandra Vidya-bhusana.

मन्देन्दुबिन्दुविधुसमितशकवर्षे
तच्छाषणे सितदले सुनिसिद्ध तिर्य्यां
स्वाती शनैश्चरुते कविवैरि लघ्ने
तन्नान्यदेव नृपतिर्विदधीत वा स्तुन ॥

Vide the Rock-Edicts on the ruined walls of the ancient fort of Simrāon.

लं नान्यवैरि विजयौति गिरः कवीनां
अत्यन्थयामनन निगूढ बोधः ।

Deopara Vijaya Sen Inscription.

which has continued up to the present time. Most of the later productions of Mithilā appeared in these periods.

The Modern School of Nyāya commenced with Gaṅgeśa on the eve of the 12th century. Similar is the case with Smṛti writers who began with Graheśvara in the 13th century.

The most important scholar of the Kāmeśvara period is

Writers of the Mithilā
in modern times.

Jagaddhara who besides writing commentaries on a variety of subjects, such as the Gītā, Devīmahātmya, Meghadūta, Gīta

Govinda and Mālatī Mādhava and others, wrote original treatises on erotics (Rasika Sarvasva, Saṅgīta Sarvasva). The next is Vidyāpati whose name is associated with Maithili songs or Padāvalī generally. His works stirred up the later Vaiṣṇava writers of Bengal. The next scholar to be mentioned is Śaṅkara Miśra. His works on the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya are of high value. His other works on Smṛti are also of great value.

The next scholar of great importance is Vācaspati Miśra who flourished in the time of Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra and wrote mainly on the Smṛti. But the great influence of the age did not spare him and he wrote also on Nyāya. His works on the latter subject are the Nyāya-sūtrādhāra, Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍādhāra and the Anumāna-khaṇḍa-ṭīka, his other works being the Nīti-cintāmaṇi, a work on the morals.

Many other scholars flourished at this time. But they are overshadowed by the glory and achievements of the scholars named above. It was an age of great scholastic activities. The glory of Mithilā was at its height, and its fame spread throughout all centres of oriental learning in India.

Thus Mithilā was the principal seat of Hindu learning in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries A.D. and was the resort of a large number of students who flocked there from all parts of India to study specially Logic or Nyāya philosophy.¹

¹ Students who finished their education in Mithilā had to undergo an examination called Needle Examination, Śalākā-parīkṣā. They were asked to explain the page pierced last by a needle. In this way they had to show their skill in any part of a book. After passing the examination they received the diploma of the Mithilā University.

APPENDIX G.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NADIA. (1575—1920 A.D.).

Navadvīpa, which is popularly known as Nadia, is a small town in Bengal situated on the river Bhāgīrathī (Ganges) at the point of its junction with the Jalāngī. It occupies the north-western part of the Gangetic delta and literally signifies “a new isle.” Once it was a very important centre through which trade was carried on by the Bhāgīrathī between Saptagrāma (a port on the river Sarasvatī, a little to the north-west of Huglī and nearly 15 krośas south of Nadia) and the United Provinces and by the Jalāngī between Saptagrāma and Eastern Bengal.

Nearly four miles to the east of the modern town of Nadia there is a small village called Suvarṇa-vihāra (golden hermitage) which is often pointed out as the place where the Buddhist Kings of the Pāla dynasty used to reside in the days of yore, when a branch of the Bhāgīrathī, flowing from the north of the modern village Māyāpur, rolled below the hermitage. Even now the ruins of the ancient buildings can be found here and there, silently testifying to the former grandeur of the place. The decaying stone column and fragments found here bear clearly the architectural designs of Buddhist India, which may be taken as proof that the place was once a temporary resort of the Pāla Kings. Relying upon these facts the existence of Nadia can be traced back to the 10th century A.D.

But, practically speaking, Nadia was unknown in history until it rose to importance for the first time in 1063 A.D. (or rather about 1106 A.D.) when, according to a local legend cited in the Imperial Gazetteer¹ of India and Statistical Account of Bengal² it was selected by Mahārāja Lakṣmaṇa Sena of Gauda³ as the place of his residence in consideration of the sanctity of the Bhāgīrathī flowing by it. The ruins of the palace of Lakṣmaṇa Sena are still extant in Nadia at the south of the village Bīlpukur and north of the village Samudragada

¹ W. W. Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. VII, p. 13.

² W. W. Hunter's Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. II, p. 142.

³ Lakṣmaṇa Sena is said to have reigned in Bengal between 1106 and 1138 A.D. For the date of the kings of the Sena dynasty, *vide* Rajendra Lal Mitra's Indo-Aryans, Vol. II, p. 256.

between the Bhāgīrathī and Jalāngī. About a mile to the north-east of Nadia there is a tank called Ballāla Dighi which is said to have been dug by Lakṣmaṇa Sena to commemorate the name of his father, the famous Ballāla Sena.

Lakṣmaṇa Sena (1106–1138 A.D.), who raised Nadia to the status of a town, is said to have been a great hero, whose prime minister was Halāyudha, the renowned author of Brāhmaṇa-sarvasva, Smṛti-sarvasva, Mīmāṃsā-sarvasva, and Nyāya-sarvasva. The court of Lakṣmaṇa Sena was also adorned by Paśupati, the eldest brother of Halāyudha, who wrote a treatise on Hindu ceremonials called Paśupati-paddhati; Sūlapāṇī, the reputed author of Smṛti-viveka, Jayadeva, a native of Kendubilva, Birbhum and the well-known author of Gītagovinda; Dhoyi, the author of Pavana-dūta; and Umāpati, the poet who made “language to sprout into luxuriant foliage”—all these flourished in the court of Lakṣmaṇa Sena.¹

Though Lakṣmaṇa Sena resided in Nadia, he greatly embellished the city of Gauḍa, which was the capital of Bengal at that time and was called Lakṣmaṇavati or Lakhnauti after his name. Nadia conquered by the Mahomedans. Lakṣmaṇa Sena was succeeded by Mādhava Sena (1138–39) Keśava Sena (1139) and Lakṣmaṇeya Sena alias Aśoka Sena (1139–1205 A.D.) The last king named Lakṣmaṇeya, designated by Mahomedan writers as Lakṣmaniya, was overthrown by Mahammad Bakhtiar Khiliji and was forced to run away to Vikramapura in Eastern Bengal about 1197 A.D. Bakhtiar Khiliji who marched with his troops from Behar to Nadia, plundered the latter town, and placing a Kazi there to look after its internal administration, himself proceeded to Gauḍa which he conquered. Subduing Gauḍa he chose it as the capital of whole Bengal which he ruled up to 1200 A.D. The Mahomedans ruled Bengal from 1198 to 1757 A.D., when the battle of Plassey took place and the country came into the possession of the British.

During the Mahomedan rule from 1198 to 1757 A.D., Nadia became the greatest centre of Hindu learning in Bengal. In the 15th century A.D. the nucleus of a university was formed here. It is not known how much aid was directly given by the Mahomedan rulers towards the formation of this university, but it cannot be denied that their having expelled the Buddhists from every corner of Bengal and having stood as safeguards against all for-

¹ Batū Dāsa was the general of the army of Lakṣmaṇa Sena. His son, Śrīdhara Dāsa, who wrote a book named Sadukti-karṇāmrta in 1209 A.D., has mentioned many of the learned men of his time.

eign invaders, enabled the Brāhmanas to lay the foundation of this new university on strictly orthodox Hindu principles.

Before the rise of the Nadia University in Bengal there were two famous Universities in Behar, *viz.* the Buddhist University of Vikramaśilā and the Brahmanic University of Mithilā. Vikramaśilā is said to have been burnt and destroyed by Bakhtiar Khiliji about 1198 A.D., when he marched from Behar towards Nadia, while the glory of the University of Mithilā was extinguished by the energy of the rising scholars of Nadia. Mithilā, which was a principal seat of Hindu learning in the 14th century A.D., was the resort of a large number of students who flocked there from all parts of India to study specially the Nyāya philosophy (Logic). Knowing her importance Mithilā guarded with extreme care and even jealousy her own teachings and did not permit any student to take away from any *tol*¹ any logical book or even notes of the lectures delivered there. Students were allowed to go away only with their diplomas. This rule was a great obstacle to the study and teaching of Logic outside Mithilā. This great inconvenience was at last removed by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Nadia, as already related in his life.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of immortal memory founded in the University of Nadia a special Chair of Logic which has since been occupied by the best and foremost logicians of Bengal. Ability to write works of original merit did not alone constitute the sole and sufficient qualification of an occupant of the chair, but an exceptional dialectical skill was regarded to be the *sine qua non* for the candidate. Accordingly it was only those who in a large assembly of scholars could effectively silence their opponents in open debate, could with any chance of success lay a claim to the chair. The Nadia University has produced numerous logicians of eminence since the time of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, who was the

¹ A *tol* consists generally of a thatched chamber in which the Pandit and the class meet, and a collection of mud hovels round a quadrangle, in which the students live in the simplest manner. Each student has his own hut, in which there is scarcely any furniture except his brass water-pot and mat. A student remains at the *tol* often for eight or ten years, according to whether he is studying law or logic. The Pandit does not always live at the *tol*, but comes every day on which study takes place, from an early hour till sunset. The huts are built and repaired at his expense. No fees are charged, and until recent years the Pandit even helped to provide his pupils with food and clothing. He himself obtained the necessary funds by grants and by the presents which his fame as a teacher ensured to him at religious ceremonies. The usual number of students in a *tol* is about twenty-five, though there may be more. These in most cases have no means of subsistence. The teacher provides them with shelter and free tuition, and food and clothes they obtain from him and also from shopkeepers and landholders and by begging at the chief festivals.

(" Ancient Indian Education " by Rev. F. E. Keay, p. 52.)

founder and first occupant of the Chair of Logic. During recent times the following were the senior logicians of Bengal :—

- (1) Harirāma Tarka-siddhānta (about 1730 A.D.).
- (2) Ramanārāyaṇa Tarka-pañcānana (about 1760 A.D.).
- (3) Buno Rāmanātha (probably 1770).
- (4) Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgiśa (probably 1780 A.D.).
- (5) Śaṅkara Tarkavāgiśa (about 1800 A.D.).
- (6) Śivanātha Vidyāvācaspai (1810 A.D.).

This last mentioned gentleman was son of Śaṅkara Tarkavāgiśa and exhibited his dialectic skill in a debate with the famous Jagannātha Tarka-pañcānana of Bansberia. He was succeeded by

- (7) Kāśinātha Cūḍāmaṇi (about 1820 A.D.).
- (8) Daṇḍi (about 1830 A.D.).
- (9) Śrīrāma-Śiromāṇi—(author of Padārtha-tattva).

(10) Mādhava Tarka-siddhānta (about 1850 A.D.) was originally a court Pandit of Naldāṅga, but subsequently came to settle at Nadia. He was the author of a commentary called Subodhā on the Padārtha-tattva. He was succeeded by

(11) Haramohan Cūḍāmaṇi, author of Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, who was a contemporary of Mādhava Tarkasiddhānta and Prasanna Tarkaratna (1870 A.D.) Principal and founder of Paka-tol. About this time Golakanātha Nyāyaratna (about 1854 A.D.) was a great logician.

Pandit Harinātha Tarka-siddhānta, who died in 1890 A.D. was a logician of high order, though not the senior logician. Subsequently Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhuvanamohana Vidyāratna, Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣṇa Tarkapañcānana, Mahāmahopādhyāya Jadunātha Sārvabhauma and Mahāmahopādhyāya Kāmikhyānātha Tarkavāgiśa became the senior logicians.

I happened to be present at the Council of debate, held at Rājibāti, Nadia, in which Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣṇa Tarkapañcānana was declared the senior logician in 1894 A.D. The rival candidate was Jadunātha Sārvabhauma. The Maharaja of Nadia opened the debate in the presence of Pandits and Professors, which was to decide the fate of the two candidates. The questions to be debated were (1) “Whether there is re-birth!” and (2) “Whether Nirvāṇa is possible!”

Mahāmahopādhyāya Jadunātha Sārvabhauma, whose erudition and energy were manifest to all and commanded the respect of every scholar, was first to take up the questions and lead the debate. He tackled the questions thoroughly and answered them from every possible point of view. But his exposition was of such an abstruse character that it was only the experts who could follow

him. Then came the turn of Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣṇa Tarkapañcānana, who took up the same questions and explained them fully, steadily and clearly. He elucidated each difficult word and that so thoroughly and clearly that every point in the argument was driven home to the audience. He then assailed the arguments put forward by his rival and thoroughly exposed his hasty exposition. Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣṇa, in recognition of his lucid exposition and convincing logic, was declared senior logician by the Council.

In Smṛti there is a chair¹ of the Senior Smārta (Jurist), which was inaugurated by Raghunandana, the most famous jurist of his time. Raghunandana flourished in the sixteenth century A.D. His Jyotiś-tattva was compiled in 1489 Śaka or 1567 A.D. After him there flourished Srikrṣṇa Sārvabhauma, Srikrṣṇa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gopāla Nyāyālaṅkāra, Daitya Bireśvara and Rāmānanda Vācaspati, Bireśvara Nyāyapañcānana, Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa, Lakṣmīkānta Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, Brajanātha Vidyāratna, Mathurānātha Padaratna, Lālmohan Vidyāvāgīśa, Śivanātha Vacaspati, Mahāmahopādhyāya Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana and Jogendranātha Smṛtītīrtha.

Tāntrik studies flourished under Kṛṣṇānanda Agamvāgīśa and his followers.

A chair of astronomy was established in Nadia a long time ago. As late as 1718 A.D. there was born in Gārgya gotra an astronomer named Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi who was the author of Jyotiṣa-sāra-saṅgraha and Court-Pandit of Pañcakota. From the time of Mahārāj Kṛṣṇacandra Roy, Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi, who is related by blood with the compiler of this work, was also a Court-Pandit to the Raj-family of Krishnagar. He and his successors, Rāmakṛṣṇa Vidyāmaṇi, Prāṇanātha Vidyābharāṇa, Rāmājaya Śiromaṇi, Śrīdāma Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Tāriṇīcharaṇa Vidyāvāgīśa, Durgādāsa Vidyāratna and Pandit Bīśvambhara Jyotiṣārṇava successively held the chair of senior astronomer in Nadia. Almanacs were prepared by them, which were supplied to the Nawab's Court in Murshidabad as well as to the East India Company, the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Bengal Government, etc. Pandit Viśveśvara Jyotiṣārṇava, the brother of the compiler of this work, was the last senior astronomer, who supplied almanacs to the High Court, etc. The Navadvīpa Pañjikā under the imprimatur of Nava-dvīpādhipate-ranujñayā is accepted by all the landholders of Bengal.

¹ Vide Navadvīpa Mahimā, by Kanti Chandra Barhi and "Nadia Kāhinī," by Kumudanath Mullick.

APPENDIX H.

THE TASHI LAMA'S VISIT TO INDIA.

During the year 1905, His Holiness the Tashi Lama, accepted the invitation of the Government of India to be present at the reception to be held by their Royal Highnesses, the Prince and Princess of Wales. With full staff His Holiness left Shigatse for India early in November (8th Nov.). The Government of India made ample provision for the reception and escort of the party. Accordingly Captain W. F. O'Connor, C.I.E., British Trade Agent, Gyantse (Tibet), Captain R. Steen, I.M.S., Medical Officer, Gyantse, Maharaj Kumar Sidkyong Tulku, C.I.E. of Sikkim, Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana of the Presidency College, were deputed by the Government of India to receive the party.

Tashi Lama and his party.

In addition to this about sixty Lamas and laymen accompanied the party. From Shigatse to Darjeeling, the Tashi Lama travelled by easy stages halting at various stations. At Gangtok His Holiness and his followers were the guests of the Maharaja of Sikkim who placed his palace at their disposal. The party then started for Darjeeling. Great was the excitement when the party arrived there about afternoon on Wednesday, the 29th November, 1905. Crowds went out to meet him. At Jalapahar and Ghoom, the Bhutias prostrated themselves as he passed, touching his garments and even his baggage to receive a blessing. Special arrangements were made at the Drumdruid Hotel, and His Holiness was received with a Tibetan salutation. The party started for Kurseong by a special train and a special trolley conveyed His Holiness to Siliguri where he was joined by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. At Siliguri, all round the camp lay camps of devout Bhutias, who, clad in their motley dress, had ridden in for miles to pay their respects to the Lama. His Holiness and suite arrived at Rawalpindi on the 7th December at 2-30 p.m. and on the same day His Holiness had an audience with His Royal Highness the Prince and Princess of Wales. On the 10th December, 9-30 a.m., His Holiness left for Taxila, called in Tibetan Do-Jog, about 26 miles north of Rawalpindi, whence he started for Agra, which place he reached on 11th December. About five days after, 16th December, the party arrived at Benares where he was accommodated in the Hotel de Paris. On the same day the Lama visited the Buddhist ruins of Sarnath about 4 miles north of Benares. Here, on the 18th December, Captain O'Connor accompanied by Professor

Tashi Lama in India.

Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and the tutor of the Lama went to the Government College to make a preliminary examination of the Brahminic Sanskrit manuscripts, copies of which had already been translated into Tibetan at various dates between 629 A.D. and 1400 A.D. At 4 P.M. the Tāshi Lama, together with his minister and the Māharāj Kumar of Sikkim, visited the College and examined the various Sanskrit manuscripts. The party started for Buddha Gaya where His Holiness was a guest of the Mahant. On the 20th December Captain O'Connor, accompanied by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana and others, made a preliminary inspection of the sacred sites in Buddha Gaya. The Tāshi Lama offered his worship to the Bodhi tree and the image of Buddha on the 21st December, one of the most auspicious days according to the Tibetan calendar. On entering the sacred shrine His Holiness bowed down before the great image and sat down himself. An hour after His Holiness came out of the temple and changed his dress for a yellow one and sat in meditation in the *vaijṛāsana* under the Bodhi tree for about three hours from 9 A.M. to 12 A.M., while his numerous devotees stood round him in deep silence. At noon the Lama opened his eyes and received ovations and gifts from his followers.

The Tāshi Lama left Buddha Gaya at 10 P.M. on the 25th December and reached Calcutta by a special train on the 26th at 7-30 A.M. He was greeted by a salute of 17 guns and was received by the Aide-de-Camp of the Viceroy. His Holiness was accommodated at Hastings House and was a guest of the Government of India. On the 2nd January His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales received a state visit from the Tashi Lama. His Highness appeared before the heir-apparent of the Imperial throne of Great Britain in all the dignity of his high place and made offerings to His Royal Highness. From the 5th to the 11th January, His Holiness attended the garden party at the Government House, witnessed illuminations and was greatly delighted with all he saw. His Holiness also received their Royal Highnesses when they paid their return visit. On the 11th January, His Holiness left Calcutta, and, on the eve of his departure, in appreciation of the great assistance rendered by Professor Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, presented to him the Khatag or complimentary silken scarf. The departure was public and was honoured by 17 guns.

Captain O'Connor accompanied His Holiness up to Siliguri and Lieutenant Bailey accompanied the Tāshi Lama's departure. Lama all the way up to Shigatse. On the way back His Holiness was hospitably received at Chumbi. The party reached Gyantse on the 3rd February.

APPENDIX I.

REMINISCENCES OF A VISIT TO LABRANG, PAMIYANG- CHI AND PADANGI.

Having being associated with Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., in the compilation of the *Journey to Labrang.* Tibetan Dictionary, I heard of the fame of Labrang and Pamiyangchi as two old monasteries.

About 1907 I learnt that there were two block prints of the *Bstan h-gyur* and *Bka h-gyur* at Labrang and Pamiyangchi and I undertook my journey there with the express purpose of examining the manuscripts and endeavouring to extend the knowledge of Sanskrit through the study of the Tibetan.

I started with credentials, from Mr. (afterwards Sir) A. Earle, Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, and Mr. C. H. Bompas, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling. On the 31st May, 1907, I left Darjeeling at 10 A.M. At the time of my departure from my residence at Darjeeling Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das came to see me, offering me a dozen of oranges and a lantern. He said, "Accept these as a traveller's humble gifts." I received them with delight and found them very useful on the way.

Riding a distance of about 22 miles I arrived in the evening at the Teesta Bridge. This is a very important frontier station between Tibet, Sikkim, and India, and through it the British mission passed to Lhasa in 1903-04. There is a magnificent bridge over the river Teesta and there is a small bazar where edibles are procurable. I was welcomed here by the Deputy Forest Ranger, who accommodated me in the upper flat of a new building erected by a Marwari trader in the centre of the bazar. Within a mile of the bazar there is a Triveni junction, where the Fangeet and another river flow into the Teesta. Nepalese and other hillmen attach great sanctity to these junctions, where they wash themselves every year at *Pous Sankranti* (about the middle of January). On this occasion they sacrifice goats and sheep and hold a fair which continues for three days. Teesta Bridge is a very charming place surrounded by hills and dales.

In the morning of 1st June, I left the Teesta Bridge Valley and following up the course of the river Teesta, by the Tibetan trade route, I arrived in the evening at the Rung-Po Valley. It is fifteen miles to the north of Teesta Bridge and is situated on the river Rung-Po, on which there is an artistic drawbridge. The source of the river,

according to local information, lies on a snow-covered lake at Phari. The Rung-Po Valley commands a very conspicuous position in Sikkim on the way to the territory of the Grand Lama. The musical rippling of the river and the artless beauty of the hills surrounding the valley are imposing and impressive. The grandeur of the landscape, specially in the evening, can better be imagined than described.

There are very few human habitations here, still there is a bazar where rice, *dal*, *ghee* and even potatoes are available. Besides, there are a post office, a telegraph office, a medical hospital, a police station and an excise patrol and a magnificent Dak Bungalow—all testifying to the great importance of the place.

In the morning of 2nd June I left Rung-Po Valley for Gangtok. The river Rung-Po falls into the

Gangtok.

Teesta at a place called Bhotang which is about a mile down the Rung-Po Valley. Again following up the course of the river Teesta, I arrived at a place called Singdom which is 7 miles up the Rung-Po Valley. Here there is a magnificent bridge over a small river which flowing from upper Sikkim, empties itself into the Teesta. Bidding farewell to my old friend—the Teesta—I pursued this new river which took me to a place called Khola Bridge, 12 miles north of Rung-Po Valley. This place derives its name from the beautiful bridge which is supported by a spring. Crossing this and several other bridges and passing through hills and dales, I arrived in the evening at Gangtok, 27 miles north of Rung-Po Valley. It is the present capital of Sikkim, situated on the peak of a hill girt by two rivers on its sides. There is a good road from Gangtok. The good-natured Maharaja of Sikkim and the intelligent Maharani are both very much interested in Buddhism and showed me the kindest consideration.

Mr. J. C. White, C.I.E., Political Resident of Sikkim, to whom I was already known in connection with the Tashi Lama's pilgrimage in India, received me very kindly and gave me letters of introduction to the Lamas at Labrang and Phodang, a copy of it is given below :—

ལས་ཡིག།

༄༅། འབྲས་ལྗོངས་སྤྱི་བྱུང་བློ་བཟང་མ་ཉེ་བ་ནས། ལྷ་བྱང་འདུས་ཚོགས་
 ལྷན་རྒྱས་ལགས་སུ། ལྷ་བྱང་འབྲས་ལྗོངས་ལས་ལྷ་མོ་དེ་སི་ཙན་ལྷ་ས་
 འབྲི་མི་ཡ་འབྲས་སན་དེ་བཞིན་དེ་ག་ལྷ་བྱང་དུ་བསྐྱོན་འབྱུང་བའི་དེ་མེད་ཞེས་ཆ་ལྷ་
 ཉེགས་བྱ་བར་འབྲུ་རྩིས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལྷ་གས་སུ་ཉིད་རྣམས་ནས་བོད་ཉི་རྣམས་ཁྱོད་

བཅུག་དགོས་དང་། ལྷག་པར་ཁོང་ལ་རོགས་རམ་གང་དགོས་ཅི་ཡོད་ཀྱི་དགོས་པ་
 དེ་ལྷགས་ཐུགས་འཇགས་ཀྱི། མི་ལྷག་ཆེ་བ་བཞི་པའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་ལྷ་ལ་སྒྲུབ་དོན་གོ་
 ཁྱི་ནས། སུལ།

འབྲས་ལྗོངས་སྤྱི་ཁྱབ་ཁྲོམ་ས་ཉེ་བ་ཀྱི་ས་ཡིག།

PASS-PORT.

From

WARA SAHIB,

Political Resident of Sikkim.

To

The Council of Monks,
 Labrang.

Communication :

Now from here Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana is going to Labrang to see and examine Bstan-h-gyur, how much of it is there. For that purpose the Lamas must let him read the Puthis. Moreover whatever assistance he wants must be given. In this direction keep your heart—I request.

Fire sheep year, fourth month, date 25th, from Gangtok Kuthi sent letter from

WARA SAHIB,

Political Resident, Sikkim,

1907

(SD.) G. J. WHITE,

Political Officer.

Gangtok, 4th June, 1907.

A similar letter was written to the Phodang Lama's monastery.

I got this letter at about 2 P.M. and started in the company of my attendants towards Labrang. The Hospitality of a lady. weather that day was extremely foul and some inhabitants of Sikkim advised us not to set out that afternoon. But as the time at our disposal was rather short, and we could ill afford to lose even a single day, we felt constrained to start that very afternoon, even in the face of the stormy weather. We had not gone far when the sky began to pour forth in torrents. Taking the reins of the horse in one hand and the umbrella in the other we tried to brave the elemental frowns as best as we could. But we got terribly drenched and thoroughly exhausted after a short time, and to our consternation we saw the shades of the evening were falling fast. Swiftly we rode on but no trace of human habitation was to be found. At last the darkness of the night made it absolutely impossible for us to keep the horses on the roads, and every moment they began to stumble. Thoroughly exhausted and horribly frightened, we looked for human abodes but none could be found—it was dreary and desolate

all around. We saw one or two lights on the way but we could never reach them, they seemed ever so far off and twinkled more like will-o'-the-wisp. At last at about 11 we saw the unmistakable glow of a lamp, coming out from a humble cottage. The Lama, who was our guide and interpreter, knocked at the door, but the inmate would not open the door easily. "Are these ghosts or elves that come to me at so late an hour in the night?" That was the first murmur that reached our ears, and we came to know that it was a woman that spoke. We had no breath to argue with her. We begged and implored, and to our relief the door flew open and we saw she was preparing barley flour then. She received us very hospitably and gave us plenty of milk she had kept reserved for selling in the following morning. Our cook got this milk properly warmed on the fire and some of our attendants prepared tea with it. I drank a quantity of milk and felt somewhat refreshed. She supplied us with water which she kept in very big bamboos from which the soft portions had been carefully scooped out. These bamboos contained enough water for us to cleanse our hands and feet, etc. We learnt from her that her son was a Thapa Lama that is, one who is dedicated to the service of the church, which he serves for six days in the week, and is also allowed to keep his connection with his home to which he is allowed to return on the seventh day. Next morning we were going to take leave of her when she insisted on my divining some future truth with regard to her son. The inhabitants of the place have no other conception of a scholar than as an astrologer and a physician. Learning that I was a scholar, she had inferred that *ipso facto* I knew divination and pressed me with importunity to let her know whether her son was to be blessed with a child or not. I found myself in a queer position. I looked at the palm of her hands and said: "Your object will be fulfilled by the grace of Buddha whom you will adore with devotion for two years."

Then we took leave of her and arrived in the morning of the 4th at the Labrang Monastery. Subsequently I visited Phodang, which is only one mile from Labrang.

Labrang, which is 77 miles north of Darjeeling, is situated on a beautiful hill overlooking the snowy range of Khangri. There is an old monastery belonging to the oldest religious sect of Tibet, named *Nying-ma-pa* or the unreformed sect. It contains images of Buddha, Bodhisattvas and saints, and a very large collection of the Tibetan Buddhist manuscripts and block prints including the encyclopædias of the Kangyur and the Tangyur.

Phodang is nearly a mile below Labrang. Here, too, there is an old monastery (which is being reconstructed) belonging to the Karma-pa sect of Tibet. This monastery is said to have been

founded in 1725 A.D. by the then Maharaja of Sikkim who visited the headquarters of the Karma-pa sect in the north of Lhasa and was asked by the head of that sect to establish some Karma-pa monasteries in Sikkim. In the Phodang monastery too there are numerous images and books, but the Tangyur is not to be found here. It is surprising to find that the veneration shown here by Lamas to Buddha is not so great as that shown to Karma-pa, the founder of the sect. Karma-pa's image adorns the very centre of the sanctuary, while on his left side is the image of the Indian saint Pe-ma-jungne (called in Sanskrit Padma-sambhava) who founded Lamaism in Tibet about 747 A.D. To his left is the image of Sākya-Thub-pa or Buddha, who preached the doctrine of Nirvāṇa nearly 2,400 years ago. There are images of such saints as Srid-du-rim-po-che, Chong-kha-pa, Gye-chag-rim-po-che and others.

I examined a considerable portion of the manuscripts and block prints at Labrang where the Lamas gave me all possible help in the matter. I could not stay there for more than a week because the provisions I carried from Darjeeling and Gangtok were all exhausted. At Phodang and Labrang very few edibles are available, even rice, salt and oil are not obtainable there. The people pass their days round their blazing hearth and depend entirely upon *tsam-pa* or flour from the parched barley. A dish of bamboo offshoot being regarded as a great delicacy. Their only luxury is tea unmixed with milk or sugar. The Marwaris, whom one can see in almost every hill or wood where there are three or four householders or coolies, have totally failed in their enterprise here. I heard that a Marwari retail-dealer had once set up a small shop here, but finding demand of no kind had to break it up.

Both Phodang and Labrang are solitary places almost abandoned by men. On the way from Gangtok to Labrang—a distance of thirteen miles—I found no human habitation and came across only three cowherds who had come from distant villages to graze their cattle. Sikkim is very thinly populated. I asked an old man at Labrang why the road from Gangtok to that place was bad and there were no shops. The reply was: "because no Englishman treads the path. There are very few people here. Our only hope is that with the increase of population in the plains men might revert to the hills to make them comfortable."

I passed a week at Phodang and Labrang very happily. I have never seen people more simple or more charitable than the Lamas there.

Sikkim was inhabited by Lepchas who were a mild pastoral race without any settled government. Buddhism was unknown in the country and the

only creed that seems to have prevailed was Bon which was a kind of devil worship. Sikkim emerges into the ken of history in 1641 A.D., when a man named Phun-tshog-nam-gyal, supposed to be of Tibetan origin, was, in fulfilment of a prophecy, made king by Lha-tsun-chen-po and two other learned priests who had come from Tibet to spread Lamaism. By efforts of the priests and their followers and patronage of the king and his successors Buddhism or rather Lamaism, was firmly established and became the state religion in Sikkim. People from Tibet, Bhutan, China, Mongolia and Nepal migrated to Sikkim and were mixed up with the Lepchas to give rise to a new race called Bhuteas. They profess Lamaism and have built numerous monasteries, temples, *chaityas*, etc. The Tibetan term for a monastery is *gumpa*, meaning a solitary place or hermitage. There are 35 monasteries in Sikkim of which Sang-ngag-tsi-ling, Pamiangchi, Tashiding, Phodang and Labrang are the chief. These were visited by the writer of this both during his travels in Sikkim in June 1907 and October 1908. Sang-ngag tsi-ling, 47 miles west of Gantok and founded in 1697 A.D., is a most democratic institution which is open to all classes of Tibetans, Lepchas, Limbus, etc., both male and female. It consists of several two-storeyed stone-buildings with a spacious quadrangle and the largest collection of curios and arts. Pamiangchi, facing the Kanchanjangha peaks and founded in 1705 A.D., is an aristocratic institution whose gates are shut against women and which is supposed to be managed by celibate monks of pure Tibetan race. It has lately been reconstructed and consists of a grand three-storeyed stone building. Tashiding, situated on the confluence of the rivers Rathong and Rungeet, was founded in 1716 A.D. It is the holiest place resorted to by pilgrims from all quarters. Phodang, 13 miles north-east of Gangtok and facing the snow of Khangri, was founded in 1740 A.D. on the site once occupied by the fort of the Bhutanese invaders. All its Head Lamas were disturbed by evil spirits that appeared in the shapes of scorpions, rock-snakes, etc., until one named Dum-chot totally destroyed them by his magic powers. The monastery has recently been rebuilt, and its Head Lama at the time of my visit was the late Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, Sid-kayong-tul-ku. Labrang, 2 miles above Phodang, is a very secluded monastery founded by a prince of Sikkim in 1844 A.D. All these monasteries, built on the traditions of old Buddhist monasteries, stand on the tops of hills, and belong to the Nying-ma-pa or Redhat sect, with the exception of Phodang which belongs to the Karmapa sect. They contain a large collection of Tibetan manuscripts and xylographs, but the famous encyclopædia called the Tangyur is contained only in Labrang and Pamiangchi. Almost every family in Sikkim is bound to spare at least one boy for devotion to the

monastery, and he has to undergo various grades of training before attaining the exalted position of a Lama. It is to be regretted that the pure Lepchas are rapidly dying out, and the Bhuteas cannot stand the heat of Sikhim below the height of 6,000 feet. Since the termination of the wars with Nepal, the Nepalese have been rushing in large numbers and in a few years almost the whole of Sikhim will be occupied by them.

APPENDIX J.

REMINISCENCES OF A VISIT TO PAMIYANGCHI.

During the Puja vacation of the year 1908, I received a letter of invitation from the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim. His Highness the Maharaja Sir Thu-tob-nam-gyal, K.C.I.E., of Sikkim was very anxious to give me all comforts on the way to Pamiyangchi, and the Maharani, a daughter of the Prime Minister of Tibet, wrote to the authorities of the Pamiyangchi monastery on my behalf. I also received the following letter from Her Highness the Maharani of Sikkim enquiring the date on which I might start :—

Bhutia Sa Tel
Year, 4th month.

GANGTOK,
26th June, 1908.

MY DEAR PROFESSOR,

Last year when you came up about this time to go through the Tengyur at Labrang, you told me that you were so much interested that you would come up again this year to Pamiyangchi. Do you think that you will be able to do so, and if you do about what time will it be? You must let me know beforehand, as to when you intend coming up, so that I may make some arrangements about making your journey and sojourn in Sikkim as easy as we can. At present we are having copious rains here, but we are all in sound health. Trusting you also to be in perfect health.

I remain,

Yours truly,

ཐུ་བོ་འཇམ་དཔལ་ལྷན་པུ་ལོ།

MAHARANI.

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA SATIS CHADRA VIDYABHUSANA, M.A.,

Secy. to the Buddhist Shrine Restoration Society,

CALCUTTA.

The letter was very kind, and I at once made up my mind to undertake a journey to Pamiyangchi. Reception on the way. I started from Darjeeling on the 10th of October with a passport from Mr. Crawford, Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling, and on first setting foot on the territory of the Maharaja of Sikkim I was simply surprised to notice the extraordinary arrangements that had been made by the Maharaja to provide me with all possible necessities and comforts on the way. The royal mandate had gone forth to furnish us with all possible help and at every stage of our halt, we found numbers of men waiting for us with various articles of provision and fuel— all much too great for us to carry. Rice, *dal*, oranges, fruits, veg-

tables, hay, butter, milk, etc., almost in cartloads, were placed freely and abundantly at our disposal. On the third day we arrived at Pamiyangchi. Here we saw three European Consuls, who had come here on a pleasure trip, mainly for sight-seeing. Pamiyangchi commands an excellent view of the lofty and snow-covered hills of Kinchinjanga, and the Europeans were enjoying themselves immensely seeing sights and taking photos. They were a large company, being attended by a good many servants and camp-followers. They were however badly in need of provisions, and as we had more than what was necessary for ourselves we gave them a quantity of our own.

When I reached the monastery I was wonder-struck at the majestic and imposing sight which was presented from the lofty heights of the peak of Pamiyangchi which commands an excellent prospect of the picturesque and snowy peaks of Kanchanjangha from which silver-white liquid streams seem to be perpetually running out. On entering the monastery I introduced myself to the monks and presented before them the following letter of introduction, which had been sent to me by the Maharaja of Sikkim before I started from Calcutta :—

(TRANSLATION.)

To

THE INCOMPARABLE SCHOOL OF PRECIOUS MONKS.

Communication :

From Calcutta, India, a Sanskrit Pandit named Satis Chandra Acharyya Vidyabhusana goes to have access to Bs-tan-h-gyur. He being of a different kingdom, provide him with a good residence. Whatever necessary objects the Balu himself wants, be that done in a worthy way. Whatever may benefit and assist him that should be immediately rendered. This is very important. Bear this in mind. I beseech you.

From Gangtok Palace, Earth-Ape Year, month 8, date 8.

The monks received me well and gave me a ready access to the Bs-tan-h-gyur Block Prints. They offered me a seat there for the night. But this I thankfully declined and put up in the Dak Bungalow. I stayed at Pamiyangchi for eight days during which time I had every opportunity and facility for making a searching examination of and for studying of the Bs-tan-h-gyur.

APPENDIX K.

JOURNEY TO CEYLON.

The Government of Bengal in accordance with the advice of the Hon. Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee-Vice-Chancellor, and Dr. G. Thibaut, C.I.E. Experience in Ceylon. having deputed me to prosecute studies in Pali and Buddhism for six months in Ceylon, I started for the island on the 20th June, 1909. Starting at 6 P.M., 20th June, I arrived at Colombo on the 25th June via Madras and Tuticorin. I passed six months in Ceylon making researches in the Pali language, under the guidance of Venerable Sri Sumungala Mahathero, High Priest of western Ceylon, and Prof. Venerable Nanisar and Deva Mitta helped in my research work. Sir P. Arunachalam, Member, Executive Council, Ceylon, kindly helped me with various books and information. I also derived much help from Rev. Anagarika Dharmapala, Secretary, Maha Bodhi Society. On the 25th November, I started back for Benares *via* Colombo, Pamban, Madura, Trichinopoly, Chidambaram, Madras and Calcutta, arriving on the 11th December, at 10 A.M. In Ceylon I visited, on the 27th October, the Buddhist monasteries and remains at Galle, Dodondwa and To-to-go-mo, and on 1st-7th July Anuradhapur, Mihintale Hill and Kandy, etc.

I received addresses from all the important monasteries including the To-to-go-mo (Tirthagrāma), in Address at To-to-go-mo. which the Bhikkus observed that for more than 450 years after the demise of Rāmacandra Kavibhāratī, no learned Pandit had come from India. Tirthagrāma is a chosen spot of nature. On one side rolls the limitless ocean and on the other side rise the eternal hills and in front is spread a charming lake. The stone-walls of the monastery I found still standing at the time of my visit eleven years ago, though in ruins. But a new monastery has been erected in the midst of a grove of areca-nuts and cocoanuts and flowers innumerable, and here the monks resident therein honoured me with an address of welcome and asked me with a simplicity most befitting to monks, whether I, Satis Chandra, a Bengali Brahmin, was a relation to Rāmacandra—so green was the memory of the Kavibhāratī in their minds.

The Venerable Sumungala Mahāthero convened on the day previous to my departure a grand meeting in Departure. which most of the learned gentlemen of Ceylon were present. I first addressed the meeting in English

then read an address in Sanskrit in forty stanzas describing my reminiscences of Ceylon.

One of the incidents on my way to Ceylon may here be narrated. At Tuticorin I stayed at a Dharamsala, which was a very big building consisting of long rows of rooms. The building covers a wide space and can accommodate over a thousand people. Any stranger would find food and lodging there for three days. Its doors remain open to all, night and day, and no question is asked of any one who enters its precincts. We were offered food and shelter when we went there. But, as we had enough provisions with ourselves, we would take no articles from them but merely sought shelter for the night. One elderly supervisor of the Dharamsala happening to find me a foreigner there was curiously speculating with a countryman of his as to where I lived, whither I was going and with what object. Wishing to satisfy his curiosity, I told him that I was an inhabitant of Calcutta and was going to Ceylon to learn Pali. He seemed to take my statement with a good big grain of salt and turned to his companion and spoke to him in Tamil, which I partly understood. "Surely this is a good story-teller! No doubt he is a trader and is going to Ceylon for commercial purposes, but look you how he fables! Calcutta is the centre of learning and this man says he comes all the way from there to Ceylon of all places!" This conversation evidently shows how poor an opinion common people themselves have about Ceylon being a seat of learning, although scholars from Siam, Burma, Bombay, Calcutta and even Europe go there for the study of Pali and Buddhism.

Another of my reminiscences with regard to Ceylon is put down in detail, as the incident made a rather deep impression on my mind then. One evening I was taking my usual walk in the Victoria Park, which is surrounded on three of its sides by the sea. This is perhaps the most picturesque spot in all Ceylon, and is resorted to by all lovers of nature. Whilst taking my rounds amongst the beautiful pathways and groves of the park, the striking loveliness and singular attraction of this most wonderful work of nature, threw me in a fanciful reverie, and for a time I was lost to the world. When I came to myself, I realised that the park was almost deserted and I was the solitary figure present there. It was about 8-30 P.M. and I thought it expedient to return to my residence at once. But this I could hardly do. Having travelled through many pathways and groves I had completely lost sight of my direction and found myself in a labyrinth as it were. I then wanted to go near the sea, but the sea seemed to be on every side of me. I walked for a time towards one direction and then

How I lost my way and a strange Bengali song saved me.

caught the noise of the roaring sea, and immediately receded, lest, in the darkness of the night, by one hasty step I might at once drop down into the waters below. Immediately turning back I travelled in the opposite direction and again the roar of the ocean frightened me away! To the right, and to the left, in my front, and behind my back, the sea seemed to be everywhere! Impatient and restless, I was getting excited and frightened when the short snatch of a popular Bengalee love-song reached my ears. I had been for one month in Ceylon and had not come across a single Bengalee. Hence I was beside myself with astonishment on catching the notes of the song there. The loneliness of the place, the helplessness of my position and the quaintness of the voice, heightened my sense of horror and astonishment and put me in mind of sirens about whom I had read many a tale describing how they beguile and seduce innocent victims. My hair stood on end as soon as I could see the singer, who seemed to be approaching towards me, I felt myself trembling, but I was not so thoroughly unnerved as not to make bold to ask him who he was. Somewhat to my surprise and relief, he answered me, much in the same way as a human being would do, that he was a native of Malabar and a sailor by profession. Then my fear of sirens vanished and I learnt on further enquiry that he had been to France, England, Japan, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Calcutta, and other places and had picked up a smattering and speaking knowledge of the language of every country he had visited. While he was in Calcutta, he used to stay at Mechuabazar and had learnt there the love-song of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, which he liked very much and used to sing whenever he was alone. The romantic grandeur of the picturesque park had let loose his sentiments and he was singing loudly this favourite song of his. At my request he showed me the way out of the park to the stand for carriages. Hardly any was available at this late hour of the night. Still I managed to secure one and reached home at about 10-30.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
Abandonment of a proposition ..	35	Akhyāti (non-manifestation) ..	139
Abhayadeva Sūri ..	196f.	Akṣapāda (see Gautama, his doctrine embodied in Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda) 16, 26, 47, 112, 348, 358, 359, 395	
—particulars about ..	196 (ftn. 2)	—age of ..	50, 502 (ftn. 1)
Abhayākara Gupta ..	347	—Aksapada darśana ..	48, 398
Abhayatilakopādhyāya ..	151	—attacked by Jaina logicians 221 (ftn. 2)	
Abhihitānvaya-vāda (connection of the expressed) ..	146	—birth-place of ..	512
Abhinanda ..	147 (ftn. 2)	—compiler of the Nyāya Sūtra ..	50
Absolute (Śūnyatā) ..	254	—(his) definition of perception criticised by Dignāga ..	278
Absolute non-existence 184, 394, 416		—designated as Naiyāyika ..	278
—Deva Sūri on ..	203	—different from Gautama ..	49
Absolute truth ..	255	—(his) identification with Gautama ..	18
Abstract perception ..	383	—not conversant with the Yogācāra ..	110 (ftn. 3)
Ācāra's monastery ..	272	—Nyāya philosophy as the philosophy of ..	18
Ācārya Buddhajñānapāda ..	519	—Nyāya Sūtra of ..	497f.
Ācārya Bodhisattva ..	323	—on the relation of thought and language ..	55
Action ..	37, 114	—real author of the Nyāya Sūtra ..	50
—bodily ..	58	—redactor of the Ānvikṣikī of Gautama ..	50
—mental ..	58	—son of Soma Śarmā ..	155
—three kinds of ..	58	—(in) Tibetan ..	47
—vocal ..	58	Akṣapāda and the Mīmāṃsakas, their definition of proposition criticised by Dignāga 283 (ftn. 2)	
Activity ..	58	Alarka ..	10
—grounds for ..	410	Alaya-vijñāna, explanation of 249 (ftn. 3)	
Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva ..	159	Alexander ..	352
Admission ..	35	Amaracandra Sūri 207, 396, 406 (ftn. 5)	
—of an opinion ..	89	—details about ..	207 (ftn. 5)
Advaita-vedāntins ..	139	Amradeva Sūri ..	210
Affection ..	114	Amṛtacandra Sūri ..	195
Affirmative-negative inference 131, 435		Analogue ..	65
Affirmative reason ..	437	—application of ..	816
Agniveśa ..	25 (ftn. 1)	—kinds of ..	67, 261, 288f.
—in Tibetan ..	25 (ftn. 1)	—principles to be applied to ..	81f
Ahalyā ..	17f.		
Ahalyā-sthāna (Ahirya) ..	18		
Ahaṁkāra or Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya philosophy ..	245 (ftn. 2)		
Ajāta śatru ..	226, 349		
Ajaya Deva ..	223		
Ajita Sīṃha ..	477		
Akalaṅka Deva, age of ..	186		
—works of ..	185		

	Page		Page
Analogue—		Ānvikṣikī—	
—test of	81f.	—followers of	107 (ftn. 1)
Ānanda .. 112 (ftn. 2), 406 (ftn. 5)		—formation of	5
Ānanda Sūri	207, 396	—founding of	17
—details about	207, (ftn. 5)	—generally designated as, in the	
Ananta-vīrya .. 122 (ftn. 1), 98		first stage	40
Ananta-yajvan	498	—(in a) general sense	6
Ancient School of Indian Logic,		—held in high esteem in some	
termination of	157	quarters	37f.
Andhra Dynasty .. 251 (ftn. 2, 3)		—Kali satirising the founder of ..	37
Andhras 272 273 (ftn. 1), 274, 274 ftm. 3)		—(in) Kauṭiliya	52, 7
Aṅga	160	—known as Nyāya-śāstra in the	
Angīrasa, name of Buddha Gau-		second stage	40
tama	19 (ftn. 2)	—(as the) lamp of all sciences ..	38
Āngīrasa tribe	19	—(in its) logical aspects	7
Annambhaṭṭa	388	—(in) Manu	4
Anvavacaniya-khāyiti (manifesta-		—Mānavas' description of	5
tion of the undefinable)	139	—meant by Nyāya	20
Annihilation of things impossible	105	—(as a) necessary study	38
Annihilationists followers of the		—not a part of the original Āyur-	
Lokāyata philosophy	228f.	veda	26
Antecedent non-existence	184, 416	—not in Brahma Sūtra	37
—Deva Sūri on	203	—opposed to the Vedas	36
Antigonos Gonetas	352	—par excellence is Logic	6, 3
Antiochos	352	—penalties for studying	37
Anuruddha Thera	352	—philosophical aspect of	6
Ānvikṣikī (see Hetu-śāstra and		—principal topic of	27
Tarka-vidyā)	36	—replacable by the word 'Darśana'	6
—accepting Vedas	39	—(used in) special sense of Logic ..	7
—bifurcates into Philosophy and		—(as) Science of inquiry	1
Logic	5	—(as) Science of true reasoning ..	8
—Brāhmaṇa addicted to	37	—(in) Sulabhā	12
—called Nyāya-śāstra	8, 40	—teachers of	9
—called Nyāya-śāstra when Nyāya		—(in) Tibetan	7
constituted its special scope ..	40	—training prescribed in	37
—condemned by certain Brāhmanas	36	—unfavourable criticism of	39
—condemned by Manu	36	—useful for ascertaining truths ..	38
—condemned by Vālmīki	36	—utility of	37f.
—condemned in certain circles ..	36	—Vātsyāyana on	5
—dealt with two subjects	5	—Vyāsa arranges Upaniṣads with	
—Dharma should be ascertained		the help of	33
by	38	Ānvikṣikī-vidyā of Gautama	50
—distinction between Ātma-vidyā		—styled the Nyāya-sūtras	50
and	5	Anvitābhīdhāna-vāda (expression	
—(as) expounded by Dattatreya ..	10f.	of the connected)	147

	Page		Page
Anyā-mata-parīkṣā (examination of the doctrines of others) ..	51f.	Ascertainment ..	33, 62
Anyathā-khyāti (converse manifestation) ..	139	Aśoka 222, 226, f., 335, 349-51, 352	53
Apoha (knowledge of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites) criticised by Jayanta ..	149	Assembly—	
Application (upanaya) 32, 61, 437 (ftn. 1)		—(of) fools ..	29
—affirmative ..	61	—friendly ..	29
—Deva Sūri on ..	202	—hostile ..	29
—(as an) essential part of a syllogism ..	504	—how to influence ..	29
—kinds of ..	61, 395	—indifferent or impartial ..	29
—means of ..	395	—(of) wise men ..	29
—negative ..	61	Assumption, based on doubt ..	34
—of the example ..	60	Aṣṭāvakra, his debate with Vandin	13ff.
—of the reasoning of the disputant to his own case ..	236	—his ingenuity ..	16f, 114 (ftn. 1)
Āraṇyakas (Forest treatises) ..	1	—shouts of victory for ..	15f.
Arcata ..	211, 331f., 348	—a violent debator ..	13ff.
Ardashīr ..	20	Āsuri ..	10
Argumentation (Tarka) ..	189	Aśvaghoṣa ..	248
—Deva Sūri on ..	201	Atheistic doctrine ..	9
Aristotle ..	295 (ftn. 2)	Ātma-ka theory (i.e. Tīrthaka doctrine) ..	315
—and Akṣapāda ..	502f.	Ātma-khyāti (manifestation of the self) ..	138
—and Caraka Saṁhitā ..	500f.	Ātma-tattva-viveka, analysis of ..	145f.
—and Dharma-kīrti ..	503	Atom ..	103f.
—and Dignāga ..	506	—what it is ..	105
—and Maitreya ..	504	Ātreya ..	11f.
—and Nāgārjuna ..	504	—mentioned in Tibetan ..	11
—and Uddyotakara ..	510f.	—(the) original author the	
—and Vasubandhu ..	505	Caraka-saṁhitā ..	6
Art of Rhetoric ..	512	Attribution of censure ..	35
Ārya Aśaṅga 249, 262, 265f., 334		Augustus Caesar ..	352
—age of ..	265 (ftn. 5)	Avadhi ..	169 (ftn. 1)
—logical views of ..	265f.	Avalokiteśvara ..	332, 334, 335
Ārya Deva ..	248, 261f.	Avayava (members of a syllogism)	51
—names of ..	261	—corresponding to analytics ..	502
Ārya Mahāsaṁghika and its sub-sects ..	247, 248	Avesta ..	20 (ftn. 4)
Ārya Sammitīya and its subjects ..	246, 247 (ftn. 2)	Avoidance of defeat ..	35
Ārya Sarvāstivāda and its subjects	246	Ayodhya ..	262, 265, 266
Ārya Sthavira and its sub-sects	247, 248	Āyurveda ..	11
Asat-khyāti (manifestation of the unreal) ..	139	—eight books of ..	11
		Bakhtiar Khiliji ..	356
		Bālāditya ..	349, 515
		Bālāditya Narasimha Gupta ..	267 ²
		Balancing the alternative ..	70
		—(the) co-presence ..	71

	Page		Page
Balancing—		Bhairavendra ..	459, 522
—(the) counter-example ..	73	Bharsu ..	335
—(a) deficit ..	69	Bhartṛhari ..	320
—(the) demonstration ..	78	Bhāṣā-pariccheda (a manual of	
—(the) doubt ..	74	logic by Viśvanātha) ..	392
—(the) effect ..	81	Bhāsarvajña ..	155, 357ff., 386
—(the) eternal ..	80	—date of ..	357
—(an) excess ..	68	—life of ..	357
—(the) heterogeneity ..	68	Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas ..	147
—(the) homogeneity ..	67	Bhavānanda Rāya ..	482 (ftn. 1)
—(the) infinite regression ..	73	Bhavānanda Siddhānta Vāgīśa ..	470
—(the) mutual absence ..	72	Bhavanātha ..	406 (ftn. 7)
—(the) non-difference ..	77	Bhikṣu Nāga Sena ..	240
—(the) non-eternal ..	79	Bhoja Deva ..	251
—(the) non-perception ..	79	Bhora Śīlā ..	272 (ftn. 1)
—(the) non-produced ..	74	Bhūṣaṇa ..	386
—(the) non-reason ..	75	Birth ..	58
—(the) perception ..	78	—a source of pain ..	102
—(the) point at issue the contro-		Blo-lan-seṣ-rab ..	336, 344, 345
versial ..	75	Bodhi Sattva of Za-hor ..	299
—(the) the presumption ..	76	Body ..	57
—(the) question ..	11	—made of earth ..	99
—(the) questionable ..	69	Brahma, region of ..	3
—(the) subject ..	34f.	Brahman (the Pervading Essence) ..	4
—(the) unquestionable ..	70	Brāhmaṇa and Buddhist logicians	
Bāṇa, date of ..	124	antagonism between ..	348f.
Barygoza ..	352	Brāhmaṇas ..	1
Baṭū Dās ..	524 (ftn. 1)	Brāhmaṇa Vasubhūti ..	160
Bauddhas' doctrine of the non-		Brāhmanic Sages, conceits of ..	50
ātman ..	127 (ftn.)	Brāhmaṇī Pṛthvī ..	160
Bde-byed-dyah-wa ..	344	Brāhmanism in Bengal, revival of ..	350
Begging the question ..	34	Brāhmanism in Mithila, revival of ..	350
Being ..	253	Brāhmanism, in Northern India ..	351
Bengal, senior logicians of ..	526	—in Southern India ..	351
Bhadanta, same as Dignāga ..	129	—preachers of ..	351
Bhadrabāhu ..	164ff. (ftn. 1, 2, 3)	Brahmavidyā (the Divine Science) ..	4
—date of 164f., 164 (ftn. 1), 165 (ftn. 2)		Buddha Gautama ..	225
—(his) explanation of Syādvāda ..	167f.	—date of ..	225 (ftn. 2)
—syllogism of ..	165f.	Buddha Ghoṣa ..	352
Bhadrabāhu the Junior, date of ..	165	Buddhism—	
Bhadra Pālita ..	272	—at Rome ..	352
Bhadreśvara Sūri ..	212	—disappearance of ..	353
Bhagīratha Thākkurra ..	406 (ftn. 7)	—in Central Asia ..	352
Bhagīratha or Megha Thākkura ..	457	—in Ceylon ..	352
Bhāgya Rāja ..	345	—in China ..	352

	Page		Page
Buddhism—		Calukya kings	349
—in other countries	353	Canaka	336, 340, 341, 342, 520
—in Tibet	352f.	Candra Dvīpa	334 (ftn. 2)
—persecution of	349	Candra Gomin	332
—reception in foreign countries ..	351ff.	Candra Gomin the Junior ..	334f.
—royal patronage received by ..	349	—date of	335f.
—spread of, in Asia, Europe and		—life of	333f.
Africa	351f.	Candra Gomin the Senior, date of	335
—Śrāvaka School of	341	Candra Gupta	261
Buddhists—		Candra Gupta II	117
—eighteen sects of	246f.	Candrakīrti	334
—heretical sects of	226	Candra Pati	406 (ftn. 7)
Buddhist and Jaina Scripture—		Candraprabha Sūri	206
—condemned by Vācaspati Miśra ..	141	—particulars about	206 (ftn. 3)
Buddhist Council	225f.	Candra Sena Sūri	211
—account of	225 (ftn. 3)	Candra Simha	460
—fourth	50	Candra's well	335
Buddhist denial of the soul—		Canonical Scriptures of the Jainas	
—criticised by Uddyotakara	125	divisions of	160f.
Buddhist doctrines of 'apoha,'		Canons of speech	12f.
'kṣaṇabhaṅga' etc.—criticised		Canons, logical subjects in ..	161ff.
by Udāyanacārya	143	Canton	301
Buddhist Logic	158	Caraka	25, 26, 499 (ftn. 1)
—contentious spirit of	348f.	—according to Pāṇini	25
—rise of	251	—borrowed terms from Vaiśeṣika	
—triumph of	348	philosophy and incorporated	
Buddhist Philosophy, four schools		them into Vādamārga	27
of	247	—date of	26 (ftn. 4)
Buddhist Sabbath (uposatha) ..	232ff.	—introduces terms unknown to	
—preliminary acts of	233	Gautama into Vādamārga ..	27
—preparation for	232f.	—lived in the court of Kaṇiṣka ..	26 (ftn. 3)
—recitation of the code of monas-		—(a) name for śākhās of the Yajur-	
tic laws in (pātimokkhuḍdeṣa) ..	233	veda	25
—right season for	233	—(a) physician named	26
—three kinds of	233	—(the) wandering sect named ..	26 (ftn. 1)
Buddhist Sūtras, quoted by Brah-		Caraka Saṁhitā—	
maṇa authors	126 (ftn. 2)	—also called the Agniveśa-tan-	
Buno Rāmanūtha	484	tra	25 (ftn. 1)
Burden and the burden-bearer ..	127 (ftn.)	—contains for the first time an ex-	
Bu-ṣton	270, 353	position of the doctrine of syl-	
Bzams-paḥi-ṅgon-pa	262	logism	42
Caitanya	351, 462 (ftn. 1)	—(its) exact meaning unknown ..	26
Cakra Saṁvara	340	—means the Āyurveda	26
Calukya Dynasty	351	—older in logical doctrines than	
		Nyāya Sūtra	50

	Page		Page
Caraka Samhitā—		Choṣ-graṣ	303
—terms explained in ..	27	Choṣ- mchog	329
Cārvāka ..	9, 393ff.	Choṣ-mi-m Them-dpe-ltar-gnah-wa	296 (ftn. 1), 297 (ftn. 1)
—followers of ..	9	Cinna Bhaṭṭa ..	384
—not the name of any individual	9	Cirakārin (son of Gautama. see	
Cases for settlement (adhikaraṇa)	229f.	Gautama as mentioned in the	
(A) Case presented by a disputant		Mahābhārata) ..	18
in a regular form (anuloma) ..	235	Clearing the meaning of terms ..	238
(A) Case presented through an ana-		Cola Dynasty ..	351
logy ..	238	Collective Nyāya (Saṁgraha) ..	171
(A) Case presented through a		Colour ..	57
simple comparison ..	237f.	Commentaries—	
(A) Case presented through the		—nature of ..	115
fourfold method ..	239	—(as) store-houses of informations	115
Casuists ..	227	Comparative estimate of the Ān-	
Category ..	374ff., 387, 393, 395	vikṣikī and the Nyāya ..	152
—defined in Nāgārjuna's Pramāṇa		Comparison ..	33, 56, 384, 443
Vihetana ..	258	—Dignāga on ..	287
—definition of ..	54ff.	—(a) distinct means of right know-	
—examination of ..	90ff.	ledge ..	9
—reduced to one ..	357	—instrumental causes of ..	411
—treatment of ..	53	—(a) mere inference ..	94
Category of pramāṇa, (means of		—(a) mere perception ..	94
knowledge) in the prakaraṇas ..	357	—not a means of right knowledge	93f.
Causality ..	400f.	—operation of ..	443
Cause ..	390	—process of ..	443
—kinds of ..	382f., 390	—really a means of right know-	
Causes of Inference—		ledge ..	94
—ancient on ..	434	—result of ..	443
—Gaṅgeśa on ..	434	—(a) Separate means of knowledge	99, 443
Cavil ..	62, 63	—special cause of ..	409
Caviller ..	63	Complainant or Plaintiff (codaka)	231
Cedi race ..	350	Complaint (codanā) ..	23
Censuring the non-censurable ..	90	Compound—	
Ceylon—		—attributive ..	452
—an incident of Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa		—kinds of ..	452
in ..	541f.	—potentiality of aggregative ..	453
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's departure		—potentiality of attributive ..	452
from ..	540	—potentiality of descriptive ..	452
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's experience in	540	—potentiality of determinative	452
—estimate of ..	541	—potentiality of indeclinable ..	453
Candra Kīrti ..	126 (ftn. 2)	Comprehensiveness ..	429
Censurable ..	33	Conclusion (nigamaṇa) 32, 61, 167,	
Chan Dynasty ..	268		237, 437
Chinese Mission, sent to Magadha	301		

	Page		Page
Compound—		Darśana—	
—as an essential part of a syllo-		—(a) branch of philosophy ..	6
gism	504	—(an) explanation of the term ..	6
—Deva Sūri on	202	—literal sense	6
—kinds of	259	Dattātreyā	
Concrete cause	383	—(his) parable of a tree ..	10f.
Condition (upādhi) 140, 376 (ftn. 4),		—(his) proper name	10
378, 399, 431, 432		Death	58
—kinds of	432f.	Debate (vāda)	31
—sure	432	Debate—the art of (Tarka-vidyā),	6
—suspected	432	(see also Vāda-vidvā)	
Conditionality	255	Debate—	
Conditional middle term	431	—attending a place of	264
Conditional truth	254	—categories for the knowledge of	
Conflicting testimony	59	the course of	31
Confutation	61	—(a) congenial	29
Conjoined inherence (sainyukta-		—(a) council of (pariṣad)	29
samavāya)	130	—(the) course of (see Vāda-mārga)	31
Conjoined inherent-inherence (sain-		—defects of	163
yukta-samaveta samavāya)	130	—disputant of	379
Conjunction (saṃyoga)	130	—(the) expedients of (see Vādo-	
Consideration (parāmarśa) 384, 390,		pāya)	30f.
420, 433		—expedients in	163
Consistency	447	—kinds of	29, 31, 379
Context	113	—(a) hostile	29
Contiguity	447f.	—(the) limits of (see Vāda-māryā-	
Contradiction	34	dā)	31
Contradictory fallacy	63, 64	—means of	264
Contradictory reason	439	—members of	379
Controversial fallacy	63, 64	—method of	28f.
Council of Discussion—Deva Sūri on	204	—or dialogues in the Upaniṣads ..	23
Counter-activity		—place of	263
—grounds for	410	—president of	379
Counter-balanced reason	439	—several terms of	162
Counter-demonstration	32	—technical terms of	23f.
—analysis of	501	—requisites of	378
Counter-proposition	166	—requisites of a council of	378
Counter-questioned fallacy	63, 64	—respondent of	379
Cūḍāmaṇi	303	—rules of	378
Cunningham	124 (ftn. 7)	—rules of, according to Deva Sūri	204f.
		—subjects of	263
		—utility of (see sainbhāṣā-pra-	
Daḍ-paḥi-śes-rab	275	śamsā)	28f.
Dāna Pāla	352	Debater—	
Dāna Śīla	340f.	—confidence of	264f.
Dar-ma-graṣa	318		

	Page		Page
Debater—		Deva Sūri—	
—qualifications of	264	—on superimposition ..	201
Debts, three kinds of ..	102 (ftn. 1)	—on the method of debate ..	204
Defeat—		—on the soul ..	204
—points of (see points of defeat) ..	379	—(his) Pramāṇa-nayatatvālokā-	
—eight kinds of	237	laṅkāra	200
Defect of speech	34	Devendra Bodhi	319f.
—various types of	34	Deviating from a tenet ..	90
Definition	53	Dgaḥ-waḥi-rdo-rje	345
—of terms	238	Dge-bruñ	328
—of the minor term and explana-		Dgra-laḥ-rgyal-wa	337
tion of a proposition ..	506f.	Dhammatā doctrine ..	500 (ftn. 1)
Demonstration (sthāpanā) ..	32	Dhammuttariya or Dhammottara	
—and counter-demonstration of		248 (ftn. 6)	
Caraka-Saṁhitā compared with		Dhaneśvara Sūri	197 (ftn. 3)
demonstration and refutative		Dhanukha Inscription ..	406 (ftn. 7)
Enthymeme of Arts to the ..	500	Dharma Bhāṣaṇa ..	215f. 237 (ftn. 7)
—analysis of	500f.	—his references to other philoso-	
—through three kinds of middle		phers	215
terms and through the media of		—his references to works on logic	215
essence and cause	508	Dharma Deva	352
Deprecating description ..	108	Dharmagañja	516
Description—		Dharma Ghoṣa	206
—kinds of	108	Dharmākara Gupta	329
Desert (merit or demerit) ..	57	Dharmakīrti 124, 133, 135, 136 (ftn.),	
—grounds for the existence of		274 (ftn. 1), 303ff., 344, 346, 348, 358	
(ftn. 1)		—age of	124 (ftn. 3), 305f., 321
Desire	57	—birth-place of	303 (ftn. 4)
—and aversion	113	—criticises Dignāga	315f
Determinate	55	—designated as a Bhikṣu, Sangata.	
Determinate knowledge	414	Buddha or Śākya	150
Determinate perception (see Savi-		—(his) division of the point of	
kalpaka)	138	defeat (nigrahasthāna) criti-	
Deva Bhadra	211	cised by Vācaspati Miśra ..	136
Deva Nātha Ṭhākkura ..	460f.	—triumph of	305
Deva Pāla	517	Dharmakīrti and Kumārila ..	304
Devardhi Gaṇi, known as Kṣamā-		Dharmapāla 117, 302f., 304, 323,	
śramaṇa	172	517, 519	
Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka	195	—works of	303
Deva Sundara	214	Dharmarājādharin	485
Deva Sūri—		Dharmarakṣa	352
—called Vādi-pravara	198	Dharmaratna	300
—on fallacies of Naya ..	203f.	Dharmavijaya	165 (ftn. 22)
—on non-existence	203	Dharmottara	143, 338, 348
—on right knowledge ..	200ff.		

	Page		Page
Dharmottarācārya	329	Divine Science (Brahma-vidya)	4
Dialogue	62	Doctrine of Impermanence ..	239
—three kinds of	62	Doctrine of inter-relation leading	
Digambaras	159 ²	to the doctrine of voidness	117 (ftn. 3)
Dignāga 116, 117, 125, 135, 307		Doctrine of momentariness	246, 262f.
(ftn. 2), 348, 349		—criticised by Vātysāyana ..	121
—age of	116, 135, 272f ²	Doctrine of Mutual Dependence	
—birth place of	512.	(Paticca samuppāda)	227 (ftn. 2)
—called Bhadanta	125, 135 (ftn. 3)	Doctrine of Nyāya (method)	217 (ftn. 1)
*—(his) definition of balancing the		Doctrine of Phonetic Explosion	
effect (kārya-sama) criticised by		(sphoṭavāda)	131f.
Vācaspati Miśra	135	Doctrine of Self-consciousness ..	418
—(as) founder of the Mediaeval		Doctrine of Voidness	262f.
Logic	158, 270ff.	—time of	119 (ftn.)
—fuller accounts of	272 (ftn. 1)	Dogma	59
—life of	272f.	—hypothetical	60
—(a) portrait of	271	—implied	60
—(his) criticism of the definition of		—of all the schools	59
perception as given by Akṣapāda		—peculiar to some schools ..	60
and Vātsyāyana	278	Doubt	33, 58f.
—(his) theory of examples	295ff.	—Deva Sūri on	201
—(his) theory of Nine Reasons		—grounds for	104
criticised by Uddyotakara and		—impossibility of	103
Vācaspati Miśra	283 (ftn. 2)	—possibility of	104
—(his) views on inference	281ff.	—sources of	428
Dignāga and Iśvara Kṛṣṇa	274f.	Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-brtan-po ..	349
Dinakara Miśra	380	Dravali (Drāvida)	305
Dināra (the Roman coin denarius)		Dress of monks	271
imported into India	45 (ftn. 2)	Dr. H Jacobi—	
Diodotus	352	—on commentaries of the Nyāya	
Dīpaṅkara or Śrījāna Atīśa 337,		Sūtra	116 (ftn. 1, 3)
341, 352, 517, 519f.		—on the date of the Nyāya Sūtra	
Direct knowledge (Pratyakṣa) 169,			50 (ftn. 2)
174, 184		—on Hari bhadrā Sūri	209 (ftn.)
—Deva Sūri on	201	Dr. Sherbatski	120 (ftn. 3)
—kinds of	174	Drṣṭivāda	161, 161 (ftn. 3)
Discussion	62	Dul-lha	320f.
—art of (Vāda-vidyā).. ..	6	Durgādatta Miśra	460
(See also Tarka-vidyā)		Dvividha Sambhūṣṇ (see Debate—	
Deva Suri on	204	kinds of)	29
—with whom to hold	104	Dwyiggūen	266
Disjunctive categorical syllogism		Ear	57
435 (ftn. 1)		Eastern Cālukya dynasty	273 (ftn. 1)
Disputation, methods of, as illus-		(An) Ecclesiastical act	232
trated by the Kathāvattan ..	235ff.		
Dissentient	62		

	Page		Page
Effect ..	280, 311, 382, 390	Example—	
Efficient Cause ..	383, 390 (ftn. 1)	—heterogeneous, fallacies of ..	297f.
Ego ..	245, 246, 249	—homogeneous or affirmative ..	60,
Ego or Ālaya—		191, 259, 286, 290, 368	
—of the Vijñāna-vādins ..	245 (ftn. 2)	—homogeneous, fallacies of ..	296f., 313f.
E. Harding—		—fallacies of ..	368f., 163, 176, 191,
—on the Sūtra of the Burden and		289, 290, 311	
the Burden-bearer ..	127 (ftn.)	—kinds of ..	286f.
Elements ..	57	—superfluous ..	193
Emancipation or release ..	57, 58, 246, 370	—theory of ..	295ff.
—attainment of ..	102	—uselessness of, according to Deva	
—definition of ..	103	Sūri ..	202
—means of attainment of ..	103	Excellence of speech ..	34
Emperor Kublai Khan ..	353	Excess ..	113
Enthymemes ..	500f.	Exclusively affirmative (anvayī)	
—definition of ..	501	inference ..	130, 431
Entreaty ..	113	Exclusively negative (vyatirekī)	
Enunciation ..	53	inference ..	131, 434
Equipollent concomittance ..	399	Exercise ..	113
Erratic fallacy ..	63	Existence, as a thing ..	97 (ftn. 1)
Erratic reason ..	438	Expectancy ..	447
—non-general ..	438	Explanation of the truths ..	261
—too general ..	437	Explanatory example ..	10
Ētapurī ..	346	Extrinsic inseparable connection	
Eternalists (sassata-vādins)—		(bahir-vyāpti) ..	177
—followers of the Sāṃkhya philo-		—Deva Sūri on ..	202
sophy of Kapila ..	228	Eye ..	57, 111f.
Eternalists—non-eternalists (eka-		—(a) material substance ..	111, 112
coasassatikā-ekacca-asassatikā)—		—(a) non-material substance ..	112
—followers of the Ānvīkṣikī of			
Medhātithi-Gautama ..	228	Fa-hian ..	241 (ftn. 1), 252
Evasion ..	89	—his description of Ārya Nāgār-	
Examination ..	53	juna ..	251 (ftn. 3)
—different means for ..	28	Fallacy ..	63f., 362, 438ff.
—four standards of ..	28	—general definition of ..	438
Example (dṛṣṭānta) ..	32, 59, 167,	—kinds of ..	192f., 260f., 438
258f., 366f., 437		—of absence of connection ..	297
—affirmative or homogeneous ..	502	—of absence of disconnection ..	298
—and major premise ..	503	—of affirmative example ..	368f.
—and paradigm ..	502f.	—of argumentation ..	193
—converted into universal pro-		—of balancing the controversy ..	367f.
position ..	295f.	—of balancing the predicate ..	260
—function of ..	504	—of balancing the point in dispute	
—heterogeneous or negative ..	61, 191,	or begging the question ..	260
159, 287, 290, 368, 502		—of example ..	178, 193, 368, 369f.

	Page		Page
Fallacy—		Fallacy of the homogeneous ex-	
—of false assumption ..	260	ample—	
—of implied contradiction ..	315f.	—of connection unshown ..	179
—of included major term ..	297	—of inverted connection ..	179
—of included major and middle		—three kinds of ..	179
terms ..	298	—unconnected ..	179
—of included middle term ..	297	Fallacy of the immediate, Deva	
—of inverse connection ..	297	Sūri on ..	203
—of inverted negation ..	298	Fallacy of the middle term or	
—of 'Naigama,' according to Deva		reason ..	178, 193, 293
Sūri ..	203	Fallacy of the middle term or sem-	
—of negative example ..	369	blance of reason—	
—of non-erroneous contradiction		—contradictory ..	178
316, 368		—kinds of ..	178
—of perception ..	192	—uncertain ..	178
—of quibble in respect of a term	260	—unproved ..	177
—of regressus ad infinitum ..	257	Fallacy of the minor term	177, 193
—of reason ..	63f., 90	—of the mistimed ..	260
—of reasoning (see fallacies of the		—of the mistimed reason and its	
thesis, middle term and example) 298		subdivision ..	367
—of recognition ..	193	—of the non-tried reason ..	366
—of recollection ..	193	—of the non-tried reason, subdivi-	
—of Sādhya-sama ..	256 (ftn. 1)	sions of ..	366f.
—of showing absurdity ..	260	—of the practical, Deva Sūri on ..	203
—of the adoption of a fallacious		—of the subtle, Deva Sūri on ..	204
reason ..	261	—of the such-like, Deva Sūri on ..	204
—of the collective, Deva Sūri on	203	—of the uncertain middle term	
—of the contradictory ..	260	293f., 313	
—of the contradictory middle term		—of the uncertain reason ..	365
294f., 313		—of the uncertain reason, subdivi-	
—of the contradictory reason ..	363	sions of ..	365f.
—of the contradictory reason, kinds		—of the undistributed middle ..	260
of ..	363ff.	—of the unproved middle term 293, 313	
—of the excluded major term ..	296	—of the unproved reason ..	362
—of the excluded major and middle		—of the unproved reason, kinds of	
terms ..	296	362f.	
—of the excluded middle term ..	296	—of verbal testimony ..	193
Fallacy of the heterogeneous ex-		—of verbal testimony, Deva Sūri	
ample,—kinds of ..	180	on ..	204
Fallacy of the homogeneous ex-		—services of ..	442
ample ..	178	Faults ..	58
—of contrary separation ..	180	—subdivisions of ..	101
—of separation unshown ..	180	Fear ..	113
—of six kinds ..	180	Firoz Shah Tughlak ..	223
—unseparated ..	180		

	Page		Page
First academy of Logic in Nadia	432	Gautama—	
Five Skandhas (aggregates of being) 126, 127 (ftn.)		—birthplace of 17	
Fixed signification of numbers ... 114		—Buddha 19	
—Akṣapāda on 114		—(as) described in the Rāmāyaṇa .. 18	
Forefathers—		—(his) doctrine embodied in the Nyāya sūtra of Akṣapāda (see Akṣapāda) 26	
—(the) path of the 3		Gautama—	
Form 111		—Gotamaka, his followers .. 21	
Formal cause .. 390 (ftn. 1)		—(his) identification with Akṣapāda 48	
Fortuitous-originists (adhicca-samuppannika) 229		—(and) Medhātithi the same person 18	
Four schools of Buddhists—		—mentioned in old Persian scripture 20f.	
—(as) mentioned in the Chinese Tripiṭaka 243f.		—Naciketas 19	
Fruit 58		—Nodhā 19	
Future time 106		—(his) theory of reasoning .. 20	
Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya .. 481		—(his) theory of soul .. 20	
—date of 482		—(his) wife Ahalyā 17f.	
—(the) prince of Indian schoolmen 481		—(his) work on Ānvīkṣikī .. 20	
Gajapati Pratāparudra .. 462		Gautama-Medhātithi (see above)—	
Gāndhāra .. 265, 266, 351		—age of 21	
Gaṇeśa Upādhyāya 155		—(his) doctrines as reproduced in the Caraka Saṃhitā .. 25ff.	
Gāṅgā (Padmā) 346		—family and tribe of .. 19	
Gāṅgā Deva 521		—(the) founder of Ānvīkṣikī .. 17f.	
Gāṅgeśa .. 396, 405ff., 522		—(and) Gautama or Gotama the same person (see Ahalyā) .. 20	
—date of .. 406 (ftn. 7), 407		—mentioned in the Mahābhārata .. 20	
—Portuguese account of .. 488f.		—(his) Nyāya 20	
—succession of pupils from 406 (ftn. 7)		—terms unknown to 27	
—Gāṅgeya Deva 350		Gautamī-vidyā .. 20, 497	
Gangtok—		Generality (samavāya) .. 32, 333	
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to .. 531		Genus or type 111	
—hospitality of a lady to Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa at 532f.		Gestures 57	
Garbhapāda 337		—as means of knowledge .. 453	
Gautama 21		God—	
Gauḍa 341, 524		—(the) giver of fruits .. 101	
Gaurī Kānta Sārvabhauma .. 478f.		—proof of the existence of .. 143f.	
Gautama (see Gautama Medhātithi)—		—path of 3	
—(in) Avesta Gaotema .. 21		Gopāla 323, 517	
—believed to be the author of the Nyāya Sūtra 48		Gopīnātha Maunī 485	
		Gotama (see Gautama) .. 37, 497 (ftn. 2)	

	Page		Page
Gotama—		Heretical—	
—descendants of	19	—names and subdivisions of	226 (ftn. 2)
—Tarka Śāstra of	497	Heterogeneous or negative example	176
Gotamaka (see Gautama, his fol- lowers)	21	Heterologue	361, 433
Govardhana Miśra	381	Hetu (reason)	162
Govicandra	320	—(as) identical with valid know- ledge	162
Govinda Nyāyavāgiśa	480	—(in the) sense of inference	162
Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-le zañ	289	—kinds of	162
Graheśvara	522	Hetu-śāstra (see Ānvikṣikī)	7, 25
Graug-can-pa	278	Hetu-vidyā (see Ānvikṣikī) 7, 240, 243, 274 (ftn. 3)	
Gser-gyi-go cha	275	Hetu-vidyā-śūtra	274 (ftn. 3)
Gtan-tshigs-ltar-gñan	293 (ftn. 1)	Hīnayāna	247, 272
Gtan-tsig-s-ni-tshul-gsum	291 (ftn. 1)	—spread of	241
Guge	324	Hindu Logic—	
Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgiśa	468	—Aristotalian influence on	511f.
Guṇaratna 151, 206 (ftn. 4), 214, 357, 371		Hīravijaya	216
—his references to other philoso- phers	214f.	History of Jaina literature	172
—his references to works on logic	215	Homogeneous example	176
Gupta Dynasty, kings of	349	Homologue	361, 433
Halāyudha	524	Huen-Tsang 124, 241 (ftn. 1), 248, 261, 265, 266 ^d , 267, 274 (ftn. 3), 302, 302 (ftn. 4), 303, 306, 335	
Harṇsa	210	Hurting the proposition	84f.
Han Dynasty	243 (ftn. 1)	Hymn	108
Hanumat	391	Idealism (vijñāna-vāda)	120f.
Haramohan Cūḍāmaṇi	526	—in the Laṅkāvatāra	245
Haribhadra	337	Identity	311
Haribhadra Sūri 152, 154, 208, 346		Ignorance	89
—age of	209	Illustrative description	108
Haribhadra Sūri II	209 (ftn.)	Immediate perception	418f.
Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭā- cārya	465	Immediate subsequency	113
Hari Dikṣita	384	Imperceptible reason in the affirma- tive form—	
Hari Miśra	406 (ftn. 7)	—three subdivisions of	191
Harirāma Tarkavāgiśa	479	Imperceptible reason in the nega- tive form—	
Harṣa Vardhana	335	—seven subdivisions of	191
Hbro or Do	324, 337, 343	Implication (of a word)	450, 451f.
Hellenestic monarchies	352	Imposition	218
Hemacandra Sūri (surnamed Kali- kāla Sarvajña)	205, 335	Inadequacy	34
—details about	205	Incoherence	34
Hema (or Kanaka) Varmā	275	Incoherent	87
Heretical sects of the Buddhists 226, 226 (ftn. 2)			

	Page		Page
Incompatible reason	440	Inference—	
—kinds of	440f.	—instrumental causes of ..	411
Indeterminate perception (nirvikal-		—kinds of 130f., 361, 260, 175, 192,	
paka)	138	202, 280, 434, 435	
Indian Paṇḍits, as translator of		—not a means of right knowledge	93
Sanskrit works into Tibetan	353	—really a means of right know-	
(ftn. 1)		ledge	93
Indication	449	—special cause of	409
Indirect knowledge (parokṣa) 169, 189		—terms of	361f.
—five kinds of, according to Deva		Inference for one's self and dialectic	
Sūri	201	proposition	506
Indirect perception	413	Inference for the sake of others and	
Indirect valid knowledge—		demonstrative proposition ..	506
—two kinds of	175	Inference of God	442
Individual	111	Inferential knowledge ..	384, 390, 419f.
Indrabhūti Gautama—		Inherence (samavāya) 32, 130, 333,	
—(a) disciple of Mahāvīra ..	159f.	383, 412, 414	
—birthplace of		—relation of	383
—date of		Inherence and union—	
—parentage of	160	—distinguished	414
Indravijaya	165 (ftn. 2)	Inherent inherence	130, 412
Inference 33, 56, 175, 189, 298,		Injunction	108, 448f.
361f., 376, 383, 390		—Gaṅgeśa on	449
—a posteriori	56	—Kumārila on	449
—a priori	56	—Prabhākara on	449
—as a means of knowledge ..	420	Inopportune	87
—Cārvāka on	398ff.	Inquiry	33
—cause of	433	Inseparable connection or invari-	
—commonly seen	56	able concomitance (vyāpti) 177,	
—demonstration of	361	189, 361	
—denied by Cārvāka	398ff.	—affirmative	361
—Deva Sūri on	202	—kinds of	177, 361
—Dignāga on	281ff.	—negative	361
—distinct from perception ..	420	Instrument (karaṇa)	382, 390
—established	400f.	Intellect	50
—for one's own self (svārthānumā-		—impermanent	101, 112
na)	175, 192, 280, 310, 435	—kinds of	395
—for one's own self, Deva Sūri		—permanent	112
on	202	—(a) quality of a conscious agent,	
—for the sake of others (parārthā-		the soul	101
numāna) 176, 192, 282, 312, 435f.		—(an) unconscious instrument ..	112
—for the sake of others, Deva		Intention	448
Sūri on	202	Intercourse (sannikarṣa)—	
—for the sake of others, kinds of ..	312	—kinds of	130, 360, 412
		—produced by meditation	414

	Page		Page
Intercourse—		Jainas	158, 273
—whose character is general ..	412f., 429, 430f.	—canonical scriptures ..	160f.
—whose character is knowledge ..	413	Jaina sects ..	159
Interrogation	33	Jainism—	
Intervention	113	—persecution suffered by ..	222f.
Intrinsic inseparable connection		—rights and privileges of the laity of ..	223
(antar-vyāpti)	177	—royal patronage enjoyed by ..	222
—Deva Sūri on	202	—support of the Jaina community	
Invalid knowledge	409ff.	received by	223
—Mīmāṃsakas on	410	—unperturbed by the Mahomed-	
Invariable concomittance (see In-		ans	223
separable connection) ..	376, 384, 390	Jalandhara	349
—Buddhist views on	400f.	Jambudvīpa	332
—comprehensiveness of ..	429	Janaka	12, 13
—conclusive definition of ..	424	Jānakīnātha Śarmā ..	466
—defined by the ‘Lion’ and the		Jātukarṇya, probably a compiler ..	50
‘Tiger’	423	Jātukarṇya Vyāsa	50
—five provisional definitions of ..	421	Jayadeva	455, 524
—knowable	400f.	Jayanta	137 (ftn. 1),
—means of apprehending ..	426ff.	—author of the Nyāya-mañjarī ..	146f.
—nature of	140	—criticises the doctrines of Kalyā-	
—objectionable definitions of ..	424	ṇa Rakṣita and Dharmottara ..	149f.
—of special forms	426	—(his) criticism of Sphoṭa-vāda ..	149
—of the Buddhist condemned ..	376	—(his) criticism of the doctrines of	
—right means of apprehending ..	428	apoha, kṣaṇa-bhaṅga, Īśvara-	
—unknowable	398ff.	bhaṅga, etc.	149f.
Inversion, Deva Sūri on	201	—date of	147
Invocation of Blessings	408	—(his) explanation of verbal know-	
Invocation, kinds of	403	ledge	147f.
Irrelevancy	34	—life of	146f.
Īśvarabhāṅga (non-existence of		—(his) reproach of the Buddhists ..	150
God) criticised by Jayanta ..	150	—(his) review of some Buddhistic	
Īśvara Sena	307 (ftn. 2)	doctrines	150
I-tsing	306	Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana ..	477f.
Jagaddala	346 (ftn. 3)	Jayarāma Tarkālāṅkāra ..	483
Jagaddhara	522	Jaya Simha Deva	199
Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra ..	469f.	Jaya Simha Sūri	206, 371, 372
Jayāditya	336	Jehāṅgīr	479
Jaina Āgamas	172	Jehāri	337f., 342, 349
Jaina Logic	158	Jinadatta Sūri	152, 154
—conciliatory character of ..	221f.	—date of	152 (ftn. 3)
—not conflicting with the Brāh-		Jinas	159, 274 (ftn. 3), 338
maṇas	221f.	Jina Bhadra Gaṇikṣamā Śramaṇa ..	174,
—permanency of	24	181	
		Jina Bhaṭṭa	210
		Jina Bhaṭṭa Sūri	390

	Page		Page
Jina Mitra ..	340, 349	Karatoyā ..	346
Jinendrabodhi ..	323	Kāryābhiniṣṛtti—	
Jineśvara Sūri ..	197	—(not in) Āṇvikṣikī ..	272
Jivita Gupta I ..	301	—(a) part of the Vaiśeṣika Philo-	
Jñānacandra ..	213	sophy ..	27
Jñānagarbha ..	250	Kāṣṭhāsariṅgha ..	169 (ftn.)
Jñānapūrṇa or Jñāna Deva	374, 380	Kāśyapa ..	43
Jñāna Śrī Bhadra ..	342	—hermitage of ..	39, 42
—same as Jñānasiddha Bhadra	342	Kauśāmbī 117 (ftn. 2)	265, 266, 303
(ftn. 1)		Kauśika ..	262
Jñāna Śrī Mitra ..	211 (ftn. 3), 341	Kavicaṇḍra ..	396
Jñātipuṭras ..	244	Keśava Mīśra ..	318
Judicial Council of monks (saṃgha)	231	—life of ..	381
—judge or umpire, in ..	231 f.	Kevala ..	169 (ftn. 1)
—member of ..	231	Kha-che-jñāna Śrī ..	329
Kākaṭiya Dynasty ..	380	Khajjuttarā ..	112 (ftn. 2)
Kālāśoka ..	226, 346	Kri-sroṇ-den-tsan ..	352
Kālidāsa ..	273	King Amoghavarṣa ..	223, 349
Kaliṅga ..	305	King Bhassa ..	322
Kalyāṇa Candra ..	198	King Candra Gupta ..	222
Kalyāṇa Rakṣita ..	143, 328	King Ciṅghana ..	386
Kamala Rakṣitā ..	350	King Dpal-lha-tsan-po ..	250
Kamala Śīla ..	327, 352, 516	King Harihara ..	381
Kāmbhoja ..	351	King Jayacandra ..	406, 406 (ftn. 6)
Kāmeśvara Dynasty ..	521	King Jaya Simha ..	205
Kaṇāda ..	395	King Jitāra ..	210
—system of ..	304	King Kaṇiṣka ..	512
Kaṇāda Gupta ..	304	King Khri-sroṇ-den-tsan	323, 327
Kaṇāda Taṭkavāgīśa ..	466	King Kēma ..	222
—traditional account of	466 (ftn. 3)	King Lalitacandra ..	320
Kāñci ..	117, 272, 512	King Lalitāditya ..	324
Kāñcipura ..	117, 302, 351	King Muktāpīḍa ..	147
Kaṇiṣka 26 (ftn. 3), 50, 241, 242, 349	352	King Muñja ..	197
—date of ..	241 (ftn. 1)	King Nemicaṇḍra ..	252
Kanoj ..	335	—date of ..	252 (ftn. 4)
Kaṇva ..	45	—genealogy of ..	252 (ftn. 4)
Kaṇva Dynasty ..	251 (ftn. 3)	King Poros ..	352
Kapila—		King Riggs-lan-rgyal-po ..	299
—date of ..	10	King Śrī Harṣa or Harṣavardhana	123
—(his) doctrine of matter and soul	9f.	King Sroṇ-tsan-gan-po ..	305
Kapilas ..	278	King Tribhuvantilaka ..	388
Karṇa Deva ..	350	King Vimalacandra of Bengal,	
Karṇāta Dynasty ..	521	Kāmarūpa and Tirhut	338, 342
Karṇātaka Kṣatriya race ..	350	(ftn. 6)	
		Kīrti (see Dharmakīrti)	386

	Page		Page
Kīrti—		Labrang—	
—time of	137	—monastery of 342 (ftn. 4), 344 (ftn. 4)	
Kīrtivijaya	216	Lachimā Devī	460
Klog-skya-ses-rab-brtrya	313	Laghusamantabhadra	197f.
Knowledge (viññāna)	227	Lakṣaṇa Bhaṭṭa	374
Knowledge	3	Lakṣmaṇa Sena .. 350, 523 (ftn. 3)	
—basic	243	—court of	524
—distinguished from work)	—successors of	424
—divisions of	227 (ftn.) 2	Lalitacandra	321
—from particular standpoint (Na- ya)	218	Laugākṣī Bhāskara	395
—(a) function of the intellect	112	Law of Extension	328
—general grounds of	409	—application of	285
—kinds of	245, 389, 411	Lha-dvan-blo	319f.
—objectified	245	Liang Emperor Wu-fī	301
—potential	245	Licchavi Dynasty	335
—practical functions of	418	Likeness	113
—presentative	245	—Gaṅgeśa on	443
—(a) quality of the soul	98	—Mīmāṃsaka on	443
Koṅkana	338	Limitation of the proposition (pra- tijñā-vibhakti)	166
Kṛpārāma	479	Limitation of the reason	166
Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa Āde	486	Logic (sophism)	229
Kṛṣṇa Dāsa Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭa- cārya	468	—called Nīti or Nyāya	240
Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvagīśa	384f.	—called pre-eminently the Ānvik- ṣikī	6
Kṣamākalyāṇa	390	Logical theories of Aristotle migrat- ed from Alexandria into India	511ff.
Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga (the momentary ex- istence)—			
—criticised by Jayanta	149	Logical works—	
Kṣīrodadhi (khiroi)	17	—brought to Nadia from Mithilā	462
Kṣitīścandra Roy	526	Logic and Logicians—	
Kubja Viṣṇu Vardhana .. 273 (ftn. 1)		—in the Laṅkāvatāra	244
Kukutasiddha	516	Logic of Mithilā and Nadia	218
Kumāra Gupta	267	Lohacārya II	169 (ftn. 8)
Kumārajīva	252	Lokanātha	334
Kumāra Kalasa	343	Lokāyata	5, 6, 9
Kumāra-lābha	248 (ftn. 7)	Louis De La Vallée Poussin—	
Kumāra-pañha	114 (ftn. 1)	—on the Buddhistic doctrine of the soul	126 (ftn. 2)
Kumāra Śrī	336		
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa .. 138, 183, 273, 351		Mādhavācārya 247 (ftn. 5), 248 (ftn. 3), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 274 (ftn.), 306, 308 (ftn. 3), 341, 397f.	
Kumārila and Dharmakīrti	304	Mādhava Tarkasiddhānta	526
Kumudacandrācārya	198		
Kauṇḍa kunda	169 (ftn.)		
Labrang	533f.		
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to	530		

	Page		Page
Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura ..	461	—canonical books of ..	242
Madhyadeśa ..	304 (ftn. 1)	—rise of ..	514
Mādhyamika ..	135, 253, 249f.	—spread of ..	241
—Chinese account of ..	253 (ftn. 2)	Mahāyāna Hoshang ..	327
—criticised by Jayanta ..	150	Mahendra Varman ..	222
—explanation of ..	249 (ftn. 6)	Mahinda ..	352
—expounders of ..	250	Maheśa Ṭhakkura 406 (ftn. 7), 456	(ftn. 2), 457f.
—founder of ..	250	Maheśvara Ṭhakkura ..	521
—Indian account of ..	253 (ftn. 3)	Mahipāla ..	340, 517
—principal works of ..	250	Mahipāla II ..	340
—Tibetan and Chinese versions		Mahomedans—	
of ..	256	—in Bengal and Behar ..	350
Mādhyamika Buddhists ..	139	—in Rāśmīra ..	350
Mādhyamika doctrine of inter-re-		Mahī Śāsaka sect ..	265
lation—		Maitreya ..	262
—criticised by Vātsyāyana ..	117	Maitreyanātha 120 (ftn. 3), 249	
Mādhyamika doctrine of Śūnyatā		Major term ..	64 ¹ , 128 ² , 176
(voidness)—		Maladhāri Śrī Rāja Sekhara Sūri	153, 154, 155, 357, 371
—criticised by Vātsyāyana ..	118	Mallasena Sūri ..	212
Magadha 322, 339, 341, 350, 352 ²		Mallavādin 194f., 329 (ftn. 3)	
Mogas ..	352	Mallinātha ..	273, 380
Māgha ..	147 (ftn. 4)	Mālwa ..	320
Mahādeva Puntamkar ..	486	Manah-paryāya ..	169 (ftn. 1)
Mahāmahopādhyāya Jadunātha		Māna Simha ..	477
Sārvabhauma ..	526	Manidhara ..	396
Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājakṛṣṇa		Māṇikya Nandi—	
Tarkapañcānana ..	526	—age of ..	188
Mahāpāla ..	336, 337	—(his) parīkṣāmukha sūtra ..	188
Mahāpuruṣiya sect ..	351	—(his) references to contempora-	
Mahārāja Dharmapāla ..	328	neous systems of philosophy ..	193
Mahārāja Girīśacandra ..	485	Mañjunātha ..	309
Mahārāja Kumārapāla 205, 222		Mañjuśrī 272, 274 (ftn. 3), 275, 335,	337, 344
Mahārāja Kṛṣṇacandra Ray ..	488	Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta ..	258
Mahārājā of Sikkim—		Manoratha ..	266, 345
—invites Dr. Vidyabhūṣaṇa ..	537	Manu ..	4
—original letter of introduction in		Manuals of Logic—	
Tibetan given by ..	539	—classes of ..	356
Mahārāja Rāmākṛṣṇa Rāya ..	488	—composition of ..	355f.
Mahārāja Śivacandra 484, 498		Māra ..	315
Mahāsāṅghikas ..	226	Mark ..	113
Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna ..	159	Material cause 382f., 390 (ftn. 1)	
—date of ..	159 (ftn. 1)		
—the founder of Jainism ..	158f.		
Mahāyāna 126 (ftn. 2), 247 ² , 272 ²			

	Page		Page
Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa ..	407	Method of comprehending a thing	
Mati	169 (ftn. 1)	from particular points of view—	
Maticitra (Aśvaghoṣa) ..	241 (ftn. 1)	—Deva Sūri on	203
(The) Meaningless	82	Method of debate, Deva Sūri on ..	204
Meaninglessness	34	Method of description (Naya)	
Means	445	seven kinds of	181
Means of right knowledge 54ff., 90ff.,		(The) Middle Path Doctrine (Ma-	
.. ..	370 387	dhyama-mārga)	253
—critical examination of ..	90 (ftn. 1)	—four aspects of	253f.
—criticised by Nāgārjuna ..	257	Middle term (hetu)	120, 128, 176
—Dignāga on	276ff.	—affirmative negative	362
—impossibility of	91	—characteristics of 310f. 377f., 202	
—invalidity of	90f.	(ftn. 1)	
—kinds of	259, 360	—conditional	431
—non-self established	257	—Deva Sūri on	202
—number of	95	—exclusively affirmative	362
—validity of	91f., 457	—exclusively negative	362
Medhātithi (see Gautama) ..	6, 20	—fallacies (see fallacy of the middle	
—of Bhāsa	18	term)	293, 313, 315 (ftn. 3)
—(his) work on Ānvīksikī ..	20	—kinds of	311, 362
Mediaeval School of Indian Logic		—law governing	288
.. ..	172, 270ff.	—law of extension of	283
—(its) difference from the Ancient		—three characters of	280f., 291
School	158	Middle term and major term—	
—early writers of	270ff.	—relative extension of	292
—formation of	157f.	—relation between	508
—founded by the Jainas and the		Migration of Aristotle's works into	
Buddhists	157f.	India—	
—special features of	157f.	—first period of	511
Mediate perception	419	—second period of	512
—doctrine of	419	—third period of	512
Meeting of the question (āśaṅkā-		Milinda	240
pratiśedha)	167	Milinda and Nāga Sena—	
Memory	112f.	—dialogue between	240f.
—belongs to the soul	112	Mind	417
—causes of	112 (ftn. 2)	—(an) atom	98f., 101, 417
—ground of	112f.	—mark of	57
Menander	349	—one in number	101
Merit and Demerit	114	—whether a sense organ 280, 280 (ftn. 1)	
—Gaṅgeśa on	449	Minor commentaries on the Nyūya	
—Prabhākara on	449	sūtra	151f.
Meru Śāstrī	391	Minor term	60, 120, 176, 312, 361
Method—		Mirok	262
—fallacies of	203f.	Misaruka	460

	Page		Page
Misaru Miśra	460	Nadiā University—	
Mistimed	35	—chair of Smṛti at	527
Mistimed fallacy	63, 64	—Tāntric studies at	527
Mithilā	497	Nāgadatta	272
—decay of	525	Nāgārjuna 24 (ftn. 2), 106 (ftn. 1),	
—modern history of	521f.	125, 248, 250, 251ff., 348, 349	
—modern writers of	522	—age of	117f., 252
—University of	521f.	—(his) criticism of the Nyāya doc-	
Mithilā School of Logic	454ff.	trine of Pramāṇa	256
—principal logicians of	454ff.	—legend about	258
Modern School of Hindu Logic ..	405	—(his) letter to Sātavāhana 257 (ftn. 2)	
Modern School of Nyāya	522	—(his) logical theory of examples	
Moggaliputta Tissa	234	(udāharaṇa) criticised by Vātsyā-	
Mokṣākara Gupta	346f., 349	yana	119
Monastery of <u>Bsam-yaś</u> (Sam-ye)	324	—(his) Mādhyamika-kārikā	253
Monastery of Labrang 289 (ftn. 1),		—mentioned neither by Vātsyā-	
299 (ftn. 1), 319 (ftn. 5), 320		yana nor by Uddyotakara by	
(ftn. 3), 324 (ftn. 2), 328 (ftn. 2),		name	119 (ftn. 1)
336 (ftn. 3)		—philosophical works of	253 (ftn.)
Monastery of Sam-ye (see Monastery		—(his) references to the logical	
of <u>Bsam-yaś</u>)	323	doctrines of Akṣapāda	255f.
Monastery of Śi-waḥi-dge-inas ..	300	—Tibetan name of	252
Monastery of Vikramaśīla	336	—(his) Vighraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā	256
Mudita Bhadra	516	—(his) works on Tantra	252 (ftn. 6)
Mudgala	395	Nāgas	258
Mukta kumbha	331	Nāgasena	112 (ftn. 2), 334
Munisundara Sūri	214	Nāgeśa	384
Muscular movement	370	Nag-tshul-khrimā-rgyal-wa	320
Mu-tig-leum-pa	331	Naiyāyikas	139, 146, 244
Mutual non-existence	184	—also called Yaugas	154 (ftn. 2)
—Deva Sūri on	203	—are Śaivas	154, 155
Mya-ñau-med	332	—characteristics of	155
Nadiā—		Nālandā 261, 265, 272, 273, 303,	
—college at	464	320, 323, 327, 334, 335, 352	
—Mahomedan conquest of	524	—as a University	515
—nucleus of a university at	524	—celebrated men of	515
—raised to the status of a town		—Dr. Spooner's observation of 515	
under the Sena kings	523f.	(ftn. 5)	
—situation of	523	—earliest scholars of	514
—traces of the Pāla kings in	523	—Fa-hian's visit to	514
Nadiā School of Logic	461ff.	—Hwen-Thsang's visit to	514
—principal logicians of	461ff.	—I-tsing's visit to	515
—chair of Astronomy at	527	—kings building monasteries at	514
—chair of Logic at	525f.	—monks at	514f.
		—royal recognition of	515

	Page		Page
Nālandā—		Negative reason	437
—Saṅghārāmas or monasteries at	514	Negative things	394
—situation of	514	Nemicaṇḍra Kavi	207
—Tibetan account of	516	—details about	207 (ftn. 2)
—University of (see University)		Neo-Brahmanic age	355
	252, 302, 303, 352	Nilakaṇṭha	16 (ftn. 1), 391 ²
Nāma Deva	374	Ñi-ma-slas (a Tāntric teacher) ..	322
Nānken	301	Nine reasons (see wheel of reasons)	283
Nānyadeva	521	—illustration of	284
Nārada	498	—logic of	299
—(an) expert in Nyāya Śāstra ..	43	—(a) table of	284
—legends about	44, 44 (ftn. 2)	Nine Sacred Works (Navadharmas)	
—(as a) logician doubtful			242 (ftn. 3), 243
—(his) other works	45	Nirgranthas	305
—(the) real	45	Nirgrantha putras	244
—represents the philosophical cul-		Nirukta kāras	138 (ftn. 1)
ture of the first cent. A.D. ..	44	—criticised by Vācaspati Miśra ..	138
—shrouded in mystery	44	Nirvāṇa	255
—(his) skill in syllogistic reasoning	43	Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate per-	
—(his) visit to Śvetadvīpa ..	44f.	ception)—	
—(his) works in Smṛti	45	—defined	137
Nārada Smṛti—		Non-activity	
—represents the theories of Smṛti		—grounds for	410
and Nyāya of the early centuries		Non-analytical Naya (Nigama) ..	170
of Christ	45 (ftn. 2)	Non-being	253
Nārāyaṇa	153	Non-censurable	33
Naropā	341, 342	Non-equipollent concomitance ..	399
Narrative description	108	Non-erratic	55
Nature of the universal proposition—		Non-existence	54, 96., 370
—as understood by Dharmakīrti		—as a separate entity	415
and Aristotle	509	—counterpart of	416
Navadvīpa—		—Deva Sūri on	203
—university of	405	—included in inference	97
Naya (method) of description or		—kinds of	97, 184, 419f., 416
mood of statements 161, 161		—(a) means of right knowledge ..	96
	(ftn. 4), 170f.	—not a means of right knowledge	96
—five kinds of	170f.	—of the general form	425
Nayapāla	343, 344, 350	—perception of	416
Nedumāraṇ Pāṇḍya	222	—subdivision of, according to Deva	
Negation—		Sūri	203
—absolute	97 (ftn. 1)	—(as a) thing	97 (ftn. 1)
—of correlation	97 (ftn. 1)	—whose counterpart is qualified	
—of identity	97 (ftn. 1)	by a Nature already in a different	
—of the opposite	132, 287	Locus	423
		Non-ingenuity	89

	Page		Page
Non-material cause	383	Nyāya—	
Non-perception	281	—rise of vernacular detrimental to	492
—eleven kinds of	311	—(in the) sense of Logic first in the	
—invalidity of	414f.	Mahābhārata	42
—irregularity of	59	—(in the) sense of logic in the	
Non-reason (see fallacy) three kinds		Caraka Saṁhitā	42
of	34, 39f.	—signifies just or justice in Artha	
Nose	57	Śāstra	41 (ftn. 6)
Nrga	134	—spread of the study of	39
Nṛsiṁha Deva and his successors	521	—supported by reasoning and scrip-	
Nṛsiṁha pañcānana	482	ture	39
Numbers doctrine of things fixed in	14f.	—supports the Veda	39
Nyāya (the science of true reason-		—technical meaning of	40
ing)	8	—tenets of	39
—adopts Pramāṇa alone	402	—used in the sense of logic from	
—called Gautamīvidyā and Akṣa-		about the first cent. A.D.	42
pāda-darśana	50	—three causes for its popularity	155f.
—causes of its present disregard	492f.	—(in) Tibetan	8
—(in) Chinese	40 (ftn. 2)	—Vātsyāyana on	40f.
—competition for the chair of	526	—very popular about the 2nd cent.	
—encouraged by the British Govern-		A.D.	42
ment	490ff.	—Viśvanātha on	41
—included among the fourteen		Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika amalgamated	396
principal sciences	38 ²	Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika categories	
—included in Śaḍdarśana by		impossible to assimilate	402
Jaina writers	157f.	Nyāya-bhāṣya earliest commentary	
—included in Śaḍdarśana by the		on	115
Brāhmaṇic writers	153	Nyāyabhūṣana	338
—in the sense of logic not known		Nyāya category of Pramāṇa in-	
to Pāṇini and Patañjali	41	corporated in the Vaiśeṣika	386
—introduction of this word	40	Nyāya doctrine of tātparya (inten-	
—Mādhavācārya on	41	tion)	148
—Mahābhārata full of references to	39	Nyāya līlāvati commentaries on..	387f.
—meaning of	40	Nyāya philosophy	279
—mentioned in the Veda and Cikitsā	39	—incorporates the Vaiśeṣika	373
—origin of the name of	40	—why termed Akṣapāda darśana..	398
—Pāṇini derives the word in the		Nyāya-ratnāvalī (a prakaraṇa by	
sense of justice	4, 41 (ftn. 4)	Vallabhācārya)	387
—patronised by the Mahārāja of		Nyāya-sāra (a manual of logic by	
Nadiā	488	Bhā Sarvajña	358ff.
—popularity of	39, 155f.	—commentaries on	371f.
—Portuguese account of	489	Nyāya Śāstra (see Ānvikṣiki)	39
—Portuguese interest in	488ff.	—antiquity of	41f.
—recognised as a branch of Ortho-		—early teachers or	42f.
dox Learning	152ff.	—first regular work on	46

	Page		Page
Nyāya Śāstra—		Opposing the proposition ..	85
—science of right judgment or		Opposition ..	113
true reasoning ..	40 ²	Opposition to the counter-proposi-	
—science of syllogism and of infer-		tion ..	166f.
ence ..	41	Ordinary Intercourse of Particular-	
—technical terms of, as used in the		ity ..	430
Caraka Saṁhitā ..	43	Originating cause ..	33
—(in) Tibetan ..	40 (ftn. 3)	Overlooking the censurable ..	89f.
Nyāya Siddhānta Dīpa (manual of		Padmanābha Miśra ..	381
logic by Śaśadhara) ..	396f.	Padma-saṁbhava ..	327, 352
Nyāya Sūtra (see Nyāya Śāstra) ..	46	Pain ..	58
—arrangement of categories in ..	52	Pakṣadhara Miśra ..	406 (ftn. 7), 455f.
—author of ..	47f.	Pāla Dynasty—	
—Bhāṣya (commentary) on ..	46	—kings of ..	349
—contains the principles both of		—of Bengal and Behar ..	517f.
logic and philosophy ..	46	Pāla kings dates of ..	517f.
—criticised by Nāgārjuna ..	50	Pāli Buddhist Literature—	
—Gautama and Akṣapāda both		—logical topics in ..	227
authors of ..	49	—origin of ..	225f.
—(as) Gotama sūtra ..	48	Pallava Dynasty kings of ..	350
—not the work of one person ..	46	Pallavas ..	273 (ftn. 1)
—authorship of ..	498	Pamiāngeli ..	535
—passage quoted from later Bud-		—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's reception on	
dhist works in ..	46	the way to ..	537f.
—reviews doctrines of various		—monastery of ..	538
periods ..	46	Pañcaśikha ..	10
—subject-matter of ..	49, 50ff.	Panchen-shwa ḍmar ..	271
Nyāya theory of Pramāṇa criti-		Paṇḍita Candra father of Jayanta ..	147
cised by Nāgārjuna ..	256	Paṇḍita Dipāṅkara ..	318
Nyāya-vidyā emanated from the		Paṇḍita's red cap ..	271
mouth of Brahmā ..	38f.	Pāṇini ..	11
Nyāya works found by Portuguese		Parahita ..	345
missionaries ..	489	Parahita Bhadra ..	340
Nying-ma-pa ..	533	Paramahansa ..	210
Object of knowledge (see pra-		Paramārtha ..	267, 301f.
meya) ..	375	Parīkṣā (see examination) ..	28
—kinds of ..	370f.	Paṛiṣad (council)—	
Object of right knowledge ..	97	—constituents of ..	22
Objects of sense distribution of ..	100	—(a) council of debate ..	22
Occasional signification ..	450	—various names of ..	22
Odantapura Sarvāstivāda school of	342	Parivrājaka Karuṇānanda ..	303
Old man respect for ..	30	Parokṣa and Pratyakṣa senses of,	
Opponent how to argue with ..	30f.	according to Umāsvāti and early	
—how to vanquish ..	30	Jaina writers ..	170

	Page		Page
Pārsvanātha	159	Pleasure—	
Parśvadeva Gaṇi	210	—as the summum bonum ..	102
Pārtha Sārathi Miśra	273	Pleasure and pain	113
Particularity (viśeṣa) ..	32, 412, 416	Point of defeat or an occasion for	
Parts	333	rebuke	35, 66, 261, 264
—alone are realities	105	—twenty-two kinds of	269
Past time	106	—varieties of	84ff.
Pāsupata Śaiva sect	155	Positive things	394
Pāṭaliputra	349	Possession	113
Pātimokkha introductory part of	233f.	Posterior non-existence ..	97, 97 (ftn. 1)
Perceptible reason in the affirma-		Potentiality (of a word)	449ff.
tive form six subdivisions of ..	190	—Gaṅgeśa on	451
Perceptible reason in the negative		—Mīmāṃsakas on	451
form—		—sources of	450f.
—six subdivisions of	190f.	Prabhācandra	183 193f.
Perception	33, 55 ² , 298, 359ff.	—his references to other philoso-	
—causes of	92, 416f.	phers	194
—characteristic of an object of ..	310	Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas ..	148
—contemplative	360	Prabhākaras	139, 359
—defined a knowledge	92	Prabhāsa	49 (ftn. 2) ² , 512
—(as) defined by Akṣapāda ..	130	Practical direct valid knowledge ..	174
—definition of	92, 310	—Deva Sūri on	201
—determinate	360	—subdivisions of, according to Deva	
—different from inference	93	Suri	201
—Dignāga on	277ff.	Practical Naya	171
—five special kinds of	92	Pradyumna Sūri	196, 205
—how it arises	57	—particulars about	196 (ftn. 1)
—indeterminate	360	Prahlāda	10
—instrumental causes of	411	Prajñāskara	187 (ftn. 1)
—irregularity of		Prajñāskara Gupta ..	187 (ftn. 2), 330f.,
—kinds of	310, 360f., 383, 390		349
—ordinary	360	Prajñāskara mati	126 (ftn. 2), 336
—parts taken by soul and mind in	92	Prakṛti (primordial matter) ..	10
—same as inference	93	Pramāṇa (means of knowledge)	50f.,
—special cause of	92, 409		161
Perceptual knowledge	411	—four kinds of	170 (ftn.)
Permanent signification	450	Prameya (object of knowledge) ..	51
Philosophy or darśana	5	Pratāparudra	380
Phodang	533f., 535	Prayer	2
Phun-tshog-nam-gyal	535	Predicate or major term ..	282, 285, 290
Phyogs-glañ	272	Prefixes	453
Phyogs-ltar-suan	290 (ftn. 1)	Present time—	
Pippalāda	22	—critical examination of ..	106 (ftn. 1)
Pījūṣa varṣa	380	—denied	106
Pleasure	58	—established	106

	Page		Page
Present time—		Quibble—	
—indication	106	—in respect of a term ..	65
Presumption	33, 56, 370	—three kinds of	65
—Mīmāṃsakas on	435		
—not valid	96	Rabhasa Nandi	194
—(a) special kind of inference ..	96	Rāghava Bhaṭṭa	358, 359 (ftn. 1)
—validity of	95	Rāghava Rāya	482 (ftn. 1)
Prior non-existence	97, 97 (ftn. 1)	Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra ..	220
Probability	56, 370		(ftn. 5), 481
—(a) special kind of inference ..	96	Raghunandana	527
Production of fruits—		Raghunandana Dāsa Miśra ..	458
—time of	102	Raghunātha Nāyaka	485
Prof. H. Ui—		Raghunātha Sāstri	487
—on the date of the Nyāya sūtra		Raghunātha Śiromaṇi ..	405, 456
	50 (ftn. 2)		(ftn. 2), 463ff., 525
Prof. L. Suali—		—date of	465
—on the date of the Nyāya sūtra		Raghuvratī	305
	50 (ftn. 2)	Rājacūḍāmaṇi Makhin ..	485
Proofs—		Rājā Ballāla Sena	153
—eight kinds of	264	Rājā Bhairava Siṅha	456
—subdivisions of	306	Rājagṛha	349
Proposition 32, 60 ² , 166, 290, 312		Rājā Rāghava	480
	361, 436f.	Rājā Rāmakṛṣṇa	477
Protector and Protégé	113	Rājā Sanātana	337
Ptolemy Philadelphos	352	Rājasekhara	134, 213
Pudgalavāda	127 (ftn.)	Rāmabhadra	459, 522
Pudgalavādins	127 (ftn.)	Rāmabhadra Śiddhānta Vāgīśa ..	480
Puggalavādins	235	Rāmacandra Kavibhāratī ..	540
Punarvasu Ātreya—		Rāmacandra Vidyāvāgīśa ..	468f.
—(his) dissertation on the senses	11f.	Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya Cakra-	
—(the) original author of the Car-		varty	406f.
ka Saṁhītā	11	Rāmānuja	351
Purpose	33, 59 ²	Rāmapāla	346
Puragupta	227, 549	Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa ..	477
Puṣpapura	26 (ftn. 2)	Rāmadeva Cirañjīva	433
		Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa ..	483
Qualification or Particularity		Rāmarudra Vidyānidhi ..	327
(Viśeṣaṇatā)	130	Rāṣṭrakūta king Kṛṣṇarāja 1 or	
Quality (guṇa)	31	Śubhatuṅga	222
—kinds of	38	Ratnākara Śānti	338, 342f., 358
Questioning the validity of the		Ratnakīrti	133, 134, 338f., 358, 371
example	167	—identification of	342 (ftn. 6)
Quibble	34, 65	Ratnaprabhā	147, 211
—in respect of a genus	65	—particulars about	212 (ftn. 2)
—in respect of a metaphor	65	—spiritual descent of	212

	Page		Page
Ratnavajra	339f.	Rejoinder (uttara)	32
Ravi Gupta	322	—causing entanglement or defeat	
—date of	335	on the disputant (niggaha) ..	236
Reason (hetu,) (see middle term)		—by the respondent (patikamma) ..	235f.
32, 32 (ftn. 2), 60 ² , 166, 190, 258,		Relation of Identity	400
284f., 290, 361, 437		Relation—	
—and the minor premise	503	—fundamental conceptions of ..	255
—affirmative	286, 503	Relative non-existence	394
—different phases of	190f.	Renouncing the proposition	86
—kinds of	286, 437	Repetition	34, 88f.
—negative	286, 503	Resources for the accomplishment	
—unproved in respect of constant		of an action	27
accompaniment	440	Respondent accused or defendant	
—unproved in respect of invariable		(cuditaka)	231
concomittance	440	—three classes of	29
—unproved on the part of its locus	439	Rgyal-wa-can	338
—unproved on the part of the		Rgya-tshan-señ-ge	352
major term	440	Right knowledge	138, 174, 389, 394
—unproved on the part of the		—objects of	56ff.
reason	440	—two kinds of	169, 174
—unproved with regard to its own		Rigg-pa-can	278
mature	440	Rig-pahi-yan-lag	289 (ftn. 3)
Reasoning (casuistry)	229, 290, 429	Rin-chen-grags	338
—form of	290	Rituals	2, 108
—processes of	429	—three subdivisions of	108
—theory of	5	Rual-hbyor-pa	278
Reasons—		Root	453
—distinguished from Ānvīkṣikī		Rucidatta	406 (ftn. 7), 457
and Ātmaśāstra	5	Rudra	395
—theory of	5, 22	Rudra Nyāyavācaspati	476f.
Receipt	113	Rudrarāma	484
Reciprocal non-existence	394, 416	Rudra Vācaspati	392
Recognition	101, 112, 189, 201	Rumour	56, 370
—(a) function of a conscious agent,		—not a separate means of know-	
the soul	112	ledge	95
—of common properties	59	—(a) special kind of verbal testi-	
—of properties not common	59	mony	95
Recollection (smṛti)	189, 201	Rung-po—	
Redundancy	34	—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's journey to ..	529f.
Reflection	129	Sabda-śakti-prakāśikā (a logico-	
—Vācaspati and Jayanta on ..	129 (ftn. 3)	grammatical treatise of Jagadīśa	
Refutation (Dūṣaṇa)	181, 298, 315	Tarkālaṅkāra)	470ff.
—semblance of	181, 298	Sadvāha or Śātavāhana	251
Re-inculcation	108	Sahabuddin Ghorī	406 (ftn. 6)
Re-interrogation	33		

	Page		Page
Sahaja Sarvajña	384	Śānta Rakṣita 271, 323, 327, 352, 517	
Saint Tirujñana Sambandar	222	Śāntideva	126 (ftn. 2)
Śakābda	241	Śānti Sūri	197
Śākala	266	Sapta-bhaṅga Naya (sevenfold	
Śakrāditya	515	paralogism, see Syādvāda) ..	167f.
Śaktisvāmin	147	—particulars about	167 (ftn. 2)
Śākyabodhi	320	Śaraha	251
Śākya hoḍ	343	Śarṅgapāṇi	398
Śākya muni	315	Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha	398
Salvation (see emancipation)	359	Sarvajña	342
Sāmantabhadra	182f., 333, 339	Sarvajña Deva	340 ² , 357
—age of	183	Sarvajña Mitra	322, 357
—(his) Āptamīmāṃsā	184f.	Sarvajña Śrī Rakṣita	289
Saṁbhāṣā (see Vāda-vidhi and de-		Sarvajña Viṣṇu	398
bate)	28f.	Sarvāstivāda	247
—method of	28f.	Sarvāstivāda sect	266
Saṁbhāṣā-prasāṁsā (see debate-		Śāśadhara	396
utility of)	28f.	Śāśāṅka Narendra Gupta	349
Saṁbhāṣā-vidhi (see Vāda-vidhi		Śā-ākya monastery of Western	
and Ānvikṣikī)—the principal		Tibet	289, 300
topic of	27	Śūtavāhana (see Sadvāha) 251 (ftn.	
Saṁbhūtivijaya	164 (ftn. 4)	2), 349	
Sāṁkhya	5, 6, 10, 243, 278	Sautrāntika	135, 248
—same as Upaniṣad and Vedān-		—criticised by Jayanta	150
ta	244 (ftn. 1)	—explanation of	248 (ftn. 3)
Sāṁkhya Philosophy—		—founder of	248
—the oldest work of	295 (ftn. 1)	Sautrāntikas—	
Samprati	222	—philosophical principles of	248
Sam-ye	323 (ftn. 3)	—sects belonging to	247
Śāṅkara Svāmin	302, 302 (ftn. 4)	Svavikalpaka (determinate percep-	
Saṅgha	304	tion)—	
Saṅgha-bhadra	248 (ftn. 2), 266	—definition of	137
—a contemporary of Vasubandhu		Sāyana	397
267 (ftn.)		Saying too little	88
Saṅghamittā	352	Saying too much	88
Saṅghārāma	248, 265	Scheme—	
Saṅg-ugag-tsi-ling	535	—for the reduction of sixteen cato-	
Śāṅkarācārya	351	gories into one	359
Śāṅkara Deva	351	—of incorporation of the Nyāya	
Śāṅkara Miśra 366 (ftn. 1), 406 (ftn.		and the Vaiśeṣika 375, 382 387,	
7), 456 (ftn. 2), 458 f., 522		389, 393, 394	
Śāṅkarānanda	344f., 349	Scholarly debate	240
Sanskrit Buddhist Literature—		School of Gaṅgeśa	391
—logic mentioned in	242ff.	School of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	392
—origin of	242		

	Page		Page
Scripture (Āgama)	189	Shifting the topic ..	35, 86f.
—definition of	175	Shi-wa-htsho	323
Seish	266	Shu-chen 321, 322, 328, 329, 340 ²	
Self-consciousness	418	Sh'-yen-tūh-cia	251 (ftn. 2)
Señ-dkar	337	Siddharṣi	147 (ftn. 4)
Senses	55, 57 ² , 411, 417	Siddhasena Divākara	268 (ftn. 2)
—Ātreya's doctrine of	12	alias Kṣapāṅkara 173 ff., 268 (ftn. 2)	
—five characteristic of knowledge		—date of	173, 505 (ftn. 9)
corresponding to	100	—first Jaina writer on systematic	
—five in number	99, 100	logic	173
—five objects of	100	—founder of Mediaeval Logic	158
—forms of	100	—(his) Nyāyā vatāra	174
—grounds of their being five	100	—particulars about	173
—material	99	(a) pupil of Vṛddhavādi Sūri	173
—materials of	100	Siddhasena Gaṇi	182
—(as) modifications of touch 99, 99		—a contemporary of Devardhi	
(ftn. 1)		Gaṇi Kṣamā Śramaṇa	182
—objects of	57	Sign (see middle term, reason) 113,	
—processes of	100	377, 383	
—sites of	100	Signification (of a word)	450
Sentiments	57	Signification (of letters)	131f.
Separation	113	Sikkim—	
Ser-ṣkya-wa	278	—Buddhism in	535
Śes-paḥi-dge-guas	275	—monasteries in	534f.
Śes-rab-hbyuṅ-gnas-ṣbas	336f.	Śīla	335
Settlement of cases—		Śīlabhadra	302, 303
—by a majority	230	Śīla Saṅgama	519 (ftn. 6)
—by an undertaking	230	Silence	89
—covering over with grass	230	Simha	335
—for the insane	230	Simha Giri or Simha Sūri 182, 182	
—from recollection	230	(ftn. 3)	
—in presence	230	Simhavaktra	272
—seven rules for	230	Simha Varman	349
—with the prospect of further in-		Similar employment	113
quiry	230	Śiromaṇi—	
Seven categories of the Jaina phil-		—satirised by Yaśovijaya	18
osophers	168	Śivanātha Vidyāvācaspati	526
Sevenfold paralogism (syādvāda. 185		Six Systems	209
Shahiya Dynasty	350	Six-winged disputation	82f.
Shāh-jehān	479	Skanda Gupta	267 ² , 349
Sha-lu	270	Skin	57
—monastery of	353	Smell	57
Shapur	20	Sñe-ṭhañ monastery of	344
Shifting the proposition	85	Soma Śarmā—	
Shifting the reason	35, 36	—father of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda	

	Page		Page
Sophists	227	Sound—	
Soul	181, 393	—destroyed and not concealed ..	448
—(an) abstract conception of ..	4	—cognised by the senses ..	109f.
—compared to a charioteer ..	3	—having a beginning ..	109
—compromise between the two		—merely a manifestation of itself	109
ideas of	4	—nature of	109
—(a) concrete substance ..	4	—non-eternal	109
—connection with a body ..	57	—non-eternity of	448
—destiny of	3	—(a) product	109
—Deva Sūri's views of ..	204	—reasons for its being non-eternal	109f.
—different from body ..	3, 98	—substratum of	110
—different from mind ..	98	—traditionary teaching of ..	110
—different from the senses ..	93	Speech—	
—(the) enjoyer	7	—Buddhists on	445
—existence of	57	—canons of a sound	12f.
—evolution in the doctrine of ..	2	—defect of	260
—good work of	3	—excellence of	260
—ideas of	4	—(a) means of valid knowledge	
—identical with the senses ..	97		444, 445
—individual	371	—opportune	260
—individuality of	99	Sphoṭa (the outburst of a conglom-	
—(in the) Kāthopaniṣad ..	3	erate sound)	131
—kinds of	371	Sphoṭavāda (theory of phonetic	
—Lokāyata doctrine of ..	9	explosion)—	
—marks or signs of	57	—Jayanta's examination of ..	148f.
—pre-existence of	99	Śrī Candra	210, 211
—(as consciousness) produced by		Śrīdhara	213, 329
the combination of elements ..	9	Śrī Harṣa 330, 335, 349, 406 (ftn. 6)	
—qualities of	57	Śrī Kanṭha	151
—(puruṣa)		Śrī Kṛṣṇa Nyāyalankāra ..	483
—sāṅkhya doctrine of ..	10	Śrīlabdha	248
—(in the) Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa ..	2	Śrīparvata or Śrīśaila 251 (ftn. 4)	
—(the) seat of knowledge (cogni-		Śrīprerumātur	351
tions)	98	Śrī Sūnya Śū Mitra	336
—science of (Ātmavidyā) ..	4	Sron-tsan-gam-po	352
—seeing	6	Śrughṇa	124 (ftn. 1)
—supreme	371	Śruta	169 (ftn. 1)
—theory of	5	Śruta Sāgara Gaṇi	215
—two ideas regarding ..	4	Śrutya Prāmāṇya (denial of the	
—(in the) Upaniṣads ..	3	authority of the Veda) criticised	
—(spirit) (in the) Vedas ..	2	by Jayanta	149f.
—yoga doctrine of	11	Statement of the Conclusion ..	60
Sound	57	State of being the locus or the	
—according to the Nyāya Sūtra ..	109	minor term	433
—artificial properties attributed to	110	Sthavira Ratnākāra	520

	Page		Page
Sthiramati .. 334, 515 (ftn. 2)		Syllogism .. 258, 361, 377, 436, 497	
Sthitamati 266		—form of 290	
Sthūlabhadra 161		—members of 60f.	
Strabo 352		—of five members .. 43, 269	
Straight or immediate Naya		—of ten parts 166	
(Rjū-sūtra) 171		—criticised by Vātsyāyana .. 121f.	
Subandhu same as Vasubandhu .. 128		—essential nature of 361	
Śubhakarā Gupta 346		—first introduction of .. 498f.	
Śubhatuṅga 186 (ftn. 3)		—Greek influence in .. 500 (ftn. 1)	
Subject 290		—Mīmāṃsā form of 377	
Subjective law (Pakṣadharmatā) 390		—of two parts 269	
Subsequent non-existence 184, 394, 416		—parts of 203, 289f., 436	
—Deva Suri on 203		—(a) Speech of five parts .. 43	
Substance (dravya) 31		—terms of 176, 189f.	
Subtle śabda 171		Syllogism and Inference—	
Such-like śabda 171		—connexion between 499	
Sudharma Svāmī 160 (ftn. 1)		Syllogism from a sign—	
Sufferings—		—and Enthymeme from a sign .. 510	
—channels of 132f.		Syllogism in Indian Logic—	
—kinds of 132f.		—conforms to the logical reeds of	
Suitable śabda 171		Aristotle 500ff.	
Sulabhā 12		Syllogism of two parts—	
—(his) interview with king Janaka 12f.		—and a perfect syllogism .. 505f.	
—probably a fictitious person .. 24		Syllogism and Sainkhyā or Sān-	
Sumati 336, 314		khyā 498 (ftn. 8)	
Summary—		Systematic Jaina Logic .. 172	
—of a dissertation or the senses 12		Takṣaśilā 248	
Summum bonum 54		Tantrayukti (forms of scientific	
Sumpa 337		argument) 24	
Sundara 222		—added to the Carakasamhitā	
Sun Dynasty 243 (ftn. 1)		24 (ftn. 1)	
Śūnyatā or Nirvāṇa .. 127 (ftn.), 255		—in the Caraka Samhitā .. 25	
—of the Mādhyamikas 245 (ftn. 2)		—oldest work of Logic .. 25	
Śūnyavāda 245 (ftn. 2)		—(in the) Suśruta-Samhitā 24f., 24	
Superimposition, three kinds of .. 201		(ftn. 2)	
Sūtra of the Burden-bearer 127 (ftn.) ²		—for the systematisation of de-	
Suvarṇa vihāra 523		bates 24	
Svatantra Mādhyamika school .. 323		—technical terms constituting .. 25	
Svāmin 117		Tāntrika Pūrṇānanda .. 478	
Śveta dvīpa, identical with Syria		Tārā 332, 334, 335	
44 (ftn. 3)		Tarka 37	
Śvetāmbaras 1592		Tarka-bhāṣā (a treatise by Keśava	
Syādvāda (assertion of possibi-		Mīśra) 381	
lities) 167f., 181, 184		—commentaries on 384	
—particulars about 167 (ftn. 2)			

	Page		Page
Tarka-bhāṣā—		Taxila—	
—incorporates the Vaiśeṣika categories	381	—Persian influence at	494
Tarkakaumudī (a manual of logic by Laugākṣi Bhāskara) ..	395	—political history of	494
Tarkāmṛta (a manual of logic by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra) ..	393f.	Technicality	450
Tarka Saṁgraha (a manual of logic by Annam Bhaṭṭa) ..	388ff.	Technicalities of Logic in the Mā-dhyamika kārīka	255
—commentaries on	390f.	Teesta Bridge	530
Tarka Śāstra—the science of diabetes	402ff.	Temple of Pārśvanātha 324 (ftn. 3)	
Tarkavidyā (see Vāda-vidyā and Ānvikṣikī)	7, 8 37	Temple of Śāntinātha	329
Tārkika—		Tenet or conclusion	33, 59
—(as) indispensable member of a legal assembly	38	—four kinds of	33, 59
Tārkika-rakṣā (a treatise by Varadārāja)	374ff.	Terms—	
Tārkikas	244	—five definitions of	403
—Vyāsa against	37	—meanings of	403
Tashi-lhum-po	270	—of scientific argument	24
Tashiding	535	Terms technical	23, 403f.
Tashi Lāmā—		—(used) in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads	
—and his party	528	—(used in the) Manusmṛitā	23
—departure of	529	—constituting the tantra-yukti	25
—his reception of the Prince of Wales	529	—(used in the) Rāmāyaṇa	23
—his visit to Buddha Gayā	529	Thān Dynasty .. 343 (ftn. 1), 266 ²	
—in Calcutta	529	Thas-paḥi hbyun-gnas-gbas	346
—in India	528f.	Theory of Condition (upādhi)—	
—reception accorded to	528	—Vācaspati Miśra on	140.
Taste	57	Theory of cause and effect—	
Tathāgata	126	—Vacaspati Miśra on	140
Tattva-cintāmaṇi (the earliest work on Tarka Śāstra) ..	405ff.	Theory of Impermanence (kṣanika vāda)	121
—popularity of	454	Theory of perception as set forth by Dignāga—	
Taxila—		—controverted by Uddyotakara	126
—antiquity of	494	Theory of Proof	266
—as the great seat of Hindu learning and culture	495	Theras	226, 246
—Greek regime at	494f.	Theravāda	226
—mutual exchange of Hindu and Greek culture at	495	Theravādin	235
—Persian conquest of	494	Thesis (see proposition)	290, 312
		—fallacies of	290f., 312
		—two kinds of	264
		Things—	
		—kinds of	394
		Third Buddhist Council	234
		Thogz-med	265
		Thon-mi-gam-bhota	352

	Page		Page
Three characteristics of the middle term—		Tsin Dynasty ..	243 (ftn. 1)
—and the middle term in a syllogism ..	507f.	Turuṣkas ..	350
Three Times ..	106	Tutārī ..	386
Tilakācārya ..	212	Udayakara ..	141
Tilopā ..	340	Udayana 155, 209 (ftn.)	348, 351, 386, 396, 399
Tipiṭakas ..	226	—author of the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā-parīśuddhi ..	141
Tirhut ..	350	—better known as Ācārya ..	142
Tīrtha 275 ³ , 303 ² , 304, 305, 308, 315		—combats the Buddhist ..	142
Tīrtha dialecticians ..	272	--(his) contention of the Buddhist doctrines ..	146
Tīrtha-grāma ..	540	—(his) criticism of the doctrine of apoha, kṣaṇabhāṅga, etc. ..	143
Tīrthakas ..	261, 339, 342	—(his) Kusumāñjali ..	143
Tīrthanīkaras ..	158	—opposes Kalyāṇa-rakṣita and Dharmottara ..	143
Tīrtha system—		—(his) victory over the Buddhists causes his death ..	142
—doctrines of ..	304	—(his) works ..	141
—followers of ..	304	—(his) work Ātmatattva vidyā ..	145f.
Tol (a Sanskrit school) ..	525 (ftn. 1)	Uddyotakara 119 (ftn.) 127 (ftn.), 155, 273, 306, 348	
Tongue ..	57	—attacked by Abhayadeva Sūri 221 (ftn. 2)	
To-to-go-mo—		—author of the Nyāyavārtika ..	123
—Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa receives an address at ..	540	—(his) controversy with the Buddhists ..	125
Touch ..	57	—criticises Dignāga ..	129
Tradition ..	33	—criticises Nāgarjuna ..	128
Transcendent Intercourse ..	430	—(his) criticism of the Buddhist denial of the soul ..	125
—kinds of ..	412f.	—criticism of the theory of perception as held by Dignāga ..	129
Transcendent perception ..	412ff.	—date of ..	123, 124
—consequence of ..	181	—(his) defence of the Nyāya-Sūtra and the Nyāyabhūṣya 287 (ftn. 2)	
—process of ..	412f.	—(his) definition of Inference ..	130
Transcendental direct valid knowledge ..	175, 201	—(his) explanation of perception ..	130
—subdivisions of ..	201	—(his) main object to write the sub-commentary ..	125
Transcendental truth ..	254	—(his) Nyāya theory of signification of words ..	131
Transmigration—		—on Dignāga's theory of perception ..	277 (ftn. 1)
—belongs to the soul ..	101		
—(the) path of ..	3, 57, 58		
Triangular perception ..	418		
Trilocana ..	358, 369 (ftn. 1)		
—date of ..	134		
—(a) writer on Vaiśeṣika philosophy ..	134		
Trilocana the Junior ..	374		
Trimalaya ..	303		
Trividha paraḥ (see respondents)—			
three classes of ..	29		

	Page		Page
Uddyotakara—		Vācaspati—	
—(as a) rescuer of the Nyāya ..	123	—author of the Nyāya -Vārtika-	
—residence of ..	124	tātparya-ṭikā ..	133
—(his) theory of sufferings ..	132f.	—(his) condemnation of the Bud-	
—(his) theory of verbal knowledge	131	dhist and Jaina scriptures ..	141
—various names of ..	124	—criticises Dharmakīrti ..	136
Udyāna (Kabul) ..	340, 352 ²	—(his) criticism of Dharmakīrti's	
Ujjayinī ..	301	division of the point of defeat	
Umāsvāti 161 (ftn. 4, 5), 164		(Nigrahasthāna) ..	136
—(his) doctrine of right knowledge	169f.	—(his) criticism of Dignāga's	
—(his) explanation of Naya (mood		definition of kārya-sama (balanc-	
of statements) ..	170f.	ing the effect) ..	135
—life of ..	168f.	—(his) criticism of the Nirukta-	
—known as Vācaka Śramaṇa, Nāga-		kāra's ..	138
ra-vācaka and Umāsvāti Vācakā-		—(his) explanation of determinate	
cārya ..	168	and indeterminate perceptions..	137f.
—(his) particulars about	168 (ftn. 3)	—(on the) name Pakṣila Svamī	115
Umā Svāmin (same as Umāsvāti)		(ftn. 2)	
	168 (ftn. 3)	—opposes Dignāga ..	135
Uncertain ..	33	—place and time of ..	133
Uncertainty—		—(his) reference to the four Bud-	
—Deva Sūri on ..	201	dhist schools ..	135
Unintelligible ..	87	—supports the Brahmanic interpre-	
Union ..	412, 414	tations of the Nyāya sūtra ..	133
United-inherent-inherence ..	412	—(his) theory of cause and effect	140f.
United inherence ..	412, 414	—(his) theory of condition ..	140
Universal non-existence ..	416	—(his) theory of right and wrong	
Universal proposition—		knowledge ..	138ff.
—discovery of ..	295 (ftn. 2)	—Trilocana, the preceptor of ..	134
University of Nadia (see Nadia)—		—works of ..	134
—foundation of ..	464	Vācaspati Miśra, the junior	151, 459f.
University of Nālandā (see Nālan-		Vaccagotta ..	117 (ftn. 3)
dā) ..	271	Vāda (discussion) ..	51
University of Vikramaśilā (see		—subject of ..	51
Vikramaśilā) ..	271	Vāda-mārga (see debate-course of)	31
Unnameable ..	55	Vāda-maryādā (see debate-limits	
Unproved reason ..	439	of) ..	31
Upāṅga ..	160	Vāda-vidhi (see Ānvīkṣikī)—the	
Upaniṣads ..	134	principal topics of ..	27
Upendra ..	258	(also see Sambhāsā and debate)	28
Uttara Tantra ..	24 (ftn. 2)	Vāda-vidyā (see Tarka-vidyā) ..	7
Vācaspati Miśra 120 (ftn. 3), 155,		Vāadopāya (see debate-expedients	
183, 209 (ftn.), 247 (ftn. 2), 273,		of) ..	30f.
282 (ftn.), 339, 348, 522		Vāgīśvarkīrti ..	338
		Vaibhāṣika ..	135

	Page		Page
Vaiśeṣikas ..	244, 247	Vasubandhu	116, 266ff., 272, 349
—criticised by Jayanta ..	150	—age of ..	116
—explanation of ..	247 (ftn. 5)	—biography of ..	267
—fundamental principal work of	247	—works of ..	267
Vaibhāṣika School of Philosophy—		Vāsudeva	372, 406 (ftn. 7), 456
—sects belonging to ..	246	Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma	405, 456
Vaiśālī ..	349	(ftn. 2), 461	
Vaiśeṣika Philosophy ..	27, 278, 393	Vasudhara Rakṣita ..	299
—incorporated into the Nyāya ..	373	Vātāpi ..	349
—incorporates the Nyāya categories ..	386	Vātsīputrīya sect ..	135, 272
Vaiśeṣika principles—		Vātsyāyana	46, 106 (ftn. 1), 155, 348
—adopted in Nyāya ..	402	—age of ..	116f.
Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine of apoha		—author of the Nyāya bhāṣya ..	115ff.
(exclusion) ..	132 (ftn. 1)	—birthplace of ..	117
Vajrāsana (Buddhagayā)	339, 343	—criticises Nāgārjuna ..	117f.
Vajra-varāhī ..	340	—(his) criticism of the doctrine of	
Valedictory description ..	108	momentariness ..	121
Validity of knowledge ..	408f.	—(his) criticism of the Mādhyamika	
—consciousness of ..	409	doctrine of inter-relation ..	117
—derived from its general grounds	408	—(his) criticism of the Mādhyamika	
—derived through the instrument	409	doctrine of voidness (śūnyatā) ..	118
—Gangeśa on ..	409	—(his) criticism of Nāgārjuna's	
Valid knowledge (see right know-		logical theory of examples ..	119
ledge) ..	218, 375f., 408f.	—(his) criticism of the syllogism of	
—consequence of ..	181, 192	ten parts ..	121f.
—Deva Sūri on ..	200ff.	—(his) criticism of the Yogācāra	
—defined by Māṇikya Nandi ..	189	doctrine of Viññāna (knowledge) ..	120
—how derived and known ..	408f.	—(his) definition of perception cri-	
—kinds of ..	189, 310, 201	ticised by Dignāga ..	278
—objects of ..	192	—designated as Drāmila ..	117
—of the Buddhist condemned ..	375f.	—followed Nāgārjuna and the Lan-	
Vallabhācārya ..	374 ² , 386f.	kāvatāra ..	116
—founder of a Vaiṣṇava Sect ..	387	—(his) idea of emancipation ..	122
Vallāla Sena ..	350	—(his) idea of God ..	122
Vāmana ..	267	—on mind as a sense-organ	280 (ftn. 1)
Vana Pāla ..	329	—(his) other name Pakṣila Svāmin	115
Vandin (a famous sophist) ..	13	—precede's Dignāga and Vasuban-	
Varadārāja	373ff., 399 (ftn. 1)	dhu ..	116
Varāha Mihira	165, 165 (ftn. 2), 173	—(his) references to previous com-	
Vararuci ..	334	mentators ..	115 (ftn. 3)
Vardhamāna	151, 386, 406 (ftn. 7),	—(in) Uddyotakara's Nyāya Vārti-	
	403, 454f.	ka ..	115 (ftn. 1)
Vārendra	322, 333, 334 (ftn. 2), 335, 337	Vatthagāmaṇi ..	226
Vasanta Sena ..	722	Vedānta ..	4
		Vedāntins ..	273

	Page		Page
Veda	1	Vidyāpati ..	456, 522
—(its) authority established ..	107	Vidyāvācaspati ..	476 (ftn. 1)
—faultless	107	Vijaya Sena Sūri ..	212, 350, 521
—faulty	107	Vijaya Siniha ..	216
—refers to unbelievers ..	9	Vijñāna-vāda ..	135
—(its) reliability established ..	108	—in Tibetan ..	245 (ftn. 1)
—subject-matter of ..	2	Vijñāna-vādins or yogācāras ..	146
—two main divisions of ..	108	Vikramāditya ..	173, 222, 267
Vedic speech—		Vikrama Saivrat or Śaka era	329 (ftn. 3)
—classification of	108	Vikrama Śilā ..	336, 342, 352
Veṅgi .. 273 (ftn. 1), 274		—decay of	525
Verbal knowledge (śabda) ..	444, 470ff.	—Mahomedan attacks on ..	520 (ftn. 2)
—cause of	473ff.	—situation of	519 (ftn. 6)
—different from perception and in- ference	470f.	—university of ..	337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343, 345, 350, 519f.
—different from recollection ..	471	Vikramaśilā University—	
—Mīmāṃsakas on	473f.	—destruction of	520
—Naiyāyikas on	471	—gate-keepers of	520
—process of	444, 471	—head of	519
—Vaiśeṣikas on	471	—scholars of	520
Verbal Naya (śabda)	171	Vimalacandra	320
—three kinds of	171	Vinaya Vijaya	216
Verbal suffix	453	Vindhyavāsin	211
Verbal testimony (Āgama śabda)		Vinita Deva	320f.
175, 192, 444		Viṣṇu Svāmin	374
—Deva Sūri on	201	Viśvanātha	151
—Dignāga on	287f.	Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana ..	392
—distinct from inference ..	95, 446	Viśvanātha Siddhānta-pañcānana	479f.
—distinct from perception ..	446	Viśveśvara Jyotiṣārṇava ..	527
—included in inference according to the Vaiśeṣikas	446	Vyāsa—	
—included in perception according to the Buddhists	445	—signifies a compiler	50
—instrumental causes of ..	44	Vyomācārya	386
—kinds of	370	Western Calukya Dynasty ..	273 (ftn. 1)
—(a) mere inference	94f.	Wheel of reasons (see table of nine reasons)	285, 298
—Mīmāṃsakas on	408	—analysis of	198
—special cause of	409	Whole	105, 333
Vidyādhara Ācārya Aśoka ..	334	—beyond its parts	105
Vidyānanda	183 (ftn. 2)	Word	33, 56, 384
—age of	187	—compound (see compound) ..	452
—identical with Pātrakeśarī ..	187, 188 (ftn. 1)	—conventional	451
—works of	187	—connotes the genus	111
Vidyānivāsa	392	—denotes the individual	111
		—does it denote 'apoha' (exclusion)	132

	Page		Page
Word—		Yaśovijaya—	
—etymological ..	451	—his references to works on philo-	
—etymological-conventional ..	451	sophy ..	219
—etymologo-conventional ..	451	—his reviews of other writers ..	218
—four kinds of ..	33	—life of ..	217
—how it signifies a thing ..	131	—particulars about ..	218 (ftn. 3)
—presents the form ..	111	—spiritual descent of ..	217 (ftn. 2)
—signification of ..	111	—works of ..	218f.
—species of ..	451	Yośodharma Deva ..	173
—two kinds of ..	56, 110f.	Ye-śes-dpal-bzan-po ..	342
Words and their meanings ..	106f.	Yoga 5, 6, 11, 274 (ftn. 3)	
—Jayanta on ..	147f.	Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra 274 (ftn. 3)	
—their connection conventional ..	107	Yogācāra Buddhists ..	138
—their connection natural ..	106	Yogācāras or Viññānavādins 146,	
Wrangler ..	63	249, 278	
Wrangling ..	62, 63	—criticised by Jayanta ..	150
Wrangling and Cavi—		—explanation of ..	249 (ftn. 1)
—use of ..	104	—founds of ..	249
Wrong knowledge or error ..	138f.	—in China, Tibet and Nepal 249 (ftn. 1)	
—nature of ..	138f.	Yogācāra-darśana ..	245
Yādava Dynasty ..	386	Yogācāra doctrine of Viññāna	
Yajñapati ..	406 (ftn. 7)	(knowledge)—	
Yama (the lord of death) ..	2	—criticised by Vātsyāyana ..	124f.
Yamāri ..	343f.	Yogins ..	278
Yaśovijaya Gaṇi ..	217	Za-hor ..	323
—his references to other philoso-		Zarmana Chagos ..	352
phers ..	219	Zla-wa-dge-hsüen ..	333f.

INDEX OF BOOKS.

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
Abhedya-dhikkāra	459	Ancient India by Rapson ..	494 (ftn. 1)
Abhidharma jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra	242	Ancient Indian Education ..	525 (ftn. 1)
Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā	242	Ancient Indian Logic ..	348 (ftn. 1)
(ftn. 2), 247		Anekānta-jaya-patākā ..	221 (ftn. 2)
Abhidhamma Piṭaka 226, 227		Anekānta-jaya-patākā-tikā ..	209 (ftn. 2)
(ftn. 2), 242, 334		Anekārtha saṅgraha	205
Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha 227 (ftn. 2)		Anguttaranikāya III 21 (ftn. 2), 26	
Abhidhāna Cintāmaṇi	205	(ftn. 1) 227 (ftn. 2)	
Abhidharmakośa	127 (ftn.)	Antarvyāpti	343 (ftn. 3)
Abhidharma-vibhāṣā	242	Anumāna-cintāmaṇi-dīdhīti-tikā ..	482
Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā 262,		Anumāna-dīdhīti	406 (ftn. 2)
262 (ftn. 5)		Anumāna-dīdhīti-prasāriṇī ..	468
Ācārāṅga Sūtra	165	Anumāna dīdhīti-viveka	468
Ācārya-mata-rahasya-vicāra ..	479	Anumāna-khaṇḍa-tikā	460, 522
Adhikaraṇa Candrikā	484	Anumānāloka-prasāriṇī ..	468
(?) Ādi-kriyā-viveka	467	Anumāna Sutta	229
Ādipurāṇa	176, 183	Anumiti-parāmarśa-vāda ..	481
Advaitaratnakośa	106 (ftn. 2)	Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā 143, 150, 329	
Ain-i Akbari	201 (ftn. 1)	Apasabda-khaṇḍana	466
Aitareya Brāhmaṇa	23, 23 (ftn. 6)	Apoha-nāma-prakarāṇa 143, 150, 330	
Akalāṅka stotra	185	Apoha-siddhi 133 (ftn. 4), 134, 339	
Akbar	221 (ftn. 1)	(ftn. 3), 345, 371	
Ākhyānamanikośa	210	Āpta-mīmāṃsā 182, 184, 185, 186	
Ākhyātavāda	465, 482	Āpta-mīmāṃsālaṅkāra	186
Ālambana-parīkṣā	300, 301, 322	Āpta-parīkṣā	187
Ālambana-parīkṣā-tikā	321	Archaeological Discoveries at Taxila	
Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti	301	495 (ftn. 2)	
Ālambana-pratyayadhyāna-śāstra		Archaeological Survey of Western	
300 (ftn. 3)		India 49 (ftn. 2), 496 (ftn. 1), 515	
Ālambana-Pratyayadhyāna Vyākhyā	303	(ftn. 5)	
Ālaṅkāra-parīkṣā	479	Arḍa-Viraf-Nāma	20 (ftn. 4)
Ālaṅkāra-sāra-sthiti	477	Arabic Literature 511 (ftn. 3), 512	
Āloka 458, 460, 465, 467, 468, 478		- (ftn. 2)	
Amarakośa	7 (ftn. 1)	Aristotle by Grote 505 (ftn. 1), 510	
Ānanda-lahari-tarī	478, 479	(ftn. 3, 4), 511 (ftn. 4)	
Ānanda-varḍhana	459	Arrian	496 (ftn. 1)
Ancient Geography of India 514		Artha Śāstra	24, 117
(ftn. 2, 4)		Ārya-kośa	322 (ftn. 7)
		Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva-Su-	
		śīlekha	251 (ftn. 2)

	Page		Page
Ārya-Tārā-antarbali-vidhi	334 (ftn. 1)	Bhāṣya-vṛtti	.. 391
Aśoka by V. A. Smith	234 (ftn. 1)	Bhāva-dīpikā	.. 483
Aṣṭa-sāhasrī	.. 186, 197	Bhāvārtha-dīpikā	.. 478
Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā prajñā-pāramitā	242 (ftn. 3)	Bhāva-vilāsa	.. 477
Aṣṭa-sāhasrī - viṣamapada - tātpa -		Bheda-prakāśa	.. 456 (ftn. 2), 459 ²
rya-ṭikā..	185 (ftn. 3)	Bheda-ratna-prakāśa	.. 459
Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-vivarāṇa	.. 481	Bhikṣu Sūtra	.. 240
Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-vṛtti	.. 218	Bhrama-pramathana-yukti-hetu-	
Aṣṭasatī	.. 185 (ftn. 2)	siddhi	.. 261
Atharva-veda Samhitā	2 (ftn. 2)	Bhramara-dūtam	.. 477
Ātmakhyāti	.. 195 (ftn. 6)	Bhūṣaṇa Sāra	.. 220 (ftn. 6)
Ātma-tattva-viveka	143, 145, 348, 465	Bilingual Index of Nyāya-bindu,	
Ātma-tattva-viveka-dīdhiti-ṭikā	.. 468	introduction	307 (ftn. 4), 309 (ftn. 2)
Ātma-tattva-viveka-kalpa-latā	.. 459	Big-wa hjug-paḥi-rtog-ge	.. 337
Avacchedakatva-nirukti	.. 465	Bkaḥ-hgyur	.. 11 (ftn. 3), 352
Āvaśyaka-laghu-vṛtti	.. 212		530
Āvaśyaka-niryukti	.. 181	Bodha-siddhi	.. 141 ²
Āvaśyaka-sūtra	.. 165, 210	Bodhi-caryāvatāra-ṭikā	126 (ftn. 2) ²
Avayavi-nirākaraṇa	.. 338 (ftn. 1)	Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa	249, 262
Āyur-daya-bāvanī	.. 467	Brahmajāla-sutta	20, 21 (ftn. 4),
Ayurveda-samhitā	.. 27		227 (ftn. 4)
Bālāvatāra-tarka	.. 337	Brāhmaṇa Sarvasva	.. 524
Bauddha-dhikkāra	.. 145	Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa	155 (ftn. 1),
Bauddha-dhikkāra-ṭikā	.. 459		498 (ftn. 7)
Bauddha-dhikkāra-rahasya	.. 467	Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad	3 (ftn. 3)
Bauddha-dhikkāra-siromaṇi	.. 465	Bṛhad-jñāna-koṣa	.. 324 (ftn. 3)
B.B.R.A.S. (Journal)	.. 406 (ftn. 6)	Brief notes on the modern Nyāya	
Bedā-vṛtti	.. 303	system of Philosophy by	
Berlin Catalogue by Weber	388 (ftn. 3)	MM. Maheścandra Nyāyaratna	403 (ftn. 1)
Bhagavad-gītā	.. 4 (ftn. 2)	Bṣaṇ-hgyur, Bstod-pa	253 (ftn.)
Bhāgavata-purāṇa	.. 23 (ftn. 4, 6)	Bṣes-paḥi-sprin-yig	.. 215 (ftn. 1)
Bhagavatī-sūtra	.. 161, 161 (ftn. 4)	Bstan-hgyur	7 (ftn. 7), 8 (ftn. 7),
Bhāmatī	.. 127 (ftn.)		54 (ftn. 2), 55 (ftn. 1), 241 (ftn. 1),
Bhāmatī-ṭikā	.. 134		249 (ftn. 4), 251 (ftn. 2), 256,
Bhatṭhari and Kumārila by K. B.			256 (ftn. 2), 257, 262 (ftn. 5), 270,
Pāthak	186 (ftn. 3), 188 (ftn. 2, 3, 7)		276 (ftn. 1), 289 (ftn. 1), 299 ² ,
Bhāṣāpariccheda	392f., 392 (ftn. 1),		300 ² , 300 (ftn. 1), 301 ³ , 306 (ftn.
	480 (ftn. 1)		7), 307 (ftn. 3, 4), 308 (ftn. 1),
Bhāṣāratnam	.. 466 (ftn. 21)		309 (ftn. 1, 2), 316 (ftn. 3), 318
Bhāskarodaya	.. 39		(ftn. 2, 3), 319 (ftn. 1, 2, 3), 320,
Bhāskarodaya-ṭikā	.. 391		321 ⁴ , 322 ² , 323 ² , 324 ³ , 328 ⁶ , 328
Bhāṣya (Patañjali's)	.. 41 (ftn. 5)		(ftn. 4), 329 ³ , 330 ⁴ , 331 ² , 332,
„ (Vātsyāyana's)	.. 55		336 ³ , 337 ³ , 337 (ftn. 3), 338, 340 ² ,

	Page		Page
341 ² , 342, 341 (ftn. 6), 343 ² , 343 (ftn. 2), 344 ² , 345 ³ , 346, 352, 530, 538 ²		Chandonuśāsana-vṛtti	.. 205
Buddha by Rockhill 246 (ftn. 2), 322 (ftn. 7)		Chandoratnākara	.. 343 (ftn. 1)
Buddha Deva 495 (ftn. 3), 496 (ftn. 1)		Chinese Tripiṭaka	.. 26, 243
Buddhism by Schlagintweit 249 (ftn. 1, 5)		Choṣ-byuñ	.. 305 (ftn. 1), 517
„ by Wassilief 248 (ftn. 6)		Choṣ-dañ-choṣ-can-gtan-la-dwal-pa	337
Buddhist India by Rhys Davids .. 242 (ftn. 4), 248 (ftn. 3)		Cintāmaṇi	.. 404
Buddhist Records by Real 124 (ftn. 7), 173 (ftn. 5), 241 (ftn. 1), 243 (ftn. 3), 247 (ftn. 1), 248, (ftn. 2, 7, 8), 249 (ftn. 4), 251 (ftn. 1), (261 (ftn. 2), 265 (ftn. 2, 7), 266 (ftn. 1), 274 (ftn. 3), 302 (ftn. 5), 303 (ftn. 1), 496 (ftn. 1), 514 (ftn. 6)		Citrādavaita siddhi	.. 394
Buddhi-vāda 482		Cittarūpa	.. 438
Gaitanya Candrānṛta 484		Commentary on the R̥gveda by Sāyana 45 (ftn. 3)	
Gaitanya Caritāmṛta .. 462 (ftn. 1)		Comparative studies in Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity by B.N. Seal 44 (ftn. 3)	
Candrāloka 455		Cūrṇika of Nandī-sūtra	161 (ftn. 2)
Cāndra Vyākaraṇa .. 334 (ftn. 3), 335		Damśaṇa-sāra	.. 195
Can-shwo (or here) tso-li-ein 302 (ftn. 1) ²		Dānakāṇḍa	.. 392
Caraka Saṁhitā 9 (ftn. 4), 20, 26 (ftn. 5), 31 (ftn. 3) ² , 42 (ftn. 2), 51 ⁴ , 221, 499 (ftn. 1), 500 ⁴ , 501 ² , 512		Dānakhaṇḍa	.. 477
Catalogue by Eggeling 392 (ftn. 3)		Darpaṇa	.. 458
Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka 240 (ftn. 2), 242 (ftn. 2), 243 (ftn. 1, 4, 5), 244 (ftn. 2), 247 (ftn. 3, 4), 248 (ftn. 1, 2), 249 (ftn. 4), 252 (ftn. 5), 253 (ftn. 2), 256 (ftn. 2), 259 (ftn. 1), 261 (ftn. 1, 5), 262 (ftn. 2), 265 (ftn. 6, 8, 9), 266 (ftn. 2) 267 (ftn. 2, 4), 268 (ftn. 1), 272 (ftn. 3), 289 (ftn. 1), 300 (ftn. 2, 3), 301 (ftn. 3) ² , 302 (ftn. 3, 4, 5), 348 (ftn. 1)		Daśana-siddhi (or Samyaktva-pra- karaṇa)	.. 206
Caturvīṁśati-jina-stuti .. 183		Daśabhūmīśvara	.. 242 (ftn. 3)
Caturvīṁśati-prabandha 165, 208 (ftn. 4), 213		Daśapadārtha	.. 503
Chāndogyopaniṣad 3 (ftn. 2), 45 (ftn. 4)		Daśa-śruta-skandha-sūtra	.. 165
		Daśa-vaikālīka-niryukti	164, 165 ³
		Daśa-vaikālīka-niryukti-ṭikā	208 (ftn. 4)
		Daśa-vaikālīka-sūtra	.. 164
		Dāyabhāga-ṭikā	.. 484
		De Interpretatione	.. 512
		De kho-na-ñid- bṣduṣ- pañi- ḍkañ- hṡrel	.. 328
		De-kho-no- ñid- bṣduṣ- pañi- Tshig- lehwi-byas-pa	.. 324
		Devabhadra and his Nyāyāvatāra ṭippaṇa	.. 211 (ftn. 1)
		Devapratisthā-tattva	.. 153
		Devīmāhātmya	.. 522
		Devīpurāṇa	.. 145 (ftn. 4)
		Dhamma saṅgaṇī	.. 227 (ftn. 2)
		Dharmādharmā-viniścaya	.. 337
		Dharma-dhātu-stava	.. 253 (ftn.)
		Dharma Saṁgraha	.. 249 (ftn. 2)
		Dharma-viniścaya	.. 342 (ftn. 6)
		Dharmottara-ṭippaṇaka 195 ² , 222, 329 (ftn. 3)	

	Page		Page
Dialogue of the Buddha by Rhys		Edicts of Aśoka ..	49 (ftn. 2)
Davids ..	9 (ftn. 5)	Eka-ṣaṣṭhyalaṅkāra-prakāśa ..	47)
Dictionary of Religion ..	254 (ftn. 2)	Encyclopædia Britannica 511 (ftn. .	
Didhiti ..	478 ² , 481	8 7 : . 5), 512 (ftn. 1. 3. 4)	
Didhiti-rahasya 467	Encyclopædia of Religion and	
Didhiti-tilā ..	469, 481	Ethics 227 (ftn. 1)	
Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse		Epigraphia Indica ..	221 (ftn. 1)
by Weber ..	197 (ftn. 3, 4)	Explanation of the Cañ-lun 302 (ftn. 1)	
Digambara Paṭṭāvalī ..	168 (ftn. 3)		
Dīgha Nikāya 227 (ftn. 2), 500 (ftn. 1)		Fa-hian ..	514 (ftn. 4)
Dinakarya-prakāśa-tippaṇī ..	483	Fa-hian and Sungyun by Real 248 (ftn. 3)	
Dīpikā ..	388	Fān-pien-sin-lun ..	259
Diṭṭhivās ..	161 (ftn. 3)	Filosofia Indiana 26 (ftn. 4), 119 (ftn.)	
Dmigs-pa-btrag-pa ..	301		
Dmigs-pa-btrag-paḥi-hgrel-bśad ..	321	Gacchotpatti prakaraṇa 208 (ftn. 4)	
Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzan 274 (ftn. 1),		Gadādhari-pañcavādā ..	487
320 (ftn. 4), 322 (ftn. 3), 323		Gaṇapāṭha ..	41 (ftn. 5)
(ftn. 2), 327 (ftn. 1), 328 (ftn. 3),		Gaṇḍa-vyūha ..	242 (ftn. 3)
329 (ftn. 1), 333 (ftn. 5), 335		Gandhahasti-mahābhāṣya ..	182
(ftn. 1), 336 (ftn. 2), 338 (ftn. 3),		Gāthāsāhasrī ..	208 (ftn. 1, 4)
340 (ftn. 2, 4), 341 (ftn. 2), 342		Gaurī digambara-prahasana ..	459
(ftn. 1, 3, 5, 6), 344 (ftn. 2), 348		Gautama-dharma-sūtra 7 (ftn. 3),	
(ftn. 1), 353 (ftn. 1)		8 (ftn. 4), 48 (ftn. 4)	
Dravya-bhāṣya-tikā (or Padārtha-		Gaūtama-sūtra-vṛtti ..	392
tattvanirṇaya) ..	470	Geschichte des Buddhismus by	
Dravya-kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa ..	455	Schiefner 246 (ftn. 2), 248 (ftn.	
Dravya-padārtha ..	455	5. 7. 8), 249 (ftn. 4), 251 (ftn. 4.	
Dravya-parīkṣā ..	407 (ftn.)	5), 252 (ftn. 2, 4), 261 (ftn. 3), 265	
Dravya-sāra-saṅgraha ..	481	(ftn. 4), 274 (ftn. 1), 274 (ftn. 2),	
Dṛṣṭivāda ..	161, 161 (ftn. 3)	303 (ftn. 3), 307 (ftn. 1), 319	
Durgotsava-tattva ..	476 (ftn. 1)	(ftn. 4), 320 (ftn. 1, 2, 4), 322	
Dug-brum btrag-pa ..	301	(ftn. 3), 328 (ftn. 3), 329 (ftn. 1),	
Dvaita-nirṇaya ..	460, 461	333 (ftn. 5), 336 (ftn. 2), 337	
Dvāśraya mahākāvya ..	205	(ftn. 1), 338 (ftn. 2, 3), 339 (ftn.	
Dvātrimśat-dvātrimśikā ..	174	7), 340 (ftn. 2, 9), 341 (ftn. 2),	
Dvātrimśikā ..	212	342 (ftn. 5, 6), 343 (ftn. 4), 344	
Dvyardha-śatikā ..	118 (ftn. 3)	(ftn. 2, 3), 348 (ftn. 1), 514 (ftn.	
Dwañ-phyug-hjig-paḥi-tshig - bñur -		3), 517 (ftn. 2), 519 (ftn. 2), 520	
byas-pa ..	329	(ftn. 2)	
Early History of India by Smith 221		Gītā ..	522
(ftn. 1), 267 (ftn. 3), 301 (ftn. 3),		Gīta Govinda ..	522, 524
348 (ftn. 1), 496 (ftn. 1)		Gbs-bam-bklag-paḥi-thabs ..	341
Early History of the Dekkan by R.		Gopāla-līlāmṛta ..	484
G. Bhandarkar 186 (ftn. 4), 251 (ftn.. 2)		Grimm's Phonetic Law of the Indo-	
		European Languages 1 (ftn. 1)	

	Page		Page
Gslase-la-bstag - paḥi - tshig - bhur-		History of Ancient Sanskrit Lit-	
byag-pa	329	erature by Max Müller 22 (ftn. 2),	
Gshan-sel-wa	330	25 (ftn. 2)	
Gtan-Tshigs-kyi - de - kho - na - ñid-		History of Indian Literature by	
bstan-pa	337	Weber 10 (ftn. 5), 48 (ftn. 4), 498	
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-hkhor-lo - gtan-la-		(ftn. 5)	
dwab-pa	299	History of Logic by Dr. Robert	
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-tshigs-pa	318	Adamson	52 (ftn. 1)
Gtan-tshigs-kyi-tshigs-pa-ugya cher-		History of Mithilā during the pre-	
hgrel wa	321	Moghal period	521 (ftn. 1)
Gtan-tshigs-tshigs-paḥi-hgrel-wa ..	332	History of Navya-Nyāya in Bengal	
Guide to Taxila by Marshall 494 (ftn. 2)		and Mithilā by M. Chakravarty	
Guṇa-dīdhiti-vivṛti	478	454 (ftn. 1), 455 (ftn. 1)	
Guṇa rahasya	469	History of Navya Nyāya and	
Guṇa Śiromaṇi prakāśa	467	Smṛti	521 (ftn. 1)
Guṇa-vivṛti-viveka	468	History of Sanskrit Literature by	
Gurugītā	153	Macdonell 1 (ftn. 1), 10 (ftn. 2).	
Gurvāvalī Sūtra	164 (ftn. 4)	380 (ftn. 4)	
Gyen-min-gshihi-eiñ lihi-lun ..	300	History of the Medieval School of	
		Indian Logic 26 (ftn. 3), 357 (ftn. 3)	
Harṣa-carita	123 (ftn. 4)	Hjig-rten-pha-rot-grub-pa ..	330
Hastābala	250	Hwentsang's Life by Beal 251 (ftn. 4)	
Hayaśīrṣa-Pañcarātra	153 (ftn. 3)		
Hbrel-pa-bṛtag-paḥi-rgya-cher - leś -		Illustration of the Literature and	
ad-pa	321	religion of the Buddhists 242 (ftn. 3)	
Hbrel-pa-bṛtag-paḥi-rgeṣ-su-berañ -		Imperial Gazetteer of India 523 (ftn. 1)	
wa	345	Indian Antiquary 116 (ftn. 4), 198	
Hbrel-pa-grub-pa	345	(ftn. 3), 199 (ftn. 1), 200 (ftn. 1,	
Hbrel-wa-bṛtag-pa	319	2), 206 (ftn. 1), 209 (ftn. 3) 214	
Hbrel-wa-bṛtag-paḥi-hgrel-wa ..	310	(ftn. 3), 267 (ftn. 3) ² , 322 (ftn. 6),	
Hetu-cakra	300 (ftn. 1) ²	335 (ftn. 2), 406 (ftn. 6), 505 (ftn. 3)	
Hetu-cakra-hamaru	299 (ftn. 1)	Indian Logic—Medieval school by	
Hetu-dvāra-śāstra	299 (ftn. 1)	Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa	406 (ftn. 5)
Hetu-vidyā nyāya-praveśa-śāstra ..	302	Indian Paṇḍits in the Land of Snow	
Hetu vindu	321, 332	517 (ftn. 3), 519 (ftn. 2)	
Hetu vindu-ṭikā	321	Indian Thought	403 (ftn. 1)
Hetu vindu-vivaraṇa	318, 332	Indo-Aryans 518 (ftn. 2), 523 (ftn. 3)	
Hetu-tattva-upadeśa	337	Inscription of Rudradamana 49 (ftn. 2)	
Hhien-yāñ-Stañ-ciāo-ben	266	Introduction à l'Étude des	
Hindu Logic as preserved in China		Traites Medicaun Sanskritas 252	
and Japan 262 (ftn. 3), 265 (ftn.		(ftn. 6)	
1), 267 (ftn. 5), 289 (ftn. 1), 302			
(ftn. 1), 505 (ftn. 2)		Introduction to the Kūṭadabha-	
Historical Record of the Jainas		Sutta by Rhys Davids 9 (ftn. 5)	
199 (ftn. 1), 200 (ftn. 2)		Introduction to the Pañca-siddhān-	
		tikā	174 (ftn. 1)

	Page		Page
Introduction to Śaṅkarāśana Samuccaya	210 (ftn. 1)	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 7 (ftn. 9), 26 (ftn. 1), 267 (ftn. 3), 304 (ftn. 1), 495 (ftn. 1), 510 (ftn. 1), 126 (ftn. 2), 225 (ftn. 2), 220 (ftn. 2), 241 (ftn. 1, 2), 212 (ftn. 2) (243 (ftn. 3), 246 (ftn. 2), 267 (ftn. 2), 267 (ftn. 2), 515 (ftn. 4)	
Introduction to the Sragdharā-stotra	252 (ftn. 6)	J A.S.G.B. I	497 (ftn. 1)
Íśvarabhaṅga kārīkā..	143, 150, 329	J.R.S.B.	18 (ftn. 3), 19 (ftn. 4)
I-tsing 241 (ftn. 2), 247 (ftn. 1, 2), 275 (ftn. 2), 289 (ftn. 1), 299 (ftn. 1), 300 (ftn. 3), 301 (ftn. 2), 302 (ftn. 5), 303 (ftn. 2) 306 (ftn. 2, 5), 320 (ftn. 5), 335 (ftn. 3), 515 (ftn. 3)		Jyotiṣa-sāra-saṅgraha	527
Jaiminiya Nyāya-mālā vistara ..	397	Jyotiṣ-tattva	527
Jaina Inscription ..	221 (ftn. 1)	Kādambarī-kathā-sāra	147 (ftn. 2)
Jaina Logic by Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa	331 (ftn. 5)	Kalpa Sūtra 159 (ftn. 1), 164 (ftn. 1), 165, 172 (ftn. 1)	
Jaina Sthānāṅga Sūtra.. ..	51	Kalpataru	477
Jainistic Notices 210 (ftn. 4), 211 (ftn. 1)		Kalyāṇakāṇḍa	342 (ftn. 6)
Jalada	457	Kamala-sīla-tarka	324 (ftn. 3)
Jambudvīpa-Samāsa	169 (ftn.)	Kāmandakīya Nītiśāra	23 (ftn. 6)
Jātakas	495 (ftn. 3), 496 (ftn. 1)	Kāma Śāstra	117
Journal Asiatique 26 (ftn. 3), 499 (ftn. 1)		Kāminī-kāma-kautuka	484
Journal of the American Oriental Society 50 (ftn. 2), 116 (ftn. 3), 120 (ftn. 3), 261 (ftn. 4)		Kaṇādarahasya-muktā-hāra	381
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 232 (ftn. 1), 241 (ftn. 1), 249 (ftn. 6), 253 (ftn.), 262 (ftn. 1), 272 (ftn. 1), 323 (ftn. 3), 324 (ftn. 2), 334 (ftn. 3), 342 (ftn. 2), 343 (ftn. 1), 348 (ftn. 1), 407 (ftn. 1), 454 (ftn. 1), 480 (ftn. 1), 481 (ftn. 2)		Kaṇāda Sūtra	459
J.B.B.R.A.S. 183 (ftn. 3), 187 (ftn. 5), 88 (ftn. 1, 2, 3, 7), 199 (ftn. 1), 241 (ftn. 1), 273 (ftn. 7), 306 (ftn. 3), 316 (ftn. 1, 3)		Kaṅgyur	533
Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta 227 (ftn. 2), 348 (ftn. 1), 242 (ftn. 1), 246 (ftn. 2), 247 (ftn. 5), 248 (ftn. 3, 5), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 253 (ftn. 1, 2), 324 (ftn. 3), 327 (ftn. 1), 337 (ftn. 2), 519 (ftn. 2)		Kaṅkhā-vitarāṇī	232 (ftn. 1)
Journal of the Pali Text Society 226 (ftn. 4) 251 (ftn. 2)		Kaṇṭakoddhāra	461
		Kāraḍyārtha-nirṇayaṭīkā	483
		Kāraka-vāda	482
		Kāraka-vivecana	478
		Kāraka-vyūha	484
		Kārīkāś	478
		Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-siddhi	341
		Kāśika-vṛtti	335
		Kathākoṣa	158 (ftn. 1)
		Kathānirṇaya	397
		Kathāvatthu 235 (ftn. 1), 239 (ftn. 1)	
		Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa 234 (ftn. 2)	
		Kauśika Sūtra of the Atharva veda	10 (ftn. 5)
		Kāthopaniṣad 3 (ftn. 4), 23, 23 (ftn. 4)	
		Kauṭilya	23 (ftn. 12)
		Kāvyānuśāsa vṛtti	205
		Kāvyā-prakāśa-rahasya	469
		Kāvyā-prakāśa-saṁketa 207 (ftn. 1)	
		Kāvyā-prakāśa-tilaka	478

	Page		Page
Kāvya-vilāsa	483	Lecture on the Story of Hemacan-	
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍādhāra ..	522	dra by Peterson (in the Bombay	
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā 406 (ftn.		Gazette, Aug. 29, 1895) 205 (ftn. 1)	
6), 459		Līlāvatī-prakāśa	455
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā-dīdhiti ..	465	Līlāvatī-viveka	455
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa-prakāśa ..	455	Lhan-cig-dmigs-pa-ñes-pa ..	336
Khaṇḍana khaṇḍoddhara ..	460	Life of Buddha by Rockhill 11 (ftn. 3)	
Kharatara-gaccha-paṭṭāvalī 164		List of Antiquities in Madras by Se-	
(ftn. 1), 208 (ftn. 4)		well .. 251 (ftn. 3), 273 (ftn. 1)	
Khorda Avestā	20	Logic of nine reasons and fourteen	
Khuddaka Nikāya	229	fallacies .. 300 (ftn. 1)	
Kiraṇāvalī	141, 473	Loka-prakāśa	216 (ftn. 1)
Kiraṇāvalī-bhāskara	381	Mādhava-cāmpu	483
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa	455	Madhyama-hṛdayakārikā ..	250
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-dīdhiti ..	465	Mādhyamika kārikā	250
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-parīkṣā ..	457	Mādhyamika philosophy ..	334
Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-rahasya ..	467	Madhyama-pratitya-samutpāda ..	250
Kirātārjunīya	380	Mādhyamika Sūtra 116 ² , 118 (ftn. 3)	
Klon-īdol-gsun-hbum 517 (ftn. 3),		Mādhyamikāvatāra ṭīkā ..	250
520 (ftn. 1)		Mādhyamika vṛtti 126 (ftn. 2), 250	
Kośakāraka Śāstra	248	Madhyāntavibhāga Śāstra 262 (ftn. 4)	
Kriyāratna-samuccaya	214	Mahābhārata 7 (ftn. 5, 9), 8 (ftn.),	
Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi 133 (ftn. 4),		12 (ftn. 1), 13 (ftn. 1), 16 (ftn. 2),	
134, 143, 150, 330, 331, 339 (ftn. 3, 6)		18 (ftn. 1), 20, 23 (ftn. 4, 7, 8,	
Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā ..	331	10, 11, 12, 13), 42 (ftn. 2), 51,	
Kusumāñjali 17, 141 143, 155 (ftn.		114 (ftn. 1), 244 (ftn. 1), 407, 521	
3), 373 (ftn. 1), 462		Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali 129 (ftn. 3)	
Kusumāñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā ..	465	Mahāpadāna Suttanta 500 (ftn. 1)	
Kusumāñjali-prakāśa	457	Mahāsamaya Sūtra	249
Kusumāñjali-prakāśa-parīkṣā ..	457	Mahāvagga	495
Laghiyastraya	185, 194	Mahāvāṇisa 225 (ftn. 2), 226 (ftn.	
Laghu-dīpikā	374, 380	3, 4), 246 (ftn. 2), 248 (ftn. 6)	
Laghu-vṛtti	214 (ftn. 1)	Mahāvastu	26 (ftn. 1)
(The) Logic of the Arabians 510 (ftn. 5)		Mahāvvyutpatti 7 (ftn. 7), 11 (ftn.	
Lakṣāṇārati	386	1), 25 (ftn. 1), 40 (ftn. 3), 43 (ftn.	
Lakṣaṇamālā	378 (ftn. 1)	2), 47 (ftn. 1), 54 (ftn. 2), 55 (ftn. 1)	
Lakṣmīdhara	477	Mahāyānābhīdharma - saṃhyukta-	
Lalitavistara 242 (ftn. 3), 243 (ftn. 1)		saṅgīti-śāstra	265
Lamaism by Waddell 271 (ftn. 1),		Mahāyāna-samparigraha-śāstra ..	265
323 (ftn. 3), 327 (ftn. 1), 520		Majjhima Nikāya 229 (ftn. 1), 239	
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 116 ² , 118 (ftn.		(ftn. 1)	
3), 121, 121 (ftn. 2), 242 (ftn. 3),		Makaranda	469
243 (ftn. 3), 249, 249 (ftn. 3) ²		Mālatīmādhava .. 251 (ftn. 4), 522	
Le Buddhisme d'après les Sources			
Bramaniques 306 (ftn. 7), 30 (ftn. 3)			

	Page		Page
Mallinātha's commentary on the		Nirupama Stava ..	253 (ftn. 1)
Meghadūta ..	273 (ftn. 5)	Niṣkaṇṭakā ..	380
Maṇimekalai ..	387 (ftn. 2)	Nīti-cintāmaṇi ..	522
Maṇi-vyākhyā ..	466 (ftn. 2)	Notices of Sanskrit MSS. by H. Śāstri	
Manual of Buddhism by Hardy	225 (ftn. 1)	459 (ftn. 1), 460 (ftn. 1), 461 (ftn. 1), 466 (ftn. 2)	
Manusamhitā 7 (ftn. 2, 8), 8 (ftn. 1), 23 (ftn. 4, 5, 9, 11, 12), 56		Notices of Sanskrit MSS. by R. Mitra	
Manyāloka-ṭippanī ..	465, 464	460 (ftn. 1), 461 (ftn. 1), 462 (ftn. 2), 478 (ftn. 2), 466 (ftn. 2) ²	
Matsyapurāṇa ..	20, 42 (ftn. 1)	Notices of Sanskrit MSS. in Bengal	
Medieval School of Indian Logic		467 (ftn. 2)	
221 (ftn. 1), 504 (ftn. 1), 505 (ftn. 4), 506 (ftn. 1), 508 (ftn. 1), 514 (ftn. 1), 517 (ftn. 1), 519 (ftn. 1)		Nyāsa ..	323
Meghadūta ..	273 (ftn. 2), 522	Nyāya ..	302 (ftn. 1)
Mem. de l'Ann. des Inscriptions et belles letters ..	489 (ftn. 3)	Nyāya-bhāṣya 52 (ftn. 1), 57, 97 (ftn. 1), 115, 115 (ftn. 3), 116 (ftn. 2), 117 (ftn. 4), 119 (ftn. 1), 121 ² , 155, 155 (ftn. 2), 302, 498 (ftn. 3), 504	
Milinda pañha ..	240	Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa ..	358, 371
Mīmāṃsā sarvasva ..	524	Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha ..	340
Mīmāṃsā-sādhārtika ..	132 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-bindu-pūrvapakṣa-samkṣipta ..	327
Mookerjee's Magazine ..	464 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā 194, 195, 222, 321, 329 (ftn. 3, 5), 330	
Muir's Sanskrit Texts ..	2 (ftn. 2, 3)	Nyāya-bodhinī ..	390, 391, 460
Muktāvalī ..	403 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-cakra ..	195
Muktāvalī-ṭikā ..	482	Nyāya-candrikā ..	391
Muktivāda ..	482	Nyāyādarśa or Nyāya-sārāvalī ..	470
Mīlamadhyama-vṛtti ..	250	Nyāya-dīpikā ..	215, 460, 467
Mīlamadhyamaka vṛtti-akutobha-ya ..	250	Nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra 289 (ftn. 1)	
Muṇḍakopaniṣad ..	4 (ftn. 2)	Nyāyālokaśiddhi or Nyāyasiddhyāloka ..	336
Nadiā Kāhinī ..	527 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-kalikā ..	371
Nāgasena Bhikṣu Sūtra ..	240	Nyāya-kandali ..	329 (ftn. 1)
Naiṣadha-carita ..	153, 497 (ftn. 2)	Nyāya-kaṇikā ..	134, 140
Naiyatakālika ..	477	Nyāya-kaṇikā ..	216, 217 (ftn. 1)
Nāmamālā ..	205	Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khāḍya 218, 219 (ftn. 4), 468 (ftn. 2)	
Nandi Sūtra ..	161 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-koṣa 48 (ftn. 5), 498 (ftn. 6)	
Nañ-gi-khyab-pa ..	343	Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya or Candrodaya ..	194
Nañvāda ..	465, 482	Nyāyakusumāñjali 380, 406 (ftn. 2), 457b	
Nañ-vāda-ṭikā ..	479	Nyāyakusumāñjali - kārikā - vyākhyā 469, 478, 481	
Navadvīpa-mahimā ..	527 (ftn. 1)		
Navadvīpa-pañjikā ..	527		
Navina-nirmāṇa ..	481		
Nighaṇṭu śeṣa ..	205		
Nīlakaṇṭha-ṭikā ..	391		
Nirukti ..	391 ²		

	Page		Page
Nyāyakusumāñjali-prakāśa ..	455	Nyāyasārapada-pañjikā ..	371
Nyāya kusumāñjali-prakāśa-maka-		Nyāyasāra-ṭikā ..	371
randa ..	457	Nyāyasāra vicāra ..	372
Nyāya-kusumāñjali-tarka ..	371	Nyāya-sarvasva ..	524
Nyāya-kusumāñjali-ṭikā 373 (ftn. 1)		Nyāya Śāstra ..	107 (ftn. 1)
Nyāya-kusumāñjali-viveka ..	468	Nyāya-siddhānta dīpa ..	396f.
Nyāyalañkāra ..	151	Nyāya-siddhānta dīpa ṭikā ..	397
Nyāya-lilāvati ..	386, 387f., 459	Nyāya-siddhānta mālā ..	478
Nyāya-lilāvati-didhiti ..	388	Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī 404, 463, 483	
Nyāya-lilāvati-didhiti-vyākhyā ..	470	Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-bhūṣā ..	482
Nyāya-lilāvati-kanthābharaṇa 388, 459		Nyāya Sūtra 16 (ftn. 1), 20, 84 (ftn.	
Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa 386, 388 455		1), 97, 101 (ftn. 1), 105, 106 (ftn.	
Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-didhiti-ra-		1), 109, 109 (ftn. 1), 112 (ftn. 1), 114	
hasya ..	467	(ftn. 1), 115 ³ , 116, 117 (ftn. 5), 136	
Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-didhiti-vi-		(ftn. 1), 154 (ftn. 1), 155, 221, 280	
veka ..	468	(ftn. 1) ⁵ , 283 (ftn. 1, 2), 288 (ftn.	
Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-rahasya ..	467	3), 301, 302, 302 (ftn. 1), 315 (ftn.	
Nyāya-lilāvati-prakāśa-viveka ..	388	1), 348, 356, 359 ² , 370, 460 ² , 478,	
Nyāya lilāvati prakāśa-vyākhyā ..	457	497 ² , 499, 502 ² , 503 ² , 504	
Nyāyamañjarī 132 (ftn. 1), 147		Nyāya-sūtradhāra ..	522
(ftn. 3, 4, 7), 148 (ftn. 1), 149,		Nyāya Sūtra in the Indian thought	
150, 153 (ftn. 4)		40 (ftn. 4)	
Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī ..	218	Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti 17, 41 (ftn. 2),	
Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa 151, 454		52 (ftn. 1), 479	
Nyāyānusāra Śāstra ..	244	Nyāya-sūtroldhāra ..	460
Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa ..	141, 388, 455	Nyāyatānta-bodhini-or Nyāya-	
Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa prakāśa 388, 455		bodhini ..	480
Nyāyapradīpa ..	218, 385	Nyāya-tātparya-dīpikā 221 (ftn. 1)	
Nyāyapraveśa 210, 221, 289 (ftn.		357 (ftn. 1), 371, 372 (ftn. 2)	
1 ²), 295 (ftn. 1), 300 (ftn. 12, 2),		Nyāyavārtika 57, 97 (ftn. 1), 119	
302, 315 (ftn. 3), 316 (ftn. 3) ²		(ftn. 1), 124, 125, 130, 131 ² , 132,	
Nyāyapraveśaka Sūtra ..	208	132 (ftn. 1), 133, 138, 155, 273	
Nyāyapraveśa-tarka-śāstra 289		(ftn. 3), 277 (ftn. 1), 287 (ftn. 2),	
(ftn. 1), 302, 302 (ftn. 4)		288 (ftn. 1), 348, 498 (ftn. 3), 504	
Nyāyapraveśa-ṭippaṇa ..	210	(ftn. 2), 505	
Nyāyapraveśa-vṛtti ..	210	Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭikā 97	
Nyāyarahasya ..	218, 469 ²	(ftn. 1), 129 (ftn. 3), 131, 134	
Nyāyarahasya-dīpikā ..	151 (ftn. 2, 3)	(ftn. 6), 135, 135 (ftn. 2, 3), 138,	
Nyāya-ratnāvalī ..	484	140 ² , 155, 273 (ftn. 4), 282 (ftn.),	
Nyāyārtha-laghubodhini ..	390	283 (ftn. 1), 284 (ftn.), 348, 498	
Nyāya-saṃkṣepa ..	480	(ftn. 3), 505	
Nyāya-saṃgraha ..	384	Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-parīśud-	
Nyāyasāra 221 (ftn. 1), 356, 357 ³ ,		dhi ..	454
358, 366 (ftn. 1), 367 (ftn. 1), 369		Nyāyāvatāra 122 (ftn. 1), 166, 173,	
(ftn. 1), 371ff., 372 (ftn. 2)		173 (ftn. 1) ² , 174, 200, 206 (ftn. 4),	

	Page		Page
208 (ftn. 4), 221, 331 (ftn. 8), 565		Parāśara Upapurāṇa ..	356
(ftn. 4), 507		Paribhāṣā-darpaṇa ..	384
Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippaṇa ..	211	Parikṣā-mukha-pañjikā ..	198
Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti 179, 180, 211,		Parikṣā-mukha-śāstra 188 (ftn. 5, 7)	
206 (ftn. 4) ² , 208 (ftn. 4) ² , 331		Parikṣa-mukha-sūtra 185, 188, 193,	
Nyāya-vindu 309 (ftn. 2) ² , 316 (ftn.		194, 198, 200	
2), 317 (ftn. 1), 327, 329, 340, 508		Parīṣiṣṭa Parvan ..	159 (ftn. 1)
Nyāya-viniścaya ..	185, 198, 200	Parivāra ..	229 (ftn. 3)
Nyāya-viniścaya-vṛtti ..	198	Pārtha Sārathi's Gloss on Kumāri-	
Nyāya-vṛtti ..	151 ²	la Bhaṭṭa's Vārtika on the Sūtra	
On Yuan Chwang 242 (ftn. 1), 248		of Jaimini ..	273 (ftn. 6)
(ftn. 4), 249 (ftn. 1, 9), 251 (ftn.		Pārtha-vijaya ..	134
1), 261 (ftn. 1), 262 (ftn. 4), 265		Paśupati-paddhati ..	524
(ftn. 3), 266 (ftn. 1), 272 (ftn. 2),		Paṭicca-samuppāda ..	227
515 (ftn. 1, 4)		Pātimokkha of the Vinaya-Piṭa-	
Organon ..	502 ² , 503 ² , 506 ³	kam 229 (ftn. 3), 232 (ftn. 1), 271	
Padakṛtya ..	391	Paṭṭāvali of the Kharataragaccha	
Padārtha-caṇḍra ..	460	160 (ftn. 5), 172 (ftn. 1), 209 (ftn.	
Padārtha-khaṇḍana ..	480	3), 214 (ftn. 3)	
Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyakhyā 477,		Paṭṭāvali of the Sarasvatī gaccha	
480, 481		169 (ftn.)	
Padhārtha-maṇi-mālā ..	478	Pavanadūta ..	524
Padārtha-tattva ..	526	Persia by Dr. K. Geldner 20 (ftn. 4)	
Padārtha-tattvāloka ..	480	Phyi-rol don-grub-pa ceṣ-bya-waḥi-	
Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa or Pa-		tshig-blur ..	328
dārtha-khaṇḍa ..	465	Piṅgala-prakāśa ..	480
Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa 469		Piṭakas ..	272, 304
Padārtha-viveka-prakāśa ..	469	Pitr̥bhakti-taraṅgini ..	459
Padārtha-viveka-ṭīkā ..	485	Pitṛmedha Sūtra ..	48 (ftn. 4), 498
Padma Caritra ..	195	Points of controversy by Shwe Zan-	
Padmapurāṇa 10, 20, 42 (ftn. 5),		Aung 235 (ftn. 1), 239 (ftn. 1)	
497, 497 (ftn. 2), 498 (ftn. 4)		Posterior Analytics ..	508, 509 ² , 517
Pag-sam-jon-zang 516 (ftn. 1), 517 ² ,		Prabandhacintamaṇi 152 (ftn. 3),	
517 (ftn. 2), 519 (ftn. 2)		173 (ftn. 4), 195 (ftn. 1)	
Pāli-kathāvatthupakkaraṇa ..	51	Prabhākara-caritra ..	195
Pāli Mahāvagga ..	11 (ftn. 3)	Prabhāvaka-caritra 173 (ftn. 3),	
Pañcatantra ..	179 (ftn. 2)	208 (ftn. 4)	
Paṇḍitavijaya ..	459	Prācīna-lekha-mālā ..	406 (ftn. 6)
Pānini 23 (ftn. 8), 303, 323		Pradeśa-vyākhyā-ṭippaṇaka ..	210
Pānini by Goldstucker 41 (ftn. 4)		Prajñāpanā Sūtra ..	161, 161 (ftn. 4)
Paraloka siddhi ..	330	Prajñāpāramitā ..	250, 516
Parāśara-smṛti-vyākhyā ..	397	Prakaraṇārya-vācā Śāstra 265, 506	
		Prakāśa ..	153, 469
		Pramāṇa-cintāmaṇi ..	405
		Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā ..	205 (ftn. 2)

	Page
Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-lokālaṅkāra 170 (ftn.), 198, 200, 211, 213	
Pramāṇa-nyāya-praveśa (or Nyāya- praveśa-nāma, Pramāṇa-praka- raṇa) 300 (ftn. 1), 302	
Pramāṇa-parīkṣā .. 187, 330	
Pramāṇa-samuccaya 116 (ftn. 2), 274 (ftn. 2), 275 ³ , 284 (ftn. 1), 299, 307 (ftn. 2), 508 (ftn. 2)	
Pramāṇa-samuccaya vṛtti 299, 300	
Pramāṇa - śāstra - nyāya - praveśa (or Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-pra- veśa-nāma) .. 300 (ftn. 1)	
Pramāṇa-vārtika 198, 222, 319, 323, 344 ²	
Pramāṇa-vārtikā-kārikā 307, 308	
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra 336, 344	
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭīkā 338, 344	
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā .. 319	
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-ṭīkā .. 320	
Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭīkā 198, 222, 344	
Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti .. 323	
Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana .. 128	
Pramāṇa-viheṭana 128 (ftn. 4), 257, 258	
Pramāṇa-viheṭana - ṭīpanaka - vṛtti (or Pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana - sam- bhāṣita-vṛtti) 257, 257 (ftn. 1)	
Pramāṇa-viniścaya .. 308 (ftn. 3), 331	
Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā 330, 342 (ftn. 2)	
Pramāṇya-vāda-dīdhiti-ṭīkā .. 482	
Prameya-kamala-mārtanda 188, 193	
Prameya-nibandha-prakāśa .. 455	
Prameya-ratna-kośa .. 206, 406 (ftn. 2)	
Prameya-ratna-mālā .. 198	
Prameya-tattva-bodha .. 455	
Prasamarati .. 169 (ftn.)	
Prasanna Rāghava .. 455	
Prāśnopaniṣad .. 22 (ftn. 3)	
Pratibandha-siddhi .. 345	
Pratyakṣāloka .. 456 (ftn. 2)	
Pratyakṣāloka-sāramañjarī .. 479	
Pratyeka buddha caritra .. 212	
Prāyaścitta .. 185	
Prior Analytics 504, 505 ² , 506, 509, 510, 512	
Pūjā-prakarana .. 169 (ftn.)	
Pustaka-pāṭhopāya .. 341	

	Page
Questions of King Milinda 113 (ftn.), 240 (ftn. 1, 3, 4)	
Raghuvaiṃśa .. 380	
Rāmāyaṇa 7 (ftn. 4), 8 (ftn. 5), 23 (ftn. 5, 6, 9, 12, 13), 51, 521	
Rāmapāla-carita .. 246 (ftn. 3)	
Rasika-sarvasva .. 522	
Ratnakaraṇḍaka .. 183	
Ratnākara-vatārikā .. 213	
Ratnākara-vatārikā-pañjikā 213 (ftn. 1)	
Ratna-kośa .. 406 (ftn. 2)	
Ratna-kośa vāda rahasya .. 482	
Ratna-kośa-vicāra or vāda .. 479	
Ratnāvalī .. 251 (ftn. 4)	
Ratnāloka-dharaṇī .. 29 (ftn. 1)	
Report on Sanskrit MSS. by Peter- son 168 (ftn. 3), 181 (ftn. 1), 182 (ftn. 3), 186 (ftn. 3), 194 (ftn. 4), 195. (ftn. 1, 2, 5, 7), 196 (ftn. 1, 2), 197 (ftn. 1, 2, 5), 198 (ftn. 2), 199 (ftn. 1, 2), 200 (ftn. 1), 205 (ftn. 1, 2, 3), 206 (ftn. 3, 4 ²), 207 (ftn. 1 ² , 2, 4, 5), 208 (ftn. 1, 2, 3), 209 (ftn. 3 ²), 210 (ftn. 1, 2, 3, 5), 211 (ftn. 1, 4), 212 (ftn. 1, 2, 3 ²), 213 (ftn. 3), 214 (ftn. 2), 215 (ftn. 1), 218 (ftn. 3), 329 (ftn. 5), 457 (ftn. 5), 466 (ftn. 3), 47	
Report of Sanskrit MSS. by R. G. Bhandarkar 160 (ftn. 2), 164 (ftn. 3), 165 (ftn. 2), 173 (ftn. 4), 183 (ftn. 3), 185 (ftn. 1), 197 (ftn. 4), 198 (ftn. 3), 201 (ftn. 1), 206 (ftn. 2), 207 (ftn. 3), 214 (ftn. 3), 381	
Report II by Weber 212 (ftn. 2), 213 (ftn. 4), 214 (ftn. 3)	
Report of the Archaeological Sur- vey .. 519 (ftn. 6)	
Rgyal-dwan-blo-gros .. 323	
Rgyu-dan-hbrag-buhi-no-wo-grub- pa .. 341	
Rgyud-gshan-grub-pa .. 319	
Rgyud-gshan-grub-pahi-hgrel-bśad 322	
Rhetoric .. 500, 501 ² , 509	

	Page		Page
Rigs-pa-grub paḥi-sgron-ma ..	336	Śākta-krama ..	478
Rigs-paḥi-sbyor-wa ..	340	Śakti-vāda ..	482, 483
Rigs-paḥi-thigs-pa ..	309	Śālistambha-sūtra ..	126 (ftn. 2)
Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-don-bṣdug-pa	340	Samādhi-rāja ..	242 (ftn. 3)
Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-phyogs-sna-		Samāja-guhya ..	516
ma-ndor-bṣdug-pa ..	327	Samantapāsādikā 232 (ftn. 1), 267	(ftn.)
Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-rgya-cher-			
hgrel-wa ..	329	Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasūritā 333	(ftn. 1)
Rigs-paḥi-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-hgrel-			
wa ..	321	Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa ..	526
Rigveda Samhitā 2 (ftn. 1), 9 (ftn. 1), 19 (ftn. 3)		Samaya-prābhṛta ..	195 (ftn. 6)
Rnam-par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-do-		Samaraiccekaḥā ..	209 (ftn.)
grub-pa ..	343	Samāsa-vāda ..	480
Ronki ..	267, 268, 269, 505	Samayabhedoparacana-cakra ..	321
Ronshin ..	267	Sambandha-parikṣā 194, 221, 319,	321, 345
Ronshiki ..	267	Sambandha-parikṣānu-sāra ..	345
Rṣibhāṣita-sūtra ..	165	Sambandha-parikṣā-ṭikā ..	321
Rṣimaṇḍala prakaraṇa vṛtti ..	165	Sambandha-parikṣā-vṛtti ..	319
Rtog-gehi-skad ..	346	Sambandhoddyota ..	194, 221
Rtsod-pa-bzlog-paḥi-tshig-bhur-		Samkṣepa Śārīraka ..	459
byas-pa ..	256	Sāṅkhya Kārikā 10 (ftn. 1), 274	(ftn. 4), 295 (ftn. 1)
Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-pa ..	318	Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī ..	134
Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-paḥi-hbrel-pa-		Sammati-tarka ..	221 (ftn. 2)
don-ruam-par-hbyed-pa ..	323	Sammati-tarka-sūtra ..	173, 197
Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-paḥi-hgrel-wa ..	321	Samyutta Nikāya ..	127 (ftn.)
Sabda-kaustubha ..	148 (ftn. 1)	Saṅgīta-sarvasva ..	522
Śabdāloka-viveka ..	468	Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on the Vedānta-	
Śabdanirnaya ..	460	sūtra ..	6 (ftn. 7)
Śabda-prāmāṇya-vāda-rahasya ..	482	Saptapadārthī ..	356
Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā ..	470, 480	Santānāntara-siddhi or Tantrān-	
Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā-ṭikā ..	485	tara-siddhi ..	319, 322
Sacred Literature of the Jainas 161		Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭikā ..	322
(ftn. 3)		Sapta bhaṅgī taraṅgiṇī ..	167 (ftn. 2)
Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya 154 (ftn. 3),		Saptadaśa-bhūmī-śāstra-yogācārya	249, 262, 262 (ftn. 4), 263
208 (ftn. 4) ² , 209 (ftn.) ² , 214 (ftn. 1), 222, 371 (ftn. 1)			
Śaḍdarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti 151		Sapta-padārthi ..	406
(ftn. 2, 3), 214, 331 (ftn. 6), 371 ² ,		Sāramañjarī ..	384
371 (ftn. 1)		Sāra-Saṅgraha ..	380, 399 (ftn. 1)
Saddharmapūṇḍarīka ..	242 (ftn. 3)	Sarasvatī-gaccha-paṭṭāvalī ..	165 (ftn. 1)
Sadukti-karṇāmṛta ..	524 (ftn. 1)	Sārasaṅgraha-ṭikā ..	380
Sad-yukti-muktāvalī ..	478	Sārvabhauma-nirukti ..	462
Sahāvalambha-niścaya ..	336	Sarvābhisamaya-sūtra ..	126

	Page		Page
Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha	41 (ftn. 3), 48, 126 (ftn. 2), 127 (ftn.), 186 (ftn. 5), 167 (ftn. 1), 168 (ftn. 2), 198, 247 (ftn. 5), 248 (ftn. 3), 249 (ftn. 1, 6), 306 (ftn. 7), 308 (ftn. 3), 377 (ftn.), 397, 398 ff., 407 (ftn. 2), 454 (ftn. 3).	Śrutiparīkṣā	143, 150, 328
Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā	328	Statistical Account of Bengal	523 (ftn. 2)
Sarvānukramaṇikā	45	Sthānāṅga Sūtra	161 (ftn. 5) ² , 167 (ftn. 1), 170 (ftn.), 221
Sarvārtha-siddhi	168 (ftn. 1)	Sthira-siddhi-dūṣaṇa	339
Śāstra on the Meditation of the three worlds	301 (ftn. 2)	Surbodhā	526
Śāstra-vārtā samuccaya	221 (ftn. 2)	Subodhini	480
Śataka-śāstra	261	Sukṛta Saṁkīrtana	152 (ftn. 3)
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa	3 (ftn. 3), 4 (ftn. 1), 19 (ftn. 4)	Sukṛa Saṁkīrtana	208 (ftn. 2)
Śata-śāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā	303	Sum-paḥi-chos-byun	241 (ftn. 1), 242 (ftn. 1)
Ṣaṭ-cakra-krama-dīpikā	469	Surata kalpataru	391
Ṣel-wa-grub-pa	345	Sūrya-prajāpati-sūtra	165
Siddhānta-candrodaya	390	Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra	165, 221
Siddhāntamuktāvalī	392	Sūtrālaṅkāra ṭīkā	262 (ftn. 4)
Siddhāntamuktāvalī-ṭīkā	483	Sūtra piṭakas	334
Siddhānta-rahasya	467	Sūtra Upadeśa	242
Śikṣā-samuccaya	126 (ftn. 2)	Sutta Piṭaka	226, 227, 229 ² , 242
Site of Ancient Palibothra	589 (ftn. 6)	Suvarṇa prabhāsa	242 (ftn. 3)
Śivajñānasiddhiyār	387 (ftn. 2)	Suvartha tattvāloka or Kāraka-cakra	480
Six Buddhist Nyāya Texts	339 (ftn. 3)	Sva-prakāśa-rahasya-vicāra or Bhaṭṭa-mata-siddhānta-vicāra	479
Six Nyāya Tracts by H. P. Śāstri	322 (ftn. 4), 333 (ftn. 1)	Svarūpa-sambodhana	185
Six Systems of Indian Philosophy	148 (ftn. 1)	Svayambhū Stotra	183
Skad-cig-ma-hjig-grub-paḥi - ruam - hgre	331	Syādvādakalika	213
Skal-cig-ma-hjig-pa-grub-pa	330	Syādvāda-ratnākara	198
Skandapurāṇa	8 (ftn. 3), 497 (ftn. 2)	Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatārikā	329, 331
Śloka-vārtika	187	Takakusu	515 (ftn. 2)
Smṛti-saṁskāra-vāda	482	Tangyur	506 (ftn. 3), 519 (ftn. 5), 533, 534, 535
Smṛti-sarvasva	524	Tantra	516
Smṛti-viveka	524	Tantrayukti	51
So-sor-thar-pa	232 (ftn. 1)	Tapāgaccha-paṭṭāvalī	159 (ftn. 1), 161, 208 (ftn. 4)
Sragdharā Stotra, Introduction to	322 (ftn. 5, 6), 334 (ftn. 1)	Tāraikaviṁśatikāṅga-sūtra Sankṣepa	518 (ftn. 5)
Sragdharā-stotram	357 (ftn. 2)	Tārā-triratna Stotram	519 (ftn. 5)
Sragdharā-stotra-ṭīkā	519	Tarka bhāṣā	215, 218, 346, 373, 381 ff., 478
Śrīpaṭṭāvalī-vācanā	160 (ftn. 5)	Tarka bhāṣā bhāva	384
		Tarka bhāṣā prakāśa	381
		Tarka bhāṣā prakāśikā	384 ² , 385 ³

	Page		Page
Tarkabhāṣā-praveśikā ..	381	Tattvacintāmaṇi-rahasya (Phak-	
Tarkabhāṣā-ṭikā ..	485	kikā or Māthuri) ..	467
Tarka-candrikā (Prabhā) ..	391	Tattvacintāmaṇi-ṭikā ..	479 ² , 456
Tarkadīpikā ..	385, 391 ²	Tattvacintāmaṇi-ṭikā-vicāra ..	479
Tarkakaumudī ..	395	Tattvacintāmaṇi-vyākhyā ..	482
Tarkāmṛta .. 393 (ftn. 1), 393f. ..	470	Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka ..	455
Tarkanyāya or Vāda-nyāya ..	318	Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka - kaṇṭako -	
Tarka-phakkikā ..	390	ddhāra ..	461
Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā ..	214	Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka-prakāśa ..	460
Tarka-saṁgraha 324 (ftn. 3), 387		Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka-ṭikā ..	482
(ftn. 1), 388 ff.		Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka-rahasya ..	467
Tarka-saṁgraha-candrikā ..	391 ²	Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka-viveka ..	478
Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā ..	390	Tattva-prabodhinī ..	385
Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā-prakāśa ..	391 ³	Tattvārtha ..	187
Tarka-saṁgraha, saṅku ..	391	Tattvārtha-bodhavidhāyinī ..	197
Tarka-saṁgraha-taraṅgiṇī ..	391	Tattvārtha-dīpikā ..	391
Tarka-saṁgraha-tattva-prakāśa ..	391	Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika ..	187 (ftn. 4)
Tarka-saṁgraha ṭikā ..	390 ² , 391 ⁴	Tattvārtha-ṭikā ..	182, 182 (ftn. 1)
Tarka-saṁgraha-vākyārtha-niruk-		Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra 168 (ftn.	
ti ..	391	1). 169 (ftn.), 182 ²	
Tarka-saṁgraha-vyākhyā ..	391	Tattvārtha-dīpikā ..	182 ²
Tarka-saṁgrahopanyāsa ..	391 ²	Tattvārtha-sāra ..	195
Tarka Śāstra ..	268 ² , 301, 505	Tattvārtha-vārtikālaṅkāra ..	168
Tarkaṭikā ..	331	(ftn. 1), 169 (ftn.)	
Tārkika-rahasya ..	373 ² , 374ff.	Tattvārtha-vārtika-vyākhyānālā-	
Tārkika-rakṣā ..	399 (ftn. 1)	kāra ..	185
Tā-shan-ō-phi-tā-matsā-tsi-hen ..	266	Tattvasamāsa ..	324 (ftn. 3)
Tathāgata-guhyaka ..	292 (ftn. 3)	Tattvasaṁgraha 222, 324 (ftn. 3) ² ,	
Tattvacintāmaṇi 155, 208, 376		326 (ftn.), 328	
(ftn. 4), 388, 405, 406 (ftn. 1, 2,		Tattvasaṁgraha-dīpikā-ṭippanī ..	483
3, 4, 5, 6), 454 (ftn. 4), 456, 461,		Tattvasaṁgraha-kārikā ..	324
462, 465, 466, 484		Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjika ..	328
Tattvacintāmaṇi-darpaṇa ..	485	Taxila by Law ..	496 (ftn. 1)
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti ..	465	Thema-cad-ukhyan-pa-grub - paḥi -	
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-guḍhār-		tshig-bhur ..	328
tha-vidyotana ..	478	Thos-pa-brtag-paḥi-tshig-bhur-	
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-parīkṣā ..	477	byas-pa ..	328
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā		Tibetan Catalogue by Cordier ..	262
470, 479, 482		(ftn. 2)	
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī ..	468	Tibetan Dictionary ..	530
Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti-ṭikā ..	483	Tibetan Grammar 306 (ftn. 1), 323 (ftn. 3)	
Tattvacintāmaṇi-guḍhārtha-dīpi-		ṭikā (on Tarkasaṁgraha) ..	391 ³
kā ..	481	Tipitaka ..	226, 227, 242
Tattvacintāmaṇi-mayūkha ..	459, 470	Ṭippanaka ..	195
Tattvacintāmaṇi-prakāśa ..	454,	Tīrthacintāmaṇi ..	458
457, 460, 485			

	Page		Page
Tirthakalpa ..	159 (ftn. 1), 169	Upāli-vāda Sutta ..	229
Tīrthika works ..	289	Upamiti-bhava-prapañca-kathā 147	(ftn. 4)
Translation of the Mahāvamsa 226		Upaniṣads by F. Max Müller 45	(ftn. 4)
(ftn.), 226 (ftn. 1, 2), 234 (ftn. 1)		Upamānacintāmaṇi-ṭīkā ..	485
Translation of the Nyāya-praveśa		Upāsakādhyayana ..	183
—by Hwen-thsang ..	300 (ftn. 2)	Upāyakaūsalya-hṛdaya-śāstra, 259,	504
—by I-tsing ..	300 (ftn. 2)	Upāyakaūsalya Sūtra..	119
Translation of the Vinaya Texts by		Utpāda-siddhi-prakaraṇa ..	211
Rhys Davids ..	232 (ftn. 1)	Uttarādhyaṇa Sūtra ..	165
Travels of Fa-hian and Suñg-yun		Uvāsagadasāo ..	182 (ftn. 3)
by Beal ..	252 (ftn. 3)		
Tripitaka ..	272	Vādabuddhivicāra ..	479
Triṣaṣṭi-śalāka-puruṣa-caritra ..	205	Vāda-mahārṇava ..	196, 197, 124
Trisūtri-nibandha-vyākhyā 458,	459	Vādanyāya ..	321 ² , 324
Tshad-ma-bṛtag-pa ..	330	Vādanyāya-vṛtti-vipaṇcitārtha 323,	324
Tshad-maḥi-bstan-bcos-rig-pa-la-		Vādayāya-vyākhyā ..	321
hjug-pa ..	300	Vāda-pariccheda ..	484
Tshad-maḥi-mdo-kun-las-bhus-pa	276	Vāda-vidhi..	124 (ftn. 1)
Tshad-me-kun-las-btus-pa ..	276	Vāhyārtha-siddhi kārīkā ..	328
Tshad-ma-kun-las-btus-pehi-hgrel-		Vaiduryakarmo ..	517 (ftn. 4)
wa ..	299	Vaiśeṣika philosophy by Prof. H.	
Tshud-ma-rigs-par-hjug-paḥi-ngo..	289	Ui 40 (ftn. 2), 256 (ftn. 2), 300	
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-dkal-h-		(ftn. 1), 302 (ftn. 1)	
hgrel ..	319	Vaiśeṣika-śāstriya-padārtha-nirū-	
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-		paṇa ..	484
bśad ..	320, 344	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra ..	356, 499
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-wa	308	Vaiśeṣika-sūtropadeśa ..	459
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-lshing ..	307	Vaiyākaraṇa-bhuṣaṇa-sāra 132 (ftn.	
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-pa	323	1), 148 (ftn. 1)	
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan ..	336	Vākyapadīya ..	148 (ftn. 1)
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-rgyan-		Vaṃsu Brāhmana ..	380 (ftn. 5)
gyi-hgrel-bśad ..	338	Varāhapurāṇa ..	45 (ftn. 1)
Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-rgyan-gyi-		Vārtika on the Nyāya Sūtra 259 (ftn.)	
hgrel bśad ..	344	Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāya-	
Tshad-ma-rnam-neḡ-kyi-ṭīkā ..	331	bhāṣya ..	116 (ftn. 4)
Tshad-ma-rnam-par-hjoms-pa-		Vāyupurāṇa ..	498 (ftn. 7)
mdor-bśad-pehi-hgrel ..	257	Vedi-vinoda ..	459
Tshad-ma-rnam-parneḡ-pa ..	309	Vibhāṣā-śāstra ..	248
Tshad-ma-rnam-parneḡ-pehi-hgrel-		Vibhāṣa-vinaya ..	266 (ftn. 2)
bśad ..	342	Vicārāmṛta-saṃgraha 208 (ftn. 4)	
Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Mön-		Vicāra-ratna-saṃgraha 169 (ftn. 2)	
ches Hemacandra ..	205 (ftn. 1)	Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa 159 (ftn. 1),	
Ujjvala ..	384	208 (ftn. 4)	
University of Nadia (see Nadia) 521		Vicāra-śreṇi ..	159 (ftn. 1)
(ftn. 1)			

	Page		Page
Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana-viṭikā	479	Vṛndāvana-vinoda-kāvya	.. 477
Vidhi-vāda	482	Vṛtta-ratnā valī	483
Vidvānāmōda-taraṅgiṇī	.. 483	Vṛtti on Gaṇadharasārdhaśata-	
Vidyāmātra-siddhi - śāstra - vyā -		kam	160 (ftn. 1)
kyā	303	Vyāptipañcaka	407 (ftn. 1)
Vienna Oriental Journal	195 (ftn. 3)	Vyavahāra sūtra	165
Vigraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā	.. 257 ²	Vyutpatti-vāda	482
Vijñapti-mātra siddhī	343	Vyutpatti-vāda-vyākhyā	483
Vinaya-piṭaka 225 (ftn. 3), 226, 229			
(ftn. 3) ² , 242		Wassilief	306 (ftn. 1)
Vinaya-vibhāṣā	241	Yājñavalka Samhitā 8 (ftn. 6), 23	
Viśālāmelavatīmānca - pramāṇa -		(ftn. 5, 11), 42 (ftn. 6), 152 (ftn.	
samuccaya-ṭikā	323	1), 498	
Viśayatā-vāda	482	Yast	20 (ftn. 3)
Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya	181	Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra	504
Viṣṇupurāṇa	42 (ftn. 3), 456, 497	Yogācāra philosophy	303
Viśvasāra-tantra	153	Yoga Śāstra	205
Vītarāga-stuti	212	Yukti-muktāvalī	384
Vivādacandra	466	Yukti-prayoga	340
Vivādaśamana-śāstra	257	Yuktyanuśāsana	183
Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha	397 (ftn. 1)	Yuka Pon.	263 (ftn. 3)
Viveka-vilāsa	153, 154	Zend Avesta	489 (ftn. 3)
Vṛhadgaccha	212	Zu-shih-ben	268
Vṛhatsvayambhūpurāṇa	519		

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
Abhayadeva Sūri ..	199	Candra Sena ..	205 (ftn. 3), 211
Abhayatilakopādhyāya ..	151	Caraka ..	50
Abhinanda ..	147 (ftn. 2)	Choṣ-kyi-brtson-bgruṣ..	342
Ācārya Dignāga ..	270ff.	Choṣ kyī rin-chen ..	300
Akalaṅka Deva ..	168 (ftn. 1)	Ci-cia-ye ..	259
Akhaṇḍānanda ..	406 (ftn. 2)	Cinnā Bhaṭṭa ..	381, 384
Amaracandra Sūri ..	207	Dad-pa-śes-rab ..	300
Amrtacandra Sūri ..	195	Dāna Śīla ..	340
Ānanda Sūri ..	207	Devabhadra ..	211
Ananta Nārāyaṇa ..	390	Devardhi Gaṇi ..	172
Ananta Śrī ..	341	Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka..	195
Anantavīrya ..	188 (ftn. 6), 198	Deva Sūri ..	198ff.
Annam Bhaṭṭa ..	388, 390	Devendrabhadra ..	328
Arcaṭa ..	331f.	Devendraboddhi ..	319f., 348
Ārya Āsaṅga ..	265f.	Dgo-śes-si-si-gyañ ..	300
Ārya Deva..	250, 261f.	Dge-waḥi-blo-groṣ ..	307, 318, 320 ²
Aśoka ..	332f.	Dharma-bhūṣaṇa ..	215, 273 (ftn. 7)
Bāla Candra ..	384	Dharmakīrti 124, 133, 136 (ftn.),	303ff., 340, 345
Bāṇa ..	123 ²	Dharmapāla ..	302
Bhadrabāhu ..	122 (ftn. 1)	Dharmottara ..	150, 329ff.
Bhāsa ..	20	Dhoyī ..	524
Bhāsarvajña ..	155	Dignaya ..	42, 135
Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa ..	384	Dīpāṅkara Rakṣita ..	338
Bhaṭṭa Rāghava ..	372	Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita ..	321, 322, 328
Bhavya ..	250	Dpal-mchog-dañ-poñi-rdo-rje ..	337
Bhavyarāja ..	330 ³ , 336	Dpal-ldan-blo-groṣ ..	323
Bhīma Sena Dīkṣita ..	477	Dpal-rtsegs-rakṣita ..	328
Bhīmī Bhaṭṭa ..	384	Dpal-trsegs..	319
Blo-ldan-śes-rab 262 (ftn. 5), 309,	330 ³ , 331, 336 ²	Dr. J. Jolly ..	45 (ftn. 2)
Brahmanemi Datta ..	188 (ftn. 4)	Gadādhara ..	406 (ftn. 2)
Buddhaghoṣa 232 (ftn. 1), 267 (ftn.)		Gaṅgādhara Bhaṭṭa ..	391
Buddha Pālita ..	250	Gaṅgeśa Dīkṣita ..	385
Byañ-chub-śes-rab ..	338	Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya ..	155, 404, 405ff.
Candra Gomin ..	333ff.	Gaurī Kānta ..	390, 385
Candraja Simha ..	391	Gautama ..	48 (ftn. 4)
Candra Kīrti ..	126 (ftn. 2), 250	Govardhana Miśra ..	385, 390
Candraprabha Sūri 166 (ftn. 1),	206, 406 (ftn. 2)	Groṣa-hbyor-śes-rab ..	328, 331
		Gser-gyi-go-cha ..	300

	Page
Guṇākara Śrībhadrā	323
Guṇaratna	151, 214, 331
Guṇḍu Bhaṭṭa	384
Haṇumat	391
Haribhadra Sūri 152, 154, 160 (ftn. 6), 206 (ftn. 4), 208f.	
Harirāma	406 (ftn. 2)
Hbro-señ-kar	324
Hemacandra Sūri	205
Hema (or kanaka) Varma	300
Hwon-thsang	300 (ftn. 2), 302
Isvara Kṛṣṇa 274 (ftn. 4), 295 (ftn. 1)	
I-tsing	300 (ftn. 2)
Jābāla	9
Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭa	391
Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra	393
Jagannātha Śāstrin	391
Jānakīnātha Cuḍāmaṇi	404
Janārdana Vyāsa	478
Jayadeva	524
Jayānanta	250, 256
Jayanta	371
Jayasinha Sūri	372
Jayasoma Sūri	164 (ftn. 2)
Jaya Tīrtha	371
Jetāri	337
Jina	338
Jinabhadra Gaṇi	181
Jinadatta Sūri	152, 154
Jina Mitra	321, 328, 340
Jinaprabha Sūri	159, (ftn. 1), 169
Jinendrabodhi	323, 348
Jñāna Candra	213
Jñāna Garbha	256, 319, 321, 329
Jñāna Pūrṇa	374, 380
Jñāna-śrī Bhadrā	318, 342
Jñānaśrī Mitra	341
Kalyāṇa Candra	198
Kalyāṇa Rakṣita	150, 328f., 348
Kamala Śīla 324 (ftn. 3), 327f., 348	
Kapila	9f.

	Page
Kātyāyana	41 (ftn. 4)
Kātyāyanī-putra	242, 247
Kaunda Bhaṭṭa	132
Kaundinya Dikṣita	385
Kauṭilya	24
Ka-wa-dpal-brtsegs	256
Keśava Bhaṭṭa	385
Keśava Miśra	373, 381ff., 478
Khu-ndo-sde-dpal	256
Kṛṣṇa	250
Kṣamākalyāṇa	390
Kumārājīva	261, 267
Kumāra-kalasa	337, 341
Kumāra Śrībhadrā	324
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa	138 (ftn. 1), 273
Kundakundācārya	195 (ftn. 6)
Laugākṣi Bhāskara	395, 478
Laghu Sāmantabhadra 185 (ftn. 3), 197	
Lha-bla-ma-shi-wa-hod	323
Mādhavācārya	198
Mādhava Deva	384
Mādhavapadābhīrūma	391
Māhopādhyāya Dharma-sāgara	
Gaṇi	164 (ftn. 4)
Maitreya	262
Maladhāri Śrī Rājasekhara Sūri 153,	
154, 155	
Mallasena Sūri	212
Mallavūdin	194
Mallinātha 273, 373 (ftn. 1), 380	
Mammaṭa	478
Mañibhadra	214 (ftn. 1)
Māṇikyanandi	185, 188
Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa	388
Meru Śāstri	391
Meru Śāstri Goḍbole	391
Merutuṅga	159 (ftn. 1)
Mokṣakara Gupta	346
Muktākumbha	331
Mukunda Bhaṭṭa	391
Mukunda Bhaṭṭa Gāḍgil	391
Munisundara Sūri	165 (ftn.)
Murāri	391
Murāri Bhaṭṭa	384

	Page		Page
Nāga Rakṣita	337	Sanghabhadra	248
Nāgārjuna	50, 250, 256, 334	Śaṅkara Miśra	388
Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa	384	Śaṅkarānanda	344
Nārāyaṇa	153	Śaṅkara Svāmin	289 (ftn. 1), 320
Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa	384	Śānta Rakṣita	323f., 348
Nemicandra Kavi	207, 210	Śānti Bhadra	336, 343
Nilakaṇṭha	391	Śāntyācārya	147 (ftn. 4)
Padmanābha Miśra	381	Sarvajñātma Muni	459
Pakṣadhara Miśra	407 (ftn. 3)	Śaśadhara	396
Paṇḍita Amara Gomin	262 (ftn. 5)	Śeṣ-rab	323
Parahita Bhadra	309	Sha-ma-dge-bṣṅen-sin-rgyal	299
Paramārtha	267, 268, 301f.	Siddharṣi	147 (ftn. 4)
Pārśvadeva Gaṇi	210	Siddhasena Divākara	173ff.
Pārthasārathi Miśra	273	Siddhasena Divākara-vyākhyāna- ka	206 (ftn. 4)
Paśupati	524	Siddhasena Gaṇi	168 (ftn. 3), 182
Patañjali	41 (ftn. 4, 5)	Śilabhadra	303
Pattābhirāma	391	Śivāditya Miśra	378 (ftn. 1), 406
Prabhā Candra 193, 208 (ftn. 4), 273 (ftn. 7)		Śrī Candra	210
Pradyumna Sūri	173, 196	Śrīdhara Dāsa	524 (ftn. 1)
Prajñākara Gupta	331f., 344	Śrīkaṇṭha	151
Prajñākaramati	126 (ftn. 2)	Śrīkṛṣṇā Dhūrjati Dikṣita	390
Prajñā Varma	321	Śrīnivāsa	391
Pūjyapāda Svāmin	168 (ftn. 1)	Śrī Śitaprabha	336
Rabhasa Nandi	194	Śrī Śubhūti Śānta	340
Raghunandana	153 (ftn. 3)	Śrutasāgara Gaṇi	215
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi	388, 406 (ftn. 2)	Stou-gshon	300
Rāja Śekhara	134, 147 (ftn. 6) 213	Subandu	123
Rāma Liṅga	384	Śubhakara Gupta	346
Ramānātha	391	Subhūti-Śrī-Śānti	307, 320
Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭa	391	Śuklaratna Nātha	391
Ratnākara Śānti	342	Śūlapāṇi	524
Ratnakīrti	133, 338	Surendrabodhi	340
Ratnaprabha Sūri	166 (ftn. 1), 211, 331	Sureśvarācārya	306
Ratna Vajra	339	Thān-yāo	259
Ravi Gupta	322f., 348	Thasam-tsan	300
Rdo-rje-rgyal-mtshan	323	Tilakācārya	206 (ftn. 5), 212
Romavilva-Veṅkata Buddha	384	Tiñ-ñe-hṣin-bzan-po	340
Śākya bodhi	320, 348	Tsab-ñi-ma-grags	330
Śākya-hod	337 ² , 341, 343	Udayana	386
Śākya Simha	322	Umāpati	524
Samanta Bhadra	182ff., 185	Vācaspati Miśra	131, 133ff
		Vācaspati Miśra—the Junior	151, 303

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
Vadhulavenkata Guru	.. 391	Vimokṣa Prajñā	.. 257
Vaidyanātha Gadgil	.. 391	Vināyaka	.. 331
Vairocana	.. 336	Vinaya Vijaya	.. 216
Vande-dpal-brtsegs	.. 322	Vindhyeśvari Prasād	.. 391
Vande-nam-nykhas	.. 319, 321	Vinīta Deva	.. 348
Vande-ye-śeg-gde	.. 321, 340	Viśuddha Siṃha	.. 319, 322, 328
Varadā rāja	.. 373ff.	Viśva Karmā	.. 385
Vardhamāna	151, 388, 406 (ftn. 2)	Viśvanātha	52 (ftn. 1), 151, 391
Vasubandhu	124 (ftn. 1), 266ff., 300, 371	Viśvanātha Nyāya pañcānana	.. 392
Vātsyāyana	40 (ftn. 1), 52 (ftn. 1)		
Vidyānanda	186, 273 (ftn. 7), 306	Yamāri	.. 343
Vijayasimha Gaṇi	.. 371	Yaśovijaya Gaṇi	.. 217
Vijñāna Bhikṣu	.. 244 (ftn. 1)	Yayanta	.. 146 (ftn.)
Vimala Dāsa	.. 167 (ftn. 2)	Yuan Chwang	.. 40 (ftn. 2)

INDEX OF QUOTATIONS.

Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi—	Page	Anumānālōka-darpaṇa—	Page
—वात्सायनो मल्लनाग ..	117 (ftn. 2)	—जनकविषयजन्मा राजसम्मानपात्रं	457 (ftn. 5)
Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā—		—ज्येष्ठा महादेवभगौरथ ..	458 (ftn. 7)
—धर्मज्ञानान्वयज्ञान ..	263 (ftn. 2)	Apokṛtsiddhi—	
—पूर्वेण बोधिधीरुक्ता ..	262 (ftn. 6)	—वृत्तिरियं महापण्डित ..	338 (ftn. 3)
—स्वप्नोपमेषु धर्मेषु ..	263 (ftn. 1)	—नाकाटस्य न वाह्यस्य ..	338 (ftn. 4)
Ācāra-dinakara—		—नास्माभिरत्रोद्देश्येन विधिरेव ..	339 (ftn. 4)
—सुत्तुण दिट्ठिवायं कालिय	161 (ftn. 1)	—यच्चात्र न्यायभूषणेन ..	339 (ftn. 1), 358
Address of Udayana—			(ftn. 1)
—ऐश्वर्यमदमत्तः सन् ..	142 (ftn. 3)	—यत्तु विलोचनः । अश्वत्थगोलादिना	134 (ftn. 3)
Ādipurāṇa—		—यदप्यवोचद्वाचस्पति ..	339 (ftn. 2)
—चन्द्रांशु शुभयशसं ..	194 (ftn. 3)	Āptamīmāṃsā—	
—भट्टकलकं श्रीपाल ..	188 (ftn. 1)	—अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि ..	182 (ftn. 5)
Alaṅkāra-sāra-sthiti—		—भावैकान्ते पदार्थानाम् उपयोगाद्	
—शक्तिर्न शक्तिवाद व्याख्या	477 (ftn. 2)	सर्वथा ..	184 (ftn. 1)
Amarasvāmi-carita—		—स्याद्वादुसर्वथैकान्त	183 (ftn. 1)
—सौमि श्रीहरिभद्रं तं ..	209 (ftn. 3)	Āptamīmāṃsālaṅkārti-tīkā—	
Ānādalāhari-tarī—		—येनाशेष कुनीति वृत्तिसरित	183 (ftn. 2)
—यो नानावेधशस्त्रतर्कनिपुण	478 (ftn. 1)	Arthasāstra of Kautilya—	
Anekānta-jaya-patākā—		—त्रयी वार्त्ता दण्डनीति ..	5 (ftn. 1)
—उक्तञ्च वादिमुखेन ..	209 (ftn. 2)	—धर्माधर्मो त्रय्याम् शस्त्रदानीक्षिकी	
—यथोक्तं वार्तिकानुसारिणा	209 (ftn. 2)	मता ..	7 (ftn. 6)
Anekāntajaya-patākā-tīkā—		—प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानाम् ..	38 (ftn. 4)
—यथोक्तं वार्तिकानुसारिणा शुभगुप्तेन	346 (ftn. 2)	—शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्यत ..	41 (ftn. 6)
Antarvyāpti—		—संघमुख्यस्य संघेषु ..	42 (ftn. 1)
—अन्तर्व्याप्तिसमर्थनं समाप्तम्	343 (ftn. 3)	—सांख्यं योगो लोकायतं ..	5 (ftn. 4)
—इह सत्यमर्थक्रियाकारित्वं	343 (ftn. 3)	—ह्यान्वीक्षिकी त्रयी वार्त्ता	5 (ftn. 2)
Anumāna-dīdhiti-gūḍhārtha-vi- dyotana—		Aṣṭasāhasri—	
—श्रीविश्वेश्वरमहेश्वरभुवं	477 (ftn. 1)	—अथोपयोगेऽपि पुनः ..	187 (ftn. 1)
Anumāna-dīdhiti-prasārinī—		—प्रज्ञाकरस्येदं वचः क्रमप्रतीतिरेवं स्यात्	187 (ftn. 2)
—विचारस्तु अनुमानालोक	468 (ftn. 1)	—यदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिनाञ्जतद्रूप परावृत्त	187 (ftn. 1)
Anumāna-khaṇḍa—			
—इति न्यायसिद्धान्तसाराभिज्ञ	456 (ftn. 5)		

	Page
—यदुक्तं दृष्टदारणकवार्तिके आत्मापि	
सदिदं ब्रह्म ..	187 (ftn. 4)
—श्रीमदकलङ्कविहतां ..	187 (ftn.)
—श्रीमदकलङ्कशशधरकुल ..	186 (ftn. 6)
—श्रीवर्द्धमानमभिवन्द्य समन्तभद्रं	186 (ftn. 6)
Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivarāṇa—	
—ऐन्द्रमहः प्रणिधाय न्याय ..	220 (ftn. 4)
—न्यायमुधिर्दीधितिकारयुक्ति ..	218
(ftn. 2), 465 (ftn. 1)	
Aṣṭasāhasrī-viṣama-pada-tātparyā- ṭīkā—	
—देवं स्वामिनममलं विद्यानन्दं ..	197 (ftn. 6)
Ātma-tattva-viveka—	
—बहुतरपटतन्तप्रान्तरध्वान्तभीत ..	141
(ftn. 2)	
Avadāna Kalpalatā—	
—भगवदुभाषितं तत् ..	174 (ftn. 2)
Āvaśyaka niryukti—	
—कृष्णस सद्वाङ् नवुत्तराद् ..	159 (ftn. 2)
Avayavinirākaṛaṇa—	
—एवं मया बहुषु दुर्मतिनिमित्तेषु ..	333
(ftn. 4)	
—तदेतत् सकलमालोक्य ..	332 (ftn. 4)
—ननु भवद्भि रसन्नेवापयवी ..	333 (ftn. 2)
Bhadrabāhu-carita—	
—मृते विक्रमभूपाले ..	159 (ftn. 2)
Bhāgavata—	
—न वस्तुमिहास्माभिः ..	49 (ftn. 2)
—स्त्रियो वालाश्च वृद्धाश्च ..	49 (ftn. 2)
Bhāgavatapurāṇa—	
—षष्ठमचेरपत्यत्वतः ..	10 (ftn. 4)
—सूयमानो जनैरेभिः ..	6 (ftn. 5)
Bhagavatī Sūtra—	
—अथवाहेज चउव्विहे णत्थि सो हेज ..	162 (ftn. 1)
Bhāmati—	
—नरेश्वरा यच्चरितानुकारम् ..	134 (ftn. 1)
—यथाह धर्मकीर्तिः तस्मान्नार्थेन च ज्ञाने ..	306 (ftn. 6)
—स्याद्वादसर्वथेकान्त ..	183 (ftn. 1)

	Page
Bhāṣāpariccheda—	
—ब्रह्माद्या निखिलार्चितास्त्रिदश ..	392 (ftn. 6)
—रसवाणतिथौ शकेन्द्रकाले ..	392 (ftn. 4)
Bhāṣāratna—	
—चूडामणिपदाम्भोज ..	466 (ftn. 2)
Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa—	
—वने लाङ्गिरसः श्रेष्ठो ..	19 (ftn. 2)
—सप्तविंशतिर्मे प्राप्ते ललूकी वत्स एव च ..	49 (ftn. 1)
Bṛhadāranyaka—	
—अरेयमात्माऽनन्तरोऽवाह्यः ..	9 (ftn. 2)
—आत्मा वारं द्रष्टव्यः ..	6 (ftn. 1)
—तदेतत् चतस्रश्च चतस्रम् ..	3 (ftn. 1)
—श्वेतकेतुर्हं आरुणेयः ..	22 (ftn. 2)
Bṛhadāranyaka-vārtika—	
—त्रिष्वव लविनाभावाद् ..	306 (ftn. 4)
Gaitānya Caritamṛta—	
—नौमि तं गौरचन्द्रं ..	462 (ftn. 1)
—पूर्वे भशश्रु नवे ..	462 (ftn. 1)
Caraka Samhitā—	
—अर्थात् इन्द्रियापक्रमणौयमध्यायं ..	11 (ftn. 2)
—एवं प्रमाणैः युतिभिः ..	28 (ftn. 3)
—चतुस्त्रिंशद् विचित्राभि भवत्येतानि ..	24 (ftn. 1)
—द्विविधमेव खलु ..	28 (ftn. 1)
—हेतुर्नामोपलब्धि कारणम् ..	28 (ftn. 2)
Caturvīmśati-prabandha—	
—शरगगनमनुमितादौ ज्येष्ठा ..	213 (ftn. 4)
Commentary on Tārkikarākṣa	
—एतच्च ग्रन्थस्तैव स्पष्टीकृत ..	373 (ftn. 1)
Commentary on Utpāda-siddhipra- kāraṇa—	
—श्रीमांश्चन्द्रकुलेऽभवद् ..	205 (ftn. 3)
Dāna-kāṇḍa—	
—सर्वेषां मौलित्वरानां ..	392 (ftn. 3)
Daśa-vaikūlika-niryukti—	
—तेषु पदत्रय विभक्ती ..	166 (ftn. 1)
Daśa-vaikūlika ṭīkā—	
—तीर्थे वीरविभोः सुधर्मगणभृत् ..	206 (ftn. 5)

	Page		Page
Daśa-vaikālika-vṛtti—		—येनार्दितश्चतुरशीति सुवादिलीला	
—वाल्मीकिवृद्धसूत्राणाः ..	160 (ftn. 6)	शिष्या बहवोऽभवन् विदितः 199 (ftn. 2)	
Deopara Vijaya Sena Inscription—		—रसरसमनुमितवषे २४६६ 214 (ftn. 4)	
—त्वं नान्यवीरविजयीतिगिरः कवीना	521 (ftn. 3)	Harṣa-carita—	
Devīpurāṇa—		—कवीनामगलदुर्दुषी ..	123 (ftn. 3)
—शम्भोः कृपामनुप्राप्य ..	154 (ftn. 4)	Hayaśīrṣapañcarātra—	
Dhanukhā Inscription—		—गोतमस्य कणादस्य ..	153 (ftn. 3)
—आसीत् पण्डितमण्डलाग्रगणितो 406	(ftn. 7)	Introductory verses to Śaṅkara	
Dharmābhyudaya Mahā-kāvya—		Mīśra's works—	
—आनन्दस्वरिरिति तस्य बभूव शिष्यौ		—अधीतमध्यापितमर्जितयशो 458 (ftn. 3)	
यात्रसिंहशिखकाविति सिद्धिराजः	207 (ftn. 4)	Jaina Harivaṃśa Purāṇa—	
—सिद्धान्तोपनिषद्भिषण्यहृद्यो 208 (ftn. 3)		—अथ सप्तर्षिसम्पन्नं ..	159 (ftn. 3)
Gacchotpatti-prakīrṇaka—		Jambudvīpa-samāsa—	
—पंचसह पण्तीय ..	208 (ftn. 1)	—कृतिः सिताम्बराचार्यस्य 169 (ftn.)	
Gadādhari-karsikā—		Jyotirvidābharāṇa—	
—श्रीकृष्णं मुञ्जरानभ्य ..	486 (ftn. 1)	—धन्वन्तरिः क्षणकोऽमरसिंह 174 (ftn. 2)	
Gandharva-tantra—		Kādambari—	
—गोतमप्रोक्तशस्त्रार्थनिरताः 17 (ftn. 3), 36 (ftn. 3)		—रजोजुषे जन्मनि सन्वहत्य 194 (ftn. 1)	
Gautama Dharma Sūtra—		Kalpasūtra-subodhikāvṛtti—	
—राजा सर्वस्येष्ट ब्रह्मणवर्जः प्रत्यवहृत्य		—प्रतिष्ठानपुरे वराहमिहिरभद्रवाङ्म 165	(ftn. 3)
निष्ठां गमयेत् ..	37 (ftn. 5)	Kātantra—	
Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti—		—भृग्वच्यद्विः ..	19 (ftn. 5)
—एषा सुनिप्रवरगौतमसूत्रकृतिः 392 (ftn. 5)		Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa—	
Gloss on Bhavānandi-ṭīkā—		—नो च मयस् तया तत् 234 (ftn. 2)	
—नत्वा पदाम्भोजयुगं शिवस्य 486 (ftn. 2)		Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa - uṭṭaha -	
—श्रीमत्पुण्यस्तम्भोपनायक 486 (ftn. 2)		kathā—	
Gotama-stotra—		—एवं तेन, धुलेन निगच्छे 234 (ftn. 2)	
—श्रीमन्तं मगधेषु गर्वर इति ग्रामो-		Kathopaniṣad—	
भिरामः त्रिया ..	160 (ftn. 4)	—शान्तसंकल्पसुमनाः आत्मा भवति	
Guru-śiromaṇi-prakasa—		गैतमः	19 (ftn. 1)
—यन्मूलमेव सुकृतानि तयोः कृतानि 467	(ftn.)	Kāvya-lankāra sūtra vṛtti—	
Gurvāvali Sūtra—		—सामिप्रायत्वं यथा सोऽयं संप्रति चन्द्र-	
—अवस्थिमः पूर्वभृतां द्वितीयः श्रीसूत्र-		गुप्ततनय	267 (ftn. 1)
भद्रश्च ददातु शर्म ..	164 (ftn. 5)	Khuddakapāṭha of the Pāli Sutta-	
—उभावपि षष्ठपट्टधरौ 164 (ftn. 4)		piṭaka—	
		—एकं नाम किं ? पञ्चपादानकस्त्वन्वा	114 (ftn. 1)
		Kriyāratna-samuccaya—	
		—कालं षड् रसपूर्वं २४६६ 214 (ftn. 5)	

	Page		Page
Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi—		Mādhyaṃika-kārikā—	
—कृतिरियं महापण्डितरत्न	338 (ftn. 3)	—प्रदीपं स्वपरात्मनोः ..	256 (ftn. 2)
—त्रिलोचनस्याप्ययं सन्निप्रार्थः	134 (ftn. 4)	—विग्रहे यः परौह्वारं ..	256 (ftn. 1)
—प्रकृतेः सर्वधर्माणां ..	339 (ftn. 5)	Mādhyaṃika Sūtra—	
—यच्चात्र न्यायभूषणेन ..	339 (ftn. 1)	—अनिरोधमनुत्पादम ..	254 (ftn. 4)
—यदप्यनोचद् वाचस्पतिः	339 (ftn. 2)	—जतं न गम्यते तावत् ..	47 (ftn.)
Kumārāpāla-carita-praśasti—		—न सन् नासन् न सदसन	46 (ftn. 2)
—श्री विक्रमनृपाद् द्वि द्वि	372 (ftn. 3)	—न सम्भवः स्वभावस्य ..	118 (ftn.)
Kusumāñjali—		—न हि स्वभावो भावानां	46 (ftn. 2)
—अस्माकन्तु निसर्गसुन्दर चिराच्चेतो		—यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो	47 (ftn.),
निसमं लयि ..	145 (ftn. 2)		118 (ftn. 2)
—इत्येव श्रुतिनीति संभवजलैर्भूयोऽभि-		—रूपादि व्यतिरेकेण ..	117 (ftn. 6)
राक्षलिते ..	145 (ftn. 1)	Mādhyaṃikā-vṛtti—	
—व्याघातावधिराशङ्का ..	31 (ftn. 2)	—अतो भावाभावान्द्वयरहितत्वात्	249
—सापेक्षत्वादनादित्वाद् ..	144 (ftn.)		(ftn. 6), 253 (ftn. 2)
Kusumāñjali-vyākhyā—		—अनन्तरस्य धर्मस्य ..	255 (ftn. 2)
—भवानीभवनायाभ्यां ..	469 (ftn. 1)	—आर्य समाधिराजे चोक्तं भगवता	254
			(ftn. 1)
Laghu-dīpikā—		—एवं शून्यमुपादानमुपादाता	119 (ftn.)
—तस्मिन् विश्वरूपजयन्तयोर्मते	380 (ftn. 2)	—द्वं सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य ..	254 (ftn. 3)
—सर्वैश्वर्यनिजावासं ..	380 (ftn. 1)	—यथैव गन्धर्वपुरं मरौचिका	118 (ftn. 2)
Lakṣaṇāvali—		—जः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादः सर्वधर्मनिःस्वभाव	
—तर्कान्तराङ्ग प्रमितेष्व ..	142 (ftn. 1)	योगेन इति ..	118 (ftn. 3)
Lalitavistara—		Mahābhārata—	
—निर्घण्टौ निगमे पुराणे ..	243 (ftn. 2)	—अत्राप्युदाहरणीयमास् ..	19 (ftn. 2)
Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra—		—अहमासं पण्डितको शृङ्गालत्वं मम	
—अनुत्पत्तिस्तु धर्माणाः ..	46 (ftn. 1)	द्विज ..	36 (ftn. 3)
—आलस्यविज्ञाने पुनर्निरूप्यमाने	245 (ftn. 2)	—श्रीश्लोकानन्तवासांश्च ..	498 (ftn. 2)
—कथं हि शृण्वते तर्कः ..	244 (ftn. 4)	—क्षीरोदधेरुत्तरतो ..	44 (ftn. 3)
—दृष्टान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तः ..	244 (ftn. 5)	—चतुर्थोपनिषदो धर्मः ..	20 (ftn. 2)
—निर्वापारं क्षणिकं ..	246 (ftn. 1)	—तत्रोपनिषदं तात्त्व ..	38 (ftn. 6)
—नैयायिकाः कथं ब्रूहि ..	244 (ftn. 3)	—तस्मिन् यज्ञे प्रवृत्ते तु ..	39 (ftn. 4)
—बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां	46 (ftn. 1),	—तुल्यं शौचं तपोयुक्तं ..	6 (ftn. 4)
	120 (ftn. 2)	—न्यायतत्त्वात्मविज्ञान ..	39 (ftn. 2)
—सांख्या वैशेषिका नद्या ..	244 (ftn. 2)	—न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि	39 (ftn. 3), 42
Last words of Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyā-			(ftn. 10)
vāgīśā—		—न्यायशिक्षा चिकित्सा ..	39 (ftn. 1)
—अधिगगनमनेका ..	485 (ftn. 1)	—वेदोपनिषदां वेत्ता यथावत् कृतनिश्चयः	
Līlāvati-prakāśa—			43 (ftn. 3)
—न्यायाम्बोजपतङ्गाय ..	454 (ftn. 2)		

	Page
—सालिनीमभितो राजन्	43 (ftn. 1)
—मेधातिथिर्महाप्राज्ञो ..	18 (ftn. 4)
—ज्ञातकानामिदं शास्त्रं ..	37 (ftn. 1)
Mahāvagga—	
—अङ्गरक्षस्य कार्य ..	19 (ftn. 2)
Mahāvīracarita—	
—इन्द्रभूतिप्रभृतीनां ..	160 (ftn. 1)
Mandhara-Stuti—	
—रक्षिया काशीमठे ..	217 (ftn. 3)
Manimayūkha—	
—सर्वभौमस्य गुरोः पदाब्जं	469 (ftn. 3)
Manu Samhitā—	
—आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च ..	38 (ftn. 1)
—त्रैविद्येभ्यस्त्रयीं विद्यादु 4 (ftn. 3),	38 (ftn. 2)
—त्रैविद्यो ह्येतुक्तर्को 22 (ftn. 4), 38	(ftn. 3)
—प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च ..	23 (ftn. 3)
—योऽवमन्येत ते मूलं ..	36 (ftn. 1)
—क्षिभवद्विन्ध्ययोर्मध्य ..	304 (ftn. 1)
Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa—	
—शृणु तात यथा योगो ..	10 (ftn. 5)
Matsyapurāṇa—	
—अनन्तरं च वत्सेभ्यो ..	38 (ftn. 8)
Mundakopaniṣad—	
—भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः ..	6 (ftn. 3)
Naiṣadha-carita—	
—सुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय 17 (ftn. 4), 37	(ftn. 4)
—सातु प्रयच्छति न पञ्चतुष्टये तां 153	(ftn. 2)
Naiṣadha-carita—Nārāyaṇa's com- mentary on—	
—मतानां सांख्यादिषड्दर्शनानां 153 (ftn. 2)	
Nañ-vāda-vyākhyā—	
—शिवं प्रणम्य तत्पश्चात् ..	481 (ftn. 1)
Nārada-smṛti-pariśiṣṭa—	
—तद्गुहादशसुवर्णसु ..	45 (ftn. 2)

	Page
Navadvīpa-mahimā—	
—शाके त्रियुग्मविशिखक्षणाधिनाथे	466 (ftn. 1)
Nitisāra of Kamandaka—	
—आन्वीक्षिक्यात्म विज्ञानम्	4 (ftn. 3)
Nyāyabhāṣya—	
—अवयवविपर्ययसवचनं ..	115 (ftn. 3)
—इमास्तु चतस्रो विद्या ..	5 (ftn. 3)
—उपनयनचान्तरेण न वैधर्ममात्रस्य	
वेति ..	119 (ftn. 1)
—तत्रेत्तन्मन्त्रस्य ..	278 (ftn. 4)
—तत्र नानुपलब्धेन ..	40 (ftn. 4)
—त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य	53 (ftn. 1)
—दशदाडिमानि षड्पूपाः	117 (ftn. 1)
—पटममप्रतिसिद्धम् ..	24 (ftn. 3)
—प्रमाणैरर्थपरीक्षणं न्यायं	41 (ftn. 1)
—यत् पुरुषधर्मो ज्ञानम् ..	6 (ftn. 6)
—योऽक्षपादमृषिं न्यायः ..	47 (ftn. 2)
—बुद्ध्या विवेचनात् भवानां	120 (ftn. 1)
—सर्वेषामेकार्थं समवाये ..	42 (ftn. 8)
—सेयमान्वीक्षिकी 40 (ftn. 1), 116 (ftn. 5)	
Nyāya-dīpikā—	
—न याति न च तत्रास्ते ..	273 (ftn. 7)
Nyāya-kandali—	
—श्रीमद्भिनप्रभविभोरधिगत्य	213 (ftn. 3)
Nyāya-karṇikā—	
—इत्थं नयार्थकवचकुसुमेर्जिनेन्दु	216 (ftn. 2)
—सर्वे नया अपि विरोधमन्तो मिथस्ते	216 (ftn. 3)
Nyāya-khaṇḍanakhāḍya—	
—अभाग्यं गौडदेशस्य 218 (ftn. 1),	464 (ftn. 2)
—ऐङ्कारजापरमाप्य कवित्ववित्	219 (ftn. 5)
—जानेहि वृत्तिनियमोद्गदित	220 (ftn. 2)
—यत्त्वेवं सति तत्रये भावभूतसूत्र	220 (ftn. 3)
—सत्येनैव क्षणभङ्गो वक्तव्य	220 (ftn. 1)
Nyāyakusumāñjali-viveka—	
—नमः कर्मण्यधिष्ठात्रे ..	468 (ftn. 3)
Nyāya-līlāvatī—	
—तदिदं चिरन्तन वैशेषिक	386 (ftn. 3)

	Page		Page
—तदियमनाम्नातता भासर्वज्ञस्य	386 (ftn. 2)	Nyāya-siddhānta-maṇjari-bhāṣā—	
—यथाभेय्याकाश संयोगस्य	386 (ftn. 1)	— श्रीमच्छ्रीयुतगौडमण्डलमहोविद्यात	482 (ftn. 6)
Nyālaloka—		Nyāya-sūci-nibandha—	
—कृत्वा न्यायालोकं प्रवचनरागाद्	219	—न्यायसूची निबन्धोऽसौ..	133 (ftn. 3)
	(ftn. 2)	Nyāya Sūtra—	
—प्रणम्य पटमात्मानं ..	219 (ftn. 1)	—इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं	278 (ftn. 4)
—यदुक्तं बौद्धप्रधानेन, चित्रमेव हि		—न प्रदीपप्रकाशवत्सिद्ध	25 (ftn. 7)
संसारो	219 (ftn. 3)	—न सन् नासन् न सदसद्	46 (ftn. 2)
Nyāyamaṇjari—		—न स्वभावसिद्धिः	46 (ftn. 2), 118 (ftn.)
—अक्षपादप्रणीतो हि ..	47 (ftn. 5)	—नियमहेत्वभावादु ..	121 (ftn. 1)
—अत्र कीर्तिराह द्वाविंशति धा	137 (ftn. 1)	—नोत्पत्तिविनाश ..	121 (ftn. 1)
—अथोच्यते अनादिरेवैषा	26 (ftn. 2)	—मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च ..	50 (ftn. 1)
—एतेन रविगुप्तोऽपि ..	322 (ftn. 4)	—मायागन्धर्वनगर ..	46 (ftn. 2)
—एतेषां धर्म कीर्तेऽपि ..	137 (ftn. 3)	—वर्तमानाभावः पततः ..	17 (ftn.)
—नास्यात्मा फलभोगमात्रमय च स्वर्गोय		—बुद्ध्या विवेचनात् ..	46 (ftn. 1)
चेत्यर्चनं	151 (ftn. 1)	—स्फटिकेऽपि अपरोत्यत्ते	46 (ftn. 1),
—पञ्च चैताः कल्पना भवन्ति	129 (ftn. 3)		121 (ftn. 1)
—यथाह नारदः सारस्तु व्यवहाराणां	44	—स्वप्न विषयाभिमानवत्	118 (ftn. 1)
	(ftn. 1)	Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti—	
—यदपि उच्यते-नानिष्पन्नस्य	147 (ftn. 3)	—एषा मुनिवरगीतम सूत्रवृत्तिः	48 (ftn. 3)
—बादेष्प्रज्यो जयन्त इति यः ख्यातः		Nyāya-vārtika—	
सतामग्रणीः ..	147 (ftn. 1)	—अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये ..	288 (ftn. 2)
—षट् पक्ष्यामुभयोरसिद्धिः	84 (ftn. 1)	—अपरे तु मन्यन्ते प्रत्यक्षं कोऽन्यो	
Nyāya-praveśa-pañjikā—		भदन्ताद्वक्तुमर्हति ..	129 (ftn. 1)
—दुर्वारभारधारि कुम्भतदप्रभेद	210 (ftn. 2)	—अहो प्रमाणाभिज्ञता भदन्तस्य	125 (ftn. 2)
Nyāya-saṅkṣepa—		—इति त्रैपरमर्षिभारद्वाज	124 (ftn. 4, 5)
—न्यायवाचस्पतेः सूत्रो ..	480 (ftn. 4)	—उपनयनिगमने ..	119 (ftn. 1)
Nyāyasāra—		—एतेन तयोः सम्बन्धिः ..	128 (ftn. 4)
—अन्ये तु सदैह द्वारेण ..	358 (ftn. 5)	—एष पन्थाः श्रुप्तं गच्छति	124 (ftn. 6)
—एकत्र तुल्यलक्षणविषय	358 (ftn. 4)	—तथा भाटं वो भिन्नवो पुगलौ तिस्तु	
—प्रणम्य शम्भुं जगतः पतिम्बर	155 (ftn. 4), 360 (ftn. 1)	वचनीयं	126 (ftn. 1)
Nyāyasāra-pada-pañjikā—		—तथा सिद्धो दृष्टान्त इत्यन्ये	128 (ftn. 3)
—देवदेवमभिवन्द्य भास्वरं	371 (ftn. 2)	—तदिदमन्तिमं प्रत्यक्षम् ..	511 (ftn. 2)
Nyāyasāra-vicāra—		—तदेतस्मिन्नवयवत्रये एवं	128 (ftn. 1)
—शके चतुःसप्तति संख्यके शतैः	372 (ftn. 1)	—तस्मात् स्मृत्यनुगृहीतो हिर	511 (ftn. 1)
Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa—		—न चात्मानमनभ्युपगच्छता	125 (ftn. 3)
—इति महोपाध्याय ..	396 (ftn. 1)	—यदक्षपाद प्रतिमाः	115 (ftn. 1), 123
—ध्वसितनरसिद्धान्तध्वानं	393 (ftn. 2)		(ftn. 1)

	Page
—यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनां 47 (ftn. 3), 125 (ftn. 1), 273 (ftn. 3)	
—यदपि वादविधौ .. 124 (ftn. 1)	
—लिङ्गलिङ्गीसम्बन्ध .. 510 (ftn. 2)	
—सृत्यनुगृह्णीती लिङ्ग परामर्शानुमानम् 130 (ftn. 1)	
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā—	
—अत्र सुबन्धना प्रतिज्ञादयः 128 (ftn. 2)	
—अथ भगवता अक्षपादेन 47 (ftn. 4), 115 (ftn. 2)	
—अस्माभिः	
—आप्तवाक्याविसंवादः .. 288 (ftn. 1)	
—आहुः असाधनाङ्गवचनम् 136 (ftn. 2)	
—तस्माद् यदुक्तं कौर्तिना 137 (ftn. 2)	
—त्रिलोचन गुरुनीतमार्गानु 134 (ftn. 2), 137 (ftn. 5)	
—न सुखादिप्रमेयं वा .. 280 (ftn. 1)	
—नित्यानित्यप्रयत्नोत्तममध्यम 285 (ftn. 1)	
—प्रमेयकृतकानित्यकृत .. 285 (ftn. 1)	
—यथाहुः निरुक्तकाराः । निर्विकल्पक- बोधेन .. 138 (ftn. 1)	
—यद्यपि भाष्यकृतकृतव्युत्पादनम् 133 (ftn. 1)	
—व्यवसायात्मकं पदं साक्षात् 137 (ftn. 4)	
—संप्रति दिग्गगस्य लक्षणम् 129 (ftn. 2)	
—साध्येनानुमानात् कार्यं .. 136 (ftn. 1)	
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā-pari- śuddhi—	
—मातः सरस्वति पुनः पुनरेष नत्वा 141 (ftn. 1)	
Nyāyāvatāra—	
—अन्त व्याप्तैव साध्यस्य .. 268 (ftn. 2)	
—आप्तोपज्ञमनुङ्गल्यम् .. 175 (ftn. 1)	
—साध्याभ्युपगमः पक्षः .. 507 (ftn. 1)	
—खनिस्वयवदन्येषां .. 286 (ftn. 2)	
Nyāyāvatāra-ṭippaṇa—	
—ननु चार्थक्रिया सामान्यमेव 211 (ftn. 3)	
Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti—	
—अवयवापेक्षया जघन्यमध्यमोक्तृष्टा 166 (ftn. 1)	
—प्रमाणेत्यादि अनेन च .. 206 (ftn. 6)	

	Page
Nyāya-vindu—	
—उत्तमभेदेन पुनर्विशेषेण 318 (ftn. 1)	
—तत्र च तृतीयोऽपि .. 316 (ftn. 1)	
—त्रिरूप हेतुस्तः । तावतेव 317 (ftn. 2)	
—त्रौण्येव च लिङ्गानि .. 508 (ftn. 3)	
—त्रैलोक्यं पुनर्लिङ्गस्य .. 202 (ftn. 1)	
—विरुद्धाभिचारी अपि .. 358 (ftn. 3)	
—स्वयमिति वादिना .. 124 (ftn. 2)	
Nyāya-vindu-ṭikā—	
—अयं च विरुद्ध आचार्य 316 (ftn. 1)	
—जयन्ति जाति व्यसनप्रबन्ध 330 (ftn. 1)	
—विरुद्धाद्यभिचर्यपि .. 316 (ftn. 3)	
Padārtha-candra—	
—श्रीचन्द्रसिंह वृषतेर्दयिता 460 (ftn. 1)	
Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa—	
—इति श्रीरामभद्र सार्वभौम 469 (ftn. 2)	
Padārtha-viveka ṭikā—	
—अभेदभावनोद्रेकाद् .. 486 (ftn. 1)	
—राक्षः श्रीजयसिंहस्य .. 486 (ftn. 1)	
Padmapurāṇa—	
—अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् .. 38 (ftn. 7)	
—कणादेन तु संप्रोक्तं 17 (ftn. 1), 48 (ftn. 1)	
Pañcasiddhāntikā—	
—सप्ताश्विवेदसंख्यां शककालम् 174 (ftn. 1)	
Pāṇḍavapurāṇa—	
—अकलङ्कोकलङ्कः स .. 186 (ftn. 1)	
—समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थी .. 182 (ftn. 4)	
Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī—	
—अध्यायन्यायोद्याव संहाराश्च 41 (ftn. 4)	
—कठचरकालुक् .. 25 (ftn. 2)	
—इन्द्रसि पुनर्वसोरेकवचनम् 11 (ftn. 4)	
—क्रतुकथकादि सूत्रान्तर्गते ठक् 41 (ftn. 4)	
Pañjikā on Syādvāda-ratnākara- vatārikā—	
—स्याद्वादरत्नाकर इत्यस्ति 198 (ftn. 4)	
Parāśara Samhitā—	
—अनादिताम्रयो येन्ये .. 22 (ftn. 5)	
Parīkṣāmukhaṁ satīkaṁ—	
—वैजय प्रियपुत्रस्य .. 198 (ftn. 2)	

	Page		Page
Parikṣāmukha Sūtra—		—प्रत्यक्षं कल्याणापोढ ..	277 (ftn. 1)
—परीक्षासुखमादर्शं ..	193 (ftn. 2)	—स्वपक्षे सन्नसन् द्वेधा ..	283 (ftn. 1)
—सह क्रमभाव नियमो ..	189 (ftn. 2)	—सामान्य विशेषापेक्ष ..	279 (ftn. 1)
—साधनात् साध्य विज्ञानम्	189 (ftn. 1)	—स्वरूपेणैव निर्देश्य ..	282 (ftn. 2)
—साध्याविनावाभिलेन ..	193 (ftn. 1)	Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā—	
Parivāra—		—भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैः ..	306 (ftn. 7)
—अङ्गीरसो साक्यमुनि ..	19 (ftn. 2)	Pramāṇa-viniścaya—	
Pārsvanātha-carita—		—नान्यऽनुभायो बुद्ध्यास्ति भेदवानिव	
—तर्कग्रन्थविचारदुर्गमवनी	विजय	लक्ष्यते ..	308 (ftn. 3)
—त्रिसंग्रहं संवधात् ..	197 (ftn. 3)	Prameya-kamala-martanda—	
—पुंसां विग्रहजं विकारमाखिलं गौर्य-		—तथा अर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरं	194
दास्यमश्रियत् ..	196 (ftn. 2)	(ftn. 2)	
—षड्तिर्कीललना विलास	207 (ftn. 1)	—रजोजुषं जन्मनि सत्वदृत्तयं	194 (ftn. 2)
Peterson's Report V—		Prameya-ratnakosa—	
—इति धर्मेत्तर टिप्पनके ..	195 (ftn. 2)	—प्रमेयरत्नकोशोऽयं ..	206 (ftn. 4)
—संवत् १२३१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुदि	195	Prameya-ratnamālā—	
(ftn. 2)		—अकलङ्कवर्चोऽर्थाधः ..	188 (ftn. 6)
Piṅgala prakāśikā—		Prasanna Rāghava—	
—विद्यानिवाससूनोः 392 (ftn. 2), 480		—येषां कोमलकान्तकौशलकला	155 (ftn. 1)
(ftn. 2)		Prasastapāda-Bhāṣya—	
Prabhāvakacar—		—अक्षाणि इन्द्रियाणि ..	279 (ftn. 1)
—चन्द्राष्टशिववर्षेऽत्र ..	199 (ftn. 1)	—पञ्चावयवेन वाक्येन ..	282 (ftn. 1)
—श्ववेदेश्वरे वर्षे ..	206 (ftn. 1)	—सामान्यविशेष द्रव्यगुण ..	279 (ftn. 1)
—शिखिवेदशिखे जन्म दीक्षा त्रीदेव-		Prasasti of Pāṇḍava-carita	
सूरयः ..	200 (ftn. 2)	—शैशवेऽप्यस्तनां तर्कः ..	211 (ftn. 2)
Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā—		Pratimā Nāṭaka—	
—वाचकमुख्य विरचिताभि	186 (ftn. 2), 205 (ftn. 2)	—भोः काश्यपगोत्रोऽस्मि ..	18 (ftn. 2)
Pramāṇa - naya - tattvālokālaṅ-		Pratyakṣāloka—	
kāra—		—शुभमस्तु श्रीरस्तु शकाब्दा	407 (ftn. 3), 456 (ftn. 1)
—अन्तर्यामिना हेतोः ..	202 (ftn. 3)	Rāmāyaṇa—	
—त्रिविधं साधनमभिधायैव	202 (ftn. 2)	—एतिह्यमनुमानश्च ..	23 (ftn. 2)
—मन्दमतींस्तु व्युत्पादयितुं	203 (ftn. 1)	—धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु ..	36 (ftn. 2)
Pramāṇasamuccaya—		—मिथिलोपवने तत्र राजपुत्र मन्त्रायणः	17 (ftn. 6)
—आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थं सन्निकर्षाद्	279 (ftn. 1)	—स नास्ति परमित्येतत् ..	9 (ftn. 3)
—कार्यत्वान्यत्वलीनेन यत् ..	135 (ftn. 4)	Ratnākara-vatārikā-tippaṇa—	
—केचिद् धर्मोन्नतं मेयं धर्मिणं		—तेनान्यापोहविषयाः प्रोक्ताः	198 (ftn. 1), 213 (ftn. 5)
गमयिष्यति ..	281 (ftn. 1)	—रत्नाकरावतारिकावरटिप्पणं तत्	213
—तत्र 'यः सन् सजातीये ..	283 (ftn. 3)	(ftn. 6)	
—प्रत्यक्षमनुमानश्च ..	277 (ftn.)		

	Page		Page
Ratnāvali—		—ननु प्रमाणदि पदार्थ षोडशके	398 (ftn. 2)
—न चाभावोऽपि निर्वाणं	255 (ftn. 1)	—न याति न च तत्रासीद्	274 (ftn.)
Ratnāvatarikā—		—श्रीमन्सायणदुग्धाब्धि ..	397 (ftn. 3)
—तथा च जयन्तः स्वरूपादुद्भवत्	147 (ftn. 5)	—श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनयं ..	398 (ftn. 1)
Rock Edicts on the ruined walls of the ancient part of Simraon—		—समासमाविनाभावा ..	399 (ftn. 1)
—नन्देन्दुबिन्दुविधुसम्मितशकवर्षे	521 (ftn. 2)	Saṭika Utpāda-siddhi-prakarana—	
Śabdāloka—		—द्वादशवर्षशतेषु श्रीविक्रमतो	211 (ftn. 4)
—पितृज्ञानपतेरत्र व्याख्यानं	486 (ftn.)	(A) Saying—	
—सतामस्मिन् गहने प्रबन्धे	485 (ftn. 4)	—शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः ..	455 (ftn. 3)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā—		Siddha - Hema - Śabdānuśāsana-br-	
—इति पुनर्न्यायरहस्ये ..	460 (ftn. 4)	hat-ṭikā—	
Śaddarśana-samuccaya—		—अनुमल्लवादिनं तार्किकाः	195 (ftn. 4)
—अथादौ नैयायिकानां नित्यबुद्धि समा-		Siddha-jayanti-carita-ṭikā—	
श्रयः ..	154 (ftn. 2)	—यत्प्रज्ञाप्रसरतिशायिनि तथा प्राज्ञेय	
—जयन्ताचार्यरचितो ..	147 (ftn. 6)	शैलोज्ज्वाले ..	160 (ftn. 3)
—जैनं सांख्यं जैमिनियं ..	153 (ftn. 1)	Skandapurāṇa—	
—प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोद्गम् ..	209 (ftn. 1)	—गौतमः स्वेन तर्केण	17 (ftn. 2), 48 (ftn. 2), 37 (ftn. 3)
—भासर्वज्ञो न्यायसारतर्क	357 (ftn. 5)	Śloka-vārtika—	
—बौद्धं नैयायिकं सांख्यं ..	152 (ftn. 2)	—तत्तानुमानमेवेदं ..	287 (ftn. 3)
Śaddarśana-samuccaya-vṛtti—		—शब्दानुमानयोरैक्यं त्रैकाल्यविषया-	
—एषां तर्कग्रन्थन्यायसूत्र	151 (ftn. 2, 3)	अथात् ..	288 (ftn.)
Śaddarśana-vṛtti—		Śloka-vārtika-ṭikā—	
—भासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारे	357 (ftn. 4)	—परार्थानुमानन्तु ..	282 (ftn. 1)
Syādvāda-ratnākara—		Śrāddha - prati - kramaṇa - sūtra -	
—यदत्र शक्तिसंसिद्धौ ..	147 (ftn. 6)	vṛtti—	
Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dikprasārikā—		—विख्याततपेत्याख्या जगति वृत्तिमि-	
—व्यापकनित्यमेकश्च ..	333 (ftn. 3)	मामल्लत कृतितुष्टौ ..	214 (ftn. 2)
Sāṃkhya-bhāṣya—		Sragdharā-stotra-ṭikā—	
—एकमेवाद्वितीयं तत्त्वं ..	244 (ftn. 1)	—श्रीमद्विक्रमशैलदेवमहाविहारौय	
Sāṃgatva-prakāśa—			519 (ftn. 3)
—तथा श्लोकवार्तिके विद्यानन्दपरः	188 (ftn. 1)	Sthānāṅga Sūtra—	
Saptapadārthi—		—चण्डिविहे णाए पन्नत्ते ..	163 (ftn. 1)
—नन्वेवं शास्त्रप्रकरणयोः ..	356 (ftn. 1)	—कण्डिविहे विवादे पन्नत्ते ..	163 (ftn. 2)
Sarvadarśanasamgraha—		—दसविहे दोसे पन्नत्ते ..	163 (ftn. 3)
—तदुक्तं ज्ञानत्रिधा यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं		—पमाणे चण्डिविहे पन्नत्ते ..	161 (ftn. 5)
यथा ..	341 (ftn. 3)	Subodhini—	
—तार्किकरक्षायां च धर्मस्य तदतद्रूप		—इति नवद्वीपीय महामहोपाध्याय	480 (ftn. 3)
	374 (ftn. 2)	—गिरिमिव गुरुमिह ..	480 (ftn. 3)

	Page		Page
Sukhabodhikā-ṭikā to Kalpa		Tārikakarakā—	
sūtra—		—अविसंवादि विज्ञानमिति	376 (ftn. 1)
—बलहृदिपुरमि नयरे ..	172 (ftn. 1)	—आलोच्य दुस्तरगभीरतरान् प्रबन्धान्	1), 375 (ftn. 1)
Sūkti-muktāvalī—		—एते सम्बन्धिनः सर्वे ..	373 (ftn. 2)
—कर्तुं त्रिलोचनादन्यः ..	134 (ftn. 5)	—तथा च स्मरन्ति, रागद्वेषविनिर्मुक्ताः	379 (ftn. 2)
Suśruta Saṁhitā—		—त्रौनुदाहरणान्तान् वा ..	377 (ftn. 1)
—असद्वादिप्रयुक्तानां ..	24 (ftn. 4)	—निरुपाधिकसाध्यसम्बन्ध	378 (ftn. 1)
—द्वाविंशद् युक्तयो ..	24 (ftn. 2)	—मोक्षे साक्षादनङ्गत्वाद् ..	375 (ftn. 1)
Sūtrakṛtāṅga—		—यथाहुः तन्मे प्रमाणं शिवः	374 (ftn. 1)
—सस्त्रिस्तुभावं न गिरा गरीय सउर्णै-		—वादे कथावसानस्य ..	379 (ftn. 3)
पञ्चरं जहा ..	162 (ftn. 2)	—विचारविषयो नाना ..	378 (ftn. 2)
Sūtrakṛtāṅga-niryukti—		—व्याप्तिग्रहणसापेक्षं ..	376 (ftn. 2)
—असिधसयं किरियाणं ..	167 (ftn. 1)	—व्याप्ति सम्बन्धो निरुपाधिकः	376 (ftn. 3)
Svetāśvataropaniṣad—		—साधनाव्यापकाः साध्य ..	376 (ftn. 4)
—अज्ञामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां	10 (ftn. 3)	—सौगताश्च तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यां	376 (ftn. 5)
—अष्टिं प्रसूतं कपिलं ..	9 (ftn. 6)		
Syādvādamāñjarī—		Tattvacintāmaṇi	
—श्रीमल्लिषेण स्मरिभिरकारि	212 (ftn. 4)	—गुणातीतोऽप्यौशन्तिगुणमचिव श्रोतव-	
Syādvāda-ratnākara-vatārikā—		चिन्तामणिम् ..	407 (ftn. 4)
—अत्र धर्मेत्तरानुसारी प्राह	329 (ftn. 4)	—सन्धिग्रहसाध्यधर्मत्वम् ..	507 (ftn. 1)
—अर्च्यं चर्चचतुरः पुनराह	331 (ftn. 7)		
—पक्षादिशुद्धयश्च पञ्चग्राह्याः	166 (ftn. 1)	Tattvacintāmaṇi-darpanam--	
—प्रमाणे च प्रमेये च ..	211 (ftn. 5)	—अधीत्य निखिलं शास्त्रम्	485 (ftn. 2)
		—अधीत्य रुचिदत्तेन ..	457 (ftn. 1)
Taittiriya Āraṇyaka—		—इति श्रीसौंदर्यपुरकुलसमुद्भूत	457 (ftn. 3)
—स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यम् ..	23 (ftn. 1)	—तत्र कण्ठरमाणिक् ग्राम	485 (ftn. 3)
Tarkabhāṣā—		—श्रीदेवदत्ततनयो ..	457 (ftn. 2)
—एन्द्रवृन्दनं नत्वा ..	218 (ftn. 4)		
—पूर्वं न्यायविशारदत्वं विरुद्धं	217 (ftn. 4)	Tattvacintāmaṇi-rahasya--	
Tarkabhāṣā-prakāśa—		—न्यायाम्बुधिहतासेतुं ..	467 (ftn. 3)
—विजय श्रोतनुजन्मा तन्यन्ते पद्मनाभेन	381 (ftn. 1)		
Tarkakaumudī—		Tattvacintāmaṇi-ṭikā--	
—यथा सा मणिकर्णिका ..	395 (ftn. 1)	—जयदेव गुरोर्वाचि ..	456 (ftn. 4)
Tarkāmṛta—			
—श्रीविष्णोश्चरणाम्बुजं ..	394 (ftn. 1)	Tattvacintāmanyūloka—	
Tarkasaṁgraha—		—अधीत्य जयदेवेन ..	455 (ftn. 2)
—तपोमास्यसिते कृष्णे ..	388 (ftn. 3)		
—निधाय हृदि विश्लेशं ..	388 (ftn. 4)	Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra—	
—प्रकृती शोभयात्मादि क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः	234 (ftn. 3)	—अनुमानोपमानागमार्थापत्ति	169 (ftn. 2)
		—चतुर्विधमित्येके ..	170 (ftn.)

	Page		Page
—नैगमसमग्रह व्यवहारर्जु सूत्रशब्दा	170	Uttarādhyāyana brhadvṛtti—	
(ftn. 2)		—यस्याभूद्भूरागमे गुणनिधिः	197 (ftn. 4)
—न्यग्रोधिका प्रसूतेन विहरता स्पष्टसु-		Vaiśeṣika Sūtra—	
मास्वातिना शास्त्रम् ..	168 (ftn. 3)	—आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थं सन्निकर्षात्	279 (ftn. 1)
—यथार्थाभिधानं शब्द ..	171 (ftn. 1)	Vaiśeṣika Sūtropaskāra—	
--यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमाना .. प्रवचनैः	170 (ftn.)	—याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे ..	458 (ftn. 4)
Īattvārtha tika—		Vākyapadīya—	
—तत् पादरजोऽवयवः ..	182 (ftn. 2)	—न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके	187 (ftn. 3)
Triloka Sāra -		Vāsaṇa datta—	
—पण्डितस्य वस पणमास ..	159 (ftn. 1)	—न्यायस्थितिमिवोद्योतकर	123 (ftn. 2)
Tri-śūtrī (nibandha-vyākhyā)		Vedānta Sūtra—	
—प्रकाशदर्पणोद्योत ..	458 (ftn. 2)	—अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा	37 (ftn. 2)
Udanātā		Vicāra sāra prakaraṇa—	
—याव मन्मः सम्बद्धा लोके	229 (ftn. 2)	—पञ्च व च वरिमस्य ..	173 (ftn. 2)
Upadeśa mālā tika—		Viṣṇu purāṇa -	
—शिष्यः श्रीमुनिचन्द्र स्वरिगुरुभि वृत्ति-		—तस्मात्सौकिषु ते मृद ..	44 (ftn. 2)
विशेषार्थिनाम् ..	199 (ftn. 2)	—वाणैर्वेद्युतैः सशम्भुनयनैः	456 (ftn. 3)
Upadeśa mālā vaiśeṣa Vṛtti -		Vṛhatsvayambhū purāṇa—	
—व्याख्यातचूडामणि मिद्वज्जः	206 (ftn. 4)	—वाराणस्यां नगर्यां च ..	519 (ftn. 4)
Upadeśa mālā vṛtti—		Yajñavalka Saṁhitā--	
--यौरेवप्रभ स्वरिभिः शुभलते	212 (ftn. 1)	—अयन्तु परमो धर्मे ..	8 (ftn. 2)
Upāsakādhyāyana -		—चत्वारो वेद धर्मशाः ..	22 (ftn. 6)
—यनाज्ञानतमो विनाश्य निखिलं		—पुराणन्यायसीमांसा ..	38 (ftn. 5)
भयात्कचेतोगतं ..	183 (ftn. 2)		

INDEX OF SANSKRIT TERMS.

	Page		Page
Akevala jñāna (defective knowledge)	161 (ftn. 5*)	Adhikaraṇa siddhānta (conclusion accepted hypothetically) ..	259
Akṛtabhyāgama (gain of unmerited action) ..	99, 101	Adhicca-samuppannika (fortuitous originists)	229
Akṣapāda darśana (the philosophy of Akṣapāda) ..	48	Adhyātma vidyā (spiritual science)	4
Akhyāti (non-manifestation) ..	134	Adhvaryu (priest)	14
Agni (fire god)	19	Anadhyavasāya (uncertainty) ..	201
Ankābhidhāna (distinctionary of numbers) ..	16 (ftn. 1)	Anadhyavasita or Anupasaṃhāra (non-tried)	366
Ajīva (soul-less)	168	Ananubhāsaṇa (silence) 84, 261, 269	
Aja-bhāga (the unborn part) ..	2	Ananvaya (unconnected) 179, 297, 314	
Ajñāna (ignorance)	84, 269	Ananuyojya (non-censurable) ..	33
Anuloma saṃbhāṣā (congenial debate)	29	Anāgatāvekṣaṇa (anticipation) ..	25
Anulomaitta (propitiating the authority)	163	Anāpanna (not guilty)	231
Anuvāda (re-inculcation) ..	108 ²	Anārṣa (non-saintly)	359
Atikrāntāvekṣaṇa (retrospection)	25	Anitya (non-eternal)	284 285 ⁺
Aticchandas (a kind of metre) ..	15	Antya-sama (balancing the non-eternal)	67
Ativyāpti (being too wide) ..	403	Anindriya-nibandhana (not through sense-organs)	201
Atīta kāla (mistimed)	35	Anirvacanīya-khyāti (manifestation of the undefinable) ..	139
Atīta vākya (irrelevant talk) ..	264	Aniścita (uncertain)	293
Atideśa (extended application) ..	25	Anugata dharma (common property)	4032
Attā (soul)	127 (ftn.)	Anugama (generalisation) 403 429	
Atyantābhāva (absolute negation)	97 (ftn. 1), 189, 203, 394	Anutpatti-sama (balancing the non-produced)	67, 268 289,
Adṛṣṭa (desert) 143 ² , 143 (ftn. 1) ² , 144		Anupalambha (voidness of the world)	146
Adoṣodbhāvana (allegation of an unmerited action)	136	Anupalabdhi (imperceptible) 190, 203, 258, 281, 311, 332, 453, 509	
Adrikalpa (like a rock)	273	Anupalabdhi-sama (balancing the non-perception)	67
Adharma (demerit)	371, 389	Anupalabdhi-hetu (relation of negation)	318
Adhika (saying too much) 84, 261, 269		Anupalabhya pramānya-vāda (invalidity of non-perception) ..	414
Adhikaraṇa (subject)	25	Anupasaṃhārī (non-exclusiveness)	438
Adhikaraṇa (hypothetical dogma)	59	Anubhava (experience) 389 ³ , 395	
Adhikaraṇa (cases for settlement)	229 ²		
Adhikaraṇa (locus)	415		
Adhikaraṇa - samatha - dhamma (rules for the settlement of cases)	230 ²		

	Page		Page
Anubhūti (apprehension) ..	393	Anyathākhyāti (averse manifesta-	
Anumata (assent) ..	25	tion) ..	139, 140
Anumāna (inference) 23 ² , 27 ² , 28,		Anyathākhyāti (invalid know-	
32, 33, 50, 54, 130, 162 ² , 169, 175 ² ,		ledge) ..	40, 41
189, 192, 201, 209 (ftn. 1), 215, 219,		Anyathāsiddhi (conditionality) 39,	
221, 229, 310, 259, 264, 265, 266,		(ftn. 1), 40 ²	
259, 277, 280, 298, 348, 353, 359,		Anyamata parikṣa (examination	
360, 361 ² , 376 ² , 383, 387 ² , 389, 390,		of contemporaneous philosophi-	
393 ² , 394 ² , 395, 398, 407	440	cal doctrines) ..	49, 51, 497
Anumāna khaṇḍa (chapter on in-		Anyāpoha (mutual non-existence) 184	
ference) ..	419	Anyendriyātītārtha - darśana - pu-	
Anumāna parikṣā (examination of		ruṣa-parikṣā (examination of	
inference) ..	327	the soul which sees things - i.e., out	
Anumānā bhāsa (semblance of		the range of senses) ..	327
inference) ..	298	Anyonyābhāva or Anyapoh	
Anumiti (inferential knowledge)		(mutual non-existence) 184, 184	
384, 389 ² , 397, 419, 435, 510		Anvaya (affirmation) ..	361
Anumiti nirūpaṇa (determination		Anvaya-vyatirekī (affirmative-neg-	
of inferential knowledge) ..	419	ative) ..	130, 36
Anumeya (inferred) ..	282	Anvaya-vyatirekī anumāna (affir-	
Anuyoga (interrogation) 33, 234		ative-negative inference) ..	419
Anuyogī (a thing in a particular re-		Anvaya-vyapti (affirmative insepa-	
lation to another) ..	403 ²	arable connection) ..	130
Anuyogitā (quality of being in a		Anvayī udaharaṇa (homogeneous	
particular relation) ..	403	example) ..	257
Anuyoja (censurable) ..	33	Anvayī (exclusively affirmati-)	
Anuloma (regular form) ..	235	130, 191, 362, 437	
Anubandha (adjunct) ..	27	Anvita-śakti-vādinata (opinion of	
Anuvādādhikaraṇa (a case in which		those who hold the power of con-	
one party accuses another party		nected words) ..	397
of the violation of a rule of good		Anvitatthidhāna-vāda (expression	
conduct) ..	229	of the connected) ..	447
Anuvijjaka (judge or umpire) ..	231 ²	Ap (water) ..	393
Anuvyavasāya (self-consciousness)		Apakaraṇa-sama (balancing the ac-	
418, 445, 471, 472, 473		ficit) ..	67, 26
Anuvyavasāya vāda (doctrine of		Apadeśa (specification) ..	25
self-consciousness) ..	418	Apara ātmā (individual soul) ..	371
Anuṣṭubh (a kind of metre) ..	275	Apavarga (exception) 25, 375, 382	
Anekānta (uncertain) ..	25	Apavarga nirūpaṇa (nature of	
Anaikānta (erratic) ..	438	emancipation) ..	367
Anaikāntika (uncertain) 173, 313, 365		Apasiddhānta (deviating from the	
Antarvyāpti (intrinsic inseparable		tenet) ..	84, 269
connection) 177, 178, 202, 268 (ftn. 2)		Apārthaka (incoherent) 84, 117,	
Andhakāra-vipratipatti (contro-		150, 269, 261	
versy on darkness) ..	397	Apūrva vādaḥ (doctrine of merit	
		and demerit) ..	447

	Page		Page
Apekṣā (inter-relation)	117, 118 (ftn. 3)	Arthāntara (shifting the topic)	35.
Apoḥa (negation of the opposite)			84, 269
132 ² , 143 ² , 146, 149, 276, 287, 339 ² , 345		Arthāpatti (presumption)	25, 33,
Apratipatti (not understanding an			56, 95, 370, 387, 435 ² , 453
argument)	136	Arthāpatti sama (balancing the	
Apratibhā (non-ingenuity)	84, 261, 269	presumption) ..	67, 269, 289
Apratibhāna (non-ingenuity) ..	137	Arhat (one freed from all faults or	
Apradarśita vyatireka (fallacy of		obstructions)	201
separation/unshown) ..	180	Alaukika pratyakṣa (transcenden-	
Apradarśitānvaya (fallacy of con-		tal perception)	412
nection unshown) ..	179, 315	Avagraha (distinguishing)	201, 201
Apramā (error) 138, 389, 395 ² , 409 ² , 410			(ftn. 1)
Aprayojaka (inadmissible) 399 (ftn. 1) ²		Avacchinna (determined) ..	404
Aprāpta kāla (inopportune) 65, 84,		Avacchedaka (that which deter-	
261, 269		mines)	404
Aprāpti sama (balancing the mu-		Avadhi (knowledge of things be-	
tual absence) 67, 261, 268, 288		yond the range of perception)	
Abādhiṭa viśayatvam (object of			161 (ftn. 5), 169 (ftn. 1)
the sign not being incompatible) 378		Avadhi jñāna (limited knowledge)	201
Abhāva (non-existence) 56, 95, 97,		Avayava (member of the syllogism)	
97 (ftn. 1), 170, 184 ² , 203, 219,		49, 51, 52, 60, 105, 203, 350, 359 ² ,	
370, 386, 389 ² , 393 ² , 394 ³ , 395,		377 ² , 258 ² , 333, 497, 502 ² , 374,	
397, 402, 415		375, 381, 436 ² , 487 (ftn. 1)	
Abhāva vāda (doctrine of non-exis-		Avayavin (whole) ..	105, 333
tence)	415	Avārya sama (balancing the un-	
Abhinibodha or Mati (knowledge		questionable) 67, 261, 268, 289	
of existing things acquired		Avasarpaṇī kāla (period of involu-	
through the senses and the mind)		tion)	158
	161 (ftn. 5)	Avāya (arriving at) ..	201
Abhihitānvaya vāda (connection		Avijñātārtha (the unintelligible)	
of the expressed)	147		84, 261, 269
Abhyanuṣṭhā (admission) ..	35	Avidyā (ignorance) ..	371, 387 ²
Abhyupagama (implied dogma) ..	59	Avinābhāva (pervasion) 189, 361,	
Abhyupagama siddhānta (con-			376 ² , 400, 509
clusion assumed)	259	Aviśeṣa sama (balancing the non-	
Abhrānta (devoid of error) ..	310	difference) ..	67, 268
Amūḍha-vinaya (settlement for the		Avyatireki (unseparated) ..	180
insane)	230	Avyaya (indeclinable) 110 (ftn. 1)	
Ayukta (erroneous)	359	Avyayī-bhāva (indeclinable com-	
Ayogi-pratyakṣa (ordinary percep-		pound)	452
tion)	360	Avyāpti (non-pervasive) ..	369
Artha (object) ..	373, 375, 382	Avyāpti (being too narrow) ..	404
Artha vāda (description) ..	108 ²	Avyāptyabhidhāna (non-pervasive	
Arthasya smaraṇam (recollection		example)	369
of a thing)	444		

	Page		Page
Asakkaitiā (taking some time in making oneself ready) ..	163	Ātman (soul) ..	2, 3, 278
Asiddha (unproved) ..	362	Ātma-khyāti (manifestation of the soul) ..	138
Asti (it is existence) ..	184	Ātma-vidyā (the science of soul) ..	48
Aśvinikumāras (the twin gods) ..	14	Ātma sambandhā (concerning one's self) ..	264
Asat (absent) ..	284 ⁶	Ātmā (soul) 4, 5, 146, 204, 120 ² , 127 (ftn.) ² , 219 ² , 371 ² , 375 ² , 382, 386, 393 ³ , 394	
Asat khyāti (manifestation of the unreal) ..	139	Ādityas (a group of gods) ..	15
Asataḥ sajjāyate (effect springs up from nothing) ..	140	Ādeśa (substitution) ..	111
Asat pratipakṣatvam (there being no counterbalancing sign) ..	378	Ādheya śakti (power of the content) ..	397
Asamavāyi kāraṇa (non-material cause) ..	383, 390	Ānvikṣikī (the science of logic) 1, 4 ² , 38, 39, 40 ² , 152	
Asādhanaṅga vacana (improper reason) ..	136	Ānvikṣikī vidyā (the science of logic) ..	49, 50 ²
Asādhāraṇa (not general) ..	294, 438	Āpattādhikarana (case in which a monk has actually transgressed an established rule of good conduct) ..	229
Asiddha (unproved) 178, 293, 313, 438, 439 ²		Āpanno (guilty) ..	231
Asiddhi (absence of proof) ..	438	Āpta vākya (reliable assertion) ..	450
Asu (breath, life) ..	2	Āptopadeśa (reliable assertion) 27, 28, 51	
Ahaṁ (ego) ..	245	Ābhāsa (fallacy) ..	188, 192, 203
Ahaṁkāra (ego) ..	245 (ftn. 2) ²	Ārya (reliable person) ..	56
Ahetu (fallacy) ..	34, 51 ²	Āryas (the civilised) ..	107
Ahetu sama (balancing the non-reason) ..	67, 261, 268	Ārṣa (saintly) ..	359
Ākāṅkṣā (expectancy) ..	447	Ālambana (objects of thought) ..	322
Ākāṅkṣā vādaḥ (expectancy) ..	447	Ālaya (ego) ..	245 (ftn. 2) ²
Ākāśa (ether) ..	105, 219, 265	Ālaya vijñāna (the abiding cognition, or ego) 146, 245, 245 (ftn. 1)	
Ākṣepa (refutation) ..	43	Āśaṅkā (questioning the validity of the instance) ..	167
Ākhyāta (verbal suffix) ..	447, 453	Āśaṅkā pratiśodha (meeting the question) ..	167
Ākhyātavāda (doctrine of verbal suffix) ..	453	Āśraya-hīna (supportless) ..	369 ²
Āgama (verbal testimony) 162, 170, 189, 192 ² , 201, 203, 215, 219, 221, 259, 266, 264, 265, 358, 359, 360, 370 ² , 370 (ftn. 1)		Āśrayāsiddha (unproved in respect of the abode) ..	363, 439
Āgamākhyā pramāṇa nirṇaya (determination of the nature of valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony) ..	200	Āśrayaika deśāsiddha (unproved in respect of a part of the abode) ..	363
Āgamābhāsa (fallacy of verbal testimony) ..	193	Āsattiḥ (contiguity) ..	447 ²
Ācāra (practice) ..	249	Āśrava (action) ..	168
Ācārya (head of the church) ..	223	Āsana (seat) ..	233

	Page		Page
Āharana (complete example) 163,	221, 234	Udāharanābhāsa (fallacious exam- ple)	368
Āharana-taddeśa (limited example) 163 ²		Uddeśa (enunciation) ..	25, 53
Āhnikā (diurnal portion) ..	46	Uddhāra (citation) ..	25
Itaretara (mutually aggregative compound)	452	Upadeśa (instruction) ..	25
Itaretarābhāva (mutual non-exist- ence)	203	Upanaya (application) 27, 32, 60, 119 ² , 119 (ftn. 1), 120, 122, 176, 191, 202, 203, 234, 236, 266, 370, 437 ² , 437 (ftn. 1), 501, 502, 510	
Indra (lord of gods)	142	Upānyāsopanaya (anecdote used as an example)	163
Indriya (senses)	11, 375, 382	Upapatti sama (balancing the de- monstration)	67, 268
Indriya nibandhana (through sense-organs)	201	Upamāna (comparison) 25, 50, 51, 54, 125, 162, 170, 221, 259, 265, 266, 268, 287, 359, 384 ² , 387 ² , 389, 393 ² , 394 ² , 407, 443, 450	
Indriya parīkṣā (examination of the sense-organs)	326	Upamāna-khaṇḍa (section of com- parison)	443
Iṣṭa-vighāta-kṛt viruddha (implied contradiction)	315	Upamiti (comparative knowledge) 389 ² , 443	
Īśvara (God)	122, 143, 155	Upaniṣad kalpita ātma parīkṣā (ex- amination of the Upaniṣad- doctrine of the soul) ..	326
Īśvara parīkṣā (examination of God)	325 (ftn.)	Upalabdhi (perception) ..	190
Īśvara bhāṅga (non-existence of God)	150	Upalabdhi sama (balancing the perception)	67, 289
Īśvarānumānam (inference of God)	442	Upasarga (prefix)	453
Ihā (inquiring)	201	Upasarga vāda (doctrine of pre- fixes)	453
Ukthādi-gana (a group of words beginning with Uktha) 41, 41 (ftn. 5)		Upādhi (condition) 140 ² , 376, 376 (ftn. 4), 378, 384, 399 ² , 399 (ftn. 1), 400, 428, 431	
Ucchanna-pracchannavāda (doc- trine of the sound as destroyed or concealed)	448	Upādhi mana' (conditional) 399 (ftn. 1)	
Uccheda-vāda (annihilationism) ..	228	Upādhi vāda (doctrine of the con- ditional middle term) ..	431
Uttukkhāna (naming the season) ..	233	Upāya (favourable condition) ..	27
Utkār-ā sama (balancing the express)	67, 261	Upālabha (attribution of cen- sure)	35
Uttara (rejoinder)	27, 32, 51	Upāsaka (devotee) 304, 334, 335, 339	
Uttara (posterior)	190, 191 ²	Upāsana (prayer)	2 ²
Uttara-pakṣa (reply)	25	Uposatha (Buddhist sabbath) 232 ² , 233 ²	
Uttara-vahinī (flowing towards the north)	519 (ftn. 6)	Ubhaya parīkṣā (examination of both)	326
Utpatti (origination)	219	Ubhaya vikala (defective in both) 369	
Utsarpanī kālā (period of evolution) 158			
Udaka (water)	233		
Udāharana (example) 60, 119, 121, 191, 221, 259, 264 ² , 266, 268, 359, 368, 437 ² , 502 ² , 504 ²			

	Page		Page
Ussakkaittha (gaining enthusiasm)	163	Karma (merits and demerits)	127, 204, 245
Urdhvatā (heterogenous)	.. 192	Karmadharaya (descriptive compound)	.. 452
Ūha (argumentation)	.. 189	Karma-phala sambandha-parīkṣā (examination of the relation between karma and its effect)	.. 326
Ūhya (ellipsis)	.. 25	Karma śabdārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word karma)	.. 326
Rju-sūtra (straight method of description)	161 (ftn. 1), 170, 171, 181, 216	Kalpanā (reflection)	125, 129 (ftn. 3), 321
Rju-sūtrābhāsa (fallacy of the straight)	.. 203	Kavi (poet)	.. 185
Rṣi-rna (debt to sages)	102 (ftn. 1)	Kāraka (case)	.. 447
Rṣi (sage)	.. 56, 107	Kāya-viññāṇa (tactual perception)	227
Ekacca-sassatika - ekacca-asassatikā (eternalist-non-eternalists)	228	Kāraṇa (cause)	189, 190, 191, 332, 390, 511
Ekānta (certain)	.. 25	Kāraṇata-vicāra (examination of causality)	.. 397
Evambhūta (such-like)	161 (ftn. 4), 171 ² , 181, 216	Kāraṇa-doṣa (defect of arguing)	.. 163
Evambhūtābhāsa (fallacy of the such-like)	.. 204	Kāraṇa - viruddha - kāryopalabdhī (perception of effect contrary to its cause)	.. 312
Aitihya (tradition)	232, 32, 33, 51, 56, 95, 370, 387, 453	Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhī (perception contrary to the cause)	.. 312
Opamma-samsandana (a case presented through analogy)	.. 238	Kāraṇānupalabdhī (non-perception of the cause)	.. 312
Om namaḥ Śivāya (hail, obeisance to Śiva)	.. 155	Kārya (action)	.. 27
Ovāda (arrangement)	.. 233	Kārya (causality)	.. 134
Aupameya (comparison)	27, 32, 33, 51	Kārya (effect)	189, 190 ² , 191 ² , 140, 258, 280, 311, 332, 382, 390, 508
Aupanīṣadakaḥpitātma-parīkṣā (examination of the soul according to the upanīṣads)	.. 325 (ftn.)	Kārya-kāraṇa (causal relation)	.. 140
Aupādhika (conditional)	.. 384	Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva (causality)	.. 400
Auśadha (medicine)	.. 34	Kārya-phala (effect)	.. 27
Kathā (discourse)	51, 62, 235, 370, 378 ²	Kārya-yoni (material cause)	.. 27
Kapila-kalpitātma-parīkṣā (examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul)	.. 325 (ftn.), 326	Kārya-viruddhopalabdhī (perception contrary to the effect)	.. 311
Kāraṇa (instrument)	27 ² , 382 ² , 390, 445	Kārya sama (balancing the effect)	67, 135 ² , 135 (ftn. 4), 268, 289
Karma (work)	.. 3	Kārya-hetu (relation of effect)	.. 318
Karma (rituals)	.. 2 ²	Kāryānupalabdhī (non-perception of effect)	.. 311
Karma (action)	27, 32, 279, 287, 326 ² , 375, 382, 387 ² , 388, 389, 393 ² , 394 ² , 395	Kāryābhiniṣṭvṛtti (the aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action)	.. 26, 27 ²
		Kāla (time)	27, 106, 219, 393 ²

	Page		Page
Kalatrāya-parīkṣā (examination of the three times)	327	Kṣiti (earth)	393 ²
Kālātita (mistimed) 63, 115 (ftn. 3), 367 (ftn. 1)		Khaṇika-kathā (doctrine of impermanence)	239
Kālātyayopaḍiṣṭa or -bādhita (mistimed or incompatible) ..	367	Khyāti-vijñāna (potential knowledge)	245
Kiccādhikaraṇa (case relating to the formal procedure of an ecclesiastical act)	230, 232	Gaṇa-dhara (leader of the assembly)	160
Kutārkika (quibbler)	273	Gavaya (bos gavaeus)	384
Kumāra-pañha (<i>Pāli</i>) (novice's question)	16 (ftn. 1)	Guṇa (quality) 27, 31, 129 (ftn. 3 ²), 279, 287, 375, 382, 386 ² , 387 ² , 388, 389, 393 ² , 394 ² , 395	
Kurvad-rūpatva (causing activity) ..	404	Guṇa-guṇi-bheda-bhaṅga (a substance is not distinct from its qualities)	145
Kṛta (produced)	283	Guṇa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'Guṇa')	326
Kṛtaka (product)	284	Guru (preceptor)	216
Kṛta-hāni (loss of merited action)	99, 101	Guru-dakṣiṇā (preceptor's fee) ..	458
Kṛttikā (constellation)	14	Gautami-vidyā (Gotamide science) ..	20
Kecit (some)	396	Ghṛṇa-viññāna (olfactory perception)	227
Kevala (absolute) .. 169 (ftn. 1), 175		Cakkhu-viññāna (ocular perception)	227, 227 (ftn. 3)
Kevala-jñāna (absolute knowledge)	160, 161, (ftn. 5)	Cakṣuḥ (eye)	111
Kevala-vyatiroki (exclusively negative)	361	Caṇ-ḷi (<i>Chinese</i>) (right or justice) ..	40
Kevala-vyatirekya-numāna (exclusively negative inference)	434 ²	Catukka-naya-saṁsandana (case presented through the four-fold method)	239
Kevalānvayi (exclusively affirmative)	361	Candra-kūpa (Candra's well)	335
Kevalānvayanumāna (exclusively affirmative inference)	434 ²	Cikitsā (the science of medicine) ..	39
Kevalin (one who has attained absolute knowledge)	160	Cetṣā (muscular movement)	370
Keśi (a presiding deity)	15	Cetṣā (gesture)	453
Koṣa (dictionary)	450	Cuditaka (defendant)	231
Āivarta (fisherman)	334	Codaka (complainant)	231
Āriyā (action) 129 (ftn. 3) ²		Codanā (complaint)	231
Āriyā (verb)	447	Caitya (tower)	150
Āsana-bhaṅga (momentariness)	143 ² , 145, 149, 339	Chanda (vote by proxy)	233
Āsanikatva (momentariness)	121, 219	Chandas (prosody)	343
Āsanika-vāda (doctrine of momentariness)	52, 121, 262	Chandaṁ danami (I give authority)	233
Āsanika-ādin (upholder of the doctrine of momentariness)	121	Chandaṁ me āroceti (do ye con-	
Āstrasya kṣātram (strength of the kṣātriya)	3		

	Page		Page
vey my authority to the council)	233	Tajjāta-dōṣa (defeat arising from a disputant being agitated in mind)	163
Chandaṁ me hara (do ye receive my authority)	233	Tatpuruṣa (determinative compound)	452
Chala (quibble) 23, 34, 52, 65, 162, 212, 221, 234 (ftn. 2), 258, 356, 359, 374, 375, 381		Tattva-jñāna (right knowledge) ..	138
Jagat-svabhāva-parīkṣā (examination of the nature of the world) ..	326	Tattva-vyākhyāna (explanation of truth)	259
Jagatī (a kind of metre) ..	15	Tathātā (suchness)	255
Jana-śruti (rumour)	453	Tadutpatti (effect)	508
Jalpa (wrangling) 23, 31, 51, 52, 62, 63, 258, 357, 359, 370, 374, 375, 379, 381		Tantra-yukti (terms of scientific argument)	24
Jalpa-vitaṇḍā (wrangling and cavil) ..	104	Tarka (debate) 23, 37, 38, 52, 61, 61 (ftn. 1), 162, 189, 201, 215, 244, 258, 359, 374, 375, 381, 427, 429, 497	
Jāti (analogue)	51 ^a , 52, 65, 135	Tarka-puṅgava (bull in discussion)	272
Jāti (genus) 129 (ftn. 3) ² , 219, 212, 258, 259, 288 ² , 276, 315, (ftn. 1), 315 356, 357, 370, 374, 375, 381		Tarka-vidyā (logic)	7, 40
Jāti-śakti - vādi - tantāṭikā-mata (power in generality as maintained by Tantāṭikas)	397	Tarkābhāsa (fallacy of argumentation)	193
Jātyuttara (analogous rejoinder) ..	119	Tarkin (logician)	38
Jijñāsā (inquiry)	33, 122	Tassa pāpiyya sika (settlement with the prospect of further inquiry)	230
Jina (conqueror of passions) ..	158, 159	Tātparya (intention)	148, 448
Jivhā-viññāṇa (gustatory perception)	227	Tādātmya (inherence)	508
Jīva (soul)	168, 181	Tādātmyabhava (negation of identity)	97 (ftn. 1)
Jñāta (example)	163	Tārkika (logician)	37, 244
Jñāna (knowledge) 2 ^a , 3, 161, 161 (ftn. 5)		Tiṇa-vatthāṇaraka (settlement by covering over with grass)	230
Jñāna-karma-samuccaya (aggregate of knowledge and action) ..	397	Tipiṭaka or Piṭakattaya (the three baskets of Buddhist teachings) ..	226
Jñāna-kāṇḍa (section on knowledge)	394 ²	Tiryak (homogeneous)	192
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa (imagination)	140	Tīrthakara (builder of a landing place in the sea of existence) ..	158
Jñāna-lakṣaṇa (intercourse whose character is knowledge)	412	Tuṣāṇala (penitentiary rite of putting an end to one's life in a slow fire)	142 ²
Nāa (=Sans. jñāta) (example)	163	Tūṣṇīm bhava (speechlessness)	137
Tol (school)	525 (ftn. 1)	Tṛṣṇā (lust)	371
Takka (Prak.) (debate)	162, 227	Tejas (light)	303 ²
Takki (argumentationist)	21, 227 ²	Trayī (the three Vedas)	5
Takkika (logician)	227, 229 ²		

	Page		Page
Trasareṇu (triad or tertiary compound)	106 ²	Dvandva (aggregative compound)	452
Tripiṭaka or Piṭakatraya (three baskets of Buddhist teachings)	226	Dvātrīṃśadākāra - śrauta - yutaya (the thirty-two forms of set argument)	42
Tripuṭī - pratyakṣa - vādin (supporter of triangular perception)	418	Dvigu (numeral compound) ..	452
Trividha-paralī (three classes of respondents)	29	Dvidvidha-sambhāṣā (two kinds of debate)	29
Darśana (<i>Prak.</i>) (philosophy) 5 (ftn. 5)		Dvyaṇuka (dyad or binary compound)	106, 442
Darśana (Philosophy) 5. 5 (ftn. 5), 6, 152		Dhammatā (law) ..	500 (ftn. 1)
Daśāvayava-vākya (syllogism of ten parts)	166	Dharma (duty)	38
Dassana (<i>Palī</i>) (philosophy) 5 (ftn. 5)		Dharma (predicate) ..	190, 290
Dik (space)	393 ²	Dharma (doctrine)	305
Digambāra-parikalpita-ātma - par-ikṣā (examination of the Digam-bare Jaina doctrine of the soul)	326	Dharma (merit)	371
Dīnāra (the Roman coin <i>denarius</i>) 45 (ftn. 2)		Dharma-putra (foster son) ..	208
Duṣṭa-vākyaṇusaraṇa (adoption of a fallacious reason)	259	Dharmin (subject)	290
Duḥkha (pain) 132, 371, 375 ² , 382		Dhātu (root)	447, 453
Duḥkha-satya (misery as a pain) 127 (ftn.)		Dhātu-vādaḥ (doctrine of roots)	
Dūṣaṇa (refutation)	181, 298, 315	Dhāraṇā (recollecting)	201
Dūṣaṇābhāsa (semblance of a refutation)	181, 298	Dhāraṇi (numonics)	304
Dṛṣṭānta (familiar instance) 27, 32, 52, 59, 128, 128 (ftn. 4), 167, 176 ² , 177, 191 ² , 203, 258 ² , 265, 268 (ftn. 2), 286, 290, 359, 374, 375, 381, 501 ²		Dhvaṃsa (destruction)	210
Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of example)	178, 193	Naya (method of comprehending things from particular stand-points) 168, 174, 181 ² , 182, 203 ² , 215, 216 ² , 218	
Deva-ṛṇa (debt to gods) 102 (ftn. 1)		Nayatma-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge)	200
Deśa (place)	27, 219	Nayābhāsa (fallacy of Naya)	203
Doṣa (defect)	163, 375, 382	Nava-dharma (nine sacred works) 242 (ftn. 3)	
Dravya (substance) 27, 31, 129 (ftn. 3), 219, 279, 287, 373, 375, 382, 386, 387 ² , 388, 389, 393 ³ , 394 ² , 395		Nāntariyaka (non-co-presence) ..	504
Dravya (cause)	171	Nāna (name) 129 (ftn. 3) ² , 171	
Dravya-padārtha-parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word substance)	326	Nāma (crude word)	447
Dravyāstikāya (a group of substance)	216	Nāma (valid knowledge)	161
		Nārada (a celestial sage)	14
		Nāsti (it is not, non-existence) ..	184
		Nihāreyasa (summum bonum) ..	54
		Nigamana (conclusion) 27, 32, 42, 60, 119 ² , 167, 176, 191, 202, 203, 237, 266, 268, 370, 437 ² , 501, 502	
		Nigraha (=Sans. <i>nigraha</i>) (defeat) 234, 234 (ftn. 2), 236	

	Page		Page
Nigraha (defeat)	51	Niścita (sure) ..	376 (ftn. 4), 398
Nigraha-doṣa (defect of under- standing)	163	Nihkṣepa (imposition) ..	218
Nigraha-sthāna (point of defeat) 35, 44, 51 ³ , 52, 65, 66, 136, 136 (ftn. 1), 150, 212, 258, 259, 264, 268, 269, 356, 357, 359, 370, 374, 375, 379, 381		Nīti or Nyāya (logic) ..	240 ² , 240 (ftn. 3)
Nitya (eternal)	285 ⁴	Naigama (non-analytical method of description) 161 (ftn. 4), 170 . 181, 216	
Nitya-sama (balancing the eternal) .. 67, 269		Naigamābhāsa (fallacy of the Nai- gama)	203
Nidāna (the introductory part of the Pātimokkha)	233	Nairātmya-vāda (doctrine of non- soul)	127 (ftn.)
Nidarśana (example)	25	Naiyāyika (logician) ..	41 (ftn. 5), 244
Nindā (deprecation)	108	Nyāya (logic) 20, 38, 39 ¹ , 40 ¹ , 152, 240 ¹ , 240 (ftn. 3), 497	
Nimitta (efficient cause)	383	Nyāya (syllogism) ..	41 (ftn. 2), 136 ¹
Nimitta-kāraṇa (instrumental cause)	390	Nyāya-tattva (categories of logic) ..	39
Niyoga (injunction)	25	Nyāya-pūrvāṅga (first part of logic)	41 (ftn. 2)
Niranuyojyānuyoga (overlooking the censurable)	84	Nyāya-vidya (science of logic) ..	38
Niranuyojyānuyoga (censuring the non-censurable)	264	Nyāya-vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-puru- ṣa-parīkṣa (examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrine of soul)	326
Nirarthaka (meaningless) 84, 261, 269		Nyāya-śāstra (science of logic) 39, 40, 116	
Nirartha-khaṇḍana (rejoinder on the ground of meaninglessness) ..	268	Nyāya-sūtra (science of true logic) ..	8
Nirukti (explanation)	487 (ftn. 1)	Nyāya-svarūpa (essential form of a syllogism)	41 (ftn. 2)
Nirjara (destruction of the conse- quences of action)	168	Nyāyavayava (members of a syllo- gism)	12, 289, 289 (ftn. 3)
Nirṇaya (ascertainment) 232, 52, 62, 258, 359, 370, 374, 375, 381		Nyāyāśraya	41 (ftn. 2)
Niryukti (commentarie)	165	Nyāyottaraṅga (the last part of logic)	41 (ftn. 2)
Nirvacana (etymological explana- tion)	25	Nyāyya (reasonable)	41 (ftn. 5)
Nirvāṇa (Buddhist emancipation) 159 ² , 159 (ftn. 1 ² , 2), 160 ² , 160 (ftn. 1)		Nyūna (saying too little) ..	84, 261, 269
Nirvikalpa (indeterminate)	55	Pakkha (Prak.) (party) ..	162
Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) 134, 137 ² , 138 ² , 138 (ftn. 1), 179, 360, 383, 390, 418		Pakṣa (party)	162
Nirvikalpaka-vāda (doctrine of in- determinate perception)	418	Pakṣa (minor term) 176 ² , 177, 193, 292, 268, 268 (ftn. 2), 283, 291, 312, 361, 506	
Nirvikalpaka-vipratipatti (contro- versy about indeterminate per- ception)	397	Pakṣatā (nature of the minor term) 433 ² , 487 (ftn. 1)	
		Pakṣa-dharma (law of extension of the minor term)	283
		Pakṣa-dharma-cakra (wheel of rea- sons put in order)	299 (ftn. 2)

	Page		Page
Pakṣa-dharmatā (essential nature of a syllogism) ..	361, 377, 390	Paticca-samuppāda (=Sams. <i>Prāti-</i> <i>tya samutpāda</i> , doctrine of mu- tual dependence) ..	227 (ftn. 2)
Pakṣa-prayoga (use of the minor term) ..	203	Patiññā (=Sams. <i>Pratijñā</i>) (pro- position) ..	234, 234 (ftn. 2)
Pakṣābhāsa (fallacy of the minor term) 176, 177, 193, 290 (ftn. 1), 312		Patiññaya kāretabbam (settle- ment by an undertaking) ..	230
Pakṣaḥ anumāna-bādhitaḥ (minor term being incompatible with in- ference) ..	441	Patta (sacred chair) ..	199
Pakṣaḥ pratyakṣa-bādhitaḥ (min- or term being incompatible with perception) ..	440	Pattakallam (in season) ..	233
Pakṣaḥ śabda-bādhitaḥ (minor term being incompatible with verbal testimony) ..	441	Pathamo niggaho (first defeat) ..	237
Pakṣaḥ sādhyā-grāhaka-pramāṇa- jātiya-pramāṇa-viruddhaḥ (min- or term being incompatible with the evidence which is analogous to the evidence that establishes the major-term) ..	441	Pada (word) ..	110, 149
Pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhaka-pratyakṣa bādhitaḥ (minor term being in- compatible with perception which establishes the middle term) ..	441	Pada-sphoṭa (word-explosion) 148, 149	
Pakṣaḥ hetu-grāhaka-anumāna-bā- dhitaḥ (minor term being incom- patible with inference which es- tablishes the middle term) ..	442	Padārtha (category) 25, 381, 387, 389, 393	
Pañkaja iti padānām yogarūḍhi- tva-kathana (etymologo-conven- tional use of a word as mud- born) ..	397	Padīpa (lighting a lamp) ..	238
Pañkti (a kind of metre) ..	14	Pamāṇa (valid knowledge) ..	161
Paccanika-niggaho (adverse con- troversy) ..	237	Para-ātmanā (supreme soul) ..	371
Pañcāvayava (five parts of a syl- logism) ..	286	Paratantra (conditional) 245, 245 (ftn. 1)	
Pañcāvayava-vākya (speech of five parts) ..	43	Parama-nyāya (conclusion) ..	42
Pañjikā (commentary) ..	213	Paramātmā (supreme soul) ..	143
Paṇḍita (scholar) ..	240	Paramānu (atom) ..	105
Patikamma (rejoinder) ..	235	Paramārtha (transcendental) 254, 255	
		Paramārtha-sat (absolutely real) ..	310
		Para - sambandha (concerning others) ..	264
		Paramarśa (consideration) 384, 390, 420, 433, 435, 510, 511	
		Paramarśānurūpānumāna (syl- logistic inference) ..	511
		Parārthānūmāna (inference for the sake of others) 175, 192, 202, 276, 282, 307, 309, 310, 312, 359, 361, 435	
		Parikalpita (false) 245, 245 (ftn. 1)	
		Pariccheda (chapter) 184, 200	
		Pariniṣpanna (perfect) 245, 245 (ftn. 1, 2)	
		Paribhāṣā (technicality) ..	450
		Paṇḍad (council of debate) 7, 22, 24, 29, 263	
		Pariharāṇa-doṣa (avoidance of charges) ..	163
		Parihāra (avoidance of defeat) ..	35
		Parikṣā (examination) 26, 27, 28, 51, 53, 90	

	Page		Page
Parokṣa (indirect knowledge) 161		Pūrvavat (à priori) 56, 116 (ftn.	
(ftn. 5) ² , 169 ² , 170 ² , 170 (ftn. 1),		1), 260, 409	
174, 175, 188, 189, 201 ² , 215		Poṭhi (book) .. 324 (ftn. 3)	
Parokṣa-jñāna (indirect know-		Pauṣa samkrānti (the last day of	
ledge) 219		the month of Pausa) .. 530	
Paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa (admission		Prakarṇa (expository treatise) .. 205	
of an opinion) 84		Prakarṇa-sama (begging the ques-	
Paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa (overlook-		tion) 34, 63, 67, 260, 268, 367	
ing the censurable) 269		Prakāśa (chapter) 215	
Paryāstikāya (group of attributes)	216	Prakṛti (primordial matter) 10, 363 ²	
Parvata (a celestial sage) .. 14		Prakṛti (illustration) 108	
Pātimokkhuḍḍesa (recitation of		Pratijñā (proposition) 27, 32, 60,	
the code of monastic laws) .. 233		121, 166, 203, 265, 268, 436 ² , 500, 502	
Pāramārthika (transcendental)		Pratijñāntara (shifting the propo-	
175, 201 ² , 203		sition) 84, 264	
Pāramārthika-doṣā (transcenden-		Pratijñā-vibhakti (limitation of the	
tal condition) 4		proposition) 166	
Pāramārthika-pratyakṣa (transcen-		Pratijñā-virodha (opposing the	
dental perception) .. 170 (ftn. 1)		proposition) 84, 260	
Pāramārthika-pratyakṣa-pramāṇa		Pratijñā-sannyāsa (renouncing the	
(transcendental perception) .. 181		proposition) 84, 137, 260	
Pārisuddhi (purity) 233		Pratijñā-hāni (hurting the propo-	
Pārṣad (council) 22		sition) 34, 44, 84, 261, 268, 269	
Pāśupata (follower of Paśupati) .. 154		Prati tantra (dogma peculiar to	
Pitr-ṛṇa (debt to our progenitors)		some school) 59	
102 (ftn. 1)		Pratitantra-siddhanta (conclusion	
Fitṛ-yāna (path of the forefathers) 3		accepted by a particular school) 259 ²	
Puggala (soul) 235 ²		Prati-dṛṣṭānta-sama (balancing the	
Putreṣṭi (sacrifice for the sake of a		counter-example) 67, 261, 268	
son) 107		Pratiyogi (counter-part) 403 ² , 404	
Pudgala (burden-bearer) 126, 127		Pratilomaitta (making the autho-	
(ftn.)		rities hostile) 163	
Pudgala-vāda (doctrine of the bur-		Prativādī (opponent) 204, 370	
den-bearer) 127 (ftn.)		Pratiśedha (negation) 190	
Pu narukta (repetition) 84, 255, 269		Pratiśhāpanā (counter-demonstra-	
Purākālpa (narration) 108		tion) 27, 32, 500, 501	
Puruṣa (soul) .. 10, 245 (ftn. 2) ²		Pratyakṣa (perception) 27 ² , 28, 32,	
Puruṣa-parīkṣā (examination of the		33, 50, 54, 125, 129, 130, 134,	
soul) 326		150, 161 (ftn. 5), 162, 169 ² , 170,	
Pubba-karaṇa (preparation) 232,		174 ² , 188, 189, 201, 209, (ftn.	
232 (ftn. 1), 233		1), 215, 221, 259, 264, 265, 266,	
Pubba-kicca (preliminary acts) 232		276, 277, 279, 298, 306, 307, 309,	
(ftn. 1), 233 ²		310, 348, 358, 359 ² , 360, 383 ² ,	
Pūrva (prior) 190 ² , 191		387 ² , 389 ² , 390, 393 ² , 394 ² , 395,	
Pūrva-pakṣa (question) 25, 424		407, 411	

	Page		Page
Pratyakṣa-kāraṇa-vāda (causes of perception)	416	Pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (general characteristics of valid knowledge)	215
Pratyakṣa-jñāna (direct knowledge)	219	Pramāṇa-siddhi (establishment of proof)	307
Pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-parīkṣā (examination of the definition of perception)	327	Pramāṇa-svarūpa (characteristics of valid knowledge) ..	188
Pratyakṣa-vyavasthā (system of perception)	309	Pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of valid knowledge)	200
Pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of perception)	200	Pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā (examination of other kinds of valid knowledge)	327
Pratyakṣābhāsa (fallacy of perception)	192, 298	Prameya (object of knowledge) 23, 49, 51 ² , 52, 56, 97, 113, 158 ² , 257 ² , 258, 284; 357 ² , 359, 370, 373 ² , 374, 375, 381	
Pratyanyūyoga (re-interrogation) ..	33	Prayojana (purpose) 23, 28, 33, 52, 59, 122, 258, 359, 374, 375, 381	
Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) 189, 201, 215		Pralaya (dissolution of the world)	105
Pratyabhijñānābhāsa (fallacy of recognition)	193	Pralāpita (irrelevant talk) ..	137
Pratyaya (inter-relation) 117, 118 (ftn. 3)		Pravṛtti (exertion) 27, 375, 382, 410	
Pratyuccāraṇa (repetition) ..	25	Pravṛtti-vijñāna (continuous flow of momentary cognitions) 146, 245 ² , 245 (ftn. 1)	
Pradeśa (determination) from a statement to be made) ..	25	Prasaṅga (connected argument) ..	25
Pradhāna (Primordial matter) ..	325	Prasaṅga-sama (balancing the infinite regression) ..	67, 268, 289
Pradhvaṁsābhāva (posterior non-existence) 97, 97 (ftn. 1), 184, 203, 304		Prasāstr-dōṣa (defeat arising from the authorities)	163
Pramā (right knowledge) 138 ² , 389, 394, 395 ² , 408 ³ , 411		Prāgabhāva (prior non-existence) 97, 97 (ftn. 1), 189, 203, 304	
Pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) 23, 28, 43, 49, 50, 51 ³ , 52, 84, 84 (ftn. 1), 113, 155, 158 ⁴ , 161, 162 ² , 168, 169, 174 ³ , 181 ³ , 182, 189 ³ , 200, 201 ³ , 201 (ftn. 1), 203, 212 ² , 218 ³ , 256 ³ , 257 ¹¹ , 258, 259, 276 ² , 277 ² , 307 ² , 309, 330, 348, 357 ⁴ , 358, 359 ⁴ , 381, 386 ⁶ , 387 ² , 389 ³ , 393 ² , 394, 395 ² , 402 ⁶ , 408, 497, 499		Prāṇa (breath)	2
Pramāṇa-catustaya-prāmāṇya-vādaḥ (doctrine of the validity of the four means of knowledge) ..	453	Prāpti-sama (balancing the co-presence) ..	67, 261, 288
Pramāṇa-sāstra (science of right knowledge)	158	Prābhākaraḥ (the Mīmāṃsakas) ..	408
		Prāmāṇya-vāda (the doctrine of the validity of knowledge) ..	408
		Pretyabhāva (condition after death)	375, 382
		Phala (result) 188, 375, 382, 511	
		Phala-pramāṇa-svarūpādyābhāsa-nirṇaya (determination of the consequences and fallacies of knowledge)	200

	Page		Page
Bandha (bondage)	168	Madhyama (middle)	249
Bahir-vyāpti (extrinsic inseparable connection)	177, 178, 202	Manas (mind) 116, 201, 278, 286 (ftn. 1), 373 ² , 382, 393 ²	
Bahuvrīhi (attributive compound)	452	Manah (intelligence)	2
Bādhā (incompatibility) ..	438	Manah-paryāya (knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others) 161 (ftn. 5), 169 (ftn. 1), 201	
Bādhita (incompatible) 367 (ftn. 1), 438, 440 ²		Manas tattva-nirūpaṇa (determina- tion of the nature of the mind)	397
Buddhi (intellect) 52, 112, 375 ² , 382, 387 ² , 389 ⁴ , 393 ² , 395		Manonutva-vāda (atomic nature of mind)	417
Brahman (the pervading essence,	4	Mano-viññāna (mental perception)	227
Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda (doctrine of the transformation of Brahi- man)	52	Mantras	15
Brahma-vidyā (divine science) ..	4	Marut (air)	393 ²
Brāhmaṇa (ritual)	108	Mahāpratihāra (the great gate- keeper)	322
Bhāgāsiddha (unproved in respect of a part)	362	Mahābhadrā-kalpa (the very bles- sed cycle)	225
Bhāra (burden)	127 (ftn.)	Mahāyāna (the Great vehicle) ..	241
Bhāva (entity itself)	171, 184, 394 ²	Mithyā-jñāna (error)	138
Bhāṣya (commentary)	116, 121	Mīmāṃsaka-kalpita-ātma - parīkṣā (examination of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul)	326
Bhikkhu-gaṇanā (counting the number of monks)	233	Mukti (emancipation)	219 ²
Bhūmi (stage)	249	Mokṣa (emancipation) 57, 122, 123, 168, 181, 359, 370, 371	
Bhayaitta (creating divisions) ..	163	Mleccha (non-Aryan)	56, 107
Bhaitta (serving the authorities)	163	Yajña (sacrifice)	516
Bhaiṣajya (medicine)	34	Yatnaja (product of effort)	285
Bhrama (error)	138, 409	Yathārthānubhava (right experi- ence)	389 ²
Bhrānta (erring)	273	Yama (the god of death)	14
Bhrānti (blunder)	273	Yava (grain)	107
		Yukta (right)	359
Maṅgala (benedictory portion) 324 (ftn. 3)		Yukti (continuous argument) 23, 27, 28	
Maṅgala-vāda (invocation of bles- sings)	408	Yuga-pradhāna (foremost man of the age)	164
Maṅgalācaraṇa (invocation of bles- sing)	397	Yūpa (stake)	15
Matānujñā (admission of an opi- nion)	84, 261, 269	Yebhuyyasikā (settlement by a majority)	230
Mati (knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind)	169 (ftn. 1)	Yoga (union of words)	25
Mati-kamma (deliberation)	231	Yoga (concentration)	245, 249
Mati-bhaṅga-doṣa (defeat arising from the failure of the disputants memory)	163	Yoga-rūḍha (etymological-conven- tional)	451

	Page		Page
Yogācāra (practice of meditation)	249	Vārṇa-sphoṭa (letter-explosion) ..	148
Yogācāra or Vijñāna-vadin (a sect of Buddhist philosophers who maintain that cognitions alone are real) ..	146	Varṇya-sama (balancing the subject)	34, 67, 289
Yogin (contemplative) ..	359	Vartamāna (present time) 106 (ftn. 1)	
Yogi-pratyakṣa (contemplative perception) ..	360	Vasu (a sect of gods) ..	15
Yogyatā (consistency) ..	447 ²	Vastu-doṣa (defect of the subject)	163
Yaugika (etymological) ..	451	Vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna (objectified knowledge) ..	245
Yaugika-rūḍha (etymological conventional) ..	451	Vāk-chala (quibble in respect of a term) ..	260
Rudra (a sect of gods) ..	15	Vākovākya (grammar, rhetoric or debate) ..	45, 45 (ftn. 5)
Rūḍha (conventional) ..	451	Vākya (sentence) ..	149
Rūpa (form) ..	126 ² , 389	Vākya-doṣa (defect of speech)	34, 259
Rūpa (matter) ..	238	Vākya-praśaṁsā (excellence of speech) ..	34, 259
Lakṣhaṇāyutti-kathā (definition of terms) ..	238	Vākya-sphoṭa (sentence-explosion) ..	148, 140
Lakṣaṇa (definition) ..	53	Vākya-śeṣa (context) ..	25, 459
Lakṣaṇa-doṣa (defect of definition)	163	Vājapeya (a sacrifice) ..	14
Lakṣaṇā (implication) 450, 451 ²		Vāda (discussion) 23, 31, 49, 51 ⁵ , 52, 62 ² , 104, 204, 229, 258, 359, 370, 374, 375, 378, 379, 381	
Laghu-ṭīkā (light commentary) ..	211	Vāda-maryādā (limits of debate) ..	31
Liṅga (sign) 175, 190, 290, 377 ² , 383, 508		Vāda-mārga (course of debate) 27 ⁴ , 31, 51	
Liṅga-parāmarśa (remembrance of a sign; a syllogism from a sign) 130 (ftn. 1), 435, 510, 511		Vāda-vidyā (art of discussion) 7, 26, 27, 28	
Liṅga-parāmarśādi-nirūpaṇa (determination of the consideration of the sign, etc.) ..	397	Vāda-vīśadī-karaṇa (elucidation of debate) ..	259
Liṅgasya trai-rūpyam (three characteristics of the middle term) 291 (ftn. 1)		Vādī (disputant) ..	195, 204, 379
Lekhaka (writer) ..	379	Vādī-prativādī-nyāya-nirṇaya (determination of the right procedure of a disputant and his opponent) ..	200
Lokāyata (casuist) ..	240 (ftn. 3)	Vādupāya (expedients of debate)	30
Laukika (personal) ..	175, 359	Vāyu-pratyakṣatvādimata-khaṇḍana (refutation of the perceptibility of air) ..	397
Laukika-pratyakṣa (ordinary-pratyakṣa)		Vārttā (commerce) ..	5
Vacana-śodhana (clearing the meaning of terms) ..	238	Vāstīputra-kalpita - ātma - parīkṣā (examination of the Vāstīputra doctrine of the soul) ..	326
Vajra (thunderbolt) ..	272	Vāhyārtha-parīkṣā (examination of external objects) ..	327
Vanya (wild) ..	484 (ftn. 1)		

	Page
Vāhyārtha-bhaṅga (things possess no external reality) ..	145
Vāhyārtha-vāda (doctrine of the external world) ..	220
Vāhyārtha-siddhi (validity of external things) ..	219
Vikala (defective) ..	201
Vikalpa (alternative) ..	25
Vikalpa-sama (balancing the alternative) ..	67, 289
Vikāra (modification) ..	111
Vikṣepa (evasion) ..	84, 269
Vigraha (in a spirit of opposition)	29
Vigraha-sambhāṣā (hostile debate)	29
Vijñāna (knowledge) ..	120, 126 ² , 245
Vijñāna-vāda (idealism) 120, 120 (ftn. 3), 220, 245 ²	
Vijñāna-vādin (see <i>Yogācāra</i>) ..	146
Viññāna (knowledge) 227, 227 (ftn. 3)	
Vitaṇḍā (cavil) 23, 31, 51, 52, 62, 63, 240 (ftn. 3), 258, 357, 359, 370, 374, 375, 379, 381	
Vitarka (speculation) ..	162
Vidyā (knowledge) ..	387 ²
Vidhāna (arrangement) ..	25
Vidhi (injunction) ..	108 ² , 190, 448
Vidhi-vāda (doctrine of injunction) ..	448
Vipakṣa (counter-proposition) 166, 283, 284, 361, 433	
Vipakṣa-pratiśedha (opposition to the counter-proposition) ..	166
Vipakṣe asattvaṁ (non-existence of the sign in heterologues) ..	378
Viparīta-khaṇḍana (contrary rejoinder) ..	268
Viparīta-vyatireka (of contrary separation) ..	180
Viparīta-vyāpti (inverse pervasion)	369
Viparīta-vyāptyabhidhāna (example with inverse pervasion) ..	369
Viparītānvaya (of inverted connection) ..	179, 297, 315
Viparyaya (reversion) ..	25, 201, 359

	Page
Viparyaya-khaṇḍana (rejoinder on the basis of reversion) ..	268
Vipratipatti (misunderstanding an argument) ..	136
Vibhakti (case-ending) ..	447
Vibhāṣā (commentary) ..	247 ²
Viyakka (speculation) ..	162
Viraha (separation) ..	209 (ftn.), 210 ²
Viruddha (contradictory) 63, 178, 260, 294, 313, 363, 438, 439 ¹	
Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi (perception of the opposite effect) ..	311
Viruddhāvyabhiçāri (non-erroneous contradiction) 316, 358, 368	
Virodha (contradiction) ..	438
Vivarta-vāda-pāriksā (examination of the doctrine of evolution) ..	327
Vivādādhikaraṇa (case pertaining to differences of opinions) ..	229
Vivṛti (description) ..	451
Viśeṣa (particularity) 27, 32, 138, 192, 279, 287, 375, 382, 387, 388, 389, 393 ¹ , 394 ² , 395, 402	
Viśeṣaṇatā (qualification or particularity) 130, 412, 415, 416	
Viśeṣaṇasiddha (improved in respect of the adjective) ..	362
Viśeṣa-vyāpti (invariable concomitance of special forms) ..	426
Viśeṣyāsiddha (unproved in respect of the substantive) ..	362
Viśama-vyāpti (non-equipotent concomitance) ..	399
Viśaya (object of knowledge) 188, 192	
Viśaya-kāṇḍa (section on subject) 394 ¹	
Viśaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of objects of knowledge) ..	200
Vimāṇsā (casuistry) ..	227
Vimāṇsi (casuist) ..	21, 227
Vṛtti (commentary) ..	214
Vṛtti (indication) ..	449
Vṛhatī (a kind of metre) ..	15
Vedas ..	14

	Page		Page
Vedanā (feeling) ..	126 ² , 238	Vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to the container) ..	312
Vaidharṁya (heterogeneous) 176,	191, 264, 287, 290, 368, 502	Vyāpakānupalabdhi (non-perception of the pervader) ..	311
Vaidharṁya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the heterogeneous example) 179,	180, 297	Vyāpīra (operation) ..	443, 511
Vaidharṁyavat (negative inference)	312	Vyāpti (invariable concomitance) 140, 177 ² , 179, 189 ² , 292, 361, 376, 384, 390, 396, 404, 406 (ftn. 5), 421, 454, 509, 510	
Vaidharṁya-sama (balancing the heterogeneity) ..	67, 266, 289	Vyāpti-graha (indication or the process of ascertaining the middle term and the major term) ..	218
Vyakti (individual) ..	219	Vyāpti-grahopāya (means of apprehending invariable concomitance) ..	426
Vyatireka (relating to things) ..	192	Vyāpti-grahopīya-siddhīnta (conclusion as to the means of apprehending invariable concomitance) ..	428
Vvatireka (negative) ..	361	Vyāpti-nirūpaṇa (determination of invariable concomitance) ..	397
Vyatireka-vyāpti (invariable separation) ..	180, 361	Vyāpti-pañcakam (five provisional definitions of invariable concomitance) ..	421, 487 (ftn. 1)
Vyatirekī (exclusively negative) 130, 191, 286, 287, 437		Vyāptyanugama (comprehensiveness of invariable concomitance) ..	429
Vyatirekī-udāharaṇa (heterogeneous example) ..	259	Vyāptyasiddhi (unproved in respect of invariable concomitance) ..	440
Vyadhikaraṇa - dharmāvacchinābhāva (non-existence whose counter part is qualified by a nature abiding in different locus) 423		Vyāpya (pervaded) 189, 190 ² , 191, 220	
Vyadhikaraṇāsiddha (unproved on account of abiding in a different locus) ..	362	Vyāpyatvāsiddha (unproved in respect of accompaniment) ..	439
Vyabhicāra (erraticality) ..	438	Vyāvahārika (practical) 170, 171, 174	
Vyārtha-viśeṣanāsiddha (unproved on account of the adjective being useless) ..	363	Vyāvahārika-daśū (practical condition) ..	4
Vyārtha-viśeṣyāsiddha (unproved on account of the substantive being useless) ..	363	Vyoma (ether) ..	393 ²
Vyavasāya (ascertainment) ..	33	Vrata (religious vow) ..	164, 205
Vyavahāra (practical method of description) 161 (ftn. 4), 181, 216, 450		Śakti (strength) ..	171
Vyavaharābhāsa (fallacy of the practical) ..	203	Śakti (potentiality) ..	450 ²
Vyākaraṇa (grammar) ..	450	Śakti-nirūpaṇa and upādhi (ascertainment of power and condition) ..	397
Vyākhyāna (description) ..	25	Śakti-vāda (doctrine of potentiality of word) ..	449
Vyāghāta pradarśana (showing absurdity) ..	260		
Vyāghra (tiger) ..	396		
Vyāghra-śiśuka (tiger cub) ..	207		
Vyāpaka (pervader) ..	189, 220		

	Page		Page
Śākya-prāpti (capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion)	122	Śūnyatā (voidness)	52, 118 (ftn. 3), 245, (ftn. 2) ² , 254, 255
Śakra (strong)	171	Śūnya-vāda (doctrine of voidness)	119 (ftn.), 262
Śāṅkita (suspected) ..	140, 376 (ftn. 4)	Śeṣavat (a posteriori)	56, 116 (ftn. 1), 260, 499
Śarīra (body) ..	375, 382	Śaivas (followers of Śiva) ..	154
Śabda (sound) ..	109, 448	Śrāvaka (layman) ..	223
Śabda (verbal testimony)	50 ² , 125, 175 ² , 287, 370 (ftn. 1), 387, 389 ³ , 393 ² , 394, 407, 444, 465, 470	Śrāvāna (audible) ..	285
Śabda (verbal method of description)	161 (ftn. 4) ² , 170, 171, 181, 216	Śrāvikā (laywoman) ..	223
Śabda (word) ..	33, 51, 54, 384 ²	Śruta (knowledge of things acquired through reasoning and study) ..	161 (ftn. 5), 169 (ftn. 1)
Śabda-khaṇḍa (book of verbal testimony)	444	Śruta-kevalin (one versed in the 14 pūrvas of the Dṛṣṭivāda) ..	164
Śabda-nirūpaṇam (definition of verbal testimony)	444	Śruti-parīkṣā (examination of scripture)	327
Śabda-pramāṇa (verbal testimony as a means of valid knowledge)	397, 444	Śrutyaprāmāṇya (denial of the authority of the Veda)	143, 149
Śabda-prāmāṇya-vāda (speech as means of valid knowledge) ..	445	Ṣaṭ-pakṣī-kathā (six-winged disputation)	82
Śabda-bodha (verbal knowledge)	444 ² , 470	Ṣaḍ-darśana (six systems of philosophy)	152 ⁴ , 153
Śabda-Brahma-parīkṣā (examination of Brahma the presiding deity of sound)	326	Ṣaḍ-darśana-vicāra (criticism of the six systems of philosophy) ..	153
Śabdasya śravaṇam (hearing of a word)	444	Ṣaḍ-lakṣaṇa-vyākhyā (explanation of six characteristics) ..	332
Śabdānityatā-vāda (doctrine of the non-eternity of sound) ..	448	Sakala (perfect)	201
Śabdābhāsa (fallacy of verbal testimony)	204	Sakala - tārīka - cakra - cūḍāmaṇi (the crest-gem of the circle of all logicians)	185
Śabdārtha (words and their meanings)	106	Saṅgha (council) ..	230 ² , 231 ² , 232
Śabdārtha-parīkṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'sound')	327	Sat (present)	284 ⁵
Śalākā-parīkṣā (probe-examination)	461, 522, (ftn. 1)	Sataḥ sajjāyate (effect pre-exists in its cause)	141
Śaśa-śrīṅga (hare horn) ..	424	Sat-pratipakṣa (counter-balance)	438 ² , 439
Śākhās (spiritual genealogy)	25, 168	Sativinaya (settlement from recollection)	230 ¹
Śāstra (scripture)	23 ²	Sadasat (partly present and partly absent)	284 ⁵
Śāstraja-śabda (spiritual testimony)	175	Sadyaska (a kind of sacrifice) ..	14
		Sandigdha (doubtful)	398

	Page		Page
Sandigdha - viśeṣanā - siddha (unproved on account of the adjective being doubtful) ..	363	Samāropa (superimposition) ..	201
Sandigdha - viśeṣyā siddha (unproved on account of the substantive being doubtful) ..	363	Samāropita (charged) ..	140
Sandigdha-siddha (unproved on account of the reason being doubtful) ..	363	Samāsa (compound) ..	452
Sandigdha-siddha (unproved on account of the reason being doubtful) ..	363	Samāsa-vādaḥ (doctrine of compound words) ..	452
Sandigdha-siddha (unproved on account of the reason being doubtful) ..	363	Samāhāra (unified aggregative compound) ..	452 ²
Sandhāya (peacefully) ..	29	Samiti (council) ..	22
Sannikarṣa (intercourse) ..	130, 411	Samuccaya (aggregate) ..	25
Sapakṣa (homologue of the reason) ..	283, 284, 361, 433	Samkramana-doṣa (diversion to other subjects) ..	163
Sapakṣe sattvam (existence of the sign in the homologue) ..	378	Saṅketa (signification) ..	450
Saptabhaṅgī-naya (sevenfold paralogism) ..	203, 212, 221	Samkhyāikānta (final signification of numbers) ..	114
Sabhā (council) ..	22, 27	Samkhyāikānta-vāda (doctrine of the fixity of things signified by numbers) ..	16 (ftn. 1)
Sabhā-pati (president) ..	204, 379	Samgāmāvacara-bhikku (member of a council) ..	231 ²
Sabhya (member) ..	204, 379	Samgraha (collective method of description) ..	161 (ftn. 4), 170, 171, 181, 216
Samabhirūḍha (subtle verbal method of description) ..	161 (ftn. 4), 171 ² , 181, 216	Samgrahābhāsa (fallacy of the collective) ..	203
Samabhirūḍhābhāsa (fallacy of the subtle) ..	204	Samjñā (sensation) ..	126 ²
Samayocita - vākya (opportune speech) ..	259	Sambhava (probability) ..	25, 56, 95, 170, 370, 387
Samavāya (inherence) ..	27, 32, 130, 134, 219, 287, 333, 375, 382, 383 ² , 387 ² , 389 ² , 393 ² , 394 ² , 395, 402, 412, 413, 414 449 (ftn. 1), 508	Sambhava (the originating cause) ..	33
Samavāya-vāda (doctrine of inherence) ..	414	Sambhāṣā (method of debate) ..	28
Samavāya-sabdārtha-parikṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'co-existent cause') ..	327	Sambhāṣā-prasānsā (utility of debate) ..	29
Samavāyābhāva (absolute non-existence) ..	184	Sambhāṣā-vidhi (method of debate) ..	26, 27 ³
Samavāyi-kāraṇa (material cause) ..	382, 390	Sammajjanī (cleansing the ground) ..	232
Samaveta-samavāya (inherent inherence) ..	130, 412, 413	Sammukhābhīnaya (settlement in presence) ..	230
Sama-vyāpti (equipotent concomitance) ..	399	Samyukta-viśeṣanātā (united particularity) ..	416
Samāna-tantra (allied system) ..	373	Samyukta-samavāya (conjoined inherence) ..	130, 412, 413, 414
		Samyukta - samaveta - samavāya (conjoined inherent inherence) ..	130, 412
		Samyoga (conjunction) ..	130, 412 ²
		Samvara (restraint) ..	168
		Samvṛti (veil) ..	146

	Page		Page
Samvṛti (illusory)	203	Sādhana-vikala (defective in the middle term)	369
Samvṛti (conditional)	254	Sādhana-vyāvṛtta (example of excluded middle term)	369
Samsāya (doubt) 25, 33, 51, 52, 58, 103, 122, 201, 258, 359, 374, 375, 381		Sādharmya (homogeneous) 176, 191, 264 ² , 287, 290, 368, 502	
Samsāya-vidhi (method of debate) 51		Sādharmyodāharaṇa (affirmative example)	502
Samsāya-vyudāsa (dispelling all questions)	122	Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacy of the homogeneous example) 178, 296 (ftn. 1)	
Samsāya-sama (balancing the doubt) 34, 67, 260, 261, 268, 289		Sādharmya-vat (positive inference) 312	
Samsad (council)	22	Sādharmya-sama (balancing the homogeneity)	67, 268, 289
Samsarga-bodhaḥ (knowledge of the mutual connection of things) 444		Sādhāraṇa (general)	293, 438
Samsargābhāva (negation of correlation)	97 (ftn. 1), 394	Sādhu (monk)	223
Samsāra (path of transmigration)	3	Sādhyā (major term) 175, 176 ² , 177 ² , 178 ⁴ , 179, 180 ³ , 189, 261, 268, 268 (ftn. 2), 282, 285, 290, 377, 383	
Samsāra-santati-parīkṣā (examination of continuity of the world) 327		Sādhyā-vikala (example defective in the major term)	368
Samskāra (impression)	126 ²	Sādhyā sama (counter-questioned) 63, 67, 256, 260, 268, 289	
Samhitā (hymn)	108	Sādhyā-siddha (unproved on the part of the major term)	441
Sarva-tantra (dogma of all schools) 59		Sādhvī (nun)	223
Sarva-tantra siddhānta (conclusion accepted by all schools)	259	Sāmānya (generality) 27, 32, 138, 192, 279, 287 ² , 295, 333, 375, 382, 387 ² , 388, 389, 393 ² , 394 ² , 395, 402, 487 (ftn. 1)	
Sarva-daṇḍa-nāyaka (the leader of all daṇḍas)	322	Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (commonly seen) 56, 116 (ftn. 1), 260, 499	
Savikalpa (determinate)	55	Sāmānyato-’ dṛṣṭa (not commonly seen)	56
Savikalpaka (determinate) 134, 137 ² , 133, 133 (ftn. 1), 179, 360, 383, 390		Sāmānya lakṣaṇa (like any one of its kind)	310
Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa (determinate perception)	383	Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (intercourse whose character is general) 412, 429	
Savikalpaka-vāda (doctrine of the determinate)	419	Sāmānya lakṣaṇa-siddhānta (conclusion about the intercourse whose character is general)	430
Savyabhicāra (erratic) 33, 63, 438 ³		Sāmānya-viśeṣa (general particular)	177
Savyabhicāra (undistributed middle)	260	Sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha parīkṣā (examination of the meaning, of	
Sāssata- vādā (eternalists)	228		
Sahakāri-kāraṇa (causality)	134		
Sahacāra (simultaneous) 190, 191 ² , 427			
Sahaja śakti (natural power)	397		
Sādrśya (likeness)	443		
Sādhaka (theory of proof) 266, 514			
Sādhana (medicine)	34		
Sādhana (middle term) 180 ³ , 190, 290			

	Page		Page
the words 'generality' and 'particularity'	327	Sthira-bhāva-parikṣā (examination of permanent entities) ..	325 (ftn.)
Sāmānya-śabdārtha-parikṣā (examination of the meaning of the word 'generality')	326	Sthūla-hasta (rugged hand) ..	273
Sāmānyābhāvaḥ (non-existence of the general form)	425	Sparsa (tangible)	285
Sāmprata (suitable)	171 ²	Sphoṭa (outburst of a conglomerate sound)	131, 132 ² , 148 ² , 149 ⁺
Sāṃvyavahārika (practical)	201	Sphoṭa-vāda (doctrine of phonetic explosion)	131 ²
Sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa (practical perception)	170 (ftn. 1)	Smarāṇa (recollection)	201
Sāvaka (layman)	229	Smarāṇa-pratyabhijñāna-tarkānumāna-svarūpa-nirṇaya (determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, argumentation, and inference)	200
Siddha-sādhana (demonstration of what has already been established)	256	Smarāṇābhāsa (fallacy of recollection)	193
Siddhānta (conclusion) 27, 32, 33, 52, 59, 258, 259, 261, 350, 374, 375, 381, 504		Smṛti (scripture)	23
Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa (conclusive definition)	424	Smṛti (memory) 112 ² , 189, 215, 303 ² , 395	
Siddhārtha (inseparable meaning)	397	Syād-asti (may be, it is)	184
Simha (lion)	396	Syād-nāsti (may be, it is not)	184
Simha-vyaghroṅka-lakṣaṇa (definition as given by the Lion and the Tiger)	396 406 (ftn. 5)	Syād-vāda (see Sapta-bhaṅgi naya)	184, 219
Simha-vyaghroṅka-vyāpti-lakṣaṇa (definition of invariable concomitance given by the Lion and the Tiger)	423	Syād-vāda-śrūta (perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints)	181
Simha-śiṣuka (lion cub)	207	Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda (doctrine of self-evidence)	326 (ftn.), 327
Sukha (pleasure)	280	Svabhāva (relation of identity)	140, 191 ² , 158, 280, 311, 332, 400, 508
Suddhika-saṃsandana (simple comparison)	237	Svabhāva-parikṣā (examination of nature)	326
Suvarṇa taijasa-prakarāṇa (section on gold as a fiery thing)	397	Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi (perception contrary to identity)	311
Sūtrānta or sūttānta (original text)	248 ²	Svabhāva-hetu (relation of identity)	318
Sota-viññāna (auditory perception)	227	Svabhāvānupalabdhi (non-perception of identity)	311
Skandhas (aggregates of beings)	126 ² , 127 (ftn.) ²	Svarūpa (specific individual)	129
Stuti (validation)	108	Svarūpāsiddha (unproved in respect of nature)	362, 439
Sthāpanā (demonstration) 28, 42, 43, 51, 171, 500 ²		Sva-lakṣaṇa (like itself)	310
Sthira padārtha-parikṣā (examination of the permanence of entities)	326	Sva-samjñā (special term)	25
		Svārthānumāna (inference for one's own self) 175, 192, 202, 276, 280, 307, 309 ² , 310, 359 ² , 361, 435 ²	

	Page		Page
Hāra (bearer) ..	127 (ftn.)	Hetu-vādin (logician) ..	39
Hināyāna (the little vehicle) ..	241	Hetu-vidyā (logic) ..	240 (ftn. 3)
Hetu (middle term or reason) 5, 22,		Hetu-vibhakti (limitation of the	
27 ² , 28, 32, 32 (ftn. 1), 60, 121,		reason) ..	166
162 ² , 166, 175, 176 ² , 177 ² , 178 ³ ,		Hetu-śāstra (logic) ..	7, 37, 40
180, 190 ³ , 193, 202 ⁴ , 258, 264 ² ,		Hetvantara (shifting the reason)	
265, 266, 268 ² , 268 (ftn. 2), 284,			35, 84, 269
286, 290, 291, 377, 437 ² , 500, 502.		Hetvartha (implication) ..	25
	503, 504	Hetvasiddhi (unproved on the part	
Hetu (means of knowledge) 51, 161, ..		of the reason) ..	440
	162, 189	Hetvābhāsa (semblance of a rea-	
Hetu (cause) 240 (ftn. 3) ² , 404		son) 51 ² , 52, 63, 84, 137, 178, 193,	
Hetu-cakra (wheel of reasons) 299		258, 259, 269, 293 (ftn. 1), 313,	
	(ftn. 2)	359, 362, 374, 375, 379, 381, 399,	
Hetu-dṛṣṭānta (reason and ex-			(ftn. 1), 438 ²
ample) ..	276	Hetvābhāsa-samanya-nirukti (ge-	
Hetu-doṣa (committing fallacies)..	163	neral definition of fallacy) ..	438
Hetu-prayoga (use of the middle		Hetvābhāsānām asādhakatva-	
term) ..	203	sādhakatva-nirūpaṇam (deter-	
Hetu-vāda (theory of reasons) ..	23	mination of the serviceableness	
		of fallacies) ..	442

TIBETAN INDEX.

This index is intended to facilitate the finding of all references and all general matter contained in the volume connected, in any way, with Tibet, its language and literature. It is meant for those who wish to consult the work not for its main subject, logic, but for the data it contains in connection with Tibetan studies. For this reason, in this index, only such names, whether Tibetan or Indian, have been given as are referred to in some specific Tibetan connection. Only those works are quoted of which the Tibetan versions are mentioned. Indian paṇḍits collaborating in Tibetan translation, but whose Tibetan names are not given, are excluded. On the contrary the names of Tibetan interpreters have all been given. A list of Indian translator-paṇḍits may be found on p. 353. Also excluded are the details contained in appendices H, I and J except a very few items. A list of errata, as far as observed, but only in Tibetan words, or connected with them, is added. The plan of the index is as follows:—

I. Logical terms—Tibetan, Sanskrit, English.

II. Initial words of Tibetan quotations.

III. Books.

1. Titles of Logical Books—Tibetan, Sanskrit, English.
2. id. —Sanskrit only.
3. References to (a) the Tanjur.
(b) the Kanjur.
4. References to other Tibetan works.
5. References to other Indian works.
6. References to 'Tibetan books' in general.
7. Modern books quoted.

IV. Proper names.

1. Tibetan.
2. Indian.
3. Modern authors.

V. Place names.

1. Tibetan spelling.
2. English spelling..

VI. Residuals.

1. Tibetan.
2. English.

VII. Errata.

I. LOGICAL TERMS.

	Page		Page
ཀུན་བརྟགས་ parikalpita, fanciful, erroneous, false ..	245 n 1	བཟུང་པར་བྱེད་ or གཏན་རྟགས་ sādhana, hetu, liṅga, middle term, reason, mark ..	290
ཀུན་རྒྱུ་བ་བརྟགས་ samvṛti satya, conditional truth ..	254 n 2	བཟུང་བྱ་ or དཔག་བྱ་ sādhyā, anu- meya, major term, syllogism ..	282
ཀུན་གཞི་ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ ālaya-viññāna, knowledge which constitutes the basis or foundation of all, the basic knowledge ..	245 n 1	བཟུང་བྱ་མཚུངས་ sādhyā-samā ..	280
སྐྱེས་བུ་བརྟགས་ puruṣa-parikṣā, ex- amination of the soul ..	326	ངག་རྟོན་ see ཡིད་རྟོན་རྟགས་	
བྱད་ or བྱེ་བྱག་ viśeṣa, particularity	287	མངོན་སྲུང་ pratyakṣa, perception 55 n 1, 276, 277 n 1, 298, 307, 309	
བྱབ་ vyāpti universal, invariable, inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term ..	292	མངོན་སྲུང་གྱི་མཚན་ཉན་བརྟགས་ praty- akṣa lakṣaṇa parikṣā, examina- tion of the definition of percep- tion ..	327
གྲངས་ཅན་པ་ (see མེར་སྐྱབ་) sūnkhya or kāpila..	278	མངོན་སྲུང་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ pratyakṣa- vyavastha, system of perception	309
བྱུང་པ་ལེ་མཐའ་ avayava, siddhānta, es- tablished tenet, member 54 n 2, 258		མངོན་སྲུང་ཤར་ལྡང་ pratyakṣābhāsa, fallacy of perception ..	298
དགོས་པ་ prayojana, motive, purpose	54 n 2, 258	ཆ་ཤས་ siddhānta, avayava, mem- ber of syllogism, tenet, syllogism	54 n 2, 258
འགལ་བ་ viruddha, the contradic- tory ..	294	ཆད་པ་ལེ་གནས་ nigrāha sthāna, a rea- son why one may be declared unfit to continue the contro- versy, point of defeat 54 n 2	
འགལ་བ་མི་འབྱུང་པ་ viruddha-vyabhī- cāri, non-erroneous contradiction	316	ཆས་ or བཟུང་པར་བྱ་ dharma or sādhyā, predicate or major term	290
འགྱུར་བར་བྱ་བ་བརྟགས་ vivartavāda- parikṣā, examination of the doc- trine of evolution ..	327	ཆས་ཀྱི་བྱེད་པར་བྱ་ན་ཅེ་ཡིག་ཀྱི་བཟུང་པར་བྱ་བ་ iṣṭa vighāt-ekṭ-viruddha, im- plied contradiction ..	315, 316
འགྲོ་བ་རང་བཞིན་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་བརྟགས་ jagat- svabhāva vāda-parikṣā, examina- tion of the theory that the world is self-existent ..	326	ཆས་ཅན་ or རྟགས་ dharmin or pakṣa, subject or minor term ..	290
ཤྱི་ཤར་ལྡང་བ་ hetvābhāsa, fallacious middle term, fallacy 54 n 2		ཆས་མཐུན་པ་ sadharmya, homoge- neous ..	290
ཤྱི་ཡི་རྟོན་བརྟགས་ śabdārtha-parikṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' ..	327	ཆས་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཤར་ལྡང་བ་ sadharmya- drṣṭāntābhāsa, fallacies of the homogeneous example ..	296
ཤྱི་ལས་བྱུང་བ་ see ཡིད་རྟོན་རྟགས་		ཆས་མཐུན་མཚུངས་ sadharmya-samā	280
ཤྱི་རྩེ་རྩེས་པ་བརྟགས་ śabda Brahma- parikṣā, examination of Brahma, the presiding Deity of Sound ..	326	ཆས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ vaidharmya, hetero- geneous ..	290
བཟུང་པར་བྱ་ or ཆས་ sādhyā or dhar- ma, major term or predicate ..	290	ཆས་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཤར་ལྡང་བ་ vaidhar- mya-drṣṭāntābhāsa, fallacy of the heterogeneous example 297 n 1	

	Page		Page
ཚས་མི་མཐུན་མཚུངས་	vaidharmya-	position by showing that its	
samā	289	denial is impossible, <i>reductio ad</i>	
འཇིག་རྟིན་གྱི་དཔེ་བརྟག་པ་	samāsārā-san-	<i>absurdum</i> , confutation, ..	54 n 2, 258
tati-parikṣā, examination of the		རྟོག་གེ་རྟག་ tarka-vidyā, art of de-	
continuity of the world ..	327	bate	7 n 10
རྟོག་པུ་ཤིང་པུ་ཤིང་པུ་	anumāna,	ལྟ་བ་ darśaṇa, philosophy ..	5 n 5
inference	280, 298	ལྟག་གེ་ jāti, analogue, far-fetched	
རྟོག་པུ་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་	anumānābhāsa,	analogue,	278, 276, 288
fallacy of inference	298	ལྟག་ཚད་ jāti, evasive answer, analo-	
རྟོག་པུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལྟག་པ་	viparītān-	goue	54 n 2
vaya, fallacy of inverse connec-		རྟོང་པ་ ཉིད་ śūnyatā [śūnya-vāda], the	
tion	297	absolute, the void	254 n 2
རྟོག་པུ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་	ananvaya, absence	བརྟན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་བརྟག་པ་	sthira-padār-
of connection	297	tha-parikṣā, examination of the	
རྟོག་པུ་དཔག་ see རྟོག་པུ་		permanence of entities ..	326
རྟོག་པུ་དཔག་པ་བརྟག་པ་	anumānaparī-	ཐལ་བ་མཚུངས་ prasaṅga-samā ..	289
kṣā, examination of inference	327	བྱ་སྤང་ sādharmaṇa, the too general	293
བརྟོད་པ་ jalpa, wrangling	54 n 2	བྱ་སྤང་མ་ལེན་ asādhāraṇa, the not	
བརྟོད་མཚུངས་ varṇyasamā ..	288, 289	general enough	294
ཤིང་འཇམ་ upamāna, comparison ..	287	ཐེ་ཚོས་ saṁśaya, doubt ..	54 n 2, 258
གཉིས་ཀྱི་བརྟག་པ་ ubhaya-parikṣā, ex-		ཐེ་ཚོས་མཚུངས་ saṁśaya-samā ..	289
amination of both [nature and		ཐོས་པ་བརྟག་པ་ śruti-parikṣā, exami-	
sense-organs]	326	nation of śruti or scripture ..	327
གཤམ་རྟོག་ hetu, reason, middle		བྱས་གསུམ་བརྟག་པ་ kālātraya-parikṣā,	
term	258, 286	examination of the three times	327
གཤམ་རྟོག་པ་ or བུ་ཕྱེད་པར་བྱེད་	hetu, līṅga,	དོན་རྟོག་མཚུངས་ arthāpatti-samā ..	289
sādhana, middle term, reason,		དོན་དམ་པའི་བརྟོག་པ་	paramārtha
mark	290	satyā, transcendental truth	254 n 2
གཤམ་རྟོག་པ་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་ [བ་] hetvā-		འབྲུ་བྱུང་ samavāya, inherence ..	287
bhāsa, fallacy of the middle term		འབྲུ་བའི་རྟོག་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	samavāya-
293 n 1, 258		śabdārtha-parikṣā, examination	
གཤམ་རྟོག་པ་དང་དཔེ་	hetu-dṛṣṭānta,	of the word 'co-existent cause'	327
reason and example	276	ནམ་མཁའི་གོ་ས་ཅན་གྱིས་ཀྱུན་ཏུ་བརྟག་པ་པའི་	
གཤམ་རྟོག་པ་ [རྟོ] རྟུལ་གསུམ་ līṅgasya		བདག་བརྟག་པ་ digambara parikal-	
trairūpyam, three characteristics		pita-ātma-parikṣā, examination	
of the middle term	291 n 1	of the Digambara Jaina doctrine	
གཤམ་རྟོག་པ་རྟག་པ་	hetu śāstra, hetu-	of the soul	326
vidyā, science of reasoning ..	7 n 7	གནས་མཁའི་བྱས་བདག་བརྟག་པ་	Vātsī-
གཤམ་ལ་ཤལ་བ་ nirṇaya	258	putra-kalpita-ātma-parikṣa, ex-	
གཤམ་ལ་དབབ་པ་ nirṇaya, demonstra-		amination of the Vātsīputra doc-	
tion, ascertainment	54 n 2	trine of the soul	326
རྟོག་པ་ mark	298	ནམ་རྟོག་མཚུངས་ vikalpa-samā ..	289
རྟོག་གོ་ tarka, corroborating a pro-			

	Page		Page
ནམ་པར་རྩོད་པའི་མཐའ་	vitandā .. 258	དབུ་ས་	mādhyaṃika .. 249
ནམ་པར་ཞེས་པའི་ལྟ་བ་	see རྟེན་པའི་	འབྲས་པུ་	kārya, effect 258, 280, 311, 332
ལྟ་བ་	vijñāna-vāda (yogācāra-	འབྲས་པུའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་	kārya-hetu, re-
darsāṇa), the doctrine of idealism	245 n 1	lation of effect and cause	.. 318
ནམ་བཞེན་	svabhāva, identity .. 258	འབྲས་མཚུངས་	kārya-samā .. 289
རྟེན་པའི་ལྟ་བ་	yogin, yogācāra .. 278	མ་སྐྱེས་མཚུངས་	anutpatti-samā .. 289
རྟེན་པའི་ལྟ་བ་	see རྟེན་པར་ཞེས་པའི་	མ་གྲུབ་	asiddha, the unproved .. 293
ལྟ་བ་	yogācāra-darsāṇa, yogācāra	མ་ངེས་པ་	aniṣeita, the uncertain .. 293
[in Tibet yogācārya], practice of		མ་བརྗོད་མཚུངས་	avaryya-samā .. 289
meditation	245 n 1, 249, 249 n 1	མ་ཡུང་མཚུངས་	aprūpti-samā .. 288
དབག་བྱ་	or དབུལ་བྱ་ anumeṃya or	མི་དཔྱེགས་	anupalabdhi, non-percep-
sādhya, predicate or major term	282	tion	.. 258, 281, 311, 332
དཔེ་	drṣṭānta, example 54 n 2, 128	མི་དཔྱེགས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་	anupalab-
	n 4, 258, 286	dhi-hotu, relation of negation	.. 318
དཔེ་བརྗོད་	drṣṭānta, example .. 290	དཔྱེགས་པ་མཚུངས་	upalabdhi-sāma
ཐྱུ་	sāmānya, generality .. 287	[sic.] 289
ཐྱུ་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	sā-	ཐྱུ་བའི་མཐའ་	vāda .. 258
mānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha-parikṣā,		རྩོད་པ་	anvīkṣikī. vāda, logic, discus-
examination of the words 'gener-		sion 7 n 1, 54 n 2
ality' and 'particularity'	326, 327	རྩོད་པའི་མཐའ་	jālpa .. 258
ཐྱུའི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	sāmānya śab-	རྟོག་ས་	pramāṇa, source of right cog-
dārtha parikṣā, examination of		nition, means of right knowledge	54 n 2, 258
the meaning of the word 'gener-		རྟོག་ས་གྲུབ་པ་	pramāṇa-siddhi, estab-
ality' or 'genus' 326	lishment of pramāṇa	.. 307
ཐྱུད་པ་པས་བརྟགས་པའི་བདག་བརྟག་པ་	mī-	རྟོག་ས་[ག]ན་བརྟག་པ་	pramāṇ-
māṃsaka-kalpita-ātma-parikṣā,		tara-parikṣā, examination of	327
examination of the mīmāṃsaka		རྟོག་སེལ་བ་	apoha, negation of the
doctrine of the soul..	.. 326	opposite ..	276, [287]
ཐྱུ་རིལ་གྱི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	vāhyārtha-	རྟོག་གཏུང་པ་	nigraha sthāna .. 258
parikṣā, examination of external		ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	ṣoḍaśa padārthāḥ,
objects 327	the sixteen categories [in Akṣa-	
ཐྱེགས་	or ཆས་ཅན་ pakṣa or dharmin,	pāda's Nyāya-sūtra]	54 n 2
minor term or subject	.. 290	ཚིག་རྩར་	chala, quibble 54 n 2, 258
ཐྱེགས་ཆས་	pakṣa-dharma, law of ex-	མཚན་ཉིད་བྱུག་བཤད་པ་	śaḍ-lakṣaṇa-
tension of the middle term	.. 283	vyākhyā, explanation of six char-	
ཐྱེགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་	pakṣābhāsa, fallacy of	acteristics	.. 332
thesis 290 n 1	རྩིས་	dravya, substance .. 287
ཐུན་མཚུངས་	prāpti-samā .. 288	རྩིས་ཀྱི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་	dravya-
བྱེ་བྲག་	or བྱུད་ viśeṣā, particularity	padārtha-parikṣā, examination of	
དབང་ལྷན་བརྟག་པ་	indriya-parikṣā, ex-	the meaning of the word 'sub-	
amination of the sense-organs ..	326	stance' 326

	Page
གཞན་གྱི་དོན་གྱི་ཐོས་པ་ parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others	276, 282
གཞན་གྱི་དོན་གྱི་ཐོས་པ་ལ་ parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others	309
གཞན་གྱི་དོན་གྱི་ཚིག་ parārtha-vākya, words for the sake of others ..	307
གཞན་དབང་ paratantra, dependent on others, conditional ..	245 n 1
གཞན་གྱི་དབང་པོ་ལས་འདས་པའི་དོན་མཐོང་བ་ཅན་གྱི་སྒྲིམ་བྱ་བརྟག་པ་ anyendriyā titārtha-darśana-puruṣa-parikṣā, examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses	327
གཞན་སེལ་བ་ apoha, negation of the opposite	287, [276]
གཞན་བྱ་ prameya, object of right cognition, object of right knowledge	54 n 2, 258
ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག་ or སྒྲུབ་པ་ལྟར་བ་ or རག་དོན་ śabda, credible word or verbal testimony	287
ཡོངས་བྱུང་ pariniṣpanna, complete in itself, perfect	245 n 1
ཡོན་ཏན་ guṇa, quality	287
ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་ guṇa-śabdārtha-parikṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'quality'	326
རང་གི་དོན་གྱི་ཐོས་པ་[སྒྲུབ་པ་] svārthānumāna, inference for one's self	276, 280, 307, 309
རང་བཞིན་ svabhāva, identity	280, 311, 332
རང་བཞིན་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ svabhāva-hetu, relation of identity	318
རང་བཞིན་བརྟག་པ་ svabhāva-parikṣā, examination of nature	326
རང་ལས་ཚད་མ་བརྟག་པ་ svataḥ-prāmānya-parikṣā, examination of self-evidence	327

	Page
རིགས་བརྟན་བཅོས་ nyāya-śāstra, science of right judgment, of true reasoning	40, 40 n 3
རིགས་པ་ nyāya, true reasoning	8 n 7
རིགས་པ་ཅན་ naiyāyika	287, 287 n 3
རིགས་པ་ཅན་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་པས་ཀྱིན་ཏུ་བརྟག་པ་པའི་སྒྲིམ་བྱ་བརྟག་པ་ nyāya-vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-puruṣa-parikṣā, examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul	326
རིགས་པའི་བརྟན་བཅོས་ see རིགས་བརྟན་བཅོས་	
རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ nyāyāvayava, the (five) parts or members of a syllogism; syllogism	42 n 9, 289 n 3
ལས་ karma, action	287
ལས་གྱི་ཚིག་གི་དོན་བརྟག་པ་ karma-śabdārtha-parikṣā, examination of the meaning of the word 'karma'	326
ལས་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་འབྲེལ་པ་བརྟག་པ་ karma-phala-sambandha-parikṣā, examination of the relation between karma and its effect	326
ལེན་པའི་ཚུལ་པར་ཤེས་ pravṛtti-vijñāna, knowledge as received, presentative knowledge which produces the external world drawing us toward it.	245 n 1
སྒྲུབ་འབྲུག་ dūṣaṇa, refutation	298
སྒྲུབ་འབྲུག་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་བ་ dūṣaṇābhāsa, fallacy of refutation	298
སྒྲུབ་འབྲུག་དུ་གློལ་བ་ vitandā, cavil or reducing a proposition <i>ad absurdum</i> without caring to establish one's own view	54 n 2
སེར་སྐུ་པས་ཀྱིན་ཏུ་བརྟག་པ་པའི་བདག་བརྟག་པ་ kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parikṣā, examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul	326
སེར་སྐུ་བ་ see བྱང་ས་ཅན་པ་ Kāpila or Nāmkhya	278
ཁྱུ་པ་ནི་ཁྱེ་དྲི་ཀས་བརྟག་པ་པའི་བདག་བརྟག་པ་ Upaniṣad-kalpita-ātma-parikṣā, examination of the Upaniṣad doctrine of the soul	326

II. TIBETAN QUOTATIONS.

	Page		Page
ཀུན་མཁྱེན་འབྲུལ་བུ་	.. 345 n 4	ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཉིད་	.. 507 n 2
ཀྱི་མ་འཕགས་པ་	.. 334 n 4	ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་	.. 283 n 1
གང་གི་ལ་འབྲུལ་བ་	.. 345 n 2	ཕྱོགས་རྣམས་ཀུན་གྱི་	.. 276 n 3
གང་གི་ལ་གཟུང་རབ་	.. 338 n 1	བུ་མ་བློད་མ་བློད་	.. 275 n 1
གང་ཆོ་རྩ་དང་	.. 278 n 1	བྱས་ན་ཆོས་པར་	.. 244 n 6
གལ་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་	.. 305 n 2	བྱས་ཚུགས་བཞིན་དུ་	.. 287 n 1
མངོན་ཕྱིན་རྟོག་པ་	.. 277 n 1	བྱེ་བྲག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་མཛོ་ལས་	.. 279 n 1
མངོན་ཕྱིན་དང་ནི་	.. 276 n 4	བྱ་མ་འཛིག་རྟོན་	.. 347 n 1
ལྟོ་དང་འབྲུལ་བུ་ལི་	.. 376 n 5	བློ་ཡིས་རྣམས་ལྟོང་བ་[? == བློས་]	.. 308 n 3
ལྟུང་ལ་བྱུང་བ་	.. 287 n 3	བློ་ཡིས་རྣམས་པར་	.. 120 n 2
ལྟུང་པ་དྲོད་ནི་	.. 289 n 2	དབང་བྱ་དང་རྩན་ (ལྟོས་པ་ལྟོ)	.. 278 n 3
མཁས་པ་དགའ་བ་	.. 258 n 1	དབང་བྱ་དང་རྩན་ (ལྟུང་པ་ལྟོ)	.. 55 n 1
འབྲུལ་པ་ལི་དུ་བ་	.. 299 n 3	འབྲུལ་ཉིད་གཟན་གྱི་	.. 135 n 5
ཆོས་མན་གྱི་རྣམས་པ་	.. 258 n 2	རྩད་མ་རྣམས་འབྲུལ་ ? རྣམས་འབྲུལ་	.. 307 n 4
ཆེ་ལྷན་རྟོག་གི་	.. 214 n 4	རྩད་མར་གར་པ་	.. 276 n 2
ཆེ་ལྷན་དཔག་རྣམས་གཉིས་	.. 280 n 2	ལྷུང་བཞིན་ལོ་ལྟོ་	.. 344 n 1
ཆེ་ལྷན་དཔག་བྱ་དང་	.. 288 n 2	[འཛིན་གཏེ་ལྟོ་ལི་	.. 346 n 3
ཉིད་འཇལ་བཞིན་དུ་	.. 287 n 2	འཛིན་ལྟུང་དྲོད་ལོ་	.. 332 n 2
གཏན་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་	.. 317 n 2	གཟན་གྱི་རྩན་གེ་	.. 232 n 1, 506 n 2
གཏན་རྟོགས་བྱུང་བ་ལི་	.. 286 n 1	གཟུང་བྱ་བྱས་མེ་	.. 285 n 1*
རྟོགས་ནི་འབྲུལ་པ་	.. 281 n 1	ཡིད་རྣམས་རྟོག་ནི་	.. 288 n 1
ཆོ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དང་	.. 244 n 3	རང་གི་རོ་ཙ་	.. 282 n 2
དམ་བཅས་པ་ཡང་	.. 124 n 1	རང་རྩན་ཉི་ལྟོ་	.. 506 n 2
དེ་ལྟར་དཔེ་ནི་	.. 286 n 3	རང་བཞིན་དབང་ལྟན་	.. 325 n 3*
དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་	.. 252 n 1	རང་གི་རྟོག་པ་	.. 278 n 1
དེ་ནི་ཆོ་གཞི་ཆུ་	.. 305 n 1	རང་ལ་ཁོ་ལ་བཞིན་	.. 286 n 2
དེར་གང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་	.. 283 n 3	རྩ་མ་བྱུ་ལའི་	.. 346 n 1
བདག་དང་དབང་བྱ་དང་ཡིད་དང་	.. 279 n 1	རྟོགས་པ་མན་རྣམས་	.. 278 n 3
བོད་ཚུགས་གཟུང་བྱ་	.. 280 n 1	རྟོགས་པ་རྟོན་ལོ་	.. 308 n 2
མངོན་རྩ་ལོད་དུ་	.. 353 n 1	རྟོགས་པ་ལི་ཡན་ལག་	.. 42 n 9
ཆོས་ཚུགས་འབྲུལ་པ་	.. 306 n 7	སྟོབ་དཔེན་ཆོས་མཚན་ག་	.. 331 n 2
དབེལ་པ་ལི་ནི་	.. 128 n 4, 258 n 4	སྟོབ་དཔེན་རྩན་གེ་ལོ་	.. 332 n 3
ལྟོ་དང་ལྟུང་པར་	.. 279 n 1	ལྟོ་ལྟུང་པ་ལི་	.. 345 n 2

III. BOOKS.

1. Logical Works, Tibetan.

Page	Page
མྱེད་ཅེག་མ་འཛིག་གྲུབ་པ་ལི་རྣམས་འབྲུལ་ kṣa- na-bhaṅga-siddhi vyākhyā, com- mentary on the kṣaṇa-bhaṅga- siddhi 331	མྱེད་ཅེག་མ་འཛིག་པ་གྲུབ་པ་ kṣaṇa- bhaṅga-siddhi, proof of the me- mentariness of things 330

	Page
ཐུགས་བསམ་བླག་པའི་ཐབས་ pustaka-pā- thopāya, the method of reading books	341
རྒྱ་དང་འབྲས་བུའི་ངོ་མོ་གྲུབ་པ་ kārya- kāraṇa-bhāva-siddhi, establish- ment of the relation of cause and effect	341
རྒྱ་དགའ་རྒྱུ་གྲུབ་པ་ santānāntara-siddhi, proof of the continuity of succes- sion	319
རྒྱ་དགའ་རྒྱུ་གྲུབ་པའི་འབྲེལ་བའད་ santān- āntara-siddhi tīkā, commentary on the above	322
ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ dhar- ma-dharini-viniścaya, determin- ation of the minor and major terms	337
འཇིག་རྟེན་ཡ་རྫོང་གྲུབ་པ་ pūra-loka-sid- dhi, proof of the world beyond	330
གཏན་ཇོགས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ or འོགས་ཆོས་དབྱེའི་འཁོར་ལོ་ hetu-cakra- hamaru or pakṣa dharma-cakra, the wheel of reasons put in order 299, 299 n 1, 2, 3	
གཏན་ཇོགས་ཀྱི་ཐིགས་པ་ hetu-bindu vi- varaṇa, a drop of reason	318
གཏན་ཇོགས་ཀྱི་ཐིགས་པ་གྱ་ཆེར་འབྲེལ་བ་ he- ru-bindu-tīkā, detailed commen- tary on the above	321
གཏན་ཇོགས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཞུགས་པ་ hetu- tattva-upadeśa, instruction on the real nature of the middle term in a syllogism	337
གཏན་ཇོགས་ཐིགས་པའི་འབྲེལ་བ་ hetu- bindu-vivarāṇa, commentary on the hetu-bindu	332
རྟོག་པའི་སྐད་ tarka-bhāṣā, technicali- ties of logic	340
ཐབས་ཅན་མཁྱེན་པ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཇོག་ལེན་བྱས་པ་ sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā, memorial verses on the attainment of om- niscience	328
ཐོས་པ་བརྟག་པའི་ཇོག་ལེན་བྱས་པ་ śruti- parikṣā, memorial verses on the	

	Page
examination of śruti or verbal testimony	328
བུས་གསུམ་བརྟག་པ་ trikāla-parikṣā, ex- amination of [the] three times	301
དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཞུགས་པའི་དཀའ་འབྲེལ་ tatt- va-saṅgrāha-pañjikā, comment- ary on the tattva-saṅgrāha	328
དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་བཞུགས་པའི་ཇོག་ལེན་བྱས་པ་ tattva saṅgrāha-kārikā, memo- rial verses on a summary of the tattvas	324
ནང་གི་བྱུང་བ་ antar-vyāpti, internal inseparable connection	343
རྟོག་པར་རོག་པ་ཅོས་ཉིད་བྱུང་བ་ vijñap- ti-mātra-siddhi, establishment of a mere communication of know- ledge	343
བྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་ཇོག་ལེན་ vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā, memo- rial verses on the reality of ex- ternal things	328
བྱོགས་ཆོས་དབྱེའི་འཁོར་ལོ་ see གཏན་ ཇོགས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ pak- ṣa-dharma-cakra	
བྱུས་པ་འཇུག་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ bālāvatāra- tarka, children's introduction to logic	337
དབང་བྱུག་འཇིག་པའི་ལེན་བྱས་པ་ Īśvara- bhaṅga-kārikā, memorial verses on the refutation of God	329
འབྲེལ་བ་བྱུང་བ་ pratibandha-siddhi, establishment of the causal con- nection	345
འབྲེལ་བ་བརྟག་པ་ sambandha-parikṣā, examination of connection	319
འབྲེལ་བ་བརྟག་པའི་འབྲེལ་བ་ sambandha- parikṣā-vṛtti, commentary on the above	319
འབྲེལ་བ་བརྟག་པའི་གྱ་ཆེར་བའད་པ་ sam- bandha-parikṣā-tīkā, copious commentary on the above	321
འབྲེལ་བ་བརྟག་པའི་ཇོས་སུ་འབྲང་བ་ sam- bandha-parikṣānusāra, comment- ary on the above	345
དམིགས་པ་བརྟག་པ་ ālambana-parikṣā,	

	Page
examination of the objects of thought	301
དམིགས་པ་བརྟག་པའི་འབྲེལ་[པ་] ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti, commentary on the above	301
དམིགས་པ་བརྟག་པའི་འབྲེལ་བཤད་ ālambana-parīkṣā-tīkā, annotation on the above	321, 322
རྩོད་པ་བརླག་པའི་ཚེག་ལེན་རྩུས་པ་, vigraha-vyāvartanī-kārikā, memorial verses on quelling disputes	256, 257
རྩོད་པའི་རིགས་པ་ tarka-nyāya or vāda-nyāya, method of discussion	318
རྩོད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་འབྲེལ་པ་ vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā, commentary on the above	321
རྩོད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་འབྲེལ་པ་དོན་རྟོག་པར་འབྲེལ་པ་ vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipaṇ-citārtha, elaborate commentary on the above	323
རྩོད་པ་ཀུན་ལས་བརྒྱུས་པ་ see རྩོད་པའི་མཛད་པ་ etc., pramāṇa-samuccaya, compilation on pramāṇa, valid knowledge	42 n 9, 135 n 5, 276
རྩོད་པ་ཀུན་ལས་བརྒྱུས་པའི་འབྲེལ་པ་ pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, commentary on the above	299, 300
རྩོད་པ་བརྟག་པ་ pramāṇa parīkṣā, examination of pramāṇa or the sources of valid knowledge	330
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་དཀའ་འབྲེལ་ pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā, explanation of difficulties in the pramāṇa-vārtika	319
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་ pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti, annotation on the pramāṇa-vārtika	308, 308 n 2, 323
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་འབྲེལ་བཤད་ pramāṇa-vārtika (-pañjikā)-tīkā, annotation on the pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā	320, 344
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་གྱིན་ pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra, commentary on the pramāṇa-vārtika	336

	Page
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་[གྱི་] གྱིན་གྱི་འབྲེལ་བཤད་ pramāṇa - vārtikālaṅkāra - tīkā, annotation on the above	338, 344
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་ཚེག་ pramāṇa-vārtika [kārikā], memorial verses explanatory of pramāṇa or sources of knowledge	307, 307 n 4
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་པར་སྤྱི་ལྟ་ pramāṇa-viniścaya-tīkā, see below, commentary on the pramāṇa-viniścaya	330, 331
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་པར་ངེས་པ་ pramāṇa-viniścaya, determination of pramāṇa or sources of knowledge	308, 309, 308/9 n 3
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་པར་ངེས་པ་འབྲེལ་བཤད་ pramāṇa-viniścaya-tīkā, see above, commentary on the pramāṇa-viniścaya	342
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་པར་འཇོམས་པ་མཛད་པའི་འབྲེལ་པ་ pramāṇa-vidhvaṁsana tip-pitaka vṛtti, or Pr ^o -vihetana-teppitaka-vṛtti, or Pr ^o -vidhvaṁsana-sambhāṣita-vṛtti, a magic-stick commentary on Pr ^o -vihetana or Pr ^o -vidhvaṁsana	257
རྩོད་པ་རྟོག་པར་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱོད་ nyāya-praveśa, door of entrance to logic	289
རྩོད་པའི་བརྟག་བཤད་མཛད་པའི་འཇུག་པ་ pramāṇa-sūtra nyāya-praveśa, an entrance to the science of logic	300, 300 n 1
རྩོད་པའི་མཛད་པ་ཀུན་ལས་བརྒྱུས་པ་ see རྩོད་པ་ཀུན་ etc., pramāṇa-sūtra samuccaya, compilation of aphorisms on pramāṇa, valid knowledge	276, 276 n 4
གཞན་ལ་བརྟག་པའི་ཚེག་ལེན་རྩུས་པ་ an-yāpoha-vicāra-kārikā, memorial verses on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites	329
གཞན་སེལ་བ་[ནིས་བྱ་བའི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་] ap-oḥa-namā-prakarana, treatise on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites	330

	Page		Page
[ཡངས་པ་དང་རྩི་མ་མེད་པ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཞེས་ བྱ་བ་ཚད་མ་ཀུན་ལས་བརྒྱུས་པའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་]		bindu-piṇḍārtha, purport of the above	340
visālāmala-vatī-nāma-pramāṇa samuccaya-ṭīkā	323	འགྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་མའི་ལྟུགས་ཀྱི་མ་མཚན་ བསྐྱུས་པ་ nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pak- ṣe saṁkṣipta, summary of criti- cisms on the above	327
འགྲེལ་བའི་བྱུང་བའི་སྒྲུབ་མ་ nyāyāloka-sid- dhi or nyāya-siddhyāloka, a lamp of logical reasoning	336	འགྲེལ་བའི་སྒྲུབ་པ་ yukti-prayoga, ap- plication of reasoning	340
འགྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་མ་ nyāya-bindu, a drop of logic	309	མེད་པ་བྱུང་བ་ apoha-siddhi, establish- ment of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites	345
འགྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་མ་གྱི་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་བ་ nyāya- bīndu-ṭīkā (two different works), detailed commentary on the above	321, 329	སྒྲུབ་ཅིག་དཔྱད་ཐོག་མ་པ་ sahāvalam- bha-niścaya, the ascertainment of objects and their knowledge arising together	336
འགྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་མ་པའི་རྩི་བསྐྱུས་པ་ nyāya-			

2. Logical Works, Sanskrit.

(Translated into Tibetan.)

	Page		Page
[Abhidharma-]jñāna - prasthāna- śāstra	247 n 3	Nyāya-bindu 309, 309 n 2, 315, 315 n 2, 317 n 2	
[Abhidharma-mahā-]vibhāṣā [-śā- stra]	247 n 4	Nyāya-bindu-piṇḍārtha	340
Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā 262, 262 n 5		Nyāya-bindu-pūrva-pakṣe-saṁkṣip- ta	327
Ālambana-parīkṣā	300, 300 n 3	Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā 321, 329, 329 n 6	
(perhaps identical with Ālambana- pratyaya-dhyāna-śāstra).		Nyāyāloka-siddhi or Nyāya sid- dhyāloka	336
Ālambana-parīkṣā-ṭīkā	321/322	Nyāyānusāra-śāstra or Koṣa-kāra- ka-śāstra	248 n 1
Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti 301, 301 n 1		Nyāya-praveśa or Nyāya-praveśo- nāma-pramāṇa-prakarana, per- haps Nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra. 289, 289 n 1, 2; 300, 300 n 1, 302, 302 n 4, 507 n 2	
Antar-vyāpti	343	Pāra-loka-siddhi	330
Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā	329	Pramāṇa-nyāya-praveśa see Nyāya- praveśa	
Apoha-nāma-prakarana	330	Pramāṇa-parīkṣā	330
Apoha-siddhi	345	Pramāṇa-samuccaya 275, 277 n 1, 278 n 1, 2, 3; 279 n 1, 280 n 1, 2; 281 n 1, 282 n 1, 2; 283 n 1, 3; 285 n 1, 286 n 1*, 2, 3; 287 n 1, 2, 3; 288 n 1, 2; 506 n 2	
Bālāvatāra-tarka	337	Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti	299
Dharma-dharmi-viniścaya	337		
Hetu-bīndu-ṭīkā	321		
Hetu-bindu-vivarana	318, 332		
Hetu-cakra-hamaru	299, 299 n 1, 3		
Hetu-tattva-upadeśa	337		
Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā	329		
Kārya-kāraṇa-bhava-siddhi	341		
Kṣāṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi	330		
Kṣāṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi-vyākhyā	331		
Mūla-madhyamaka-vṛtti-akuto- bhaya	250		

	Page		Page
Pramāṇa-sāstra-nyāya-praveśa <i>see</i>		Santānāntara-siddhi ..	319
Nyāya praveśa.		Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭikā ..	322
Pramāṇa-vārtika [-kārikā] 306 n 7,		Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā ..	328
307, 376 n 5		Śruti-parikṣā ..	328
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra ..	336	Tarka-bhāṣā ..	346
Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-ṭikā 338, 344		Tarka-nyāya or Vāda-nyāya 124 n 1, 318	
Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā ..	319	Tattva-saṁgraha or Tarka-saṁgra-	
Pramāṇa-vārtika (-pañjikā)-ṭikā ..	320	ha ..	325 n
Pramāṇa-vārtika-ṭikā ..	344	Tattva-saṁgraha-kārikā ..	324
Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti 308, 323		Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā ..	328
Pramāṇa-viniścaya 308/309, 308 n 3		Trikāla-parikṣā ..	301, 301 n 2
Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭikā 330/331, 342		Vāda-nyāya <i>see</i> Tarka-nyāya.	
Pratibandha-siddhi ..	345	Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti vipaṇcitārtha 323/324	
Pustaka-pāṭhopāya ..	341	Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā ..	321
Sahāvalambha-niścaya ..	336	Vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā ..	328
Sambhandha-parikṣā ..	319	Vijñapti-mātra-siddhi ..	343
Sambhanda-parikṣānusāra ..	345	Viśālāmala- vatī -nāma - pramāṇa-	
Sambhanda-parikṣā-ṭikā ..	321	samuccaya-ṭikā ..	323
Sambhanda-parikṣā-vṛtti ..	319	Yukti-prayoga ..	340

3A. References to the Tanjur.

	Page		Page
<i>Tibetan Tanjur—</i>		མཉི་	gi རྒྱུ་ = 33 241 n 1, 251 n 2
general .. 519, 530 <i>et seq.</i> , 537 <i>et seq.</i>		..	ku ཀུ་ = 61 342 n 6
collection of ..	352	..	ce ཅེ་ = 95 42 n 9.
mdo, on the yogācāra school 249 n 4			124 n 1, 135 n 5, 270, 275, 276,
<i>British Mission Copy—</i>			276 n 1, 2, 3; 289, 289 n 1, 299,
in British Museum 321 n 1, 2; 328			299, n 1, 2; 300, 301, 306 n 7,
n 1, 329 n 6, 332			307, 307 n 4, 308, 308 n 3, 309,
<i>India Office Copy</i> 300 n 3, 301 n 1, 2;			316 n 3, 318, 319, 376 n 5, 506 n 2,
302, 302 n 4, 307 n 3, 308 n 1, 309 n			3; 507 n 2
1, 2; 318 n 2, 3; 319 n 1, 2, 3; 321 n		..	cho ཇོ་ = 96 .. 319
3, 4; 322 n 1, 2; 323 n 1, 324 n 1, 328		..	je ཇེ་ = 97 .. 320
n 4, 330 n 2, 3, 4, 5; 331 n 1, 4; 336		..	ñe ཇེ་ = 98 .. 320
n 1, 4; 337 n 3, 340 n 1, 3; 341		..	te ཇེ་ = 99 .. 336
n 1; 343 n 2; 345 n 1, 3, 5; 346		..	the ཇེ་ (misprint she) = 100 336
n 4		..	de ཇེ་ = 101 .. 338
<i>Sikkim, Labrang, Copy</i> 299 n 1,		..	ne ཇེ་ = 102 .. 338
319 n 5, 320 n 4, 324 n 2, 336 n		..	po ཇེ་ = 103 .. 344
3, 342 n 4, 344 n 4, 530-538		..	phe ཇེ་ = 104 .. 344
<i>Single Volumes—</i>		..	be ཇེ་ = 105 344, 344 n 1
བཅོད་པ་, ka ཀ་ = 1 .. 253 n 6*		..	mo ཇེ་ = 106 .. 344
མཉི་, ka ཀ་ = 1 .. 262 n 5		..	tse ཇེ་ = 107 .. 344
.. tsa ཅ་ = 17 256 n 2		..	tshe ཇེ་ = 108 322, 323, 334
.. ha ཇ་ = 29 128 n 4,			
257, 258 n 1, 2, 4			

	Page		Page
མདྲ་ dse རྩ་ = 109 ..	331	341, 343, 345, 345 n 2, 4; 346, 346	
„ we རྩ་ = 110	331 n 2, 342	n 3, 347 n 1	
„ she རྩ་ = 111	321, 322,	མདྲ་ he རྩ་ = 113 ..	328
328, 329, 332, 332 n 2, 340		„ ye རྩ་ = 114 ..	328
„ ze རྩ་ = 112	324, 328, 328 n	„ re རྩ་ = 115 ..	323
4, 329, 330, 331, 336, 336 n 1, 4; 337,		„ he རྩ་ = 119 ..	324
337 n 3, 338 n 1, 340.		„ go རྩ་ = 123	7 n 7, 8 n
			7, 54 n 2, 55 n 1

3E. References to the Kanjur.

	Page		Page
འདུལ་བ་, ga རྩ་ = 3 ..	11 n 3	collection of ..	352
མདྲ་, ca རྩ་ = 5	120 n 2, 244	general ..	530-538
	n 3, 4, 6		

4. Other Tibetan Works.

	Page		Page
ཁྲོ་རྩ་གསུང་འབྲུག་ ..	517, 520 n 1	334 n 4, 335 n 1, 336 n 2, 337	
ཆས་བྱང་ see also under Tibetan		n 1, 338 n 3, 340 n 2, 4; 341 n	
names s. v. Tārānātha	305 n 1, 517	2, 342 n 1, 5, 6; 344 n 2, 346 n	
འཇམ་དཔལ་ཙྰ་ཁྱེད་ mañju-śrī-mūla-		1, 348 n 1, 353 n 1, 516 n 1,	
tantra ..	252 n 1	517, 517 n 2, 519 n 2	
དཔག་བསམ་ལྗོན་བཟང་ see also under Modern		བེདྲུ་དཀར་པོ་ ..	517
Authors, s. v. Das, Sarat Chandra,	305	ཤེས་རབ་ཕྱོང་བྱ་ prajñā-daṇḍa	252 n 1
n 1, 2; 320 n 4, 322 n 3, 323 n 2,		བཞེས་པའི་སྒྱུར་ཡིག་ suhrillekha	251 n 2
327 n 1, 328 n 3, 329 n 1, 332 n 3,		སུམ་བཟང་ཆས་བྱང་	241 n 1; 242 n 1
333 n 5,		སྔ་སྔར་ཐར་བ་ pātimokkha	232 n 1

5. Other Indian Works.

	Page		Page
Amarakoṣa.. ..	7 n 1, 10	Lankāvatāra sūtra	120 n 2, 243 n
Mahārāja-kanika-lekha	241 n 1		3, 244 n 3, 4, 6
Mahāvīyutpatti	7n7, 8n7, 11n1,	Pātimokkha ..	232 n 1
25n1, 40n3, 43n2, 47n		Suhrillekha ..	251 n 2
1, 54n 2, 55n 1			

6. Tibetan Books in general.

	Page		Page
T. authorities on the sūtra of “the		T. books on yogācāra ..	249
burden and the burden-bearer”	127	Sanskrit books translated into	
T. accounts of Nālandā ..	516	Tibetan ..	352, 519 n 5, 6
T. books	11, 241 n 1	T. literature about Madhya-deśa	304 n 1
T. books on the Pāla dynasty of		T. translations of Vasubandhu's	
Bengal	517	works	267
Some books of T. on date of Bud-		T. versions of Asaṅga's works	265
dha	252 n 1		

7. Modern Books.

(See Modern Authors.)

	Page		Page
Bilingual Index of the Nyāyabindu, Vidyābhūṣana	370 n 4, 309, n 2	Life of Buddha, Rockhill	11 n 3, 246 n 2, 322 n 7
Buddhism, Schlagintweit	249 n 1. 5	Sāṅkhyā Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas, Vidyābhūṣana	324 n 2
Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Cordier ..	257 n 1, 262 n 2	Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography as preserved in Tibet, Vidyābhūṣana	334 n 3, 343 n 1
Geschichte des Buddhismus, Tārānātha, Schiefner, see under Tibetan names s. v. Tārānātha.		Sragdharā Stotra, Vidyābhūṣana	322 n 5. 7
Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No. 3, Vidyābhūṣana	262 n 1, 342 n 2	Tibetan-English Dictionary, Sarat Chandra Das ..	520 n 2, 530
Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow, Sarat Chandra Das	517, 519 n 2	Tibetan Grammar, Csoma de Kőrös	306 n 1, 323 n 3, 517
Lamaism, Waddell	271 n 1, 323 n 3, 327 n 1, 520 n 2		

IV. PROPER NAMES.

1. Tibetan.

[Abbreviations : Chinese : C; Editor : e; Interpreter : i; King : k; Monk : m; Official : o; Scholar : s; Tibetan : T; Translator : t; Venerable : v; Very Venerable : vv.]

	Page		Page
ཀྱེ་པ་དཔལ་བརྟེན་གས་ Ti ..	256	ཀྱེ་པ་དབང་ལྷ་ལོ་གས་ Jinendrabodhi ..	323
ཀྱེ་ལྷུ་བ་ Nāgārjuna, date of ..	252	ཀྱེ་ན་ལེས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ Ātreya ..	11 n 1
ཀྱེ་ལྷུ་བ་མཚན་ To i ..	250	ཆས་ཀྱི་བརྩོན་ལགས་ im ..	342
ཀྱེ་ག་ལྷུ་ལེས་རབ་བརྟེན་གས་ ..	343	ཆས་ཀྱི་རིན་ཆེན་ Dharmaratna vv (' in	
ཀྱང་མིག་ཅན་ Akṣapada ..	47 n 1	e T t ..	300
པཱ་ཆེ་རྩ་ལྷུ་ = ལེ་ལེས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོ་		ཆས་གཤགས་ Dharmakīrti ..	303
ལུ་མཛེ་ལྷུ་དཔལ་ i ..	256	ཆས་མཆག་ Dharmottara	329, 331 n 2
ལྷི་རལ་ or རལ་པ་ཅན་ k ..	517	རྩི་མ་ལུས་ Ravi Gupta ..	322
ལུ་མཛེ་རེ་ཅན་[ལྷུ་བརྩོན་] k	323, 327, 352, 517	ཏ་ར་རྩ་མ་ Lama	246 n 2, 248 n 5, 7, 8; 249 n 4, 251, 251 n 1, 4, 5; 252, 252 n 2, 4; 261 n 3, 265 n 4, 272 n 1, 274 n 2, 303 n 3, 305 n 1, 307 n 1, 319 n 4, 320 n 1, 2, 4; 322 n 3, 328 n 3, 329 n 1, 333 n 5, 336 n 2, 337 n 1, 338 n 2, 3; 339 n 7, 305 n 1, 340 n 2, 4; 341 n 2, 342 n 5, 6; 343 n 4, 344 n 2, 3; 348 n 1, 350 514 n 3, 517, 517 n 2, 519 n 2
གཤགས་པ་ལྷུ་མཚན་དཔལ་བཟང་ Sāskya m	289		520 n 2
གཤགས་ལྷུ་ལེས་རབ་ im ..	331, 328	ནི་ལོ་པ་ ..	340
དགའ་བའི་རྩི་ལྷུ་ Tim ..	345		
དགའ་བའི་ལྷུ་ལོ་གས་ Tim ..	307, 318, 320		
དགའ་བའི་ལེས་ལྷུ་ Cs ..	300		
དགའ་བཟུང་ Kalyāṇa Rakṣita	323		
དགའ་ལས་ལྷུ་བ་ [Ācārya] Jetāri	337		
ཀྱེ་ལྷུ་ལེས་ལོ་ envoy ..	352		
ཀྱེ་པ་ཅན་ Jina ..	338		

	Page		Page
ཉིང་པེ་འཛིན་བཟང་པོ་ i m of Shu-chen	340	མུ་ཉིག་བུམ་པ་ Mukṭā-kumbha	.. 331
ཚུན་གཞན་ t m	.. 300	མེ་བཞིན་འབྲུག་ Agniveśa	.. 25 n 1
ཐང་པའ་འབྲུང་གནས་ཐུས་ Mokṣākara		མུ་ངན་མེད་ Paṇḍita or Ācārya Aśoka	332
Gupta	.. 346	རྩྭ་པའི་བྱ་མཆོག་ Tarka-puṅgava,	
ཐོགས་མེད་ Asaṅga	.. 265	Fighting Bull, nickname of Dig-	
ཐོན་མི་སམ་ལྷོ་ཏ་ minister	.. 352	nāga	.. 272
དད་པ་ཞེས་རབ་ ti	.. 300	ཚབ་ཉི་མ་གྲགས་ i m	.. 330
དད་པའི་ཞེས་རབ་ ti	.. 275	ཚུལ་འབྲིས་ཀྱི་ལ་མཚན་ i m t	.. 301
དར་ས་གྲགས་ [ལྷོ་ ?] i m	.. 318	ལ་ས་དགེ་བསྟན་མེད་ཀྱི་ལ་ Ti	.. 299
དུལ་ལྷ་ Vinīta Deva	.. 320	ཞི་བ་འཛོ་ Śānta Rakṣita	.. 323
པདྨ་བྱུང་དཀར་བ་ Śaṅkarānanda	.. 341	ལྷ་བ་དགེ་བསྟན་ Candra Gomin	332, 332 n 2, 333
རྩྭ་ཞེས་ཀྱི་ལ་མཚན་ Ti	.. 323	ཡེ་ཞེས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོ་ Jñāna-śrī	
ན་རྩ་པ་	.. 341, 520	Bhadra	.. 342
ནག་ཚེ་ལོ་སྤྱོད་	.. 517	རལ་པ་ཅན་ or བྲི་རལ་ k	.. 517
དཔལ་མཆོག་དང་བོའི་རྩྭ་ Ti	.. 337	རིགས་ལྷན་གྱི་ལ་པ་ k	.. 299
དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷོ་གྲོས་	.. 323	རིན་ཆེན་གྲགས་ Ratnakīrti	.. 338
དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷོ་གྲོས་བརྟན་པོ་ i m	.. 346	རིན་ཆེན་རྩྭ་ Ratnavajra	.. 339
དཔལ་རྩིགས་ Toi	.. 319	རིན་ཆེན་འབྲུང་གནས་ཞི་བ་ see ལ་ས་པ་འཛོ་གན་ཉི་	
དཔལ་བརྩིགས་རྩྭ་ཉི་ T i m of Shu-chen	.. 321, 322, 328	Ratnākara Śānti	.. 342 n 5
དཔལ་ལྷ་ཚན་པོ་ k	.. 250	ལྷ་ཀྱུ་འདྲ་ T i m of Hbro	336, 337, 341, 343
ཕྱོགས་སྒྲུང་ Dignāga	.. 272-301	ཞེས་རབ་ v i m	.. 324
portrait of	.. 271	ཞེས་རབ་འབྲུང་གནས་ཐུས་ Prajñākara	
nick-name of	.. 272	Gupta	.. 336
བན་དེ་ནམ་མཁས་ i	.. 319, 321	ཐྱོང་ཚན་གས་པོ་ k. contemp. of Dhar-	
བན་དེ་དཔལ་བརྩིགས་ see དཔལ་བརྩིགས་		makīrti	.. 305, 306, 352
i of Shu-chen	.. 322	སྟོབ་དཔོན་ Ācārya, Tib. name of	
བན་དེ་ཡེ་ཞེས་ལྷ་ i of Shu-chen	321, 340	Ratnavajra	.. 340
བྱ་ལྷན་ great T. sage	.. 270, 353	གསེར་གྱི་གོ་ཆ་ Hema (or Kanaka)	
བོ་རོ་ཅ་ན་ i m	.. 336	Varma, Indian sage	.. 275, 300
བྱང་ཚུབ་ཞེས་རབ་ Ti	.. 338	ལྷ་ལྷ་མ་ཞི་བ་འདྲ་ great T i Śākya m	.. 324
བྱམས་པའི་མགོན་པ་ Maitreya-nātha or		ལྷ་ལྷ་མ་ཡེ་ཞེས་འདྲ་	.. 517
Maitreya	.. 262, 262 n 5	ལྷ་དབང་ལྷ་ Devendrabodhi	.. 319
ལྷོ་ལྷན་ཞེས་རབ་ T i m 262 n 5. 309,		ལྷ་བཙུན་བྱང་ཚུབ་ k	.. 352, 517
330, 331, 336, 344, 345		ལ་ས་པ་འཛོ་གན་ཉི་ or གན་ཉི་པ་ see རིན་ཆེན་	
དབྱིག་གཉེན་ Vasubandhu	.. 266	འབྲུང་གནས་ཞི་བ་ Ratnākara Śānti	342
འབྲོ་སེང་ཀར་ v i m	.. 324		
མིས་བྱིན་གྱི་བྱ་ Nārada	.. 43 n 2		

2. Indian.

	Page		Page
Ācārya, T name for Ratnavajra	.. 340	Ārya Deva, Tārānātha on	.. 261
Atiśa (Śrī Jñāna Atiśa), visits Ti-		Ātreya	.. 11, 11 n 3
bet	.. 341	Dānaśīla or Dānaśrīla, visits Tibet	340

	Page		Page
Dharmakīrti, quoted ..	124 n 1	Muktākumbha, name restored from	
Dignāga epithet of 272	the Tibetan ..	331 n 3
Dīpaṅkara, starts for Tibet ..	318	Paramahansa, killed in Tibet ..	210
Haṃsa, killed in Tibet ..	210	Ratna Vajra, see Ācārya.	
Jina Mitra, visits Tibet ..	340	Śaṅghabhadra, existence of his	
Jñāna-siddha Bhadra, perhaps		work in Tibetan ..	248 n 1
identical with Jñāna-śrī Bhadra	342 n 1	Śaṅkara Svāmin, Tibetan know-	
Kamala Śīla (Śrīla), called to Ti-		ledge of	302, 302 n 4
bet	327	(Tārānātha, see under Tibetan	
Kaṇiṣka, date of ..	241 n 1	names).	
Nāgārjuna, quoted 128 n 4, 250		Tarka-puṅgava, see Dignāga.	
Nāgārjuna, Tārānātha's date of	252, 252 n 4		

3. Modern Authors.

	Page		Page
Cordier, P., Tibetan catalogue 257		schichte des Buddhismus, see	
n 1, 262 n 2		under Tibetan names & Tārā-	
Csoma de Kőrös, A., Tibetan Gram-		nātha.	
mar 55 n 1, 306 n 1, 323 n 3, 517		Schlagintweit, E., Buddhism, 249 n 1, 5	
Das, Sarat Chandra, various, 43 n		Sherbatski, F. J., Nyāya-bindu 309	
2, 47 n 1, 242 n 1, 274 n 2, 275 n		n 2, 329 n 6	
1, 305 n 1, 320 n 4, 323 n 2, 3;		Vidyābhusana, Satis Chandra, va-	
324 n 3, 327 n 1, 332 n 3, 338		rious, 7 n 1, 7, 10; 40 n 3, 241	
n 3, 348 n 1, 516 n 1, 517 n 2,		n 1, 262 n 1, 307 n 4, 309 n 2,	
517 n 3, 519 n 2, 520 n 2, 530		322 n 5, 7; 324 n 2, 334 n 3,	
Rockhill, W. W., Life of Buddha		343 n 1, 342 n 2	
11 n 3, 246 n 2, 322 n 7		Waddell, L. A., Lamaism 271 n 1,	
Ross, E. D., Mahāvvyutpatti, 7 n		323 n 3; 327 n 1; 520 n 2	
7, 8 n 7, 40 n 3, 43 n 2, 47 n 1		Wassiljow, W. ..	251 n 1, 306 n 1
Schiefner, A., Tārānātha, Ge-			

V. PLACE NAMES.

1. Tibetan Spelling.

	Page		Page
བཀྲ་ཤིས་ལྷན་པོ་ ..	270, 353	ཁ་ལུ་, near Tashi Lhunpo	270, 338
བཀྲ་ཤིས་, in W. Tibet 324	ཁང་ཁྱུང་, interpreter of	.. 338
མ་རི་, [?] Tholing in 517	ཁྱེན་, interpreters of 321, 322, 328,	
སྤེན་, monastery near Lhasa ..	344	(See errata)	329, 340
མ་ལེང་ [?], in Nari 517	འ་ཉྱ་, Bodhisattva t of	299, 323
འབྲོ་, province, translators of	324,	ཤི་བའི་དགེ་གནས་, monastery	.. 300
337, 343		ཤིས་པ་འི་དགེ་གནས་ monastery	.. 275
མྱེ་འཇམ་པ་, Candra-kūpa	.. 335		

	Page		Page
ས་མུ་, monastery ..	289, 300	བསམ་ཡས་, holy monastery	323, 323
སུམ་པ་ province in Amdo ..	337		n 2, 324
མེང་དཀར་, village ..	337	ལྷ་ས་, Nyethang near ..	344

2. *English Spelling.*

	Page		Page
Amdo, province of Sum-pa in ..	337	Sikkim, see Labrang ..	537-539
Do-jog, Taxila ..	528	Tibet, spread of Mahāyāna in ..	241
Labrang, in Sikkim 289 n 1, 299		Buddhist Missionaries in ..	352
n 1, 319 n 5, 320 n 4, 324 n 2,		Enterprising monks visiting ..	351
328 n 2, 336 n 3, 342 n 4, 344		Śānta Rakṣita visits ..	517
n 4, 530-536		Western Tibet, Saskya monastery	
Padangi ..	530, et seq.	in ..	289, 300
Parniyangchi 530, et seq., 537-539			

VI. RESIDUALS.

1. *Tibetan.*

	Page		Page
གོ་སྐྱེ་ dvāra-paṇḍita?, gate keeper	520	ཐུགས་ gupta ..	328 n 3
རྡོ་རྗེ་ vajra, thunderbolt ..	272	ལམ་ཡིག་ ..	531
པ་ཆེན་གྲ་དམར་ paṇḍita's red cap ..	271	བསྐྱེ་ rakṣita, protected	328 n 3

2. *English.*

	Page		Page
Illustration, likeness of Dignāga	271	Mahārānī of Sikkim, letter from	537
Mahārājā of Sikkim, letter from	538, 539	Tashi Lama, visit to India	528, 529

VII. ERRATA.

PAGE:	FOR:	READ:
124, n 1:	Dhamakīrti,	Dharmakīrti.
245, n 1:	ཡོང་ས་གྲུབ་	ཡོང་ས་གྲུབ་
252, n 1:	ཐུ་འདས་	ར་འདས་
252 3 n 6:	Bṣan-hgyur,	Bṣtan-hgyur.
257, § 82:	ṭēppitaka,	ṭippitaka.
276, l. 15/16:	rje dpag,	rjes-dpag.
288, n 1:	དཔག་པ་འི་ཉིད་	དཔག་པ་འི་ཉིད་
298, bottom:	Mñon-sum-ltar-nañ,	Mñon-sum-ltar-snañ.
299, l 5:	u do,	u do, Vol. ce.
299, bottom:	hgrel-wa,	hgrel-pa.
300, § 98:	Dge-ses	Dge-bśes.
301, § 100:	brtag-paḥis hgrel,	brtag-paḥi-hgrel-pa.
301, § 101:	Dug-bṣum,	Dug-gsum.

PAGE:	FOR:	READ:
303, n 3:	von,	von.
307, n 4:	རྩ་མ་རྩམ་པ་འགྲུལ་	རྩ་མ་རྩམ་པ་འགྲུལ་
308, n 3, l. 2, fr. b.:	ལྷན་	ལྷན་
309, l. 5:	man-par	nam-par.
309, n 2:	Sher-batski, Shere-bataki.	Sherbatski.
317, n 2:	<i>id.</i>	<i>id.</i>
319, § 114, § 115:	Hbrel-wa	Hbrel-pa.
321, passim:	<i>id.</i>	<i>id.</i>
323, last line:	hbrel,	hgrel.
323, n 3:	Koros,	Körös.
325, Tib. l. 4, fr. b.:	འགྲུལ་	འགྲུལ་
326, l. 26:	Tibtan,	Tibetan.
326, l. 2 fr. b:	po,	pa.
327, l. 12:	shan,	gshan.
327, l. 23:	drtag,	brtag.
336, § 129, l. 13:	She,	The.
337, l. 9 fr. b.:	Bis-wa,	Byig pa.
342, § 137, last l.:	bgrus,	hgus.
343, l. 4:	do,	du.
335, n 4, l. 1:	མཁྱེན་	མཁྱེན་
353, n 1, l. 1:	བྱེད་པ་འི་པ་རྩ་	བྱེད་པ་འི་པ་རྩ་
517, l. 11:	Thi-srong,	Khri-sron.
517, l. 17:	lama,	bla-ma.

Passim, See Index V. I. ལྷ་མོན་ is not the name of a country, but a title: great revisor. Certain other irregularities have not been indicated, as this index enables the reader to draw his own inferences.

